Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Considering the Effects of Private Protection

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Introduction by Lucas Winter, FMSO

This essay, written by a captain in the Estonian Army, aims to counter today's arguments against using private protection teams (PPTs) to reduce instability. The author suggests that while the use of such teams in ground-combat zones has been fraught with controversy, they are nevertheless the most suitable assets to use tactically against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

The paper presents a detailed description of effective PPT tactics against pirates, makes the case for a robust international regime to ensure PPTs operate within an agreed-upon framework, and presents possibilities that would ensure they do not financially overburden shipping companies. As the international community continues to debate the best approach to curb the problem of piracy, this paper presents an important contribution to the debate. Moreover, it opens the door to a modern discussion of the letters of marque and reprisal, and potential mayhem, if private security firms are not controlled properly.

The author specifically describes the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia and explains how the current model to prevent acts of piracy, largely relying on naval task forces, is unable to fully counter the problem. The author rightly highlights the urgency of dealing with piracy, both due to its detrimental effects on the world economy and the dangers of allowing strengthened pirate groups to ally with terrorist organizations. The author is careful to note that the aim of PPTs is to bring piracy back down to “tolerable” levels.

While the author endorses the privatization of maritime security as the best way to curb piracy, his proposal points to a need for even further research in this field. For example, a recent decline in piracy successes warrants a detailed study of current, multinational anti-piracy operations. Indeed, the recent decline may stem from the increased international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and an increased use of evasive, non-lethal defensive measures by ships. Moreover, larger ships and tankers — already employing PPTs — offer another worthy area of analysis that would contribute to this argument.

Perhaps the key contribution from this paper is its highlighting the importance of creating a robust set of international norms for PPTs; i.e., ones that are economically feasible and safeguarded from some of the pitfalls inherent in the privatization of international security.

The Estonian author’s decision to explore this topic parallels his country’s near-term commitment to the European Union anti-piracy Operation, ATLANTA, in the Gulf of Aden, later this year. Estonia will send a Vessel Protection Detachment that will board vessels of the UN Food Program and help secure them until departure from dangerous waters.

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By Rene Toomse, Captain, Estonian Army

There were 111 piracy related incidents reported on the east coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden last year [2008], representing an increase of nearly 200 per cent compared with 2007. Furthermore, the reach of pirates in the region has extended hundreds of miles away from the coasts. All types of vessels with varying freeboards and speeds were targeted. The pirates boarding the vessels were also better armed than in previous years and prepared to assault and injure the crew. Pirates earned more than $30 million in ransoms in 2008 with the total bill estimated at close to $180 million due to payments to negotiators and other players. The estimated loss of profit while ships are out of service is not even discussed, but average insurance rates, for instance, rose by up to 400% last year.

Even though the US and EU have formed multinational counter-piracy task forces consisting of numerous warships, that alone is not likely to solve the problem. The area to cover is too large (up to 2.5 million square miles) and no country can afford to deploy the ships needed to gain total control of the area. There are nearly 16,000 ships a year as potential targets for pirates passing through the Gulf of Aden. One of the most important trade routes in the world is now threatened by regional instability. If the problem is not solved quickly and decisively, the cost of international trade will rise significantly due to higher insurance payments or ship rerouting to avoid these dangerous waters, which will in turn exacerbate the current international economic crisis.

An additional problem is the strengthening links between pirates and the “Al-Shabab” Islamist insurgent group. As part of this relationship, the pirates are becoming more closely involved in arms trafficking through the region. This contributes to instability and violence in Somalia and in Africa as a whole, and may one day pose a major security threat to the rest of the world.

Given that naval patrolling in the area has not significantly improved the situation, now might be the right time to consider adding another layer of solutions — private security companies. While a mostly discouraging attitude has been assumed in terms of involving private sector into active actions, one of NATO’s relevant standpoints notes:

Success in the future security environment won’t be achieved by ‘military victory’ alone, it has to be created through communication, coordination and cooperation with all relevant actors at all levels within a global framework — providing security and stability wherever the sources of threat and instability appear.
The aim of this essay is to counter the negative attitude towards using private security companies for reducing the problem. Private security companies are available assets and are today probably the most suitable assets to use on a tactical level in commercial vessels. This paper will focus on the problem at sea by analyzing how pirates operate and what their goals are, counter the argument against using private protection teams (PPTs), and set out vital principles to use them effectively as an additional security measure. Detailed pirates’ *modus operandi* and suggested tactics for PPTs will be described. The analysis provided below is a combination of information from official websites, expert research, and international open source media.

**Threat situation and prognosis**

_A short history and current situation_

Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectorate to join Italian Somaliland and form the new nation of Somalia. After the regime collapsed in early 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting and anarchy. The current estimated population of Somalia is 9.5 million and the main religion is Sunni Muslim. There is no effective government at present, and major clans rule their territories.¹¹
Since 2005, a dramatic increase in piracy in this region has captured the world’s attention. Piracy has always existed in these waters and was not considered a major problem previously; even up to the end of 2007, little attention was given to what were mostly isolated incidents in Mogadishu’s port area. Since then, the problem has expanded into the entire Gulf of Aden and areas in open seas several hundred nautical miles (nm) from the coast, leading to growing resentment against piracy within the international community. According to estimates, on December 31, 2008, Somali pirates were holding 13 vessels for ransom and 242 crew members hostage.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Seas defines piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”

The passage above defines piracy as an act that can take place only outside a state’s territorial waters. Such activities in territorial waters are considered armed robbery and are not treated as piracy by International Law. That is, there are not clear legal standards worldwide to counter or pursue pirates who attack ships in high sea and then take them into the territorial waters of weak states, or who commit armed robbery within the territorial waters of a weak state without fear of facing sanctions.

The United Nations Security Council recently issued a resolution authorizing all states to take an active part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. They can do so by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, and through the seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in acts of piracy and armed robbery. States and regional organizations cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (Somalia) may enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. This resolution is a good platform to reduce the problem, as it increases the level of risk for pirates. The only problem is that the allowed means (navies and military aircrafts) are not sufficient to fight piracy. Additional approaches and a broader spectrum need to be considered.

**Pirates’ goals, organizations and operational setup**

An analysis of various sources including research studies, news stories and others yields a few major conclusions. First of all, the goal of pirate attacks is purely monetary. Even if pirates previously justified their acts as aimed at protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing or waste dumping by other countries, acts of piracy are now committed solely to obtain money via ransoms that shipping companies are so generously paying. Easy profit has become the pirates’ Cen-
ter of Gravity (CoG), and the main critical capabilities to achieve the CoG are the willingness of shipping companies to pay the ransom. The threat to the hijacked crew members’ lives keeps warships at a distance once a victim vessel is taken over. Most importantly, commercial ships are unable to protect themselves.

Pirate groups are based on bigger clans and possess an intelligence system that uses spotters in “bottlenecks” such as the Suez Canal, designated safe routes, relevant offices and so on. These are combined with monitoring of relevant internet sites and communication traffic, which allows pirates to identify high-cost vessels and calculate the routes. Well-prepared and well-equipped teams in “motherships,” located far from the coast, are informed via satellite phones and intercept the predicted route of victims. After receiving the information from home base, they launch the raid with speedboats and attack the target with great speed and aggressiveness. These groups can operate in 5-6 boats and use diversion tactics to draw possible protecting ships away from the area. Groups are well composed, armed and equipped with high-tech devices such as satellite phones and GPS. Agreements are in place between different groups to divide areas of operations, conduct combined training, and even have combined supporting activities.21

**Pirates’ modus operandi**

Once pirates make the decision to launch an attack, the operation can be divided into four phases: approach, boarding, gaining control over the bridge, and diverting the course to the designated staging area while controlling the ship’s crew.

Approach is usually done at high speed (up to 25 knots) from behind the target ship.22 So far it has happened mostly in daytime and in relatively calm seas to ships that are not exceeding speeds of around 15 knots. As attackers close in on the target and are within approximately 100 meters range, they open fire from assault rifles, mainly AK-47 or prototypes. This is a test for possible countermeasures as well as a means of applying psychological pressure on the ship’s crew. Rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7 or prototypes), and medium machine guns (PK, RPK, RPD or prototypes) are in the pirate inventory as well, but they are used only when the target vessel does not react to small arms fire or shows signs of countermeasures. However,
none of the pirate weapons systems exceed the effective range of 500 meters\textsuperscript{23} and they are very limited in ammunition due to weight considerations for their small boats.

After the approach, the most critical phase of the operation is the successful boarding that includes stable contact with the target vessel. The pirates can employ climbing tools (ladders and/or grappling lines) or, in lower riding ships, simply climb over the railing. They usually board on both sides in order to reduce the potential piecemeal attempts for defense. This phase is well rehearsed and is usually conducted within seconds. Successful boarding is the pirates’ Decisive Point (DP) because if they fail in that phase, no control over the ship is possible and they are forced to withdraw. To reach the DP they employ speed and mass with a maximum stretch to overcome possible counteraction. If they are not able to board within 35-40 minutes they usually abort the attack, as the possibility of being detained by warships in the area becomes likely.

Once on board, the pirates storm the bridge and demand that the vessel stop. In this phase, while the ship is stopped, the pirates bring in the remaining ammunition and supplies from their boats and secure the boats to the captured vessel. Meanwhile, the captain is ordered to gather all his crew, which is put under the pirates’ armed guard.

Once the speedboats are fastened, the pirates force the captain to divert course to a designated harbor area. The rest of the voyage consists of guarding the crew and looting the vessel. After the pirates have gained complete control over the vessel and ordered it to sail to a harbor area to begin bargaining for ransom, there are few options left to free the ship without making the ransom payment.

\textit{Prognosis of developments}

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden are likely to increase and exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.\textsuperscript{24} In the near future, the pirates will improve their intelligence systems to achieve better situational awareness, especially on the locations of warships. This will allow them to evade the only threat they have encountered so far. To improve the flow of information they will merge into stronger alliances with each other as well as with terrorist organizations present in the region, bringing the threat to a new and more devastating level.

As the capabilities of pirate groups grow, they will become better organized, trained, equipped and led.\textsuperscript{25} They are also likely to become more violent. Revenge and hate toward westerners might override the hunt for pure profit due to terrorist propaganda, which is what terrorists will aim to achieve.

More sophisticated methods of attack are likely to be developed. These may include using night vision devices, attaching IEDs to a target vessel to force it to comply with orders, massing more attackers against the ships, or targeting more cruise ships.\textsuperscript{26} Ransom millions will entice more locals to join the business, and we could see a growth of weapons trafficking, more violence in Somalia, and the destruction of any possible government authority that could be the only force to gain control over the situation.\textsuperscript{27}
Countering piracy on a tactical level

Current measures and effects

To bring the problem to the point where it might meet an international tolerance level — total elimination of piracy is not likely — a multidimensional approach must be considered. Three major lines of operation can be taken: first, solving the problem on the ground by attacking pirates’ harbors and safe havens and gaining control of Somalia by supporting the Somali government; second, relying on the ongoing International Maritime Interdiction Operation by multinational fleets in the sea; and, third, countering pirates from the target vessels via armed PPTs.

To approach the problem from the ground is not an attractive option for the international community, as it might create a situation similar to that we have seen recently in Afghanistan. There is neither the Western will nor resources to be committed to a full-scale conflict in the near future.

The second approach is the ongoing efforts of Multinational Naval Task Forces (US and EU). These task forces, though, are not likely to solve anything alone. In these waters, detection and detention of pirates in small skiffs before they attack their target is a matter of pure luck. Once pirates have seized the vessel, warships become useless, as they cannot do anything when pirates threaten to harm the ship and crew if attacked.

However, the problem can be very likely reduced via tactical countermeasures applied from the potential target vessels by well-armed PPTs. They can use superior firepower and tactical advantages of the high stature of the ship, as well as sophisticated detection and identification equipment. Their effects can be enormously enhanced by cooperating with patrolling warships. The ships can buy time during the action while reporting repelled pirates to warships that can take up the hot pursuit and detain failed attackers. This can be the real discouraging factor for the pirates, as the risk of death or detention is weighed up against expected profit. Although such an approach will not eliminate the problem entirely, it will very likely reduce the tension in the area to a level that is tolerable to the international community.

Argumentation on PPTs

Various reasons are given to oppose the solution described above. It is a fact that some of the PPTs have been accused of misconduct in recent conflicts, and attitudes toward them are mixed.

Opponents argue that PPTs are purely interested in money and that such a focus makes them ignore human rights (one can envision the possible use of lethal force against innocent fishermen). There is also the suspicion that they may help create the threat situation to insure their services are needed. Furthermore, as pirates feel countered, they are more likely to open fire and harm the crew and ship than if no resistance is met. Finally, poorer shipping companies cannot afford to hire PPTs, placing them in greater danger.

A few mistakes are made in discounting the use of PPTs. First of all, the environment at sea is completely different from that in, for instance, the streets of Baghdad. When operating in urban areas, PPTs are relatively alone and “acceptable witnesses” are not usually present, which might lead to their not adhering to the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The situation on a ship on the open sea is different, as the crew acts as an ever-present eyewitness. No PPT can act recklessly and hope that no one will know about it.

Arguments that pirates will increase violence in the face of armed resistance are not valid. Pirates are not suicidal and they will not endanger themselves while opposing superior power, nor will they damage ships that might explode and kill them as well. A good prediction is that pirates will stay well away from protected ships. The argument that the less wealthy companies cannot afford PPTs to protect them is also not valid — why should bigger companies give up defending their ships if they can afford it?
There are no restrictions under international law prohibiting armed defense on commercial vessels. The only restrictions come from national laws that differ from one state to another and are created to protect the states’ independence without taking into consideration the current threat of piracy. These legal issues can be solved via UN Security Council.

**Tactical suggestions for PPTs**

As vessels come in different sizes and shapes, it is impossible to establish a universal composition, weaponry and equipment for private protection teams (PPT). Therefore, sufficient time is needed to plan, organize and rehearse all the actions before voyage. The recommended PPT size should not be less than six well-trained, disciplined, and organized men. This allows them to provide the observation needed to obtain situational awareness throughout the tour. Six men can rotate in pairs on watch 24/7 without losing effectiveness over a long period of time. The bigger and more complicated the vessel is, the more men are needed to provide sufficient guard on sea.

As pirates tend to use speed as one of their main principles, the early warning of a possible attack will be critical. Enhanced optics for day and night must be used constantly. Robust alert systems for the resting team members must be planned to get everybody into rehearsed positions as fast as possible.

PPT weaponry must include assault rifles with good optics to ensure better observation and long range targeting that enhances accuracy and saves ammunition. This is an additional guarantee to make sure that no innocent people get hurt. To achieve greater effective range than the pirates, it is highly recommended that two medium machineguns be placed on each side of the vessel, so they can be easily deployed or carried to the PPTs speedboat. The speedboat will come in handy when escorting a vessel with a dangerous cargo such as oil or chemicals. This allows part of the PPT to investigate possible attackers from a greater distance while still being supported from the vessel.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures come from the team’s ability and experience, as well as the characteristics of the ship and cargo. To counter attacks, the defense plan must address different situations and conditions, and have in place clear phases and contingencies such as an evacuation plan. The whole operation can be divided into four major phases – Long Distance, Mid Distance, Short Distance and On Ship. All actions should be carried out while the vessel is on the move at the highest speed possible.

The Long Distance Phase usually commences when on a relatively empty sea the guard is alerted of an approaching vessel (vessels, boats, skiffs) that cannot be identified as friendly. Visual or audio signals are to be passed to the approaching vessel for it to stop or change course. Meanwhile, the rest of the PPT takes its positions and prepares to defend the ship. If the vessel is carrying a dangerous cargo, the PPT speedboat is to move towards the approaching vessel at a slight angle, in order to not block the fire support sector from the ship. If the approaching vessel does not show signs of slowing down or changing directions, the PPT will use signal flares to clearly inform the possible attacker that their approaching vessel is not welcome in the vicinity of the ship. If the approaching vessel threatens the PPT’s speedboat or displays weapons, lethal force is to be used decisively and aggressively by the support team on the ship, while the team on the speedboat is breaking contact.

The Mid Distance Phase occurs when the possible attacker is at a distance of between 400 – 200 meters from the ship. Whether it crossed the 400 meter line or is spurting out from the cloud of other vessels in the vicinity, warning shots from rifles and machineguns are to be fired into the water (nearby or to the side). If any other neutral vessels are present the PPT must consider maximum safety to avoid harming them. Any time shots are fired or weapons pointed from the approaching vessel, the PPT is to use lethal force.
The Short Distance Phase begins when the approaching vessel is moving towards the ship and has crossed the 200 meter line. In that case full combat power will be introduced to the attacker to stop it at that distance, bearing in mind that they may carry an IED. Safety of all others in the area must be considered while calculating the angles of fire. Situations may occur where attackers are not spotted before they are already in the Short Distance area or have been somehow evading observation (for instance at night or in foggy conditions). In this situation warning shots are immediately fired short of and next to the suspected attacker. Lethal force is to be used if the vessel does not stop or change direction immediately, or if it presents weapons.

If all previous procedures are followed, the next phase is not likely to take place at all. Although the On Ship Phase is to be considered more as a contingency plan, it is still the most important course of action to prepare and rehearse for. This phase occurs if the attackers manage to board either by surprise or with overwhelming force. Once they have reached their DP (getting on deck) the fight turns to very close combat and there is hope to beat the pirates only if the plan is prepared and well-rehearsed. Once it is obvious that the attackers have reached the deck, the defending team must pull back to the stairs that lead to the bridge. There is still the possibility of gaining the tactical high ground and applying effective fire on a canalized enemy. Prepared obstacle systems will help delay the attackers’ push towards the bridge, and this fight may initiate a long-lasting battle for position. If the PPT is really good, they may consider counterattacking if the situation is favorable and outside help is delayed.

The last resort contingency should be a readiness to evacuate from the ship. Even though not a preferred action, it is a plan to consider. Human life is the most valuable thing and once the situation has become so bad that there is no way to counter the pirates, the PPT must collect all the crew and abandon the ship with specially prepared emergency boats. That situation may emerge also if the ship is badly damaged and there is a danger of sinking or explosion.

In any case, the ship’s master must send out a distress signal immediately once it is clear that the ship is under attack or is about to be attacked. All countermeasures applied will gain significant time for patrolling warships to close in on the spot and assist with all means available. If the pirates withdraw, the security recordings will provide valuable evidence to cut off and detain fleeing pirates.

**Principles to consider**

A few additional principles might need to be discussed by the international community and UN Security Council if there is a will to be truly effective in reducing the problem:

- Certified PPTs on commercial vessels are not to be considered as a threat to the states’ independence when such vessels enter a state’s territorial waters. Clear rules of weapons posture that suit the states must be created, but these must comply with the vessels’ right to self-defense in any kind of attack;

  - Clear ROE and effective control systems have to be created. Certification (tactical proficiency and knowledge of ROE) by a proper institution of every individual PPT is the key to avoid possible misconduct;
  - All incidents must be recorded and investigations carried out. In cases of proven violations of the ROE the PPT will be held responsible (sanctioned by the country the members come from) and lose its certification. The certifying institution will record all incidents, carry out final investigations and keep track of the performance of the PPTs;
  - Insurance companies are to impose lower rates if a certified PPT is present during the journey. This allows shipping companies to afford protection and disciplines the PPTs to comply with established ROE in order not to lose their certification.
Those are just a few main principles to consider. Most importantly, a change of mindset is necessary. With clear rules, and control and support from the international community, the private sector can perform the job needed and contribute significantly to reducing the problem. Those means can establish good conditions and impose control mechanism to ensure that PPTs are performing in the best manner possible.

Conclusions

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden are about to add significantly increase the cost of international business. As consumers and taxpayers, we will be forced to pay for losses in profit, higher insurance rates, and ransom payments. Moreover, the international community must be aware of the fact that Somali pirates are liable to become agents of international terrorist networks and will strengthen these and bring the current threats to new and unpredictable levels.

As mentioned above, tensions in this region are unlikely to be decreased purely by military means such as sending conventional navies to patrol against the small pirate vessels. A possible solution to reduce piracy to a tolerable level can be achieved by having private protection teams apply tactical measures from the commercial vessels. This idea complies fully with one of NATO’s principles as declared in the 2006 Riga Summit:

Today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach.32

Now is the time for the international community to consider means other than military ones to repel piracy. Private protection teams can be an essential means to reduce the problem in the area, as they are more difficult for pirates to evade than are the warships. There is no reason to assume that using armed protection on the commercial vessels will lead to a more dangerous situation than now exists.

To apply armed private protection effectively, the international community has to establish conditions, rules and control systems for private actors so that everyone’s rights are respected. Additionally, co-operation between private protection teams and naval Task Forces in the region must be enforced. This is the most effective way to counter pirates and reduce their enthusiasm to continue their attacks. Furthermore, the insurance companies can reduce rates significantly for vessels that are under the protection of a certified protection team, enabling the less wealthy shipping companies to hire protection as well.

The desired end state is a situation where pirates’ risks increase to a level where their activities are no longer cost-effective. Attacking their Center of Gravity (easy profit) by taking away their most valuable capability — to attack unprotected ships — will force them to at least withdraw from the high seas. This would allow the situation to move down to the tolerable level that was found in the region a few years ago. Still, there are no perfect solutions. The one presented in this paper, though, can be an effective alternative at the current time and under the current conditions.
Bibliography: Books, articles, studies, interviews, reports


Official documents


Endnotes


2 Wadhams (2009).


6 Middleton (2008), p. 3.

7 See e.g. Fox News (2008): “The route is thousands of miles and many days shorter than going around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Experts say the much longer journey adds 12 to 15 days to a tanker’s trip, at a cost of between $20,000 $30,000 a day…” http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,455684,00.html, accessed 15 February 2009.


13 Middleton (2008), p. 3.

14 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2009), pp. 24, 36.


17 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2009), p. 3.


21 Schiemsky (2009), p. 43.

22 Approaches can be divided into two basic categories: overt assault and deception. Overt assault is conducted with the intention to not hide the purpose of approach. Deception is used while pretending to be a regular fishing boat in the vicinity or sending out distress signals as lost or injured fishermen.
On the ground the medium machine gun can provide an effective range of up to 1000 meters, which is not achievable on the less-stable sea platform. Estimation is that effective ranges of all weapon systems on the small skiffs while on the move are also at least 50% less than on the ground.


Schiemsky (2009), p. 45.


Babbin (2009).


The method of firing signal flares as a warning is successfully used in Afghanistan when Coalition convoys demand that all traffic stop if a convoy is on the move.

Any time the ship is encountering areas where groups of fishing boats are present, the PPT must be in positions and in full alert.

NATO Riga Summit Declaration (2006).