OE Watch Commentary: What will the foreign policy of post-Mubarak Egypt look like? Ever since Anwar Sadat transformed Egypt from American Cold War foe to ally in the 1970s, Egyptian foreign policy had been steady and predictable enough. Egypt’s alliance with the West was further institutionalized in 1989, when it became a Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA). For Mubarak, this alliance eventually backfired domestically: Egypt’s quiescent and conservative foreign policy, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue, was one of several mobilizers for the January 2011 protests that toppled his regime. The contours of the new Egypt’s foreign policy are still blurry, in part given the fact that the country remains a politically odd combination of youthful, revolutionary energy (represented by the popular overthrow of Mubarak) and cautious, conservative political Islam (represented by new President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)).
Egypt’s foreign policy choices are, in part, constrained by domestic challenges: the ongoing political crisis, the lack of domestic consensus on foreign policy orientations, and the near collapse of service provision and the economy. This domestic disarray puts Egypt at a comparative disadvantage: together with the constraints created by Mubarak’s legacy, they complicate the viability of any nascent post-revolutionary foreign policy. The historical legacy of Nasserism, when Egypt represented the vanguard of Arab foreign policy, will continue to loom large.
Egypt’s new foreign policy may have an Eastern bent. Pakistan, India and China – three of the countries Morsi has visited as president – are the focus of the first accompanying article, which explains the challenges to Egypt’s “Asian Pivot.” Morsi has racked up quite a few travel miles since becoming president; in fact, he often spends more time en route than at his actual destination. The second accompanying article, authored by one of the most widely read columnists in the Arab world, pleads with Morsi to spend more time at home. While acknowledging the importance of high-level face-to-face diplomacy, the author explains that Egypt’s own internal affairs must be in order for Morsi to be effective abroad.
Morsi’s most recent excursion was to Sudan. According to the third accompanying article, taken from an independent Sudanese news website, Khartoum wanted this trip and Doha helped make it happen. The Sudanese government hopes to reset relations with Egypt in order to negotiate over Nile waters as a unified front. More broadly, the Sudanese government hopes to deepen these oft-fractious ties by emphasizing the common Islamic foundation of the ruling party. Meanwhile, Qatar’s role in Egyptian foreign policy and the “Morsi-as-Qatari-Pawn” meme are gaining traction. Bassem Youssef (“The Egyptian John Stewart”) may be at the forefront in this regard. His return to the screen, after being called in by prosecutors for a number of transgressions, was highlighted by a cheeky rendition of an Egyptian nationalist song in which the phrase “my homeland” was exchanged for “my Qatar.” Many Egyptians doubtless find the idea of a small Gulf emirate wielding significant influence on Egyptian policy distasteful.
It is the Egypt-Iran locus, however, which is drawing most attention these days. In late March flight service between Cairo and Tehran was renewed for the first time in over three decades. Only a few days later, “Salafist protesters” tried to storm the residence of Iran’s charge d’affaires in Cairo. Shortly thereafter, the inter-capital flight service was suspended until June, pending review. Amidst the theatrics, a serious debate on Egypt-Iran rapprochement is taking place. The fourth accompanying article attests to this: coming from one of Egypt’s most serious dailies, it represents an issue that influential opinion makers – particularly in Egypt but in the region as a whole – are strongly debating and which is yet another front in the growing battle for Arab public opinion between Iran and the Gulf States. End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)
|
 |
| Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, via www.telegraph.co.uk |
| Source: Essam Abdul Shafi. “Egyptian Foreign Policy Shifts toward Asian Countries” (al-Siyassa al-Dawliya), via http://bit.ly/15GfiOP |
Article #1 (4 April, 2013)
Also present is the American role in defining the nature, patterns and trends in international relations, not only in the Arab world but in the international system as a whole. It not only monitors and develops Egypt’s relations with Asian countries but also hinders their growth. It will not hesitate to adopt plans, policies and actions to curb these relations and will use all the pressure it can muster on Egypt and all those wishing to strengthen relations with it, if this strengthening opposes the strategic interests of the United States. It is certain that several regional powers opposed to Egypt’s rise, under the current regime, will be some of the American means of pressuring Egyptian foreign policy. |
Source: Fahmi Huwaidi. “On the President’s Presence and Absence” (al-Shorouk, Egypt), via
http://shorouknews.com |
Article #2 (30 March, 2013)
This does not mean being cut off from what happens beyond the borders, but rather that the president’s travels should be limited and only in cases where the desired aim cannot be achieved without his presence…
…if the president travels abroad when his country is beset by adversity, he will be seen as ailing and wounded … |
| Source: “Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in Sudan under Qatari Pressure” (Sudaneseonline), via http://www.sudaneseonline.com/ |
Article #3 (4 April, 2013)
Analysts do not discard the possibility that Mohammed Morsi’s visit is due to Khartoum’s government and under pressure from Qatar, which has close relations with Khartoum. It appears that Qatar is ready to mediate between Khartoum and Cairo, especially given that the Sudan file was a source of disagreement between Cairo and Doha during Mubarak’s era, after the latter took over the Darfur file while Cairo resisted its growing regional role.
Egyptian expert on Sudanese affairs Hani Raslan told al-Akbhar: “It is very clear that Morsi’s visit to Khartoum is the result of pressure and urging from the Sudanese leadership.” He explains the Khartoum regime’s philosophy to strengthen relations with Egypt: “Bashir’s government wants to start a new page with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, considering that political Islam brings them together.”… |
| Source: Mohammed Asmat. “Iran is the Solution” (al-Shorouk, Egypt), via http://www.shorouknews.com |
Article #4 (2 April, 2013)
Kuwaiti MP and academic Dr. Abdullah al-Nafisi caused an uproar in the Gulf after saying that during a recent visit to Egypt he had heard a senior official say that the Iranian foreign affairs minister had offered President Morsi 30 billion dollars in assistance and 5 million Iranian tourists per year as well as assistance running 2000 factories that are currently shut down, in exchange for renewing diplomatic relations between the two countries, handing over the restoration and management duties of all the mosques built by the Fatidims in Egypt to Iran, publishing two newspapers in Egypt, and sending 20,000 Egyptian students to study in Iran every year…
Cutting through the issue of relations with Iran are Gulf concerns and fears of the spread of Shi’ism in Egypt. These will prevent Egypt from strengthening its strategic position in the region. Were Egypt to successfully create a political axis with Iran this would restore the balance of power in the region and contact with Iran would help dispel Gulf fears…
President Morsi may not be the right person to build an alliance with Iran. What is needed now is to discuss this in Egypt, to use the Iranian model to confront the great powers, to study closely their political experience at a safe distance from the imaginary worries of Iran’s plans to spread Shi’ism in Egypt. Iran has provided a model – which of course is not without its faults – to build a strong state that can resist American hegemony. What we need in Egypt is a detailed and intelligent examination of this model.
|
|