The Ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Revolution: The Interplay of Narrative and Other Factors

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Author Background
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**Introduction by Ray Finch, FMSO**

Every successful political party understands the value of a clear, potent message. This is particularly true during periods of social upheaval, when the populace is not inclined to read a detailed program and when the established order no longer controls the central narrative.

For the past three years, the importance of effective political messaging has been on display in the streets and squares of Egypt. Unprepared to counter a new message (arriving with what was once referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’), the Mubarak regime was soon ousted from office. Its replacement, under the guise of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, initially spoke of democratic reforms and social justice. This positive, optimistic and modern narrative was soon undermined, however, by policies and actions deemed undemocratic by a large portion of the Egyptian people.

In this paper, CGIS-FMSO Research Fellow, William Tombaugh, examines the ascent to power by the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian Revolution. The actors and their role in the Revolution are analyzed, with a focus on identifying and evaluating narratives. The paper examines additional factors which contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as its post-election failures.
INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the ascent to power by the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian Revolution beginning on 25 January 2011 through 3 July 2013 when President Mohammed Morsi and the Brotherhood were deposed by the Egyptian military, in the aftermath of massive public demonstrations. The actors and their role in the Revolution are analyzed, with a focus on identifying and evaluating narratives associated with each of the actors. The role of narrative as well as other important factors which contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in presidential and parliamentary elections are discussed, as well as the post election failure of the Muslim Brotherhood.
BACKGROUND

The Egyptian Revolution is the political upheaval that has occurred in Egypt during the Arab Spring, which began with the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in Tunisia in January 2011. The Arab Spring was a tsunami of revolutionary fervor crested by a decentralized youthful protest movement that spread quickly from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and other countries. The toppling of long-standing dictators and their corrupt regimes generated social and political euphoria throughout the Middle East. Many countries held their first free democratic elections, bringing long-suppressed political groups to center stage. The Arab Spring in Egypt initially resulted in a relatively peaceful and democratic change of regime, the lifting of the widely hated 30-year-old Emergency Law that the Mubarak regime used to repress dissent, and a post-Mubarak Egypt in which free elections were held. Both the president and a parliamentary majority were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. That government was recently overthrown by the Egyptian military.

Two years from the onset of the Arab Spring, the optimistic views once held by most Egyptians are now wearing thin, and the shadow of winter and reality seems to have eclipsed the euphoria of spring. Tunisia’s Islamist government has “acknowledged the prospect of civil war…” breaking out between Islamists and modernists (World Tribune, 2013). Chaos reigns in Libya. Infighting within the Libyan General National Congress and continued clashes between rival militias and Islamist groups threaten another revolution (Gumuchian, 2013) and a growing potential breeding ground for Islamic Jihadi militants (Michael, 2013). Islamist fighters pushed from the current conflict in Mali by foreign intervention now find themselves in Libya, threatening an al-
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ready fragile government. Yemen is embroiled in a struggle against armed militant groups and is on the verge of a food crisis, and the government exerts little control outside the capital of Sanaa and a few other major cities (Al-Zuhayyan, 2013). The Syrian “revolution” has become more civil war than revolution, and is widely seen as a proxy war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran (Al-Quds, 2012).

Ironically, the most stable countries within the region seem to fall into three categories. First are those ruthless dictatorships that acted decisively in the face of the Arab Spring to crush dissent, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Algeria. Second are those that bribe citizens with money, free food, loan interest forgiveness and other inducements to halt pro-democracy activism, e.g., Kuwait, United Arab Emirates. Third are those that appear to be implementing immediate “reforms” (the permanence of which remains in question) and making accommodations with other existing political parties in an effort to cling to power (Morocco, Jordan).

In Egypt the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution was marked with widespread protests and discontent with the Islamist government led by President Morsi and a parliament dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Political opposition to the Muslim Brother’s persistent efforts to “Islamacize” Egypt revealed an unmistakable authoritarian streak in the Islamist regime and produced deep fractures within Egyptian society between supporters and detractors of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak-like dictates cementing Morsi’s word as the final authority in government, a perceived Brotherhoodization of the state and mass media, a worsening economy, along with little real positive change in day-to-day life since the departure of Mubarak had left many previously hopeful Egyptians jaded and disillusioned.

The two other major actors in the Revolution, the ancien régime and the secular democratic youth (the Arab Street), failed to offer a credible voice. The discredited ancien régime was widely perceived as an artifact of the past. The disorganized secular democratic youth movement that sparked the revolution formed a loose opposition group (The National Salvation Front), but until the recent coup had been relegated to a largely background role. The Egyptian military severed the umbilical tie to Mubarak and returned to its barracks. Mubarak and many of his associates were, until recently, imprisoned. The military, prior to the recent coup, had professed no interest in taking part in the political life of Egypt unless absolutely necessary.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative of Islamic charity, opposition to dictatorship, and Egyptian nationalism had not meaningfully changed from pre-revolutionary days. In the year since the Muslim Brotherhood took power, it had been obvious to everyone that day-to-day life had become significantly worse for most Egyptians. Mostafa Bakery, the chief editor of the Egyptian language newspaper *The Week*, was quoted in a blog post saying, “Every time we hear Morsi interviewed or giving a speech, it’s like Morsi lives in a different country, where there is no economic inflation and the people live in better conditions than they did under the Mubarak regime” (Sayed, 2013).

There is an essential contradiction inherent in the fundamental nature and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. Although its rise to power was made possible by democratic elections, its ideology clearly tends toward an authoritarian religious state. The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative to adapt to being more inclusive and meaningfully addressing the failing economy, continuing social justice issues, and rampant corruption eroded its popularity and legitimacy. It seems clear that in the weeks before the military coup the Brotherhood had already reached the critical point, which cognitive linguist George Lakoff refers to as “breaking the frame” (Fora.tv, 2008), a point at which a narrative has become so detached from observable reality (the context) that it loses much of its credibility and legitimacy.

**RESEARCH QUESTION**

Was narrative an important factor in the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the Egyptian Revolution?

**THEORY**

In politics, frames are part of competing moral systems that are used in political discourse and in charting political action. In short, framing is a moral enterprise: it says what the character of a movement is. All politics are moral. Political figures and movements always make policy recommendations claiming they are the right things to do. No political figure ever says, ‘Do what I say because it’s wrong! Or because it doesn’t matter!’ Some moral principles or other lie behind every political policy agenda.

(Lakoff, 2010)
Many analysts conclude that demographics or structural factors such as unemployment rates among youth and college graduates, poverty, and other factors played a major role (for example, LaGraffe, 2012 and Korotayev, 2012) in the Egyptian Revolution. However, as Lakoff and other social scientists remind us, statistics are not the language of the human psyche. William James pointed out that although emotions are merely chemical changes in the body (Prinz, 2003), chemistry fails to explain social movements or revolutions. There is a consensus among cognitive linguists such as Lakoff and Steven Pinker -- who hail from different corners in the so-called Linguistic Wars -- that logical reasoning is often not very logical at all. Morality involves emotion. “All politics is moral,” Lakoff tells us. Human moral judgments, especially social and political behavior, are informed by emotion (Prinz, 2003). Human thought, including reasoning, is based on associations and metaphors in the subconscious mind. According to Lakoff, human thought is at its root a collection of metaphors. The process of cognition takes place mostly in the subconscious mind, based on constructions of metaphor. The thinking processes of both reasoning and emotion essentially boil down to complex networks of analogy (Lakoff, 1980).

In order to better understand the Egyptian Revolution -- why and how it began, and how it progressed -- the cultural, historical and psychological influences on the actors must be considered in context. The unique contribution of this analysis is to consider the pervasive influences of sub-textual framing and narrative that often were not explicitly discussed or explicitly articulated by the actors themselves.

This research draws heavily on the cross-disciplinary work of George Lakoff in narrative and framing, as well as other sociological perspectives. Content analysis is used to identify themes in open source media, while discourse analysis is used to identify and analyze the narratives of the major actors. A successful political movement or political actor requires a worldview narrative that is embraced by his target audience. Public opinion and other research shows that most people are heavily influenced in their political views by elites, i.e., a leader/leaders or primary group they trust (Entman, 2004 and Bernays, 2005). Narratives such as advertising slogans reduce complexity (and eliminate the work and expertise needed) of fact-finding and analysis on the part of the individual follower. The follower trusts the leader to interpret and explain things in summary form, along with action recommendations compatible with the follower’s worldview. Followers usually acquire their social, religious and political worldviews (“narratives”) from the people they accept as leaders. In early life leaders are usually parents and older members of the family. In the political realm leaders are politicians, religious figures and others who explain and organize the world into narratives. An example is a visit to the doctor. The doctor is a trusted authority figure and has expertise and access to authoritative data which enable conclusions and action recommendations that can be trusted. The act of trust, which may be at the outset rational in nature, often becomes faith. Once trust is achieved, followers are thereafter willing to overlook factual inconsistencies and incompatible behavior (Hoffer, 2002).
Public debate is comprised of both logical and emotional elements. Dialectic elements have to do with facts, logic, and theory, while narrative elements deal in metaphor, emotion, and cliché (Montanye, 2005). The advertising industry understands that consumer likes and dislikes of products (“products” include issues and candidates in a political campaign) are often influenced by factors such as emotional response, self-image, sexual desire, fear, and metaphorical association. Edward Bernays, “the father of public relations” (a nephew of Sigmund Freud), pioneered the use of psychological principles on Madison Avenue. Bernays believed that people could be, and often were manipulated. “Those who manipulate [the habits and opinions of the masses]... constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country” (Stromberg, 2010). Bernays put his theories into practice, demonstrating the power of psychology in manipulating perception throughout a long career on Madison Avenue.

A large part of the political opinion-forming process is based on emotion, evoked by cultural context and metaphor. Perception of issues involves filtering, emotion, framing, value-shifting, metaphor, and cognitive processes other than mere syllogistic reasoning. This is especially true of opinions relating to politics. George Lakoff, Eric Hoffer, Shanto Iyengar, James Montagye and other researchers have established the need to integrate political opinions into a larger matrix of values. Lakoff, a cognitive linguist inspired by the concept of framing first advanced by Erving Goffman, believes that a person’s perception and the person’s opinions are heavily influenced by the person’s personality. Iyengar (2005) has defined political or economic “framing” as “principled rhetoric: overarching philosophy of governance.”

The pre-revolutionary narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood was the story of its own long history as a provider of social welfare and health services to the poor and an honest and courageous opponent of dictatorship. The overarching frame in the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative is essentially that of trustworthiness: “The Muslim Brotherhood has the best interests of Egypt and its people at heart. You can trust us. We have earned trust based on our long history.” This powerful narrative was a significant factor in allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to influence and mobilize public opinion, allowing them to ultimately seize political power in Egypt. Their failure to effectively adapt their narrative was instrumental in their downfall.

Human beings communicate by telling stories (Lakoff, 1980). A story comprises a sequence of ideas, events, and scenes. Frames are the lens of a camera, capturing the way humans feel about ideas, events and each other. Narrative is a story outlined in frames. It is an ever-present element in politics, because there is no politics without narrative. Former U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O’Neal famously said that “all politics is local.” In fact, every construct of society and politics is at its heart local, comprised of interactions among individual human beings. The effectiveness of narrative boils down to three primary characteristics:
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1- A leader or group trusted by the audience
2- A narrative rooted in a cultural context and world-view accepted by the audience
3- Credibility and believability.

Understanding the elements of successful narrative is an important tool for policymakers in crafting effective public communication and, of course, in helping to avoid mistakes that may cause narratives to fail.

To determine the criteria used to identify and evaluate narratives, I drew on elements of Lakoff’s (1980, 1987, 1989, 1999, 2006, 2009) metaphor and framing paradigm. Major themes of the Arab Spring were identified and analyzed in terms of frame, metaphors, emotional language, cultural symbols, and filtering. Each of these elements contributed to the overall dominant narrative. Metaphors are at the root of human cognition and emotion. Emotional language can be used to shape and predispose a reader towards a specific opinion. Cultural symbols are the source of the strongest emotions and group affiliations that people can experience. Filtering, in particular omission, is as important as commission, because what people do not know can influence perception just as much as what they do know.

The use of framing, narrative and language choice heavily influences public perception of individuals, issues and events. One may think of “frames” as a series of scenes in a film. Framing refers to the method by which information is presented in such a way as to encourage certain interpretations and discourage others, offering an “organizing idea or story line that provides meaning” to events related to an issue (Zhongdang, 1993). Narrative is the story of the film taken as a whole: the overall storyline and its meaning, comprising a sequence of events/frames.

As in the case of opinion poll results, a reader’s perception of headlines can depend on framing. Lakoff’s analysis indicates that huge opinion shifts to diametrically opposite stances on issues can occur, depending on how a question was framed (Lakoff, 2011). The framing of a narrative can heavily influence the perception of an issue, often with little relationship to the factual content.

“Value shifting” (or bi-conceptualism) is the change caused in a subject’s opinion formation by varying the wording of narratives and questions (Lakoff, 2009). “Value shifting” refers to the ability of a person to hold contradictory world-views on different issues (Lakoff, 2009). Management of perception using value shifting is a traditional manipulation technique. Value shifting can be used to manipulate headlines to present a news story in a sympathetic or unsympathetic frame. An example is the directive by a Fox News manager to reporters requiring the use of emotionally laden words such as “government option” and “homicide bomber” in place of more commonly used “public option” (referring to health care) and “suicide bomber” (Dimiero,
2010). It is well understood that in response to alternative phrasing, i.e., framing, of questions (“word asymmetry”), voters may change their votes or poll answers. Word choice and phrasing often have associations relating to emotions and group identity. Daniel Rugg tested alternative wording for logically identical questions and found that respondents varied as much as 17% in their answers (Reuband, 2003). Filtering (failure to provide alternative choices) exaggerates the effect of emotionally charged framing. In his analysis of a recent California poll, Lakoff (2010) emphasized the broader significance of this phenomenon: “It was noteworthy not just because of the size of the framing shift on the main question, but because the shift was systematic. Roughly, around 18 percent of voters showed that their values are not fixed. They think BOTH like liberals and conservatives — depending on how they understand the issue. With a liberal value-framing, they give liberal answers; with a conservative value-framing, they give conservative answers.”

A famous example of the conscious use of framing and narrative to change human behavior is the marketing campaign conceived by Edward Bernays at the behest of a major tobacco company. In the 1920s cigarette smoking by females was considered a taboo subject and the only women thought to smoke were those of “loose morals” and questionable integrity. Seeking profit from the untapped female market, the American Tobacco Company enlisted Bernays to change this state of affairs. By framing cigarettes as symbols of gender equality (Torches of Freedom) he was able to convince American women that the action of smoking was an act of female emancipation in a male-dominated world and liberation from an absurd taboo (Bernays, 2005).

Lakoff has extensively analyzed the role that ideas play in influencing political and social movements. “In the ‘marketplace of ideas’ theory, that (sic) the best factually based logical argument will always win. But this doesn’t actually happen” (Bekker, 2011). The cliché of a Darwinian marketplace of ideas in which the best ideas win on their own merits and reasoned logical decisions made by people is a myth.

**Revolutionaries**

Isaac Newton pointed out that his work was made possible because he stood on the shoulder of giants. Like Newton, revolutionaries are bound to the past and their philosophies and policies are influenced by the regime they replace. Revolutionaries may be willing to sacrifice their life to the cause, but are often unwilling to sacrifice their old narratives. It could be argued that post-revolutionary states like China would have prospered far more greatly in the long term had Chairman Mao died in 1949 upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Revolutionary leaders are often loathe to change old habits, relying instead on old narratives and old comrades from revolutionary days. Victorious revolutionaries often wind up inheriting institutions rather than rebuilding them. However, a fundamental change has occurred which cannot be masked with revolutionary slogans: outsider has become insider; rebel has become ruler. The
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“\textit{In the year since the Muslim Brotherhood took power, it has been obvious to everyone that day-to-day life has gotten significantly worse for most Egyptians.}”

pre-revolutionary narrative of struggle must evolve in order to remain legitimate and must appeal to a wider audience. A new narrative is required which must address the entire nation, not merely loyal supporters. Further, the inherited institutions of the ancien régime wind up influencing the character of the regime that replaces it. Inherited institutions are one of the most important elements which determine context. Revolutionaries often exercise power through institutions which very much resemble the regimes they replaced (Geddes, 2010).

A post-revolutionary narrative must be inclusive, and offer the prospect of peace and prosperity. Regimes whose narratives fail, that is, regimes that are unable to effect their will by persuasion of narrative, often resort to coercive authoritarianism. The most successful scenario in the aftermath of revolution is for leaders to adapt their narratives (policies) to the changed context (revolutionaries as rulers), while rebuilding institutions. Historically, the failure to successfully adapt narrative results in a loss of credibility and legitimacy, leading to strife and instability.

**Narrative and Context**

There is a balance between narrative and context. Context is the total environment, including institutions, politics, economics and social dynamics, in which the narrative takes place. Neither narrative nor context exists in isolation. The context from which the narrative plays out is extremely important. If the context is incompatible with the narrative, there will be a loss of credibility, hence a loss of legitimacy. To illustrate the relationship between narrative and context, the table below lists the three most common basic typologies of the patterns of revolutionary narrative that present post-revolutionary outcomes, i.e., degree of regime stability.
Figure 1 represents what would be the ideal post-revolutionary outcome, where the revolutionaries adapt their narrative, in other words policies, worldview, etc., in order to effectively govern. An example is the change from an apartheid system to multi-racial democracy in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) was the primary opponent of the South African government and played an instrumental role in conducting negotiations with President de Klerk, the leader of the National Party. Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders were able to legitimize the ANC as a political party, enact reforms, end apartheid and ultimately seize the political leadership of the country in 1994, a position they still retain today. The ANC understood that once they were in power, if they wanted to continue to remain in power within a multiparty democratic system, they had to expand and adjust their narrative to be more encompassing of a broader audience, including whites. The Muslim Brotherhood could have followed a similar strategy by adjusting its narrative to be more inclusive of out-groups like the secular democratic youth.

Another example of ideal post-revolutionary outcome is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Following the Fall of Saigon and the successful reunification of Vietnam by the North Vietnamese in 1976, the victors dismantled the old institutions of the South Vietnamese regime. In the case of Vietnam, revolutionaries had achieved a clear-cut military victory and were able to impose their will on the losing South Vietnamese. The ANC, in contrast, negotiated a peaceful transition with the de Klerk regime. The ANC adapted its narrative as progress was made in
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negotiating the peaceful transfer of power, where neither party was able to dictate terms. The senior leadership of both the ANC and the Vietnamese tended to be elderly, set in their habits and worldview, with little formal education. Unlike the ANC, the North Vietnamese unified the country after winning a war. They held absolute power and were free to impose their will on the defeated South Vietnamese. Feeling invincible, the North Vietnamese leadership maintained a doctrinaire socialist narrative for years after their victory, refusing to adapt their old narrative to the radically changing context of a capitalist, technologically advancing world. The Vietnamese economy collapsed, abortive rebellions occurred in several provinces, and the Vietnamese leadership remained obstinately opposed to reform until 1986, when the policy changed at a national party conference. In 1986, adapting their narrative to a worsening domestic context (a sluggish economy and a largely rural based population), the socialist government embarked on a program of economic reforms. The Đổi Mới program (new change program) allowed for privately owned enterprises, market-like reforms, economic liberalizations and other aspects of capitalism into the country. These liberalizations continue up to this day and have been extraordinarily successful in economic development and maintenance of political stability. Vietnam is considered to be a new “Asian tiger.” These divergent narratives pursued by the victorious revolutionaries in South Africa and Vietnam illustrate the importance of adapting narrative and the reciprocal influences of narrative on context and context on narrative.

Figure 2. Complete failure of narrative to adapt to changes in context
Figure 2 represents the case where pre-revolutionary narrative fails to adapt to changes in context. Ruling parties are forced to use increasingly more coercive measures to prop up an increasingly illegitimate narrative to maintain power. Cuba is a classic case, where the Castro regime imposed increasingly authoritarian means to maintain power. The recent fall of the Muslim Brotherhood belongs in this category. The narrative that worked so successfully during the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascension to power no longer fits the context in the post-election phase. This loss of popular support enabled the military coup.

Figure 3 represents the case where a change in context required an adaptation in narrative, but where the change has been unsuccessful. Turkey would seem to be a recent example of this typology. The Justice and Development Islamic party (AKP), which has now been in power for over ten years, was brought into power by an electorate with a large secular component who were voting for an end to corruption and effective management of the economy. However, recent demonstrations in Turkey have shown that the large secular portion of the electorate now believes that the AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan have demonstrated authoritarian tendencies endangering Turkey’s secular traditions. The narrative of honest and good business management and promises of religious freedom is increasingly less credible in the face of the current repres-
sion of dissent. A better solution (narrative) for Turkey would be to adopt more tolerant and inclusive responses to protests. The alternative is increased authoritarian measures as we are seeing now.

**Social Identity**

Social Identity Theory is based on the human need to join groups. Group affiliation, or more usually multi-group affiliation, is an important aspect of a person’s identity. Once an individual has affiliated with a group, adherence to group norms enhances self-esteem of both individual and group, with conforming “identity-infused behaviors.” Lack of adherence has the opposite effect. People tend to avoid out-group behaviors. Violation of group norms risks ostracism. For example, a study found that minorities avoided healthy food to avoid participating in “white” out-group behavior (Burnaford, 2012). Clearly, social and political protest and dissent may violate in-group norms and run the risk of family and other in-group conflict, or ostracism.

Zaller also observes that political opinions are much more stable among knowledgeable people. Interestingly, this is not true of those who are merely “highly interested” (Zaller, 1992). This implies that support by traditional Egyptians for trusted institutions and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be much more stable than for leaderless ad-hoc protest groups. This also implies that many Egyptians who were not already knowledgeable on political issues, but who became caught up in the fervor of the revolution, would not having much staying power in continuing to support protestors as a persistent political movement.

People tend to acquire their political and social beliefs from trusted individuals within their groups. In early life such leaders are parents and older relatives. Upon reaching adulthood, people may be influenced by leaders ranging from mullahs to generals to the president of the country. In the social and political context, “cueing messages” from leaders are used to encourage in-group members to adopt group policies or perform in-group behavior (Zaller, 1992). In return, in-group members expect privileges or patriarchal patronage.

**Technology**

Electronic networking is important in today’s world. Social media such as Facebook played an important messaging role in sparking the Arab Spring. In the 1980s sociologist Manuel Castells predicted that the elimination of space and time through electronic social networking would transform politics and society. The inability of Egypt’s ancien régime to cope with self-organizing dissent, using social media to communicate subversive narratives, is a good example. However, without organizational scaffolding, narratives that rely on electronic social media are likely to be ephemeral (Castells, 2004).
Creating a Successful Narrative

Creating a successful narrative usually begins with messaging from a trusted leader or group that frames issues in accord with the follower’s world-view. If the history, character, role or behavior of the actor is so obviously in conflict with the narrative that narrative dissonance cannot be overcome, the narrative fails. Erstwhile followers may perceive such an actor to be incredible, dishonest, or even clownish. For example, Mubarak’s regime attempted to reposition itself using the narrative, “We’ve changed!,” although the observable behavior of the regime demonstrated very little actual change. Hence, the narrative failed and the claims of change were perceived as buffoonish lies.

Evaluating Narrative

One of the primary hurdles when evaluating narratives is the chicken or the egg problem. Did narrative influence the outcome or did outcome write the narrative? How do we evaluate the role that narrative played in legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood and mobilizing public opinion to its side? Narrative will always play a role in social movements, but is inevitably intertwined with other elements. For example, the long history of opposition and social welfare services is a very important legitimizing factor for the Muslim Brotherhood. That history is mediated through language in the form of narrative. Successful manipulation of narrative does not guarantee a particular outcome, but increases the chances of a successful outcome. The power of narrative is especially observable during times of crisis, where the masses look to a group or leader for a solution. In contrast, after the transition from revolutionary to ruler, old historical narrative may become somewhat of an albatross around the neck of a revolutionary opposition party which suddenly finds itself trying to unite an entire country. The Muslim Brotherhood has struggled with trying to explain inconsistent narratives. This is often a challenge for leaders and groups who in the past have never been forced to explain or cope with contradictory statements.

When Narrative is Most Important?

Narrative is most important at times when people are most emotional. As normality begins to return, other factors, such as employment, trash collection and keeping criminals off the streets tend to overshadow narrative. In other words, the evaluation of narrative must consider timing and context. In some contexts, such as the first days of the Egyptian Revolution, narrative was perhaps the most important element of all -- the spark. The case of Egypt shows that the influence of narrative waxes and wanes, depending on context. The narrative of the secular democratic youth was the most important factor in sparking the revolution, but was less effective in actually turning out voters and generating long-term support than was the party machine of the Muslim Brotherhood. At other stages other factors, such as organizational presence and the
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ability to turn out millions of members to vote, were the most important. The evolution of this research has recognized the need to incorporate other theoretical approaches to integrate the lens of narrative in a more holistic view of the dynamics of social change.

THE ARAB SPRING AS NARRATIVE

The phrase “Arab Spring” does not mean the same thing to Egyptians as it does to Westerners. When conducting a content analysis of news articles and comments, it quickly became apparent that Egyptians do not often use the term Arab Spring, except as a literal translation when mentioning source articles from outside the Middle East. Rather, they refer to the “25 January Revolution,” the “Egyptian Revolution,” the “Day of Rage,” and the “People’s Revolution.” The term “Arab Spring” is a Western construct, having an historical subtext and implicit world-view that underlies the term: “The use of the term ‘Spring,’ with its typically European connotations and inherent secular expectations, coupled with the exaggerated media focus on the almost mythological qualities and influence of Facebook and Twitter, fostered such a false universal paradigm of uniformity between the Middle East and the West” (Susser, 2012).

This biased narrative has caused many Westerners to misapprehend the “pious” nature of so-called Middle Eastern societies and overestimate the power of modern technology such as twitter and other social media. Mere technology cannot fundamentally transform deeply rooted cultural structures. “It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar” (Said, 2003).

Ironically, the metaphor of the Arab Spring has proven to be a more powerful narrative in the West than among Arabs. The Western idea driving the narrative of the Arab Spring was democracy, equality, modernity and individual freedom achieved by the Arab Street rising up against dictatorship. In fact, it is likely that only a minority of people living in the Middle East really understand or even value the Western conceptions of constitutional democracy, individual rights, and freedoms. Adham Hashish, a former law lecturer from Alexandria University in Egypt, explained that the difference is that Egyptians understand the concept of democracy fundamentally as a form of procedure, but their substantive view of democracy involves fundamental ideological differences from the West. The West has commercialized the idea of democracy, freedom and modernity. It is an export product. More generally, there is a failure to realize that the world-

“Canned notions of gender equality, free press, free speech and other democratic notions, while understood in concept, do not necessarily resonate with the common Egyptian.”
view of free markets, modernity, morality, and unrestricted individual rights is perceived very much like a product being marketed to the rest of the world, along with Western technology.

During the tumultuous days of the Egyptian Revolution, Iman Bakri, a noted female Egyptian poet once known for her romantic verse and later for her cutting criticisms of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in political verse, wrote the piece “Mulukhiyah” in colloquial Egyptian about democracy.² The poem is at the same time sarcastic and admiring of democracy, confusing the idea as some sort of food item as well as a goal:

Democracy (sic)...Democracy (sic), A word that would never come to someone’s mind.
And I swear “Abd El-Aal” it’s an insult!
Try to understand...Democracy, Democratic
It’s related to “Kabab” from the Kabab Shop
Excerpts from “Mulukhiyah” (Bakri, 2011)

The lack of a substantive number of comments concerning democracy is telling. Egyptians seemed more concerned with issues of state corruption, justice, police brutality, state oppression, unemployment and lack of opportunity in the days of the Egyptian Revolution. This is echoed by a previous study conducted by Hamdy and Gomaa (2012). While their research focused on content analysis of newspapers and social media,³ none of the top reasons identified as inciting the protests were related to the issue of democracy.⁴ The apparent focus on Westernized ideals of democracy on the part of the secular democratic youth failed to win widespread support and allowed both the Mubarak regime and Islamists to label the secular democratic youth movement as potential traitors manipulated by sinister foreign elements.

Lakoff emphasizes that a successful narrative needs to be grounded in the moral and cultural traditions of a group, which helps explain the fundamental weakness of the secular democratic youth movement’s narrative. Canned notions of gender equality, free press, free speech and other democratic notions, while understood in concept, do not necessarily resonate with the common Egyptian. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime successfully framed the secular democratic youth as “foreign” and elitist. Conflicting notions of identity and narrative caused ongoing disagreement within the secular democratic youth and explains their difficulty in mobilizing and lack of agreement on policy and leadership.

**THE ACTORS**

**Mubarak Regime**

The primary narrative of the Mubarak regime was to purvey fear of the unknown (“the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t know”), coupled with what was at first a heroic cult
of personality that transitioned over time to a patriarchal cult of personality (Ezzat, 2011). “Your duty is to trust and obey your father”.

Hosni Mubarak unexpectedly became President of Egypt with the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. While a competent Air Force officer, he was a neophyte, lacking knowledge and skill in the game of politics (Ezzat, 2011). He was initially expected to hold the position of president for one year. With a core of his trusted cadre, the one-year transitional period lasted thirty years, ending with the advent of the Arab Spring and the 25 January Egyptian Revolution. The fall of Hosni Mubarak marked the end of one of the longest standing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

During his reign Mubarak was able to shape a personal narrative that weathered interior economic and political strife, repeated assassination attempts, and the volatile political activities of the Middle East and North Africa. Like most authoritarian regimes, a part of Mubarak’s longevity lies in the fact that he created and maintained a large system of security (police and state security) and curried the favor of the Egyptian Armed Forces to protect his interests and crush dissent. He also formed a large system of patronage within the police and army, presenting retiring officers with the police posts in the government, while retiring military officers were awarded positions within the private sector (Tadros, 2012). Just as important, he fashioned a link in the “ordinary conceptual systems” (Lakoff, 1980) of Egyptians between himself and the nation of Egypt. He created the metaphoric idea that, “Mubarak is Egypt and Egypt is Mubarak.” Thus, for anyone to question or dissent against Mubarak was to be anti-Egypt and anti-Egyptian.

Figure 4. Mubarak’s name in Arabic in the middle of the heart with the letters spelling “Egypt” outside the heart
Much like the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt, Mubarak consciously strove to make a home in the hearts of Egyptians (Ezzat, 2011) by continually imprinting himself upon their consciousness. His visage was prominently displayed upon every government building throughout Egypt, his family name “christening” roads and public works projects. As of the ouster of Mubarak, there were 4600 schools, 400 hospitals/health clinics, 450 housing projects, 300 villages, 90 research centers, 180 agricultural projects, 6000 meeting halls, and 460 roads and stations, totaling over 9600 separate entities bearing the name of Mubarak (Ezzat, 2011).

Like all dynastic families, in his later years Mubarak’s main objective was to perpetuate his line. To this end, he groomed his son to assume the reins of the country by creating a nongovernmental organization (Future Generation Foundation) to jump start his son’s burgeoning political career and amending an article within the constitution to allow his son to become the only eligible candidate for the position of President (Ezzat, 2011).

In a bid to retain the narrative of a virile protector of Egypt, the elderly Mubarak created the “cult of hair dye” (Ezzat, 2011), receiving weekly visits from his hair stylist to re-dye his hair a jet black. His fetishism for black hair filtered down to many of his aged cabinet ministers, who also sported jet-black manes of hair, and subsequently down to other members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party.

Mubarak also used song and television media to strengthen the “Mubarak is Egypt” metaphor. There are hundreds of songs written by prominent lyricists (see “From The October Celebration” as an example) during Mubarak’s reign, singing his praises and expressing the appreciation that all should have for his stewardship of the country. Invariably the songs are nationalistic and feature three prominent themes: Egypt, the Egyptian government, and President Hosni Mubarak (Ezzat, 2011).

Printed booklets from the government advocate the close connection of Mubarak to Egypt and his role of protector, with such titles as “Mubarak in the Heart of Egypt,” “Mubarak and Humane Governance,” “On Mubarak: The Intellectual and The Senior” and “The Phenomenon of Terrorism in the words of Mubarak” (Alexandria Library Digital Assets Repository, 2012). Manipulation of mass media presents the idea of Mubarak as the one and only leader.

The famous photograph that ran in the state-run Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram of Mubarak appearing to head a procession of prominent statesmen, including President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, King Abdullah and President Mahmoud Abbas, was photoshopped. The original depicted Obama leading the delegation, rather than Mubarak (Four and Six, 2010). When confronted with the alteration of the photograph, then editor-in-chief Osama Sareya compared the photograph to an expressionist piece of art, “a brief, live and true expression of the prominent
stance of President Mubarak in the Palestinian issue, his unique role in leading it before Wash-
ington or any other” (Four and Six, 2010).

Though Mubarak had the full weight of both his security services and the Army behind him, he was nevertheless unable to stem the tide of revolution. Why? Consider that over 70% of Egypt’s population is less than 30 years old, and 90% of those under 30 are unemployed (Buchen, 2011 and Egypt, 2013). Mubarak’s narrative of heroism against Israel during the October War of 1973 was no longer relevant or even remembered by much of the population, and his patriarchal nar-
rative only resonated with those of the elder generation, while the younger generation mocked, albeit quietly, the octogenarians quest for youthful hair and other eccentricities (Ezzat, 2011).
The general mood of hopelessness for the future held by Egyptian youth, a barely suppressed hatred of oppressive and brutal security forces, further engendered by the vicious public beating death of Egyptian youth Khaled Mohamed Saeed, and the recent fall of Bin Ali during the Tunis-
sian Arab Spring all contributed to a counter-narrative of revolution.

What Did Mubarak Say?

Mubarak, at times seemingly unaware of the revolutionary momentum being generated in Tahrir Square and hundreds of other public spaces in Egypt, was unable to adapt his narrative. Attempts at both belatedly reshuffling and firing cabinet members, appointing a vice president, and promising not to run again in the upcoming presidential elections were all unable to mollify protestors. In his final speech Mubarak reverted to patriarchy, the archetypal frame of dictators throughout history: “A father’s dialogue with his sons and daughters…My sons, the youth of Egypt, brother citizen…The current moment is not to do with myself, it is not to do with Hosni Mubarak, but is to do with Egypt, its present and the future of its children. All Egyptians are in one trench now…” (“Egypt Unrest…”, 2011), and his hero frame: “I have spent a lifetime defending (Egypt’s) soil and sovereignty…I faced death many times…I never succumbed to
foreign pressure or dictations…I never sought power or fake popularity. I trust that the over-
whelming majority of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is. It pains me to see how some of
my countrymen are treating me today” (“Egypt Unrest…”, 2011).

His speech failed to placate the masses. The majority of Egyptians wanted Mubarak gone. The
context had changed, but Mubarak’s narrative had not. Continuing to offer the narrative of the
patriarchal/authoritarian father not only was no longer credible, but it also angered Egyptians to
the point that they invoked the grave symbol of insult in Arab culture, the brandishing of the
shoe. The foot is the lowest part of the body. The shoe is in constant contact with dirt, debris and
detritus. To thrust or hurl a shoe towards someone suggests that person is even lower than the
shoe and the garbage it treads through. Many removed their shoes and threw them or held them
aloft, sole first, at Mubarak’s visage to display their anger for the President’s empty platitudes.
He did not offer credible reforms, nor did he take responsibility for his actions; he was no longer
a credible leader. With the dispersal and desertion of the police and security forces along with
weakening support from the Army, he could not physically force Egyptians back to their homes
under threat of violence.

Certainly narrative was not the only factor in Mubarak’s expulsion; crippling unemployment, lack of
opportunity, increasing staple prices, hatred of the regime, and threats to the stability of everyday life fac-
tored into this volatile mix as well. One may speculate that the outcome could have been different had
Mubarak made immediate reforms like his counterparts, King Mohammed of Morocco or King Abdullah
of Jordan, who both avoided ouster based on quick action and perceived royal reform by citizens.

The “Arab Street”

The phrase “Arab Street” refers, generally, to popular opinion in the Arab World. Examining
the phrase more carefully, there are multiple levels of meaning hidden in the term. There is the
suggestion of a rift in society -- a divide between ordinary people and elites. The people of the
Arab Street live and work at mundane jobs, far removed in both street and status from privileged
elites and royalty, who live in luxury and far removed from the noisy abodes of the common people. The term also evokes a sense of resentment against inequality, double standards of justice and law, and the ongoing struggle in earning a living, a sense of powerlessness, of ordinary people standing outside and looking through gates at the world of the rich and powerful. The word “street” implies an essentially urban context, illustrated by one commentator saying traditional wisdom is that Egyptians do not revolt because “Farmers require stability and patience to tend their land” (Baoumi, 2011).

In Western media the term is often used generally to refer to widespread public opinion in the Arab world. In the Arab context, however, there is additional subtext: the implication of the ever-present and potentially explosive force of popular rebellion against elite rule. The cliché is that Arab dictators fear the Arab Street. In reality, Arab regimes have, up until the time of the Arab Spring, been able to lead and manage popular opinion. In truth, the Arab Street is much like common people everywhere -- citizens adopt and share conventional opinions molded by leaders, mass media and social group affinities. The Arab Street has been more bark than bite until the onset of the Arab Spring and the 25 January 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

The spirit and memory of both the martyred Tunisian Mohamed Buazizi and Egyptian Khaled Mohamed Saeed inspired Egyptians (and other Arabs throughout the Middle East) to rise up in protest. Buazizi was a young fruit vendor who, after being brutalized by local police and unable to earn a living, resorted to the ultimate act of protest: self-immolation. Saeed was an Egyptian youth who was senselessly beaten to death by Egyptian police. A portrait photo contrasted with a brutal post-mortem photo of Saeed’s battered and bleeding face caused such an outrage that he is considered to be the face that launched the Egyptian Revolution and the protest movement “We are all Khaled Saeed” (“Khaled Saeed on…”, 2011). Tens of thousands of protestors gathered in Cairo. The protests were largely non-violent. Thousands of protestors demonstrated in other major cities outside of Cairo. Social media and cell phones allowed demonstrators to self-organize and demonstrations to metastasize unpredictably and adaptively, overcoming government attempts to block access routes and communications.

Mubarak’s Egypt had the trappings of democracy, but the substance was dictatorship. Even with dictatorial powers, however, the government was unable to quell the protests. The police and security apparatus, although unconstrained and unaccountable, well equipped with the latest technology, and with the reputation for brutality, was unable to stop protestors from flowing into Tahrir square. By the end of the day it was obvious to all (assisted by continuous media coverage by Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Western networks) that leaderless and spontaneous dissent had become a national uprising against the Mubarak regime. The Arab dictator’s nightmare had become real: a true revolution -- sudden overthrow of the regime driven by massive popular protest (Mandel, 2003).
The Protestors

Over the course of the revolution in Egypt, protests involved millions of people and eventually achieved widespread support among the Egyptian population as a whole. The largest street protests occurred over an 18-day period, culminating in Mubarak’s resignation. The change of regime was accompanied by lifting emergency rule and other fundamental reforms. At the onset, however, the active protestors (“the Arab Street”) were the vanguard, i.e., the Egyptians who initiated, mobilized, and actually manned the barricades of revolution. These were also the Egyptians who largely paid the price of revolution: police brutality, arrest, torture, and at least 840 deaths (Mungin, 2011). Protestors ranged across the socio-economic spectrum, diverse in age, gender, education, and profession. However, it is clear that those protestors most actively using social media and public demonstrations tended to be young, educated and tech-savvy. Interestingly for a traditional Islamic culture, there were many female protestors. Photographs and contemporaneous news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution show most protestors to be younger adults. Western media tended to focus on protestors who spoke English.

After the initial flood of protests and Mubarak’s resignation, the leaderless momentum of the Arab Street receded. In subsequent months ongoing reform and political negotiation were coopted by existing political entities and organizations.

What Did the Protestors Say?

The leaderless nature of the Egyptian revolution at the outset made it impossible to speak with one voice. Commentators in both the West and the Arab World seemed bemused by the lack of appointed leadership and often conflicting demands and angry voices. Amid the chaotic protests, however, most of the voices were singing in key. There were common themes and goals, which are evident from the voluminous media coverage of the protests: news stories, interviews, photographs, and comments to news articles, as well as other sources.

A synthesis of media coverage of the protests during the initial 18-day period of massive street demonstrations which led to Mubarak’s resignation includes the following recurring themes: freedom – opportunity – justice – jobs – accountability – independence from Mubarak and Western domination.

Political Outcomes

The iconic photo published by Al-Jazeera (Figure 7) serves as a microcosm for the failure of Egypt’s Arab Street to translate their ideas from a successful revolution into a lasting political mandate. There are only a few elements in the photograph which are likely to appeal to traditional Egyptians, such as the colors of the Egyptian flag and Arabic nationalist slogans. The meta-
The Ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Revolution:

The metaphor of falling dominos are labeled as Arab dictators. Ordinary Egyptians are opposed to dictators. However, the rest of the photograph contains very little with which a traditional Egyptian would be able to affiliate or identify. In fact, there is much in the photograph which would be perceived as out-group values, even alien, to an ordinary Egyptian. The friction between perceived alienness of the educated youth who were the vanguard of the revolution, and traditional Egyptians holding traditional values, foredoomed the rebellious youth movement, with its Westernized ideals, to oblivion. For example, the adoption of the anonymous mask of Guy Fawkes was inappropriate in several ways. Most obviously, the face is not Egyptian. To many Egyptians, the face is villainous and threatening. The use of a mask suggests that something is being hidden. Why would anyone hide something that is good, an ordinary Egyptian (unaware of the Guy Fawkes mask and its history) may wonder? The image of toppling dominos is likewise a metaphor which requires context. To a Westerner, the old Cold War political cliché of dominos (innocent victims) falling to Communist (the bad guys) aggression is familiar. To an ordinary Egyptian, the image may imply some sinister external (read: Western or Israeli) force at work. The expensive clothing is Western. In Egypt the pampered children of the rich wear such clothing. The subtext is that the rebels are waging a covert war among corrupt elites. This is out-group messaging, unlikely to win support of ordinary Egyptians.

Taking the analysis one step deeper, it is possible to consider what linked associations might occur to an observer who took the time to spend a few minutes considering the photograph. Clearly, an internationalist theme is present (anonymity, Guy Fawkes, Western clothing, the implication that falling Arab regimes will be replaced with Western democracy). The designer Western clothes evoke the sense of a class divide. The article itself was published by Al-Jazeera, which, as all Arabs know, is headquartered in Qatar, one of the Gulf Arab states.

Ordinary Egyptians often resent Gulf Arabs as rich, selfish, stuck-up and hypocritical. The image of the protestor evokes a college student, one with well-to-do parents. Clearly, the message of the photograph is a call to revolution, to struggle. This is unnerving, especially considering the identity of the rebel is hidden, as are the identity of his backers and the goals (other than struggle and revolution against dictators).

![Figure 7](image-url)
The overall impact of the photograph is out-group messaging. Alienness. The symbolism and subtext is dark and threatening, and unfamiliar to the traditional Egyptian unversed in Western culture. Zaller (1992) points out that cueing messaging works best for those with a greater “level of cognitive engagement with an issue.” In other words, preaching is most effective when preaching to those already converted. Educated, Westernized Egyptian youth who use Western jargon and concepts of democracy and freedom of speech symbolism (Guy Fawkes) were unlikely to have their message received favorably by those outside of their own relatively small in-group. The average Egyptian would find both subtext and symbolism uncomfortable. This photograph undoubtedly (and perhaps intentionally) inaccurately portrays the protestors, but it is likely an accurate view of how much of the Egyptian population viewed the protestors and their leaders.

Although the introduction of Westernized values by protestors failed to be fully embraced by traditional Egyptians, some researchers suggest that there may have been “a shift in the attention span of young Muslim activists from violence to the nuts and bolts of realpolitik.” This resulted in a fusion of the narratives of political Islam and secular democratic ideals (Moaddel, n.d.).

Social Identity Theory helps explain how the vanguard of the Arab Street never established firm support in Egypt’s political structure. The young neoliberal democrats appeared to violate the norms of traditional Egyptian society and religion in a number of ways, most obviously by flaunting Western out-group norms.

Contrastingly, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative stands out: “For the first time in my life I feel we have elected a leader through our own free will,” said Mustafa Abu Hanafi, 31, a computer engineer, from Mansouria, Giza. “When someone graduates he’s supposed to have a job. I haven’t been able to find one. You always needed wasata (connections). Under Mursi (sic) this will change ... He’s one of us” (Lyon, 2012). This implies that support by traditional Egyptians for trusted institutions and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be much more stable than for mysterious entities and personages such as protestors and their leaders. This also implies that many Egyptians who were not already knowledgeable on political issues, but who became caught up in the fervor of the revolution, would not have much staying power in continuing to support protestors as a persistent political movement.

The perception in Egypt that protestors were supported or manipulated by foreign forces undermined popular support. Public opinion in Egypt is overwhelmingly critical of the West in general, and of the U.S. in particular. For example, in a May 8, 2012 Pew poll, 70% view the U.S. negatively (views of the United States and Israel).

As of this writing, it appears that the protestors Western-oriented narratives of democracy and freedom have failed to gain traction in Egypt:
The widespread use of ‘Arab Spring’ helped conceal this reality. The term brought to mind the changes that had swept through Eastern Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Numerous, but inaccurate, parallels were drawn between the Eastern Bloc and the Middle East. These false premises were reinforced by the tens if not hundreds of thousands bright, young, articulate, Western-oriented, media-savvy demonstrators who rose against Arab nationalist governments. Despite the attention given to them, these youthful demonstrators never represented more than a small minority of the population. The fabric of Middle Eastern society has fundamentally changed. Being Muslim has replaced being Arab as the primary identifying factor. The consequences are profound.

(Bannerman, 2012)

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brothers began as a movement for the reform of individual and social morality, based on an analysis of what was wrong with Muslim societies, similar to, and in part derived from, that of the Salafiyya [first Islamic generation]. Islam, it believed, had declined because of the prevalence of a spirit of blind imitation and the coming in of the excesses of Sufism [Islamic mysticism]; to these had been added the influence of the West, which, in spite of its social virtues, had brought alien values, immorality, missionary activity and imperial domination. The beginning of a cure was for Muslims to return to the true Islam, that of the Qur’an as interpreted by genuine ijtihad [authorities on Islam], and to try to follow its teachings in every sphere of life.

(Hourani, 1991)

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring was an illegal group which the Mubarak regime nevertheless tolerated for over three decades. It emerged from the tumult of the Egyptian Revolution as the political victors in an unstable and polarized political scene. Up until the recent coup the Muslim Brotherhood had won the majority of seats within the Shura council (upper parliament) and a Brotherhood member had ascended to the highest position within the

“The Muslim Brotherhood] is chameleonic in nature and displays an ability to shift alliances when necessary that have allowed it to remain relevant in Egyptian society when other groups have faded into obscurity and insignificance.”
Egyptian government, that of president. Ironically, former President Mubarak languishes in Tora prison, the same prison which has seen numerous important Brotherhood members spend time behind bars, including Seyyid Qutb, who composed “Milestones” during his ten-year incarceration there under then President Gamal Nasser.

This belies the relatively humble beginnings of the Muslim Brotherhood (sometimes referred to as the Society for Muslim Brothers), founded in 1928 by Hassan El-Banna, a school teacher in the port city of Ismailia. Originally begun as a social organization to promote Islamic values and morals, the tenor of the organization changed after El-Banna witnessed the colonial brutalities inflicted upon Egyptians by the British, as well as the excesses of their indulgent Western lifestyles. Inspired by these experiences, he sought to create an anti-colonial group whose members and ideology would be guided by Islam to slough off the yoke of Britain. Originating in the governorate of Ismailia, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in a time when anti-colonialist/imperialist sentiment was at an all time high and a desire to recapture nationalistic pride was strong (Mitchell, 1993). The Brotherhood was also a party that represented opposition to the authoritarian regimes of King Farouk, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak, though the Brotherhood opportunistically allied with them as well (Mitchell, 1993). The long lifespan of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite hostile governments and changing socio-political conditions, stems from pragmatism, patience and opportunism. It is chameleonic in nature and displays an ability to shift alliances when necessary that have allowed it to remain relevant in Egyptian society when other groups have faded into obscurity and insignificance (Mitchell, 1993).

From the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood has invested heavily in social programs and ideas of Islamic charity and welfare at the grassroots level. By late 1939 Muslim Brotherhood membership had spread to every governorate in Egypt and numbered over 500,000. In 2010 the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had between 2 and 2.5 million members (“No One Knows…”, 2010), or about 4% of the population; since the revolution numbers may have increased substantially. The Muslim Brotherhood has demonstrated great organizational savvy and has a long and well known history of providing Islamic guidance, stipends, food, health care and other social welfare services to Egypt’s needy. Muslim Brothers are (or were, at least) widely perceived to be devout, honest men dedicated to serving the public good. This is the compassionate basis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s most compelling narrative and gave them instant credibility among many Egyptians as they decided to enter the fray of the Egyptian Revolution, albeit as latecomers.

While the Tunisian Revolution and the overthrow of the Bin Ali regime was of obvious concern to the Mubarak establishment, the revolution was also a threat to the influence and authority of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist religious groups throughout the Arab world. Prior to the Arab Spring the framing of fundamentalist Islamic religious groups was to cast themselves as one of the only lines of defense against authoritarian regimes and the only true alternative for
change. In this capacity, as political outsiders, Islamist groups like the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood were successful in sustaining moral legitimacy and popular support for their cause, mar-
shaling opposition to authoritarian regimes and promoting principled stances on issues.

From a historical perspective the Arab Spring demonstrates the failure of Islamist groups to
offer a narrative compelling enough to motivate people to undertake Islamic Revolution à la
1979 Iran. Protestors did not rise up against entrenched governments under the banner of Islam,
the Muslim Umma, or any Islamist group (Olivier, 2012). Rather, people protested against long-
standing regimes, calling for social justice, human rights and respect. Citizens claimed “their
right to publicly express their rejection of the status quo” (Tadroz quoting El Erian, 2012). For
Islamic groups that had for so long used the threatening shadow of oppressive regimes as po-
litical and social currency and the narrative of Islamic revolution, the success of the youth-led
liberal democratic secular protest movement in Tunisia was both shocking in speed and unset-
tling in implication. To the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as a political, social, and religious
organization whose foundational ideological narrative is that Islam is the only ultimate salvation
for mankind, the un-Islamic narrative of the Tunisian Arab Spring must have been a disconcert-
ing harbinger.5

The initial response of the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the Tunisian Revolution but
prior to the 25 January 2011 protest was two-fold. While supporting the rebellion of the Tunisian
street as a justified uprising against oppression and injustice, the Brotherhood took a different
tack for Egypt, calling for reform, “stability, and social harmony” (Tadroz, 2012) rather than
transformation via revolution. It was widely believed at the time that the Muslim Brotherhood
was working with the Mubarak Regime to contain and minimize the ferment of the Arab Spring
in Egypt. A 19 January press statement from the Brotherhood states, “immediate reform is neces-
sary if Egypt is not to follow suit in Tunisia’s historical uprising” (“MB’s Statement…”, 2011).
This statement framed the Tunisian Revolution in a negative context. It was clear the Brother-
hood opposed overthrowing Mubarak, supported the status quo and was calling for modest
changes to the existing constitution, as well as a call to repeal the 30-year-old emergency law,
along with other demands:

We believe that the constitutional struggle in the natural course of political, eco-
nomic, social, and community reform. We, the Muslim Brotherhood, are an integral
part of this nation, we observe accurately and realistically the other party and the
existing system in the country which owns [sic], which has the ability to reform and
change more than anyone else if it had the will and desire to do so.

(19 January 2011 Muslim Brotherhood Statement)
Of interest in the statement above: while the Brotherhood recognized the National Democratic Party and the Mubarak governmental machine, the Brotherhood had never been officially recognized by the regime and was colloquially referred to as “the outlawed” (Tadroz, 2012). The Brotherhood hedged its bets; the idea that revolutionary furor would in less than three weeks depose Mubarak was unthinkable at this point in time. The historical memory of the brutal crackdowns by Farouk, Nasser and Mubarak in response to Muslim Brotherhood activism accounts partially for this call to restraint versus revolution. Although the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood was an illegal organization, it nevertheless quietly co-existed with the Mubarak Regime, having made deals with the regime in the past to stay out of politics and not rock the boat (Tadroz, 2012). The Brotherhood was loathe to make bets on a revolution that might fail and to have to endure the ferocious blowback of an angered dictator. Slackman (2011) mentions similar threats by Egyptian state security warning Brotherhood members against participation in any protests movements borne from the events in Tunisia.

In addition to being pragmatic and risk averse, there was an ideological motivation for the Brotherhood’s hesitation to enter into any movement for revolutionary change, according to Tadroz (p31). Gom’a Amin, a noted Brotherhood historian and advisor, said:

> The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in advocacy through acts of civil disobedience, policy change, demonstrations and hunger strikes as a means through which to elicit reform. Such tactics fail when faced with dictatorial rule, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach instead is based on a holistic approach to deepening Islamic values in society through da’wa, Islamic pedagogy and education.

(Tadroz quoting Amin, 2007)

This illustrates a long-standing schizophrenic tendency within the Muslim Brotherhood; one wing favored strong political action while the other focused on withdrawing from the political arena and instead concentrating on religious studies and social welfare work. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is rife with periods of advocacy through civil disobedience and protests that are confirmed by official statements in the past by the Muslim Brotherhood calling for civil disobedience (“Egypt’s Muslim…”, 2007). While Amin may be advocating a lesser political role, it is also possible that the statement is intended to allay the fears of an ever-suspicious Mubarak Regime.

The announcement that the 25 January 2011 Police Day would instead be a protest day by liberal democratic groups like the April 6th Movement was met with silence by the Muslim Brotherhood. Only two days prior to the protests the Muslim Brotherhood, via its official website, was still undecided as to the role it would play in the 25 January protests and was still “engaged
in internal discussions” (“MB To Announce…”, 2011). However, other sources suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood had already made a decision to not participate in the protests. Supreme Guidance Council Leader for the organization Dr. Essam el-Erian was quoted as saying “We should all be celebrating together” (Slackman, 2011). This statement was clearly intended to suggest that the proper course of conduct was for the entire nation, including the Mubarak Regime, to join together and peacefully and joyfully celebrate National Police Day. Statements like this would return to damage the narrative and erode the credibility of the Muslim Brotherhood in the days after the Egyptian Revolution as elements of their organization attempted to recast the Muslim Brotherhood’s wariness to enter protests in a different, more affirmative light.

As it became clear that the demonstrations were gaining widespread support, the Muslim Brotherhood dived headlong into the fray. Clearly, it made an opportunistic calculation that the demonstrations were about to achieve escape velocity and it feared being left behind. Another illustration of the rubbery nature of the Muslim Brotherhood’s narrative, a 2013 book by Amer Shammakh, *The Muslim Brotherhood and The Revolution of 25 January*, in a clear rewriting of history, repaints the Muslim Brothers as the vanguard and backbone of the Revolution (Mahmoud, 2013) serving on the front lines from day one and acting as a calmative element among restless and potentially violent protestors.

Once the full weight of the Muslim Brotherhood machine had been thrown behind the Revolution, local chapters all throughout Egypt sprung into action. Their strong organizational presence and manpower, along with a skilled cadre of Brothers experienced in protest (Tadroz, 2012), quickly exposed the weaknesses of the leaderless secular democratic youth protest movement. The advantage of leaderless mass protests is that they cannot easily be defanged or defused in one fell swoop by neutralizing a protest leader (Castells, 2004). However, while unorganized protest movements can exert immense momentum for change at a specific point in time, they often lack persistence, that is, they tend to fragment and disperse. Leaderless movements are vulnerable to appropriation by more experienced and ruthless operators. “Revolutionary movements lacking a vanguard are crushed by more entrenched and better-organized forces in the aftermath of massive social and political upheaval” (Bradley, 2012). In contrast, it is difficult for an ephemeral protest movement to create a sustainable presence. This is exactly what transpired as the Muslim Brotherhood’s superior organization, management and funds allowed them to quickly

“This is exactly what transpired as the Muslim Brotherhood’s superior organization, management and funds allowed them to quickly pirate the voice of the Revolution over the leaderless and fragmented secular democratic youth.”
pirate the voice of the Revolution over the leaderless and fragmented secular democratic youth.

Tadroz (2012) recounts that in the days following the ouster of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to dominate Tahrir Square. It controlled access to the square via choke points manned by Brothers, erected an elevated stage in a prime location, set up massive speakers and multimedia arrays and literally drowned out the voices of other protest groups, who were the original vanguard of the movement, as they vainly attempted to compete with paper signs, shouts, the occasional megaphone, and frantic flag waving. This precedent set by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early days after Mubarak’s departure continued to grow stronger, and with few exceptions the Brotherhood’s narrative remained dominant up until the moment it captured the Egyptian Presidency.

Attempts to coalesce political opposition against the Muslim Brotherhood had met with limited success until the most recent 30 June protests. In response to the President’s dictatorial constitutional edicts of 22 November 2012, the National Salvation Front was formed. Led by Nobel laureate Mohammed El Baradei and former presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi, the National Salvation Front has framed itself as the de-facto opposition umbrella group to President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. During a November power grab, when President Morsi bestowed upon himself sweeping and unrestricted executive powers by rendering impotent the Egyptian judiciary branch and circumventing the system of checks and balances (Hume, 2012), El-Baradei tweeted “(They) are currently staging a coup against democracy...regime legitimacy fast eroding,” (Spencer, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood reaction was to paint El-Baradei as a Westerner. “We’re not scared of El-Baradei, he has no real support on the street, he’s Western” (Rohde, 2012).

By framing El-Baradei as “Western,” the Muslim Brotherhood is attempting to tar its opponent as un-Egyptian without ever having to prove any factual charges, defend its own conduct or even make any specific accusations, because aspects of Western culture and foreign policy are hugely unpopular in Egypt and the Arab world. The not-so-subtle implication is that the largely young, educated, often English-speaking Egyptians who took the streets against Mubarak and actu-

Figure 8. One of numerous posters comparing President Morsi to Former President Mubarak. The Arabic reads “Mohammed Morsi Mubarak”
ally initiated the Revolution are “useful idiots” -- tools of America and Europe acting as foolish pawns, or even a traitorous Fifth Column manipulated by the West. There are a number of connotations to this descriptor: exploitive, colonial, conspiracy, rapacious, war, consumerism, anti-Islam and support of Israel among them. This is one of the fundamental frames that the Muslim Brotherhood invokes against the liberal opposition.

Contrastingly, the liberal opposition frames this current struggle as Mubarak part deux or the rise of a “new Pharaoh” (Hendawi, 2012), referring to Mubarak’s failed attempts to cast himself as a modern day Pharaoh of Egypt (Fein, 2011). This is powerful framing because the memory of the Mubarak dictatorship is still fresh in everyone’s minds, mindful of the Egyptian historical cycle of revolution and liberation, followed by the imposition of authoritarianism in the name of a temporary emergency, which remains in place indefinitely.

The Muslim Brotherhood, up until the present time, has always been a party in opposition, the out-group. Its history of inconsistent behavior, policies, alliances and narrative has never before been at the forefront of public attention. However, when it became a ruling party, these continuing inconsistencies entered the spotlight and it failed to adapt its narrative in a meaningful way to address these issues. As an opposition party for almost a century and an outsider group that never had to worry about governing a country or reconciling past contradictory and inflammatory statements made by its leaders, it never had to face the reality of trying to implement an Islamic State in a diverse modern world.

It is clear that although the Muslim Brotherhood “won” the battle of narratives during the phase of the revolution leading up to presidential and parliamentary elections, it failed to adapt the narrative in the aftermath. It attempted, with only partial success, to inherit institutions from the former regime rather than rebuilding them. The state media, other agencies and the police by way of the Interior Ministry were all to varying degrees seized by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, it was unable to capture control of the judiciary, the police as a whole, and the Army. It is reasonable to assume that the Muslim Brotherhood would have continued in its attempts to seize these institutions as well, were it not for the coup.

The narrative used during the election campaign of opposition to dictatorship and service to the poor was a narrative that was highly credible. That narrative carried with it a built-in expiration date, however, which was the moment that the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power and

“*It is clear that although the Muslim Brotherhood “won” the battle of narratives during the phase of the revolution leading up to presidential and parliamentary elections, it failed to adapt the narrative in the aftermath.*”
responsibility for the governance of Egypt and all Egyptians. The post-election narratives offered by the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of its election triumphs have been contradictory, incoherent, and partisan. Rather than working to widen consensus to attract a broader constituency and changing institutions to be more inclusive, it instead retained its narrow constituencies and inherited many institutions of the Mubarak regime. This bifurcated the population and eroded the Brotherhood’s legitimacy.

Upon the election of a Muslim Brotherhood President, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to allay the fears of a looming Islamic State modeled on Saudi Arabia, espousing a narrative of moderation, an environment of inclusiveness, religious tolerance and democratic plurality. These promises have not translated into action and its actions have conflicted with its narrative. There is an essential contradiction that is inherent in the fundamental nature and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its narrative is fundamentally, and inherently, schizophrenic. One leg is planted in the time of the Prophet and another leg stands in the modern world. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to rationalize its opportunistic and ad hoc behavior. A once-credible but now unsuitable narrative, coupled with a context that includes an economy in free fall, continuing social justice issues, and rampant corruption, all led to the Muslim Brotherhood’s eventual ouster.

“This never-ending struggle between the ideal world of the community of brotherly love and the brutal reality of everyday life has been the principal religious leverage towards social change in human societies” (Turner, 2010). This is a powerful and universal human narrative. Like other revelatory religions, Islam promises a better world in lieu of the Hobbesian dystopian vision of brutality, injustice, tooth, and claw, which is apparent and inescapable in the real world. “Islam is the Solution” is the often used slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood holds that if people were to conduct themselves as the Prophet, his disciple Abu Bakr (Sunni Islam) and his followers did in the time of ancient Medina and Mecca, a godly peace would be achieved. However, the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, as well as the conduct of its individual leaders, undermines the credibility of its fundamentalist narrative. Since the Qur’an forbids charging interest on loans, the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist organizations have set up parallel systems of Islamic banking in accord with Islamic principles; however, the Muslim Brotherhood is integrated with and participates in the Western banking system to further its own goals (“Secrets of…”, 2013). A revealing example of the gap between fundamentalist ideology and actual conduct is the expose by the Al-Arabiya channel showing that the Muslim Brotherhood retains tens of millions of dollars within secret Swiss bank accounts (“Secrets of…”, 2013). There are other examples of inconsistencies between narrative and actual behavior, the Muslim Brotherhood (by way of its Freedom And Justice Party) officially condemns nepotism (“FJP 2011 Program…”, 2011). However, high ranking
Muslim Brotherhood leaders like President Morsi routinely practice it ("Another Mask Falls…", 2013).

The Muslim Brotherhood, like other fundamentalist religious organizations, believes in the inerrancy of scripture. Since God’s words cannot be changed, mere humans are left with the task of proper interpretation. Only interpretation and increasingly tenuous reinterpretation can be made to adapt to the modern world (Turner, 2010), which has radically different notions of human rights and morality than those that were prevalent in the Middle East 1400 years ago. Many of the rights enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights would be unacceptable to the Prophet and the people of his time. The failure to reasonably adapt to the morals, science, and technology of the modern world not only challenges the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also undermines its image of fairness and competency to rule, in other words its legitimacy. For example, former Egyptian Minister of Health Hesham Kandil, an appointee of the Muslim Brotherhood, triggered a furor of protests and accusations of elitism and patriarchalism among rights activists when he suggested that the cause of poor infant health in rural Egypt was unhygienic female breasts ("Kandil’s Suggestion …", 2013), and that rural women are raped in fields as they do not wash in the mosque as men do ("Egypt News: Kandil…", 2013).

Further, the Arab Spring has triggered a resurgence in the feminist movement. Women served at the frontline during the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions—marching, protesting, and dying with their male counterparts in the pursuit of social justice and freedom from oppression. With the dissolution of authoritarian regimes, newly drafted constitutions and laws to instill egalitarian ideals and women serving in legislatures, the future for women’s rights looked bright. Unfortunately, fundamentalist organizations run by “men stuck in the seventh century” (Eltahawy, 2012) continue to present a hurdle for women’s equality in the Middle East, as these men consider it a direct attack on the patriarchal family concept. During the Egyptian elections Islamists from the Al-Nour party replaced the portrait photo of female candidate Marwa Ibrahim Al-Qamash with a flower, Islamists in Alexandria robed the nude carvings of mermaids, and some Islamist members refused to be interviewed by females without a head covering or were unwilling to be in the same room as the female interviewer. In response, female equality groups like the “FEMENS” have begun to surface.
blogger, feminist, atheist and FEMEN Aliaa Magda Elmahdy and others have moved to protesting the Islamic fundamentalism enveloping Egypt through nude protests covering her “unholy” parts with the “holy book.” The narrative put forth by the Muslim Brotherhood does not offer satisfactory or reasonable answers to demands put forth by modern day feminists.

Another example illustrating the challenges of modernity facing the Muslim Brotherhood is a movement in Egypt to eliminate religion from the Egyptian national identity card. The “None of Your Business” campaign seeks to obscure religious affiliations/identities on Egyptian national identity cards with stickers that replace Muslim, Christian or Jewish affiliation with “human” or the pithy “None of Your Business.” In the Prophet’s time religion was not a matter of “affiliation,” but rather a matter of being born or forcibly converted into one, often a matter of life or death. Fundamentalist Islam involves reverting to a pure form of Islam, Islam as it was during the time of the Prophet Mohammed. The Qur’an was fully composed in the 7th century, but the Muslim Brotherhood in the 21st century struggles to reconcile it with modern ideas of religious freedom and society. Morsi was obviously aware of these concerns and had publicly emphasized tolerance and inclusiveness, both prior to his election as president and afterwards, assuring Copts, Egypt’s Christian minority, and other minority religious groups that they would remain part of the fabric of the Egyptian nation (Malah, 2012). However, he was promptly confronted with a slew of YouTube videos from his earlier career as a Muslim Brotherhood apparatchik giving passionate speeches damning Jews as the descendants of apes and pigs (“Morsi Describes…”, 2013). Since the elections there were numerous reports of Muslim Brotherhood members showing intolerance of other religions, particularly the Copts. The Muslim Brotherhood wore whatever face it needed for political advantage, but the disconnect between what it was saying and what was really happening in Egypt was indefensible and readily apparent to even the most aloof Egyptian.
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Up until their ouster by the military, little progress had been made by the Muslim Brotherhood to resolve these challenges. Increasingly, Egyptians saw its narrative of inclusion and tolerance as insincere lip service, and the framing of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable political-religious entity has now been cut short.

CONCLUSION

This study addressed the question of whether or not narrative was an important factor in the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the Egyptian Revolution, beginning on 25 January 2011 to the military coup on 3 July 2013. The answer is that it was an important part, but not the only factor. Other factors such as social identity and inherited institutions also played a significant role in contributing to both the success and failure of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Looking at the revolution in hindsight, it is clear that the electoral victories of the Muslim Brotherhood were highly predictable. The most important factor in its meteoric rise to power was its pre-existing and very capable organizational presence, giving it “boots on the ground” throughout Egypt. Second to this was a powerful history and narrative based on a long history of social welfare and opposition to tyranny. The third factor was credibility; in this case the long history of the organization was known to everyone in Egypt.

The Egyptian Revolution shows that the effectiveness of narrative can be highly variable, based on time and context. When the context changes, narrative must adapt. An attractive but unauthentic narrative may be able to mask structural problems in the short run, but not over a long span of time. For example, the narrative of altruism that served the Muslim Brotherhood so well in the pre-election phase was no longer credible after the Muslim Brotherhood ascended to power in the post-election phase. In fact, changing circumstances which conflict with previous narratives seriously undermined its popularity. The Brotherhood is a classic example of victorious revolutionaries failing to adapt pre-revolutionary narrative to the changed context of having the responsibility to represent all groups in society rather than just loyalists.

The immediate cause of the Muslim Brotherhood’s fall from power was a coup, an intervention by the Egyptian Army. The coup was enabled by widespread public dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood and massive public protests against the Morsi regime. It seems clear that the Brotherhood missed many opportunities to be more inclusive and accommodating to other elements of Egyptian society. President Morsi himself acknowledged his regret for issuing himself sweeping constitutional powers. External factors such as deteriorating economic conditions and austerity measures taken to satisfy the International Monetary Fund in order to obtain loans imposed
serious constraints on Morsi’s freedom of action. The Muslim Brotherhood made arrogant and needless mistakes that undermined its support and credibility. Its narrative appealed to fewer and fewer Egyptians as time passed. Had the Muslim Brotherhood adapted its narrative and truly embraced more inclusive and tolerant policies, the protest movement against it would undoubtedly have been less powerful. There would have been fewer protestors, and the Army may never have been given the green light it needed to intervene. In short, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to create a legitimate post-revolutionary narrative that unified Egypt. It had sufficient numbers of supporters to win the presidential elections, but too few supporters to maintain legitimacy and defend it against a coup. At the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution a narrative of justice drove unprecedented numbers of ordinary Egyptians onto the streets to protest the Mubarak dictatorship and carry the Muslim Brotherhood to power. One year later, once again ordinary Egyptians flooded the streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other cities of Egypt -- but this time to bury Caesar, not to praise him.
The Ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Revolution:

END NOTES


2. Mulukhiyah is a popular dish in Egypt. It is a green vegetable chopped up and simmered until thick, commonly served over rice with chicken.

3. They conducted a content analysis of news sources broken into three categories, semiofficial (state) newspapers, independent newspapers, and social media.

4. The 9 commonly identified reasons for the protests were dictatorship, corruption, oppression, poverty, injustice, foreign influence, satellite channels, political groups, and unemployment

5. An often repeated motto of the Muslim Brotherhood is “Islam is the solution.”

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