Foreign Military Studies Office

GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH

Volume 1 | Issue 2 April | 2011

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conducts open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered. For over 25 years, FMSO's books, articles, and other products have earned international reputation for knowledge discovery. While some of FMSO's research provides in-depth analysis of a particular subject, FMSO's Global Security Watch (GSW) looks at a wide range of security issues that may not have otherwise been illuminated and which will be interesting and important to defense and security experts.

Materials, outside of the original foreign press article, under copyright have not been used. All articles published in the Global Security Watch are not provided in full, and were originally published in foreign (non-US media). For questions or original articles, contact FMSO-Analyst Ray Finch, (913) 684-5958 or raymond.c.finchiii@ugov.gov. The Global Security Watch is archived, and available for Open Source Information System (OSIS) users at www.intelink.gov/fmso.

FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to these articles to conform to organizational standards. Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

IN THIS Issue

AFRICA

3 Gaddafi and the African Union

5 The Danger of Hate Speech in Kenya

6 Is Swaziland the Next Domino?

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

8 Elections in Zimbabwe and Illicit Weapons Transfers

9 Burkina Faso: Dangers of Poorly Paid Soldiers

10 Armed Angolan Aid for Guinea Bissau: Help or Hindrance?

MIDDLE EAST

12 Growing Strain Along the Libyan-Algerian Border

13 Dangerous Water Politics on the Nile

15 Intrigues by the Huthis in Yemen

TURKEY

16 Turkey's Unique Role in Libya

17 Turkish Lesson-Learned: Arming Insurgents in Libya May be a Recipe for Terror

19 Businessmen Want Less Powerful Military

INDIA

20 Naxalite and Maoist Movements: Tactical events reveal strategic danger in India

21 Maoist Improvised Explosive Devices

22 Chronology of Maoist Actions

MEXICO

24 Salaries and Benefits to Compete with Crime

26 Mexican Media Coverage

CENTRAL ASIA

28 Turkmenistan's Natural Gas Exports: Which Direction?

29 Iranian Influence in Tajikistan

31 Kazakh View of Protest

33 Kyrgyz Media Sources

RUSSIA

35 Russia-NATO Ballistic Missile Defense

37 Russian Airborne Laser

39 Reincarnation of the Admiral Gorshkov Carrier

Global Security Watch
Regional Analyst

Africa	Robert Feldman robert.feldman1@us.army.mil
Sub-Saharan Africa	Jason Warner jason.s.warner2.ctr@us.army.mil
Middle East	Lucas Winter lucas.winter@us.army.mil
Turkey	Karen Kaya karen.kaya@ugov.gov
China	Ivan Welch, ivan.welch@us.army.mil; Cindy Hurst, cindy.a.hurst@ugov.gov
Mexico	Tony Scheidel anthony.t.scheidel@ugov.gov
Central Asia	Ruoxi Du, doro1988@ku.edu; Matthew Stein, matthew.stein2@us.army.mil
Russia	Ray Finch, rayfin3@ku.edu; Chuck Bartles, chuck.bartles@ugov.gov
Layout/Graphics	Aaron Perez aaron.d.perez@us.army.mil

Gaddafi and the African Union

6 April 2011

Source: Kabaji, Egara, "Africa: Libya Crisis Exposes AU's Soft Underbelly," The Star (Nairobi, Kenya), 6 Apr 2011, http://www nairobistar.com/opinions/others/19967-libya-crisis-exposes-aus-soft-underbelly

Muammar Al Gadaffi at the AU summit By U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt/Released (DefenseImagery.mil, VIRIN 090202-N-0506A-402) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Libya Crisis Exposes AU's Soft Underbelly

While serving as the Director of Public Affairs and Communication at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I came very close to understanding the paralysis that characterize the African Union (AU) when faced with grim situations on the continent. It is this paralysis that has made AU unable to solve political and economic problems of Africa. In my ten months torturous tenure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I sometimes felt really frustrated while listening to the deliberations of African leaders. On two occasions, I attended African heads of state summits in Muammar Gaddafi's home town of Sirte in Libya and left feeling that African leaders needed to be more serious in addressing problems afflicting the continent.

It seems, to me, that the African Union is a club of men and one woman tied together by a common interest of helping one another to remain in power. The speeches at AU summits are spiced by what is commonly referred to as 'African brotherliness'. None of the leaders is ready to look the other in the face and tell him that he has to open up democratic space and respect human rights in his country. African leaders hug one another even when it is obvious that some arrive for the meetings having overseen the butchering their own people.

The most memorable moment when I really felt that AU is a talking shop is when the Somalia delegate presented a strong case in which he accused AU members of abandoning his country at the hour of need. He argued that Al-Shabaab was appearing stronger because the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was not well supported to establish strong structures. This view was supported by Kenya, not because we felt so much for Somalia, but because we bear the consequences of the anarchy in the country. With the exception of Uganda and Burundi, who committed troops to Somalia, the session ended without a strong commitment to support the TGF from other member states. The ramifications of the anarchy in Somalia due to the inability of AU to solve the problem are all out for us to see. Another case in point is Ivory Coast which has been left to go to the dogs due to AU's inability to assert its authority and force President Gbagbo to relinquish power to the man who won elections.

FMSO Commentary: With the onset of revolution in Libya, the African Union (AU) finds itself in a difficult position with regards to Muammar Gaddafi, that country's leader since a 1969 coup. Gaddafi has been a strong advocate of African unity, a stance, along with his largesse to certain African governments, which helped get him elected in 2009 to head the AU for a year (though much to his disappointment he was not reelected). While Gaddafi for decades brutally suppressed opposition to his rule, the AU essentially remained silent, a position difficult to keep as a sizable portion of the Libyan population, inspired by what has been called the "Arab Spring," battled troops in order to depose Gaddafi and win their freedom. As the crisis in Libya mounted, the AU asked that there be no foreign intervention, yet they were unable, or as some commentaries have postulated, unwilling, to stop Gaddafi from attempting to crush the dissenters.

Besides Gaddafi's aforementioned stance on African unity and his financial generosity to certain African governments, what the following article refers to as Gaddafi "buying loyalty," there are probably additional reasons for the AU's response in the face of the Libyan revolution. To begin with, more than a dozen AU members are themselves long term leaders who refuse to relinquish power. These include individuals such as Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe since 1980; Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasago who came to power in Equatorial Guinea in a 1979 bloody coup; and José Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola since 1979. These "Big Men," as they are called, are probably concerned if Gaddafi goes they may be next.

There are at least two other reasons for the AU being rather ambivalent with regards to pushing Gaddafi to leave. First is Gaddafi's reputation for revenge, raising fears he would turn his military and/or covert forces against African nations which dare to cross him. Second, though some Western governments say "it's not a matter of if he leaves but rather when," it's still not certain he's going anytime soon. At the time of this writing there appears to be a stalemate between pro and anti-Gaddafi forces, raising the possibility he might yet be at a future AU meeting, looking angrily at any who have sought to depose him. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Libya Crisis Exposes AU's Soft Underbelly

AU has fared so badly in enforcing respect for human rights and democratic ideals. With the exception of Botswana and to some extent South Africa, the rest of African countries have no moral authority to admonish one another for human rights violations. In most cases, they are accomplices in human rights violations to dare accuse one another of the same.

It is within this context of a rudderless union of African states that Kenya took advantage of in seeking support to defer the cases of the Ocampo Six. AU gave its nod, not because it believed that Kenya had put mechanism in place to bring justice to those involved, but for the sake of "brotherliness with the Kenyan leaders." It is a case of scratch my back and I scratch your when you may need me to. From the onset, it was clear that Kenya would get its way through the AU on the deferral of the cases of the Ocampo Six. African countries would rather not tell Kenyan leaders to clean their house, but rather give them a rope to hang themselves. What has followed from both sides of the political divide is embarrassing to our country.

The Libyan crisis is perhaps what has exposed AU for what it is: indecisive and irresponsible. It is easy to understand the ambivalence exhibited by the AU on the Libyan crisis. A part from the usual brotherly support to one of their own, some African countries are bankrolled by Gaddafi. Even their AU annual subscriptions are paid by Muammar Gaddafi! In short, Muammar Gaddafi is known for buying loyalty. Many African leaders cannot therefore face Gaddafi and tell him to his face that he has to open up democratic space and that he should cease from running Libya as a limited company with his sons and cronies as major shareholders. Libya, by all means, is a nation ruled by one man with the aid of family and cronies. It is a perfect system that elevates nepotism and cronyism to new abominable levels.

As the Libyan crisis unfolds, AU and African countries individually have issued the most disheartening statements. Even before the air strikes started, AU asked the whole world to keep off Libya. African Union would rather Gaddafi rains bombs on his people, maims and kills them to remain in power than cede some power to his people. The AU is therefore supporting Muammar Gaddafi and not the people of Libya who are fighting for democracy. Although the western countries may be having their own interests in pushing for regime change, they remain the only hope for Libyans fighting Gaddafi's tyranny, after all AU has failed in its mandate.

Prof. Egara Kabaji is the Director of Public Communication and Publishing at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official position of the University.

African Union Flag By Rannpháirtí anaithnid (english wikipedia) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

The Danger of Hate Speech in Kenya

"People fear deadly riots could be readily incited by hate speech from countrymen"

7 April 2011

Source: Namunane, Bernard, "Use of Hate Speech Could Lead to Arrests, Ocampo Six Warned," The Nation, 7 Apr 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201104080981 html.

Use of Hate Speech Could Lead to Arrests

The Ocampo Six have been warned that they risk being arrested and detained if they incite the public into a fresh wave of violence.

The caution came as three of the suspects appeared before the pre-trial chamber on Thursday at The Hague.

Presiding judge Ekaterina Trendafilova said the court's attention had been drawn to signs of a new bout of violence through articles published in Kenyan newspapers.

"It came to the knowledge of the chamber by way of following some articles in the Kenyan newspapers that there are some movements towards re-triggering the violence in the country by way of using some dangerous speeches," she said.

Eldoret North MP William Ruto, Tinderet MP Henry Kosgey and Kass FM radio presenter Joshua Sang were in court at The Hague to be identified as suspects and to be read the charges they face.

The judges set September 1, 2011 as the date when the hearings to confirm or dismiss the charges will start.

Without singling out any of the suspects, Lady Justice Trendafilova warned that inciting people to start fighting was tantamount to breaching a key condition that was imposed on the suspects when the summonses were issued.

In the summonses issued on March 8, the Ocampo Six were strictly warned against engaging in activities that amount to committing crimes similar to the charges that have been brought against them by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.

"This is a general point to be made to all the suspects that such type of action could be perceived as a sort of inducement, which may constitute the breach of one of the conditions set out in the summonses to appear, namely, to continue committing crimes within the jurisdiction of the court," she said.

The judge said the court will not hesitate to withdraw the summonses and issue punitive arrest warrants. The court, she stated, wants the Ocampo Six to enjoy their freedom during

FMSO Commentary: Fallout from Kenya's contested 2007 presidential election, in which incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner over opposition leader Raila Odinga, continues. Six individuals accused of masterminding the postelection violence in that country, which resulted in 1,133 people dead and over 600,000 displaced from their homes, have been warned by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague, where they are to stand trial, that hate speech could lead to their arrest and detention. Presently the Ocampo Six, as they are called, are not imprisoned. Ocampo is the ICC prosecutor.

Such is the situation in Kenya where the political divisions, which largely follow along tribal lines, are still tense enough that people fear deadly riots could be readily incited by hate speech from countrymen waiting trial in the Netherlands. Kenya's balkanization by tribes remains perhaps its greatest obstacle to overcome, making it difficult to tackle the nation's other formidable problems, most notably its notoriously pervasive and difficult to root out corruption. In 2005, Kenya finished a dismal 144th out of 159 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index.

At least initially, the tense situation in Kenya following the 2007 riots resulted in a steep drop in the number of tourists visiting there, a marked blow to a country heavily dependent on tourist dollars. Foreign investors were similarly spooked by the outbreak of violence. Should the already fragile political/ethnic environment deteriorate, or even appear likely to deteriorate during the trial of the Ocampo Six, tourists and investors may look elsewhere, and even worse, Kenya could once again find itself mired in substantial ethnic violence. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Use of Hate Speech Could Lead to Arrests

the proceedings.

Other members of the three-judge bench are judges Hans-Peter Kaul and Cuno Tarfusser. The warning comes a day before Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, Civil Service boss Francis Muthaura and Postmaster-General Hussein Ali appear in court.

It could be as a result of the statements Mr Ruto and Mr Kenyatta and their supporters have been issuing at a series of rallies they held before going to The Hague.

FMSO Commentary: It appears the revolutionary fervor of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya has turned southward, though it is unclear to what extent the successes in Arab North Africa in overthrowing entrenched leaders can be swiftly repeated in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this has not stopped the African media from speculating as to which country in that region might fall to democratic reforms brought on by a groundswell of people rising up against an unpopular ruler. Indeed, some news outlets appear to be active participants in this movement, encouraging action as opposed to only covering it.

Swaziland, currently ruled by King Mswati III, who ascended the throne in 1986 a few years after the death of his long ruling father, King Sobhuza II, is one such country in the African news considered a likely candidate for the next revolution. Many of the key factors present in the North African countries which underwent upheaval are also present in Swaziland, and for that matter several other African nations as well: a longstanding ruler, a ban on political parties, an economic crisis, and a population anxious for reforms using social networking to help spread their message.

Though this article is specifically about Swaziland it is representative of the aspirations for change present in many sub-Saharan populations that are often suppressed by strong rulers but recently invigorated by events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Thus, while the eyes of many non-African nations are transfixed on what is happening in North Africa, it is a strong reminder that other countries on that continent are also possible contenders for revolutions. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Is Swaziland the Next Domino?

6 April 2011

Map of Swaziland By Rei-artur pt en Rei-artur blog [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or CC-BY-SA-2.5-2.0-1.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Source: Kenworthy, Peter, "Will Swaziland Become the Next Tunisia Or Egypt?" Pambazuka News, 6 Apr 2011, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/72298

Will Swaziland Become the Next Tunisia or Egypt?

Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, Swaziland is the latest African country to plan an uprising based on online social networking tools such as Facebook.

The name and the date of the campaign, the 'April 12 Uprising', is symbolic. April 12 was the day the absolute monarch's father, Sobhuza II, declared a state of emergency in 1973 that banned all political parties, centralised all power within the monarchy, and generally set the course for the mass poverty and increasing financial mess that Swaziland finds itself in today.

This state of emergency, and a monarchy that is increasingly out of step with the desperate situation of the majority of Swazis, is still in place 38 years later. The effects of this are clear to all: the regime brutally and routinely clamps down on all calls for democracy however peaceful, two thirds of the population live below the poverty line whilst the monarchy and a small elite live in luxury, hundreds of thousands survive on food aid from the World Food Programme, over 40 per cent have Aids, and over 40 per cent are unemployed.

Those behind the April 12 Uprising campaign, who are all anonymous except for the group's founder, 'Jahings Dada', promises that 'a hundred thousand men' (and presumably women too) will 'march into the country's city centres to declare a 2011 democratic Swazi-

Will Swaziland Become the Next Tunisia or Egypt?

land free of all royal dominance.'

More specifically, the campaigners demand democracy and a (provisional) end to the monarchy. The regime must 'hand over power to a transition government elected by the Swazi people', and 'the king must vacate office immediately and go on vacation' until the Swazi people have decided on the future role of the monarchy. They also speak of wealth redistribution, free education and health facilities, the 'uprooting' of traditional structures and of creating an 'egalitarian society'.

The campaign claims to be 'unaffiliated', that 'all political parties and civic organisations are 'invited to take a leadership role' in the campaign, and that there has been recruiting in 'major centres' to ensure that the campaign is able to be truly national in scope.

Several organisations from within and outside Swaziland have already stated their support for the campaign, including the South African based Swaziland Solidarity Network, South African trade union federation COSATU, and from within Swaziland, the Swaziland United Democratic Front, the Swaziland National Union of Students, the Swaziland Democracy Campaign and some of the Swazi trade unions.

Those that I have contacted for this article were cautiously optimistic about the campaign's potential.

Thamsanca Tsabedze, from the Foundation for Socio-Economic Justice, calls the April 12 Uprising 'extremely important and absolutely necessary'. 'It has the potential of exerting the necessary pressure on government to concede power one way or the other,' he says, 'and to a certain extent it has already succeeded. A clear attestation to this has been the outcry by a Member of Parliament who also happens to be a Minister that his constituency is infested with people who are talking about the April 12 Uprising.'

On the other hand, Tsabedze warns people not to be overly optimistic. 'The numbers might not be that impressive owing to the fact that the April 12 Uprising has taken a more radical and broad approach in announcing itself as an activity that seeks to topple the government. A low turnout might impact negatively because people might not take the mass democratic movement seriously in the future for similar activities.'

Bongani Masuko, COSATU's international relations secretary (and himself a Swazi national) is also cautiously hopeful. 'I do believe that it [the April 12 uprising] will contribute to the advancement of our struggle objectives for a democratic Swaziland,' he said. On the other hand, he insisted that it will take the energy of the democratic movement as a whole to bring change. 'We must not fall into the trap of believing that it is the on-going social networking or Internet sites that have made people aware of their problems and the existence of a struggle in Swaziland. It is the years of hard work, dedication and sacrifice by cadres of the progressive movement, civil society and all social forces involved therein. Every struggle is not an event, but a process.'

Richard Rooney, former associate professor at the University of Swaziland and author of the widely read Swazi Media Commentary, is less sure of the initial impact of the campaign, mostly because of the logistical problems in getting people in from the rural areas, where most Swazis live, and because he believes people are still too scared of the consequences of a large-scale demonstration.

'People are very unhappy that the economic meltdown has started to affect them personally. This has brought them on to the streets. April 12 is about something different. It is the stated aim of the April 12 Uprising Facebook group to 'topple' the Swazi monarchy. It remains to be seen how many people will take to the streets to support that.' He does acknowledge, however, that even though the campaign might not achieve its immediate goals of regime change, it might still 'be the day that led to something else'.

Another representative from within the democratic movement, who wished to remain anonymous, is worried about the lack of coordination around April 12. 'I am not sure that there will be an uprising nor that there has been extensive preparation to ensure a huge turn out.' He did, however, believe that the democratic movement as a whole was well prepared for action in April. 'My colleagues will be coming up with a roll out, if not for 12 April then for some dates in April as it is for us a busy and focus month.'

But whatever the scope and impact of the campaign come 12 April, the regime and those that support it are visibly worried about it. The Swazi senate has mandated the labour and social security minister to try and prevent it, security forces are allegedly searching high and low to try and find those behind it, arbitrarily taking people in for questioning according to the campaigners, and parts of the conservatively inclined and heavily censored Swazi media are busy discrediting it in what the campaigners call a 'smear campaign'.

Additionally, and perhaps more worrying, the Swazi army has been sent for training in Pakistan and huge quantities of military hardware have recently been bought (the military budget is now equivalent to the health budget). 'We are spending a lot on the army but we are not anticipating what is happening in North Africa. The army is there to avoid such situations,' Finance Minister Majozi Sithole told French news agency, AFP.

All this is a clear indication that the regime, known for its brutality against peaceful democracy campaigners, is not going to go quietly, however much the campaigners insist on wanting a peaceful demonstration. Many in Swaziland hope, however, that a combination of a huge turnout, good international press coverage, and the fact that even the armed forces and police are beginning to feel the economic problems, will ensure a peaceful and ultimately successful demonstration.

FMSO Commentary: It's election time in Zimbabwe, which means that embattled President Robert Mugabe is once again orchestrating his latest plot du jour to keep himself and his ZANU-PF party – the ruling coalition since Zimbabwe's 1980 independence – entrenched in power. This time, he's turning to China for arms: including the standard issue AK-47, as well as rocket propelled grenades and mortar rounds. However, as the article below details, Mugabe's clandestine importation of these materials is not being well received by the African international community.

These most recent revelations are only the newest in a growing line of questionable arms deals in which Zimbabwe has been complicit as of late. Prior to this report by SW Radio, Mugabe was accused in February 2011 of secretly channeling weapons to Cote d'Ivoire's former president, Laurent Gbagbo, who has been refusing to cede power since he lost presidential elections in November 2010. Prior to that, Zimbabwe was embarrassed by a 2008 scandal in which South African port workers refused to unload Chinese arms in Durban that were destined for Zimbabwe.

Why care about Zimbabwe's arms imports at all? In addition to the widely held presumption that Mugabe is stockpiling weapons to cement his political position in the aforementioned upcoming elections, observers worry that imported arms will widely be distributed to his mercurial base of former soldiers from the country's 1980 liberation struggle from British rule. These realities, coupled with the current waves of violence in Zimbabwe that prompted an emergency mini-summit by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as Mugabe's history of violent reprisals against political opponents – his complicity in the car crash death of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's wife in 2009 – lead onlookers to be skeptical of the benefits that new arms will bring. Trenchantly summarizing the current situation, one observer asks, "Zimbabwe has never been under threat from any of its neighbors in the last 20 years; so why [are they now] buying arms of war?" The answer, it appears, has yet to be seen. End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

Elections in Zimbabwe and Illicit Weapons Transfers

5 April 2011

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai [left] and President Robert Mugabe [right] — Photo by IRIN (irinnews.org)

Source: Sibanda, Tichaona. "Zimbabwe: Arms Shipment Destined for Zimbabwe Docks in Beira," SW Radio Africa, April 5 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201104051411 html/

Arms Shipment Destined for Zimbabwe Docks in Beira

Pro-democracy activists in Zimbabwe have launched an investigation into reports that an arms shipment destined for the Zimbabwe Defences Forces (ZDF) docked in Beira on Sunday.

SW Radio Africa is reliably informed that activists from Mozambique's trade union movement tipped off their counterparts in Harare, after some of their members who work at Beira's port became suspicious of the consignment.

The shipment, believed to be from China, is addressed to Abaxis Enterprises. Enquiries by SW Radio Africa revealed that the company is owned by Neville Mutsvangwa whose father Chris is a ZANU PF functionary and Zimbabwe's former ambassador to China.

The arrival of the shipment comes less than a month after Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa told Newsday that Zimbabwe was looking for arms, but was struggling to acquire them because of the arms embargo.

He was speaking to the daily paper when denying allegations that Zimbabwe was supplying arms to Ivory Coast's embattled leader Laurent Gbagbo.

A security consultant told us it is known in military circles that the ZDF was hunting for a substantial amount of ammunition for its standard AK-47 assault rifles, as well as mortar rounds and rocket-propelled grenades.

'As of now investigations are ongoing to try to determine the type of weapons contained in the shipment. Obviously great care was taken to try and conceal the contents but eagle eyed dock workers in Beira were able to identify that the shipment contained arms,' our source said.

Sox Chikohwero, an MDC activist who is a former member of the defence forces, said weapons bought by the Mugabe regime are responsible for the deaths of many of his opponents.

'Zimbabwe has never been under threat from any of its neighbours in the last 20 years so why do they buy arms of war. We know most of the weapons end up in the hands of the war vets, militia and its rogue soldiers,' Chikohwero said.

An attempt by Zimbabwe to purchase large quantities of ammunition from China was re-

Arms Shipment Destined for Zimbabwe Docs in Beira

portedly thwarted in April 2008 after large civil society protests in South Africa and other Southern African countries, where trade unionists refused to unload the cargo in the port of Durban.

The arms shipment arrived aboard a Chinese cargo ship, the 'An Yue Jiang', a ship owned by a Chinese parastatal, China Ocean Shipping Company.

The shipper of the arms was Poly Technologies of Beijing, China and the delivery address on the shipping documents was the Zimbabwe Defence Force, Harare. The cargo consisted of 3,080 cases of arms contained in six large containers.

The international community has in the past raised concerns about Zimbabwe acquiring arms of war when the country is not engaged in any military conflict. Accusations have been levelled against Robert Mugabe and his military henchmen for using the arms for domestic violations of human rights.

In February, the MDC-T in Manicaland accused the former ruling ZANU PF of arming its militia, to create instability in the province. The MDC-T spokesman for Manicaland, Pishai Muchauraya, said the militia and war vets in the area were fully armed. He said they were responsible for the recent violence that saw hundreds of villagers from Nyakomba in Nyanga North flee across the border into Mozambique.

Burkina Faso: Dangers of Poorly Paid Soldiers

28 March 2011

Source: "Burkina Faso: Coup de force des militaires pour libérer un des leurs," RFI, March 28 2011, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201103290400 html

Map By Rei-artur pt en Rei-artur blog [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], via Wikimedia Commons

Burkina Faso: Military Resorts to Force to Liberate One of Their Own

We learned from local authorities that on Monday, March 28th in Burkina Faso, militia in the town of Fada N'Gourma freed a soldier accused of raping a minor. The armies opened fire with Kalachnikovs in this town, situated 220 km east of the capital. Prior to this, in the capital of Ouagadougou last Wednesday, soldiers had been seen shooting in protest of the conviction of five soldiers to the penalty of prison without parole.

The soldiers left their camp early this Monday morning, according to witnesses who report that the residents of Fada N'Gourma remained in the protection of their homes for most of the day for fear of resuming gunfire.

Military personnel may be punished if their crimes fall outside of the bounds of the law.

The soldiers freed their colleague, who was charged with the rape of a 14 year-old girl. "He had been detained at the correction center and the judicial case was in progress," clarified the presiding judge. Antelm Tarpaga confided to RFI that he had left town for his own protection because he had been informed of a military march at the courthouse. The local authorities and the Head of Defense were unavailable for comment this afternoon.

It is the second incident of this kind in Burkina Faso in less than a week. Last Wednesday,

FMSO Commentary: When soldier Thomas Sankara took the helm as the president of Burkina Faso in 1983, hopes ran high that a new era of prosperity was upon the former West African colony. But just four years later in 1987, Sankara's one-time ally, former military leader Blais Campaoré, helped to orchestrate his assassination. Aggression against the Burnkinabé government by the military was to become a lamentable trend, one which was evidenced most recently by the Burnkinabé military's attacks on symbols of the government.

As the article below details, the Burkinabé army has in the past several weeks begun uprisings in response to state decisions – chiefly, imprisonment of their own – by attacking both civilian and state property. However, the causes for this discontent are possibly more widespread, perhaps a result of the fact that the army, despite being relatively well funded in comparison to other African counterparts, is nevertheless seen as being slighted for Campaoré's preferred Presidential Security Regiment. Although observers are optimistic that the army uprisings were an isolated incidence and not indicative of an irreparable rift within the Burkinabé armed forces, they nevertheless are evidence of what one French newspaper has accurately called "a malaise at the heart of the army." End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

Burkia Faso: Military Resorts to Force to Liberate One of Their Own

soldiers in the capital opened fire for five hours and ransacked stores to protest against the conviction penalty of prison without parole for five soldiers involved in a moral scandal.

Since then, the country's three magistrate unions, as well as the lawyers union and court clerks have seen a strike on court proceedings. They have requested authorities to take actions to protect the courthouse. They hope that those subject to trial, including the soldiers, will not take up arms, but will instead turn to legal appeal if they wish to contest the decision of justice.

FMSO Commentary: Angola says it's just trying to help; some from Guinea-Bissau don't see it that way. In March of 2011, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) entered Guinea-Bissau to help the country restructure its armed forces in an effort to render them more effective in providing security and stability in the increasingly tenuous West African microstate. But as detailed below, leaders from an opposition party, the Guinean Patriotic Union (GPU), have equated the entrance of the Angolan army into Guinea-Bissau as a foreign occupation.

Analysts are split on whether or not the entrance of Angolan troops should give rise to concern. On one hand, the move seems innocuous. The four Lusophone countries of Africa – Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe – are often thought of as a mini Geosphere unto themselves. All having gained independence (from Portugal) much later than the rest of Africa in 1975, the countries have a relationship with each other that is unique within an African context. As such, it is not surprising that the rising star of oil-rich Angola would give assistance to the plummeting Bissauan state. To be sure, the latter has proven itself in need of security assistance of late, as its outlying Bijagos Islands have increasingly been leveraged by South American narco-traffickers to import cocaine, turning Guinea Bissau into what one commentator has called "Africa's first narco-state."

Yet others, namely the GPU below, are skeptical of the benefits of the Angolan presence. In addition to fears that Angola is trying to assert its presence as an up-and-

Armed Angolan Aid for Guinea Bissau: Help or Hindrance?

Map based on World Map Blank By User:vigi veranda [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

24 March 2011

Source: " Guiné-Bissau: UPG considera Missão Militar Angolana uma ocupação," Jornal Digital, 24 March 2011, http://www.jornaldigital.com/noticias.php?noticia=25835

Guinea Bissau: PUG considers the Angolan Military Mission an Occupation

The Guineen Patriotic Union (GPU), a political party without representation in the National Popular Assembly, considers that the presence of the Angolan Military Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG) is a foreign occupation. In a press release published this Thursday in the capital of Bissau, the GPA forwarded that the Angolan presence in Guinea-Bissau in itself alone represents the debate about the lack of knowledge that Guineens had about the objectives of the Angolan Armed Forces.

The political warning signed by two members of a an "Ad Hoc Management Commission" of the said party, the GPU, notably Fausto Mendes and Fernando Vaz, underlined that to justify the presence of the ASSIM-GB , the Government evoked the country's agreement of "Military Cooperation with Angola." In response to the situation, the GPU said that it will hold responsible the Government for the eventual forces of instability in the near future that will be brought by the "involvement of the Angolan Armed Forces present in the country along with the [Bissauan] National Armed Forces."

It is not the first time that these types of critiques have been leveled against the Angolan military presence, that is leading the Guineen Defense Sector Reform, who concretization

Guinea Bissau: PUG considers the Angolan Military Mission an Occupation

will be conditioned by the continuity of the economic support

to Guinea Bissau by its international partners. Various moevements and segments of the Guineean society have compared the Angolan military presence to the entrance of Senegalese troops into Bissau during the conflict of June 7 in 1998, and as such are trying to undermining the acceptance of the process of Reform and Cooperation in the course between the Guinean Armed Forces and those of Angola.

Nevertheless, the GPU recognizes that the "the Guineen Armed Forces, where the military chiefs reflect almost exclusively one ethnicity, the Balantas, and its constant intervention into political life in the country, means that one part of Guinneans have lauded the of the Angolan Miltary, "capable of contributing to putting an end to the situtation in the country in which we have been living of the last ten years." The GPU, comprised in majority by former directors for the Ba Fanta Movement party, concluded its communication proposing a new iniative entitled "No Djunta Mon" or put otherwise, "All United," as a pacifistic form.

coming power player on the continent in Portuguese Guinea-Bissau, others worry that cooperation amongst Angolan and Bissauan military elite could make matters worse. The Bissauan Army Chief General Antonio Indaji, helping to lead the collaboration, is himself viewed as a source of instability within the country, having helped to oust the former Military Chief as well as have played a role in the detention of former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior in April 2010. Added to the fact that the Bissauan military is itself widely believed to be the biggest facilitators and benefactors of the Bissauan drug trade, arming and empowering them is perhaps a step in the wrong direction. End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil)

International Research Collaboration Program

Quality researchers outside of the U.S. government express new ideas that will help define the current and future defense and security environment from understudied and unconsidered perspectives.

FMSO Commentary: The Algerian government, thus far able to contain sporadic domestic popular unrest, is becoming increasingly concerned with events in Libya. Its ambivalence toward the Western position in Libya became clear when the Arab League members met in an emergency session to endorse the UN-backed imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. Only 11 of 22 Arab League members met for this session (mostly from GCC countries), with Algeria, Syria and Mauritania all expressing objections to the resolution.

Libya's National Transitional Council, based in the country's east, has accused Algeria of helping Qaddafi and says the latter has smuggled weapons and mercenaries in through Algeria's border. On March 22, Russia's foreign minister met with the Algerian president to present a unified approach toward Libya. In anodyne language, calling for the respect of both "non-interference in countries' internal affairs" as well as "the right of peoples to decide about their future," both countries expressed their skepticism regarding overt foreign intervention in Libya. Algeria's concern that a weakened Libyan government may have difficulties controlling its western border is an important reason behind this position.

Because Libya's future is largely being decided in the coastal population centers, concerns about the country's border with Algeria have been secondary at the international level. The border divides Algeria's desert from Libya's southwestern Fezzan, one of Libya's three historical regions which also borders with Chad and Niger to the south. Sparsely populated and difficult to control, Algeria's southern desert has become an important area of activities for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and there is fear that the group may attempt to exploit ongoing instability in Libya. The Algerian government claims AQIM seized various weapons in Libya, including anti-tank RPGs, and transferred them from there to the group's base in northern Mali via Chad and Niger.

The following article is taken from an independent Algerian newspaper with close ties to the president. Thus, it is expected that its reporting would reflect the government's interest in both national stability and regime survival. As has been the case with the two Arab governments in serious crisis at present – Yemen and Libya – the Algerian government can be expected to use the al-Qaeda card to its advantage. That said, the government's concern with AQIM is real, as is its fear that Qaddafi's overthrow may drag it, along with Libya, into a period of violence and uncertainty. End FMSO Commentary (Winter)

Growing Strain Along the Libyan-Algerian Border

2 April 2011



Source: L'Expression, 7000 gendarmes et 5 bataillons de l'ANP mobilisés (author translation from French), http://www.lexpressiondz.com/PDF_PAGES/P20110402.zip (page 3)

Map based on World Map Blank By User:vigi veranda [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

7000 Policemen and 5 ANP Battalions Mobilized

Security measures were strengthened in preparation for the head of state's visit

The Libya-Algeria border is on full alert and security forces are on a war footing. In addition to strict and almost daily aerial surveillance along the 960 kilometers of the border, security sources reported that they are on the highest alert in this southern part of the country. Our sources indicated that no less than 7000 policemen from the Border Patrol (Groupement de la Garde Frontière - GCF) were recently sent to reinforce this area. This, our sources add, in addition to 5 battalions from the national army (Armée Nationale Populaire – ANP) stationed there with arms and equipment, ready to intervene.

The maximum alert comes due to the fact that the head of state will travel to Tamanrasset on April 5. Thus there is no question of permitting even the slightest security flaw in the south.

In light of what is taking place in Libya, the situation is very tense along the border. Security sources insist that Algeria will suffer the consequences of the current situation, and Special Forces units have also been deployed.

Air force troops, including helicopters, are flying over this border zone. The objective is to foil any attempt to route weapons or infiltrate members of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. The amorphous organization was able to acquire heavy weapons and anti-aircraft missiles thanks to Libyan insurgents, its new allies.

The purchases are made with ransom payments deposited in its coffers by western countries such as France. Al-Qaeda has just completed a massive recruitment drive of militants who are being trained on Libyan territory. If Libyan rebels were provided with weapons – an issue on which Western opinion is divided - al-Qaeda would become well rooted in the region for years. Under such circumstances, all counterterrorism cooperation efforts would be a waste of time.

In this context, al-Qaeda's number three, Abu Yahya al-Libi, promised a war against Col. Qaddafi and vowed to make Libya – after having failed to do so in Algeria – a land of Jihad relying on new recruits. This will certainly not happen from Algerian soil, where a tight and highly mobile security plan is in place.

The message is clear, to reassure the population about its safety and to maintain awareness of any extra-territorial threat. It would be naïve to believe that al-Qaeda's aims will be limited to Libyan territory. Indeed, it is a step in the strategy of this criminal organization, which is determined to sow chaos in the region.

Dangerous Water Politics on the Nile

Source: Al-Ahram, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/7450/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-maintains-legal-and-political-position-on-Ni.aspx **11 March 2011**

Egypt Maintains Legal and Political Position on Nile Water Crisis

Yesterday's cabinet meeting headed by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf was unable to discuss the water issue between Egypt and Nile Basin states as previously announced.

Unraveling conditions in the country cut short the meeting and took it from cabinet headquarters to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

Earlier in 2010, several riparian states signed an agreement between them calling for a redistribution of Nile waters, threatening Egypt's disproportionate share based on prior treaties. Signatory states argued the need for a greater share of Nile waters to drive domestic development.

The Egyptian Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Hussein El-Atfi had said at the time that there must be consensus among all Nile states to amend any standing arrangement. Neither Egypt nor Sudan signed the new agreement. El-Atfi added that the agreement did not abrogate the commitments of signatory states towards Egypt, and that he was surprised by the signing.

Al-Atfi said he needed the help of all related ministries and civic groups. Despite previous calls by the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs for the creation of an Egyptian national agency responsible for the issue, to include technical water specialists at the ministries of agriculture and irrigation, representatives from the National Security Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no action was taken.

Meanwhile, Egypt's legal adviser on the matter, Mohamed Sameh Amr, identified seven problems obstructing the implementation of the framework agreement by source countries without the participation of Egypt and Sudan.

First, it is an incomplete agreement among Nile Basin countries because the draft did not fully meet all legal requirements. There are still some outstanding issues, most prominently the text of Article 14b remains under discussion, which pertains to Egypt's rights to river water based on previous international agreements.

Also, there are diverging opinions. Legal committees had agreed to follow a consensual not a majority decision-making model, as is the rule for adopting resolutions.

At the same time, the signing of the agreement was a clear violation of standing rules, since it was opened for signatures before reaching consensus. The fact that some source countries have already signed unilaterally is a breach of procedure.

Amr revealed that the future of the agreement is being studied, noting that the new Sudanese reality of partition into two states poses a new legal situation. Mustafa El-Feki, former Egyptian assistant foreign minister, agreed, saying that talks between Egyptian and South Sudan officials were reassuring before the partition, but this does not mean that after separation problems won't arise.

Amr noted that international donors play a critical role in the issue, and Cairo has pre-

FMSO Commentary: In November 2010, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia declared that Egypt could not win a Nile War with Ethiopia while at the same time accusing Egypt of supporting Ethiopian rebel groups. Outraged Egyptian officials were quick to deny the allegations while also emphasizing that disagreements over the Nile will be resolved peacefully and within internationally defined parameters.

The current framework for Nile water distribution, first established in 1929, provides Egypt with a large degree of control over the river, a fact that upstream countries – Ethiopia in particular – have begun to challenge. In May 2010, the majority of sub-Saharan Nile Basin upstream states signed a Cooperative Framework Agreement in Entebbe, Uganda (DRC and the future Southern Sudan are both expected to eventually join the agreement, with Sudan and Egypt remaining outside), presenting a serious challenge to Egyptian hegemony over Nile water usage.

Over Egyptian objections, Ethiopia recently launched a major hydropower dam project near the Sudanese border. The Ethiopian government has justified its actions with appeals to development and national rights while at the same time accusing Egypt of dirty tricks to maintain its imperial ambitions along the Nile. Egypt, meanwhile, has made appeals to international norms to challenge the Entebbe Agreement and maintain the status quo.

Historically, Egypt's primary national security concern has been its access to Nile waters. While Egypt's foreign policy during the transition era has yet to take a defined form, it is almost certain that the new Egypt will seek to reclaim its traditional role as leader of the Arab World. Were Ethiopian rhetoric and actions to continue escalating, one would expect Egypt to begin responding in kind. As it continues to transition away from the Mubarak era in a relatively smooth fashion, Egypt's strategic concerns are mounting. Instability and transformation along its borders (Gaza, Libya, Sudan), along with growing challenges from Nile basin states, may force the Egyptian government to begin projecting its regional interests before it is fully prepared to do so. End FMSO Commentary (Winter)

Egypt Maintains Legal and Political Position on Nile water Crisis

sented many of them with detailed legal briefs proving the prerequisite of Egypt's approval for any water project in the Nile Basin area. At the same time, Egypt is looking into ways of cooperating with Nile Basin countries, as indicated by Ambassador Reda Bebars, the official responsible for the issue at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.

However, Amr argued: "How can we reach out to these countries at a time when they are drafting agreements against Egypt's interests? This cooperation will not be fruitful because of them."

Amr asserted that international instruments underscore Egypt's right to reject any changes to its current quota of Nile water, such as the principles of the Helsinki Conference (Article 66, Paragraph 3) regulating the principles of fair use and prior notification. Also, the Berlin Principles and the UN agreement of 1997 stipulate the fair use of water and without harm, as well as negotiations and prior notification.

Regarding the legal repercussions of source countries unilaterally signing the agreement without upriver states, Amr explained that according to international law the agreement is not binding except for on its signatories, and that they alone are responsible for its stipulations. This means that legal action is confined to the signatories and anyone else is considered a third party, even if they had participated in the negotiation process.

At the same time, source countries cannot discard the international rule of prior notification of any development project they intend to construct; Egypt must be informed and consulted beforehand.

Ibrahim Nasruddin, the director of the Centre for African Studies and Research, points to the fractured relationship between source countries and upriver states, especially Egypt. Nasruddin noted that Ethiopia has played an antagonistic role, and that irrespective of Cairo's policies it will be difficult to change this role. The Ethiopians routinely claim Egyptian imperialism, he said.

Khaled Ouda, a geologist at Assiut University, blames the previous regime for mismanaging the issue. Hani Raslan, the head of the Nile Basin Unit at Al-Ahram Centre, concurred and said previous policies were muddled and blurred.

Ouda believes that the next crisis that will result in conflict and catch everyone unawares is the demarcation of the border between North Sudan and South Sudan. He described it as the worst possible border demarcation in the history of the region, because it was a political delineation that will negatively influence Egypt-South Sudan ties.

Military experts doubt Egypt can resort to military threat or action. Sameh Seifelyazel and Brigadier General Safwat Al-Zayyat assert that Egypt needs at least four to five years to prepare itself for any such action, and that it should not make any moves in the interim. Instead, it needs to stand fast and recover its diplomatic position.

[Left] Map of the Nile By African_continent-en.svg: *derivative work: Bobarino (talk) African_continent-fr.svg: Eric Gaba (Sting - fr:Sting) derivative work: Cryonic07 (African_continent-en.svg) [CC-BY-SA-2.5-2.0-1.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

[Right] Course and watershed of the Nile with topography By Imagico [CC-BY-SA-2.5 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5) or CC-BY-SA-2.5 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5)], via Wikimedia Commons

Intrigues by the Huthis in Yemen

Yemen Citizens' possession of arms — Photo Adel Yahya/IRIN (www.irinnews.org)

30 March 2011

Source: National Yemen, http://nationalyemen.com/2011/03/29/houthis-control-sa%E2%80%99ada-help-appoint-governor/

Houthis Control Sa'ada, Help Appoint Governor

Alleged arms dealer Fares Mana'a was appointed Sa'ada governor, north of Yemen, after his joining forces with the Huthi rebels there, pledging allegiance to them and resigning from the GPC membership with a number of notable persons of Sa'ada.

The former ally of the ruling party made a commitment to the field commander Abu Ali, who was assigned as a leader of the security belt in the governorate, by which the latter ceded control of Dahyan city.

Local journalist Khaled Alharithi, said that the move came after the Huthis' victory over the al-Abdin tribes, whose Sheikh Uthman Mujalli is a major local ally of the state.

The Huthis appeared to dominate the reins of power and governance in the province of Saada in northern Yemen.

Sa'ada witnessed crucial battles between tribes loyal to the president led by Sheikh Uthman Mujalli and caused in the death of 45, injury from both sides, as well as the destruction of 13 houses.

The Huthis gained control of a number of machine guns, mortar shells, guns and tanks from the Telmus military site overlooking the city of Saada.

Also, they are reported to have seized sixteen cars as they demolished Uthman Mujalli's house and burned it along with his possessions with a number of buildings.

Fares Mana'a said in a phone call to his office that his appointment as the new Sa'ada governor came after the departure of the former governor Taha Hajar, who had been appointed by the president.

Fares Mana'a is one of the most prominent arms dealers in the Middle East and was a loyal ally to the president and his regime in Sa'ada throughout the previous six wars.

But Mana'a's relationship with the president was marred by tension since he came to Sana'a, where he was detained for months and then released and then worked to extend his influence in Sa'ada with his strong ties with notables and sheikhs in Sa'ada through a block included them and was led by him under the name of the National Peace Conference.

The Huthis have run the local authorities in the governorate since the last two days amid the Yemeni army and troops from the Central Security, who remain stationed in the area.

The Huthis also installed new military points at the entrances and exits of the city of Saada manned by their ranks.

FMSO Commentary: Over the past month, the focus in Yemen has been on the potential for peaceful protesters in Sanaa, Taiz, and Aden to follow in the footsteps of their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts and peacefully overthrow their government. The March 21 defection of Gen. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the longtime strongman in President Saleh's regime, was considered by many a decisive blow to Saleh's future. At the same time, this major split within the Yemeni Army pushed Yemen into new territory, precluding the model of Army-backed peaceful overthrow that was seen in Egypt and Tunis.

As commander of the northwest military division, Ali Muhsin for the most part was in charge of the government's various unsuccessful campaigns against the Huthis. In a prelude to the current split, during the sixth and most recent round of fighting (2009-2010), tensions surfaced between Muhsin troops and those led by the president's son and erstwhile intended successor, Ahmed Ali Saleh, with accusations that Muhsin was using the Huthis to undermine Saleh.

In January 2011, Huthi followers clashed with government-loyalist forces led by Yemeni MP and tribal leader Osman Majali on the outskirts of Saada city (see GSW #1). With the Huthis in control of much of Saada province, the provincial capital and its environs remained one of the few areas under government control. Government focus on the country's major cities and the subsequent defection of Muhsin troops helped the Huthis overpower Majali's forces and seize control of Saada city.

The fall of the provincial capital to the Huthis is significant. With the neighboring province of al-Jawf now run by an ad-hoc popular committee, the north of the country has largely slipped out of government hands. As is the case with Ali Muhsin, newly appointed governor Fares Mana'a was once a key government operator who fell out of favor in recent years and now opposes the government. With the Huthis easily able to procure heavy weaponry, it will be difficult for Saleh loyalists to reclaim the province by force. This is likely of great concern to Saudi Arabia, whose interests in Saada were underscored by its military intervention in support of the Yemeni government against the Huthis, in November 2009. End FMSO Commentary (Winter)

FMSO Commentary: Under its current government, Turkey has tried to establish itself as a regional power in the Middle East and the Muslim world. To achieve this, it has pursued a two-fold strategy: To pursue friendly relations with its surrounding countries; and to increase business ties in the region. This has resulted in increased investment and trade with Libya, including 30,000 Turkish citizens working there. When the unrest in Libya started, Turkey found itself in a dilemma. Turkey's place in Western institutions such as NATO and the UN dictated it to act in accordance with the West. This was in conflict with the country's good political and economic relations with Libya. In addition, with upcoming elections in June, the Prime Minister had to heed the concerns of his Muslim base, who have a deep antipathy to Western intervention which may result in Muslim civilians being killed. As such, Turkey tried to negotiate an end to the fighting, calling Col. Qaddafi and his son to explore options; and hosting opposition leaders in Ankara for talks. Initially, Turkey remained opposed to any military operation in Libya.

The French air attacks, which Turkey claims interrupted these efforts, complicated matters for Turkey. Relations between Turkey and France are already badly strained over French objections to Turkish membership in the European Union. French air attacks on Libyan ground forces were denounced by the Turkish Foreign Ministry as surpassing UN authorization. So when France objected to NATO taking command, Turkey pushed for it even more. Once NATO took over command of the international coalition's operations in Libya, Turkey agreed to a NATO-led operation, though it still insists that there should be no attacks on ground forces.

Turkey prides itself with being unique as the only Muslim country in NATO; and having good relations with both East and West, enabling it to be a "mediator" between the sides. Experts believe that its "soft power" makes it a critical player in establishing order in Libya after the operation. The below article discusses the benefits of Turkey's participation in the NATO operation, its resentment against France, and its unique position. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

Turkey's Unique Role in Libya

25 March 2011

Source: Akyol, Taha. "Türkiye'nin Rolü? (Turkey's Role?)," Milliyet (Nationality), 25 March 2011. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-nin-rolu-/taha-akyol/siyaset/yazardetay/25.03.2011/1368678/default htm

F-16C Falcon from the Turkish Air Force By SRA Alan Port [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Turkey's Role?

Turkey is acting with NATO on the issue of Libya. This is the meaning of the motion accepted in Parliament yesterday. I find this to be a positive development in several aspects.

First of all, Sarkozy, who has been trying to exclude Turkey in every way possible, has been overridden. The political and military initiative of the operation has been transferred from France to NATO.

Second, Turkey will not "point guns at the Libyan public"; but will be actively involved in the security, monitoring and the organization of humanitarian assistance within the operation. Thus, it will remain "in the picture."

Third, as opposed to previous predictions, Turkey has not remained outside of the West; in fact, it is working in coordination with the U.S. in particular. It is good for Turkey to open up to the East, but it is also very important to continue to have good relations with the West.

The Sarkozy Problem

The Sarkozy problem is particularly important. Because this issue is not a matter of this individual's greed. It is a "case in point" which shows the West the kinds of problems that would be created by Turkey's exclusion.

Before the massacres started in Libya, Prime Minister Erdoğan said on March 1st, that "NATO has no business in Libya." The expectation was that events would unfold similar to Egypt and Tunisia, without external intervention… But when Qaddafi's massacre forces reached Bengazi on March 17th, Erdoğan said, "How much blood will be shed, how many more people will be killed?" The world was increasingly reacting to Qaddafi. On March 17th, the UN passed Resolution 1973, which entailed enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya…

Seeing this as an opportunity, Sarkozy jumped out as the leader of the "voluntary coalition forces" and bombed Libya on March 19th…

In his mind, NATO would play the role of "service provider" but France's "voluntary

Turkey's Role?

coalition forces" would be in the forefront!

Turkey objected to this. Italy, Norway and Arab countries, who had allocated war planed for the Operation also objected. And yesterday, with the support of the U.S., it was decided that the management of the operation would be transferred to NATO. The initiative was out of Sarkozy's hands!

The prognosis is that this will be a good lesson for France. Plus, the West will have a better understanding of Turkey's importance. Any country could have bombed Libya, as France did; but which Western country can have Turkey's effect?!

Turkey's Soft Power

Bombing Libya is easy; what is hard is finding an effective player which will have a constructive role in the establishment of a political order after the operation, and integration Libya back into the international community. That player is Turkey! Westerners will eventually recognize this reality.

Unfortunately, things in the Middle East will become much more complicated in the coming months and years! Public unrests and transition difficulties will increase!

God forbid, we might even see bloody mass conflict.

It is imperative for Turkey to have a solid presence in the West, but open up to the East and assume a constructive role with its "soft power," as opposed to using weapons and bombs…

Obama's America sees this perfectly well.

Those within the European Union, who refuse to understand this, will be forced to understand it eventually. They will see that a Europe which follows Merkel or, even worse, Sarkozy, will be a Europe that will be a passive player in the Middle East, which would do nothing but make fau pas…

Turkish Lesson-Learned: Arming Insurgents in Libya May be a Recipe for Terror

Rebels at a check point on the road between Benghazi and Ras Lanouf. March 2011 — Photo Gratiane De Moustier/IRIN (www.irinnews.org)

11 April 2011

Source: Erdoğan: "İsyancıların Silahlandırılmasına Karşıyız (Erdoğan: We Oppose Arming the Libyan Rebels,") Hürriyet (Freedom), 31 March 2011. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=17426818

Erdoğan: We Oppose Arming Libyan Rebels

In London, Prime Minister Erdoğan called on NATO to "not let Libya turn into another Afghanistan" He also expressed his opposition to arming Libyan insurgents.

During his visit to London, Prime Minister Erdoğan held a press conference along with his British counterpart David Cameron. He made a call to NATO, which, as of today, taken on all aspects of the operation in Libya.

"We want NATO to pass a significant test in Libya. The NATO intervention in Libya should not turn into another Afghanistan," said Erdoğan. The steps that England and Turkey will take on this issue are very important for the future. We need to act fast to stop the torture, death and bloodshed," he said.

FMSO Commentary: In Turkey's fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), considered a terror organization by the U.S. and the European Union, Turkey had, in the past, collaborated with local militias. In some cases, it had even provided weapons to the local (northern Iraqi) militias, with the promise that they would fight against the PKK. However, Turkish military leaders now claim that this was a strategic mistake. They argue that once militias had the weapons, they did not want to fight the PKK but turned against Turkish forces. This remains an important "lesson learned": Arming the local militias not only strengthened the PKK in the eyes of their followers, but also strengthened local peshmerga units with weapons. The consensus is that it was a mistake to trust local leaders to fight on their side.

Given this history, Turkey has serious reservations on the issue of arming Libyan rebels. Instead, it urges political measures to resolve the situation. Its position includes calls for an immediate cease-fire; and for Gaddafi forces to lift the siege on some towns and to withdraw from others. In addition, it calls for the establishment of safe zones which would enable uninterrupted flow of humanitarian aid to the Libyan people; and for transition towards a constitutional democracy. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

Erdoğan: We Oppose Arming Libyan Rebels

Prime Minister Erdoğan also added that he is against arming the insurgents in Libya. "We are opposed to this. There is no clear established state or party to support in this case. We don't accept any such thing. These types of moves might backfire and plant the seeds for terror, which is much more dangerous and risky," he said.

The issue of arming the rebels in Libya had first been brought up by the U.S. and British leaders, but there had not been a unanimous decision among Western leaders on this.

"ASSAD IS A WELL LIKED LEADER"

During his speech, Erdoğan also touched upon the protests against the Syrian government and said, "Two months ago I had a meeting with Bashar al-Assad, I reminded him of the importance of ending martial rule and reform. You cannot disregard the public's demands. You have to move in this direction."

Prime Minister Erdoğan, who stated that Assad is a well-liked leader in Syria, said that the reason for the popularity of the Nusayri leader, who has been in power for 11 years, also had to do with his Sunni wife.

"COMMON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE UNIT"

The British Prime Minister Cameron also spoke at the press conference and said that Turkey would take part in the international contact group with Libya, and said, "We have decided to establish a common humanitarian unit in Ankara, to respond to the Libyan people's needs."

In response to a question on the arming of the Libyan insurgents, Cameron said, "We don't want Libya to end up divided. We want it to transform into a democratic and free future."



Regarding the kind of conflict the book addresses, it is about a broader set of conflicts than 'insurgency.' The umbrella category might be 'irregular.' I defer to a section on 'Terms' in a **1960 US Army field manual titled Operations Against Irregular Forces. It states,**

> **The term irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, and counter-irregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisans, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel,** organizations and methods.

As for whom the book was written, the title seeks its audience. The text touches on a broad range of subjects. My hope then, is that the book will find its best audience, and that some of the ideas in it will be contagious.

— Geoff Demarest

Businessmen Want Less Powerful Military

22 March 2011



Turkish General staff Organization via Turkish General Staff Website

Source: "TÜSİAD'dan Tartışılacak Anayasa Teklifi (TÜSİAD's Proposal for a New Constitution Likely to Spark Debate)," Bugün (Today), 22 March 2011. http://www.bugun.com.tr/haber-detay/147800-tusiad-tan-sasirtan-teklif-haberi.aspx

TÜSİAD's Proposal for a New Constitution Likely to Spark Debate

The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), came out with a surprising suggestion today, regarding a new constitution

The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD)'s report on the draft "New Constitution", which was released today, has important clauses regarding civil-military relations. The report says, "The new constitution should see that elected organs of government are above military organs." The report recommends that, "the armed forces should be restructured such that they are subject to civilian rule."

TÜSİAD's new draft constitution, which was unveiled to the public today by Prof. Ergun Özbudun and Prof. Turgut Tarhanlı, said that the 1961 and the 1982 constitutions, which were written following military coups, gave the military some custodial powers.

The draft says, "The 1982 constitution has definitely gave the military way more powers than it should have. Despite all the amendments made in 2001, 2004 and 2010 and the subsequent steps taken towards civilian control over the military, the current situation is still far from being in accordance with global democratic norms and standards. The new constitution should not allow military bodies to be above elected bodies. The armed forces should be restructured such that they are subject to civilian rule."

"THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY"

The draft recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) stop being a constitutional body. Instead the report recommends that the NSC be restructured as a legally organized consultative body, whose role is limited exclusively to national defense issues.

The report also calls for the General Staff to be placed under the Defense Ministry, as is the case in all democratic countries. "The appointments and promotions of high level military staff should be done by a legally organized council, which includes representatives from the military as well as the civilian authority. It is clear that such a system would be open to the judiciary's supervision. The comptroller general's powers should be increased such that it has fiscal control over the armed forces," claimed the report.

FMSO Commentary: The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), is the most influential NGO in Turkey. TÜSİAD commissions reports on a wide range of issues that are on Turkey's agenda. Invariably, these reports written by the best experts in their respective fields generate an engaged public debate on the issue whether it be social security reform or democratization or the educational system.

Recently, TÜSİAD commissioned the top constitutional legal experts in the country, to draft a possible new constitution. This is part of a broad debate in the country on the need for an urgent re-write of the current constitution. This document was written in 1982 by the military, who gave itself wide room for maneuver to shape both domestic and foreign policy. The 1982 constitution also made the military accountable to the prime minister, and not to the defense minister, an organization structure that is still the case today. In fact, Turkey is the only NATO member whose chief of the general staff is answerable to the prime minister and not the defense minister.

In recent years, there has been a significant move towards curbing the military's powers. The European Union (EU), which Turkey would like to join, criticizes Turkey for having a military that exerts too much power over areas that are not in its jurisdiction. As part of its efforts to join the EU, Turkey has implemented reforms which have limited the military's role. The most important change has been the reduction of military members in the National Security Council – the primary channel through which the officers influenced Turkish politics. Despite these changes and amendments, there is still consensus on the need for a new constitution which clarifies once in for all, the military's position within the country. The below article discusses TÜSİAD's recommendation on how the military's role should be defined in the new constitution. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

FMSO Commentary: What is India's greatest national security threat? Is it a nuclear armed Pakistan, an increasingly powerful and present Chinese military, or Islamic terrorist attacks in major cities? In 2006 while speaking to State Chief Ministers, India's Prime Minister Monmohan Singh identified the ongoing Maoist insurgency as the greatest national security challenge to the nation. He said. "There can be no political compromise with terror. No inch conceded. No compassion shown". (1) Four years later at the 50th anniversary of the National Defense College, he told senior military officers and foreign dignitaries that, "Naxalism and Left-wing extremism pose the greatest threat to our national security."(2)

The forty-four year old uprising clearly has the attention of the central government of India. A decade of expanded exploitation of mineral resources in the contested area has exacerbated the conflict between the Maoist insurgency and the state. Billions of dollars of resources and the stability of several India's States are at stake. As the government of India and State governments step up the military and police pressure, the Maoist leadership has also risen to the challenge. India's Home Minister P. Chidambaram has said that the Maoists operate in 31% of India's 626 districts was capable of striking in 13% and virtually dominated 5% of the districts.(3) This encompasses a land area the same size as Boston, Massachusetts to Jacksonville Florida and from Raleigh, North Carolina to Columbus, Ohio.

The Maoists have a sophisticated leadership well versed in Maoist political thought, active in peoples' movements, and increasingly experienced in guerilla warfare. The various branches of these peoples' movements have successfully consolidated in the recent years. Current reports of tactical operations by these insurgent elements are beginning to reveal the broader strategic plan and goals of the Maoist movement.

The three sets of articles presented below provide recent evidence regarding Maoist efforts. First article is from The Statesman is the leading Indian English-language daily in West Bengal, India. Other newspapers and online sources reported this event in Hindi and Bengali. This article highlights the wide-spread movement of Maoist leadership, type of insurgent training, and a typical police encounter. End of FMSO Commentary. (Welch)

Naxalite and Maoist Movements: Tactical events reveal strategic danger in India



13 March 2011

Source: "Sasadhar Mahato, a guerrilla war prodigy," The Statesman, 13 March 2011. http://www.thestatesman net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362366:sasadhar-mahato-a-guerrilla-war-prodigy-&catid=42:bengal&from_page=search

India_Red_Corridor_map.png: *derivative work: By Hunnjazal India_Naxal_affected_districts_map.svg: w:user:Planemad derivative work: Gagan11111 (India_Red_Corridor_map.png) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) , via Wikimedia Commons

Sasadhar Mahato, a Guerrilla War Prodigy

By Biswabrata Goswami

MIDNAPORE, 13 MARCH 2011: Even with the best equipment and training, joint security forces failed to arrest top Maoist leader Sasadhar Mahato alive or injured and let five other rebels escape from the area.

Sasadhar, who was a commander of the armed squad of the Communist Party India (Maoist) in West Midnapore, Bankura and Purulia, fought so technically against the security forces at Chongsoro in Binpur in West Midnapore that the latter had no option but to kill him. "He was carrying the most sophisticated arms like AK-47 and he had three fully loaded magazines in hand. When the security forces surrounded him, he started firing at them and was shooting while changing his positions frequently.

He was hit by a bullet in his leg and the security forces asked him to surrender, but he didn't obey the instruction," Mr Mukesh Kumar, additional Special Police, Jhargram said on condition of anonymity. When asked whether it was really difficult to arrest him, Mr Kumar said: "If anyone shoots with AK-47, then will it be wise to throw flower? We don't want any loss of our forces during the operation and so what the forces did was proper."

According to sources, Sasadhar was a very skilled Maoist activist and he got training from extremist groups like United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). He was also given on-

Sasadhar Mahato, a Guerrilla War Prodigy

the-job training through real attacks on security forces, planting of explosives, blowing up of government buildings and infrastructure. Guerrilla warfare tactics were also taught to him.

"The training of guerrilla warriors, their warfare and fighting skills are very extensive and strong. Without special training, the police forces cannot fight against them. Sasadhar was a commander of a squad and he knew how to fight against security forces. So he chose to fight rather than surrender," said a senior police officer.

Police sources said Sasadhar underwent arms training from extremist groups in Chhattisgarh and Orissa. Recently Aditya Bora, a former member of ULFA and a central committee member of the CPI (Maoist), was arrested from Saranda forest in Orissa-Jharkhand border, which proved that extremist groups give training to the Maoists.

"During the interrogation of Biju Mahato, who was arrested during the operation at Chongsoro, it was learnt that his leader got guerrilla warfare training from specially-organised training camps in Chhattisgarh," a senior police officer said, adding that the deceased rebel had attended several training camps in Andhra Pradesh when he was attached with the People's War Group.

Maoist Improvised Explosive Devices

28 March 2011

Source: Hardcore Maoist held with 25kg explosive gel, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-28/ranchi/29353988_1_maoist-squad-explosive-gel-sonahatu

Ranchi District, Jharkhand State
By Joy1963 [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons

FMSO Commentary: This article is from the Times of India an English-language daily newspaper in India that has the largest circulation among all English-language newspapers in the world. Reports of Maoist actions are printed almost daily in the "Cities" section of the paper.

The Maoist insurgency has long used Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as their weapon of choice. The presence of high grade industrial explosives reveals methods and sources in the movement. This incident occurred in the Ranchi District of the State of Jharkhand. End of FMSO Commentary. (Welch)

Hardcore Maoist held with 25kg explosive gel

RANCHI, Jharkhand: A Maoist who was wanted in a dozen cases was arrested from the Sonahatu police station area along with 25kg explosive gel on Saturday evening.

A team of Ranchi police raided Kala Mahdeo village, around 6km from Sonahatu police station, and picked up Surendra Swansi, an active member of the CPI (Maoist).

Police had earlier attached his properties following a court order. Since then, he had been evading arrest and gone underground.

The rebel was to transport the explosive gel to the cadres in Bundu-Tamar when police raided the village. "The explosive was earlier hidden underground. It was recently dug out for giving to the Maoist squad active in the area," said Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Praveen Kumar Singh.

Recently, Swansi had gone into hiding in the Chowka area of Saraikela-Kharsawan district but had come to deliver the explosive gel to Sonahatu where he was arrested. "This is a major breakthrough for police as Swansi was wanted in a number of cases and was a hardcore Maoist," said Singh.

Another Maoist Hari Pad Mahto, who had been active during the formative years of Naxalism in Ranchi and its surrounding areas but has left extremism for the past two years, surrendered before police on Sunday evening.

He had worked extensively to spread Naxalism in the Bundu, Tamar and Arki areas since 2003-04. He was wanted in over a dozen of cases of murder, extortion, kidnapping, arson and police encounters.

"He had joined the Maoist ranks before the notorious rebel commander Kundan Pahan and had several warrant of arrests pending against him," said SSP. "He is a resident of Bucha Dih village in Tamar and his surrender has been implemented under the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the state."

FMSO Commentary: This chronology of Maoist related actions is taken from articles in the Times of India, The Hindu, The Hindustan Times, and ePaper Indianexpress.com. This represents a string of events over a ninety day period. This provides a flavor of the breadth and depth of Maoist insurgency in India at the present. Each incident reflects the Maoist party's discipline, equipment, methods, targets, and operational philosophy.

This popular press reporting is most likely just the tip of an iceberg. Blogs and websites sympathetic to the Maoist movement indicate even more political and social activity across this growing "Red Corridor". End of FMSO Commentary. (Welch)

Chronology of Maoist Actions

January - April 2011

Wall painting by Maoists, By Rabin06 (talk).Rabin06 at en.wikipedia [Public domain], Wikimedia Commons

Sources:

(1) Retrieved on 14 April 2011 from: http://www ft.com/cms/s/0/03e6c524-cbd9-11da-a7bf-0000779e2340 html#ixzz1JQa3ionv
(2) Retrieved on 14 April 2011 from: http://www.google.com/hosted-news/afp/article/ALeqM5jMrnrj0AyAEtWLjmqFKIrCScxjIA
(3) Retrieved on 14 April 2011 from: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article7059646.ece
(4) Retrieved on 14 April 2011 from: http://www.thestatesman net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362366&catid=42
(5) Retrieved on 14 April 2011 from: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-28/ranchi/29353988_1_maoist-squad-explosive-gel-sonahatu

Maoist Insurgency Events

Maoist Insurgency Events 2011



Maoist Insurgency Events

FMSO Commentary: With the current security situation in Mexico becoming more difficult by the day, President Calderon and the Mexican Army decided that it was finally time to take necessary measures in order to increase overall troop morale given their grim situation in Calderon's "war on drugs". They did this not only by increasing personnel salaries, but by adding an additional comprehensive benefits package including allowances such disability, all the way to a retirement package (see article for the complete list).

Little known outside of Mexico, cartels have given many of these same subsidies to their "employees" for countless years. These crime syndicates pay wages that make for a comfortable living, provide work vehicles, cover school expenses, and more. To keep pace with the recruiting efforts of the transnational criminal organizations, the president and service chiefs will have to match, if not surpass, the salaries and benefits given by these criminal organizations.

To further complicate the efforts of the Mexican government and military, media and other sources reported that as soon as the cartels received word of the salary and benefits increases, they too doubled their illicit salary structure. While today the cartels pay more than the military, the government is making steps in the right direction. Decent salaries will curb rates of corruption and desertion. Continued, modest annual salary increases could show promise in troop retention and morale and help to combat the allure of criminal activity. End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)

Salaries and Benefits to Compete with Crime

Source: Benito Jiménez, "Levantan salarios moral de la tropa," Reforma (www reforma.com), 27 Mar 2011

27 March 2011

Mexican Army Increases Salaries and Benefits

In an effort to raise the morale of soldiers who combat organized crime, their salary has been doubled in the current 6-year term....they now earn 8,000 pesos ($675.00) per month. President Felipe Calderon has had to increase the troops' salary by up to 107 percent. He has also increased their benefits by raising their mortgage credits, giving scholarships to military members' children, and bonuses to complement their income. Soldiers who combat drug trafficking earned an average of 4,000 pesos ($337.00) in December 2006. They now earn 8,000 pesos ($675.00) per month, according to the National Defense asset tabulators.



Desertions



Desertions have thus dropped more than 70 percent during Calderon's 6-year term, according to the Army's own figures. According to Sedena (National Defense Secretariat) figures, 16,405 members deserted in 2006 and only 4,398 desertions were reported by 2010. "Recruitment stopped being a problem. There were some vacancies in the past, but this has gone down because desertions have dropped, which in a good measure, has been because the soldiers' morale has been lifted by increases in salaries and benefits," a military chief indicated. The applications to join the military education system, at every one of the facilities, increased 45 percent between 2008 and 2010, but there are no vacancies for privates. The benefits for mortgages and scholarships for military personnel children are "unprecedented," according to another military commander who was consulted.

Mexican Army Increases Salaries and Benefits

Housing

A joint finance agreement was signed in April 2007 between Banjercito (Army Bank) and the ISSFAM (Mexican Armed Forces Social Security Institute), to cover only the purchase of housing for personnel ranging from corporal to sergeant first class and their equivalents in the Navy; in other words, the troops. A goal has been established for this year - to grant 10,000 credits - so the ISSFAM will contribute the sum of 20,000 pesos ($1,688) and Banjercito will finance up to 160,500 pesos ($13,550) according to the indebtedness capability of each applicant. To obtain the subsidy (which varies between 30,000 and 43,000 pesos - $2,532 to $3,640) the value of the real estate cannot exceed 225,000 pesos ($19,000) and the maximum credit amount will be 180,500 pesos ($15,239), according to the ISSFAM.

"The troops had never enjoyed this; these are new benefits that have been granted in this 6-year term, as recognition of the Army's work in the struggle against organized crime," the military commander indicated. A military member currently enjoys the following benefits: a direct affiliation to the ISSFAM by the member and his direct beneficiaries; a savings fund that is generated with a 6-percent contribution of the military member's salary for their retirement, dismissal, or death; and a work fund with an 11-percent contribution of their salary for their retirement, dismissal, or death. There is also a life insurance that is applied even when a servicemember is disabled in the combat against crime or due to an accident while in active service; a retirement group insurance with the military member's 3-percent contribution of their salary; they can designate as beneficiaries all the members of their family to have rights to their life insurance, housing fund, savings fund, and labor fund. The children of military members (in active service and retired) who are studying in official facilities or with an official recognition have the right to scholarships; the military who carry out missions for long periods in other states may occupy houses through a recovery payment; mortgage credits for soldiers with at least 10 years of contributions to the fund; vacation discounts; payment of funerals and medical services. The government has disbursed more than 1 million pesos ($84,427) in the delivery of 133 school scholarships for the children of military members who died in combat against organized crime during the Calderon Administration, for the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 cycles. For example, the amount of scholarships for the pre-elementary school education of children from military members fallen in combat, is 650 pesos ($54.82); for elementary school education it is 800 pesos ($67.54); and for high school education it is 950 pesos ($80.20) per month. "All the children of military members who start or are undergoing studies in the junior high and high school level may apply for a tuition or support scholarship, provided they meet the requirements," Sedena states. Referring to this, Javier Oliva indicated that President Calderon must keep in mind the need to raise the soldiers' morale because they support his struggle against organized crime. "They are involved in that struggle, but they continue without the legal coverage of reforms to the National Security Law; therefore, it is important that they have monetary support. The support of social policies is very important; there are military students who hold scholarships at Monterrey Tec Technological Institute and the Ibero-American University. This allows the bolstering of their morale," Oliva commented. The National Defense College adviser indicated that the Army's morale is high despite the adverse conditions to which they are exposed. "I believe that these are measures which will hopefully become permanent, rather than decisions made in the heat of the battle against drug trafficking," the specialist warned.

Additional benefits:

- Services to military personnel
- Monthly wages and allowances
- Vacation bonuses
- Year-end compensation
- Savings fund
- Compensation for services
- Life insurance
- Group retirement insurance
- Aid to cover funeral expenses in case of military member beneficiaries' death
- Death payments in case of the military member's death
- Funeral services
- Child welfare centers
- Low-cost pharmacies
- Stores and service centers
- Vacation time and granting of normal leave
- Pension for beneficiaries in case of the military members' death
- Tourism services carried out through agreements with civilian societies and other Federal Agencies
- ISSFAM scholarships (for children of military personnel holding the rank of Private to Sergeant First Class)
- Rent for housing
- Agreements with universities and education centers to pursue studies at bachelor, master, and doctorate-level depending on the interested student's education level
- Scholarships and credits for scientific and technological training depending on the interested student's education level
- Retirement benefits after 20 years of services rendered in the military
- Nursing home for retired military personnel 60 years of age or older
- Recognition and reward for outstanding actions
- Normal signature loans (starting at 1 year and 2 months of time in service for personnel holding the rank of private or above). Special signature loans (starting at 10 years of time in service for personnel holding the rank of Sergeants Second Class and up to Corporals, and 8 years for Sergeants First Class)
- Mortgage loans from the Army Bank for troop personnel with more than 7 years of services and from the ISSFAM for personnel with more than 10 years of service
- The possibility of joining military training facilities

FMSO Commentary: Over the course of President Calderon's "War on Drugs" beginning in December 2006, the media has played an increasingly important role in the coverage of narco-crime and associated violence. Although this reporting started as what most would view as traditional news coverage, in has evolved in ways unimaginable.

Today, much of the mainstream media coverage is controlled by the cartels. These criminal groups not only use direct violence against journalists by kidnapping, beating, and even killing them, but also have infiltrated the media with their own members. These "sleeper" journalists work to censor and propagandize articles before they are published.

The Mexican government is trying to establish countermeasures to mitigate the cartel influence through a new pact, creating the impression of media independence. This pact establishes journalistic guidelines. The Mexican public views the new pact as a form of governmental media censorship. Although it may seem like censorship to some, this agreement will help the government against the cartels in controlling the media for propagandistic purposes. These guidelines will also help the general public from getting too desensitized to the seemingly lawless situation. (As an example, instead of playing 'cowboys and Indians,' Mexican children have been seen playing 'cops and Cartels.') The government must take every step that it can to gain the upper-hand in what some see as a failing war on drugs. End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)

Mexican Media Coverage

24 March 2011

Source: Fabiola Martínez, "Medios de comunicación firmarán pacto sobre cobertura de la violencia del narco," La Jornada Online (www.jornada.unam.mx), 24 Mar 2010

"The Mexican government is trying to establish countermeasures to mitigate the cartel **influence through a new pact, creating** the impression of media independence"

Mexican Media to Sign Pact on Coverage of Narco-Crime and Violence

About 30 media outlets called upon by Televisa and Television Azteca will sign an agreement today to "not disseminate information that would threaten the viability of operations against organized crime," "properly contextualize information," avoid becoming "involuntary spokespeople" for drug trafficking, and not interviewing drug offenders.

According to the project, entitled "Agreement for the Media Coverage of Organized Crime Violence," participants also bind themselves to apply "editorial discretion" to make clear that the "violence is the result of criminals," who "have spread terror, and in some parts of the country, are already threatening fundamental freedoms of society."

Also, they will state their opinion in favor of restricting the dissemination of video footage and pictures that show "violence and terrorism," prevent criminals or suspected criminals from becoming victims or public heroes, and "ignore and discard information that comes from organized crime for propagandistic purposes," while "refraining from interviewing members of criminal organizations when there is a conviction against this person."

The signatories to the agreement are also part of Mexico's Advisory Council Initiative, submitted in June.

This initiative aims, according to its proponents, "to rescue the dynamic and enterprising Mexico, as well as acknowledging and praising the efforts of those who, with their initiatives, work for the Mexico we all want."

Mexican Media to Sign Pact on Coverage of Narco-Crime and Violence

The launching ceremony of these "editorial commitments" will be held at the National Museum of Anthropology and, although it was said at first that President Felipe Calderon or Secretary of the Interior Francisco Blake would be in attendance, up until last night the agenda of both of them only covered a working trip to Nuevo Leon.

Calderon has repeatedly complained about the handling given by the media to information related to crime.

An example of this occurred in February 2010 in Merida, Yucatan, when the president criticized that the media broadcasted, for free, blanket graffiti from criminals, while for any businessman or the government "it cost us several million pesos to publish a headline."

Six months later, during the Dialogues for Security, the president acknowledged that his communication strategy had not been Los Pinos' "strength" because there were deficiencies, thus he proposed to "fix the problem."

He said that in his government "we have not been able to explain what we are doing, why we are doing it, and what we are seeing around us. We also do not have control over information coming from the states."

On Tuesday, Calderon met with media executives involved in the Mexico Initiative.

It was reported that during the private meeting, television networks and other members of this project let him know the details of the new criteria on which news programs will be based from now on.

In the six-page text, which according to sources from this newspaper are "confidential" and which was updated last week, there are some actions to protect journalists, such as not signing reports relating to organized crime, making joint coverage, and not doing live reports from the most violent areas.

Protocol and special security measures for the safety of journalists must be established by each media outlet.

The agreement is part of the diagnosis that Mexico is "one of the riskiest countries for journalism and for freedom of the press" and, in light of that, "we cannot be mere observers, limited to uncritically recording violence coming from organized crime."

Journalist Protection

If the implementation of this agreement is finalized, there would be another way "for protecting journalists," because since last December, the federal government, through the Interior Secretariat, established a committee for the protection of journalists, which has made little progress and so far it is unknown who will represent journalism professionals.

Jesus Zamora, Undersecretary of the Interior for Legal Affairs, said that the federal government will not suggest or impose criteria for the safekeeping of journalists or criteria for the content of shows or news programs.

Meanwhile, the signatories of the agreement stress, in several paragraphs, that the responsibility of this fight on crime lies with the governing bodies of Mexico, although the media "has the task to act with professionalism and to wonder about potential implications of how the information is handled."

Signatories asked for "contextual facts" because they insist there may be a risk of becoming unintentional instruments of propaganda for organized crime.

The draft agreement includes several items with brief descriptions and ideas subjected to the interpretation of their own radio and television networks or executives from print media. For example: "Broadcast information on these issues according to their significance."

At the end of the Decalogue for "editorial discretion," subtitled "Do not interfere in the fight against crime," it says:

"The media should not disseminate information that would threaten the viability of actions and operations against organized crime or that jeopardize the lives of those fighting crime or their families, such as the police, armed forces, detectives, judges, and any other security and justice related authority."

Those who prepared the draft of the agreement considered that the when, how, and how often to publish video footage and pictures of violence and terrorism must be established. On each party responsibility, it suggests to explicitly specify them, that is, while stressing that they must "record" excessive actions of the state, "it is necessary to help strengthen the social perception that crime does not pay."

Thus, the ten guiding principles are: take a stand against violence and "emphasize the negative impact it has on population;" properly contextualize information, that is, show it "according to importance;" explicitly assign responsibilities; not prejudge guilt; not to become a spokesman for crime and prevent its members from becoming victims or public heroes, "because this helps build a positive image in the population, making their actions bearable, and even copied;" and care for victims and children.

Additionally, encourage the involvement and reporting from citizens; protecting journalists; solidarity against any threat or action against reporters and media; and not to interfere in the fight against crime.

FMSO Commentary: As Russia, China and the West are all coveting access to Central Asian fossil fuel resources, Turkmenistan, holding the world's fourth richest natural gas deposits (7.94 trillion cubic meters), has increasingly realized the economic and political strengths it can extract from this resource. Not only has Turkmenistan been pursuing national capacity-building and promoting energy security from within, but also is carefully choosing its natural gas outlets and markets.

Although Russia remains an important player in the competition for Turkmen natural gas, Turkmenistan has been looking around due to a lack of confidence in Russia as its main partner. Specifically, in March 2011, Turkmenistan agreed to boost its future natural gas deliveries to China through the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline by 20 billion cubic meters (still below the pipeline's expected full annual capacity of 40 billion cubic meters). Meanwhile, negotiations over the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline are underway, while Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov has also signaled the country's interest in providing gas to Europe through the Nabucco project. The Turkmen leaders hope that by keeping different customers competing with each other, they can maximize profits and gain a strong leverage in the region's energy politics.

Though the Turkmen gas situation remains fluid, three things are clear so far. First, the diversification of Turkmenistan's natural gas outlets is irreversible, and it is unlikely that Russia can regain its monopoly over the export routes of Turkmen gas. Second, both Europe and China are seen by Turkmenistan as major potential markets, and have been integrated into Turkmenistan's balancing strategy. Lastly, Turkmenistan's moves with regard to the choice of its energy partners are highly relevant to the region's energy security. End FMSO Commentary (Du)

Turkmenistan's Natural Gas Exports: Which Direction?

25 March 2011



Source: "Turkmenistan opredelyaet gazovye marshruty (Turkmenistan determines gas export routes)," Srednyaya aziya v internete (centralasiaonline.com), 25 March 2011.

Turkmenistan Natural Gas Net Export/ Imports via U.S. Energy Information Administration

Turkmenistan Determines Gas Export Routes

ASHGABAT — Turkmenistan, endowed with the world's fourth richest natural gas deposits (7.94 trillion cubic meters), is facing the choice of whom to sell its abundant natural gas — and the West is seen as an alternative customer.

Until recently, Turkmenistan primarily exported its natural gas to Russia, but now it is looking for alternative markets. Since the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China (TUKC) pipeline opened in December 2009, Turkmenistan has been supplying gas to China, and in 2010 negotiations over the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project regained life after years of dormancy.

"Lack of confidence in Russia as a partner has forced Turkmenistan to look around," said an expert of Turkmengaz company on condition of anonymity. "Also, if Turkmenistan can sell gas in much larger volumes, why not do it?"

Russia wants to continue playing an important role

One of the stumbling blocks for selling gas to the West in the past was that Russia always wanted to be an intermediary.

"Russia wants to buy Turkmen gas to resell it to Europe," Azhangeldy Togrulov, an exiled Turkmen energy analyst, said. "That's like scratching your right ear with your left hand — it's much easier to export gas to Europe directly."

To help pave the way for that possibility, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov met with representatives of the EU's TransCaspian and Nabucco projects in January. These projects have annual gas purchasing capacity of up to 31 billion cubic meters, Azerbaijan Oil Research Centre head Ilkham Shaban said.

"Although no documents were signed, Brussels was quite satisfied with that kind of reception," Shaban said. "However, implementation of the TransCaspian pipeline project will not depend on Berdymukhamedov's personal preferences alone. There has to be a whole chain of … interested countries and parties."

"I can not predict whether Turkmenistan will actually become a Nabucco supplier, but it

certainly has a strong interest in letting the Russians believe that it might," Mark Katz, a political scientist at George Mason University, said. "If Moscow wants to prevent this, it will have to accept Turkmenistan's terms."

The issue depends on whether Turkmenistan is willing to work proactively on a TransCaspian link with Baku, which has shown interest, said Borut Grgic, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Centre.

"In the past, Turkmenistan has not been ready to cooperate," he said. "The TransCaspian project is of strategic importance, primarily to Turkmenistan, as it offers direct access to the markets of the EU and Turkey."

Much of the Nabucco case needs clarification before the project can become reality, said Jan Sir, author of "Dismantling Totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under Berdimuhamedow." "Yet there seems to be a link between Turkmenistan's commitment to Nabucco and the very prospects of this important infrastructure project ... in that with no guarantees of Turkmen gas, there might be simply nothing to supply through the newly proposed corridor and consequently no pipeline to build at all."

Transparency concerns the West

As the Turkmen market grows, international companies are concerned about transparency in Turkmenistan.

That prompted Berdymukhamedov to criticize some government officials recently and to tackle a number of domestic problems, the Turkmengaz official said.

"This will no doubt improve the country's relationships with the outside world, as indicated by the January talks with the EU delegation," he said.

While Turkmenistan is making improvements, Sir said, "Obviously, it still has a long way to go."

The country "needs to be more proactive in promoting its interests in Europe," Grgic said. "In Europe we all know Turkmenistan is there with its natural gas potential. But we do not quite know what to make of it."

However, Turkmenistan has not yet let Western companies develop its gas fields, Shaban said. "Ashgabat has made an exception only for China's CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and some Asian companies, but with time it has felt economic pressure from them. ... Turkmen authorities don't want changes in domestic life."

"But then, Western companies aren't naive about Turkmenistan," he said. "(They realize that) MTS, a Russian cell phone operator, was shut down and expelled from the country overnight in late December, directly losing $583 million US dollars, according to the Russian side's estimates."

Iranian Influence in Tajikistan

11 February 2011

"in recent years Iran has become an important **investor for Tajikistan,** even now edging out Russian involvement"

Source: Viktoriya Panfilova, "Iran Interested in Tajik Uranium," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 February 2011 http://www ng ru/cis/2011-02-11/1_iran html

Iran Interested in Tajik Uranium

Tehran has convenient levers of influence on Dushanbe

In March, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon will visit Iran at the invitation of Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The official reason for the meeting of the two heads of state will be the celebration of the Navruz International Day (Spring festival and start of the new year is celebrated on 21 March in some countries of Eurasia). Experts believe that, during the meeting, there will also be a discussion about closer cooperation of Iran and Tajikistan in light of the weakening influence of Moscow on Dushanbe.

In recent times, Iran has been steadily increasing its presence in Tajikistan. Speaking at a press conference held in Dushanbe in recent days, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Ali Asgari Sherdust cited the need to eliminate the visa regimen between the countries, which would give new impetus to closer bilateral economic cooperation.

However, Iran already became one of the largest investors in that country in 2010, hav-

FMSO Commentary It is true that in recent years Iran has become an important investor for Tajikistan, even now edging out Russian involvement as the article mentions. While this can be seen as an alarming trend, particularly if Iran is seeking access to uranium in Tajikistan, the quality of this relationship needs to be examined before it can be assumed that Iran has leverage in Tajikistan. In 2006, Iran assisted Tajikistan with the Anzob tunnel, a five kilometer passage through the mountains that connects the Tajik capital Dushanbe with the northern city of Khujand. Even after the grand opening in 2006 the tunnel was often filled with standing water and generally in poor condition. The tunnel is now open but remains in various states of repair. The Tajik government did not officially criticize this problem, but the delay to complete the tunnel did not go unnoticed.

In 2007, Chinese construction companies worked on other road and tunnel projects that connect Khujand to Dushanbe. These projects were of better quality, but they did not gather as much attention. The article reflects the Russian point of view that Tajikistan is moving away from Moscow's influence and towards Tehran, but it does not consider Chinese involvement. China may not have the common language, culture, and history that Iran shares with Tajikistan, but as the article mentions, the Islamic nature of Iran's culture scares and pushes Tajikistan away. Chinese involvement does not come with any kind of religious stipulation; this should be considered as Iran supposedly pursues uranium projects in Tajikistan. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Iran Interested in Tajik Uranium

ing made $65.5 million of direct investments into the economy of Tajikistan and edging out Russia in this indicator. The trade volume has reached $201.7 million. And this is not the limit, the Iranian diplomat noted.

In his words, after the Iranian Sangob Company launches the Sangtuda GES-2 [hydroelectric power plant] on the Vakhsh River in the Fall, it will immediately begin construction of three more hydroelectric power plants: Two in Nurabad with capacity of 350 megawatts each on the Vakhsh River and the Ayna GES with capacity of 170 megawatts on the Zarafshan River, as Aziya Plus reports.

Traditionally, the power industry, transport, water provision, road construction, trade and culture have been considered to be the priority spheres in cooperation of Tajikistan and Iran. Tehran is insisting on the soonest possible launch of a Persian-language television channel of a cultural-enlightenment nature, accusing Dushanbe of procrastination in fulfillment of the agreement that was signed by the presidents back in 2008. The Iranian side is indignant at the fact that the partners cannot resolve the elementary question of the building to house the television company, while they themselves have long ago fulfilled their part of the obligations, having prepared all the necessary technical equipment. As a source in the Tajikistan President's staff explained to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the delay is caused by apprehensions that the television channel may, among other things, promote propaganda of a direction in Islam that is foreign to the Tajiks - Shiism. "Yes, we speak the same language, although in different dialects. We have much in common. But religion and culture in Iran are closely intertwined, and we do not want our young people to be pulled into another round of Islamic propaganda. Especially since, last Fall, we had to take our children -- who were being illegally educated in the local Madrassas [religious school] - out of Iran," a high-level Tajik official explained to Nezavisimaya Gazeta on conditions of anonymity. At the same time, he expressed the hope that the question with the television channel would not become an obstacle to development of economic relations.

Dushanbe is pinning particular hopes on the implementation of long-term plans in the nuclear sphere. Iran is not concealing its desire to gain access to Tajikistan's mineral resources, which contain approximately 13 percent of the world's uranium reserves (Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on this in greater detail in its issue dated 11 January 2011).

The uranium mines are not being developed today: Work was halted several years ago for financial reasons. Considering Iran's problems with raw material and its plans to develop its own nuclear power industry in spite of various resolutions, this sphere of Iran-Tajikistan cooperation may become the priority in interstate relations in the nearest time.

Especially since "Tehran has convenient levers of influence on Dushanbe to achieve its goals," Montreal University analyst Ravshan Temureen told Nezavisimaya Gazeta. And all because the authorities of Iran have repeatedly provided support to President Rahmon, the analyst believes. The countdown starts from the civil war, which continued in the republic for 5 years - from 1992 - and took 150,000 lives. Iran was an active participant in the inter-Tajik dialogue and made considerable efforts to pacify the warring parties. In 1998, Tehran gave support to Rahmon. Tajik Army Colonel Mahmud Khudoyberdyyev announced his insubordination to Rahmon and declared the Sogdiysk region of the republic to be a zone of his own interests, seizing power in the region. It was specifically Tehran that came to Rahmon's aid, sending the necessary arms and munitions to the national army. We might add that Tajikistan is the only CIS country that has military ties with Iran. The IRI gives loans to the Tajik army for material needs: Purchase of military uniforms, means of communication, ammunition for rifles, and creation of joint enterprises for sewing military uniforms in Tajikistan. At the same time, Tehran would not be averse to expanding military cooperation to the level of all three Persian-speaking countries - Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Iran - for the purpose of ensuring security in the region. Such cooperation may be effective in the fight against drugs and international terrorism, sources in the IRI believe. In the opinion of experts, Iran is striving to create a bridgehead in Tajikistan so as to significantly block the actions of the international forces in Afghanistan.

Tajikistan Uranium mine source: NTI (http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/tajikis/facils.htm)

Kazakh View of Protest

"The mindset and **world-viewpoint of** people in Kazakhstan **has been a mix of the** various ethnic groups that live there"

31 March 2011

Source: Oleg Sidorov, "Requiem for the East," Liter Online, 31 March 2011; http://www.liter kz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5540&Itemid=2

Requiem for the East

At the time, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart composed a requiem and few people know that its name - Day of Rage - has long been making the headlines in the media.

Given a trend among American spin doctors to give their campaigns sonorous names, one can assume that this operation, too, was not an exception. As is known, anti-government demonstrations have spread across several countries in the region, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain and Morocco. A catalyst for domestic political processes in the region's countries was the support provided to rebels by the international community, which in violation of international law, begun interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In turn, military operations by the UN Security Council forces [as published] served as an additional impetus.

An interesting picture emerges when we try to analyze the situation which has formed. First of all, if we consider the time factor, all of the events began to develop rapidly starting from the beginning of 2011. Interestingly though, last year most countries in the Middle East seemed to be a bulwark of stability, while it was possible to predict what further steps they might take. It is enough to just recall the parliamentary election in Egypt, in which the ruling National Democratic Party secured a victory.

The geography of the emergence and spread of the protests is also worth mentioning - the Middle East and North Africa. Since the beginning of the year, eight countries - Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Iran, Yemen, Bahrain and Algeria - have become a certain arch of instability, affecting the world economy and the political balance of power in the world.

Touching upon the methods of how the protests were organized, we have to note that popular uprisings had never before spread almost simultaneously across such a vast territory. Judging by the chronology of the events in the region, it becomes apparent that they have all been staged by one specific group, which without bothering itself with too much of over-intellectualization began to copy everything under the same "scenario".

Judging by how the protests manifested themselves, one can state with a fairly great degree of certainty that these were practically coups d'etat, which began from democratic displays of opinion and resulting in armed clashes with the law-enforcement forces and government troops. As expected, extremist groups have started to take advantage of such a situation.

FMSO Commentary: The Soviet Union never labeled Kazakhstan as a part of Central Asia. Instead it was called Kazakhstan and Central Asia; Kazakhstan essentially became a category by itself in the Soviet Union and now continues to be separated from the rest of Central Asia. The mindset and world-viewpoint of people in Kazakhstan has been a mix of the various ethnic groups that live there, including Kazakh, Russian, and a number of other ethnicities. This viewpoint continues to develop and evolve.

The article below reflects how people in Kazakhstan view world events, particularly the recent revolutions and protests across the Middle East. It reads like many other articles on the recent events in the Middle East. What is different is that this kind of article is allowed in Kazakhstan. A lot of international attention on media in Kazakhstan is that journalists are harassed and that there is little freedom of the press. This is often the case, but one overlooked feature of media in Kazakhstan is that journalists can express their own viewpoints as long as it does not discuss or is critical of the Kazakh government. This will probably not develop into any kind of revolution in Kazakhstan, but it does better connect the country to the outside world. This connection is not as strong in the other Central Asian countries. The tone of article ultimately reflects the Kazakh view of western actions and can be an important indicator for how the population views the U.S. outside diplomatic channels. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Requiem for the East

The East has changed but the leaders have failed to take notice of that. Had the political elites, instead of limiting themselves to the status quo, generated new objectives and ideas, presented to their populations a blueprint for a renewed Arab world, where there is place for social justice and new development opportunities, they might have had averted the wave of unrest that engulfed North Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Incidentally, this very goal was pursued by the supra-national Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) - modernization of societies to ensure their competitiveness, seeing this as a guarantee of their stability and progress. Therefore, the catchy Soviet term "those who have spent too much time in meetings ["prozasedavshiyesya"]" can surely be referred to the political establishments of the East.

The sense of déjà-vu itself enabled the "orchestrators" of the unrest in countries of the Arab region to easily "refresh blood" by replacing the long-serving leaders, whose actions have become not only uncontrollable but hardly predictable too. It is not that difficult to assume that relatively younger, compliant and less ambitious individuals will be hand-picked to replace the old leaders who could in the next five to seven years fulfill the "wishes" of their protégés, capable of praising those successful from time to time and of removing the undesired ones.

This might only mean one thing - the stabilization of the situation will be of a short-term nature, considering the fact that two branches of one religion, colliding with each other on the political arena in the struggle for power, could lead to the creation of new hotbeds of tension.

In addition, we have to note that, while planning their protest actions, the organizers deliberately opted for religious places and mosques. Furthermore, we should also note that the main work aimed at "rallying like-minded people" was carried out on Fridays.

There are also some other distinctive features of how these protests were organized. In most of the Arab countries the protests were organized through the Internet - the social networking site Facebook and the mass dissemination of SMSs to mobile phones. Furthermore, it is noted that these SMSs were sent not from within the country, but they came from abroad. Here the organizers of the protests took into account the fact that there are government agencies in target countries which possess the necessary technical capabilities to control the dissemination of such SMSs.

But the most interesting point is that these mass protests actions took place in countries with one single religion but different ruling regimes. Thus Libya and Syria are ruled by the national socialist regimes, while the remaining nations have a liberal democratic form of government with pronounced features of autocracy. Practically the whole of Maghreb and the Middle East represent pro-Western dictatorships.

Today Western models of government are taking shape in the countries of Maghreb and the Middle East which the "orchestrators" believe will meet democratic standards and universally -recognized humanistic values. Nevertheless, considering the fact that in most of the countries engulfed by public disorders, religious organizations have been gradually taking the initiative into their own hands, one may assume that not everything which is being done in the region at the moment has been going according to plan.

All the more so history has already witnessed such examples. One such example is the victory of the Hamas radical organization in the elections in the Palestinian Authority, following which the western media quickly recalled the coming to power of the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers' Party] headed by Adolph Hitler in Germany. However, doubts are cast not only because of historical parallels, but due to the fact that for the emergence of a Western model of sustainable democracy there needs to be a social foundation, in addition to an automated system of elections. Whatever the regime is, good or bad, it rests on the faith and trust of the population, and that represents a set of values and the level of political culture.

African Environmental and Human Security in the 21st Century combines ten original essays that discuss important non-traditional environmental and human security issues facing countries located in each region of Africa. Environmental and human security issues are vital national security interests in African states because most citizens are engaged in daily struggles to survive. This is one of the first published works to address issues related to when, how, or if national and foreign militaries should be involved in promoting human and environmental security. Several of the essays (chapters) in the book were based on conference papers presented at the 49th International Studies Association meeting in Mar 08, supported by research conducted by civilian and military researchers and funded by the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) as a sponsor of the Air Force Academy's Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) program.



Kyrgyz Media Sources

11 February 2011

Russia Channel One interview with Hillary Clinton on the "Posner Show" By U.S. State Department Photo / Public Domain [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Source: "If no attention is given to information security, we will lose our state," Sayasat Press, 11 February 2011

Information Security

Over the recent years the Kyrgyzstani government has not given any attention to information security at all. Russian and Kazakhstani TV channels dominate in the country's north and a few Uzbekistani TV and radio channels broadcast in the south. KTR [Kyrgyzstani national TV] and ElTR do not broadcast in some villages at all. The domination of other countries' information in Kyrgyzstan increases their influence in political events that are fateful for Kyrgyzstani people. Proof of this is Feliks Kulov's party. It had the lowest rating ahead of the parliamentary elections, but managed to get to the front with the support of Russian media in a short period of time. What is information security? How can we ensure information security? We have found it appropriate to look at this issue in more detail.

"Media, above all, is a particular propaganda force that can pose a threat to a state's development, integrity and security," says the former head of the Kyrgyzstani National TV and Radio Corporation, Kyyas Moldokasymov. He also says that since independence Kyrgyzstan has been under media pressure from its neighbors. Some of them are deliberately trying to undermine Kyrgyzstani statehood and others are furtively trying to influence people's minds, he adds.

"Kazakhstani media is telling Kyrgyzstani nationals that their life is too bad. This is eroding Kyrgyzstani people's trust in the government. What is more, Russian President [Dmitriy] Medvedev has openly said two or three times that Kyrgyzstan does not exist. To fulfill the president's words, Russian media is focusing on negative issues in Kyrgyzstan and manipulating public mind. For example, the Soviet Union was broken up by other countries' media. We are in the same situation", he says.

FMSO Commentary: The following article from the independent Bishkek-based Sayasat (Political) Press makes an interesting point about the power of information, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. One of the possible contributing reasons for the April 2010 Revolution in Kyrgyzstan were attacks by the Russian media on President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The Russian television media blasted Bakiyev and his policies in the weeks before the revolution, specifically corruption in the Kyrgyz government. There was no counter to Russian influences as Bakiyev shut down and harassed independent media in Kyrgyzstan in the later part of his presidency, including internet-based media.

While the mainstream Kyrgyz media is struggling to overcome pressure from outside sources, as this article mentions, one overlooked feature is social media in Kyrgyzstan. Many Kyrgyz politicians, including President Roza Otunbayeva, have used Twitter, Facebook, and blogs. Politicians used these to reach a wider audience during the campaign period before the October election last year. Kyrgyz youth have equally embraced these forms of communication. While television will likely remain an important source of news in Kyrgyzstan, social media should not be overlooked. Internet access has been restored since the April 2010 Revolution and if it remains available, it can soften the blows from foreign television sources. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Information Security

Russian media dominance

There are 1,513 registered media outlets in Kyrgyzstan. Although some 150 of them are TV and radio channels, most of them broadcast only in the capital and major towns. What is more, most of TV programs are taken from Russian channels. [Expert] Marat Kazakpayev says that Russian media's dominance in Kyrgyzstan is indisputable. He says that many Kyrgyzstani nationals look at the world from Russia's viewpoint because Russian media dominates in Kyrgyzstan.

"Russian state-run Channel One and Russia channels have been giving events in Kyrgyzstan one-side coverage. In the events in [Kyrgyzstan's] south, both [ethnic] Kyrgyz and Uzbeks suffered equally. But they focused on the Uzbeks and portrayed the Kyrgyz in a negative light. It is also possible that these are Russia's efforts aimed at making Kyrgyzstan lose its statehood", he says.

Uzbekistani media domination in south

The situation in Kyrgyzstan's south is very serious. People in Osh and Dzhalal-Abad regions watch about 10 Uzbekistani TV channels like Yoshlar, MTV, Margilon, Uzbekistan's national channel. Young and old watch Uzbekistani soap operas, concerts and news. In this way, they are being fed Uzbekistan's ideology. For example, a little boy does not know the name of the Kyrgyzstani president, but most interestingly, he knows Uzbekistani President [Islom] Karimov. Loss of people's trust in the state might gradually lead to its collapse. Experts say that since 60 percent of Kyrgyzstan's population lives in the south, more attention should be given to the area.

China begins its own work too

China has also begun its propaganda work in Kyrgyzstan through its Russian-language Chinese Central TV. The channel began its broadcasting in Bishkek on 25 September 2009. It is considered an information and entertainment channel. Experts believe that the channel furtively pursues its invisible policy just like other powers by showing programs about Chinese language, China's cuisine, history and culture.

What is the reason behind Russia's media attack?

Political experts believe that Russia has launched its media attack because it is against a parliamentary system. Another reason for this is the long-running US-Russian competition for influence in Central Asia. A good example of this is the two countries' attempts to have each other's military bases in Kyrgyzstan closed down.

How to solve the issue?

Thus, the media of various countries dominate in Kyrgyzstan. They can have a direct influence on Kyrgyzstani politics and can change it in the direction they want. Marat Kazakpayev says that the government should pursue an information policy to get out of this situation. For example, look at Uzbekistan's policy; it has set up a big relay transmitter near the border. This expands TV's broadcast range, improves image quality and restricts unnecessary waves. We should also do this at a government level.

It has been said that Russian state-run Channel One and Russian channels have been given good frequencies while KTR and ElTR and other local TV channels have been given bad ones. Owners of some media outlets say that if local TV channels were given those frequencies, the government would be stronger in pursuing its information policy. We have asked Kyyas Moldokasymov whether this would contribute to boosting information security.

"Yes, it would be very helpful, but the authorities would need to have political will to take this step. What is more, for Kyrgyzstan to find its place in the media battle, most importantly local journalists need to be patriotic. The national TV should pursue one-sided political propaganda. It should not be defused like it is now," he says.

The Dark Visitor

by Scott J. Henderson

This book attempts to analyze the history, ideology, organization, exploits, and political motivations of the Chinese hacker network. Whenever possible, the information contained herein has been taken directly from the Chinese hacker organization itself or from interviews with individual members.



Russia-NATO Ballistic Missile Defense

Ballistic Misile defense system (BMDS) in Europe By DoD, Approved for Public Release 07-MDA-2650 (http://www.airdefenseartillery.com) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

5 April 2011

Source: Vladimir Solovyev, "Such a Project Makes Us, If Not Allies, Then, Full-Fledged Partners," Kommersant Online, 5 April 11.

General Buzhinskiy Cites Benefits of Joint European Missile Defense

Reserve Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, member of the PIR Center Expert Advisory Board, explained to Vladimir Solovyev, your Kommersant correspondent, why Russia and NATO should build a joint missile-defense system.

[Solovyev] What is the essence of Moscow's proposal for the building of a sectoral missile-defense system with NATO?

[Buzhinskiy] There is as yet no precise understanding, unfortunately. There is a general outline, an idea. Why did we object to the Americans building a third position area? Because we are worried by any missile-defense system that is geared to intercepting missiles in the sector of operation of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, which could upset the so-called strategic stability that has evolved between the Russian Federation and the United States. If NATO surrounds itself with such a missile-defense fence, it is intended, naturally, to repel missile threats from all directions. They tell us that it is protecting the alliance against a threat from the south, but at the same time, after all, it is directed eastward also. Against us, that is. This is why the idea of sectoral missile defenses was born. Its essence, crudely, is that it envisages a sharing of the parties' responsibility for covering this missile-hazard direction or the other. That is, the entire Euro-Atlantic space to the Urals is divided into sectors. One national sector is assigned the Russian Federation, one or several, NATO. The crux of our proposal is that if we assume responsibility for the northwest direction, intercept resources should not be deployed on our Western borders--only detection resources.

[Solovyev] And what service does Russia, having assumed responsibility for its sector, offer NATO in this case? Shoot down everything that flies through the Russian sector?

[Buzhinskiy] Of course.

[Solovyev] And if something flies now, Russia will not shoot it down? How do we know that a missile is flying to Paris, not Kaliningrad?

FMSO Commentary: NATO military analysts believe that the alliance must do more to protect against ballistic missile threats to Europe, possibly launched from somewhere in the Middle East. During the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO members agreed to preliminary measures to defend against this threat.

Not surprisingly, Russian officials have expressed concern with this plan. Beneath the diplomatic language, many Russians consider the NATO missile defense proposal as a threat. As their conventional forces are still in the midst of military reform, the Russian leadership has placed considerable emphasis on the viability of its nuclear deterrent (particularly their land-based strategic missiles). Many Russian military specialists perceive NATO's new plan to create a ballistic missile defense as possibly weakening Russia's nuclear retaliatory capability.

Russian and NATO leaders agreed at the NATO Lisbon summit to explore the possibility of working together to create a joint-European missile defense system. However, as the article below describes, besides the question of technical compatibility of a NATO-Russian ballistic-missile defense system, there remain serious questions of trust. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

General Buzhinskiy Cites Benefits of Joint European Missile Defense

[Buzhinskiy] First, we will try to shoot down everything that flies across our territory since the missile-attack warning system operates automatically. Although the intercept could be canceled, of course, if the target does not pose a direct threat to us. This is calculated from the trajectory. Second, the essence of our proposal is that we assume responsibility for our sector and undertake to down all targets that are flying in the direction of Europe. And Europe assumes mirror commitments--to down everything that is flying in the direction of the Russian Federation. Both we and they have command centers here, but a single center or several centers of the acquisition and assessment of incoming information are built. And in this single center we propose the organization of the alert duty of mixed crews--with the participation of Russian officers.

[Solovyev] Where should this center be located?

[Buzhinskiy] Wherever you like. Vladimir Putin proposed to George Bush the creation of two such centers--in Moscow and Brussels. Now, as far as I know, the Americans intend to locate it in Germany at the Ramstein Air Base. Data from all detection facilities will accumulate here. We are talking about several Russian officers being part of the duty shift there.

[Solovyev] But before creating a unified system, we need to think about how compatible Russian and American technology in the missile-defense sphere is.

[Buzhinskiy] We conducted several computer exercises from 2003 through 2008 within the Russia-NATO Council, studying the compatibility our detection and intercept resources. This was the conclusion: they are compatible. There are no technical compatibility problems. There is a problem of the desire to combine them. As soon as our sectoral missile-defense proposal was aired, there immediately appeared five countries--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania--that said no. They cite the fact that this is a violation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and say that NATO or some NATO country cannot delegate the right and possibility of its defense to a non-member of the alliance.

[Solovyev] This is logical, is it not?

[Buzhinskiy] It is. But here the question of trust arises. Unless we trust each other, we shall do nothing. For a whole number of reasons Russia will not become a member of NATO in the foreseeable future, and NATO is not ready for this either. And if we are to speak seriously about the building of a common missile-defense system, the degree of trust has to rise. I believe, generally, that in terms of the West's cooperation with us the main question is that of trust. The lack of it, rather.

[Solovyev] This applies equally to Russia also.

[Buzhinskiy] Of course. This is a mutual problem. We do not have trust in them, they, in us. Until this lack is overcome, speaking of any serious project is impossible.

[Solovyev] Why should the Americans pay heed to our proposal at all? Why do they need us?

[Buzhinskiy] We cannot compel them to cooperation, of course. But, first, it is quite hard to tackle questions of security in Europe, and not only in Europe, without Russia. Either together with Russia here or accept a violation of international law. We let through the UN Security Council Libya resolution, we could have blocked it, and then the West Europeans, and the Americans also, would have had problems. And a second point--the Americans, and the Europeans particularly, are not interested in an arms race.

[Solovyev] But Russia in its present state is even less interested.

[Buzhinskiy] True. We emphatically are not interested. But if it comes to this, we have the possibilities for beginning the development of some new reentry vehicle with an enhanced system of missile-defense penetration aids. In response to the deployment of missile interceptors in Poland we could deploy Iskander systems in Kaliningrad Oblast. Who would prohibit us from doing this? We would not be violating any international treaties in this case--this is our national territory. Both the Baltic countries and the Poles would want to arm here. And since they cannot do this themselves--there's no money, consequently, the Americans would have to concern themselves with this. Build bases, transfer to them Patriot battalions, and so forth.

[Solovyev] What might Russia get in terms of security from the building of a missile-defense system together with the United States?

[Buzhinskiy] Most likely an increase in our threat-detection possibilities. Were missiles to fly from a southern direction, they would fly across our territory, and we have the means of detecting and intercepting them. The S-400 and even S-300 systems are capable of this. We have, like I say, detection facilities, we are restoring the space group. If all the plans for reform of the Armed Forces are executed, our possibilities in terms of missile defense will increase considerably. I shall give you my personal opinion. How is the plan for European missile defenses good? In order to cooperate seriously with NATO, Russia needs a real project. We need to switch from exercises to technological cooperation. Such a project makes us, if not allies, then, full-fledged partners. This would be joint security, and this is serious. We have not thus far had such a project.

[Solovyev] What are the chances of it appearing at this time and of a joint missile-defense project being materialized?

[Buzhinskiy] They are quite high, in my opinion.

Russian Airborne Laser

16 December 2010

Source: Veniamin Sergeyev, "'Laser Sword' for the Russian Air Force," Voyennyye Novosti Rossii, 16 December 2010.

Russian A-60 Beriyev Airborne Laser, via RIA Novosti (http://en.rian.ru)

Russian A-60 Airborne Laser Laboratory Said in 'Final Stage' of Modification

It recently became known that the A-60 aircraft with optical-electronic jamming and laser interception of all airborne threats is in its final stage of modification. Test flights and simulated tests of the laser-based combat installation will continue in the near future.

The history of the development of this magnificent project, from the realm of the "fantastic" by the standards of those times, takes us back to the remote seventies — the height of the Cold War. It was then that the Georgiy Dmitriyev Machine Building Plant in Taganrog [Rostov Oblast] was instructed to develop and make airborne a purpose-designed air-based combat laser, which was needed for the direct support of all combat arms in any theater of military operations. On the road to the development of the aircraft lay a huge spectrum of scientific-technical and engineering works, the majority of which were carried out for the first time not only in Russian, but also in world practice, and which required the involvement of the country's huge scientific and technical potential and the introduction of numerous experimental design innovations in the spheres of optics, electronics, and navigation.

For the aerial platform-carrier, as in the case of the A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, the Il-76MD heavy military transport airplane (tail number USSR-86879) was chosen, and extensive re-equipment was carried out:

— under the cowling of the augmented nose cone the weather radar was replaced with a Ladoga-3 radar for the detection of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, aircraft, remotely piloted air vehicles, and air-balloons and for the guidance of the main megawatt laser in the absence of auxiliary sources of target detection; the possibility of installing laser guidance in the cone is also known, but in view of the external form of the cowling — a white composite (ceramic, fiberglass) — an on-board radar system was installed, and for the latest modifications the installation of the N030 Irbis-E on-board radar with passive phased antenna array is entirely expedient;

— the continuously operating combat laser with a capacity of 1 MW was housed in an extensible turret installed in the rear part of the cargo bay (between the wing stems and the fin); this configuration preserved all the aerodynamic attributes of the Il-76 glider;

— capsules containing two AI-24VT turbo generators were installed in the sides of the fuselage to power the main laser; their combined capacity was 2.1 MW;

FMSO Commentary: Laser-guns, or directed-energy weapons have been on the drawing boards of scientists and science-fiction writers for the past century. Some progress has been made, but the modest results have not quite matched either the hype or the huge budget costs for developing such a weapon system. In 2010, the U.S. Air Force ceased development of its airborne laser system (Yal-1), stating that the concept was not 'operationally viable.' Modest American research continues, however, into the practicality of using an aircraft-mounted laser in defending against enemy-launched missiles.

Russia has been working on this concept for a considerably longer period of time. The article below describes their recent developments of a military airborne laser system based on the IL-76. The Russian research is directed less at ballistic missile defense and more at countering enemy intelligence means in different environments, in essence, by blinding the enemy's command and control. The complex is designed to transmit laser energy to remote objects in order to counter the infrared opto-electronic means of the enemy. Supposedly, the laser will paralyze the work of intelligence facilities located in space, air, and ground. If actually fielded, such a system could pose a serious threat to all aspects of communication, reconnaissance, and information processing. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

Russian A-60 Airborne Laser Laboratory Said in 'Final Stage' of Modification

— another two turbo generators were installed in the sides of the nose of the fuselage, as in the Il-76 (jamming aircraft);

— the leaves of the door of the cargo bay were removed, but the ramp was retained in order to give the aircraft's structure a robustness.

The aircraft's operating ceiling is 13,800m; maximum speed 850 km/h; cruising speed 700 km/h; tactical crew of the laser tower: four pilots + 10 system operators (identical to the A-50U).

Three of these flying laboratories were built. The first — the 1A — went airborne 19 August 1981 (the US counterpart YAL-1A took off 21 years later); the second — the 1A2 — on 29 August 1991. The 1A burned to ashes at the Chkalovskaya Air Force base; the 1A2 is used as a transport plane. A third aircraft under an unknown reference number, probably 1A3, is in the inventory of the Air Force to this day as a research-combat item and is based at the T.M. Beriyev Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex air field in Taganrog.

The megawatt laser, which operates by burning a mixture of various chemical substances and which emits a huge quantity of photons that give out an extremely energetic glow with an infrared wavelength of 1.2-1.4 microns, has a range of effective luminosity of 300km-600km in the case of stratospheric and low orbital targets and 100km-200km in the case of ground targets. The laser radiates both in the visible band wave, and in the infrared band wave (from 1.5 teracycles to 400 teracycles) and is designed for:

— jamming optical-electronic sighting systems in the air and on the ground;

— disabling the infrared, television, semi-active, self-directional laser heads of surface-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiles, antitank guided missiles, robot bombs, and others;

— the physical annihilation of airborne threats (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aviation missiles, aviation) by heating and melting the casing and the onboard radioelectronic equipment;

— killing personnel and exerting intimidating psychological pressure.

At the present time preparation is under way for new tests, and small-series production will begin in three to five years' time. The A-60 was designed from its inception to collaborate in an echelon with its cousin — the A-50U early radar warning and control aircraft, which will carry out early radar detection and IR-acquisition of enemy air targets (it is capable of intercepting 300 targets) and relay target detection in the case of priority targets to the A-60 aircraft. The two aircraft will most likely be covered by two echelons of fighter-interceptors: four MiG-31BM's and four Su-35S's or MiG-35's.

Thus the Beriyev 'A' aircrafts based on the Il-76 have a great future, despite their advanced age.



What General Petraeus is reading

The Boston Globe's H.D.S. Greenway finally tells us, after a whole lot of throat clearing, what the U.S. commander in Afghanistan is reading these days:

"Thomas Barfield's Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History; ***Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau's The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War***; Greg Mortenson's Three Cups of Tea; and Sir Winston Churchill's The Story of The Malakand Field Force, about frontier fighting in the late 19th century. In Churchill's time there was a similar tremendous debate about Britain's "Forward Policy," whether to really go in and build up civil institutions, pacifying the Pashtuns, or whether to maintain a lesser footprint, punishing the frontier tribes when necessary; the 19th century equivalent of drone attacks and special-ops, nicknamed "butcher and bolt."

Thomas E. Ricks, Foreign Policy
www.ricks.forignpolicy.com

Reincarnation of the Admiral Gorshkov Carrier

17 March 2011

Source: "INS Vikramaditya sea trials to begin in fall – Sevmash," Interfax, 17 March 2011

INS Vikramaditya as of 2010
By vishy.1990 (Defence news) [FAL], via Wikimedia Commons

INS Vikramaditya Sea Trials to Begin in Fall — Sevmash

SEVERODVINSK. The Vikramaditya aircraft carrier (the former Admiral Gorshkov) of the Indian Navy, which is being modernized at Russia's Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, will have sea trials in fall, shipyard representative Anastasia Nikitinskaya said.

"We have a very busy production program for this year. We must deliver three nuclear-powered submarines to the Russian Navy and start testing the Indian aircraft carrier in fall," Sevmash General Director Nikolai Kalistratov said.

He made the statement after a meeting of the interdepartmental working group, which controlled the fulfillment of the submarines order at the shipyard.

Dockside trials of the aircraft carrier started on March 1. "The final goal of the dockside trials is to prepare the ship's systems and equipment for sea trials," Nikitinskaya said.

"The ship is being stuffed with equipment, mechanisms, pipelines and cables and all that needs to be tested in various modes," she said.

Russia and India signed a deal to upgrade the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov in 2004. The Indian authorities pledged to pay $947 million to fund the ship's maintenance and modernization, and $530 million more to purchase 16 MiG-29K fighter jets and Kamov Ka-31 and Kamov Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopters.

However, having paid $458 million, India suspended the financing of the project in January 2007. In November, Russia asked the Indian authorities to increase the project's budget. The Indian government's security committee gave the go-ahead to talks on a new price for the Admiral Gorshkov modernization contract following the Russian president's visit to India in December 2008.

The ship was expected to be handed over to the customer at the end of 2008. But this deadline was subsequently postponed.

The Admiral Gorshkov, which was previously known as the cruiser Baku, was built in Mykolaiv, Ukraine, and joined the Soviet Northern Fleet in 1987.

The aircraft carrier is 283 meters long and 51 meters wide. It has a displacement of more than 45,000 tons.

FMSO Commentary: For over the past decade, Indian naval officials have been working their Russian counterparts in repairing and restoring India's first aircraft carrier. The hull of the new Indian aircraft carrier (INS Vikramaditya) was originally named Admiral Gorshkov, (the Soviet naval leader credited with creating the USSR's blue water navy). Construction of the Soviet ship began in 1978 and it was commissioned in 1987. In 1994, following a boiler room explosion, the ship was docked for a year of repairs. Briefly returning to Russian naval service in 1995, it was finally decommissioned in 1996, and offered for sale. Negotiations with India began in 1999, and the initial contract was signed in 2004.

Given the complex and huge scale of the refurbishments, completion of the project has fallen behind schedule (repairs were to be completed by 2008), and have proven to be more expensive than originally envisioned. India now plans to acquire the refitted Gorshkov in 2013 by paying $2.3 billion instead of $974 million originally proposed in the January 2004 'fixed price contract.'

The hulls of these former Soviet carriers serve as an apt metaphor for the geopolitical shifts of the last decade. China has begun to strengthen its naval projection power with their initial test trials of their first aircraft carrier, the Riga/Varyag, likely to be renamed, Shi Lang (see GSW #1). China's neighbor, India is likewise moving toward developing naval power projection/protection with the addition of their first aircraft carrier, with sea trials now scheduled for 2012. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)