



Chinese Imperialism in 2013:

Application of Unrestricted Warfare or
the Legitimate Use of the Economic
Instrument of National Power?

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
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Chinese Imperialism in 2013: Application of Unrestricted Warfare or the Legitimate use of the Economic Instrument of National Power?

BY JASON HEEG



Multiple foreign powers violated China's sovereignty during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It played the part of the victim well, in those times, and ultimately gained from this role.¹ China is now a regional hegemonic power exploiting other weaker nations throughout the world in an ironic role reversal. While there is little doubt that this is occurring, two larger questions surface: Is China truly rising peacefully, as it claims, and simply using economics as a legitimate form of national strategy? Or is the country employing the initial phase of unrestricted warfare against the United States with the goal of becoming the leading power in the world?² This essay will examine the Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare; dissect China's actions in three regions of the world: Latin America, South Asia, and Africa; and provide evidence that China is conducting unrestricted warfare against the United States.

Unrestricted Warfare

The Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare is much like the title implies: it is the application of all available capabilities of a weaker country to defeat a larger, more powerful

Background Image Source:

<http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503TheChallengesOfChina.html>

¹ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, Second Edition (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), 387.

² During this essay the author uses "China" in general terms. The author understands the People's Republic of China is not a monolithic entity, but the time and space required to explain the political, social, and cultural differences of the Chinese people is beyond the scope of this project.

country.³ The book *Unrestricted Warfare* was published in the People's Republic of China, or PRC, in 1999 by the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, Literature Arts Publishing House in Beijing. Two senior colonels of the People's Liberation Army Air Force, or PLAAF, wrote the book.⁴ The first author, Qiao Liang was the assistant director of the production office of the air force's political department at the time of publication. The second author, Wang Xiangsui was the political commissar at the Guangzhou military region air force political unit.⁵ The book was well researched and written, and offered some interesting new theories in the application of war in modern times.

The book caused a major upheaval in the PRC's military, national security, and policy circles. In the United States, defense and security analysts studied the proposed concepts, but the book did not reach widespread familiarity outside of the China watchers. On the surface, the book appears to do little more than explain how to combine the instruments of national power, and employ them against a competitor similar to the

"The Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare is much like the title implies: it is the application of all available capabilities of a weaker country to defeat a larger, more powerful country."

way the United States coordinates the use of hard and soft power to achieve national goals.⁶ However, a more in-depth study of the nuanced concepts in the book illuminates a nefarious combination of strategy and tactics that are not restricted by local or international laws, or of

³ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House: Beijing, 1999), 4.

⁴ In China, The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the over arching organization. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is a component of the PLA as are the ground and naval forces.

⁵ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 228.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (Perseus Books Group: New York, 2011), 1-24.

national ethics and morals.⁷ As Timothy L. Thomas, a China analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office, points out in his book *The Dragon's Quantum Leap*:

[The authors'] originality comes in adding the word 'war' behind each of the methods, and advancing a theory to really combine methods which US analysts and doctrine writers have not done to the same degree.⁸

While the book covers the entire spectrum of warfare, this essay will concentrate on the economic and political concepts which are similar to what the United States Department of Defense considers Phase 0, or shaping operations.⁹ The reader should not interpret this essay as a wholesale endorsement of the book, as some of the assertions have been proven wrong over the



Map Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>

⁷ The authors were severely criticized in China, and to some extent the international community, for advocating that terrorism is a legitimate technique in unrestricted warfare. A further misunderstanding of this is demonstrated in the cover of a printing of the book in 2002 by the Pan American Publishing Company, which shows the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City burning following the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, implying that China was involved in the attacks, which is not factual. Pan American Publishing also added the subtitle "China's Master Plan to destroy America" to the original short title.

⁸ Timothy L. Thomas, *The Dragon's Quantum Leap: Transforming from a Mechanized to an Informatized Force* (Foreign Military Studies Office: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009), 34. Thomas also writes in foot note 5, page 10 that some Chinese linguists translate the title to be "Beyond Limits Warfare." In this essay I will use the more common usage of "Unrestricted Warfare" in order to maintain consistency.

⁹ United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: Joint Operations*, (Government Printing Office: Washington, 2011), V5-8.

past ten years.¹⁰ Rather this essay intends to be an examination of a mindset that is very different than the majority of defense planners and security analysts in the United States.

In the following regional analysis sections of this essay, the focus will be on the geopolitical strategy, and economic aspects of unrestricted warfare. Many prominent China watchers believe that China's geopolitical strategy is to use their competitive advantage of soft power to out maneuver the United States, and other countries such as India, in acquiring natural resources and to allow for continued growth of their economy while gaining political influence in various countries and regions throughout the world.¹¹ One of the tenets of unrestricted warfare is "the essence of the side-principle structure," which is close to the United States military's concept of asymmetric warfare.¹² The authors also point out that it is a principle not a law, and should be applied appropriately to specific situations.¹³ In relation to the side-principle structure are the concepts of trade war and financial war.¹⁴ The authors assert that financial war, a type of non-military war, can be just as destructive as military conflict.

PLA Colonel (retired) Shen offers a more contemporary perspective in the 2003 book *On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs*:

War with the objective of expanding territory has already basically withdrawn from the stage of history, and even the war with the objective of fighting for

¹⁰ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 34. The authors explain the importance of helicopter warfare and provide Operation Desert Storm in 1991 as an example of how attack and assault aviation will continue to revolutionize ground warfare. This has not subsequently happened.

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, *China's Foreign Policy and 'Soft Power' in South America, Asia, and Africa* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2008); Timothy L. Thomas, *Geothinking Like the Chinese: A Potential Explanation of China's Geostrategy* (Foreign Military Studies Office: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009); Paul M. Butler IV, "Re-colonized Zambia: China's Colonial Interests on the African Continent," in *Active Measures* (Spring 2012): 49-54.

¹² Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 157.

¹³ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 170. This is congruent with Mao Zedong's approach to revolutionary warfare: First, one must understand conventional warfare; Second, one must understand revolutionary warfare; Finally, one must apply the principles of revolutionary warfare to the specific situation.

¹⁴ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 51.

natural resources is now giving way to war with the objective of controlling the flow of financial capital.¹⁵

This passage offers insight into the Chinese mindset of acquiring the benefits of the world's natural resources without actually being required to physically control the resources, or the land that contains them. Additionally, in an interview on 6 January 2012, Qiao Liang, who is now a general officer, emphasized the importance of the economic, financial and trade game playing aspects of unrestricted warfare when "making trouble for the trouble makers."¹⁶ These examples are significant because they demonstrate that Qiao Liang, and the theories of unrestricted warfare, are still relevant thirteen years after the publication of the original book.

Latin America¹⁷

China was involved in economic activity in Latin America as far back as the mid-nineteenth century, but has demonstrated a renewed interest since 2001. The Chinese became involved in the Panama Railroad by providing migrant workers in 1854.¹⁸ In April 2001, China's President Jiang Zemin toured Latin America for 13 days which marked the beginning of a new period of Sino-Latin American relations.¹⁹ In 2008, the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a policy paper on Latin

"Brazil is by far China's largest trading partner in Latin America, and potentially its most vital associate in the region."

¹⁵ Shen Weigang, *On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs* (PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House: Beijing, 2004).

¹⁶ CCTV 4 Interview with Qiao Liang, January 6, 2012, translation provided by the Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

¹⁷ For the purposes of this essay "Latin America" will include the countries located in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

¹⁸ Lucy M. Cohen, "The Chinese of the Panama Railroad: Preliminary Notes on the Migrants of 1854 Who," *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 309-320.

¹⁹ Kerry Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan, *China's Growing Interest in Latin America* (Congressional Research Service: Washington, 2005), 1.

America. The paper describes the importance of the Latin America region and Chinese relations with the Latin countries. It explains that during China's peaceful rise it will seek win-win relationships that will be beneficial to China as well as other countries. This will take place in the spirit of "the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity."²⁰ The paper goes on to explain:

To enhance solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries is the cornerstone of China's independent foreign policy of peace. The Chinese Government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a strategic plane and seeks to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development with Latin American and Caribbean countries.²¹

The tone of the paper clearly indicates that the PRC is reiterating its policy of the peaceful rise. Analysts with the Congressional Research Service find "Beijing's interests in the region appear largely economic;" however, they also noted "a political and diplomatic dimension and may have longer-term implications for U.S. interests."²² The evidence below will show that China is executing an aggressive economic and political strategy in Latin America that is in line with the principals of unrestricted warfare.

Brazil is by far China's largest trading partner in Latin America, and potentially its most vital associate in the region. In 2010, PRC President Hu travelled to Brazil and signed the *Joint Action Plan Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 2010-2014* with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.²³ The state visit by President Hu indicates the importance of Brazilian resources and

²⁰ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2008, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm> (accessed May 26, 2012).

²¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

²² Dumbaugh and Sullivan, 1.

²³ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Brazil*, 2012, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjg/ldmzs/gjlb/3473/> (accessed May 26, 2012). Note: President Lula was replaced by his chosen successor Dilma Rousseff in 2011. The new administration appears to be honoring this agreement.

commodities to the PRC. Sinopec, a publically traded Chinese company, has recently invested \$7.1 billion in the Brazilian oil industry for development of offshore oil fields.²⁴ They designed this investment to secure long-term rights to future Brazilian oil exports, which will supply China's growing economy and also block the United States and other countries from this vital resource.

Another commodity that China is relying heavily upon Brazil for is soy beans, which are critical for feeding the growing Chinese population. The United States National Intelligence Council expects the demand for food to rise 35% by 2030 which will exacerbate this issue.²⁵ In 2011, China signed a \$7 billion deal with Brazil to secure six million tons of soy per year.²⁶ As part of the deal, China is attempting to gain direct control of the farmland, a technique they are also using in Argentina. China is pressuring Brazil to produce and export additional soy in order



Photo: Grand Theater in Shanghai

Source:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>

to decrease reliance on soy from the United States.²⁷ A result of this increased production is the stripping of the Amazon rain forest for farming land which is destroying the delicate ecosystem.²⁸ Due to the size and strength of the Brazilian economy, and its stable government, they are generally able to negotiate mutually

²⁴ Kevin Gallagher, "Latin America Must See China as Trade Threat, Partner" in *World Policy Journal*, November 11, 2012, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2010/11/22/latin-america-must-see-china-trade-threat-partner> (accessed May 26, 2012).

²⁵ United States Government, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, (National Intelligence Council, Washington: 2013), 31.

²⁶ Alexei Barrionuevo, "China's Interest in Farmland Makes Brazil Uneasy" in *New York Times*, May 26, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/americas/27brazil.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed May 26, 2012).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Rebecca Lindsey, "Tropical Deforestation," in the NASA Earth Observatory Science Project, March 30, 2007, <http://www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Deforestation/> (accessed June 2, 2012).

beneficial agreements with China; this is not the case in Peru or Venezuela.

The Republic of Peru has long had social and economic ties with China. In 2010, a bilateral free trade agreement went into effect.²⁹ While the agreement was certainly beneficial to high level Peruvian politicians and the PRC, many manufacturing companies in Peru were outraged by the provisions as they provide an unfair advantage to the Chinese. In 2008, China gained control of mineral rights to Mount Toromocho in Peru, which is estimated to become one of the most productive open-cast copper mines in the world. The Chinese mining company Chinalco, plans to invest \$3 billion in the mine, including the relocation of the village Morococha that sits on the same ground where the mine is planned. Chinalco will extract the copper at \$410.00 per ton, which will give the company an estimated 2000% profit over the world market price, an agreement that the Peruvian government seems content with despite the overwhelming opportunity cost to Peru.³⁰ In 2011, the Peruvian government cancelled a similar project, at the Tia Maria copper mine near the southern city of Arequipa, which a United States based company Southern Copper owned and operated. The cancellation was due to clashes between the local populace and Peruvian security forces which left three dead.³¹ Similar incidents have taken place at a Chinese-controlled mine in northern Peru, but the Peruvian government has not taken such drastic actions.³² It is interesting that the government of Peru

“The Chinese clearly take advantage of weaker countries, and corrupt regimes, in order to gain control of precious natural resources.”

²⁹ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Peru*, 2012 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjlb/zjzg/ldmzs/gjlb/3513/> (accessed May 26, 2012).

³⁰ John Simpson, “Peru’s Copper Mountain in Chinese Hands” in *BBC News*, June 17, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7460364.stm> (accessed May 26, 2012).

³¹ John Simpson, “Peru cancels Tia Maria copper mine project after protests” in *BBC News*, April 9, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13025971> (accessed May 26, 2012).

³² Dan Collins, “Two killed in Mine Attack” in *BBC News*, November 3, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8340555.stm> (accessed May 26, 2012).

would shut down a mine under the control of the United States, but not one under the control of China. This is a possible indication of the political influence that the PRC has purchased with its huge investments in the country which have provided generous provisions to the Peruvian elite.

During PRC President Jiang Zemin's tour of Latin America in 2001, he visited with, and established what would become a very strong relationship with, Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez. During the trip they purportedly signed a memorandum of understanding that has never been released publically.

Since the signing of this document, Chinese influence in Venezuela has increased dramatically at the behest of Chavez who is dedicated to the "systematic drive to supplant U.S. influence and impose a socialist system on his country."³³ In early 2010, China invested \$20 billion in



Photo: Mexican Navy Undersecretary Admiral Armando Sánchez Moreno receives PLA Navy Political Commissar Admiral Yang Huai Qing on 28 February 2003. The visit was part of broader Chinese outreach to improve ties with Latin American countries.

Source:

https://web.archive.org/web/20040219105644/http://www.semar.gov.mx/boletin/2003/bol_048_03.htm#

the Venezuelan petroleum infrastructure in order to secure oil exports which may reach 400,000 barrels per day.³⁴ These loans are following a downswing in Venezuelan exports and economy, and provide the Chinese an excellent opportunity to buy influence. Countries such as Venezuela prefer loans from China because they do not include restrictions, such as human rights or a

³³ Roger F. Noriega, "Chávez and China: Challenging U.S. Interests" in the American Enterprise Institute, *Latin American Outlook* 3 (August 2010), 1.

³⁴ Simon Romero, "Chávez Says China to Lend Venezuela \$20 Billion" in *New York Times*, April 18, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/world/americas/19venez.html> (accessed May 26, 2012).

review of financial records that the Inter-American Development Bank, or the International Monetary Fund require. In addition to the oil industry, China is also gaining control of Venezuelan finance and manufacturing markets. This insidious control has been possible because of the weakness of the Chavez regime, and his determination to undermine the United States in the region.

A final aspect worth illuminating is the desire for the PRC to maintain its political advantage over the Republic of China, or Taiwan, through expanded engagement in Latin America. It is reasonable to expect that China will use its increasing influence in Latin America in order to shift the remaining official diplomatic relations of Paraguay from Taiwan to the PRC.³⁵ While by no means inclusive of all Chinese involvement in Latin America, this review of their activities in Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela highlights some common trends. The Chinese clearly take advantage of weaker countries, and corrupt regimes, in order to gain control of precious natural resources. This is reminiscent of the imperial period of the European powers, and economic imperialism, which China was on the receiving end of in the past. These trends will also be apparent in the following review of Chinese activities in South Asia and Africa.

South Asia

Closer to the mainland are China's relations with the countries of South Asia, a region which is critical to China because of its proximity and shared border. The main players in the region, from the Chinese perspective, are Pakistan and India, while Afghanistan is of growing importance. This section will focus on China's relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The

³⁵ Dumbaugh and Sullivan, 4.

tenuous situation and long history of antagonism between India and China is a subject that cannot be addressed sufficiently in the allotted space of this essay.

China's recent direct involvement in Afghanistan has become a significant point of contention for the United States and other Western powers. The People's Republic of China has maintained diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since the mid-twentieth century, celebrating their 55th

anniversary in 2010.³⁶ China stood by and observed the nation-building progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, following the removal of the Taliban regime by the



Photo: Camels outside the ruins of Gaochang on the ancient Silk Road
Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>

United States in 2001. In 2006, when Afghan President Karzai

opened Afghanistan's vast mineral deposits, and other natural resources to foreign investment, China jumped in to take advantage of this economic windfall. While the United States and ISAF provide for the security of the Afghan people, the Chinese are conducting economic imperialism.

China outmaneuvered companies from the United States, Canada, and Russia to gain control of the Aynak copper field in Logar province, estimated to be the world's largest shallow reserve, with 240 million tons of ore. China's Metallurgical group corporation, or MCC, outbid

³⁶ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Afghanistan*, 2012 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zizj/ldmzs/gjlb/2676/> (accessed May 27, 2012).

the other countries at \$3.9 billion, but this is only part of the story.³⁷ The PRC, which coincidentally owns 44% of MCC, tied the contract award directly to extensive development projects slated for Chinese companies.³⁸ This is a competitive advantage that companies from other countries do not enjoy. There are also credible allegations of corruption specifically that the MCC paid the Afghan Minister of Mines \$30 million to win the bid.³⁹ This should not be a surprise considering the well-documented levels of corruption of the current government in Afghanistan, and China's policy of not abiding by international standards of business ethics.

China's application of unrestricted warfare is apparent when the security and military aspects of China's involvement in Afghanistan are examined. One South Asia security expert asserts that China enjoys protection of its projects in Afghanistan due to China's close relationship with Pakistan.⁴⁰ This implies that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, Pakistan's national intelligence agency, exerts its influence over the Taliban to allow the Chinese projects to continue unimpeded. While Chinese workers in Afghanistan have been attacked, the level of violence is very low when compared to attacks on United States and ISAF personnel and facilities.⁴¹ China's placement of civilian and government workers in Afghanistan also allows the Ministry of State Security, or MSS, China's national intelligence agency and the PLA access to observe and monitor United States and ISAF forces.⁴² This provides the PLA with critical order of battle information as well as insight into tactics, techniques, and procedures

³⁷ Nicklas Norling, "The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship" in Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, May 14, 2008, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4858/print> (accessed May 27, 2012).

³⁸ Charles Wallace, "China, Not U.S., Likely to Benefit from Afghanistan's Mineral Riches" in *Daily Finance*, June 14, 2010, <http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/06/14/china-us-afghanistan-mineral-mining/> (accessed May 27, 2012).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Raffaello Pantucci, "China Passes the Buck in Afghanistan" in *Foreign Policy Magazine*, October 28, 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/28/china_passes_the_buck_in_afghanistan (accessed May 27, 2012).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 1994), 15, 75.

used by forces operating in Afghanistan. The information gathered, and the understanding gained from it, will provide the PLA with an advantage in any future conflict with the United States.

Pakistan enjoys a very unique position in world politics as it has very strong ties to both China and the United States. Diplomatic ties to the United States have ebbed and flowed since the partition of British India in 1947.⁴³ Following the 2001 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda against the United States, and the Global War on Terrorism that followed, Pakistan again came to the forefront of security policy in the United States.⁴⁴ China's relationship with Pakistan is much deeper than that of the United States, as was recently described by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zadari as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey."⁴⁵ The two countries recently signed the *Development Programme on Trade and Economic Cooperation* which directly impacts agriculture, energy, and infrastructure.⁴⁶ This



Photo: Namco Lake in Tibet

Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>

⁴³ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 46.

⁴⁴ United States Government, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (United States Printing Office: Washington, 2003), 21.

⁴⁵ Myra MacDonald, "Pakistan's China Syndrome" in Reuters, September 27, 2011, <http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2011/09/28/pakistans-china-syndrome/> (accessed May 27, 2012).

⁴⁶ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Pakistan*, 2012 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjg/ldmzs/gjlb/2757/> (accessed May 27, 2012).

relationship continues to flourish in spite of the fact that China snuffed Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars against India.⁴⁷ In contrast to other countries in this essay, China's relationship with Pakistan does not appear to be economic imperialism, but rather an indirect application of military power against India.

While there is a certain level of a tactical counterterrorism aspect to the relationship, there is a much greater conventional focus towards India. China has been experiencing a low-level terrorism problem in western Xinjiang province. The Muslim militants in the area belong to the group East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who are associated with al-Qaeda, and have training bases in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area, or FATA, in western Pakistan along the Afghan border.⁴⁸ China has been seeking basing rights in the FATA in order to facilitate military operations against these terrorists.⁴⁹ However, this pales in comparison to the projected naval base in the deep water port of Gwadar on the India Ocean in the western province of Balochistan which will allow the PRC to project naval power against India.⁵⁰ China also has 7,000 PLA personnel based in the Pakistan-controlled areas of Kashmir and Jammu, which help to contain offensive Indian military action, and force the Indian Army to commit more resources to this historical crisis area.⁵¹ Moreover, China has committed to giving the Pakistan military 50 JF-17 advanced fighters, and they are jointly developing the F33 frigate,

⁴⁷ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008), 219, 249.

⁴⁸ Holly Fletcher and Jayshree Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) Background, Council on Foreign Relations, July 31, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179> (accessed May 27, 2012).

⁴⁹ Amir Mir, "China seeks military bases in Pakistan" in *South Asia Times*, October 26, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MJ26Df03.html (accessed May 27, 2012).

⁵⁰ Robert Kaplan, "China's Port in Pakistan?" in *Foreign Policy Magazine*, May 27, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/chinas_port_in_pakistan (accessed May 27, 2012).

⁵¹ Randeep Ramesh, "What are Chinese troops doing in Kashmir? Delhi wants China to keep out of Kashmiri affairs, but it should focus on a deal that sees troops all on sides withdrawing" in *the Guardian*, September 4, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/04/troops-kashmir-alarm-india-pakistan> (accessed May 27, 2012).

along with many other future military technologies.⁵² While China is clearly interested in Pakistan's fossil fuels, the vast majority of which are consolidated in Balochistan province, the leverage that Pakistan provides against India seems to be a more important factor for China's involvement in this country.

Africa

The final region this essay will review is Africa, which has been of varying importance to China over the previous five decades, but has become a pivotal asset in recent years. Prior to 1971, the main focus of Chinese engagement in Africa was the desire to encourage countries on the continent to shift their recognition from the Republic of China in Taiwan to the People's Republic of China on the mainland. With the official recognition change at the United Nations in 1971, the emphasis of the PRC in Africa waned.⁵³ In recent years, the PRC has been focusing on acquiring natural resources to feed its growing population and economy, expanding its manufacturing base, and increasing political influence.⁵⁴ While checking the Taiwan government remains important, the PRC is also using its growing influence in Africa to block the economic and political aspirations of the United States and India in the region. Additionally, there have been more instances of backlash against China in this region, when compared to other areas of the world which the PRC is aggressively engaging.⁵⁵ The short case studies below will

⁵² Arif Rafiq, "The Pakistan-China spat that wasn't" in *Foreign Policy Magazine*, August 12, 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/the_pakistan_china_spat_that_wasnt (accessed May 17, 2012-05-27).

⁵³ Thomas Lum and others, *China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia* (Congressional Research Service: Washington, 2009), 9.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁵ The Economist, "The Chinese in Africa: Trying to pull together," April 20, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18586448> (accessed May 31, 2012).

provide evidence of the nefarious nature of the PRC's actions, and show how its policy of non-intervention allows it to out-manuever other world powers.

Angola is China's most strategic partner in Africa, and the two countries enjoy strong cooperation with each other. The partners announced the *Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Angola to Establish the Strategic Partnership*, and signed multiple bilateral development agreements, during an official visit to Angola made by PRC Vice



Photo: China and Darfur Peacekeeping
Source: <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2008/07/29/sudan-policy-engages-china>

President Xi Jinping in November 2010.⁵⁶ In May 2011, General Chen Bingde, member of the Central Military Commission and Chief of General Staff of the PLA, made a trip to Angola.⁵⁷ The African country, under the leadership of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, appears very eager to build relations with China. Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia in 2010 as the largest supplier of crude oil to China. China's Exim Bank has reportedly loaned Angola over \$10 billion in the last five years; Angola has used the money for infrastructure development projects.⁵⁸ While the partnership between the two countries appears positive for the future of Angola, not all agree.

Rafeal Marques, writing for the *World Affairs Journal*, equates the situation in Angola to a “new imperialism” conducted by China, and stated that this is part of a “low-key economic and

⁵⁶ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Angola*, 2012, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2914/> (accessed June 1, 2012).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Rafael Marques, “The New Imperialism: China in Angola” in *World Affairs Journal*, March 2011, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-imperialism-china-angola> (accessed June 1, 2012).

cultural offensive China is waging on the African continent.” Moreover, the author also quotes Beatrice Hibou, a French academic specializing in Africa, as characterizing the situation as a “privatization of the state.”⁵⁹ This statement is in response to the actions of the PRC in directly supporting private and state-owned Chinese companies in their quest for trade and development contracts with the government of Angola. The PRC combines government-sponsored grants and loans which often offset low profit margins, or sometimes even losses, which provides a significant competitive advantage for the Chinese companies when bidding against firms from other countries, or multi-national corporations.⁶⁰ Shen’s explanation, in the above quote, of the importance of controlling the flow of capital directly relates to this type of activity. By forcing “partners” into unfair trade agreements, the Chinese re-direct the flow of capital back to the mainland, and receive a significant return on their investments. The PRC uses these methods in other regions of the world, as described in the Latin America and South Asia sections of this essay, as well as other countries in Africa, such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

Another West African country that maintains close ties with the PRC is Nigeria. While not as extensive as the relationship with Angola, the partnership has been growing in the past few years.⁶¹ This growing relationship builds on a 2004 agreement that Nigeria would sell 30,000 barrels a day of crude oil to China in exchange for significant investments.⁶² In 2010, the two countries signed a \$23 billion deal to build three refineries, which is projected to increase Nigeria’s oil production to 750,000 barrels per day. While not explicitly part of the deal, the Nigerian government announced “that foreign companies must invest in developing Nigeria’s

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Princeton N. Lyman, “China’s Rising Role in Africa” in Council on Foreign Relations, Presentation to the US-China Commission July 25, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436> (accessed June 1, 2012).

⁶¹ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Nigeria*, 2012, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zsjg/fzs/gjlb/3059/> (accessed June 1, 2012).

⁶² Lyman, 3.

infrastructure and economy first, before they can benefit from its oil and gas exports.”⁶³

However, it is doubtful that they will be able to enforce this after the fact, and the announcement is likely for domestic consumption. Local businessmen in Nigeria have complained that low tariffs, which are a result of China’s abuse of trade agreements, allow China to export cheap goods to the country which disrupts local markets.⁶⁴ In May 2012, the immigration service arrested approximately twenty-five Chinese textile traders in the city of Kano in northern Nigeria. The local immigration official called them “economic scavengers” and also alleged visa offences. The traders were released under pressure of the Chinese government and have departed the country.⁶⁵ China has employed a campaign of agricultural and infrastructure development in Nigeria to soften the impact of the perceived economic imperialism, but the backlash from locals, and lower level government workers, will likely continue unless the government demands, and receives, a more balanced trade agreement with China.

“While checking the Taiwan government remains important, the PRC is also using its growing influence in Africa to block the economic and political aspirations of the United States and India in the region.”

In Zimbabwe, China has demonstrated a more insidious hand, and its policy of non-intervention in internal state affairs of partner nations has directly contradicted international efforts to prevent human rights abuses. Building on thirty years of established diplomatic relations, PRC President Hu Jintao and Zimbabwean President Robert Gabriel Mugabe,

⁶³ BBC News “Nigeria and China sign \$23bn deal for three refineries,” May 14, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10116945> (accessed June 1, 2012).

⁶⁴ Pat Utomi, *China and Nigeria* (Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, 2008), 43.

⁶⁵ BBC News, “Nigeria Frees Chinese Traders,” May 25, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18205032> (accessed June 1, 2012).

exchanged congratulatory messages and committed “to further deepen cooperation in all fields and promote continued progress in bilateral relations.”⁶⁶ In addition to the economic imperialism observed in other countries, the PRC has used its seat on the United Nations Security Council to protect its interests in Zimbabwe, as well as those of the Mugabe regime.⁶⁷ The regime’s ruthless human rights abuses against the opposition party, and others who dare to criticize it, has been the focus of much international attention. China has used its veto authority on the Security Council to blatantly protect the regime, which hinders the international community’s ability to use sanctions to attempt to modify Mugabe’s behavior with regard to human rights.⁶⁸ Moreover, Chinese politicians often claim that they would not be forced to engage with regimes of this type if the Western countries did not have control of access to all the good locations for petroleum.⁶⁹ In preparation for the upcoming presidential elections later in 2012, Mugabe introduced a reform policy that requires businesses to be majority-owned by black Zimbabweans, in an effort to slow the profits of outside investors at the expense of the indigenous population.⁷⁰ It is not clear if this will affect Chinese investment in the country, or if there will be a loop-hole in the regulation, which would not be surprising considering China’s influence on the regime. Zimbabwe is a good example of how Western desires clash with China’s search for natural resources and political influence.

⁶⁶ Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bilateral Relations update – Zimbabwe*, 2012, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/3119/> (accessed June 1, 2012).

⁶⁷ Lyman, 4.

⁶⁸ Lyman, 7.

⁶⁹ Cindy Hurst, “Feigned Ignorance is Bliss: Chinese Energy Investments in Africa,” in *The Colloquium*, September 2008 Vol. 3/2, 7.

⁷⁰ Lydia Polgreen, “In Land’s Bounty, a Political Chip,” in the *New York Times*, May 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/world/africa/mugabe-seeks-zimbabwe-edge-by-pressing-for-black-ownership.html?_r=1&ref=zimbabwe (accessed June 1, 2012).

Conclusion

There is little room to debate whether or not China is conducting economic imperialism against other developing nations across the globe similar to what it experienced during the century of humiliation. The deeper question is the purpose behind China's actions. This essay has provided clear evidence that China is doing more than just attempting to acquire commodities for its growing population. China's actions in Latin America, South Asia, and Africa are in direct correlation with the principles of the Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare. They clearly use the concepts of trade and finance war, as they relate to the side-principle structure, in various regions of the world. As Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui explain in their book, these aspects of non-military war can be just as destructive as actual force-on-force military conflict. The continued relevance of these and other concepts of unrestricted warfare, and that of at least one of its authors, were also established. Defense planners and security analysts in the United States, and other Western countries, should take a renewed interest in this subject, and allocate additional time and resources to evaluating the imperialist actions of the People's Republic of China.

-September 29, 2013

Background Image Source:

<http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503ContinuityInTheChineseMindForWar.html>

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