Europe’s Somali Diaspora:

Both a Vulnerability and a Strength

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Author Background

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“Few diasporas have as much economic and political importance to their homeland as does Somalia’s.”

As surprising as it may sound, Europe is closely connected to volatile Somalia. This unique European-Somali linkage is the result of Somalia’s unusually strong relationship with its global diaspora, and by that diaspora’s substantial presence within Europe. This connection can prove both a dangerous and constructive one for Europe. On one hand, it makes Europe vulnerable to Somali instability; on the other, it may be the driving force behind Europe’s ability to counter the primary sources of Somalia’s troubles: Islamist militancy and Somali-nationalist extremism. The outcome depends heavily on how Europe’s Somali diaspora responds to their homeland’s instability. Recent trends suggest that if this diaspora wants to stabilize their homeland, there is an increasing need to focus their efforts right where they are living, rather than expending their resources in Somalia itself.

Few diasporas have as much economic and political importance to their homeland as does Somalia’s.¹ Somalis in Europe comprise at least 25 percent of Somalia’s estimated 1.5 million worldwide diaspora population and more than eight percent of the major Sub-Saharan African diasporas in the European Union (EU).² Despite their concentration in Europe, Somali diaspora
members maintain a strong identity and ties with their homeland. Many travel back to Somalia every year, or even remain there for extended periods to hold administrative offices, build infrastructure, or to otherwise improve the country’s security and economy. The diaspora sends an estimated $1 billion per year to its homeland, making Somalia the fourth most remittance-dependent country in the world. Somalia’s diaspora is the one entity most capable of driving that country toward a modicum of stability, and its European-based members can exert a particularly strong influence on their homeland’s overall direction.

The challenge for the Somalia diaspora in Europe – and especially those who want to foster Somali stabilization – is to understand that Somalia’s troubles are not limited to the homeland. Somalia’s internal struggle has crossed the border into far-reaching areas, including Europe, in the form of Islamic radicalization and Somali national militant extremism. Coupled with the diaspora’s resilient identification with its homeland, less socio-economically integrated elements of Europe’s Somali diaspora are particularly vulnerable to recruitment for Somalia-based Islamic radicalization. According to a United Nations Development Program report, Somalia’s diaspora in Europe faces major challenges including limited employability, lack of transferability of qualifications gained elsewhere, race issues and a sense of alienation. These provide the pretext for which a diaspora member may be attracted to extremist groups.

Somali diaspora radicalization is largely connected to al Shabaab, the al Qaida-affiliated Islamist militant group whose prominence has grown significantly since Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia. Al Shabaab is a capable movement with a well developed global network, and has aggressively recruited an estimated 1,000 or more Somali diaspora members and several hundred non-Somali Muslims over the past several years. Europe is a major recruitment theater for al Shabaab, whose ability to move radicalized diaspora supporters to and from Somalia suggests the existence of an increasingly solidified and centralized network of recruitment “pipelines” into Europe. Somali community leaders in Western countries warn that it is only a matter of time before Westernized Somalis returning from training or fighting in Somalia on behalf of radical elements like al Shabaab will successfully target a Western country. Europe can expect that risk to
be highest in those regions and countries with the highest Somali populations, and where there is already diaspora radicalization.

The UK and the Nordic countries include Europe’s largest Somali communities, from which the overwhelming majority of Somali foreign fighters are recruited into Shabaab-affiliated centers for radicalization. The UK’s Somali community includes more than 250,000 and is the largest European recipient of secondary migrations within the Somali diaspora. The number of Britons who have joined militant Islamist groups in Somalia has more than quadrupled to at least 100 since 2004. Since 2007 dozens of Islamic extremists are believed to have returned to the UK from terrorist training camps in Somalia, raising the potential for violence inside their host country. At least 13 Somalis from Great Britain have supported al Shabaab or related Islamist militia activities in or near Somalia, including one who blew himself up at a Somalia checkpoint – killing 20 – in October 2007. In September 2011 Jonathan Evans, the director general of MI5, warned that it was “only a matter of time before we see terrorism on our streets inspired by those who are today fighting alongside al Shabaab.” As late as October 2012 al Shabaab publicly threatened attacks inside the UK in revenge for London’s extradition of the radical Muslim cleric Abu Hamza to the United States, and security agencies there are concerned that terrorist cells trained in Somalia – some comprising British citizens – are planning attacks in Britain.

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The Nordic Somali communities have more than 66,000, with roughly 24,000 in Norway;\textsuperscript{14} 16,500 in Denmark;\textsuperscript{15} at least 15,500 in Sweden\textsuperscript{16} and 12,000 in Finland.\textsuperscript{17} Denmark’s Somali diaspora includes approximately 200-400 al Shabaab supporters nationwide, supplemented by a larger group of loosely affiliated sympathizers.\textsuperscript{18} Since 2007 up to 50 Somali men have reportedly left Denmark to join al Shabaab in Somalia. In December 2009 the first-ever Danish suicide bomber blew himself up at the Shamo Hotel in Mogadishu, killing 24. In January 2010 a member of Denmark’s Somali community was charged with attempted murder and planning an act of terrorism, after attacking cartoonist Kurt Westergaard for his depiction of the Prophet Mohamed in a newspaper.\textsuperscript{19} In May 2012 two brothers in Denmark’s Somali community were arrested on suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack. One of them had been to an al Shabaab training camp in Somalia, and official reports indicate that the arrest prevented a “concrete act of terror.”\textsuperscript{20}

Up to 20 fighters have left Sweden for Somalia over the past few years, and at least five have been found in or near Somalia supporting al Shabaab. Former Swedish imam Fouad Shongole, who relocated to Somalia, played a central role in recruiting foreign fighters over the past decade and has emerged as one of the principal al Shabaab financiers. Sweden has also been a base for fundraising and propaganda on behalf of Somali Jihadis, including the alqimah.net website, which distributes press releases for al Shabaab in English and Arabic.\textsuperscript{21}

The Netherlands diaspora has 31,000 Somalis, followed by Germany and Italy with roughly 10,000 each. Many of those Somalis in the Netherlands consider their stay as temporary.\textsuperscript{22} Their experiences living in war-torn Somalia,\textsuperscript{23} their educational dissimilarities to the Dutch, high unemployment and different cultural-religious practices set them far apart from the norms of the

### Three Primary Somali Migrant Groups in Europe Today

1. The generation of fathers and mothers who settled in the host countries as refugees
2. Children of these families who either accompanied their parents or were born in the host country
3. The latest arrivals; the young generation that went to the West for economic reasons

*The first and third groups are most strongly attached to Somalia. They are the most likely to help their homeland with financial and political involvement or, alternatively, by participating in nationalist Islamist militant activity there. The second group identifies least with Somalia and is better integrated into European host countries.*

Netherlands, prompting many Somalis to seek residence in a third country -- including 50-per-
cent who eventually relocated to the UK, where government regulations are more amenable to
resettlement. These same factors make those who stay quite susceptible to radicalization. In
October 2009 four Somali Dutchmen were arrested near Somalia, and one arrested in the Nether-
lands, on suspicion of aiding al Shabaab. In December 2010, 12 Somali Dutchmen — includ-
ing the father of an al Shabaab commander — were detained on grounds of terrorism. While
there was insufficient evidence to convict some of these diaspora members, the arrests and deten-
tions point toward substantive al Shabaab ties and suggest a diaspora socio-economically ripe for
continued, or possibly increased radicalization. In May 2012 a former al Shabaab commander,
who left the group because of a dispute with its leaders, claimed there were al Shabaab-connect-
ed “sleeping” terrorist cells in the Netherlands, and that these individuals were planning attacks
in host countries where they hold residence permits.

Radicalization in the Somali diaspora is fueled by both international and domestic causes.
There is a perception that the international community is complacent toward Somalia’s protract-
ed conflict. Coupled with domestic causes, such as the difficulties in starting a new life in their
adopted country and xenophobia against them in many Western societies, certain elements of
Somali’s diaspora are confronted with an environment in which they perceive a radical Islamist
group as the most attractive alternative.

These elements are most vulnerable to al Shabaab’s recruitment tactics, which include a
sophisticated and diverse communications strategy. This strategy is aimed at influencing cultur-
ally relevant material that resonates with members of the Somalia diaspora, while also employing
rhetoric from the global jihadist narrative, positioning Somalia as one front in a greater struggle
between Islam and the West. Al-Kataeb (“the Brigades”), al Shabaab’s media component and
primary tool for this strategy, has increasingly produced “polished” propaganda films with Eng-
lish narration or subtitles, appealing not just to militant Somali Islamist nationalism, but also to a
wider audience of discontented Muslims. Al-Kataeb’s latest series of videos – including releas-
es in November 2011 and February, May, and November 2012 – has attracted 16,000 followers
to its twitter account. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College
London highlights al-Kataeb’s use of provocative and professional production values to appeal
to young men in the West and provide an alternative to mainstream media. The Centre states that the videos “aim to present the group’s version of events, motivate recruits and establish an alternative narrative - where the mainstream media might report losses, al Shabaab records victories.”

The same elements of the Somali diaspora are equally vulnerable to a potential al Shabaab-facilitated “European Jihad,” a new phase of jihadism in which the key actors are “European Muslims who are prepared to commit attacks in their own country,” motivated in part by domestic issues. Specifically, links between individuals or clusters in Europe and al Qaeda-affiliated movements – almost certainly including al Shabaab – are forged through personal connections and “jihad entrepreneurs.” Indeed, al Shabaab’s outreach to Muslims living in Europe and the United States has been successful relative to other al-Qaeda-linked groups; many Somali diaspora members have been enticed by al Shabaab’s call for faith-based action to correct the suffering of Muslims as compared to the life of ease in the West.

Some may argue that al Shabaab’s recent loss of control in a few of Somalia’s major cities over the past year, including the capital, Mogadishu, and Kismaya, would reduce its capability and efforts to recruit in Europe and elsewhere. However, despite these losses, al Shabaab still controls most of south and central Somalia. It is the only country in the world where approximately half of its territory is controlled by a radical Islamic movement, and where in the past six years many foreign fighters have flocked to help the movement expand its control.

Loss of Mogadishu and Kismaya may actually strengthen al Shabaab’s recruitment within Europe and beyond. In September 2011 Somalia’s Prime Minister at that time, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, warned the United Nations that al Shabaab’s August 2011 retreat from Mogadishu may herald a more dangerous phase, that the group was “actively planning to strike further afield,” and that al Shabaab was focusing its recruitment and radicalization on Somali diasporas, including Europe.

There are a few other reasons why al Shabaab’s territorial losses would not reduce its capabilities and diaspora recruitment efforts. First, al Shabaab’s leadership and ideology have a history of survival, consistency and influence despite setbacks on the ground and the rise and fall of particular organizations. The group’s Islamist leadership has changed the nature of al Shabaab before, and the group’s demise has been prematurely reported in the past. Nothing prevents its leadership and cadre from dissolving and morphing al Shabaab into something “new.” As late
as October 2012, analysts expressed fear that al Shabaab’s hardline leaders would regroup into a smaller but more committed force of radicals to carry out attacks on Somalia’s government, international aid agencies, and beyond the country’s borders.\(^{39}\)

Second, al Shabaab’s leadership is transforming from a national insurgency to a global jihad. This was evident following al Shabaab’s merge with al Qaeda in February 2012, when Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that al Shabaab had joined al Qaeda ranks. Alleged divisions in al Shabaab’s leadership over the group’s nationalist versus global jihad agenda make little difference.\(^{40}\) In either or both approaches, Somalia’s strong linkage to its diaspora communities, coupled with al Shabaab’s inherent desire for external support, risks extremist recruitment and radicalization in Europe’s Somali communities.

Third, regardless of whether al Shabaab’s influence is growing or declining, just one violent extremist act in Europe carried out by an al Shabaab-recruited Somali diaspora member in his or her host country would be catastrophic. Such an incident would also boost al Shabaab’s – and possibly al Qaeda’s – influence in Somalia and in its diaspora. Given the unusually strong ties between Europe’s Somali populations and their homeland, Europe’s vulnerability to Somalia’s instability cannot be ruled out under any circumstances.

All of these characteristics suggest Somalia’s diaspora in Europe includes two categories of concern: those who for socio-economic and various other reasons are vulnerable to radicalization, and those who have the wherewithal to effect positive change in the greater Somali community (in Somalia and beyond). While there is ample reason and evidence to be concerned about the former, there are also several key aspects of the Somali situation that can enable the latter.

### Five Waves of Migrants from Somalia

A. Oldest group – seaman from the Red Sea’s port cities, who left Somalia long before independence

B. Remnants of the Somali labor force that established itself in the Gulf countries during the 1970s and 1980s, but were unable to return to Somalia due to political instability

C. Privileged Somalis who had been studying abroad, the diplomatic corps of the Somali state and their families, and other Somalis who happened to be outside the country in 1990 when the state collapsed

D. Refugees who had escaped from Somalia during the civil conflict of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

E. Relatives in Somalia, left behind, who later benefitted from family reunion programs and joined their relatives who had settled in Western countries

Al Shabaab’s Salafi-Jihadi ideology is not popular in Somalia or in its diasporas, where the more moderate Sufi Islam is widespread. This aspect also prevents al Shabaab’s merge with al Qaeda from being more widely accepted, even within militant circles.\textsuperscript{41} The stigmatizing effect of being associated with Jihad is having an impact on Somalis in the diaspora, and there is an increasing awareness among Somalis that al Shabaab is, in fact, a terrorist organization, not just a nationalist liberation movement. Reports are circulating in Somali diaspora communities about the fate of the youngsters who disappear and how they are trapped or die needlessly by being lured into al Shabaab operations. As a result, local, national and transnational counter-radicalization networks are beginning to surface because the communities feel threatened.\textsuperscript{42}

**CONCLUSION**

The Somali diaspora has been a driving force in steering their homeland’s politics away from the monopoly of the armed groups and helping to empower the unarmed civic actors. The diaspora’s role in peace building has been quite substantive and effective within Somalia’s local, regional, and national administrations, and its financial support has often helped local elders resolve clan conflicts. Moreover, the proportion of diaspora representatives in Somalia’s transitional and new governments continues to grow.\textsuperscript{43} These efforts are indeed crucial to Somalia’s path toward greater stability. However, Somalia’s militant nationalist and Islamist problem has an increasingly global impact, and limiting stabilization efforts to Somalia alone ignores the ripple effects on Europe.

The al Qaeda-affiliated al Shabaab invites European Somalis to radicalize and participate in a global Jihad. This invitation is strengthened by frustration over recent losses in their homeland to a moderate government, despite any improvements to Somalia’s stability. Somalia diaspora radicalization and participation in the activities of al Shabaab is documented throughout Europe, especially in those locations with the largest diaspora populations. Both analysts and law enforcement officials in Europe estimate that it is only a matter of time before these elements bring Somalia’s instability to the streets of the host countries. This suggests that the other category of Europe’s Somalia diaspora, i.e., the members with the proven wherewithal and resources to effect positive change in their homeland, should refocus much of their effort from their homeland to their “host land.” Ironically, while Europe’s Somali diaspora is increasingly vulnerable to radicalization, it is also the most powerful tool to counter it.
END NOTES


7. The term “community” in this paper is characterized by being multi-generational and mostly Somali-speaking.


Also: A more academic breakdown, admittedly conservative, of the UK Somali community population can be found at: Andrea Warnecke, ed., “Diasporas and Peace: A Comparative Assessment of Somali and Ethiopian Communities in Europe,” Bonn International Center for Conversion, Brief 42, May 2010, p32.


Also, a secondary source indicates a Somali community population of 16,000:

Accessed 5 October 2011.
Note: Total Somali diaspora = 12,000; 14,400 if including Somali citizens that are 2nd generation and born in Sweden
and 15-18,000 if including those migrated from 3rd countries like Ethiopia. The city with the largest Somali population:
Stockholm.

Also, a secondary source indicates a population of 11,881 Somali-speaking residents (i.e., speaking Somali a’s mother-
tongue); 3/5ths were born in Somalia:
“Somali population in Finland growing fast,” HELSINGIN SANOMAT-International Edition, 17 May 2010,
<http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Somali+population+in+Finland+growing+fast/1135256885942>

18. Michael Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaek, “Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and
justitsministeriet.dk> Accessed 14 October 2011.

the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” Denmark Ministry of Justice, 26 February 2010, p. 44-52

20. “Danish police arrest 2 Somalis in alleged terror plot”, Fox News, 29 May 2012,

the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” Denmark Ministry of Justice, 26 February 2010, p. 42

&D1=0-2&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=3-4,187&D6=4,9,14-15&LA=EN&HDR=G3,T&SB=G5,G1,G2,G4&VW=T>
Accessed October 12, 2011.
Note: 31,000 including 23,000 1st generation and 8,000 second generation
Also, a secondary source indicates a population of 21,000 including first and second generation, according to a study
published in 2009:
Hye Won Hong, “Somali Immigrants and Health Care: Neo-Liberal Globalization in the United States and Holland,”

23. Many Somali immigrants arriving in the Netherlands have participated in – or have at least been impacted by – Somalia’s
many years of fighting. This background sets them significantly apart from the Dutch and other immigrant populations,
impeding social integration.


the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” Denmark Ministry of Justice, 26 February 2010, p. 42


28. “Al-Shabaab allegedly having terrorist cell in the Netherlands,” Foxcrawl, 27 May 2012,
Accessed 2 December 2012.

29. Concerned Somali Diaspora, “Somali Diasporas call upon the UN and the UN Security Council to Stop Ethiopia’s
Aggression and Meddling in the Internal Affairs of Somalia,” Hiiraan Online, 15 March 2011,

30. Ulla Plon, “Denmark’s Somali Community: Breeding Ground for Extremists?” Time, 6 January 2010,


40. Ibid.

