

OE WATCH

FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

IN THIS ISSUE

IRAN

- 3 Inside the Iranian Foreign Service
- 5 Iran Expands Gender Segregation in Universities

TURKEY

- 7 Turkish Jet Downed by Syria Brings the Syrian Crisis into NATO
- 9 Turkey Plans to Buy Long Range Missiles after Syria Downing of Turkish Jet
- 10 Tension between Turkey and Russia following the Syrian Jet Crisis

LIBYA, JORDAN, YEMEN

- 11 Unrest Continues in Southeast Libya
- 13 Must Jordan Pick Sides?
- 15 Iranian Influence Grows in Yemen

DRC, MALI, COTE D'IVOIRE, LIBERIA

- 17 Mutiny in the DRC
- 19 One Rebel Group Chases Out Another in Mali
- 21 Looming Insecurity on the Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire Border
- 23 Liberia Not Ready to Cut AFRICOM Ties

INDIA

- 25 India: Arming for the Future

MEXICO

- 28 Corruption: Part of the Mexican Culture?
- 30 The Visible and Invisible Victims of the Calderón Administration

COLOMBIA

- 31 Lugo Rhymes with Hugo

TAIWAN, CHINA

- 33 Taiwan Observer Notes Light Sentencing for Indicted Spies
- 34 ROC Military and Confidential Information
- 35 China Said to be Building Transportation Infrastructure at DPRK Border
- 36 China Begins Stockpiling Rare Earth Elements

KOREA

- 38 North Korean Cyber Denier

AFGHANISTAN

- 40 Assassination of Influential Figures

CENTRAL ASIA

- 42 All is Not Quiet on the Kazakh Front
- 44 Peace Mission 2012
- 45 Uzbekistan Leaves the CSTO Again
- 47 Russia's Presence in Tajikistan

RUSSIA

- 48 Russia is Working to Keep Its Military Base in Tajikistan for Another 10 Years at Same Cost; Calls Tajikistan Unreasonable
- 50 Russian Oil Giant Concludes \$120 Million Energy Deal with Iraq
- 52 Poll: Russian Bloggers Believe the West is behind Middle East Instability, and Aims to Destabilize Russia
- 54 A New Russian Strategic Bomber?
- 56 Naval Staff Relocation?
- 58 Loyal Guardians of the State

UKRAINE

- 61 "Something's got to give": Ukraine's Defense Minister on Financing Military Reform



Inside the Iranian Foreign Service



North Korean Cyber Denier

For over 25 years, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

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3 Inside the Iranian Foreign Service

Pesakhha-ye Qashqavi beh Akhrrin Vaza'it Diplomat-e Iran dar Brazil, Nahva Guzinesh Diplomatha va Ta'dad Diplomatha-ye Penihandeh Shoda" ("Answers of Qashqavi to the latest status of the Iranian Diplomat in Brazil, How Diplomats are Chosen, and Diplomats who have Defected,") Khabaronline.com. 8 July 2012

The days of the Foreign Ministry being a bastion for more reform-oriented factions is over.



15 Iranian Influence Grows in Yemen

Fears of Regional and International Escalation in Yemen Hinder a Political Settlement" (al-Quds al-Arabi)


Since the implementation of the Saudi-sponsored plan to transition away from the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh earlier this year, Iranian influence is thought to have increased in Yemen, especially at the grassroots level



21 Looming Insecurity on the Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire Border

A. Abbas Dulleh, "Liberia: Fear Mounts," New Democrat (Monrovia), 13 July 2012

The Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire border is showing itself to be an emerging spot of insecurity in an already increasingly unstable West African region.



36 China Begins Stockpiling Rare Earth Elements

Eric Min, "China Starts Stockpiling Rare Earths," Guangzhou Business China Online, July 10, 2012

...the Chinese government was awarding state funds for interest-free loans for the strategic buying of heavy rare earth oxides to stockpile because concerns that reserve are running low



38 North Korean Cyber Denier

Song Yo'ng-so'k, "Fabricated Act Borne by Chronic Bad Habit," Rodong Sinmun, 9 June 2012

North Korea may appear to be technologically primitive, but it has focused resources into developing offensive cyber weapons



40 Assassination of Influential Figures

Nokta hai penhaan roydad-s Samangan" ("Hidden Points of Samangan Incident,") Mandagar Daily, July 16,

2012

Moreover, the recent assassinations could increase resentment and anxiety among Northern Alliance leaders who are worried about political deals with the Taliban

OE Watch Commentary: In recent months the Iranian Foreign Ministry has been rocked by accusations of personal misconduct by Iranian diplomats serving abroad. First, in April 2012, Brazilian authorities accused an Iranian diplomat of fondling four young girls in a public swimming pool in the Brazilian capital of Brasilia. Then, in July, German authorities accused an Iranian diplomat stationed in Frankfurt, Germany, of lewd conduct toward a 10-year-old girl.

Against this backdrop, Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Qashqavi granted an interview to the state news agency Khabar Online, answering a number of questions regarding the specific allegations. While that is the stuff of fleeting headlines, far more interesting to analysts will be his dissection of the personnel within the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its component paramilitary, the Basij, has been growing in Iranian society. The representation and strength of IRGC veterans in the Iranian bureaucracy has accelerated throughout the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the first president of Iran to arise from a military rather than clerical background.

The extent of Basiji and war veteran penetration of the Iranian Foreign Ministry will manifest itself in a number of ways. Already the ambassadorships to the countries Iranian leaders consider most important—Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq—go to members of the Qods Force, the IRGC's elite unit charged with export of revolution. That Basijis and war veterans now penetrate the Foreign Ministry may obviate the traditional wire diagram of ministry decision making in favor of the informal networks of veterans which developed on the frontlines of the eight-year war.

Inside the Iranian Foreign Service

8 July 2012

Source: “Pesakhha-ye Qashqavi beh Akhryn Vaza’it Diplomata-e Iran dar Brazil, Nahva Guzinesh Diplomatha va Ta’dad Diplomatha-ye Penihandeh Shoda” (“Answers of Qashqavi to the latest status of the Iranian Diplomat in Brazil, How Diplomats are Chosen, and Diplomats who have Defected,”) Khabaronline.com. 8 July 2012. <http://www.khabaronline.ir/text/detail/226251/politics/diplomacy>

Iran Foreign Minister
Hassan Qashqavi, via www.mfa.gov.ir



پاسخ‌های قشقاوی به آخرین وضعیت دیپلمات ایران در
برزیل، نحوه گزینش دیپلمات‌ها و تعداد دیپلمات‌های
پناهنده شده

(Answers of Qashqavi to...how Diplomats are Chosen)

You have worked in the Foreign Ministry for several years and have had various responsibilities. What is the Foreign Ministry selection mechanism for diplomats?

Because of the sensitivity of the Foreign Ministry's work, the ministry has one of the strictest selection procedures. Because the majority of managers and staff of the former regime were excluded from the Foreign Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry was supposed to be a new force, from the beginning until today, placement in the Ministry was a careful process. Sometimes it takes months to examine individuals on the basis of personal status and family... The same applies even to international relations graduates at the university under the supervision of the Ministry.

The employees and personnel of the ministry number 4,000, if one counts both official and unofficial personal and both administrative and political cadres in tiers of the most devoted. Sixty-seven are children of martyrs, and there are 479 wounded veterans, and 1,400 veterans in general. Eighty percent of the veterans have a university degree, either a Bachelors' degree or higher. Therefore, based on the existing data, among the 4,000 personnel, the Foreign Ministry, because of strong selections criteria and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation, employees a plurality of Basij members: 2,800 are normal members of the Basij, and 1,700 [sic] are active members. Therefore, half of our diplomats are among the well-educated [families of] martyrs or Basij. According to the staff of the

The increasing proportion of Basijis, as well as the vetting procedure which put them in place, also suggests that the days of the Foreign Ministry being a bastion for more reform-oriented factions is over. Indeed, the hardline press has already taken up the theme of countering the “New Yorkers,” the derogatory name for those who have served at the Iranian mission to the United Nations and who have allowed traditional etiquette to subsume pursuit of revolution.

Given the role of the IRGC in terrorist operations (the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Qods Force to be a terrorist entity in 2007), the IRGC’s supplanting of traditional diplomats raises the possibility that Iranian hardliners may once again leverage Iranian diplomatic missions for their purposes, something they have hesitated to do since the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. End OE Watch Commentary (Rubin)

Continued: Answers of Qashqavi to...how Diplomats are Chosen

Ministry, 106 people have doctoral degrees, 877 employees have a master’s degree, and 1,334 individuals have a Bachelor’s degree, that is to say that 2,317 have college degrees. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the most educated and greatest number of Basijis of all the ministries and executive agencies in the country. Certainly, I was told all this not because the system is an absolute force for the infallibility of diplomacy and diplomats. We are all human and should always esteem Almighty God, and seek the purity of our spirit and our deeds.

Tim Thomas’s *The Dragon’s Quantum Leap* peels back the transformation process and uncovers the digital-age impacts of new modes of Chinese military thinking.

***The Dragon’s Quantum Leap* expands the scope of Tim Thomas’s two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. As**

with his previous work, Tim Thomas primarily uses all-Chinese source material



OE Watch Commentary: The Islamic Revolution has from its victory in 1979 been a work in progress. Revolutionaries were united in their opposition to the Shah, but had no consensus on what Islamic society and culture meant. Revolutionary authorities have always paid special attention to the universities. The revolution was carried on the back of student unrest, and it was hardline students who seized the U.S. embassy nine months after Ayatollah Khomeini's return. Upon seizing the reins of power, revolutionary authorities sought to implement a cultural revolution in the universities to purge them of Western influence. Revolutions evolve, however, and as Iran rebuilt after the Iran-Iraq War, universities became incubators for the reformist movement.

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005 he sought to revive traditional revolutionary values. Indeed, what many Western analysts call 'hardliners,' Iranians call 'principalists,' meaning those who reach back to the principles of the Islamic Revolution. In order to re-root the universities in traditional values, Ahmadinejad has ordered unknown soldiers from the Iran-Iraq War—called martyrs in traditional Iranian parlance—to be buried on university campuses in ceremonies which students and faculty are forced to attend.

While the Universities of Tehran, Shiraz, and Isfahan may be Iran's most famous centers of higher education, the Islam Azad University has become the Islamic Republic's largest. Founded during the early years of the revolution, the Islam Azad University was the brainchild of former President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, largely to get 18 to 22 year olds off the street. The university branches are basically akin to a national community college system.

While they taught basic trades and general subjects, the principalists long complained that the Islam Azad University system was not ideological

Iran Expands Gender Segregation in Universities

3 July 2012

Source: "Tasis 6 Wahad Tek Genseti dar Daneshgah Azad" ("Establish of 6 Single-Gender Units in Azad University,") Iranian Student News Agency. 3 July 2012 <http://tinyurl.com/7jmf85l>



Islamic azad university of najafabad library by اءووپ (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

تاسيس 6 واحد تكجنسيتي در دانشگاه آزاد/كلاس هاي دروس عمومي دانشگاه تكجنسيتي شد (Establishment of Six Single-Gender Units in Azad University)

The Deputy Head for Cultural Affairs at Islam Azad University said: Good practices in the commissioning of universities having been determined, and so until now, six single-gender units have been established in four Islam Azad Universities.

In a report to the Iranian Student News Agency, Mohammad Mehdi Mazaheri, said to the heads of the Islam Azad Universities in the Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province, and Isfahan province, and in reference to the Supreme Leader's emphasis on Islamization in the universities, that Islamizing the university and deepening and broadening the foundations of Islam and creating a religious atmosphere are among the most important cultural affairs of the university, and useful and fruitful steps have been taken in this regard.

He stated that he is committed to the mission and the university and to the development of faithful and committed people with the acquisition of modern science and in line with the progress and prosperity of society and the country, and he said, "The institutionalization of basic Islamic-Iranian culture is among the factors affecting the formation and identity of the youth and the future of the country, and the officials of the universities are in line with these efforts.

enough. Ahmadinejad and his allies spent several years during his first term trying to wrest control of the university system away from Rafsanjani's allies.

Recent moves to begin gender segregation in the Islam Azad University system are one more sign that the hardliners have consolidated control and might presage the start of a new cultural revolution inside Iran. While many Western officials are optimistic that Iranian youth seek Western freedoms, the Iranian government may hope that the youth can be "re-educated" by redesigning universities to prioritize religious indoctrination. End OE Watch Commentary (Rubin)

Continued: Establishment of Six Single-Gender Units in Azad University

The head of the fourth region of the universities said that the development and mobilization of the mosques was the most important priority in university culture, and that the directors wanted the preservation of memorials to the unknown martyrs, and various cultural programs will be implemented in such places.

He said in another part of his speech that good things have been accomplished for launching single gender universities and, up until now, six single gender university units have been launched in the fourth region, and thus 90 percent of practical courses, laboratories, and workshops, and 100 percent of public courses are offered in single gender environments, and that it is a blessed achievement for the university.

The Deputy Head for Cultural Affairs noted, cultural spaces, especially exquisite mosques built in the Persian and Islamic styles, have been built, and that these places are permanent reminders of the infallible imams, and that this is to the benefit of the students, staff, and faculty to be exposed to the different method.

Mazaheri pointed to the speech of the president of the university, that on the banner of the university, it is stated that Islamic Iran will continue to conquer the peaks of the world because of scientific achievements, activities, and the culture of the university.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil)

International Research Collaboration Program

Quality researchers outside of the U.S. government express new ideas that will help define the current and future defense and security environment from understudied and unconsidered perspectives.

OE Watch Commentary: *On 22 June Syria downed an unarmed Turkish RF-4 (F-4 Phantom) military jet, which crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. Even as of 12 July, the details of where and how the incident happened remain unclear: Turkish officials claim that the jet was shot down by a missile without warning over international airspace after having mistakenly and briefly flown over Syrian airspace. The Syrian military claim they shot the plane down with anti-aircraft fire while it was in Syrian airspace. Syrian President Assad said his forces were unaware that the jet belonged to Turkey and claimed they were protecting their airspace from an unknown intruder. The difference in accounts is one of describing an offensive act versus a defensive one.*

Following the incident Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan declared this a hostile act and announced that it now considered Syria a ‘clear and present danger.’ He warned that Turkey would consider any military element that approaches the border from Syria as a threat and treat it as a military target. On 24 June Turkey invoked Article 4 of the NATO charter, which allows consultations with allies if a member considers its security to be under threat. The NATO meeting took place on 26 June in Brussels, where the alliance expressed solidarity with Turkey.

Changing statements by Turkish government and military officials in the days and weeks following the incident created confusion in the media and public, who are still demanding answers. While original accounts by the Turkish military clearly stated that the plane was shot down by Syria, later statements referred to the jet as ‘our plane that Syria claims to have shot down,’ only to be reversed once again a few days later. Furthermore, initial statements that the plane was shot down by a missile also became questionable after early findings from the wreckage revealed

Turkish Jet Downed by Syria Brings the Syrian Crisis into NATO

Source: “5. Açıklama Kafa Karıştırdı (The 5th Statement Created Confusion),” Milliyet (Nationality), 12 July 2012. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazdir.aspx?aType=HaberDetayPrint&ArticleID=1565905>

12 July 2012



Turkish RF-4E Phantom Jet Photographed by Adrian Pingstone [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons

5. Açıklama Kafa Karıştırdı (The 5th Statement Created Confusion)

Regarding the Turkish jet that was downed by Syria in the Mediterranean, the Chief of the General Staff had, in its earlier statements used the phrase, ‘the jet that was downed by Syria’ but yesterday, they referred to it as the ‘jet that has been alleged to have been downed by Syria.’

Yesterday’s statement by the General Staff regarding the RF-4E reconnaissance jet that took off from the Jet Base in Malatya and was downed by Syria on June 22 while it was in international airspace, has led to increased question marks. Until yesterday, the General Staff had been referring to the jet as the ‘Turkish jet that was downed by Syria’ but in yesterday’s statement, they referred to it as the jet that ‘is claimed to be downed by Syria.’ In the statement, it was revealed that initial findings from the wreckage investigations raised the possibility that the jet was not downed by a missile or anti-aircraft. The phrases that were used suggested that it might have been a technical problem or a pilot error. However it was also pointed out that if it was a technical error, the jet would have contacted [the Air Operations Center in] Diyarbakır. The statement pointed out that the analysis of parts recovered from the bottom of the sea might reveal traces of ammunition.

The Question Marks are Increasing

Following the downing of the Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance jet, driven by flight

Continued: The 5th Statement Created Confusion

no trace of explosives or ammunition. This caused a debate in Turkey that the plane might have gone down due to a technical problem and raised questions about the validity of Syrian statements. Conspiracy theories emerged claiming that Russia or Israel downed it by remote-controlled electromagnetic weapons systems. Other questions that remain unanswered are why Turkey was flying an unarmed reconnaissance plane so close to the Syrian border and whether it was warned to leave Syrian airspace.

Turkey has a 550-mile border with Syria. After initially trying to use diplomatic means to get Assad to pursue a peaceful transition to democracy, Turkey changed its course and supported the Syrian opposition, and is currently hosting the Syrian National Council (dissidents' umbrella group). Turkey also hosts around 30,000 Syrian refugees on its border with Syria.

*The accompanying article from Turkish mainstream daily Milliyet highlights the Turkish position and refers to the jet as having been downed while it was in international airspace. **End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)***

lieutenant Gökhan Ertan on June 22, top government officials made tough statements. However, now that the wreckage has been discovered, the question marks have increased. Despite the fact that the pilots' remains and many parts of the plane were recovered, there has been no explanation about how the Turkish jet was downed. The General Staff and government officials had said that there was the plane was likely downed by a missile; but the information that we've been receiving in the last few days suggests that a missile was not involved. The General Staff's statement yesterday, in which they made four points, contained notable statements.

Until yesterday, the General Staff had said, 'Our plane which was downed by Syria...' But yesterday's statement said: "Regarding the RF-4 plane from our Air Forces Command, which was flying over international airspace with which we lost radar and radio contact, and which subsequently was claimed by Syrian

authorities to have been downed; we have shared all the information we have with the public in an accurate and transparent manner. We will continue to do so."

No Trace of Gas or Ammunition

Items that were recovered from the water's surface during the search and rescue efforts have been analyzed by the Gendarmerie Criminal Investigations Office and according to their report; no trace of petroleum-based, combustible or fire accelerant substances or any kind of ammunition have been found. Technical analyses by the Air Forces Command are continuing.

Sources say that there is a small chance that Israel, who had modernized the jets, has the technical capability to target the electronic route of the plane by using electromagnetic systems.



The RED DIAMOND is the Army's leading e-journal highlighting current threats in the Operational Environment.

It is produced by the Threats Intelligence Support Activity (U.S. Army TRADOC G-2) and posted at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/25364306>.

OE Watch Commentary: Due to increasing tension with Syria, especially following the 22 June incident in which Syria shot down a Turkish jet (see previous article), Turkey has announced plans to buy long-range air and missile defense systems, in a project worth around 4 billion dollars.

The project, entitled “Turkey’s Long-Range Air and Missile Defense Systems,” entails a system that would enable Turkish forces to destroy long-range missile threats before they enter Turkish airspace. Currently Turkey hosts a NATO missile shield radar in eastern Turkey, but the actual missiles that would be launched are not deployed in Turkey. This is why Ankara wants its own defense system. (Under the NATO plan, the radar in Turkey is for the early detection of missiles launched from the region, but the interceptors will be based on U.S. Navy ships in the Mediterranean, equipped with destroyers.)

The Turkish Armed Forces currently do not have long-range air and missile defense systems. Turkey has Rapiers and Stinger missile batteries against short-range threats, and American I-Hawk missile systems for medium-range threats.

The long-range system tender has attracted companies from Russia, China, Europe and the U.S. The presence of Russian and Chinese companies among the competitors has created security concerns for some NATO members. As the article states, Russian and Chinese systems are not compatible with NATO systems, and their selection might give them access to NATO intelligence. This is the first time that NATO has strongly advised Turkey against choosing non-Western systems. **End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)**

Turkey Plans to Buy Long Range Missiles after Syria Downing of Turkish Jet

30 June 2012



Source: “Türkiye Uzun Menzilli Füze Alıyor! (Turkey is Buying Long Range Missiles!),” Habervitrini, 30 June 2012. <http://www.habervitrini.com/haber/turkiye-uzun-menzilli-fuze-aliyor-614586/#>

Caption reads: “Turkey’s Critical Move” “This move by Turkey will heat up the Syrian border” via Rotahaber.com

Türkiye Uzun Menzilli Füze Alıyor! (Turkey is Buying Long Range Missiles!)

Following the Syria crisis, the government has taken action to move forward with a ‘Long-Range Air and Missile Defense Systems’ [plan].

It is being reported that the French company Eurosam is the strongest candidate to win the contract to take place in the next few days.

Following the Syrian military’s downing of a RF-4E reconnaissance plane belonging to the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkey has fast-tracked its search for a new long-range air and defense system. A new tender will be opened shortly for the new system estimated to be worth 4 billion dollars. The Defense Industry Executive Committee, whose members include the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Defense Secretary İsmet Yılmaz, the Chief of the General Staff Necdet Özel, and the Undersecretary of the Defense Industry Department Murad Bayar will meet soon to decide on the winner.

The tender is titled, “Turkey’s Long-Range Air and Missile Defense Systems” and is expected to include bids from the American Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, Russian Rosoboronexport, China’s CPMIEC and the French-Italian consortium Eurosam.

The tender was initially discussed in 2009 but was postponed indefinitely. A western diplomatic source said that the list would be finalized around July 11 or 12.

“NATO Won’t Allow Russia or China”

In a statement to the Hurriyet Daily News, western officials and experts claimed that it was unlikely that Russia or China would win the contract because systems developed in those countries were not compatible with NATO countries’ systems.

Furthermore, if Rosoboronexport or CPMIEC wins the contract, this would mean that secret information belonging to NATO would be accessible by non-member countries. NATO would not allow such a situation.

OE Watch Commentary: *Following the downing of a Turkish jet by Syria on 22 June and Turkey's move to invoke NATO Article 4, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged Turkey to refrain from viewing the incident as provocation or a pre-planned attack. He warned that relations between Turkey and Syria would deteriorate even further if the sides did not exercise restraint. He also reiterated that any NATO military action against Syria would be unacceptable and that it would lead to 'tragic consequences.' The Turkish Prime Minister accused him of speaking on behalf of Syria.*

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Russia's stance has been that it would not allow foreign powers to impose or 'dictate' their positions to Syria. Russia (along with China) has vetoed any UN call to take action against Syria.

Meanwhile, conspiracy theorists in Turkey are claiming that Russia could have downed the jet by remote-controlled electromagnetic systems. Furthermore, a 16 July broadcast on Russia's Voice radio claimed that the Turkish jet was downed by a Russian-made missile.¹

*This position by Russia, an ally of Syria, has increased tensions with Turkey. Relations between the two countries are already strained because Turkey is hosting the NATO missile shield radar, which is a disturbing development for Russia, due to its geographic proximity. Russia has threatened to deploy Iskander-E missiles in Krasnodar, which would expand its missile ranges to include Turkey, only 480 km (~300 miles) away. These would be able to hit a third of Turkey, including the NATO radar base. Turkey had been trying to cultivate political, economic and especially energy ties with Russia, and still places importance on these fledgling ties. **End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)***

1. "Uçağı Rus Yapımı Füze Düşürdü (The Jet was Downed by a Russian-made Missile)," Rotahaber.com, July 16, 2012, <http://haber.rotahaber.com/ucagi-rus-yapimi-fuze-dusurdu-289100.html>

Tension between Turkey and Russia following the Syrian Jet Crisis

26 June 2012

Source: "Jet Krizinde Rusya'ya Jet Cevap (Jet Response to Russia on the Jet Crisis)," Sabah.com, 26 June 2012. <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/06/26/erdogan-rusya-suriye-agziyla-konusuyor>



Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the North Atlantic Council Meeting on the subject of the shooting down of a Turkish aircraft by Syria. Photo by NATO via <http://www.nato.int>

Jet Krizinde Rusya'ya Jet Cevap (Jet Response to Russia on the Jet Crisis)

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan evaluated Russia's statement that, "The downing of a Turkish jet by Syria should not be seen as provocation or a pre-planned move." Prime Minister Erdoğan said that Russia was putting words in Syria's mouth. Erdoğan also expressed that he was pleased with NATO's response.

Erdoğan answered questions from press members about Russian statements regarding the Turkish jet that was downed by Syria in international waters. He said, "[Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's] statements must be based on his meetings with his Syrian contacts and he must've spoken on their behalf. So far, the information and reports that we have do not paint the picture that he is as well-intentioned as he is acting."

Prime Minister Erdoğan also relayed that NATO was very supportive after the meeting in Brussels and that the 28 members of the Alliance had strongly condemned Syria and called the act "unacceptable." He also said that NATO had assured that it would follow the situation closely.


OE Watch Commentary: Tripoli-based regional militias, global jihadists, former regime loyalists and eastern secessionists have been drawing the bulk of the security attention when it comes to Libya. Since the start of the year, though, the heaviest clashes in the country have been those taking place in Libya's southeastern oasis town of Kufra (see: OEW 2.3, p. 17 <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Archives/GSW/201203.pdf> and OEW 2.4, p. 19 <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Archives/GSW/201204.pdf>). The violence initially pitted the Arabized Berber Zway tribe against the local Tibu (who also inhabit Chad and Niger), but now also includes troops from the Libyan army's "Shield Brigade."

The fighting, which began in February, is thought to at its root be over control of smuggling routes. As Libya moves into a new era of electoral democracy, the ability to maintain security over the country's vast territory may prove to be challenging, particularly if certain tribal, ethnic or regional groups feel that the new system is rigged against them. This has been the case with secessionists in Libya's east, as well as with the Tibu in the country's south.

The following article, an overview of the situation in the region, is taken from a recently launched English-language Libyan daily, one of many new media outlets vying for influence in the post-Qaddafi era. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter).**

Unrest Continues in Southeast Libya

2 July 2012



Source: "Kufra again quiet as army takes up positions" (Libya Herald)

<http://www.libyaherald.com/kufra-again-quiet-as-army-takes-up-positions/>

Map of Libya [CC-BY-SA-2.5(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5>)] via planiglobe.com

Kufra again quiet as army takes up positions

The security pendulum in Kufra swung back in the direction of normality today after contingents of the national army moved into key positions. They were accompanied by members of the Libya Shield brigade. Shops have reopened and "life is returning to normal" according to local journalist Hassan Adrees. The national army was deployed to the southeastern oasis town a week ago after the Shield brigade, sent in late February, failed to pacify it.

On Saturday there was still heavy shelling across town, as a result of which three people were reported to have died and dozens wounded. Two of the dead were said to be members of the Shield brigade.

Adrees said that the latest three weeks of fighting in the town between government forces and Tebu fighters had claimed the lives of 18 people, Shield brigadesmen as well as Arab civilians — a figure lower than that reported earlier. At the end of last week Abdullah Zway, a representative of the majority Zway community in Kufra, said that 14 of his people had been killed in just two days. The commander of the Shield forces, Wissam Ben Hamid, said some 30 people had been killed last week alone.

However, Adrees said that his figures did not include Tebu casualties. During the three week's of fighting, Tebu spokesmen had claimed that at least 56 of their people have been killed, most recently two on Saturday during shelling of the town's Tebu districts of Qaderfi and Qarah Tebu.

Meanwhile, both the Tebus and the Zway community are now threatening to take non-military action in pursuit of their rivalry.


The Tebu threaten to boycott this weekend's national election unless government forces, especially the Shield brigade, are withdrawn. Tebu leader Essa Abdul Majid was reported saying that Tebus would not vote if tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and snipers remain in the town.

Continued: Kufra again quiet as army takes up positions

For their part, members of the Zway tribe have threatened to prevent oil being pumped from nearby oilfields if the NTC and government do not intervene, put an immediate end to the conflict and ensure there is reconciliation in the town.

However, the Tebu threat may prove academic. According to Tebu spokesman Younis Essa, the High National Election Commission has barred over a thousand Tebus in Kufra from voting in the elections for a variety of reasons — invalid national IDs, fraudulent documents, multiple registrations and lack of Libya citizenship. It represents a significant portion of the local electorate.

***Dragon Bytes* by Tim Thomas examines China's information-war (IW) theory and practice from 1995-2003. Some specialists may be surprised that the Chinese openly discuss not only computer network attacks and electronic preemption but also the development of IW units and an "integrated network-electronic warfare" theory (which closely approximates the US theory of "network-centric warfare"). The Chinese development of an IW theory is representative of their country's philosophy and culture. By creating an "IW theory with Chinese characteristics" the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has offered an alternate way of viewing the application of IW than in the West.**



OE Watch Commentary: Since protests erupted in Syria last year, the Jordanian government has maintained an ambiguous policy toward its larger neighbor's political crisis; neutrality, though, is becoming increasingly difficult as the conflict begins seeping across Syrian borders. On the Turkish border, for instance, the downing of a Turkish F4 reconnaissance plane led Turkey to create a de facto buffer zone along part of its border with Syria. On 21 June the day before Syrian air defense shot down the Turkish plane, a Syrian Air Force pilot landed his MiG-21 at a Jordanian airbase near the border, requesting and receiving political asylum from Jordanian authorities. Syrian authorities were, predictably, displeased.

Unlike the Turkish border, Syria's Jordanian border remains largely demilitarized, with refugee flows the main concern for Jordanian authorities. Large increases in these numbers may become problematic for the Jordanian government, beset with its own political and economic problems. Constant cabinet reshufflings over the past year have done little to appease those calling for an end to corruption and the beginning of real and substantive political reform, specifically more democracy and less monarchy. Jordan's politically strong and savvy Muslim Brotherhood is likely to continue using peaceful means to demand a greater share of power, which they would undoubtedly gain under a fully democratic system.

The following article, taken from the influential and respected pan-Arab al-Hayat newspaper, calls for a more proactive Jordanian policy vis-a-vis Syria. At the regional level, Jordan is clearly aligned with the GCC-countries that most strongly support the Syrian rebellion; at a more local level, as the article recognizes, the situation is more complex and, as with some of Syria's other neighbors, the preference may be for the devil they know.

End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)

Must Jordan Pick Sides?

26 June 2012

Source: Mohammed Barhouma. "The Development of Jordan's Position toward the Syrian Uprising" (al-Hayat) <http://alhayat.com/OpinionsDetails/413562>



Syria-Jordan by Aaron Perez based on Flag of Syria and Flag of Jordan [Public Domain] via Wikimedia Commons

تطور الموقف الأردني من الثورة السورية (The Development of Jordan's Position toward the Syrian Uprising)

From the statements of Jordan's King Abdullah II around a year ago ("if I were in Assad's place I would resign") to those of former Jordanian government spokesman Rakan al-Majali some months ago (Jordan has no interest in "influencing the balance in Syria"), we see a near-complete turnaround in the official Jordanian position toward the Syrian crisis. This turnaround led analysts to speak of Jordan's official "gray" position regarding events in Syria and led others to speak of a Jordanian position that rejects the expected and required involvement in what is taking place on its northern border, beyond the issue of Syrian refugees.


In this context, the incident of the Syrian MiG-21 airplane landing in Jordanian territory a few days ago is important. Jordan's granting of political asylum to the Syrian pilot baffled those who reproach Jordan's conservative position toward the Syrian crisis and led them to raise new questions and approaches to understanding this position. Jordan's quick granting of asylum to Col. Hassan Merei, who landed his MiG-21 in the King Hussein airbase in the city of al-Mafraq adds a new quality to the details of Jordan's position toward the Syrian revolution. This position has not been fixed but rather experienced changes, hesitation, confusion and unresolved debates.

The official position, expressed by King Abdullah's aforementioned statement, was initially aligned with popular Jordanian support of the Syrian uprising; there was, however, another approach in Jordan's decision-making corridors which leaned against taking a clear and decisive position. This conservative team leaned toward a position that thought the Syrian regime may persevere and survive and relations with it may go back to normal. This team strengthened its position by focusing on the influence of Islamists taking power in Syria given Jordan's internal calculations and the more extreme position of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood toward political and economic reforms. The response to this conservative group noted that cutting off contacts with Syrian opposition and the revolutionaries does not

Continued: The Development of Jordan's Position toward the Syrian Uprising

serve Jordanian long-term interests. Furthermore, the Saudi and Qatari positions of supporting the Syrian uprising with force helped tip the balance in favor of the view that Jordan could not avoid involvement in the crisis along its border and it did not have the luxury to merely watch it unfold while merely dealing with humanitarian issues. This is especially true given that the fighting in Syria seems to strongly indicate the possibility of regime collapse and disintegration, especially given that the international groundwork for such a development appears to be in place, not to mention the important implications of news that the CIA is overseeing the arming of the Syrian opposition, to achieve American interests of having the arming not take place outside of American control and conditions.

One of the most important messages of the "Eager Lion" exercises which took place some weeks ago in Jordan is that despite the importance given to what some say regarding Jordan's inability to maintain its position on Syria, as was the case with Turkey, limiting Jordanian thinking on Syria to the dimension of Islamists reaching power in Syria, or to the issue of Syrian refugees, is insufficient. Political wisdom calls for Syria's neighbors, including Jordan, to think about the possibility of the Syrian regime collapsing. The MiG-21 incident reaffirms the fact that Jordan is not in a position to fail to be a positive force in the Syrian revolution.



Scott Henderson's groundbreaking work, *The Dark Visitor* analyzes the history, ideology, organization, exploits, and political motivations of the Chinese hacker network. Whenever possible, the information contained herein has been taken directly from the Chinese hacker organization itself or from interviews with individual members.

OE Watch Commentary: Widespread claims of Iranian influence in Yemen date back to the early 2000s, when the Yemeni government launched an attack against what became known as the “Houthis,” a loose organization based in the northern province of Saada which espoused the revival of traditional Yemeni Zaydism. A subset of Shi’a Islam now endemic to Yemen, Zaydism provided the ideological underpinnings for the Yemeni Imamate that ruled the country for centuries until Yemen’s last imam was overthrown in the late 1960s. Houthi Zaydism, its detractors noted, bore strong resemblances to Iran’s Twelver Shi’ism.

Doctrinal affinity does not necessarily entail strategic cooperation, though, and the form and impact of Iranian support for the Houthis during their wars with the Yemeni government (2004-2010) remain unclear. Since the implementation of the Saudi-sponsored plan to transition away from the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh earlier this year, Iranian influence is thought to have increased in Yemen, especially at the grassroots level. Large segments of the “revolutionary youth” see the transition plan as a pact to redistribute power among political elites rather than the political transformation they and other protesters had hoped for. The Houthis in the north and many political activists in former South Yemen are also tepid at best regarding the transition plan.

Saudi Arabia, which may have the greatest stake in Yemeni stability, is currently reeling from the successive deaths of Crown Princes Sultan and Nayif, both of whom played important roles steering the kingdom’s Yemen policy. As regional tensions escalate, Iran’s Yemen policy seems to be gaining strength and coherence. This is likely to create a potentially formidable challenge to Saudi Arabia’s influence, as detailed in the following article, taken from the influential pan-Arab newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)**

Iranian Influence Grows in Yemen

26 June 2012

Source: “Khaled al-Hammadi. “Fears of Regional and International Escalation in Yemen Hinder a Political Settlement” (al-Quds al-Arabi) <http://alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today%5C26z496.htm&arc=data%5C2012%5C06%5C06-26%5C26z496.htm>



Bab Al-Yaman in Sa'ada city showing the anti-US/Israel Houthi slogans. Houthis made use of lack of state control over the country to expand their influence in north Yemen. YT Photo by Nadia Al-Sakkaf via yementimes.com

مخاوف من تصاعد صراع اقليمي ودولي حول اليمن يعيق التسوية السياسية في البلاد (Fears of Regional and International Escalation in Yemen Hinder a Political Settlement)

According to Yemeni political sources, several influential personalities in Yemen have turned toward Tehran in view of the changes brought about by the Yemeni revolution. They add that Iran has been able to attract a number of influential political personalities, helping expand Iran’s influence in Yemen at the expense of the traditional Saudi influence in the country. According to the sources, Iranian influence in Yemen currently exceeds Saudi and American influence and goes beyond support for the Zaydi Houthi movement in Saada province’s north to include the provinces of Taiz, al-Hodeida, Ibb, Aden, Lahj and other southern provinces which were ideologically distant from Zaydi doctrine and Iranian influence. They spoke of a new type of political dependence on outsiders that was not previously well-known and which may represent the greatest obstacle to a political settlement in Yemen, as the Iranian current in the north has rejected any political compromise other than a revolutionary one while the Iranian current in the south rejects anything less than secession as a resolution to the southern question, as stated by the south’s last president Ali Salem al-Bidh.

A western diplomatic source spoke of discontent with the rise of Iranian influence in Yemen, which he described as “material influence,” that is to say it is motivated by more than ideological reasons and doctrinal sympathies, and is meant to establish material interests with Iran by purchasing the loyalty of influential political and media personalities belonging to the Zaydi sect and others, some completely removed from Zaydi influence.

Continued: Fears of Regional and International Escalation in Yemen Hinder a Political Settlement

“Iranian activities in Yemen have begun frightening the west, since they go beyond the political elite to a popular level, via middlemen and brokers,” he noted. “Saudi Arabian and American programs to build alliances are countered by Iranian payments of money to its new allies,” which the source sees as a blow to traditional holders of influence in the country.

In another matter, the Nasserite leader Mohammed Yahya al-Sabri told al-Quds al-Arabi that Tehran had become a new direction for the Hajj and Omra, in light of this foreign battle over Yemeni politicians, which has created a new environment for political battles, which is only enhanced by the regional and international conflicts of interest.

He added that “Iran’s new influence in Yemen is part of the regional and international struggle over the country. The revolutionary transformations have created space for regional and international struggle and conflict in Yemen that has contributed to Iran’s entering this struggle.” He said that the regional and international conflict was in part linked to what is happening politically in Yemen and in part to ongoing developments in the region, and that the “popular uprising provided a fertile environment for this conflict to develop, led by the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia/United States.” He added that the development of this foreign influence in Yemeni politics cannot succeed except through the presence of domestic pillars to help support it and create suitable ground for them.

He spoke of American desire to pre-emptively spread American influence in Yemen via a military landing under the pretext of fighting al-Qaeda in Abyan and Shabwa provinces. President Abd Rabo Mansour Hadi, though, cut this short by taking a “quick, courageous and successful decision” to launch a full war against al-Qaeda militants using Yemeni government forces. In less than a month, they were able to recover all the cities and areas that fighters from Ansar al-Sharia (the local name for al-Qaeda) had controlled. With this Hadi achieved two goals at once: defeat al-Qaeda members in Abyan and Shabwa province, in line with both American and local desires; and, put a stop to American military intervention to resolve the al-Qaeda problem in Yemen, given that military intervention in Yemen would whet the appetites of those wishing to fight the Americans and more prominently enhance domestic political problems, namely the violation of national sovereignty which would be acceptable to none.

A revolutionary source noted that the popular uprising opened a wide door for political transformation in Yemen and revealed cards that had remained hidden in the previous era. It revealed the nationalist credentials of politicians and traditional leaders for what they were by showing their foreign links. He pointed to the subservience of many Yemeni leaders to Saudi Arabia under

the “Special Saudi Committee,” which provided large monthly payments to tens of major political, military and tribal leaders in Yemen. At its head were former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, military leader Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the children of deceased tribal leader Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, and other senior tribal leaders. Recently, a local Yemeni newspaper revealed a long list of names of Yemeni politicians that receive Saudi support.

Despite the large sums paid by Saudi Arabia to senior leaders and politicians in Yemen, Iran has been able to extend its grassroots influence in Yemen at a crucial time by benefitting to the maximum from the political transformation brought about by the popular uprising early last year and by resorting to various means, the quickest and most influential among them being money and media support.

Radical Islam’s Western Foothold:

Hugo Chavez and Hezbollah

By *Sam Pickell*

“This points to a particularly worrisome possibility: that Hezbollah will move beyond financing and support in Latin America to pursue operational objectives within the Western Hemisphere.”



<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/universities.html>

OE Watch Commentary: Name the deadliest conflict since World War II. That would be the Second Congo War, which started in 1998, and though it officially ended in 2003, the dying continues, with over 5 million lives claimed so far either directly from the fighting or from the disease and starvation associated with it since the war began. Eastern Congo in particular has continued to suffer as various rebel groups and foreign nations jockey for power in this mineral-rich region.

As part of the peace deal to end this eastern fighting, one of the rebel groups, the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), agreed to be integrated into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) army, known as the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). That was 23 March 2009. However, in April 2012 approximately 300 of the CNDP rebels, complaining about poor conditions, started defecting from the FARDC. These mutineers, whose numbers have increased since the initial uprising, are known as the March 23 Movement, or M23, in reference to the date the CNDP had signed the peace agreement, which strikes at least this analyst as being rather ironic - a rebel name based on the date one signed a peace treaty with the people against whom one is now rebelling. At any rate, this group, led by Bosco Ntaganda, aka The Terminator, has been taking control of several towns and appears to be closing in on Goma, the capital of North Kivu province. However, M23 has said it would evacuate all of the towns it has captured except for Bunagana, which is quite important in the mineral trade.

Since the publication of the accompanying story, the UN has stationed tanks around Goma and several African nations are calling for armed intervention to eradicate the rebels. Meanwhile, UN Chief Ban Ki-moon has asked the presidents of

Mutiny in the DRC

11 July 2012

Source: "Democratic Republic of the Congo: As the M23 gains ground, the situation in North Kivu is becoming increasingly dangerous for civilians," Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), 11 July 2012. <http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=31627>



The March 23 Movement, sometimes abbreviated as M23, is a rebel military group based in eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), mainly operating in the province of North Kivu. Map of North Kivu Province, DRC by Derivative work: User:Profoss - Original work:Uwe Dederling [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

Democratic Republic of the Congo: As the M23 gains ground, the situation in North Kivu is becoming increasingly dangerous for civilians

In April 2012 the former Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) rebels started defecting from the Congolese army. They had been integrated into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) under the 2009 peace deal. The subsequent clashes between the mutineers and the FARDC have caused over 200 000 civilians to flee the region.

Last weekend, however, the situation started changing dramatically, with the mutinous group, now known as the M23 taking control of numerous strategic towns, including Bunagana, Rutshuru, Ntamungenga and Rubare, which is 10km from the provincial capital Goma. An estimated 600 FARDC troops fled to neighboring Uganda. Although the leader of the battalion that fled described the move as a tactical withdrawal, the soldiers left their weapons behind and these have now been captured by the M23.

These latest developments are reminiscent of the events in 2008, when the CNDP came very close to taking control of Goma. While the M23 leader, Col. Sultani Makenga is calling for negotiations with DRC President Laurent Kabila to discuss better treatment of troops in the FARDC, it is doubtful whether the M23 will once again be integrated into the army.

Kinshasa is extremely concerned about the possibility that rebels could take over Goma. Indications are that the confrontation could be deadly, and also contribute to the fragility of

Rwanda (accused of supporting M23 but denying that it does) and the DRC to “defuse tensions.” <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207120421.html>

*There is much more to this story, which the reader is encouraged to explore in the accompanying article, as well as in other sources. It is a complex tragedy replete with ethnic divisions and foreign interventions against a backdrop of vast wealth for a few and grinding poverty for many. Unfortunately, similar tragedies have played out in the past in the DRC, and a long-term solution to end them, especially in the eastern portion of the country, remains elusive. **End OE Watch Commentary (Feldman)***

Continued: As the M23 gains ground, the situation in North Kivu is becoming increasingly dangerous for civilians

the region and the country as a whole.

The fact that the M23 has said that it would evacuate all the towns it has taken, except for Bunagana, indicates that the group is increasingly interested in gaining control over mineral trade in the region, as Bunagana is a strategic mineral transit town on the border with Uganda.

It has to be remembered that the former CNDP members, who make up a large component of the M23, were interested in protecting the Banyamulenge population (Tutsi Congolese who migrated to the DRC in the 1880's); fighting the former Hutu rebels of the Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and gaining what they could in the process. If the M23 manages to take control of Goma, it will effectively be controlling the North Kivu, and would thus be better able to protect the Banyamulenge and keep the FDLR weak.

It is of great concern that while the M23 is interested in protecting certain parts of the population, its members are also notorious human rights abusers. Their leaders, Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga have both been involved in various massacres, rape and recruitment of child soldiers.

Having the M23 in control of Eastern DRC may be in the interest of Rwanda, and of the Tutsi population in the East, but for the rest of the civilian population, it will mean that their lives will become more insecure than ever before.

Unfortunately the United Nations peacekeepers mandated to protect civilians, even if force is required, have not been very successful in enforcing their mandate. Thus, it has now become critical for President Kabila and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda to discuss the situation. So far, the mutiny has only been discussed by the military and by foreign ministers of the two countries, but given Rwanda's alleged involvement in supplying weapons and recruits for the M23, this situation requires urgent discussion at the highest level.

OE Watch Commentary: Can rebel groups be “frenemies?” Apparently so, as the recent merger of - and subsequent falling out between - Mali’s two main rebel groups has recently proven. Observers will recall that the trouble in Mali began in March 2012, when discontented army officers overthrew Mali President Ahmadou Toure for his alleged poor handling of Tuareg rebellions taking place in the north of the country. In the absence of even a nominal national government, the anti-statist and nomadic Tuareg peoples inhabiting northern Mali, seeing their opening to claim some degree of autonomy over the part of the country that they had always claimed as theirs, coalesced under the banner of the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA). They then teamed up with radical Islamist group Ansar Dine, also already operating in the region, and together they declared sovereignty for northern Mali under the name of the “Republic of Azawad.”

Fast forward to July 2012, and that marriage of convenience between the secular MNLA (which simply wanted autonomy from the Malian state) and Ansar Dine (which seeks to instill a stricter version of sharia law that makes the MNLA uneasy) has suffered a traumatic rupture. As the accompanying article details, Ansar Dine has recently chased its one-time bedfellow, the MNLA Tuaregs, out of the northern Malian region which they once co-governed. The departure of MNLA means that now extremist Muslim group Ansar Dine has exclusive control of northern Mali.

While the schism may be bad news for their alliance, it could be a positive development for the international community, which has thus far been ineffective at brokering a resolution to the April coup. Indeed, the West African regional bloc ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) has been unsuccessful in its shuttle diplomacy efforts; the wider

One Rebel Group Chases Out Another in Mali

12 July 2012

Source: “Mali: Les islamistes contrôlent la totalité du nord du pays,” (“Mali: Islamists now control the entire north of the country”), *Nouvel Observateur*, 12 July 2012 : <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20120712.OBS7130/mali-les-islamistes-controlent-la-totalite-du-nord-du-pays.html>



Mali Islamist rebels occupying swathes of northern Mali © Magharebia/Flickr via IRINnews.org

Mali: Les islamistes contrôlent la totalité du nord du pays **(Mali: Islamists now control the entire north of the country)**

Armed Islamists are now in control of the totality of northern Mali, where they are able to impose their laws resistance-free, after having chased out Tuareg rebels from their last stronghold in Ansogo, near the city of Gao, on July 11.

The Tuareg rebels from the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA) have been chased completely out of Ansogo by Islamists from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) which had previously already dealt them a crushing defeat on June 27 in one of the three biggest cities in northern Mali, Gao.

An elected official from the area told the Associated Press that the Tuareg rebels have been chased from their last bastion, Ansogo, located 100 kilometers south of Gao. At present, our entire zone is now in the hands of the Islamists, » he added.

« We just had a conversation with one of the new rulers of these areas, who told us that they aren’t there to hurt the populations, » added the official, under the condition of anonymity. « Before, the MNLA still controlled a part of the zone, but now, that’s over. That group has now fled into the bush. »

According to a security source, having been chased from Ansogo, the Tuareg rebels have taken refuge near the town of Tassiga.

international community been even less effective. Impacts could be a mixed bag: the recent split may mean that with fewer allies, the AQIM-allied Ansar Dine will be less capable of controlling the vast and harsh land of northern Mali. On the other hand, it may simply mean that now the group will not have to compromise internally with another party, leading to their future consolidation of power in ways that were previously unthinkable.

End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)

Continued: Islamists Now Control the Entire North of the Country


After this new defeat at Ansogo, the Tuareg rebels no longer control a single village in the north. Increasingly, in small groups, they are returning to these areas of Mali now exclusively under Islamist control, more for survival purposes than to fight.

The three largest cities in Mali's northern region, which represent more than half of the population of Mali – Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal – have been occupied for the last three months by Islamists from MUJAO and another group, Ansar Dine (Defenders of Islam), the latter of which is allied with AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).

They have systemically ousted the Tuareg rebellion that had launched the offensive in the north with them in January.

Tim Thomas's *Decoding the Virtual Dragon* explains how Chinese information warfare (IW) concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition.

Tim Thomas provides an indispensable source for understanding the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrating how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy.



OE Watch Commentary: *While neither country is individually known as a bastion of serenity, even the border between Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire is showing itself to be an emerging spot of insecurity in an already increasingly unstable West African region.*

With tumultuous pasts, both countries are unsurprisingly insecure. Liberia is continuing to cope with the aftermath of two civil wars that lasted from 1989-1996 and 1999-2003, and which resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 citizens; its former president Charles Taylor was convicted by the International Criminal Court in April 2012 of committing crimes against humanity. For its part, Cote d'Ivoire's experiences with profound instability are more recent. Nationwide violence erupted there in November 2010, as incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede the national election to winner Alasane Outtara. Widespread bloodshed followed as factions composed of both military and civilian participants were formed across pro-Gbagbo and anti-Gbagbo lines. The episode, which took some 3,000 lives, was brought to a close only by a swift UN and French intervention.

*These tenuous histories localized, one sees that the current fear that is paralyzing Liberian citizens at the crossroads of the Ivorian border are thus caused by a confluence of insecurity at home and "abroad." Indeed, in the aftermath of Cote d'Ivoire's political crisis in 2010, tens of thousands of refugees flooded into eastern Liberia; people still worried about outbreaks of violence continue to stream in. Compounding the difficulties is that mercenaries loyal to ousted Ivorian President Gbagbo are widely believed to have taken refuge in eastern Liberia, and continue to live there today. Combined, these developments demonstrate that, indeed, the aftershocks of violence often continue to reverberate for years after their apparent conclusion. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)***

Looming Insecurity on the Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire Border

13 July 2012

Source: A. Abbas Dulleh, "Liberia: Fear Mounts," New Democrat (Monrovia), 13 July 2012: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207131265.html>.



An Ivorian soldier patrolling in Saho village in the west of the country. The region is plagued by recurrent violence. Photo © Olivier Monnier/IRIN via IRINnews.org

Liberia: Fear Mounts

Reports are filtering in that residents at the Liberian border with Cote d'Ivoire are panicky after more than 13,000 people recently fled their homes in southwestern Ivory Coast following attacks in which unidentified armed men killed at least 22 people, but Information Minister Lewis Brown Thursday said Liberian soldiers deployed at the common border are "doing well" and there is no problem there.

Frightened residents around the border town of Tai told this paper in an interview that they live in constant fear and panic, due to heavy security presence in the area and parts adjacent.

"Too many security people are here stopping us to move around. We cannot leave because there is nowhere else for us to go," Moses Taye told this paper in a telephone interview.

"We are living in fear; we feel that the people can attack this place anytime. AFL soldiers are here but we do not trust them, they can do anything any time," another villager said from Tai.

Ute Kollies, head of the U.N. humanitarian agency in Ivory Coast said his agency has recorded five attacks since the beginning of June, something that has promoted fears amongst civilians. She added that all homes have been destroyed in some villages.

Continued: Fear Mounts

United Nations peacekeepers and Ivorian soldiers are manning the other side of the common border, while Liberian soldiers are patrolling the densely forested Liberian side.

On 18 June, several armed men swooped on a camp near the village of Ponan, killing eight civilians leaving one man's throat cut, Human Rights Watch says.

After several peace talks between both countries to harmonize the border crisis, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf ordered the immediate deployment of Liberian troops along the border but the soldiers say their logistical demands were not met before their departure.


"As I speak to you, we are standing in the water. You know this is the first time we are deployed and things are not fine. They promised us good money to come here but gave us peanuts. This is unfair to us," an officer of the AFL said to this writer in an interview from the border, but seeking strict anonymity.

Contacted for clarification on the claims, Assistant Defense Minister for Public Affairs, Mr. David Dahn, refused to comment, saying, it was the work of the Chairman on the House Committee for Defense, Rep. George Mulbah, who also refused to comment on the matter.

Recent attacks, which have claimed more than 40 lives and displaced thousands, highlight continued insecurity along the common border.

Les Grau's classic *The Other Side of the Mountain*, is the most broadly distributed book on the Afghan theater. Capturing the personal stories and perspectives of Mujahedin fighters during the Soviet Afghan war, Les Grau has provided a blueprint of the belligerents in the current conflict.

It is on General Petraeus's reading list and in the rucksacks of deploying soldiers.



OE Watch Commentary: *Of all African countries, Liberia arguably has the historically closest relationship with the United States, and, as senior Liberian officials recently reiterated, at least concerning military affairs, they do not want those ties to change.*

Since its inception, Liberia's history has been intimately interwoven with that of the United States. Liberia was the founding location of the American Colonization Society, a resettlement effort for freed American slaves begun in the 1820s that eventually led to the 1847 establishment of the Republic of Liberia. The American ex-slaves who arrived quickly became the republic's elite, and, until a military coup in 1980, the leadership of the country, particularly under president William Tubman, was dominated by the so-called "Americo-Liberian" class.

*Within the context of bilateral military relations, so too has Liberia been a stalwart friend of the United States. With the unveiling of AFRICOM in 2007, the one African country that publicly expressed interest in potentially hosting a U.S. base was, in fact, Liberia. Other African countries purportedly expressed interest, but refused to make these intentions public for fear of reprisals by their civil societies. Liberia has both such a profound historical connection to the United States and enduring pockets of insecurity; its desire to retain ties to AFRICOM should come as a welcome, if not unexpected, revelation. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)***

Liberia Not Ready to Cut AFRICOM Ties

10 July 2012

Source: "Liberia: Defense Min. - Liberia Is Not Prepared to Unravel 'Umbilical Cord' With AFRICOM," Heritage (Monrovia), 10 July 2012: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207100813.html>



CAREYSBURG, Liberia - Medics with the Armed Forces of Liberia take part in a training class near Careysburg, Liberia. Sergeant 1st Class Dedraf Blash, a U.S. Army Africa noncommissioned officer, assisted in the development of the weekly instruction classes and mentored medical soldiers and females serving within the Liberian ranks. The initiative was part of the Liberia Security Sector Reform program, a U.S. State Department-led effort to help build leadership capacity within Liberia's military. (U.S. Army Africa photo)

Liberia Is Not Prepared to Unravel 'Umbilical Cord' With AFRICOM

Liberia's Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai, Jr., says Liberia is not prepared to un-tie what he calls the umbilical cord with the US-Africa Command, AFRICOM. According to the Defense Minister, the presence of AFRICOM's engagement in Liberia will help in maintaining a tacit guarantee of security in Liberia over at least a three-election period.

For the purpose of cooperative security location, the Minister availed a request leading to Liberia being considered for future exercises being conducted by AFRICOM in other parts of Africa. He further proffered the need for AFRICOM's support in setting up an institutionalized training program in Liberia for continuous capability development of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).

Minister Samukai, on behalf of Commander-in-Chief President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, brought to scale AFRICOM's immeasurable support to the rebuilding efforts of the Liberian Defense Sector through engagements at the level of Operation Onward Liberty (OOL), the African Endeavor, the African Partnership Event, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, among others.

Minister Samukai made these remarks at the Kelley Barracks, Headquarters of

Continued: Liberia Is Not Prepared to Unravel ‘Umbilical Cord’ With AFRICOM

AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany where he and his delegation held strategic discussions on Liberia’s Defense Sector Reform. During a Command Brief, AFRICOM’s Deputy Director of Programs Mr. James Hart highlighted that as its mission, the U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) seeks to protect and defend the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African States and regional organizations, and when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.

For his part, the Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, General Carter F. Ham lauded the Liberian Government and particularly the Defense Authority for the great task of raising the current quality of army. According to General Ham, there is a growing recognition of Liberia-US interest which is closely aligned.


He assured Minister Samukai that AFRICOM’s relationship with Liberia is still strong and will be further stronger in the coming years for the benefit of both countries. Speaking further, the Director of Programs (J5) at AFRICOM, Major General Charles Hooper noted, “Commitment from AFRICOM to AFL is enduring based on mutual trust and confidence, adding, we will not walk away from Liberia because to do so will not only be morally wrong but also strategically incorrect.”

Tim Thomas’s *Cyber Silhouettes* explores the impact of the Cyber Age on military thinking and operations worldwide.

***Cyber Silhouettes* presents challenges to the American information operations (IO) expert regarding inadequate current terminology, and the need for reevaluation of “core capabilities and supporting elements.” Tim Thomas further recognizes how cyber processes have allowed criminals and insurgents/terrorists to practice guerilla warfare tactics and illegal or extremist activities online. He contends that the subjective nature of war has changed to include a social context unlike any other time in history.**

Tim Thomas provides a unique perspective that will lead to a better understanding of our

complex digitized lives, new ideas for US armed forces to consider, and help analysts identify potential danger zones.



OE Watch Commentary: The recent national economic success in India has created fiscal resources for the purchase of arms and expansion of military infrastructure. In the past the ideologically-based largess of the former Soviet Union allowed India to field modern mechanized ground forces and state-of-the-art combat aircraft. Indigenous arms manufacturing has long been plagued with technical problems, manufacturing delays, and program failures. Foreign arms deals of the past have reached the height of political scandal, with bribes, kickbacks, and shady deals. It remains to be seen if this legacy can be shaken off as new monies flow into the international arms market, new co-production schemes are signed, and plans for naval and air base expansion gather momentum.

India's 12th Army Plan calls for Rs 10 lakh crore (\$18 billion) for operations and acquisition over the 2012 to 2017 time period. New Army Chief General Bikram Singh is calling for modernization in equipment, systems, and munitions. He points out major gaps in joint capabilities with India's air and naval forces. A major initiative is the creation of a new mountain strike corps with high-altitude war fighting capabilities. The Army also seeks a "rapid reaction ground force capability" along its border with China in the eastern reaches of the nation¹

The India Air Force has experienced consistent aircraft losses over the years in operational areas. The Soviet-Union-built aircraft comprised the bulk of the fleet for the past forty years. In that time 482 of the 872 aircraft crashed, killing 171 pilots.² The MiG-21 is being

1. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-10/india/32617446_1_infantry-combat-vehicles-new-mountain-strike-corps-divisions-for-high-altitude-areas

2. <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/iaf-lost-half-of-mig-fighter-jets-in-deadly-crashes/1/187061.html>

India: Arming for the Future

11 July 2012

Source: Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times <http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Path-clear-for-Rafale-fighter-deal-Antony/Article1-886703.aspx>



A French Dassault Rafale aircraft from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier French Navy Ship Charles de Gaulle (R 91) performs a touch-and-go landing April 12, 2007, on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). St ennis, as part of the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group, and Charles de Gaulle, the flagship of Commander, Task Force 473, are operating in the Northern Arabian Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Denny Cantrell) (Released) (Released to Public)

Path clear for Rafale fighter deal: Antony

New Delhi, India's hunt for acquisition of 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) is coming to a close with the defence ministry giving the green signal to the evaluation process that led to selection of the French Rafale fighter. The plane was chosen as it was the lowest bidder on the basis of its lifecycle cost and technology transfer. The total deal is worth \$20 billion (Rs 1.12 lakh crore) with options for further purchases.

Replying to a letter written on February 27, 2012 by TDP Rajya Sabha member MV Mysura Reddy alleging manipulation of the MMRCA evaluation process, defence minister AK Antony said: "The issues raised by you were examined by independent monitors who have concluded that the approach and methodology adopted by the Contract Negotiations Committee (CNC) in the evaluation of the commercial proposals thus far, have been reasonable and appropriate and within the terms of the Request for Proposals (RFR) and Defence Procurement Procedure, 2006."

The Indian Air Force on January 31 had declared Rafale as the preferred bidder, overriding the claims of the multi-nation Eurofighter. According to negotiations, 18 Rafale fighters will arrive in India from mid-2015, with another 108 to be built in India under collaboration.

phased out of the inventory by the end of this decade. As pointed out in the accompanying article, the French Dassault Rafale fighter has been selected as the newest medium multirole combat aircraft. The current foreign contracts for aircraft exceed \$27 billion.


India's shipbuilding industry has shown its mettle over the years with the launching of destroyers, frigates, and submarines. Current construction includes some 32 warships and submarines, with another 75 ships, including aircraft carriers and amphibious vessels, planned for the next decade.³ Long association with the Soviet and now Russian shipbuilding industry continues with technical exchanges and ship purchases.

India has long lacked strategic air and naval bases. This increase in military infrastructure construction is a serious attempt to expand a very modest capability. **End OE Watch Commentary (Welch)**

3. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16de2e94-7d22-11de-b8ee-00144feabdc0.html#axzz20nvFHgVE>

Continued: India: Arming for the Future

Hawk eye on Malacca strait



10 July 2012

Source: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120710/jsp/frontpage/story_15711340.jsp

India Naval Bases in Andaman and Nicobar Islands © 2012
The Telegraph via <http://www.telegraphindia.com>

New Delhi, July 9- Sujan Dutta: India is set to commission its latest military post named Baaz (hawk) on its south-eastern fringe in the Bay of Bengal to oversee a sea lane through which a quarter of the world's trade passes, an Indian Navy source told The Telegraph on Monday.

In April this year, the navy had upgraded its detachment in the Lakshadweep Islands in the Arabian Sea to the level of a full-fledged base. Named the INS Dweeprakshak, the base is in the island of Kavaratti.

Together, the INS Dweeprakshak and the naval air station, Baaz, are set to be India's western and eastern-most sentinels.

But it is the Baaz that is of greater significance to the world because its location gives it a hawk eye over the Straits of Malacca after US defence secretary Leon Panetta said in Delhi last month that its military was "re-balancing" to the Asia-Pacific.

Campbell Bay, where Baaz has come up, is closer to Indonesia than to the Indian mainland.

To be opened this month-end by the outgoing navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, whose mission it has been, naval air station (NAS) Baaz will be based in Campbell Bay at the southern tip of Great Nicobar island. Spread over nearly 70 hectares, Baaz will eventually be capable of turning around all kind of fighter and transport-troop carrier aircraft.

NAS Baaz sits astride the Six-Degree Channel between Nicobar and the coast of Aceh that is known to sailors around the world as the mouth of the Straits of Malacca. The strait connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the economies of China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are largely dependent on it.

Battered by the tsunami of 2004, Campbell Bay, with its fragile ecosystem, is now set to

Continued: India: Arming for the Future

become one of India's most strategic forward operating air bases. It now has a 3,000ft runway that is likely to be extended and will eventually be able to handle airlifters like the IL-76 and the larger Globemaster III that the IAF has contracted.

Fighter aircraft can operate from the base even now but, with its commissioning as a full-fledged station, it extends their reach. Indian air surveillance in and around the Bay of Bengal, apart from the coastline, has depended on sorties from Port Blair — about 550 nautical miles north of Campbell Bay, roughly the distance from Delhi to Bhopal — that made it difficult to sustain the watch over

longer periods of time.

With the commissioning of Baaz, Indian military aircraft would now be able to spend more time in surveillance of not only the Straits of Malacca but also the Straits of Sunda and Lombok. China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) rates its strategic interest in the Straits of Malacca on a par with the importance it gives to Taiwan.

The commissioning of NAS Baaz on the southern tip of Great Nicobar island will be followed by an upgrade of NAS Shibpur at Diglipur on the northern tip of the Andamans.

India to buy M777 howitzers from US

Source: http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/india-to-buy-m777-howitzers-from-us_774730.html

11 May 2012

New Delhi: Speeding up the military modernization process, the Defence Ministry on Friday cleared procurement projects worth over Rs 7,000 crore including the long-pending acquisition of 145 Ultra Light Howitzers from the US under a Rs 3,000-crore (\$650 million) deal.

The decision to go ahead with the procurement of 145 M777 howitzers from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route and several other items was taken at a meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by Defence Minister AK Antony.

The Ultra Light Howitzers of 155 mm (39 caliber) were being acquired for deployment in high altitude areas in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, the sources said, adding that this would be the first acquisition of howitzers by the Army in the last 26 years.

After the Bofors controversy in 1986, no new gun has been procured by the Army for its artillery.

The M777 guns, manufactured by the BAE Systems of the US, can be airlifted easily and be used for quick deployment of assets in mountainous regions.

Army Chief Gen VK Singh had raised questions about the preparedness of his force in a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and mentioned all the above three arms which were facing critical shortage of equipment.



M777A2 Lightweight 155mm Howitzer. Photo by U.S. Army via <http://www.pica.army.mil>

OE Watch Commentary: Children in Mexico learn about corruption at an early age. As this article states, it is common practice to pay teachers for good grades. This practice extends into the university setting, where professors demand payments from students to pass classes. In Veracruz an agricultural engineering student, supported by his father working illegally in the United States to pay his college tuition, recently dropped out of school. The reason? His teacher informed him that if he did not pay, he would not receive a passing grade regardless of the quality of his work.

Regarding authority figures to which the article alludes, a common argument is that low salaries prompts police officers to become involved in criminal activity. However, this may not necessarily be the entire picture. For example, when comparing salaries, the Federal Police in Mexico receive the highest salaries. Yet, as evidenced by the arrests of 691 officers between 1 January 2007 and 31 May 2011, 46.2% were identified as Federal Police, 31.5% as municipal officers, and 22.3% as state police officers. This article would posit that the Federal Police, despite better pay, may be prone to higher levels of corruption because of other cultural reasons, such as scope of influence and information. This article also underscores that corruption in Mexico and in Latin American countries is systemic and that if change is to be expected, the government must lead its citizens by example, and the school system must educate children that honesty is a virtue. **End OE Watch Commentary (Fiegel and Gonzalez)**

Corruption: Part of the Mexican Culture?

21 April 2012

Source: <http://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/164194.corrupcion-parte-de-la-cultura>,
<http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/751752.html>.



Mexican Peso by capl@washjeff.edu [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/>)] via <http://capl.washjeff.edu>

Corruption: Part of the Mexican Culture?

The Presidency of the Republic of Mexico recognized that corruption in the country is a cultural practice not exclusive to authorities. This practice took root decades ago, and is prevalent among all levels of society. According to President Calderon, this phenomenon begins in the primary education system where children learn the value of bribery and cheating to get ahead. According to a study done by CEI Consulting and Research, by the age of 12, children understand that good grades can be earned by paying their teachers. It is estimated that 15% of the population between the ages of 10 and 15 have paid bribes at least once in their lives.

Children also learn that cheating works and carries small consequences. For example, it is very common that homework done in groups is completed by just one student, while the rest take credit for it. The entire class, to include parents and teachers, know which children are working, and those that are not, but no one complains because that is the way school works. Children that happen to openly state they cheated are punished. The ones who do not confess, but copy the work of another at the last minute are not. In this manner, children learn that honest kids are stupid kids. They also learn that telling the truth will only lead to punishment, while cheating will allow them to receive credit.

Additionally, parents who complain about poor school practices are looked down upon. Children whose parents have influence, money, or ties with government officials will receive an education. Those who do not may not end up going to school at all.

Continued: Corruption: Part of the Mexican Culture?

The Argument that Corruption Stems from Low Salaries, Not Culture:

Some argue that corruption in Mexico is not part of its culture, but rather stems from the low salaries. Despite pay disparities between Federal Police and other security entities operating in Mexico, Federal Police represent nearly half of those officers arrested on corruption charges.

Regarding public service officers, the most highly discussed corruption case in the last six years was that of Nestor Felix Moreno the Director of the Federal Electricity Commission. Monthly, he earned more than \$(MXN) 222,000 (about \$(USD) 17,000 dollars), but despite his high salary, he was arrested on corruption and illicit enrichment charges estimated around \$(MXN) 30 million pesos (about \$(USD) 2.2 million dollars).

The corruption case of Nestor Felix Moreno, along with the statistics mentioned above regarding Federal Police officers, contradicts the theory that corruption in Mexico is due to low salaries. Eduardo Bohorquez, Director of the Mexican Transparency, argues that corruption is a reflection of the faults that exist within governmental sector. In terms of improving the corruption situation in Mexico, authorities recognize that the process will be tenuous and long-term, and that it requires all three levels of government to lead by example.

Spanish Sources:

- <http://html.rincondelvago.com/corrupcion-en-mexico.html>
- <http://www.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/noticia/164194.corrupcion-parte-de-la-cultura>
- http://www.cdhecamp.org/LA_CORRUPCION.pdf
- <http://www.planetacurioso.com/2008/06/16/los-10-estados-mas-corruptos-en-mexico/>
- <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/751752.html>
- <http://www.criteriohidalgo.com/notas.asp?id=46409>
- <http://monterrey.milenio.com/cdb/doc/noticias2011/10be2547894d0e36d7be418861b7b07b>
- <http://mexicoparalosmexicanos.blogspot.com/2009/09/los-bajos-salarios-de-la-policia-en.html>
- <http://www.elsiglodedurango.com.mx/noticia/247965.mas-salario-para-policias.html>
- <http://www.milenio.com/cdb/doc/noticias2011/5b3f6569861bc7b1ebc8edca2e039111>
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- <http://www.esmas.com/finanzaspersonales/320145.html>
- <http://www.am.com.mx/Nota.aspx?ID=501948>
- http://www.fronesis.org/imagen/rmt/documentosrmt/texto_corrupcion_en_la_escuela.pdf
- http://html.rincondelvago.com/corrupcion-en-mexico_1.html

OE Watch Commentary: Since President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and the initiation of his “War on Drugs,” there has been a constant progression and escalation of murders and other crime. In 2010 the annual rate of murders tied to organized crime reached over 10,000 victims; this was the first time Mexico had ever seen this. By January 2012 organized-crime-related murder rates were looking like they would approach 20,000 victims (based on trends during that time), so the Calderón Administration quit publicly reporting murder figures as they pertained to the ‘War on Drugs,’ most likely a political move to help rid the National Action Party (PAN) of an eyesore and to help the reelection efforts of the party (although we see this did not help in Mexico’s recent presidential election).

Before this most recent study by Leticia Ramírez de Alba, Reforma and other media sources were simply publishing murder rates that could be directly and immediately attributed to organized crime, revealing surprisingly low numbers. Yearly totals as reported by Reforma were as follows: 2,119 in 2006, 2,275 in 2007, 5,207 in 2008, 6,587 in 2009, and 11,583 in 2010. 2011 had some anomalies with the weekly addition of the figures, as well as Reforma discontinuing this reporting in late November 2011, with a reported 11,503 organized-crime-related murders. What is interesting is they stopped before surpassing the 2010 total, giving the misconception of a lower rate than the previous year, although the weekly figures totaled 11,757.


Given the crime rates during the Calderón Administration through March 2012, the current president is looking at staggering figures by the end of his term in early December 2012, with a forecasted 135,779 victims affected by kidnapping, extortion, and murder; of those, an estimated 99,406 are attributed to homicide. **End OE Watch Commentary (Scheidel)**

The Visible and Invisible Victims of the Calderón Administration

3 June 2012

Source: Source: “Las Víctimas Visibles e Invisibles del Sexenio (The Visible and Invisible Victims of the Six-Year Presidential Term),” Proceso, Edition 1857, 03 June 2012. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=309572>

120,692 crime victims between December 2006 and March 2012



Las Víctimas Visibles e Invisibles del Sexenio (The Visible and Invisible Victims of the Calderon Administration)

According to estimates produced by Leticia Ramírez de Alba, who developed the Index of Visible and Invisible Victims (IVVI) of serious crimes reported a few months ago by the organization México Evalúa (Evaluate Mexico), the harsh facts suggest an equally harsh reality: 88,361 murders in the country under President Felipe Calderón and his failed war on drugs. These numbers, clarifies Ramírez de Alba, do not include the “invisible victims.”

From the start of his administration, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa has seen an ever-increasing number of victims following the launch of his “War on Drugs.” Estimates on the impact of this problem in many sectors of the population, fundamentally in the home environment of those directly affected, show the failure of his national security policy.

Based on complaints filed in the offices of the Federal Public Ministry and sent to the National Public Security System (SNSP), between December 2006 and March 2012, 120,692 people were victims of three crimes: kidnapping, extortion, and murder. The latter is the most disgraceful, citing 88,361 cases during this same period.

Considering that on average each household is composed of three to four people (according to the latest figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography; INEGI), for each victim there are some 366,478 people close to them that are affected. “If you stick to official figures, we can speak of a failure of public security policy of this administration,” said Leticia Ramírez de Alba to Proceso. Ramírez de Alba was responsible for the development and publication of the Index of Visible and Invisible Victims (IVVI) of serious crimes published by México Evalúa in August 2011.

OE Watch Commentary: *The attached article is about an abrupt political change that, if it had happened in some country with a greater international profile than Paraguay, might have been big news. Furthermore, since events move so quickly, readers might easily take this as merely archiving a recent, now well past event.*

Since the article came out, the Paraguayan president was removed from office, after which many of the country's regional neighbors and former allies turned on the new government as anti-democratic coups supporters. It appears that the process of removing President Lugo from office was entirely constitutional and enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the members of the Paraguayan legislature and supreme court. Former President Lugo, however, is a coreligionary of the left-leaning leadership currently in power in the republics that surround Paraguay.

*From 4-6 July the Forum of Sao Paulo, a congress of leftist political entities from around the hemisphere, met in Caracas. The posture of the membership toward Paraguay probably will have been featured in backroom conversations, if not in open sessions. The article, meanwhile, gives us insights into South American regional geopolitics, as well as internal conflicts in Latin American countries generally. On the list of components are land grabs, high levels of violence, party polarization, manipulation of international trade, and the influence of ideologically motivated enterprises. Latin America predictably finds ways to continue fighting the Spanish American War. **End OE Watch Commentary (Demarest)***

Lugo Rhymes with Hugo

21 June 2012

Sources: "The Five Charges in the Impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo" El Universo, Thursday, June 21



Fernando Armindo Lugo Méndez, President of Paraguay in the Presidents Plenary at the World Economic Forum on Latin America 2010. © World Economic Forum/Edgar Alberto Domínguez Cataño [CC-BY-SA-2.0] via flickr.com

The Five Charges in the Impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo

Five members of Paraguay's Chamber of Deputies, acting as "prosecutors," brought charges of "malfeasance in office" against President Fernando Lugo before the full Senate, which had convened for trial.

The "prosecutors" took barely half an hour in total to present their case, even though the rules approved by the Senate had granted them an hour and a half.

1. Political Meeting at a Military Base

José López Chávez, from the opposition National Union of Ethical Citizens (Unace) party, presented the first charge of permitting the leftist groups that comprise the governing coalition to hold a political meeting at the headquarters of the Armed Forces Engineering Command from May 6 to 10, 2009.

That was a "distinctly political act" endorsed by the Government, asserted López Chávez.

"The president has demeaned the Armed Forces, law enforcement, and the National Police," charged the legislator, who maintained that "not even in the darkest days of the dictatorship were political meetings held on bases."

Continued: New Guerrilla Group Detected in Panamá

2. Land Invasions

Jorge Ávalos, from the Liberal Party, presented the charge against Lugo concerning the conflict involving landless campesinos who demanded that the State turn over to them a hacienda belonging to the Brazilian Tranquilo Favero, the country's largest individual soybean producer, in Acunday, on the border with Brazil.

According to Ávalos, "the only instigator of land invasions in Acunday is Fernando Lugo," who has been "complicit."

"While these invasions were underway, the president had his door open to the leaders of the invasions," he stressed.

3. Wave of Insecurity

Carlos Liseras, from the Colorado Party, presented the charge concerning the wave of insecurity that the country is experiencing and floated rumors about the Head of State's alleged involvement with groups that promote the existence of the Paraguayan People's Army (EPP), to which the Attorney General's Office attributes kidnappings and political assassinations.

4. Ushuaia II Protocol

Clemente Barrios, also from the Colorado Party, charged President Lugo with having supported the Mercosur Ushuaia II Protocol, established in Montevideo on December 20, 2010, without the approval of the Congress.

"The Ushuaia II Protocol threatens democracy and protects certain governments currently in power that are violating the pillars of democracy," he charged.

The Ushuaia Protocol is a Mercosur document that aims to defend the democratic order and is the basis on which the Paraguayan Senate has refused Venezuela's entry into Mercosur "as long as its government continues its attacks on democratic institutions (attacks against opponents, attacks on the independent press, the president's expanded powers, etc.)," writes the Paraguayan daily Abccolor in its digital edition on Thursday, June 21.

The Paraguayan opposition denounced the support of President Fernando Lugo's government for a new version of this document, the Ushuaia II Protocol, in which there is an attempt to identify the "democratic order" with the figure of president.

5. Curuguaty Massacre

Finally, Óscar Tuma, again from the Unace party, presented the arguments concerning the massacre in Curuguaty, an eviction of landless campesinos on June 15 from a hacienda in Curuguaty which resulted in the death of six police officers and eleven campesinos.

Tuma argued that it was an ambush against security forces and stated that Lugo "has strengthened the criminal groups that threaten the people and stoop so low as to endanger the lives of others."

Liberal Party Support Lost

The impeachment was approved after the Liberal Party, which was part of the governing coalition, decided to support it. Of 28 Liberal Party deputies, 27 voted in favor of impeachment and one was absent. Of 80 total deputies, 77 voted for impeachment and only one against.


The Liberal Party had demanded that the president dismiss his new interior minister, Rubén Candia, who was appointed following the dismissal of Carlos Filizzola on the Friday after the massacre in Caraguaty, and replace him with a member of their political inner circle.

"The deadlines have passed. Lugo ignores us," Liberal Party president Blas Llano told the press.

If Lugo is removed by the Senate, he will be replaced by Vice President Federico Franco, leader of the Liberal Party, a member of the Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC), the coalition that won the 2008 presidential elections.

The next presidential elections will be held April 23, 2013, and the current presidential term will conclude on August 15 of that year.

Geoff Demarest's *Winning Insurgent War* is about a broader set of conflicts than just 'insurgency.' In its 144 sections, Geoff Demarest raises new and overlooked concepts related to modern conflict in a provocative manner designed to stir up debate and critical thinking. As Geoff Demarest puts it: "I hope that some of the ideas in it will be contagious."




OE Watch Commentary:

A blogger took note of the light sentence incurred by Taiwanese officers who were recently indicted for spying. The commentator compared the sentencing to that of being caught robbing a convenience store and notes that in the times of authoritarian Kuomintang rule the officers might have instead faced the death penalty. The blog further notes a possible relationship between spying and Party ties, identifying a motivating factor as the desire to undermine the competing political party by working with China.

*Such mild punishments clearly do not work to dissuade Taiwanese from passing information to the Chinese. This year alone has seen several separate espionage indictments against high-ranking officials from intelligence agencies and the academic community. In June Professor Wu Chang-yu (吳彰裕) from the Central Police University was found guilty for handing over information regarding members of the Falun Gong, a spiritual group facing severe suppression under the Chinese Communist Party, and pro-Tibetan activities in Taiwan to mainland authorities. The information was collected with assistance from two former students who had previously worked as police officers with the National Police Bureau's Foreign Affairs Department. One officer was let off without charge and the other was penalized with a fine of less than USD\$3,500 and community service. **End OE Watch Commentary (Faruolo)***

Taiwan Observer Notes Light Sentencing for Indicted Spies

19 June 2012



Source: "How Times Change," Letters from Taiwan (blog), 19 June 2012, <http://lettersfromtaiwan.tumblr.com/post/25211521520/how-times-change>

Silhouette or caricature of a 50's spy by Setreset (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>)], via Wikimedia Commons

How Times Change

Only forty years ago, one would likely have faced the death penalty in Taiwan for the egregious crime of spying for the PRC. Now it seems, the act warrants a relatively light penalty:

"Two former military officials charged with spying for China were found guilty yesterday by the Banciao District Court.

The court gave Tsai Kuo-bin (蔡國賓), a former colonel at the National Security Bureau (NSB), a suspended sentence of one year and eight months in prison, pending four years probation.

Former major Wang Wei-ya (王維亞), who was with the Ministry of National Defense (MND), was given a suspended sentence of six months in prison pending three years probation."

What is interesting here is not only the subtle message this sends to other members of the military that spying for China is far less risky, and far more profitable, than say robbing a 7/11, nor how Taiwan's military is a veritable sieve of classified information, but how the Party-State ties between the KMT and military have remained relatively unscathed by democratization and the supposed dislocation of the military from politics:

"The pair both worked for the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) China Affairs Department after leaving their posts. The ruling said Tsai was recruited to spy for China after visiting China's Fujian Province in 2006."

Straight out of the military and straight into a party position, dealing with China!. Obviously the offenders found no logical disconnect, nor strain on principle or ethic, between selling out your country then joining the KMT. Probably because, if you note the date they were recruited, they were serving under President Chen of the pro-Taiwan DPP - a party whose cold relations with China the KMT exploited to bypass the constitution and institutions of state and cook up a party to party deal on the future of Taiwan following Lien Chan's visit to Beijing in 2005. The rationale of the officers for spying could have purely been personal financial gain but I don't think it outside the realm of possibility that these officers, probably lifelong supporters of the KMT, might have also thought it was their patriotic duty to work with China to undermine a DPP administered Taiwan.

Picking apart and playing the Taiwanese against themselves must be child's play for the PRC intelligence community. Who knows how many Taiwanese in the military and within the civil service are currently busy selling secrets to earn their ticket off the island if and when shit hits the fan.

OE Watch Commentary:

Only a few weeks after a top-secret laptop went missing, the Republic Of China Navy reports the disappearance of a classified naval chart. The chart details strategic information of wartime naval deployments and relevant hydrographic data in the Taiwan Strait. The military states that should enemy forces acquire the missing chart, its information could threaten the security of wartime naval operations.

This occurs only weeks after the military's investigation into a missing laptop off a fast-attack, antiship missile vessel. Initial reports claimed the laptop did not contain classified information; however, later reports claimed the laptop was indeed top secret and used to test classified communications systems. The Navy has since called upon units to increase security measures protecting confidential information.

*The article does not speculate whether or not the disappearances are coincidental accidents or perhaps deliberate acts. **End OE Watch Commentary (Faruolo)***

ROC Military and Confidential Information

11 July 2012



Source: "Navy investigates disappearance of a classified chart," Taipei Times, 11 July 2012, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/07/08/2003537244>

A Kuang Hua VI fast attack missile boat participates in a drill near the Tsuoying Naval Base in Greater Kaohsiung on Jan. 21 2011. The Taiwanese navy currently has 31 of the radar-evading craft in service. Jan 12, 2012. Photo: Chang Chung-i, Taipei Times via <http://www.taipeitimes.com>

Navy Investigates Disappearance of a Classified Chart

Two classified naval charts were reported missing when an inventory was carried out amid the decommissioning of aging Hai Ou ("Seagull") missile boats last month, and the information they contained could put navy vessels at risk during wartime, reports said yesterday.

According to the Chinese-language United Daily News, navy officers who had custody over the documents accidentally burned one of the two missing charts while destroying other documents, but the other, which contained classified information about naval deployments in the Taiwan Strait, remains unaccounted for.

The missing chart reportedly contained hydrographic data, ship information, waterways depth, sea salt fluctuation and the locations of navy vessels and submarines in wartime.

The information could leave navy vessels exposed if it were to fall in enemy hands, reports said.

Naval Command said two control officers had received demerits over the affair and added that it had turned the case to a local military court for possible prosecution. It said it had also instructed all relevant units to tighten management of confidential information.

The navy decommissioned its last 20 Hai Ou missile boats during a ceremony at the Zuoying (左營) naval base in Greater Kaohsiung on July 1. The ships, whose design was inspired by Israel's Dvora-class patrol boats, had been in service for about three decades. Each Hai Ou — a total of 50 were deployed — came equipped with locally produced Hsiung Feng I (HF-1) anti-ship missiles.

Amid modernization efforts, three squadrons of Kuang Hua VI (KH-6) radar-evading fast-attack missile boats have entered service since 2010. Each of the 31 KH-6s is armed with the more advanced HF-2 anti-ship missile.

The embarrassment over the disappearance of the classified chart comes after the Ministry of National Defense (MND) admitted last month that it had launched an investigation into the disappearance in May of a top-secret laptop used on a KH-6 vessel.

The computer, which belonged to the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology's (CSIST) — the nation's top military research body — had been installed for a six-month period, during which the ship's crew carried out tests of confidential communications equipment and procedures.

The Southern District Prosecutors' Office is handling the investigation into the computer's disappearance.

OE Watch Commentary: According to this South Korean article, China's bilateral ties with North Korea are proving to grow stronger with this latest move to build up the transportation infrastructure at the border. This article also suggests a specific link between China's economic motivations and hard security when it comes to DPRK. Extended thinking along these lines


China needs to further develop the border province of Jilin, which has the lowest gross domestic product in all of Eastern China. One way to further develop the province would be to secure mineral and energy resources from across the border and to establish industrial bases in the area. Naturally, the transportation infrastructure between the two countries is an important starting point to realize this goal. It is possible that Jilin, which has an abundance of natural resources, as well as its literal connection to North Korea and access to that country's natural resources, could become another Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia provides an excellent example of transformation in China through the development of its natural resources. The province has established major industrial production bases to support the production of its natural resources and associated products. Today Inner Mongolia has one of the fastest growing economies throughout the country.

Two of China's top priorities regarding North Korea are ensuring stability and avoiding war. China's ties to North Korea's mineral resources would mitigate both these risks. Working with Pyongyang on securing more mineral resources could help to stabilize the government by providing revenues, much needed by the North. Whether or not it helps the people of North Korea is another story. **End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)**

China Said to be Building Transportation Infrastructure at DPRK Border

12 July 2012

Source: "China in Huge Infrastructure Projects Near N. Korean Border," Chosun Ilbo Online, July 12, 2012, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/07/12/2012071201118.html



Map of Chinese Eastern Railway (Trans-Manchurian) by Voland77 (Own work) [GFDL (<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>) or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

China in Huge Infrastructure Projects Near N. Korean Border

China is building a massive highway and rail network in Liaoning and Jilin provinces near the border with North Korea. Beijing is expected to spend more than US\$10 billion on the project by 2015. Experts believe the aim is not only to tap into North Korea's mineral resources but to secure easy access for Chinese troops in case of an emergency in the North.

According to Jilin Province officials, a 41.68 km railway is to link the city of Helong with the border town of Nanping, which is just a stone's throw from North Korea's Musan, where the North's largest iron ore deposits are. The railway will apparently be used to carry iron ore from Musan to the steel town of Anshan in Liaoning Province.

The Changbai region in Jilin, on the western side of Mt. Baekdu and just across the border from North Korea's Hyesan, is rapidly becoming a regional traffic hub. A 100.58 km highway and 126.4 km railway linking Songjianghe with Changbai will be completed in 2015. Hyesan is home to North Korea's biggest copper mine.

Another highway is also being built connecting Shenyang, Liaoning Province, home of the regional government office that has jurisdiction over the border area, with the border town of Ji'an in Jilin Province.

"A four-lane highway is being built into the remote region and many people think it is for military purposes," said one source in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin.

OE Watch Commentary: China has been discussing stockpiling rare earth elements for several years now but, according to the state-run China Securities Journal, this is the first time that the country has given an indication that it is actually moving forward with the plan. China controls the industry, producing over 90 percent of the world's supply.

Not all rare earth elements will be stockpiled, however – only those that are in danger of suffering shortfalls. As the article points out, terbium, dysprosium, europium, and yttrium are viewed as strategic resources. Experts have been predicting that by 2015 there will be a shortage of neodymium, terbium, and dysprosium, while supplies of europium, erbium, and yttrium could become tight. These strategic minerals play important roles in critical technologies, including military-based technologies. Terbium and dysprosium can be used as additives in neodymium iron boron magnets. These magnets are the strongest magnets on the market, and by adding dysprosium, for example, they are able to withstand higher temperatures before losing their magnetic properties. Dysprosium is also used in lasers. Europium, the most reactive of the rare earth elements, is used in liquid crystal displays and fluorescent lighting, and has been studied for possible uses in nuclear reactors. Yttrium is used in metal alloys, as well as lasers.


Some experts are now predicting that China will become a net importer of rare earth elements by 2014. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, China possesses nearly 50 percent of the world's reserves. The country is also the biggest consumer, having enticed many high tech manufacturers from around the world to bring their operations to Chinese territory.

Despite scores of mining companies outside of China jumping into the

China Begins Stockpiling Rare Earth Elements

10 July 2012

Source: Eric Min, "China Starts Stockpiling Rare Earths," Guangzhou Business China Online, July 10, 2012.



Global rare earth element production from 1950 through 2000, colored to indicate source. (1 kt=106 kg). By BMacZero [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

China Starts Stockpiling Rare Earths

China has started strategic stockpiling of rare-earth minerals for the first time, the state-run China Securities Journal reported Thursday.

According to the report, the Chinese government was awarding state funds for interest-free loans for the strategic buying of heavy rare earth oxides to stockpile because concerns that reserves are running low.

Jia Yinsong, head of the rare earth department at China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, said Beijing has identified 11 rare earth mining zones in order to carry out the stockpiling of the nation's rare earths.

Eight major rare-earth mineral production bases in Guangdong Province signed framework agreements with Guangdong Rare Earth Industry Group on Saturday, the official China News Service reported.

Marketwatch.com said these oxides include four of the five rare earth elements classified as critical by renowned industry consultant Jack Lifton of Technology Metals Research: terbium, dysprosium, europium, and yttrium.

The US, Europe and Japan have all filed complaints to the World Trade Organization (WTO) over what they claim is a deliberate attempt by China - which produces 90 per cent of the world's supply of rare earths - to throttle supply and drive up prices.

rare earths industry, with all the environmental and technical complexities surrounding these operations, as well as more companies expected to move their manufacturing base to China, there are numerous challenges before alternatives to Chinese supplies are realized. **End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)**

Continued: China Starts Stockpiling Rare Earths

Since 2010, China has reduced its export quotas for rare earth minerals, maintaining the restraints are justified to protect the country’s natural resources and environment.

China has so far granted companies the right to export 21,226 tons of rare earths this year, although they are not always fully used.

In 2011, the government granted rare earth export quotas of 30,200 tonnes but only 18,600 tons were exported, Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology Su Bo said.


“China hopes other countries will actively develop their domestic earth resources, as well as expand and diversify supplies for the international market,” Su said.

Rare earths, a group of 17 metals vital for manufacturing products ranging from smart phones, wind turbines, electric car batteries to missiles, are an important and non-renewable natural resource.

RELATED ARTICLES



China’s Rare Earth Elements Industry: What Can the West Learn?
Cindy Hurst’s article on Rare Earth in the March 2010 issue of the *Journal of Energy Security*, published by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security.
<http://www.iags.org/rareearth0310hurst.pdf>



China’s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements
Cindy Hurst’s article on Rare Earth in the October 2010 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly*, published by the National Defense University Press.
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/China%27s_Ace.pdf

OE Watch Commentary: As this North Korean article demonstrates, DPRK leaders still believe that they can 'manage information' and win a propaganda war against the South. The harshness of the accusations that they put forth in this piece, however, suggest that they may not believe their own words.

Some experts have proposed that South Korea is the most digitized nation on the planet, with the world's highest percentage of Internet users and fastest Internet speed. The South Korean government has invested heavily in the country's communication infrastructure, and the fruit of this investment is enjoyed by nearly the entire population. This extensive Internet and digital penetration has had both positive and negative consequences for the country. While improving worker productivity and overall education, the growing dependence on digital communications has also drawn the attention of their less technological northern neighbor.

As reported last month, North Korea is training a special unit of 3,000 elite hackers under the direct control of its leader, Kim Jong-un, with some being sent to China and Russia for detailed studies. North Korea may appear to be technologically primitive, but it has focused resources into developing offensive cyber weapons.


Although its own population may be digitally illiterate, North Korea has been preparing for cyber warfare since the late 1980s, and many analysts believe that the country ranks in the top-5 in cyber capability.

Given the wide disparity in quality of life and access to information, it is no great surprise that leaders in North Korea want to exploit their cyber prowess. Cyber attacks are difficult to trace, and as the excerpted article illustrates, leaders in Pyongyang are

North Korean Cyber Denier

9 June 2012

Source: Song Yo'ng-so'k, "Fabricated Act Borne by Chronic Bad Habit," Rodong Sinmun, 9 June 2012. <http://dprkmedia.com>



Cyber DPRK Army Flag based on Flag of the Korean People's Army by Denelson83 (Manual tracing of an image at Flags of the World.) [GFDL (<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

DPRK Party Organ Decries ROK Talk of Cyber Terrorism by DPRK

Proclaiming all unusual things that happen to them to be the fault of fellow countrymen and using that as an excuse to intensify anti-Republic confrontation maneuvers is a chronic bad habit of the Lee Myung-bak (President of South Korea) gang of traitors, which is accustomed to slander and fabrication. The fact that these people are harping on us again over radio-wave jamming damage that they recently experienced is an eruption of that bad habit.

As is known, the whole area of South Korea was thrown into unprecedented chaos recently. Great turmoil arose in the sky and on the land and sea owing to radio-wave jamming, and there was even a case of a puppet navy UAV that was doing a test flight suddenly turning into a "missile" and flying into the control vehicle.

The problem is that the puppet gang has linked this situation with us again and raised the heat in anti-Republic smear racket. At first, the puppets clamored ambiguously that it seemed the radio-wave jamming was being transmitted from the North, but they backed down and said that was not scientifically confirmed. Having shown their true colors, the gang of traitors then said that it was clear the radio-wave jamming signal was coming out of the Kaeso'ng area, and they harped on us without reason. On top of that, the puppets made

expert at claiming plausible deniability. Moreover, with little required hardware, cyber attacks are a relatively inexpensive means to harass one's enemy, especially when one's country is not nearly as digitized and subject to counterattack. Having no access to the Internet or digital communications, the average North Korean would never feel the aftershocks of a cyberattack. This is not true for those living in South Korea. End OE Watch Commentary (Kim)

Continued: DPRK Party Organ Decries ROK Talk of Cyber Terrorism by DPRK

a commotion trying to mislead opinion at home and abroad, spouting baseless sophistry saying that the North was mobilizing a means of radio jamming brought in from a foreign country and that it had stopped the radio-wave jamming because of someone's "action." This reminds us of the ship "Ch'o'nan" incident, which was a childish anti-Republic smear act that became a joke to the world.

In the past, every time the Lee Myung-bak gang was driven into a corner it has run amok in a smear racket of outrageously taking issue with us. That, however, was as foolish as spitting while lying down.

In April last year [2011], an incident occurred in which the South Korean "Nonghyo'p" financial computer network was totally paralyzed by a cyber attack. At that, the puppet authorities launched a joint investigation game by mobilizing the National Intelligence Service and Public Prosecutor, and they maintained, even without accurate evidence, that it was "an act of North Korea." However, as the victims and even the puppet army's Defense Security Command denied that, the Lee Myung-bak gang was humiliated.

It was the same thing during the Seoul mayoral "election" at the end of October 2011. At that time, the Internet home pages of the "National Election Commission" and Pak Wo'n-sun, the only opposition candidate, were paralyzed for several hours by DDoS attacks.

This historically unprecedented cyber-terror incident was an organized criminal act committed by "Saenuri Party" cronies who considered the youth vote unfavorable to them and tried to block it.

Moreover, the Lee Myung-bak gang even said the large-scale power outage that happened in South Korea in 2011 because of abnormally high temperatures was "caused by North Korean cyber-terrorism" and that the probability for that was "nearly 99.9%," so they jumped on our Republic without reason. When the cause of it was revealed later, however, they performed the tragicomedy of helplessly yielding with an apology. The facts clearly show that anti-Republic smears and fabrications are an inveterate bad habit of the Lee Myung-bak gang of traitors, who are frantic for confrontation with fellow countrymen.

As to the fact that the puppet authorities are unfurling another anti-Republic fabricated act over the radio-wave jamming damage, every level in South Korea expresses serious concern and says that plotting to harm fellow countrymen without accurate evidence will make the breakdown in North-South relations even worse.

Even so, the puppets turn a deaf ear to that and raise the heat further in smears and fabrications. A while ago, while stating that the cause of a UAV crash turned out to be "no GPS reception capability," they were humiliated again for frantically trying to make the story of a "North Korean act" a foregone conclusion through the foreign company that manufactured the aircraft.

No matter how skilled the Lee Myung-bak gang is at smears and fabrication, it can never turn lies into truth. The truth will always come out, and the gang of traitors can never conceal their scheming nature.

OE Watch Commentary: On 14 July a suicide bomber struck a wedding ceremony in the northern Afghan province of Samangan, killing influential anti-Taliban politician Ahmad Khan Samangani and 22 others, including the provincial intelligence chief and two senior army and police officers. The Taliban denied responsibility for the attack, but Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah Khan Mohammadi said initial evidence suggested the insurgent group was behind it. Local officials also alleged that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which operates in alliance with the Haqqani Network, carried out the killings. Announcing its spring offensive in May, the Taliban had warned that it would target government officials and anyone cooperating with the foreign troops.

Samangani was a prominent mujahideen commander who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s and against the Taliban in the late 1990s. He won a seat in parliament in 2010, and had thousands of armed men under his command in northern Afghanistan.

His slaying was the latest in a series of high-profile assassinations by the Taliban in the past two years, especially influential leaders of the Northern Alliance such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat-e Islami and head of the High Peace Council, and General Daud Daud, the police chief of northern provinces. On 15 July Higher Education Minister Obaidullah Obaid survived an assassination attempt while traveling to northern Kunduz Province.

The recent killings are feared to undermine security in the relatively peaceful north and jeopardize the smooth transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan lead in the region. They may also further strain ties between minority leaders and Karzai. The excerpted article in the Mandegar Daily criticizes the government for freeing Taliban

Assassination of Influential Figures

16 July 2012

Source: “Nokta hai penhaan roydad-s Samangan” (“Hidden Points of Samangan Incident,”) Mandagar Daily, July 16, 2012. <http://mandegardaily.af/IMG/pdf/No-860.pdf>



Afghanistan Samangan Province location based on Afghanistan location map by NordNordWest [GFDL (<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

نکته‌هاي پنهان رویداد سمنگان

Hidden Points of Samangan Incident

With the assassination of [MP] Ahmad Khan Samangani, the north has lost another political pillar who enjoyed the people’s support but the main culprit for the incident has not yet been identified. The point is that many important officials have lost their lives in such incidents over the past decade but the government has never wanted to probe the matters completely and all the president did was appoint a weak delegation which has failed to finish its work.

In the past decade, or perhaps during the past two or three decades, no country has witnessed such a series of deliberate terror attacks as Afghanistan has. In other words, there are countries which suffer war and violence but none has witnessed such serial killings of influential figures who all belong to the same political circle and have the same ideas. I believe this plan and strategy has only been designed for Afghanistan and the tactic taken into consideration for this is also delicate and dangerous.

But again, the question is that why such incidents are not prevented and the causes always remain ambiguous. In fact, it is very clear that the killing of jihadi leaders in the north, who are and have been the defenders of this land, has been planned as part of a big political plan and the Taliban are only used as a tool. The simple and unlucky suicide bomber who

commanders from jail and not doing enough to prevent such attacks. It also alleges that certain elements within the government could be involved in the assassination campaign of northern leaders.

Moreover, the recent assassinations could increase resentment and anxiety among Northern Alliance leaders who are worried about political deals with the Taliban. Leaders in the north fear that a backstage deal between Karzai and the Taliban could undo gains of the past decade and repeat the horrors of the 1990s. A similar article in the *Jawedan Daily* quotes Ahmad Zia Massoud, leader of opposition alliance *Jabha-e Melli* (National Front), as warning that Karzai is trying to forge a coalition with some factions of the Taliban and *Hizb-e Islami* to contest the 2014 presidential elections. <http://jawedan.com/index.php/1389-03-26-19-12-1/5018-karzai-coalition-with-taliban-and-hekmatyar> On 14 July former Afghan spy chief and key opposition figure Amrullah Saleh warned in an interview with local *Tolo TV* that his followers would turn against the government if a secret power-sharing deal was made with the insurgents.

While the effort to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table has largely failed, it has created deep divisions inside Afghanistan. Many commanders in north and central Afghanistan have begun rearming their militias as Kabul and Washington have intensified efforts to reach a settlement with the Taliban to end the war. The recent killings may only accelerate their rearming drive, which could spark a civil war once foreign troops depart the country in 2014. **End OE Watch Commentary (Majidiyar)**

Continued: Hidden Points of Samangan Incident

has been tasked to kill himself and his target does not know for which political circles or intelligence body he is working but the official and big game behind these movements are getting clearer with every passing day.

It is clear that members of the resistance against Pakistan and those who come to Afghanistan to oppose Pakistan's plans know that such a process will also take their lives one day, but they have again sat silently and patiently and bury one of their old friends every day. One should ask the gentlemen now that what conditions they are now living in and how long they need to wait for their turn while they have the capability to strongly prevent this hostile program. In fact, when you know that you have all been trapped in a purposeful conspiracy, why you do not get awakened and do not establish a strong front against such a conspiracy by strengthening your ranks? important resistance figures who now work in the government alongside Mr. Karzai and those who have distanced themselves from the government and work as political oppositions, and who have gathered under any other plan, know that only the Taliban and Pakistan do not organize the serial and purposeful killings, but there are also some individuals who have infiltrated into the government in a dangerous manner and act as the fifth pillar of the enemies of Afghanistan. But unfortunately, none of them take into consideration this point and do not think about a strategy.

In the meantime, the government of Afghanistan also faces an important question because it has failed to assess such cases effectively and why it fails to prevent such incidents. Also, why it has not made any plan to target leaders of the enemies the people of Afghanistan, this ambiguous enemy! While instead, their dangerous commanders and leaders are freed from jails.

Passing It On
Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan's Frontier
General Sir Andrew Skeen
LESTER W. GRAU & ROBERT H. BAER, EDITORS

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)
Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE)

In resurrecting General Sir Andrew Skeen's *Passing It On*, the Foreign Military Studies Office and the Maneuver Center of Excellence, have provided a detailed look from 1932 that holds valuable lessons and understanding of the Operational Environment in the Af-Pak Theater of today.

***OE Watch Commentary:** The 30 May 2012 incident in which border trooper Vladislav Chelakh allegedly executed 14 of his comrades at a post on the Sino-Kazakh border has been a bombshell in the Kazakh media, and has again brought the issue of military hazing to the forefront. Hazing [“dedovshchina”] in the Soviet Union developed due to the two-year conscription period and a lack of a strong noncommissioned officer tradition, and it continues to be a common occurrence in post-Soviet militaries. In the Soviet system officers did the vast majority of troop handling. At night, when the officers went home, the conscripts were left with little or no supervision. A practice developed in which the senior second-year conscripts, or “grandfathers,” [“ded” in Russian], bullied the junior first-year conscripts. The level of this bullying often got out of control, resulting in serious injuries and sometimes even death. On a micro level, commanders lost significant manpower to preventable causes, but on a macro level “dedovshchina” substantially damaged the public perception of military service and was a major factor in draft dodging.*

*There has been some speculation that the 30 May 2012 incident was prompted by some particularly brutal hazing of Chelakh. There is also some speculation that the hazing was exacerbated in part due to Chelakh being an ethnic Russian, the rest of unit consisting of ethnic Kazakhs. Other theories, prompted by initial reports, posit that some “armed group” conducted the attack, and Chelakh is being blamed to conceal the ineptness of the Kazakh Border Service. In general, it seems more likely that the event was brought on by hazing and not by some random armed group, the latter being very unusual in Kazakhstan due to terrorist/gun violence being very rare there. The following article discusses some of the broader issues of the status of the Kazakh Armed Forces that this incident brings to light. **End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles)***

All is Not Quiet on the Kazakh Front

21 May 2012

Source: Farkhad Sharip, “Kazakhstan’s Borders Remain Vulnerable in the Face of Potential Terrorist Threat,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 9 Issue: 127, 5 July 2012. <http://www.jamestown.org/>



Vladislav Chelakh (in the top row to the right) photo by RIA Novosti via <http://en.ria.ru/world/20120607/173895145.html>

Kazakhstan’s Borders Remain Vulnerable in the Face of Potential Terrorist Threat

The quick succession of alarming incidents at the Arkan Kergen and Tersayryk border posts (see EDM, June 27) revealed deep-running security problems and raised public concerns about the state of Kazakhstan’s border protection. Border authorities and the National Security Committee gave rather confused and often contradicting accounts of the incident to journalists, creating the impression that they were concealing real causes of the event from the public.

A few days after the killings of guards at the two above-mentioned border posts, President Nursultan Nazarbayev called the incidents an “act of terrorism” (www.interfax.kz, June 4). Rumors fueled nationalist sentiments and generated suspicion that Uyghur separatists operating in China might have attacked the border guards (Zhas Alash, June 7). During his visit to China on June 6, President Nazarbayev, after discussing with Chinese officials new oil and gas projects and development of transportation links with Chinese officials, announced to the media that the killing of 14 border guards at the Arkan Kergen border post on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border had nothing to do with foreign intrusion (www.tengrinews, June 6). Yet, while allegations about possible incursion from Chinese territory seem to be unfounded, the inability of the authorities to provide a rational explanation for the case has created tension.

Continued: Kazakhstan's Borders Remain Vulnerable in the Face of Potential Terrorist Threat

The tragic events at Arkan Kergen and Tersayryk reflect only a visible tip of the iceberg in the context of the overall deterioration of discipline in military units and the frequent media reports of deaths of servicemen in mysterious circumstances – obviously victims of bullying harassment and beatings by senior officers. None of these cases were thoroughly investigated and no culprits were ever named. Dosym Satpayev, the head of the Almaty-based consultancy firm Risk Assessment Group, believes that Nursultan Nazarbayev is being constantly misinformed by his advisors about the real state of the army and border security force (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 20).

The atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the border incidents triggered a sharp public reaction. At a recent media conference, the Association of Afghan War Veterans of Kazakhstan made a strong statement saying that “the current situation in the border services of the National Security Committee threatens the security and independence of the country and may lead to destabilization of the internal situation” and raises doubts about the “inviolability of the [state] border.” Kairat Yelubayev, the first deputy head of the Association of Afghan War Veterans said that his organization suggests the government should take “a number of measures that may [positively] influence the situation.” These include, above all, retesting the level of competence and training of commanders of border units and detachments, as well as educating officers responsible for training of personnel. According to Kairat Yeubayev, military officers who fail to pass the test should be dismissed from army ranks. Furthermore, overall civilian control over the work of security forces in all regions and in Astana and Almaty should be established (KTK TV Channel, June 26).

Public organizations in Kazakhstan never voiced such deep concern about the low morale and lack of discipline within the military before. The strong statement from the Association of Afghan War Veterans was preceded by chains of incidents that illustrated the vulnerability of Kazakhstan's borders to potential intrusion. In February of this year, an unmanned aircraft flew in from Uzbekistan, undetected by Kazakhstani anti-aircraft units and border guards, and circled over the Beyneu railway station in Mangystau region (western Kazakhstan) for about 15 minutes before it safely returned to Uzbekistan. The Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan sent a note of protest to Uzbekistan, but the authorities in Tashkent practically ignored it, asserting that the violation of air space did not take place (KTK TV Channel, February 17).

On June 28, Kazakhstani media sources, referencing Kyrgyzstan's 24.kg news agency, reported the arrest of two residents of Kazakhstan in Bishkek. The suspects reportedly were carrying extremist literature calling on Muslims to launch a holy war of jihad against infidels. Parts of home-made bombs were also seized from them (RIA Novosti-Kazakhstan, June 28).

In his public speeches, Nursultan Nazarbayev often speaks about the “threat from the South.” In his speeches to domestic audiences, he downplays the potential danger of religious extremism and terrorism, which are likely to escalate after the pullout of NATO and American troops from Afghanistan. According to him, the only imminent threat to Kazakhstan comes from instability in Afghanistan, especially in the context of drug trafficking. Not long ago, in his interview with the Russian Rossiya 24 television channel, Nazarbayev stressed that the only real threat would come from Afghanistan, “which is continually increasing the annual output of narcotic substances” (www.tengrinews, April 25). During his talks with the UN Secretary-General's special representative Jan Kubis, President Nazarbayev reiterated that security in Central Asia entirely hinges on the situation in Afghanistan (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, June 28).

Kazakhstan seems to rely heavily on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and primarily on Russia, for its border security. But Uzbekistan's recent statement that it would suspend its membership in the CSTO shows the fragility of this Russian-led structure. A viable alternative for Kazakhstan in these circumstances would be a radical reform of its border service. Kazakhstan's border security forces are weakened by loose discipline, as well as corruption within the higher echelons of the military hierarchy, which undermines the public image of the army and precludes closer border cooperation with its neighbors. But given the prevailing rivalry in Central Asia, latent territorial disputes, regional ambitions, and disagreements on energy and water issues, Kazakhstan will find it difficult to enhance border cooperation with its neighbors even if it can tackle its domestic corruption issues.

OE Watch Commentary: Ever since the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) conducted incursions into Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000 from its bases in Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan, regional security organizations have often tailored joint exercises to simulate another possible incursion by the IMU or another terrorist group. The following article about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Peace Mission-2012 exercise is yet another example of regional militaries practicing a combined arms assault to repel and destroy a terrorist group.

Overall, Peace Mission-2012 can be considered fairly useful. In 1999 the IMU incursions took place in mountainous terrain, which can be difficult even for modern military and security forces to operate in. The fact that SCO members chose this location for the exercise is a sign that they are considering some of the difficulties they might face in future operations.

However, this exercise still misses a couple of important aspects of possible future scenarios. The exercise does not address what might happen if the population (instead of a terrorist group) is the cause for unrest, as was the case for the June 2010 violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, when ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz fought each other. Nor does the exercise mention the legal framework for member countries to deploy in response to a threat. The SCO's mandate states a policy of non-interference in a member state's internal affairs. Since the majority of conflicts in Central Asia in the past several years never crossed international borders, a future SCO response might be a more complicated issue than any exercise could address.

End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)

Peace Mission 2012

15 June 2012

Source: Khudoleev, Victor. "Школа Чорух-Дайрона (The School of Chorukh-Dayron)," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 15 June 2012. <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/v-armiyakh-sng/tadzhikistan/item/2831-shkola-choruh-dayrona>



Kazakhstan military officers observe the SCO drills during Peace Mission 2012, after taking the scenic route to northern Tajikistan. Photo by Eurasia Net via <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65552>

Школа Чорух-Дайрона (The School of Chorukh-Dayron)

Common methods of resolving a potential crisis in the Central Asian region were worked on in an antiterrorist exercise (Peace Mission 2012) in Tajikistan by participants of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This was stated by Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Army, Dmitry Bulgakov. "The exercise Peace Mission-2012 was a clear confirmation of the consistency of our countries to join efforts for an effective response to today's challenges," – said General Bulgakov.

The goal of the exercise, the active phase of which took place at the Chorukh-Dayron range in the Sughd Province of Tajikistan, was to develop uniform methods of resolving a crisis through joint military operations in mountainous terrain. The exercise was worked out in separate tactical episodes. Combined units surrounded the village occupied by the enemy. Then special forces freed civilians from militants and then destroyed the terrorists' bases with air and artillery strikes.

Peace Mission-2012 started on June 8. The active phase involved more than two thousand soldiers and about 500 combat vehicles and aircraft from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Apart from the soldiers in the exercise, units from the Ministry of Emergency Services and Interior Ministry of Tajikistan participated.

OE Watch Commentary: The following article about Uzbekistan's second departure from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the successor security organization of several former Soviet republics, is a fairly straightforward analysis of the history and circumstances behind the government of Uzbekistan's decision. One drawback, however, is that this analysis is a Russian, not Central Asian or even Uzbek, perspective of the CSTO.

The author mentions a few reasons that Uzbek political scientists (likely on behalf of the government) gave for leaving the CSTO and states that these are unconvincing. While the author is not wrong, there are sometimes assumptions that Russian and Central Asian perspectives of the CSTO and regional security in relation to Afghanistan are the same. There is a small but growing part of the population in Central Asia that does not see Russia as the best option for a security partner. An article titled "Uzbekistan Finds Its Own Way" came out in a Kazakh language newspaper a few days after Uzbekistan's decision (see: <http://zhasalash.kz/saraptama/7434.html>). The collage depicts other CSTO members as dragging along a Russian vessel on dry land and the article suggests that Kazakhstan should also quit the CSTO. This does not reflect the government of Kazakhstan's position, but in a country not known for having a free press it is worth noting to see something critical of Russia in a country known for usually having close relations with Moscow.

The author does not mention Uzbekistan's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or within the less known Council of Commanders of Border Troops since 1991. The latter is an organization that, like the CSTO, grew out of security issues during the transition to independence among former Soviet republics. Uzbekistan has not suspended

Uzbekistan Leaves the CSTO Again

2 July 2012

Source: Litovkin, Victor. "ОДКБ для Ташкента – проходной двор (The CSTO for Tashkent – A Revolving Door)," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 July 2012. http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-07-02/3_kartblansh.html



CSTO Flag [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

ОДКБ для Ташкента – проходной двор (The CSTO for Tashkent – A Revolving Door)

Uzbekistan has once again suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Last week, a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan was given to the Secretariat of the CSTO to suspend its membership in the organization. Many commentators have tried to explain what caused this unexpected step of Tashkent. The arguments of some Uzbek political scientists, that (Uzbekistan) prefers bilateral cooperation to multilateral and does not agree with the strategic plans of the organization with regard to Afghanistan, look extremely unconvincing.

According to the charter of the organization, Article 20, "The suspension of a government's participation in the CSTO is possible only by a decision of the (CSTO) Council as a measure for failure to comply with the charter." Moreover, the charter "does not imply the possibility of a state suspending its membership in the CSTO unilaterally." It is not the first time the country suspended its participation in the CSTO, blatantly ignoring the political and military activities of the organization (including antiterrorism exercises) and never took any responsibility.

Knowledgeable people will remember that Tashkent already suspended its participation in the CSTO. It happened in 1999 when Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) forces came close to the borders of Uzbekistan and the question arose of the possibility of aggression against the country. President (of Uzbekistan) Islam Karimov asked Moscow

participation in all regional security organizations, which would be a more telling sign than withdrawing from the CSTO. End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)

RELATED LINK

Uzbekistan's View of Security in Afghanistan After 2014

Much of the recent focus on Uzbekistan in relation to Afghanistan has been on the Northern Distribution Network...

Less considered is the issue of regional security, specifically Uzbekistan's view of the coming U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan. This viewpoint is difficult to capture, because it is not often directly voiced, but we can examine it through the government's previous actions on security issues. <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Uzbekistans-view.pdf>

Continued: The CSTO for Tashkent – A Revolving Door

for military assistance and emergency supplies of weapons. For one reason or another (Russian financial crisis, fighting in the North Caucasus) no aid was received. Naturally, (Karimov) decided that he did not need those kinds of allies. Uzbekistan also entered into an agreement with the U.S. on the deployment of forces at Karshi-Khanabad.

The romance with Washington was short. After the unrest in Andijan (in 2005), Uzbekistan's love of the West passed. The Central Asian republic even asked to return to the CSTO. The organization accepted the country without any preconditions or requirements that are common to all members. Tashkent, without losing anything from entering and exiting the CSTO, continued to behave as it wanted. The lesson of Andijan, the fate of Mubarak, Gaddafi, and others who were once friends in Washington is not alarming. How the CSTO will react is again the question. It is easy to lose face, but to recover credibility – a problem.

The Kazakhstan-Russia Axis: Shaping CSTO Transformation

By *Roger N. McDermott*

*Senior International Fellow,
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United Kingdom



„ Viewed from Kazakhstan's perspective, the need to transcend the symbolism of the CSTO's collective defense theme and promote ways in which it might meet real transnational and emerging security challenges is both real and urgent...„

<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/International.html>

OE Watch Editor Note: Taken together, the following two articles provide perspectives on Russian military presence in Tajikistan from both Tajik and Russian media viewpoints.

OE Watch Commentary: During the Tajik Civil War (1992-97) the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division provided a fair amount of stability for Tajikistan, as did the Russian Border Guards that remained in the country until 2005. Since the Civil War ended there have been a number of predictions that violence would again break out among various groups over power, limited resources, or general strife among the population. There have been several violent incidents, but not at a level like the Civil War.

While the Russian media appear to be conducting a sort of blackmail against Tajikistan, some credit for the lack of violence could be given to the continuous presence of the 201st. Additionally, General Chirkin's comments about conflict in Central Asia could turn out to be true, although any potential water, energy, or land conflict may have more to do with the economic resources related to the three spheres. At the same time the Tajik political analyst understands the population's sentiment about conflict in Tajikistan. Many people in Tajikistan claim that bad memories of the Civil War prevent any tension among various groups from turning into violence.

Looking past the threat of a conflict in Tajikistan, both sides in the negotiation are largely concerned about the cost of a continued Russian presence. As it stands now, Russia pays nothing for its bases in Tajikistan, but provides vital security assistance in lieu of money that bolsters Tajikistan's military and security forces. In recent years, Tajikistan has expanded security cooperation with the U.S. and even India. While it might seem that Tajikistan is moving away from Russia toward other bilateral security partnerships, it was more likely done as a negotiation tactic. The security partnership is important for both sides, despite whatever heated rhetoric comes out in the media. It may be just a matter of what each side is prepared to give up. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)**

Russia's Presence in Tajikistan

28 June 2012



Source: Yuldashev, Avaz. "Эксперт: России не нужно шантажировать таджикское руководство новой гражданской войной (Expert: Russia Does Not Need to Blackmail Tajik Leadership With a New Civil War)," Asia-Plus, 28 June 2012. <http://news.tj/ru/news/ekspert-rossii-ne-nuzhno-shantazhirovat-tadzhikskoe-rukovodstvo-novoi-grazhdanskoi-voinoi>

Vladimir Chirkin, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, via <http://www.eng.mil.ru>

Эксперт: России не нужно шантажировать таджикское руководство новой гражданской войной
(Expert: Russia Does Not Need to Blackmail Tajik Leadership With a New Civil War)

When considering the continued presence of the Russian military base in Tajikistan, keep in mind that Russia and Tajikistan are equal parties of international relations. This was stated by the well known political analyst Rustam Khaidarov, commenting on reports from Russian media and high ranking Russian politicians.

"Right now in the Russian media there are publications predicting a new civil war in Tajikistan with the withdrawal of the Russian military. These conclusions are first of all false, and second, politically incorrect because there is no premise or basis for a new conflict in Tajikistan. The provider of peace in Tajikistan is not the Russian military, but the people of Tajikistan, which does not allow a new war," said Khaidarov.

It should be noted that on June 26, the Russian Commander of the Ground Forces, General Vladimir Chirkin stated that the signing of an agreement on extending the presence of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Tajikistan for 49 years is on the verge of breaking down. Chirkin added that Tajikistan insists on signing an agreement for a period of 10 years. "Considering the projected worsening of interstate conflicts in the spheres of energy, water, and land, Central Asian countries may have local armed conflicts that involve Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan," – words quoted by Chirkin.

"In discussing this issue, both parties should exercise maximum accuracy and not react emotionally," said Khaidarov. "Russia must understand that Tajikistan has the right to withdraw Russian troops from its country, because it is a sovereign state and will act in accordance with its national interests. Tajikistan may host on its territory military bases of any government, including Russia, the U.S., and India. If Russia wants to stay on our land another 49 years, (they) can construct new infrastructure in these cities. They will support the development of these towns and provide work for local residents."

OE Watch Commentary: On 9 July 2012 Russian federal information agency Rosbalt, one of Russia's largest information agencies, and by its own description one of top five most quoted internet sources, published an article about the perceived danger to the stability of Tajikistan should Russia remove its 201st military base from that country. The article is based on an interview with chief editor of Russia's National Defense magazine, Igor Korotchenko.

Russia keeps its largest military base abroad in Tajikistan without paying for an actual lease, though providing some compensation in other forms. A ten-year agreement about keeping the base in Tajikistan is set to expire in 2014. Last year both sides agreed, in principle, to extend the agreement in 2012 past this date, and Tajikistan confirmed this commitment in April 2012.

Yet, at the beginning of July 2012 discussions between Tajikistan and Russia about renewing the agreements past 2014 reached a sudden impasse after Dushanbe presented the Kremlin more than twenty conditions for extending the agreement, including an increased cost to Moscow for keeping its base there.

Moscow's geostrategic view of Central Asia is currently colored by the impending U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent possible rise of extremist Islamism on Russia's borders—a major concern for Russia. However, the U.S. withdrawal also signals to the Kremlin an opportunity for expanding its reach into Central Asia in the U.S. absence.

Ensuring a Russian presence and influence in Central Asia—military and otherwise—at as little cost as possible to Russia is, therefore, among Russia's top priorities. The planned U.S. withdrawal puts Tajikistan, as other Central Asian countries, in a weaker bargaining

Russia is Working to Keep Its Military Base in Tajikistan for Another 10 Years at Same Cost; Calls Tajikistan Unreasonable

9 July 2012

Source: “Ekspert: Vyvod voyennoi bazy RF iz Tadzhiqistana chrevat destabilizatsiyeyi rezhima Rakhmona (Expert: Removing Russia's Military Base from Tajikistan is Likely to Destabilize Rakhmon's regime). Informatsionnoye Agenstvo Rosbalt.ru (Information Agency Rosbalt.ru), <http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2012/07/09/1008873.html>



Tajikistan map by planiglobe [CC-BY-2.5(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/>)] via <http://www.planiglobe.com>

Expert: Removing Russia's military base from Tajikistan is likely to destabilize Rahmon's regime

Removal of 201st Russian military base from Tajikistan will potentially lead to destabilizing Rahmon's regime. Chief Editor of National Defense magazine Igor Korotchenko expressed this opinion to Rosbalt's correspondent, commenting on the situation with regard to the signing of the agreement about the presence of the 201st Russian military base on Tajik territory.

“Tajikistan is taking an extremely unconstructive position, and following Azerbaijan towards totally frivolous demands about disproportionate increase in rent for the Russian military facilities. The Tajik president must understand that Russia's withdrawal from Tajikistan, in terms of military presence, will mean the potential for destabilization of the regime immediately after the Americans leave Afghanistan. [Tajikistan's president] Emomali Rahmon simply won't have anyone to lean on in terms of reliable and predictable allies,” said Korotchenko.

Continued: Removing Russia's military base from Tajikistan is likely to destabilize Rahmon's regime

position vis-à-vis Russia, which comes through in the tone of the interview with Mr. Korotchenko. Presenting Russia's withdrawal from Tajikistan as dangerous to Tajikistan's security, and calling the Tajik government behavior unreasonable and obstinate, as Mr. Korotchenko does in this article, makes strategic sense for Russia in this context, and Tajikistan does have reasons to be concerned, given the U.S. withdrawal.

Russian and some Tajik analysts say that for Tajikistan this stalemate is largely about money and other compensation from Russia, whether unreasonable or not. Some believe that the increased demands are about obtaining Russia's support for President Rakhmon in Tajikistan's upcoming 2013 presidential elections. Nonetheless, the underlying dynamic of both fear of Russia's dominance and the need for Russia's protection after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan—perceived in the region as U.S. abandonment—cannot be discounted. End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)

A unique space-monitoring complex, “Okno [Window],” is located on Tajikistan's territory, and belongs to Russia; Russia has been paying Dushanbe a symbolic fee for eight years for leasing the land allocated to this complex. “Russia definitely cannot “throw away “ this site, said Korotchenko. According to him, no matter how the situation developed, no matter what requirements are put forward by officials in Dushanbe, Moscow has to find any option possible for influencing its “partner”, “so that this facility remains under Russian control and operated by the Russians in the foreseeable future.”


Such options, Korotchenko is sure, can always be found. “Just do not stand on ceremony where the ceremony is not necessary. In the end, Russia has a free hand to act no less brutally than the United States, if necessary,” notes the expert. “I think that for Russia, it is critical to use all the leverage that it can, to influence both the Tajik leadership, and the leadership of other CIS countries”, he said.

Recall that Russia has the 201st military base in Tajikistan; its stay, in accordance with the signed agreement of 16 October 2004, is set for 10 years. This base is the largest Russian military contingent outside the country, designed to ensure the security and stability in Central Asia.

As previously reported, Dushanbe puts forth conditions unacceptable to Moscow with regard to further extending the lease on the site. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, believes that in October, “Tajik colleagues will be ready and will have signed all the documents.” He also expressed confidence that “the financial terms of the lease will remain the same.”

The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war for a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a stubbornly difficult mission and technology can offer only modest support to the infantry's mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician's mission of getting support forward. This book by Les Grau and Chuck Bartles covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications, training, and logistics in the mountains.

This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as an alternate view to a most-challenging military environment.



OE Watch Commentary: *On 29 June Russia's powerful national business daily Vedomosti — a joint venture with the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Sanoma, the largest Russian publishing house—published an article about a \$120 million deal between Bashneft, Russia's oil giant, and the Iraqi Oil Ministry.*

Bashneft is one of the largest oil producers in Russia, and will now be the third Russian oil company to have a signed deal with Iraq.

Under the terms of this agreement Bashneft will develop a geological survey of block 12 in the south of Iraq—an 8,000-square-kilometer (3,100 square miles) area in the provinces of Muthanna and Najaf. If the company discovers at least 200 million barrels of oil—which is more than likely according to Bashneft's president—it will be allowed to develop the site and receive a remuneration fee of \$5 per barrel of oil.


Russia has been quietly expanding its reach into the Middle East, including Iraq, for the last several years now. Bashneft's oil deal with Iraq is another example of this.

In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Moscow had enjoyed lucrative commercial contracts in exchange for providing Iraq its diplomatic support, often against the United States and the United Nations. Ever since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which signaled an end of these deals for Moscow, Russia has been trying to win back Iraq's main energy contracts.

The Arabs traditionally see the Kremlin as a counterweight to Washington's influence and presence in the Middle East. The world's fourth largest oil reserves are in Iraq, and the country's new leadership has been trying to build up its energy sector in recent years. Most analysts expect Iraq to be a major source of the world's future oil supplies. Russia's relations with Iraq,

Russian Oil Giant Concludes \$120 Million Energy Deal with Iraq

29 June 2012



Source: Dzyadko, Timofei, "Bashneft potratit \$120 millionov na geologorazvedku v Irake (Bashneft to spend \$120 million on geological exploration in Iraq)," Vedomosti, 29 June 2012. http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/2231701/bashneft_potratit_120 mln_na_geologorazvedku_v_irake

БАШНЕФТЬ

Bashneft company logo by Acodered (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>) or GFDL (<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>)], via Wikimedia Commons

«Башнефть» потратит \$120 млн на геологоразведку в Ираке (Bashneft to spend \$120 million on geological exploration in Iraq)

A Bashneft-led consortium, which on Thursday received the status of block 12 operator of exploration and development in Iraq, is to sign a contract in the coming months with the Ministry of Petroleum of the Republic, which stipulates that \$120 million will be invested during a five-year period into geological exploration. Bashneft's president Alexander Korsik discussed this with Vedomosti.

During this time, the consortium must carry out a two-dimensional seismic survey in the amount of not less than 2000 km and drill at least one exploratory well. If necessary, the exploration can be extended twice for two years, said Korsik. But, he said, five years should be sufficient.

Under the contract's terms, discovery of oil deposits reserves of no less than 200 million barrels will be deemed a commercial discovery, in which case Bashneft will get the right to develop the deposits and receive \$5 for each explored barrel. Investors in Iraq can only count on receiving payments for oil extraction after they discover certain set volumes, but cannot count on the oil itself.

According to assessments of Bashneft's geologists, the amount of reserves that can be discovered on this block is much higher, so the risk [of failure] is minimal, says the company's president. Due to remuneration differences, Bashneft managed to get into Iraq only in the second attempt.

Continued: Bashneft to spend \$120 million on geological exploration in Iraq

particularly commercial relations, while less visible in the news, are important to watch. End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)

At the end of May, within the framework of the fourth licensing round together with British Premier Oil and Petrovietnam Drilling, the Russian company bid on two oil blocks - 10 and 12. But the company lost the tender for block 10 to a Lukoil-Japanese Inpex alliance, which asked for the lowest amount - \$ 5.99 on every barrel explored (Bashneft and its partners requested \$ 7.07). The tender for block 12 then was declared invalid because Bashneft, Premier Oil, and Petrovietnam Drilling wanted \$ 9.85, and Iraq is counted on \$5.

Bashneft agreed to the terms of the tender organizers on the basis of further negotiations with Iraq's Oil Ministry, but received the status of block operator, giving it full independence in making decisions on key issues of project implementation. Premier Oil stays as a partner to the Russian company. Bashneft is also considering bringing a third partner into this project, said Korsik. The company can choose from all fourth round participants (47 companies from 25 countries were on the list of finalists), and discussions are currently being held with them. But in any event, Bashneft is going to remain the largest participant in the project, he underscored.

Dr. Les Grau's article "The Delafield Commission: Forerunner to FAO Program" is the lead article in the December 2011 edition of The FAO Journal: International Affairs. The issue also includes Karen Kaya's "Turk Concerns with US Withdrawal from Iraq" as well as "Southeast Asia: 'Indo' or China'?" by Ivan Welch



OE Watch Commentary: Russian information source REX conducted a poll among 1,821 Russian bloggers between 11-18 June 2012. The survey asked one question: “Will the war spread from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Russia?” The respondents could answer “yes,” “no,” or “difficult to tell,” or write their own response.

The majority (62%) of the respondents answered “yes,” indicating a belief that war will spread into Russia and the Caucasus.

REX published survey results and select comments from the respondents. These comments primarily express a conviction that the West and the United States are the ultimate driving factor behind the current conflicts in the Middle East, and its intent is to destabilize Russia and the Caucasus. Several bloggers further elaborate that the “war” waged by the U.S., with the aim of world domination, is conducted through many means, including economic and social, and is “smarter” than conventional warfare.

These comments are significant because they represent popular opinion among Russian officials, policymakers, and some Russian people. Such paranoid sentiments are also indicative of insecurity, or Russia’s perceived weakness, vis-à-vis the West. They also help explain what is behind the Russian government’s policy towards the Middle East, how the Russians think, and how they view the United States, the West, and the situation in the Middle East.

The way the survey question itself was phrased, using the word “war,” in and of itself reveals how the Russians view the situation in the Middle East. That these opinions come from bloggers is particularly relevant because bloggers have the ability to influence a large portion of the population, especially the young and educated Russians who have

Poll: Russian Bloggers Believe the West is behind Middle East Instability, and Aims to Destabilize Russia

19 June 2012

Results of the survey “Will the war spread from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Russia?”		
Response	Number of respondents who gave a positive response	% of respondents
No	331	18%
Yes	1120	62%
Difficult to answer	244	13%
Individual response	126	7%

Source: “Voyna s Blizhnego Vostoka Rasprostronitsya na Kavkaz i Rossiyu: Mneniya Blogerov (War will Spread from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Russia: Bloggers’ Opinions),” Informatsionnoye Aгенstvo REX (Information Agency REX), 19 June 2012. <http://www.iarex.ru/news/26816.html>

Война с Ближнего Востока распространится на Кавказ и Россию: мнения блогеров (War will Spread from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Russia: Bloggers’ Opinions)

According to expert Rachya Arzumanyan, Hillary Clinton’s visit to the South Caucasus countries is connected not only with the need to solve tactical problems, but also with preparation steps that will unfold in the geopolitical arena of the Caucasus.

The coordinator of the International Expert Group IA REX Sergei Sibirykov has conducted a poll within the social network GaydPark: “will the war spread from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Russia?”

Here are the most interesting commentaries from the survey:

Yaroslav Butakov:

If, thanks to Putin’s position of capitulation towards the Euro-Atlantic policy in Syria and Iran, a war will break out (and this is almost 100% certain), then it will most certainly spread to Russia. I’m not sure if this power still has usable nuclear weapons. And, besides, what kind of a fool attacks directly nowadays?

Vasilii Otmakhov:

No one suggests that Russia will get “attacked,” for example, by NATO or specifically the U. S. Today, there will not be a war akin to the second world war, with front lines and a clear opponent. Especially when it comes to Russia. Remember the so-called “Chechen campaigns” - what did it matter that Russia is a nuclear power? Take a look at how NATO is fighting against

Continued: War will Spread from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Russia: Bloggers' Opinions

access to technology.

Hostility towards and distrust of the West, particularly the United States, continue to present a serious challenge for the United States when it comes to cooperation with Russia on Middle-East-related issues. This is especially unfortunate for those Russians who believe their country and the West share common and peaceful goals in the Middle East, and want to see Russia succeed as a respectable, democratic partner to the West.
End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)

Syria today.

In the contemporary war against Russia, its ownership of nuclear weapons matters little. First, because the “enemy forces” (terrorists and other “illegal armed formations”) operate in our territory, where the use of nuclear weapons is not possible. And second, all military actions are conducted by the so-called “opposition.” In the case of Russia among them are the so-called “angry citizens” and “belolentchniki (white ribbon wearers)” and other “disagreeables.” As far as the question itself, upon putting an end to Syria and Iran, “Western powers” of course will be able to concentrate their efforts (primarily financial and informational) against Russia. Have no doubt about this.

Irina Shpilevskaya:

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war will break out sooner or later, this is unequivocal. A subsequent attempt to squeeze Russia from the Caucasus will follow. In general, the Caucasus are the most vulnerable area in Russia.

Konstantin Zhukov:

What does it mean “the war will spread”? Is it a virus? With regard to Russia, the plans are operating quite successfully. With regard to the Middle East – there are other plans. If someone is not noticing the ongoing war in Russia, it is their own problem, for the time being. Human casualties alone are about a million a year. I won't say anything about the economy, agriculture, defense, science, culture, education, health care – these have been almost razed to the ground. Or, is war for you - the howling of aircrafts, the whistles of bullets and bayonet attacks? I dare to remind you that progress, including in the destruction of unwanted peoples, has made long leaps forward. We simply turned out to be too “smart,” so we are being destroyed in a “smart” way. But when patience will run out, the anger of the people will spill into the streets, and it will tear us apart; a foundation is already being laid for this, Ulyanovsk is one example.

Ruslan Menliazizov:

The war is already happening on the Bolotnaya Square! This is “Arab Spring, Russian style.” The opposition is being fueled not only by internal criminals, but also by the external forces seeking to destabilize the country and carve it to suit their interests. With regard to this issue, vigilance

is necessary first and foremost. In politics, all parameters must be calculated, and not stop at the emotional level.

Rinat Sagitov:

There will be no war in the Caucasus. That is, there won't be a war in the understanding of the conflict between political entities (states, tribes, political groups, etc.) that occurs in the form of armed confrontation, military (combat) operations between their armed forces. Russian Armed Forces are almost nonexistent, and Georgia will simply win back South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As for the Middle East, the United States will occupy Syria and Iran (it no longer pays attention to Russia, a weak state militarily and economically), thereby achieving control over approximately 80% of world's oil production (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long been under their thumb). Then, there will be an oil prices collapse to cause Russia's bankruptcy and a price increase to \$ 200-250 per barrel to collapse the Chinese economy. That's when the U.S. goal of world domination will be achieved. And if the U.S. will have problems with China, the anti-state and anti-people policies of Russia's rulers is already bearing fruit.

We would like to add that this poll was conducted from 11 to 18 June. 1,821 bloggers participated in the poll, who left 636 comments in response to the survey.

We also would like to note that, according to expert Rachya Arzumanyan, the West has repeatedly emphasized that it distinguishes three separate geopolitical problems in the Caucasus. It is energy projects, the unrecognized Artsakh and recognized by Russia Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as terrorist activities of Islamist groups in the North Caucasus.

“And we should understand that we're not necessary talking about the West's desire to unleash a large-scale war. The implemented strategy can be multi-faceted and include many options, when elements of political and socio-economic pressures are used, as well as escalation of military and political tension, including local military actions, without removing from the table the option of large-scale regional war unfolding on the northern borders of Iran, “ says the expert.

OE Watch Commentary: For those who have followed the debate in this country regarding plans to build a new strategic bomber to replace aircraft developed during the Cold War, the current deliberations among Russian security chiefs will sound familiar. There are questions surrounding what the primary mission of this new bomber consists of and what type of characteristics the aircraft should possess. Confounding the fluid geopolitical factors (i.e., who are likely enemies?) are the constant technological changes in almost every component in modern aircraft. Since the development life-cycle for a new bomber can stretch to a decade or longer, there is a danger that the prototype will be obsolete before the first aircraft is delivered.

Alongside these formidable challenges, the Russian aviation industry must also address a weakened technological infrastructure. Despite all the bombastic rhetoric, some analysts question whether the country still has the ‘right stuff’ to design, construct, and field a 21st century strategic bomber. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a lack of capital investment in new technologies and a dramatic decline in Russia’s aircraft research and development. Massive spending (20 trillion rubles on defense needs through 2020) may fix today’s problems, but long-term prospects are less sanguine. As the accompanying article makes clear, the debate in Russia over its new strategic bomber is not likely to end anytime soon. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)**

A New Russian Strategic Bomber?

21 June 2012

Source: “The Bomber as a National Problem,” AviaPort, 21 June 2012. <http://www.aviaport.ru>



A Tupolev Tu-160 of the Russian Air Force at MAKS in 2007, by Sergey Krivchikov - Russian AviaPhoto Team [GFDL 1.2 (<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl-1.2.html>) or GFDL 1.2 (<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl-1.2.html>)], via Wikimedia Commons

Бомбардировщик как национальная проблема (The Bomber as a National Problem)

In Russia at the level of the most highly placed individuals suddenly a lively discussion arose as to whether we need a new strategic bomber, and if so, then what sort. Thus, Vice-Premier Dmitry Rogozin said, that there was no sense in further developing the Tu-95 MS or the Tu-160, since those aircraft are unable to overcome modern air defenses. Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov in response said, that a future bomber is necessary, and for this it will have some sort of fundamentally new airframe design. Soon Vladimir Putin declared a decision to begin the development of a future bomber for Long-Range Aviation. After that Rogozin said, that a bomber is necessary, but “it must not be a copy of the American B-2, and it is necessary to look over the horizon and to develop long-range hypersonic aviation.”

As has long since been officially recognized by the very same Nikolay Makarov, the current military reform was begun without any scientific study. And it is continuing in the very same fashion, moving forward exclusively by the method of trial and error. Military-technical policy is also no exception. The well-known sum of “20 trillion rubles by the year 2020” for the purchase of new weaponry was discussed repeatedly and very heatedly.

Continued: The Bomber as a National Problem

Many believe, that this is too much, and others believe, that this is still modest. The discussion on the issue of the bomber confirmed, that the dispute on the sum is purely scholastic. “20 trillions” is also precisely chosen “off-hand,” as, for example, was the number of the RF Armed Forces at 1 million men. There was no question of any sort of scientific study. Therefore to decide whether 20 trillions - is a lot or a little, is impossible in principle. It is correspondingly unknown, on what these rather large funds will be spent. And it is natural, that for their “assimilation” a fierce battle is being waged.

In general the acquisitions of armaments must be defined depending on what sort of war is most probable for Russia’s to wage in future. Beginning with this, decisions must also be taken, as to how much and what sort of equipment we need. However the country’s political leadership until now has not even deigned to report to the military, with whom and when they will fight. The military themselves do not have the right to determine this, and indeed they are obligated only to follow the orders of the political leadership. Since the politicians until now have decided nothing, then such strange discussions also continuously arise, such as the aforementioned “bomber question.” For that reason Russia is acquiring for a huge amount of money the Mistral assault landing ship, which is completely unnecessary to it, from the French. And it is from there that statements come that in place of one Russian T-90 tanks it is possible to purchase three German Leopards etc., etc.

Since there is no unified concept, then our Armed Forces purchase that which is imposed on them by the lobbyists from the VPK [military-industrial complex], or the political leadership, who decided that in any event we cannot lag behind the potential enemy. In particular, the program for the creation of the T-50 fifth generation fighter is considered critically important, and indeed it is forbidden to lag behind the West! Moreover the American agonies with the F-22 and the F-35 fighters indicate that it is very probable that the entire concept of a fifth generation fighter in its current form is a blind alley. It is not excluded that, having wasted gigantic funds on this program, the States will effectively bugger up their own Air Force. But we are persistently following the Americans into this very blind alley.

The question of strategic bombers is also very complex. All the more so since here it is possible to single out at a minimum four concepts.

Number one - is to create a great “bombovoz [bomber]” of the Tu-95 or the B-52 type, which will either be a delivery vehicle for 20-30 long-range cruise missiles (which are launched beyond the limits of the enemy’s PVO zone), or several tens of tons of bombs, which can be used against enemy infantry, if its air defenses are fully suppressed preliminarily. The second - is to make a supersonic bomber, able to break through air defenses at rather low altitudes (similar to the Tu-160). The third - is to build a super-expensive stealth class B-2. The fourth - is to develop a fundamentally new vehicle (for example, a hypersonic one).

One can, certainly, in general forgo strategic bombers, but this, without doubt, would be incorrect. Russia with its great territories and multidimensional threats needs such a vehicle. Moreover this strategic bomber - is the sole component of the nuclear “Triad,” which can be used in a non-nuclear war as well. For example, the U.S. Air Force used their “strategic bombers” in local wars repeatedly and as a whole very effectively.

One cannot fail to agree with Rogozin that is extremely complex to battle with modern air defenses. Therefore in point of fact of the four aforementioned concepts, it is necessary to choose between the first and the fourth. Only from the beginning it is all the same necessary to proceed from the general, and only then move to the specific. That is, for all that to decide who our potential enemies are and by what method we will combat them. Only after this will it be possible to choose the correct strategic bomber concept, and also any other weapon.

Moreover, it must be kept in mind, that our science and industry cannot simply manage the creation of a fundamentally new vehicle at some acceptable timeframe and price. Therefore, it will be simplest to create precisely a “bombovoz.”

OE Watch Commentary: The Admiralty Building is one of the favorite tourist sites in St. Petersburg. The cornerstone of this conspicuous landmark near the confluence of the Neva River and Baltic Sea was laid by Peter the Great in 1704, and served to illustrate Russia's maritime ambitions. After the Revolution and WW I, the Russian Naval Headquarters was transferred to Moscow, but St. Petersburg has always retained a strong naval tradition. It has long been home to Russia's finest naval academies, research institutes, and ship construction facilities.

*In 2007 discussions began and a tentative decision was made to again move Russia's Naval Headquarters back to St. Petersburg. However, prickly domestic politics and an even larger military reform complicated matters, and the decision over relocation of the naval headquarters has wavered up and down over the past five years. Anyone who has followed base realignment discussions in this country is well aware of the challenges involved in such a major move. Besides the infrastructure and personnel to support such a transfer, there are a host of other issues which must be resolved before relocation can occur. The excerpted accompanying article captures some of these problems and suggests that the Admiralty will likely remain a favorite tourist site for the foreseeable future. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)***

Naval Staff Relocation?

19 June 2012



Source: Yuliya Nikitina, "They Are Packing Suitcases Again for the Main Naval Command," fontanka.ru, 19 June 2012. <http://www.fontanka.ru/>

The Admiralty tower (1806-23) as seen from the Alexander Gardens. It is the focal point of St Petersburg's centre: three main avenues converge nearby. Photo by Alexei Troshin (Алексей Трошин [CC-BY-SA 3.0(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en>)] via Wikimedia Commons

Главкомату ВМФ снова собирают чемоданы (Naval Headquarters is Again Packing their Bags)

The move of the glavkomat VMF [Main Naval Command] to St. Petersburg again is at the epicenter of attention. This time they give the date of September for the Main Staff to settle in the Admiralty building. According to Fontanka information, officers will occupy new work offices by the new year. Discussing the move or non-move of the GSh VMF [Main Naval Staff] has been a unique tradition for five years now. This subject is raised invariably once a quarter. During this time Gryzlov and Matviyenko, authors of the idea, changed their "residence," the Main Staff lost its importance, and Admiral Vysotskiy himself, who has been called a vociferous opponent of the move, left the CINC Navy post.

On the morning of 19 June 2012 federal SMI [mass media], referring to a high-ranking source in the Main Naval Command, reported that new CINC Viktor Chirkov had set the move of the Main Staff to St. Petersburg for the middle of September. According to Fontanka information, on one of his last official trips the vice-admiral, who already had visited the Northern Capital several times since his appointment on 6 May, had inspected the Admiralty and had been left very dissatisfied with how repair of premises, begun more than three years ago, was progressing. Chirkov ordered the work to be completed by fall so

Continued: Naval Headquarters is Again Packing their Bags

high-ranking naval officials already would be able to occupy offices by the end of December of this year.

The subject of a move by the Main Naval Command already is five years old. From that very day when into the clear head of then State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov came the no less clear thought, the press has spread rumors and gossip of high-ranking sources that often contradict each other. Officially the military bureaucrats also are constantly getting mixed up in statements. A year ago, when Fontanka touched on the subject in detail, the situation was shaping up as follows. Information had been dumped into the mass media in March 2011 that the active phase of the move would begin in July. This information, however, found no factual confirmation. As Fontanka wrote at that time, at that moment the Defense Ministry was deciding the more important issue of whether there was to be a move at all. Such uncertainty was connected with ongoing reform of the Armed Forces command and control system.

After four operational-strategic commands (West, East, South, and Center), which also included fleets, were formed from six military districts, the question arose of the advisability of main commands existing at all. The Defense Ministry spent a long and agonizing time deciding what functions would remain with main staffs of combat arms in the new look. There even were rumors that the GSh [General Staff] would cease to exist and would be reorganized as a Defense Ministry department. According to a Fontanka source in the military department, this idea did not catch on and as of today there already is an understanding of what missions a main command, particularly the Main Naval Command, must perform. The new role of the Main Naval Staff is such that it now has one road, to St. Petersburg. This is where the notorious Military Training and Scientific Center is located into which all naval vuz's [higher educational institutions], schools, and NII's [scientific research institutes] were included as affiliates following military education reform.

Coordination and control of the VUNTs [Military Training and Scientific Center] is one of the primary missions of the Main Command. By the way, back in 2008 the Defense Ministry announced the beginning of construction of a super-modern science campus in Kronshtadt to where cadets and instructors will move. It was planned that new academic buildings, technology parks, and athletic and workout complexes would appear on Kotlin Island by 2013, and residences, multifunctional personal goods and services complexes, and leisure-time complexes will be built for cadets, students, and their families. According to Fontanka information, not a lick of work has yet been done to implement these Napoleonic plans, not one stone has been turned over, and work has halted at the design stage. Nevertheless, it is this mythical VUNTs that new CINC Chirkov is to direct.

Direction of the shipbuilding program calculated up to 2020 also went under Main Naval Staff control, which again leads to the Northern Capital, where some of the country's largest yards — Admiralteyskiye [verfi] and Severnaya [verf] — are concentrated. Among other issues, the Main Command is charged with overseeing advanced developments of military scientific research institutes, international military-technical cooperation along the Navy line, navigation safety, and organization of combat training. In addition, although functions of operational command and control of fleets were removed from the GSh, strategy remains. The Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces — for example, submarines with ballistic missiles in the Far East and North of the country — remained under the jurisdiction of the Main Staff and General Staff.

According to Fontanka sources, the aforementioned fits quite logically within the scope of the need and advisability of a trip from Moscow to St. Petersburg. A duty team, a so-called forward command and control facility, the missions of which also included preparing the ground for the move, has been working in the Admiralty building since 2009. In this time there have been cosmetic repairs and debugging of equipment, and a secure communications link system has been run. The preparatory phase presently has concluded. It is planned that the great resettlement will cost the budget an enormously lesser amount than was declared originally. By the way, it is rather difficult to understand how strong the economy is: in 2007 they named a figure of R26 billion, and in 2008, according to various information, from R15 to R50 billion. The decrease in expenses is connected above all with the fact that Main Staff numerical strength has been reduced almost 80% and now no more than a thousand officers with families and a total of around 200 of the top brass will have to change their place of residence. By the way, the idea of recruiting servicemen from VUNTs instructor personnel for the table of organization is being discussed seriously in the Defense Ministry.

The subject of a move always was painful for Admiral Vysotskiy and was linked inseparably with every day of his five-year leadership of the Main Command. Gryzlov voiced this idea literally on the fourth day after [Vysotskiy] entered the position. All these years [Vysotskiy] spoke extremely unwillingly with the press about this. He was echoed by retired admirals, who declared that implementation of this project would lead to the undermining of Navy combat readiness. When Vysotskiy's retirement became known on 6 May 2012, a source of the federal mass media named his position on the staff transfer as the primary reason. Fontanka sources are sure that this could not be the reason for removal from the position. Be that as it may, a fact is a fact — the Admiral did not want a move to St. Petersburg and the Main Staff remained in place under his direction.

OE Watch Commentary: Some political scientists posit that there is an inverse correlation between popular legitimacy and police force. The greater democratic legitimacy a ruler has, the less he needs to rely on force structures to protect his power. Where the ruler's legitimacy is in doubt, however, the more he will have to rely upon the police and other internal security structures to silence opposition and preserve his hold on power.

Like any political theory, this concept does not always apply to real world situations. For instance, Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, enjoys considerable political legitimacy among most Russians, although a vocal minority questions the political maneuvering which returned him to the top Kremlin post this past spring. Opposition leaders in Russia have staged a number of protests since Putin's re-election, claiming that the country is moving away from democracy and back toward one-party, one-man rule.

The Kremlin has adopted a multi-prong response in handling these protests. Using the media, it has impressed upon the Russian people that even a corrupt stability is preferable to the chaos and destruction of an 'Arab Spring' or 'colored revolution.' Pro-Kremlin apologists argue that, like China, Russia will evolve slowly and carefully toward a stronger 'sovereign' form of democracy.

To subdue the opposition the Kremlin leadership has used both carrot and stick, co-opting some and punishing others. They have recently passed legislation, whereby fines for protesting have increased dramatically. It will now cost a lot more for those who engage in protests not sanctioned by the government.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Kremlin has worked to ensure that

Loyal Guardians of the State

19 June 2012

Source: Aleksey Polubota, "The Police Wavered. How the Struggle between the Regime and the Opposition for the Loyalty of the Security Forces Will End," [Interview with Pavel Salin, leading expert with the Current Political Developments Center], Svobodnaya Pressa, 13 June 2012. <http://www.svpressa.ru/>



OMON personnel in Red Square, Moscow, by Flickr.com user "lazyoldsun" (<http://www.flickr.com/photos/lazyoldsun/154135940/>) [CC-BY-2.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

Russian Regime, Opposition Seen Engaged in Battle for Police Loyalty

On 13 June it became known that almost 3 billion rubles will be spent in 2012 on paying the Special-Purpose Police Detachment [OMON] personnel drafted in to protect law and order during mass events. According to Izvestiya's information, a decision to this effect has been adopted by the State Duma Special Commission for National Defense Expenditure. Everybody is also talking about the recent demonstrative "donation" of apartments to OMON personnel who were hurt during the unrest during the 6 May March of Millions. That is to say, the regime is making it clear to the security services in every way that their services will not go unpaid.

On the other hand, the 12 June March of Millions demonstrated that the opposition is not averse to trying to win the security structures over to its side. During the march toward Sakharov Avenue Svobodnaya Pressa's correspondent repeatedly witnessed demonstrators inviting the OMON personnel who were escorting them to join them. And one of the speakers during the protest rally turned out to be former police officer Roman Khabarov, who told those assembled that many of his former colleagues do not want to serve this "thieving regime."

If you compare these facts it is not hard to conclude that a struggle for the siloviki is taking place between the opposition and the regime. How will it end?

Continued: Russian Regime, Opposition Seen Engaged in Battle for Police Loyalty

the guardians of the state (the 'siloviki') are well compensated for their efforts. Military and internal security personnel have seen large pay hikes since the beginning of the year, and promises to improve other social benefits (i.e., housing) are covered widely in the media. As the excerpted interview points out, the Kremlin leadership believes that it can control popular protests by well compensating those charged with guarding the state. End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)

“Events in the country are currently developing in accordance with a color revolution scenario,” Pavel Salin, a leading expert with the Current Political Developments Center, contends. “And not because somebody is planning them from abroad but because the formulas once described by the American political analyst Gene Sharp are universal for the majority of countries. So anybody who wishes to destabilize the situation can resort to these formulas and reckon on success.

“Demoralizing the security structures and winning them over to your side is a key aspect of any color revolution. If, at the same time, the split in the elite continues (when a section of it is turning to the protesters), the revolutionary situation in Russia will move into a decisive face. The regime and the opposition understand this very well. So a struggle is now underway for the loyalty of the security corporation in the broad sense — it includes the police, the FSB [Federal Security Service], the Emergencies Ministry, and the army alike. But at the present moment it is the police that is nevertheless the center of attention.

“So when the story about OMON personnel being rewarded with apartments was shown on television it was a signal to the entire security corporation that its members will receive bonuses for loyalty.”

[Polubota] What is the opposition doing in this situation?

[Salin] For its part, the opposition is operating in two directions. First, demonstrating that some police officers are with it. This is why the Khabarov story is currently being hyped in every way and it is being presented as a fact that the police are switching to the side of the “insurgent nation.”

Second. The opposition is trying to drive a wedge between the leadership of the security structures and rank-and-file personnel, who are unhappy at having to do repeated overtime. Incidentally, this tactic has been in use for a long time. Even before last year’s December protests a story was planted in the media that a Dzerzhinskiy Division commander had been given 1 million rubles for loyalty to the regime and company commanders each got 100,000 while the rest were given nothing — they are allegedly conscripts and will thus have to do the dirty work. So attempts are being made to instill in “grassroots siloviki” the idea that the regime is treating them unfairly so why should they then defend it...

There is also another factor. The appetites of the top and middle tiers of the security corporation have now started to grow. They have come to feel that the regime needs them very much. So at an informal level they are demanding from the regime more than it is giving them in the shape of official incentives. For example, in the last year or two small and medium businesses in many Russian cities have been subjected to an extremely significant levy by specifically the police. The so-called “Tambov syndrome” is occurring. During the 2011 elections to the oblast Duma in Tambov United Russia obtained a majority with the aid of administrative leverage. After this the police, with the consent of the central authorities, imposed a levy on local entrepreneurs. The result was that this led to a social revolt. A media embargo was imposed on coverage of it, and virtually nothing was written about it. A similar situation was repeated in several regions.


If the regime decides to punish siloviki who have taken a bite out of medium and small businesses, this threatens it with the risk of losing the siloviki’s support. Admittedly this is the least likely option. In a choice between the business community and the siloviki, the regime always chooses the latter. This is why small and medium businesses today are increasingly inclined to fund the opposition.

Continued: Russian Regime, Opposition Seen Engaged in Battle for Police Loyalty

[Polubota] Is it possible that siloviki estrangement from the regime will develop in accordance with one of these scenarios that you described and that within the foreseeable future, within six months or a year, the opposition will ultimately achieve the “neutralization” of the siloviki?

[Salin] A great deal depends on whether the regime cuts funding for the security structures in the very near future. We can see that the Finance Ministry is already preparing to cut expenditure on rearmament by 4 trillion. People are also starting to talk about the security structures. Admittedly without any specifics as yet.

In addition, in order to achieve such a significant objective as the neutralization of the siloviki the opposition needs to acquire a more specific program in which they will describe, among other things, how to put an end to the abuses in this same police force. You see, many rank-and-file personnel there are also unhappy about the situation that has taken shape. But at the same time they can see no alternative. But if they were to see such an alternative and start thinking about it, the monolithic nature of the security corporation might be affected. Under pressure from opposition campaigning, the siloviki may indeed distance themselves from the regime over the next two-three years. But for the time being, until the end of the year, events will more likely develop in accordance with an inertial scenario. Opposition leaders will be unlikely to succeed in moving the protest to a new level. Vague slogans about honest elections and freedom for political prisoners have virtually ceased to play a mobilizing role.



Tim Thomas's *Recasting the Red Star* describes Russia's culture of military thought through its modernization effort. Adding to his robust library of work on the subject, Tim Thomas illuminates Russia's Defense Ministry reform efforts, the Russian national security strategy take on the operational environment, and a relevant review of the Russian military doctrine.

OE Watch Commentary: Dmytro Salamatin, Ukraine's new Defense Minister, is attempting to reform the country's military amid shrinking defense budgets. In 2004 the Ukrainian military introduced the Strategic Defense Bulletin, which began troop reductions corresponding to the transition from a partial conscript-based force to a professional standing army, to be completed by 2015. Since the introduction of the Strategic Defense Bulletin the size of the military has been reduced, but, much to the chagrin of Ukraine's Defense Ministry, so have military expenditures.

Allocating adequate monies for defense spending is a frequent concern and topic of discussion for governments across the globe. Acquiring adequate support for Ukraine's military reform suffers from deepening structural problems at all levels. The financial question weighs heavily on the development and maintenance of new military technologies, and the sense of security for other governmental, societal, and economic institutions. Real potential exists in radical military reform that improves military capability while reducing the size of the armed forces.

*Continuing problems with corruption in Ukraine's government and economic sectors impede contracts that would otherwise improve the capabilities and reliabilities of its military. As the excerpted article makes clear, merely selling off excess military equipment does not equal reform. Ukraine's reform regimen has done little more than line the pockets of contractors and political actors. Salamatin concludes, "The problem is the desire to leave the legal loophole for corruption schemes. Something's got to give." **End OE Watch Commentary (Callen)***

"Something's got to give": Ukraine's Defense Minister on Financing Military Reform

16 July 2012



Source: "Army's future: rearming and new developments by the defense industry complex," Narodna Armiya, 11 May 2012

Ukraine Defense Minister Dmytro Salamatin. Photo via <http://www.mil.gov.ua/>

Ukrainian Defense Minister Interviewed on Army Reform

Ukrainian Defense Minister Dmytro Salamatin said that increased funding would allow the defense industry of Ukraine to develop new weapons and equipment. Also, the recently approved law on use of lands owned by the Defense Ministry will regulate this area and prevent scams connected with sale of land plots.

[Narodna Armiya] Lately you returned from Kazakhstan, where you participated in KADEX 2012 international weapons and military equipment exhibition. Did you see and learn anything new?

[Dmytro Salamatin] Participation in such international weapons and military equipment exhibitions gives us an opportunity to learn about new products and demonstrate our own achievements in this area as well. A striking example was the agreement about joint production of armored personnel carriers signed with Kazakhstan. This and similar projects

Continued: Ukrainian Defense Minister Interviewed on Army Reform

open great prospects for us. Much of what we offer for export will be used for rearming the Ukrainian army. Our partners have already requested modern models of equipment and weapons. And our task is to progress in this direction. Using capabilities of the Ukrainian defense industry, we will be able to start fundamental rearming of our army and navy. In this context, cooperation and coordination of the Defense Ministry and Ukroboronprom state company is very important. High level of cooperation of the Defense Ministry with Ukroboronprom allows solving the most difficult problems, which were not tackled for years.

[Narodna Armiya] What progress has been achieved in modernization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Dmytro Salamatyń] Modern army and navy are not just tanks, planes or ships which have been in service for several decades. Modern army is about cutting-edge technologies, which are provided by weapons and military equipment modernization program.

Without doubt, it is impossible to modernize all equipment, adopted by the army, especially taking into account financial and economic capabilities of the country. However, the highest rate of modernization was in the last decade.

[Narodna Armiya] Some media reported drastic reduction of the army, referring to the draft concept on reform and development of the Armed Forces. How would you comment on this?

[Dmytro Salamatyń] In current conditions a radical reform of the Armed Forces is impossible without their reduction.

The Strategic Defense Bulletin for the period up to 2015, which was approved in 2004, provided that the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be from 80 to 100 thousand people.

[Narodna Armiya] The issue of using land plots owned by the Defense Ministry has been attracting attention for several years due to constant scandals and abuses in this sphere. What are the roots of the problem, in your opinion?

[Dmytro Salamatyń] The land, owned by the Defense Ministry, is a valuable asset, which should work for the country. In order to achieve this, a group of MPs initiated development of the draft law 6644, which would regulate all problem issues of using land plots of the Defense Ministry. For a long time, adoption of this draft law was obstructed by those who actively used criminal shadow schemes of alienating land and property of the Defense Ministry from the state. Despite all efforts to prevent adoption of this important law, we managed to bring the matter to a logical end. However, discussions around this issue still go on. This document is aimed at creation of a transparent market, effective use of the Defense Ministry's lands

and real estate objects. Funds, obtained by selling land plots, go to the special fund of the defense budget to be used for renovation and modernization of equipment and weapons, as well as for solving social problems of members of the armed forces. That is why, statements of some political figures and experts are not the problem. The problem is the desire to leave the legal loophole for corruption schemes. Something's got to give.

How Do Belarusians Perceive Democracy?

By *Alena Daneika*, Wider Europe

**“Pollsters conclude that
Belarusian
authorities
rely on
citizens
being
passive,
and not
active.”**

<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/International.html>

