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Winning Irregular War: Conflict Geography is built from *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, sharing its format and about 70% of its text. A note on page vi outlines the major differences.

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About the Cover Illustration:

Today's armed conflicts have chartable, controllable natures, and their outcomes are subject to long-standing principles. To best comprehend these conflicts we need to look closely at the interrelationships of people with their surroundings. Just because they are not simple does not mean these contests are intractably amorphous affairs. Many constants in their dynamics can be rendered in vivid color and detail, much like a 19th Century landscape.

In this panoramic view, Justice and Liberty are held hostage by sinister actors. A contest for power has defaulted to opponents able to orchestrate their violent action. Included as backdrop are mundane elements -- parachutists, pick-up trucks and pumpkins -- along with non-corporeal influences -- devils, dragons and death worms. The key investigative challenge in preparing for effective action (for winning a civilized and enjoyable peace) in such landscape is to illuminate hidden identities and the interests of shadowy, but nevertheless exposable perpetrators.

The image of a Sherlock Holmes on the cover of *Winning Insurgent War* has transformed into an Oliver Wendell Holmes. It is a fitting adjustment of allusions, the earlier one tied to investigative prowess and the latter to the movement of matters in the institutions of justice. Evidence of crimes is to be discovered in a conflictive landscape; indictments can also be found, but most must be willed. Sherlock might have said, 'the game is afoot', and Oliver, 'when we study law, we are not studying a mystery'.

On the cover, ominous threats hang dangerously like the sword of Damocles or aggressively advance -- sometimes punctuating the countryside as surprising, limb-wrenching detonations. Always accompanied by human error and carelessness, and by illicit commerce, irregular wars endanger the innocent. Perhaps not always bad, and not inevitable, they can be won.

DEDICATION

To Chuck's arm, which he nobly left on the other side of the world.

QUICK START: HOW TO READ THIS BOOK

You can take a traditional approach, reading the sections in numerical sequence; or you can read the author's preface, the first seven-fifteen sections, then the last several, then the middle (say 68-76), then skip around. Going backwards from 144 to 1 will work, or you can peruse the Contents and go to whatever sections interest you, which I hope will be all of them.

Some of the sections have expansive titles like *Legitimacy* or *Human Rights*. They aren't intended to encapsulate those subjects, but just tie those themes to the book's central assertions. Other titles, like *Dogs and Mules*, or *Forts and Walls*, or *Poop* are less abstract, but relate to the same assertions. Those assertions, or propositions, include:

- An impunity-based definition of State success;
- Attention to anonymity as a competitive emphasis;
- Inventorying as an indispensable knowledge activity;
- Withdrawal and pursuit as key operational and strategic concepts;
- Deception as a compulsory element of strategic thinking;
- Geography as the academic discipline of choice;
- Property analysis as tool for exposing the distribution of power;
- Distance as a key variable in the measurement of relative power;
- Civil engineering and construction as noble activities;
- Personal dignity and honor as key quantities of a durable victory;
- Adaptation of classic strategy as operational artistry; and
- Formal property regimes as a basis of peaceful social compacts.

'Winning' means not just neutralizing your enemies, but doing so without creating more of them. It may also mean building places that do not create enemies.

Building such places requires that ideology, political philosophy, epistemology, engineering, and shooting all get along, so the book assumes these things cannot be distanced one from another. Below each section is a joke, quotation, or piece of poetry. They are interrelated in a way similar to the text, and with the text. They are like the fins on a '60 Cadillac.

**WHAT DISTINGUISHES *WINNING IRREGULAR WAR*
FROM ITS PREDECESSOR *WINNING INSURGENT WAR***

This text contains fourteen new sections, as follows:

7, Sanctuary;
16, Presence;
27, 'Nonviolent' Action;
41, Dear Westy;
51, Get Willy;
58, Condottieri;
83, Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?;
85, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck;
88, Escape Geography;
109, Your Staff Work Sucks;
113, Unrestricted Chi Whiz;
127, Between Liberty and Lawrence;
135, Borders and Anarchism;
138, Raids.

A number of maps are now included, as listed on page xxi.

Many sections were re-worked (hopefully the ones that needed it). The order of the sections was also changed. You can trace the section number changes on the excel spreadsheet provided at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) website, fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. The spreadsheet has new word counts and other information as well.

What had been sections *33, Built Environment* and *36, Engineers* combine to become *33, Engineers & Built Environment*; sections *51, Underclass* and *60, Slavery* combine to become *60, Slavery and Underclass*; sections *61, Who Sins More*, *62, Illicit Commerce* and *85, Ploesti and Putuma* combine and shorten to become *61, The Geography of Dope*; sections *106, Tourism* and *107, Price of Real Estate* combine to become *75, The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; sections *108, Neogeography*, *109, Hotspotting* and *113, National Knowledge Strategy* combine and shorten to become *108, Common Knowledge*; sections *136, Weapons* and *139, UAAV* combine to become *136, Weapons*; *115, Transforming Armed Forces* was reduced and renamed *Academies*; *124, Americas Insurgent Stamp* is no more; nor is *55, The Statute of Frauds*, much of which was folded into *3, Domesday*

FOREWORD

This book offers a smorgasbord of topics, presenting a menu and vocabulary both varied and intriguing. It is divided into 144 sections encompassing 661 pages, with titles that could interest almost anyone. They include, for example, “The Denver Broncos,” “Songs of Chu,” “*Mens Rea*,” “Your Staff Work Sucks,” “Impunity,” “Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis,” “The Doomsday Book,” “Magical Realism,” and “Misleading COIN Articles of Faith.” They provide arrows not found in the quiver of most (perhaps any) other strategist or irregular warfare specialist. While the many sections are individually titled and most have an independent integrity, they together form larger arguments which are themselves parts of a unified whole.

The book’s contextual canvas transmits readers’ thoughts into some areas and conclusions that they probably have never considered. As but one example, the following formula for “winning irregular war” was developed by a person who read a draft of the book:

Winning irregular war (WIrW) is equal to imposing early culminating points (IECP) on an opponent (stop his initiatives), often by exposing him (EH, eliminating anonymity through the use of property and identification methods, perhaps via an effective social contract based on people’s will), then cutting off his line of retreat (COLOR, his essence of survival), thus denying him impunity (DHI), and doing so before time expires (BTE). The equation offers leaders a template to keep in mind:

$$WIrW = IECP + EH + COLOR + DHI + BTE.$$

The book entertains. A popular culture buff myself, I find what must be hundreds of movies, books, cartoons and internet productions referenced for their insights or humor, but also their applicability to irregular war. Although a few are purely fanciful, the majority underscore one or more of the book’s more serious points. Many of them are curiously related to one another in a way that can cause the reader to enter into a parallel search for interconnections among these seemingly random flourishes. Do you like personalities? Then you will be introduced to R.V. Jones, T. R. Fehrenbach, Errico Malatesta, Mary Roach, Margaret Elizabeth Kerr, and Ricardo Asturias, as well as the more familiar Led Zeppelin, Joe Namath, and Chuck Norris. Looking for a bottom line? The section “Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?” provides one answer, as does “Seven Strategy Strains,” as well as “The Operational Equation.”

Dr. Demarest is a lawyer, retired military foreign area officer, strategist and Latin America expert. He has doctorates in geography and international relations and speaks Spanish fluently. It follows that his perspective would be different from those military writers who have been heralded in recent years (perhaps, for instance, David Kilcullen, John Nagl, David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, etcetera). The majority of these authors offered a discussion within the context of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and within a range of preferred thinking as to how those wars were to be prosecuted. Dr. Demarest, under the umbrella of irregular war, herein outlines an understanding (of what to do with power) that is markedly unlike those writings, but without being disdainful toward them.

I have repeatedly asked Dr. Demarest who the book’s audience is, but he dodges. The number *one hundred forty-four* can be divided multiple ways such that the book’s organization lends itself to course preparation -- to divvy up readings -- so perhaps it is aimed at instructors. The section subjects provide a richer and more comprehensive taxonomy (for the filing and cross-reference of observations) than, say, PMEISII, so perhaps intelligence collectors and academic researchers are a part. As the book seems to give almost as much credit to screenwriters as it does to historic military figures (for pronounced wisdoms), it seems he intends a wider audience. He suggests in his preface that the title ought to be enough: If you want to win a war, the book is for you. However, many who would in no way see themselves as competitors in or practitioners of any warfare will find the book an enlightening intellectual experience.

This work expands awareness of irregular war and of warfare, national strategy, and even decision-making generally. It does not channel the imagination into any particular scale of activity. It begs the reader to mix theology, ideology, politics, policy, strategy, operations -- all levels of human thought and endeavor -- in the context of mortal competitions. The book admits what the Chinese might call ‘all forms of power’ and how all forms of power might be applied to create *shur*, or strategic advantage. Here, however, we have a distinctly American approach for beating wily opponents, whether we would call them insurgents, counter-insurgents, separatists, or something else entirely.

Timothy L. Thomas

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This book is the outgrowth and destination of *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics (WIW)*, with which this work shares about seventy-five percent of its content. In the preface to that previous title I stated that 'insurgency' was a place-holder for and center of mass of a broader set of conflicts types, and that the umbrella category might be named 'irregular'. While admitting doubts about the term 'irregular', it appears to be the best of the more inclusive alternatives. The 'Terms' section of a 1960 US Army field manual titled *Operations Against Irregular Forces* states,

Irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, and counter-irregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisans, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods.

Irregular moves the title toward the inclusiveness suggested by the 1960 list. Onto that list, however, I would throw organized crime, genocide, humanitarian intervention, hybrid war, insurrection, *latrunculi*, low-intensity conflict, punitive expeditions, light-intensity conflict, new war, contingency operations, war amongst the people, occupations, peoples' war, cocktail war, postmodern war, rebellion, anarchy, separatism, piracy, privateering, small wars, sedition, unconviction, manhunts, counterdrug operations, stability operations, raids, and unrestricted warfare. You name it. I admit to an occasional indiscipline regarding what may be appropriate distinctions between types of irregular conflict; I spent little text parsing definitions of what these phenomena *are*, preferring instead to address what to *do*. The book pertains to almost everything other than State-on-State wars in which a tank commander maneuvers against another, or countries launch nuclear missiles at each other. From among the connotations that generally distinguish *regular* from *irregular* war, I find it useful to emphasize the greater influence that legalities have in the latter, as well as the greater presence of non-fighting people. I often default to the use of that word *insurgency*, which is often at the heart of the matter, even though it doesn't do justice to the whole range of organized violence.

'Doubling down' as they say, I tried to make this text even more pretentious than the last. Not only do I stick by the claim of showing how to *win*, this volume presents the skeleton for a whole new academic sub-discipline, which I tentatively call Conflict Geography. You might find parts of this work disagreeable (putting yourself in good company). Some readers of *WIW* found the epigrams at the ends of the sections to be distracting, irrelevant, frivolous, and even juvenile. For those folk, I added about 300 additional gems. I'm reminded of advice attributed to John Steinbeck regarding the reception of one of his books: "Unless a reviewer has the courage to give you unqualified praise, I say ignore the bastard."^[1]

As in *WIW*, control of impunity occupies the center of this book's definition of winning. Impunity is protection from punishment. Building the definition of victory around impunity makes good sense, given that if a society does not develop some kind of delimitation over organized impunity (that is, if an errant entity can defiantly grant impunity to its members), a formula for violent conflict exists, maybe the elemental condition for organized violent competition. Impunity has a synonym, immunity, but the latter word is usually applied to a wider range of phenomena and is far less likely to connote a wrongdoing. I sense a dynamic as one becomes the other, that is, as immunity becomes impunity and vice versa. I thought I had been sufficiently neutral in *WIW*, asserting that it was not a counterinsurgency manual (but maybe my being a government minion showed through). Just because I outline basic elements of victory and defeat in irregular war should not lead the reader to infer an argument that a State is inherently worth defending or strengthening. I lean in the other direction; but the ingredients of State failure and success don't care what I think, and remain the same regardless. If an insurgent wins, his organized impunity might become legal immunity. Likewise, governments often slump to granting protection from punishment for the corruptions of a select group. Such behavior invites subversion, sedition, rebellion, insurgency.... So, like *WIW*, this book starts and ends with *impunity*, control over which the contenders try to achieve. Impunity implies specific geography, which we can call *sanctuary*, which in turn allows us to depict military objectives on a two-dimensional map. Achievement of those objectives may constitute victory.

The second and third sections of this book are about *anonymity*. If forced to choose a single most useful vocational theme from the book, I would pick the control of *anonymity*. Some amount of anonymity supports freedom, but anonymity can enable impunity, and so the book highlights efforts that can appropriately sway what I call the 'balance of anonymities'. Like impunity, anonymity is a word we don't see in books on military strategy, so it too needs some defining. It is an outlaw imperative (especially in the early stages of forming a defiant group) to maintain a culture of silence in order to keep oneself and one's comrades or lieutenants from being punished by the authorities. For a defiant leader to grant impunity it is necessary that he hide identities and whereabouts.

The next ten or so sections are in one way or another about the *line of retreat*, a geographic concept related to the physical survival of outlaw leaders. *Impunity* is the first semantic guidepost for setting logical objectives, and control of *anonymity* is the first prescription. It is rarely enough, however. To stop the defiant leaders from granting impunity, authorities must still close with and neutralize them, often meaning capture or kill them. Therefore, the book asserts continuing applicability of classic military operational art. In this regard, special emphasis goes to control of lines of communication, which include *lines of retreat*.

If asked to declare a third vocational theme, it would be highlighting the question 'where?' in the set of questions you might use to address your war. We obsess over *why* insurgents or criminals act – a valuable question, certainly. Of more urgent operational relevance is exactly *where* and *how far away*. Knowing your enemy's motives may not matter. If you can't find him, he'll sneak up on you. Geography as an academic discipline focuses on *where*, and also on *distance*, and distance is intimately related to questions of power. Unfortunately, Geography, like most of the social sciences, is being weakened by a politically-painted ideological fashion that tears at things like positivism, empiricism and even optimism. Fortunately, Geography is also the home of geographic information science (GIS), which is busily restoring those things.

If imposed upon to highlight a fourth item, it is the book's promotion of durable property ownership systems, which we can also call social compacts. Much of the text is about closing with and destroying the enemy, but more of it is about not creating other enemies in the process. *Property* is an axial term for that endeavor. It is closely related to the abstraction *Rule-of-Law*, which I prefer over its sister, *Legitimacy*.

The book is pro-American. It doesn't hide my disdain for Anti-Americanism, including its cousins: deconstructionism, neo-marxism, anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism, anti-globalism, and the reigning favorite, *post-structuralism*. These isms, and especially the latter, tend to reject maps, GIS, reason, engineering, human nature, American football and other good things. Those isms are annoying, especially post-structuralism, since it makes no bones about not seeking or telling an objective truth. They feed patent anti-Americanism, as well as a covert pseudo-epistemology that indirectly but purposefully preferences anti-Americanism. This book takes a dim view of those philosophical-ideological propositions. Americans can reach into a rich inheritance of their own isms, some of which are appreciated by allusion in the epigrams.

Although I posit *impunity* as a prompt for correctly stating one's objective in an irregular war (which strikes me as a significant step), there is no stand alone prime message in this book. The Quick Start mentions twelve key themes, the Restatement seven, and I discussed four just above in this Author's Preface. Counting is hard work; there is no utility in an integer of principles that might guide you to winning your war. The format of this book is itself intended as a reminder that words enslave and categories deceive. The ideas make a soup, not a ladder. That said, after each section, I invite you to read exactly eight other sections because I'm told 'ba' and 'fa' sound alike in Chinese – one word meaning 'eight' and one word meaning 'luck' -- and that makes eight a lucky number.

Maybe the book's attitude will suffice as a center-pole -- that the best objective in war is to win, not 'seek a solution', 'prepare conditions for negotiation', or 'find a favorable outcome'. Those results might be acceptable, but this book is about how to win. Winning means defeating your enemies without creating more of them. Geometric, geologic, topologic, pragmatic, empirical, physical aspects of winning are favored in the book. Nevertheless, they cannot be honestly addressed unless they are mixed with less tangible, bigger things.

As for whom the book was written, the title seeks its audience. The text touches on a broad range of subjects. In a Memorial Day speech, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., relating why his generation fought in the Civil War, suggested that we should share the passion and action of our time. Some folk may want to share that action competently. I doubt, however, I can successfully argue why anyone should read most of the material in this book. If one were to ask...

"Why should I seek to know the secrets of philosophy? Why seek to decipher the hidden laws of creation that are graven upon the tablets of the rocks, or to unravel the history of civilization that is woven in the tissue of our jurisprudence, or to do any great work, either of speculation or of practical affairs? I cannot answer him; or at least my answer is as little worth making for any effect it will have upon his wishes if he asked why I should eat this, or drink that."^[2]

"Books are good enough in their own way..."^[3] I would like to think these pages will be useful to some man or woman who does not wish to be one of those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.^[4]

Geoff Demarest

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This being a disparate work, the reader will appreciate that many reviewers and counselors were abused in its making. I apologize to those who deserve personal mention here but who I forgot. Several individuals were especially generous with their time, and I in turn especially thievish with their ideas. They are, in no reasoned order: Kathleen Demarest, Kevin Benson, Scott Henderson, Tim Thomas, Ivan Welch, Naomi Jan Horvath, Les Grau, Robert Feldman, Alice Mink, Greg Fontenot, Linda Pride, Karl Prinslow, Merle Miyasato, Joel Anderson, Cindy Hurst, Brenda Fiegel, Karen Kaya, Tyson Demarest, Kayla Harford, Vince Demarest, Lauren Demarest, Chuck Bartles, Matt Stein, Patrick Reanier, Nathan Toronto, Stephany Trofino, Jason Warner, Lucas Winter, Dennis Giangreco, Charles Martinson, Tom Wilhelm, Ralph Erwin, Randy Love, Rob Kurz, Andy Pollock, Kevin Freese, Brian Williams, Steve Gerecke, David Spencer, James Green, James Riely, Kent Baumann, Aaron Perez, Gary Philips, Ernesto Villamizar, Anthony Scheidel, Myrna Myers, Eduardo Castillo, David Bailey, Brian Kaiser, Monroe Bonfoey, Cullen Demarest, Paul Kent Baumann, Mathew Kent Baumann, Mark Monroe, Hommy Rosado, and Robert Cassella. Some of you will recognize that many of the names come from the Foreign Military Studies Office. A few of them, even, are Marines.



Great job team. Head back to base for debriefing and cocktails.
Spottswode in the movie
Team America: World Police (2004)[\[5\]](#)



CONTENTS

DEDICATION	p. iii
QUICK START	p. v
FOREWORD	p. vii
AUTHORS PREFACE	p. ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	p. xiii
CONTENTS	p. xv
LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS	p. xxi
GLOSSARY	p. xxiii
RESTATEMENT	p. 567
SYNTHESIS	p. 569
APPENDIX: MISCELLANEOUS LISTS	p. 573
BIBLIOGRAPHY	p. 585
ENDNOTES	p. 597
INDEX	p. 623
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	p. 630

SECTIONS 1-144:

1, Impunity ...executive strategy	p. 1
2, Anonymity ...operational art	p. 4
3, The Domesday Book ...executive strategy	p. 6
4, Defining Enemy ...executive strategy	p. 11
5, Classic Strategy and Irregular Warfare...knowledge process	p. 14
6, The Operational Equation...operational art	p. 19
7, Sanctuary...operational art	p. 22
8, Linearity and the Line of Retreat...operational art	p. 28
9, White Bird...historical vignette, Chief Joseph's failed retreat	p. 31
10, Decisive Battle...operational art	p. 36
11, Protraction and Diligence...executive strategy	p. 40
12, Commitment of the Reserve...operational art	p. 44
13, Puthukkudiyirippu ...historical vignette, Sri Lankan war	p. 46
14, Legitimacy...executive strategy	p. 52
15, NGOs, IOs, and Unions...environment	p. 56
16, Presence...operational art	p. 62
17, Keeping Secrets...operational art	p. 65
18, Whole of Government...executive strategy	p. 69
19, Mercatus...environment	p. 73
20, Rule-of-Law...synthesis	p. 79
21, Iximché...historical vignette, warfare in Guatemala circa 1982	p. 83
22, Badassoftheweek.com ...environment	p. 93
23, Mens Rea...environment	p. 96
24, Ruthlessness and Resolve...environment	p. 99
25, Why Humans Don't Fight...environment	p. 101
26, How Violent Groups Form...environment	p. 105
27, 'Non-Violent' Action...operational art	p. 110
28, Takeovers and Sieges...operational art	p. 116
29, Heavy Machines...executive strategy	p. 119
30, Control Technology...executive strategy	p. 121
31, Holes in the Ground...operational art	p. 124
32, Land-use Planning...knowledge process	p. 126
33, Engineers & Built Environment...environment	p. 130
34, Urban or Rural...environment	p. 133
35, Comuna 13...historical vignette, a troubled borough in Medellin	p. 137
36, The Denver Broncos...environment	p. 147
37, School Lunches...operational art	p. 151
38, Cultural Study for What?...knowledge process	p. 153

- 39, Socioeconomic Causation...knowledge process p. 155
- 40, Popular Support...knowledge process p. 159
- 41, Dear Westy...historical vignette, a letter to Gen. Westmoreland p. 163
- 42, Brigands...environment p. 170
- 43, Sam Spade's Whereabouts...knowledge process p. 174
- 44, Political/Military/Administrative...executive strategy p. 177
- 45, Police or Military...executive strategy p. 180
- 46, Taxation and Debt...environment p. 186
- 47, Why the County...knowledge process p. 189
- 48, Grading the Social Compact...knowledge process p. 192
- 49, Territorial Scrutiny...knowledge process p. 195
- 50, U.S. Persons...environment p. 200
- 51, Get Willy...historical vignette, manhunt in part of Colombia p. 204
- 52, Sovereignty...knowledge process p. 210
- 53, Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis...knowledge process p. 215
- 54, Extortion...executive strategy p. 220
- 55, Kidnapping...environment p. 223
- 56, Militias and Gun Control...executive strategy p. 225
- 57, Dogs and Mules...executive strategy p. 231
- 58, Condottieri...executive strategy p. 233
- 59, Spontaneity...environment p. 235
- 60, War Nouveau...historical vignette, the world circa 1900 p. 239
- 61, The Geography of Dope...environment, illicit drugs p. 248
- 62, Bank Robbery...environment p. 255
- 63, Roadblocks and Checkpoints...operational art p. 258
- 64, Measuring Distance and Comparing Power ...knowledge process p. 262
- 65, Smuggling...environment p. 268
- 66, GIS...knowledge process p. 271
- 67, Points, Lines, Spaces...knowledge process p. 275
- 68, Scale...knowledge process p. 277
- 69, Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies...knowl. process p. 281
- 70, Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure... knowl. process p. 288
- 71, Jerusalem...historical vignette, the Zionists create a nation state p. 293
- 72, Land Strategy...executive strategy p. 300
- 73, Property and the Social Compact...ideology p. 306
- 74, Refugees and Displaced Persons...operational art p. 313
- 75, The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism...knowledge process p. 316
- 76, Gender...environment p. 319
- 77, Sex...environment p. 322
- 78, Identity... knowledge process p. 326
- 79, Suicide... moral azimuth p. 330
- 80, Why You Should Like Geography... knowledge process p. 333
- 81, What a Clergy Wants...environment p. 336
- 82, Conflict Thresholds...knowledge process p. 339
- 83, Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?...synthesis p. 343
- 84, Cultures of Violence...environment p. 345
- 85, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck...historical vignette p. 348
- 86, Shifting Covet-geographies...environment p. 354
- 87, Water Wars...operational art p. 356
- 88, Escape Geography...environment p. 359
- 89, The Dot Game and Go...operational art p. 362
- 90, Prisons & Prisoners...operational art p. 364
- 91, Forts and Walls...operational art p. 366

92, Graves Registration...environment p. 371

93, Diseases and Disasters...environment p. 375

94, Poop...environment p. 379

95, Childhood...moral azimuth p. 381

96, Combatant Status...executive strategy p. 384

97, Oviedo...historical vignette, start of Spanish Civil War p. 386

98, Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa...ideology p. 395

99, Postmodern and Post-structural...knowledge process p. 399

100, What the Foucault?...ideology p. 404

101, Magical Realism...knowledge process p. 408

102, Negotiations...executive strategy p. 412

103, Amnesty...executive strategy p. 415

104, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction...environment p. 419

105, Genocide Geography...knowledge process p. 422

106, Massacres...historical vignette, repugnancy p. 428

107, Guerre d'Algérie...historical vignette p. 434

108, Common Knowledge...knowledge process p. 443

109, Your Staff Work Sucks...knowledge process p. 446

110, Knowledge Gaps...knowledge process p. 450

111, Knowledge Cultures...knowledge process p. 454

112, DIME and PMECII...knowledge process p. 460

113, Unrestricted Chi Whiz...executive strategy p. 465

114, R.V. Jones...knowledge process p. 467

115, Academies...executive strategy p. 469

116, Songs of Chu...executive strategy p. 471

117, Strategic Communication...executive strategy p. 473

118, Democracy...ideology p. 475

119, Declaration of Counterinsurgency...moral compass p. 479

120, Misleading COIN Articles of Faith...knowledge process p. 481

121, Dignity and Honor...moral azimuth p. 484

122, Ulm and Austerlitz...historical vignette, Napoleon p. 487

123, Sea and Aerospace Power...executive strategy p. 491

124, Slavery and Underclass...moral azimuth p. 495

125, Human Rights...moral azimuth p. 498

126, Particularization of Power...environment p. 502

127, Between Liberty and Lawrence...historical vignette p. 504

128, Global Insurgency and Global Trespass...ideology p. 509

129, Nerd Globe...executive strategy p. 512

130, Globalization...environment p. 516

131, Is It an Insurgency?...knowledge process p. 521

132, Turducken and Hybrid...knowledge process p. 525

133, Snipers and Assassins...environment p. 529

134, Luigi Galleani...historical vignette, violent anarchy p. 531

135, Borders and Anarchism...executive strategy p. 534

136, Weapons...environment p. 537

137, Foreign Support and Perspective...executive strategy p. 541

138, Raids...executive strategy p. 545

139, Strategy of Aggregate Tactics...executive strategy p. 549

140, Risk Distance and the Pursuit...operational art p. 552

141, Thirty-six Strategems...executive strategy p. 555

142, Conflict Geography...knowledge process p. 557

143, Seven Strategy Strains...executive strategy p. 562

144, What the Pirate Said to Alexander...moral azimuth p. 564

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Montana circa 1878 p. 35

Sri Lanka circa 2006 p. 51

Bolivia, La Paz and El Alto p. 61

Guatemalan Highlands circa 1982 p. 92

Comuna 13, Medellín, Colombia circa 2002 p. 146

Hell with Limbo (Purgatory?) circa 1300 p. 188

Yöknapatawpha circa 1936 p. 191

South-central Colombia circa 2012 p. 209

World Map circa 1900 p. 247

Palestine circa 1920 p. 299

East Africa circa 1914-1918 p. 353

The Revolution of '34 in Asturias p. 394

Colombia, various locations p. 433

French Algeria circa 1954-1962 p. 442

Europe circa 1805 p. 490

Kansas-Missouri Border circa 1858 p. 508

GLOSSARY

60974 -- The serial number of Simo Häyhä's Mosin-Nagant sniper rifle.

Adui tayari -- Swahili meaning 'the enemy is ready', that is, battle may be imminent.

Amat victoria curam -- Latin meaning if you want to win, prepare. More literally perhaps, 'winning loves preparation.'

Amplius prodest locus saepe quam virtus -- Ground is often more important than valor.

ALN -- The Army of National Liberation, armed force of the FLN in Algeria.

ARVN -- Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Askari -- In much of East Africa, a soldier or policeman.

Anonymity -- condition in which some set of observers lacks sufficient knowledge to distinguish the relevant identity of persons or their whereabouts.

AUC -- United Self Defense Forces of Colombia -- Colombian guerrilla group (rightist) formed in the late 1990s, now defunct.

Autotroph -- An simple organism able to synthesize its own food from inorganic material. Early stage of nerdiness.

Autochthonous -- Home-grown, indigenous, aboriginal, native, local.

AYBABTU -- Abbreviation of "All Your Base Are Belong To Us," an internet meme derived from the assertion made by martyred Taliban leader Al-Adquiri-Feinman after Russian General Boris Gromov crossed the river from Forward Base Khairatan, Afghanistan in February, 1989; or it is from a Japanese video game called *Zero Wing*.

Built environment -- Man-made surroundings or phenomena. More than infrastructure and more than urban, built environment encompasses all features we could not agree were part of the 'natural' environment.

Cadastre -- A land or real estate record system, usually concerned with taxes.

Castrametation -- The creation and maintenance of survivable encampments.

CEDA -- *Confederación de Derechas Autónomas* (Confederation of the Autonomous Right). Right-of-center political party or movement in Spain around the time of the Spanish Civil War in the early 1930s.

CIDG -- Civilian Irregular Defense Group

CCTV -- Closed-Circuit Television (monitoring cameras).

DDR -- Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

ثورة جزائرية -- Arabic for French-Algerian War. Big insurgent win.

EGP -- Guerrilla Army of the Poor. Guatemalan armed insurgent group (leftist), active 1972 to 1997, now defunct.

Ejido -- A form of communal land tenancy, especially in Mexico.

ELDORADO 5-9970 -- Can you remember that?

ELN -- National Liberation Army -- Colombian guerilla group (leftist) organized in the mid 1960s and active today with perhaps 1,500 active members.

Enthrall -- To make a slave of; enslave; to put or hold under strong influence; captivate; enchant; fascinate.

Eyjafjallajökull -- Volcano in Iceland, which erupted in 2010 causing flight disruptions across Europe. In Icelandic the word means island mountain glacier. The volcano is covered by an ice cap. It has absolutely nothing to do with Puthukkudiyirippu, other than being on a large island.

FARC -- *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- Colombian guerrilla group (leftist) formed in the mid-1960s and active today with perhaps 8,000 active members.

Foucault -- Michel Foucault, a heavily-cited leftist French philosopher of the mid-20th century highly regarded by sociologists. As a verb: to try to bewilder or overawe by way of circular semantic flight, as in, "Major Thomas tried to *foucault* the commander by talking about *design*."

FLN -- National Liberation Front -- Algerian Insurgent Organization (leftist) active in the 1950s and 1960s, now a legal political party.

FMLN -- *Frente Farabundo Martí de (para la) Liberación Nacional*, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front -- El Salvadoran guerrilla consortium (leftist) active in the 1970s and 1980s, now a legal political party.

FMSO -- Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

GIS -- Geographic Information Systems or Geographic Information Science.

GPS -- Global Positioning System.

Guerrilla -- or guerilla, a type of warfare (perhaps a tactic or a strategy, and perhaps a phase within a war) in which at least one of the opponents

strikes blows, but does not attempt to hold and keep terrain. ‘Guerrilla’ supposes *hit-and-run*, as opposed to *hit-and-stay*.

IGPGEECTMT -- Introduction, Geography, People and Society, Government, Economy, Energy, Communications, Transportation, Military, Transnational Issues. These are the categories used in the CIA’s *The World Factbook*. It is *The World Factbook*’s way of spelling PMESII.

Imbricated -- overlapped in a pattern, like roof tiles or fish scales.

Immunity -- exemption from punishment or cost, probably as a matter of law.

Impunity -- protection from punishment for wrong-doing.

Incorporeal -- without material body or substance, but existing nevertheless.

In flagrante delictu -- Caught in flaming perpetration of an illegality or impropriety; caught ‘red-handed’; with hand ‘in the cookie jar’; outside a bank with the bag of stolen money; or with your car still in the garage.

INTERPOL -- International Criminal Police Organization.

IPB -- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

IO -- International organization such as the United Nations, International Postal Union, etc. These are not generally classed as NGOs, but they are not governments, per se.

IPKF -- Indian Peacekeeping Force.

LTTE-- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a defeated Sri Lankan insurgent group.

MACV -- The US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

MDMP -- Military Decision Making Process. At times these days countered by, compared to, or complemented with ‘design.’

M-19 -- 19th of April Movement -- Colombian guerrilla group (leftist) active in the 1970s and 1980s, became a legal political party, now defunct.

Mens Rea -- Latin for criminal intent, herein used as a reference to the intellectual authorship of iniquitous violent acts.



-- Mongolian Death Worms. From what little we know of these creatures, the specimen on the right is the female.

Moschi, also Moshi, near New Moschi -- a place, approximately [3°20′05.58″S 37°20′25.37″E](https://www.google.com/maps/place/3°20′05.58″S+37°20′25.37″E), in Tanzania, southeast of Mt. Kilimanjaro.

NGO -- Non-Governmental Organization.

ORPA -- Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms. Guatemalan armed insurgent group (leftist), active 1972 to 1997, now defunct.

Paisa -- Person from a region in Colombia that includes the Department of Antioquia as well as much of the central coffee-growing region.

PMESII -- Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure.

Post-structuralism -- Late 20th century/early 21st century suite of ideas honored by some writers as a distinguishable philosophy. See pp. 77 and 401.

PSOE -- *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Workers Socialist Party). The PSOE, led by Largo Caballero and others, the PSOE sparked the Spanish Civil War in 1934.

Quiet-title -- Quiet-title is a formal legal euphemism used for a legal process in civil court that decides definitively the ownership of land. The court ‘quiets’ the title. Of course, it is not the title that is being quieted.

Radix malorum est cupiditas -- Latin for: The root of evil is greed.

මහින්ද රාජපක්ෂ -- Sri Lankan for Rajapaksa, Percy Mahendra ‘Mahinda’. President of Sri Lanka since November 19, 2005.

Sanctuary -- a safehaven, perhaps from persecution, or, as used in most instances in this book, a place where one enjoys impunity.

Schutztruppe -- German colonial protective forces, especially in Germany’s African colonies prior to WWI.

Shi -- Strategic advantage

SLA -- Sri Lankan Army.

SLM/A -- Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SLMM -- Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.

Strategy -- The composite of a leader’s competitive decisions.

Tessellated -- tightly seamed in a pattern like the squares of a chessboard.

孟母三迁 -- Chinese title, *The Three Moves* or *Mother Meng’s Three Moves*, a Chinese parable about a mother who loved her son, Mencius.

UFMCS -- University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

URNG -- *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. Guatemalan armed insurgent umbrella group

(leftist), active from 1981 or early 1982. The URNG coordinated the EGP and the ORPA. The URNG is now a legal political party.

WWF -- World Wide Wrestling Federation (From 1963 to 1979, when it became the World Wrestling Federation, until 2002 when it became World Wrestling Entertainment, WWE.)

Iximché -- Archeological site in Guatemala at 14°44'8.88"N 90°59'46.32"W. Capital of the Kaqchikuel tribe from about 1470-1524.

ZANLA -- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. Rhodesian-Zimbabwean armed insurgent group (leftist), formed in 1965. Robert Mugabe, a leader of ZANLA, is now dictator of Zimbabwe.

A State fails that cannot monopolize the granting of impunity

Section 1, Impunity

In most, if not all, irregular wars, somebody organizes to defy a State, the State being or acting through a government. By defy I mean they don't pay their taxes, refuse to serve in the military, extort, bribe, murder, steal, trespass, bomb, rape, give away State secrets, give aid to an enemy of the State, or otherwise offend in the eyes of the relevant agents of the State. When safe in their defiance, we say the defiers enjoy *impunity*, which means they are somehow resistant to State punishment. The word carries a negative connotation distinct from its nicer cousin, *immunity*. Immunity is gained or conveyed for many reasons and purposes, usually within an established system of laws. When a person gets away with something they're not supposed to get away with, they enjoy impunity. When impunity is provided to the 'they' by a defiant leader (who might be a mobster, clergyman, union leader, insurgent, separatist, spymaster, or something else), a fundamental challenge to the State is put in motion. When the State responds (attempting to discipline the transgressors and stop the impunity), and the transgressors resist violently, we might have the beginning of an irregular war.

Maybe the transgressors want to adhere to some other State, or form a new one entirely. They may want to destroy the government, or become it. The State's goal in response will not be just to inhibit individuals from enjoying impunity, but to prevent another structure of human leadership from providing or conveying impunity. That defiant grant of impunity is the fundamental threat to the power of a State. Therefore...

A durable State controls the power to grant impunity.

Exemption or protection from punishment can be granted in advance. The protection from punishment granted to a country's artillerymen, for instance, probably existed before they pull a lanyard, probably before they were born. Countries in the international system generally claim a thing called *sovereign immunity*, considered a legitimate expression of State power. If a country can grant immunity for future acts of warfare that might be committed in other lands, we might say that country has strategic power to that extent. However, if some organization can grant premeditated impunity for illegal acts to be committed inside the territory of that same country, we might say that State is not completely healthy or fully sovereign. Although strategically powerful, it might be failing as a State, at least to the extent of the impunity.

Governments regularly abuse sovereign immunity. If a government agent were to perpetrate a corruption, or commit any act that most of us would consider immoral, excessive, or normally punishable, and yet is exempted or protected from punishment, we might agree that the operative word should be *impunity*, not immunity. Thus, how we label the protection from punishment may depend on whose side we're on. Still, an impunity-based definition of State success and failure need not imply judgment about whether or not a government or a defiant organization is good or bad, moral or immoral. Evidence may suggest that impunity is rampant in some territory. That evidence may include an excess of unsolved violent crimes, failed prosecutions, and prison escapes. Lack of transparency in government records also hints to a high level of government impunity; likewise the absence of free speech. The government in such a place may or may not be failing. The impunity we observe may have been granted by the government itself. While it may be an unattractive place, with an irresponsible, tyrannical government, even an evil immoral State, it is durable if nobody can effectively defy it. It is not going away soon if no other entity can successfully challenge its monopoly over the granting of impunity. Other indices of State failure -- based on normative standards such as the number of violent crimes, economic wellbeing, breadth of the political franchise and so on -- might influence State survival. Impunity is a good mental starting place for winning irregular war. It goes to the point.

Impunity has an associated geography. That geography includes the places where the offenses occur, where the offenders go to be safe, and the routes they take to get there. The most competitively valuable places may be the locations of leaders who are able to grant or convey impunity. If spaces exist inside a territory where perpetrators are protected from a constituted government, the government fails in those spaces to the extent of those offenses. In response, the State can take actions to make the offensive acts harder to achieve, to otherwise deter the perpetrators, to neutralize them, or simply to punish them. The most effective actions are probably those directed against those leaders able to grant the impunity.


To win your armed conflict, you will neutralize any capability to grant impunity other than by those institutions and mechanisms accredited or tolerated by you, your people, system, or society. You will secure the capacity to grant immunity to your agents from the punishments of others, even in advance of your agents' actions, knowing you have the power to absolve those you send out to express your dominating will. To progress in this matter, you will concentrate on the management of anonymity, provide it to your people and their informants, and take it away from your enemies. When your enemies are exposed, you will take their wealth, pursue them physically, shut off their routes of escape, close their sanctuaries, corner and maybe kill them.

Please see sections: 142, *Conflict Geography*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 16, *Presence*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 83 *Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?*; 54, *Extortion*; and 23, *Mens Rea*.



"The right of revolution is an inherent one. When people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable." [6]

Ulysses S. Grant
Memoirs (1885)



"Señor Bond, you got big *cojones*. You come here, to my place, without references, carrying a piece, throwing around a lot of money...but you should know something: nobody saw you come in, so nobody has to see you go out."

Franz Sanchez in the movie
License to Kill (1989)[7]



"And have thee'en ta'en, Kinmont Willy,
Withouten either dread or fear?
And forgotten that the bauld Buccleuch

Can back a steed, or shake a spear?"[8]

from the
Ballad of Kinmont Willie



Section 2, Anonymity

Anonymity is that obscure quality of going unnoticed or unidentified which helps an insurgent or outlaw act and move without being caught. Speed is good, too, but if there were a keyword or ‘nub’ to either the survival or demise of insurgency, separatist movement, rebellion, revolution, mafia and other related insults to the State, that word would be *anonymity*. With anonymity rides facility of movement, the possibility of surprise, security in escape, sanctuary, and the potential to enjoy illicit profits. Whether you are a starship trooper, Che Guevara, an embezzler, a whistleblower, or the police chief, calculated attention to the question of anonymity may be the difference between success and being shot to death in a Bolivian village. There are other variables, other dimensions, other preoccupations bearing on violent conflict; this book has a hundred and forty-three other sections. Failure to address anonymity, however, is a severely punished negligence.

Perhaps the most consequential operational difference between regular (conventional?) warfare and the more common violent competitions considered by this book is anonymity, and how the contenders care for it. Your objective will probably not be to eliminate anonymity, but rather to change the balance of anonymities in your favor. For a government, this may mean the development of ways by which individual members of the public at-large can anonymously inform about illegal activities -- like an anonymous hotline. For the outlaw it can mean creating an environment of certain retribution for such ‘ratting’.

For governments, public records are the traditional and proven tool for establishing a social environment in which anonymity is difficult to achieve and, consequently, for making anti-State behavior dangerous to attempt. Because an insurgent leader has to balance the secrecy of his whereabouts with a useful degree of public notoriety and political identity, he may be concerned more with geographic anonymity than with hiding his personal identity as an insurgent leader. Likewise, the same insurgent wants to hide the locations of his wealth while maintaining its liquidity. Hence, systems that tie specific physical locations to individual identities are especially relevant. These systems -- that relate physical geography to personal identity and wealth -- are called property systems.

Careful record-keeping helps make personal anonymity hard to maintain, allowing a State to control a population with less physical coercion. Peacefully controlling Big Brother’s excesses, on the other hand, can be partly accomplished by making those records publicly transparent. Transparent public records are the hallmark of a liberal State, making corruption and tyranny at least a little more difficult. Anonymity might be the most significant, even the defining environmental phenomenon in your irregular war -- or it might not be. Instead, the single defining operational characteristic might be legal constraint. Nevertheless, when respect for the ‘rule-of-law’ is an operational preoccupation, then actions that mark or manifest respect for the rule-of-law (like the serving of a warrant, or observance of *habeas corpus*) require control of anonymity. Anonymity and privacy are siblings, and, although transparency would seem their nemesis, transparency (of government files) can also serve to protect privacy. To push family a little further -- if anonymity and privacy are somehow brother-and-sister, then anonymity and impunity are at least first cousins.

Please see sections: 43, *Sam Spade’s Whereabouts*; 30, *Control Technology*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 35, *Comuna 13*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; and 16, *Presence*.



“I think somebody fell off the roof. He thought he’d sing to the Crime Commission. He won’t.”

Truck in the movie
On the Waterfront (1954)[\[9\]](#)



“From now on you’ll have no identifying marks of any kind. You’ll not stand out in any way. Your entire image is crafted to leave no lasting memory with anyone you encounter. You’re a rumor, recognizable only as *deja vu* and dismissed just as quickly. You don’t exist; you were never even born. Anonymity is your name. Silence your native tongue.”

Zed in the movie,
Men in Black (1997)[\[10\]](#)



Hastings is not called the 'Domesday Battle'

Section 3, The Domesday Book

Historically, few things spell Big Brother better for the English than Domesday. William the Conqueror won the battle of Hastings in 1066, but it was the census he ordered two decades later that subdued the English. That inventory, which included everything worth anything – land, cattle, gravestones, everything, was put in a big registry, which became known as the Domesday Book.

If you are working for the State, you can help defeat anti-State actors and settle matters if you do an inventory soon and well. In any case, without a good inventory, the chances of creating a peaceful society are slim to none. If you are a smart insurgent, you will not only want to confound the government's inventories, you will build your own.

If you are in charge, don't let whatever crew that considers itself the 'action people' wait for the 'knowledge people' to complete an inventory. Don't let any shiftlessness seep in under the guise of a debate about whether or not security comes before or after public administration, census-taking and cadastre-building. (A cadastre is a land registry.) If there is to be territorial control by anyone, it will be accomplished in the long run on the basis of knowledge about exactly what and who are located where within the territory. If your entity (government or other) wants or occupies space, count everything in it. If you're not sure you control territory 24/7, count everything anyway. And, of course, put it all in a georeferenced relational database because *where stuff is* is as significant as what it is. Everything belongs to someone and everyone has some kind of connection with someplace, something, or someone else. Try not being anywhere! If you think a person doesn't belong in a place, you will want to talk to him about it, or you might learn the nature of his strangeness the wrong way. In short, any debate about whether or not intelligence runs operations or operations runs intelligence is just that and no more – a debate. If you have time to ponder whether induction comes before deduction, work on that for a while. Otherwise, proceed with the inventory with all available strength. If there is nothing else to do, take inventory.

If it is at all possible, give everybody an ID card. Biometrics can't be allowed to mean just careful physical identification of perpetrators or of someone from whom we want to deny access. Biometrics has to be applied to everyone for Big Brother to work as well as it might.

Inventories are the essential Big Brother tool, maybe basically un-American, but they can be helpful for the preservation of a liberal social compact when constrained by individual liberties and transparency. A transparent, high-quality system of public records can be an aid for checking government corruption and controlling Big Brother itself. This book offers few items of advice more practical and achievable for countering an armed insurgency than the creation of complete inventories within any territories at issue. Nevertheless, it is equally true that peaceful, liberal social compacts depend on formalized public records of ownership. There exists a singularly significant overlap of what for some would appear to be two competing concepts: The public knowledge that underpins a peaceful society and the Big Brother intelligence that allows the State to repress resistance and opposition. The quality of records, and rules regarding accessibility to those records, are central factors for reaching culturally appropriate political balances. If you are not involved in this activity (determination of the types, qualities, and management of public records) or, worse, you are oblivious to it, you may have absented yourself from the most critical events associated with creating a durable, peaceful social compact.

The creation of viable public records is an expensive proposition. Your immediate organization will probably not find the number of disposable work hours it would take to do a sufficient inventory – much less create functioning public records. To be successful, you will want to involve as much of the population as possible in the creation of records. For this reason you will focus publicly on information members of the public will themselves own and which empowers their control over their own wellbeing as they perceive it. When the knowledge you seek is knowledge everyone needs and wants, the costs of data collection and input go down precipitously. In other words, if you design an inventory that is clearly advantageous to the flourishing of peoples' lives as they see it, the inventory will be much more realizable. Some obvious examples are inventories of water and water pollution sources, home titles and appraisals, and insect infestation or communicable disease data. Entertainment, tourism and recreational data, or broader market information, are others. The phone book with its 'yellow pages' is an example, and likewise social Internet sites.

One of the decisions that will most bear on the acceptability of a human geographic inventory regards scale. If the people involved believe information will be public at a controllable scale, they are far more likely to participate in the inventory. The *county* (not *country*) may or may not be the right scale of formal territory, but as a beginning assumption the county is a better territorial scale for understanding, planning, and prosecuting military, police, or economic development operations than is the country.

Taking the kind of inventory suggested in this section requires technical and social training. New tools are available that can make the work faster and more accurate than it was in 1066. Two of the best known are the GPS devices available from firms like Garmin and Trimble, or the ID-card making and biometrics suites that have come on the market in the last decade. The taking of human geographic data, however, must be contemplated and implemented in consonance with the systems of data maintenance and retrieval. Gathering human geographic data in a piecemeal or one-off manner in order to inform a local commander or leader may be immediately, tactically useful, but it might not change the balance of anonymities for any consequential length of time.

The business of creating a useful inventory is an easy thing to inspect. Any leader at any level, when questioning the condition of an insurgency, for instance, will do well to ask questions about territorial inventories – about precision, comprehensiveness, transparency, and availability. Look to see if you have a record of everyone in your territory and that any of your foot soldiers can quickly use it to cross-check the ID of anyone. If your territory has a weak records or ID-card system, that is not a good sign. Don't know where Mrs. Castro is buried? Not good. Can't quickly tell who is married to whom? Don't know the relative worth of a piece of real estate or who gets the rents from it? A cop can't quickly tell where a motorcycle was bought or where it should be parked at night? Can't say where all the licensed doctors live? These are all signs that you are at a disadvantage in terms of anonymity control.

Early in 2002, the Colombian government decided to complete a titling and property formalization project for hundreds of peasant families in an area known as Puerto Leguizamo that was partly under the control of the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). To proceed, the government functionaries had to present a letter of introduction from the office of President Andrés Pastrana to the local FARC commander. The FARC commander knew the value of having precise public records, especially when paid for by the government.

In a way, the construction of a regime of regulations that causes a population to inventory itself (thereby constraining anonymity) is the pinnacle of intelligence management. Creating a system in which the population exposes itself to scrupulous investigation by government is nothing new. In 1677, the English Parliament passed the Statute of Frauds. It wasn't conceived as a domestic spying mechanism, however. It was a moment of recognition that physical technologies, and persons who could put them to use, were available in sufficient quantity that they could be applied to thwart human dishonesty. From that point on, any important agreement in the realm (anything dealing with land was considered important) would have to be in writing if it were to be recognized and enforced by the State. Later, agreements would have to be signed, then witnessed, then notarized, then copied, photocopied, distributed and even put on the Internet. All of the requirements go to the same end – to make evidence more reliable and court decisions more effective. The simple rejection of oral evidence became a competitive advantage of Western civilization. The West systematically prepared the legal environment for peaceful conflict resolution. This one cultural inheritance has been

overlooked or taken for granted, but it is a key to peace. The requirement that the evidence of human agreements be precise, comprehensive and transparent is much of what makes life in your county peaceable. It is what keeps so many of today's practical geographers at work in the county courthouse or office of the city manager. There they maintain ownership maps, land-use plans and the like. If not for such records, their maintenance, and the courts and markets that apply them, we would live in a world of possession by force -- a continual physical struggle. Almost all of the records exist because of some regulation that says an owner of a boat has to get it tagged before he can put it in the lake, or an inspector has to certify that a house is termite-free before it can be sold. The records almost grow themselves.

If you are an insurgent leader or a crime boss, it is harder to protect your followers (for violent acts they perpetrate) in a land that has excellent records of who has what, and who is supposed to be where. In a well-inventoried land, you cannot assure the secrecy of your rebels' identities and the locations of their hideouts, cashes, and accounts. You cannot effectively grant them impunity.


Centralized control and manipulation of public records is dangerous to liberty. If you're an inveterate counterinsurgent, GIS everybody and everything. For a social compact that is both durable and liberal, and resists Big Brother metastasis, keep records local, maybe at the county-level, and do not allow public filing of much more than real estate rights, professional licenses, motor vehicles, and perhaps the locations of a few incendiary phenomena such as pedophilia. Control of anonymity may be necessary to maintain a monopoly over the granting of impunity. Security, justice, and freedom depend on and are tied to the control of impunity. If a government is allowed to monopolize access to public records, however, it can grant impunity to a privileged few. It becomes the brigand. We then have reason to revolt, and will want to grant protection to our rebel followers who defy the State.

Please see sections: 30, *Control Technology*; 47, *Why The County*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 92, *Graves Registration*; 78, *Identity*; 66, *GIS*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; and 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*.



“This is our land. A land of peace and of plenty. A land of harmony and hope. This is our land. Oceania. These are our people. The workers, the strivers, the builders. These are our people. The builders of our world, struggling, fighting, bleeding, dying. On the streets of our cities and on the far-flung battlefields. Fighting against the mutilation of our hopes and dreams.”

[Big Brother](#) in the movie
Nineteen Eighty-Four (1984)[[11](#)]



KGB officer: Do you want to see me?

Cuban Colonel: Yes... yes. Go to the sporting goods store. From the files obtain forms 4473. These will contain descriptions of weapons, and lists of private ownership.

from the movie
Red Dawn (1984)[[12](#)]



He will hurt you if you act gently

Section 4, Defining ‘Enemy’

There may be nothing morally inadequate about turning the other cheek and not responding to threats with violence, even if your own demise, honor, and family are at risk. Martyring yourself peacefully is one answer to violent affront, but this book is just not about that answer. It is about winning, dominating, and it supposes winning and dominating may entail violent effort, or at least a sincere willingness to use violence. The healthy path is to be careful in drafting a definition of enemy, and to be clearheaded regarding the values held at risk by the use of violence.

If you are assigned the task of stopping an enemy, have a working definition of ‘enemy’ on paper as well as in mind. Your definition should also be explicitly acceptable to your boss, if you have one. The Table of Organization & Equipment (TO&E) of tank battalions typically start out with a mission statement something like: ‘To close with and destroy the enemy by firepower, shock action and maneuver’. Such a statement could hardly be clearer, subject to agreement regarding who the enemy is. Make the definition of your enemy as increasingly specific as possible, in time, space and name. ‘The seven members of the secretariat of the FARC’ may be specific enough. Maybe ‘Álvaro Uribe Vélez’ would be specific enough if you are a FARC leader. ‘Terrorism’ or ‘communism’, ‘globalization’, or ‘neoliberalism’ (while useful shorthand for expressing solidarity, motivating adherents, or to create alliances) are too abstract to help solve the operational equation.

In irregular war, given over as it generally is to legal constraints, you will want to obtain, as best you can, something close to a complete warrant, that is, an objectively reviewed document that states specifically the persons whose liberties or life you aim to deprive, where they are to be found, and the nature of the threat they pose. It would also be nice to get a statement of the authority and jurisdiction of the person or persons signing the warrant. Such a legalistic standard is not just one of domestic rights or liberalism, it is a practicality. To the extent you can meet such a standard, it means you are more likely to enjoy actionable intelligence, to help implement the rule-of-law, and to have a greater chance of not wasting time and life.

Here is a suggested intermediate definition of *enemy*:

Enemy: A person or group the behavior of which cannot be changed by peaceful means before they do us grave harm.

It could be presented as, ‘What would you do if a strange man broke into your home and threatened your family? Would you shoot?’ Your answer is probably, ‘Oh hell yeah.’ It is a useable definition, but the imperative of immediate defense may be only occasional in the context of an on-going conflict. Such a definition could cause hesitancy in the use of force that could on occasion make effective deterrence more difficult or even dangerous. To enforce a definition of enemy that causes your shooters to wait until danger is imminent might impose a dangerous disadvantage on potential victims.

Beyond the context of timely defense against mortal danger, there is an essential link between *impunity* and *enemy*. If an organization can grant impunity in defiance of a State, it is the enemy of that State, even if no individual subject or citizen of the State faces an urgent mortal threat. A State may have to apply force in order to uphold simple elements of the social compact, such as the preservation of public lands, free passage on public byways, evictions of trespassers, and the like. Moreover, it may have to apply force to oppose illegal conscription and recruitment into an armed force that is not its own, or stop illegal taxation. These are threats to sovereignty itself, to the definition and existence of the State. This is not to suggest that preservation of States is an elemental good. The preservation of State power, especially of a centralized State, might be counterproductive to the maintenance of a peaceful, flourishing society. That question may become part of your decision process.

Intent to punish offenses already committed adds another layer to the question. Rather than the fear of harm, perhaps we deal with the vengeance of those who have suffered harm. The rule-of-law standards (and excellence in intelligence) remain almost unchanged in the context of retribution, however. The warrant is now for a perpetrator, and specifies offenses committed rather than just the threat posed, but it is otherwise similar.

The above discussion of *enemy* identifies with the defense and with the victim, preferring that we deem an enemy to exist before our armed response makes good sense. If he’s not going to do us much harm, why shoot him? But you may not be satisfied with a purely defensive definition. You may be uninterested in supporting the existing legal regime of a territory in question, but instead face opportunities for material gain and dominion, or to realize revolutionary goals that you can achieve by the use of force. You might just want to take things, or your enemy may be an entire structure of relationships, symbols, preferences, assumptions, fashions, and teachings that keep you and yours from enjoying life as you feel you should, or maybe they just offend your sensibilities. In any case, armed organized violence may be the only path you have to gain what you want while you are young enough to enjoy it. In that case, you will cite the impossibility of peacefully beating the system that denies or despises you, or that you despise.


This section preaches definitional specificity, to include specificity as to location and spatial extent (physical geography). For effective operational plans, your definition of ‘enemy’ (and the warrant that goes with it) should specify clear territorial boundaries (as on a map), including jurisdictions, sovereign borders, and sanctuaries. These relate in turn to the measurement of your enemy’s strength and the safe reach of your coercive force.

Please see sections: 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 52, *Sovereignty*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 109, *Your Staff Work Sucks*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; and 16, *Presence*.



“I believe that force, mitigated so far as it may be by good manners, is the *ultima ratio*, and between two groups of people who want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds, I see no remedy but force.”^[13]

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.



“We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”^[14]

President Lyndon Johnson (1964)



Section 5, Vocabulary of Classic Strategy

Several of the most influential writers on classic military strategy, including Jomini and Clausewitz, were participants in, direct observers of, or victims of Napoleon's campaigns in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Military strategy was already old as an academic discipline, and it was not until after the arrival of the revolutionary technologies of the 20th century (aircraft and radio in particular) that the basic formulae began to lose their grip on the imaginations of military theorists. About when our atmosphere became available as a plane of military action, the changes in cost-distances diverted strategic thinking, and less respect was accorded to the classic principles. In the 21st century, some strategy writers dismissed the ancient vocabulary and its attending concepts as irrelevant -- at least as to irregular wars. I think that dismissal was a mistake. Below is a list of words we associate with classic western military strategy (Frederick, Marlborough, Jomini, Clausewitz, etc.). The concepts can be applied advantageously to irregular conflict.

Mass

It is advantageous to marshal and concentrate force at propitious places and moments in time in order to gain at least localized and temporary superiority of force over the enemy. Mass, and the complementary notion that it is a general's vocation to determine where and when strength will be marshaled and manifest, are central to classic strategy, perhaps its heart.

Culminating Point

The culminating point is an imaginary point in time and space beyond which the continuation of a mission (usually in the form of an offensive, an attack, or a pursuit) is too risky. The culminating point is a favorite topic of discussion in military strategy and history circles. Although recent insurgency literature passes over this concept, it is nevertheless vital to the conduct and understanding of irregular armed conflict.

Pursuit

After the leader of force *A* decides for whatever reason that it is time to break or avoid contact with an enemy force *B* (maybe because he thinks *A* has been or is about to be beaten by *B*), force *B* may press the confrontation in order to prevent *A*'s escape. That's when the pursuit begins. Knowing when to withdraw (and having secured a path to do so) is part of the essence of good field generalship. Knowing whether to pursue is also important, and the decision to pursue is equally wrapped up in an understanding, maybe intuitive and maybe studied, of the culminating point.

Envelopment

In order to get around your enemy and to seal off his retreat, you might conduct an envelopment. If you are Field Marshal Zhukov and have 20,000 tanks at your disposal, you can envelop the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, and take 100,000 men prisoner (95% to die later in captivity). The word, according to big-maneuver people, is generally reserved for vast thrusts deep into enemy territory. A smaller-scale event might be called a 'pincer movement'. At a smaller scale still, you're a cop serving an arrest warrant on a dangerous felon, and you get a backup squad, so you send it around to the back door. All are essentially the same; you want to seal off his escape.

Economy of Force

Creation of mass often necessitates economy of force. You can't be everywhere with everything, so you will decide to hold things together as best as possible with a small force in one location so you will have an advantageous correlation of force in another.

Center of Gravity

This is possibly the most controversial of the classic strategy terms. Sometimes it is the place on the battlefield (or maybe a capability you or your enemy possesses) domination of which can dramatically change the probable outcome of a contest. It might be thought of as a checkmate square, or something your control of which so confounds your enemy that the result of the contest is foretold. It is a wobbly term used for all kinds of things, however. It can be confused with the 'main objective', 'biggest advantage', or a 'first priority'. Some strategists enjoy arguing whether or not there can be only one or many, or if a center of gravity has to exist at all.

Flank (verb)

You hit your opponent in his side, or get around his side in order to threaten his capability to safely withdraw or retreat, or because the enemy can't deliver or place as much firepower on you when you are located on his flank. It is not quite an envelopment, which you would like to effect from two or all sides, but it can be enough to win. If you're the one being flanked (or enveloped), you might have to *countermarch* (go back the way you came) in order to prevent having your supplies or your route of retreat cut off.

Lines of Communication

These are the paths established and followed to send and receive reinforcements, supplies, orders, information; or, and this is often the crux -- to withdraw or retreat. If supply lines to a force are cut, that force is often obliged to surrender or retreat, hence supply and withdrawal are related.

Commitment of the Reserve

History teaches us that it is a good idea to hold on to some sort of mobile reserve force in case things go badly somewhere, a hole needs to be plugged, or an attack repulsed; or, in case things go well somewhere, there is an opportunity to exploit success and break through, pursue, or seal off your enemy's retreat. In many historical, classical battles the contenders each had one reserve force, and there seems to have been one good time to use it. If you commit your reserve too soon, perhaps to check an enemy breakthrough, and then the enemy starts to succeed in another place, and still has his reserve, you might face an unpleasantness. Knowing when to commit the reserve has been a traditional measure of good generalship. It still applies in irregular war, but the formula of types and sizes is distinct. Commitment of the reserve is associated with the notion of mass, either to create it or respond to the enemy's focusing of mass. 'Commitment of the

reserve' also connotes a degree of timing or urgency.

Countermarch

You might have to go back the way you came. If you were taking the initiative and moving toward an objective (to attack or take something), but your enemy threatens to (or has) crossed behind you to cut off your lines of communication, you may have to turn around and countermarch. When you turn around all or part of your force (because you're about to be flanked or enveloped) to confront some force threatening your lines of supply or retreat, it is usually a bad situation.

Correlation of Force

This is the comparative relationship of strength at points of potential battle. Competent generals try to avoid battle when and where the enemy would enjoy an advantageous correlation of force. When they have had to risk battle with a superior force, they manage to secure their line of withdrawal, not letting the enemy flank, envelope or force a countermarch. Whether or not the general might decide to withdraw depends in part on his estimation of the correlation of force in potential battle. The notion of mass is closely associated in that massing is an attempt to produce at least a localized and momentary advantage in the correlation of force.

Objective

Objective, as used by classic strategists is a word both obvious and abstract. It means the goal, purpose, mission, end, achievement, etc. We often read that good strategy balances or reconciles the objective with the resources available for achieving the objective and the ways or methods for so-doing. Wise enough. In classic military strategy, however, the objective was often defined as the defeat or destruction of an enemy army, and attainment of that end almost always entailed seeking to occupy or control the right places on the ground. That process often caused the word *objective* to appear inside circles on maps. Sometimes the circle highlighted where the enemy or part of the enemy force was to be destroyed, sometimes it highlighted a location the control of which would confound the enemy as to his options. Sometimes it was a location needed to assure the development or maintenance of the force necessary to achieve one of the above.

The above-listed entries express 'principles', which, like canons or ancient wisdoms, often oppose one-another. 'Look before you leap' versus 'He who hesitates is forever lost'. In teaching these principles, or at least in the literature of classic strategy that remains, few succinct statements present the dynamics, the interrelationship of themes, or a guiding equation using the 'principles' as variables. That interplay of principles was taught mostly through the study and comparison of many historical examples. Section 6, *The Operational Equation* discusses a rare exception.

Around the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, an army might move two hundred miles to get within that mile and a half wherein it could bring its weapons to bear. Some of today's weapons can be brought to bear on an enemy from almost anywhere at any distance. This is part of the reason some people argue that the old operational art of position and movement is irrelevant to today's irregular wars. It is, however, exactly because weapons can be brought to bear from vast distances that people resort more to guerrilla war, care for their anonymity, dig holes, and invoke legal cover. Because of these measures, soldiers often still have to walk up to within personal distances in order to bring their weapons to bear, which means rules of position and movement still apply. The notion of correlation of force reminds us that the objective of classic military strategy was not to position and maneuver in order to come into contact with the enemy, but rather to come into contact where and when a strength advantage could be enjoyed (at least for long enough to hit and run).

The principles of classic strategy still apply. One of the most significant aspects of classic strategy, however, is not stated in the principles directly, but presumed by them. Strategy does not just happen; it is made. The creation of sufficient mass at the right time and place, for instance, is the conscious accomplishment of a leader. When the greats of the Napoleonic wars talked about the lessons of strategy, they associated strategic competence with some previous leader such as Frederick, Marlborough, or Gustavus Adolphus. Strategy was not spontaneous. The etymology of the word strategy, at its Greek root, tells us that it means generalship.

Please see sections: 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 120, *Misleading COIN Articles of Faith*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 122, *Ulm and Austerlitz*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; and 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*.



“Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them.”^[15]

Thucydides



“An inexorable process of attrition, caused by continual pursuit and hardship, wore out the commandos.”^[16]

Arthur Conan Doyle in
The Great Boer War



The nub of classic military strategy

Section 6, The Operational Equation

To introduce and illustrate the central concept of this section, I offer an assertion, written at the end of the non-flight age, summarizing a core dynamic of the classic principles. It helps explain how they apply to irregular war. In *Outlines of Military Geography* (1899), T. Miller Maguire, in order to arm his students with a working concept of military strategy, stated the following:

Once the reader understands that soldiering and fighting are far from synonymous -- that in a campaign combats are occasional while marching is constant -- that before entering into battle a general must be most careful to secure his line or lines of retreat; he understands the leading principles of strategy, whether he can define the phrase to his satisfaction or not. He sees that a general whose road homeward or to his base is threatened or cut by a superior force must, if he loses a decisive battle, be ruined as well as defeated; while a general who has secured his line of communication will not be ruined even if defeated, but can fall back, procure recruits, replenish his waggons, and begin to fight again with a fair prospect of success. [17]

Maguire's observation remains valid today, and for every type of armed conflict. It has two parts. The first is about movement. Before an action, someone is going to travel. Even the lone terrorist doesn't detonate the bomb in his own basement -- at least not intentionally. He moves it to some other place for detonation. If he is not a suicide bomber, he also wants to safely leave the site of the intended detonation.

The second part of Maguire's observation depends on the first, but is the more consequential point for understanding the military operational problem. The careful leader will make sure his line of withdrawal is secure in case he attacks or is met by a stronger force. About the only terminal mistake an insurgent leader can make is to get trapped. He can recover from everything else. When the leader of the Sendero Luminoso, or the Tupamaros, or the Tamil Tigers is caught or killed, it might not take all the wind out of the revolution, but it is a severe blow.

The equation isn't all about physical movement. It is about shaping physical reality in order to act prudently *and* to affect the perceptions and mindset of the opposing leader. Another expression from *Outlines of Military Geography*:


The object of the strategist in drawing up his plan is so to arrange his marches and his lines of operations that, on the one hand, if he wins the battle he will not only defeat the enemy on the field but place him in a situation of much perplexity as to his future action, his line of retreat, and his supplies; and, on the other hand, if the battle be lost, he will have secured for himself a safe line of retreat, and an opportunity of recuperating his strength. [18]

Again, there are two parts -- movement and secured options -- but this statement weaves them together more tightly, and emphasizes the psychological. Maguire reminds us that contacts don't just up and happen -- someone makes *decisions to be someplace*. He also notes that competent strategy implies the constant measurement of relative power, but with prudence to know that those measurements will often be wrong.

Maguire's statements make the line of retreat a central geographic concept for operational art. This does not diminish the importance of battle. Maguire was emphatic in his writings about the primacy of battle. Without armed action, an insurgent is just a lawyer or a politician. Without robbery, the thief goes broke. And as far as the State goes, if it does nothing to engage the armed insurgent physically, the latter will continue to attack and grow until he *is* the State. Battle was to Maguire the ultimate military preoccupation, but he noted that it did not have to occur in order for it to be effective. Potential battle, with its results and consequences as perceived in the minds of the contending leaders, could be enough.


Position and movement is hardly the only strategic approach. Section 143 *Seven Strategy Strains*, lists six others, including extortion, annihilation, and surrender. To my way of thinking, position and movement is the most ethical and culturally appropriate for Americans. Nevertheless, a multifaceted approach combining position and movement with extortion perhaps, or with negotiation, appears nearly universal if not necessary. Such mixed strategies are devised around timing, separated battlefields, the need to economize force, gain time, or to placate allies. They are also driven by uncertainty or deception. In irregular war, you will almost always mount a mixed strategy. Whatever mixture you might follow, if your efforts disrespect the classic military operational equation, they will be less likely to succeed. Maguire was emphatic about the importance of perception and the mindset of opposing leaders, but he also insisted that the best way to influence the mind in war is to create advantageous facts of power on the ground. There is little substitute for physically confounding your enemy.

Please see sections: 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; 60, *War Nouveau*; 139, *Strategy of Aggregate Tactics*; 102, *Negotiations*; 59, *Spontaneity*; 10, *Decisive Battle*; 63, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; and 139, *Strategy of Aggregate Tactics*.



“There are few generals who have run oftener, or more lustily than I have done. But I have taken care not to run too far....” [19]

Nathaniel Greene (1781)




“French troops in armoured vehicles advanced on Sunday towards a central Malian town abandoned by Islamist rebels after days of air strikes, moving cautiously for fear of guerrilla-style counterattacks by the al Qaeda-linked fighters.” [20]

Bate Felix (2013)



“To the maximum extent feasible and possible, the fight must be taken to the enemy. The enemy must be given cause for concern for his own home area and thus restricted in his capability to provide for the needs of his guerrilla movement in another area.” [21]

General Maxwell Taylor, 1961
(On the war in South Vietnam)



“The machine, which seems at first to protect us, subjects us that much more seriously to the great challenges of nature.”[\[22\]](#)
(My sorry translation)

Antoine de Saint Exupéry
Terre des Hommes (1939)



Section 7, Sanctuary

Sanctuary is where one goes to be safe, and more to the point, to get away, and still more to the point, to ‘get away with something’. It is the *where of impunity*, the geography of impunity. If you are trying to get away, sanctuary is the destination of escape from whomever is trying to make you comply, punish you, deter you, etc. It is the *where to* of your retreat or withdrawal. Sanctuaries can be drawn on a map.

I place sanctuaries into three categories, these being: clandestine, physical, and governance. The categories (types, phases, whatever) aren’t mutually exclusive; they can combine or meld into one another. As a concept, sanctuary can be delimited by time as well as space. You might enjoy a time of the day, week, or year during which it is safe to commit this or that nefarious act. If you are the leader of some irregular armed force, being in sanctuary means you can safely and deliberately plan and initiate. What you plan and initiate will probably include the destruction of some other leader’s sanctuary, probably someone working for a government.

Clandestine (or *furtive*) sanctuary. Safety is provided by anonymity, with perfect anonymity obviating the need to be in any particular place. As the pursued, you can move and act in the same geographic space as your pursuer because he doesn’t know to pursue precisely you. The thing is, as an insurgent or separatist, at some point you will have to assume a name and a public presence, or it will be hard to set much of a movement (insurgent, revolutionary, separatist...) in motion. To use ‘social media’ to its fullest, for instance, people will eventually need a clue as to who you are, even if it is just a pseudonym. The rival of the fugitive or anonymous agent can still (had better) map the rebel sanctuary. This may have to be done by exception, however. A government analyst, for instance, might draw those areas wherein he is confident that no subversive can enjoy such sanctuary-by-anonymity. The area drawn might be no bigger than the cone of silence around himself and Agent 99, but the purpose of the map is therein revealed -- to expose the geographic extent of operational insecurity and the need to better address the question of controlling anonymity.

A lot can be done in the shadows, but at some point in the proceedings there needs to be some naming, some identity, and that point can occur at about the time you as a rebel decide you want to attack something big, like a government army garrison, but you realize that explosives alone aren’t enough to do the trick. (Even the organized crime guy discovers at some point that he wants to enjoy the wealth he is gaining, and that it is hard for him to drive his Bentley without someone noticing he’s driving a Bentley.)

Physical (often *remote*) Sanctuary. If you need more than clandestine sanctuary, because for whatever reason you are noticeable or need to be noticed, then you must prepare or find a physical sanctuary. You don’t abandon secrecy; you attempt to keep your people anonymous and your safe havens clandestine to the extent possible. However, you recognize that you need something other than just clandestinity if you are going to begin hitting-and-running. You need to run *to a specific, safe place*, and that means putting distance between yourself and your pursuers. Maybe you can maintain enough anonymity and secrecy of destination such that you or your subordinates don’t have to travel too far to get away. As you become more exposed, however, you will likely look to go someplace more remote, remoteness being the product of distance. Purely clandestine sanctuary does not depend on physical distance, but remote sanctuary does. The distances that count are those between the points from which your pursuers embark to their *culminating points* (the points in time and space beyond which they feel it is too costly for them to continue to pursue you). That is their *risk distance*. If you are the fugitive, you can artificially shorten the government forces’ risk distances, that is, how far they can or are willing to come. You might do this with weapons, deceptions and so on, but most of the distance you need in order to escape will relate to basic geographic phenomena. Difficult terrain often gives an advantage to the pursued. A border, especially an international border, can do the same.

Governance (often *legal*) Sanctuary. If you, as an opponent of a government, no longer have to settle for hit-and-run actions, but in some space can hit-and-hold, then within your new space you can openly identify yourself and get away with doing some existential stuff like taxing and executing people. You enjoy the perquisites of governance. You’re in charge within some territory and are now the one working to keep other entities (including agents of that government you just defeated in battle) from defying your authority in your newly gained space. You can now bestow upon your friends some of the impunity (protection from punishment) that comes from governing. You may still have to put distance between yourself and pursuers from the still pesky government. You’ll still keep secrets, but with this kind of sanctuary you might not have to constantly retreat to the most remote places. As far as you are concerned, the old government you are defying also grants impunity to its agents, and the geography of that government’s impunity is the geographic extent that their now (hopefully) retreating army can defend. You press on, hitting-and-running where necessary and hitting-and-holding where possible, until you close all of the old government’s government sanctuary. You force your enemy to submit, go to remote places, into anonymity, or to the gallows.

The sanctuary trinity asserted above is conformable to the common notion that insurgencies proceed in distinct phases -- phases that can be studied and planned as such. Some trace the idea of three-phase insurgency back to Mao, who used political, guerrilla warfare, and positional (or regular or conventional).^[23] The influential 1970s *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* claims that there are four phases: Pre-insurgency, Organizational, Guerrilla Warfare, and Mobile Conventional.^[24] I drop “Pre-insurgency” since that implies *before* insurgency (rebellious thoughts, still in the mind and before action), and keep three (organizational, guerrilla, conventional), which match many other pronouncements on the subject. I can see perhaps throwing in a fourth phase between organizational and guerrilla, which would be a ‘criminal’ or ‘terror’ phase, but for our purposes here, we’ll stick with three. The phases, like the types of sanctuary, overlap. The matrix below offers how the two (phases of insurgency and types of sanctuary) might mash up.

In their beginnings, insurgents especially depend on anonymity. They roam within the social space, their status as insurgents protected by discretion. Insurgents must eventually expose themselves in order to have public identity, and so with any luck they proceed into the guerrilla phase. In the guerrilla warfare phase, the insurgents have enough strength to target units of the government public force or other pieces of government infrastructure or identity, often beginning in remote areas. They do not have enough strength to take and keep terrain, however, so they must retreat after contact. They don’t just retreat into the ether. As long as they still enjoy enough clandestinity (can keep secret their personal identities and the locations of their physical sanctuaries), some rebel warriors might get to sleep at home with their parents or in-laws. As they lose clandestinity, they must retire to remote places, which, by the way, is tedious. Once the guerrillas gain enough strength, perhaps by convincing more and more people to support them with food, money, fighters, and closedness of mouth, maybe they can hit-and-hold rather than hit-and-run. At that point they enter into the conventional phase.

SANCTUARY►	Clandestine	Remote	Government
▼PHASE			

Organizational	Maintain impunity and initiative through anonymity	Begin to prepare refuges and routes for future stages	Place supporters within the existing government
Guerrilla	Protect secret sanctuaries. Maintain personal anonymity of as many supporters as possible.	Keep safe havens beyond where the government is willing to go. Assure a rule of silence in communities enroute to sanctuaries	Continue to hit-and-run in some areas still controlled by the government, even as territory won is consolidated.
	'Anonymity' becomes 'operational security'.	Attack and occupy isolated government bases and capitals. Stay only as long as govt resolve allows.	Govern area-by-area; turn impunity into immunity, wear a sash, talk up peace, tax like crazy and collect all the guns.
Conventional			

You may have cause to wonder how to usefully, operationally define military objectives. If you are working for a government, your descriptions of overall goals might invoke abstract positives like *stability, sustainable peace, legitimacy, cooperation, or initiative*. If you're on the other side of things you might use *vindication, revolution, liberation, or social justice*. Both sides might use *righteousness*. This use of positive abstractions is standard practice. They fill the lyrics of an apparently necessary music, but a 'narrative' is hard to point to on a map. At some point, whatever side you are on, you might face the worldly necessity of telling people where physically they are to go. Erring in that operational test (perhaps because you flounder at finding and fixing your foe), you might resort to the use of more abstractions -- this time not abstract goals, but abstract excuses. You might sprinkle your briefings with *complexity, net-centricity, fog of war, uncertainty, ambiguity, or volatility*, all of which might be perfectly applicable, but none of which hold an edge or gain traction. Consider focusing instead on the three types of sanctuary.

Plan to reduce your opponent's impunity by shrinking the geographic space wherein he enjoys it. The geography of his impunity is his sanctuary. Some sanctuaries belonging to an anti-government guerrilla will be in remote places, which can be depicted on a map. Given the means, you can bomb the snot out of a remote guerrilla encampment, walk in, jackboot the guerrilla leader's face, and grab his rosters. Meanwhile, to close clandestine (furtive) sanctuaries (to expose hidden identities and safe havens) the common tool is some sort of Big Brother aparat. At first, you might only be able to draw on the map those places where you know your enemy does *not* enjoy impunity, but at least the map expresses the extent of your difficulty and gives you a baseline for the valid measurement of progress.

Governance sanctuary is a stickier challenge. There might be two sets of governance sanctuary -- one being the areas where a guerrilla has succeeded in holding territory, which is similar, as far as you are concerned, to physical sanctuary (except that it may contain whole communities inside of which your enemy is creating all forms of sanctuary). The other kind of governance sanctuary may be the product of laws, corruptions or errors of your own, or of an allied or host government. That sanctuary still has a physical geography. Closing it usually starts with demands for more transparency and inspection.


Another phenomenon to keep in mind regarding sanctuary is the relationship of sanctuary to amounts of coercive strength. A basic rule of thumb regarding power and influence is that as distance increases, power or influence decreases. Section 64 directly addresses the rule. Here suffice it to note that the measurement of distance requires a *to* and a *from*, and that a sanctuary is generally one or the other. The effective strength that any organization can wield (at a specific place and time) will have an inverse relationship to the distance between an organization's base and the place that the power is to be or has to be applied.

On whatever side of a ledger of competitors you find yourself, places on a map where your enemy enjoys impunity can be marked as your military objectives. Sanctuary is the geography of impunity -- where you or your enemy enjoys impunity. The other guy's sanctuaries are the places you need to affect. Perhaps that means you go there with force to confound your enemy, to neutralize or destroy him, or to set the conditions for so doing. Routes to and from sanctuary are almost as valuable as the sanctuary itself. Destroying, blocking or even taxing routes changes distances and therewith effective power and influence. Ultimately, if one cannot get back to one's sanctuary, one is at best in limbo and, more probably, one is about to lose.

Please see sections: 16, *Presence*; 59, *Spontaneity*; 35, *Comuna* 13; 78, *Identity*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 69, *Measuring Actions against Enemies*; 138, *Raids*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*.



"These aren't the Droids you're looking for." [25]
standard Jedi mind trick




Computer: Do you identify the word sanctuary?

Logan 5: Negative.


Computer: Sanctuary is a pre-catastrophe code word. Used for a place of immunity.

from the movie
Logan's Run (1976) [26]



"The first rule of fight club is don't talk about fight club." [27]
Tyler Durden in the movie

Fight Club (1999)



“Always let someone know where you’re going.”[\[28\]](#)

Marc Brown and Stephen Krensky

Dinosaurs Beware!



The central geographic concept in armed strategy

Section 8, Linearity of Irregular Warfare

Sometimes insurgencies or other forms of irregular warfare are described as nonlinear. The idea of nonlinearity is part of the misleading common wisdom about irregular war. Armed struggles of all kinds, including insurgencies, are linear, and often extremely so. To become a believer, just accept for a moment that the important lines in classic military theory are not what military planners sometimes call the ‘front’, ‘battle line’, ‘forward edge of the battle area’, or something similar to denote the face-to-face phenomena that opposing forces tend to experience in battle. The relevant lines are lines of communication, especially supply lines and lines of withdrawal, and most especially any lines of withdrawal that a weaker force would be obliged to take from places of action to its sanctuaries.

If you are a single criminal suspect about to be served a warrant and apprehended in your home, the line that counts (if you intend to remain fugitive) is the line out the back door (or that secret tunnel). You intuitively understand the classic strategy – the heart of the operational equation. For your enemy to win decisively against you, he must cut off your retreat. You figure that if he has an extra cop or two at his disposal, he’s likely to send them around to the back, so you may want to get out before that happens. Or you can be like Che, who probably thought he was waging nonlinear war. The problem German General von Paulus had when facing the Russians at Stalingrad is at its root the same as that facing the single felon about to be served an arrest warrant: Once escape is no longer an option, the future can get bleak.

Just because you are having a hard time finding your enemy’s lines of communication doesn’t mean the lines aren’t there. You better find his and secure yours. Usually, if you hear a government briefer use the term ‘nonlinear warfare’, you can confidently translate it as, ‘We can’t find the insurgent lines of communication’. When an insurgent uses the term, he is saying to himself, ‘Whew, they haven’t found our lines of communication’, while to outside audiences he finesses, ‘Don’t bother looking for our lines of communication. This thing is nonlinear’.

Q. If you agree roadblocks are salient phenomena in irregular war, how can you suppose irregular war to be nonlinear?

A. Exactly.

Leave ‘nonlinear’ out of your irregular warfare lexicon or you might leave your enemy free to use his lines of communication while he attacks yours. This does not mean you are constrained to move sequentially or make geometric moves to your points of action.

In order to win (decisively, definitively, conclusively, to be sovereign, to have a successful State) you want to assert a monopoly over the granting of impunity in your territory. You especially have to stop any armed competitor who figures to grant impunity in the same places as you. To discipline your impunity-granting adversary, your best bet is to go capture or kill him. To that end, the line of retreat is the central geographic concept. That does not mean retreat is the most important event in armed conflict. Battle is the most important event in armed conflict, but the line of retreat is the most important geographic concept.

Whether we are thinking of a single criminal, an insurgent column, a group of thugs, the Sixth German Army, a Costa Rican patrol boat, Darius’ hordes, or you, attention to the lines of retreat to sanctuary is a key to winning. The line of retreat runs from a point of violent action to calm safety. If you’re in opposition to government, the action may be one of your own initiative, at places you choose for a kidnapping, bank robbery, mortaring of a police station or a government convoy, making a drugs-for-money exchange, or where you plant an annoying bomb. The point of action may also be a place where a government force catches you on your way to one of your intended points of action. In either case, if you are about to engage with an enemy force of greater immediate strength than your own, you better have a secure route of escape. If you do not, you could be decisively hurt. If your force is much stronger than your enemy’s, then he’s the one with the retreat problem. Since it is often difficult to estimate likely comparative strengths, and the costs for guessing wrong are so steep, a prudent commander assures the security of his route of escape in all cases except those in which the superiority of his force is exceedingly obvious. Of course there are daring and brilliant commanders who sense correctly when to defy prudence.

If you think you’ve made it to sanctuary, but your enemy presses his pursuit and you find yourself under siege, you might not be in sanctuary, and, at best, you are still located along your route to sanctuary; and if that route remains unsecure, your participation may be about to end.

It is discomfiting spiritually for the warrior to think of the line of retreat as the central geographic concept of operational strategy. If that’s you, just try to make your lines of retreat those of orderly withdrawal and your enemies’ lines of retreat those of routed panic and capture.

What is the psychology of a man on the run? Fugitives without sanctuary do not take the initiative. They concern themselves with finding sanctuary. They are on the defensive mentally as well as physically. It is tough to be both reeling and planning offensive moves. If a guerrilla cannot attack, he is stripped of identity. If your enemy is safe in sanctuary, what does he have to do with his time? Plot, of course. His mind is able to initiate; he is on the offensive. A secure line of retreat is often, for the able strategist, geography for regaining the initiative.

Please see sections: 123, *Sea and Aerospace Power*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; 67, *Points, Lines, Spaces*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; 65, *Smuggling*; and 16, *Presence*.



“Retreat is a concept which fully enters into that of the attack. I retreat over 100 to 200 kilometers so as to go over to the attack on a certain line at a certain moment decided by myself...Retreat is one of the movements in the general course of offensive operations. Retreat is not flight.”^[29]

Mikhail Frunze, 1922



“They went ashore to have a nap,
But local tribes had set a trap,
And Drake, exhausted by the fight,
Decided it was time for flight.”^[30]

Sir Francis Drake His Daring Deeds



Retreat without strategy

Section 9, White Bird

I distilled this section from four sources: Jerome Greene's *Nez Perce Summer 1877*, Elliot West's *The Last Indian War*, Helen Addison Howard's *Saga of Chief Joseph*, and Bruce Hampton's *Children of Grace*. Although an American vignette and long ago, it is illustrative.

Near Slate Creek, on the Salmon River in Idaho Territory, on 14 June, 1877, three young Nez Percé warriors went on a killing spree in revenge for unpunished crimes, including murder and rape, by white settlers against Nez Percé families and the tribe. Chief Joseph had recently decided to capitulate to the federal government's demand that his band of the Nez Percé move to the Nez Percé reservation where the bulk of the tribe had already resettled. Joseph had his people busy marshalling at Tolo Lake for the trek to the reservation. In line with the Nez Percés' form of shared governance, Chief Joseph did not exercise unchallenged authority. Other, more militant and recalcitrant chiefs spurred the three young braves to change facts on the ground. Chief Joseph's efforts to keep his band out of an unwinnable war soon became futile, obliging Joseph to lead about 100 warriors and 500 women, children and elderly toward possible sanctuary across the US-Canadian border. That October 5, after an 1,100 mile retreat and more than a dozen battles, Chief Joseph surrendered at Bear's Paw, Montana Territory, about forty miles short of the international border.

Joseph incorrectly measured the strength of a treaty agreement he thought he had with the Crow, who ultimately sided with the US Army. He also did not gauge the resolve of Brigadier General Oliver Howard, Commander of the Military Department of the Columbia, to pursue him; and he did not correctly measure the impact of modern communications, which enabled the US Army to timely deploy columns to intercept his route from distant garrisons. Joseph hoped, in vain, that the Lakota Sioux would come to his aid, but they would not endanger themselves for the sake of the Nez Percés. During the long retreat, combat decisions of the Nez Percé warrior chiefs were brilliant and the actions of the warriors exemplary in competence, valor and discipline. Chief Joseph's operational and international strategies, however, were founded almost entirely on hope. He was moving away from the sanctuary of the greater tribe, not toward it. He was moving instead toward a sanctuary that did not exist.

Responding as best he could to what many regard today (as then) as a righteous indignation of his people, Chief Joseph acted on the presiding emotion and not the imposing geography. This is not to say Chief Joseph was foolish. He figured, probably correctly, that the invisible line between the United States and Canada could protect his people as it did the Lakota Sioux. Given Joseph's acceptance of federal demands (before the June killings) that he remove his people to the reservation, he apparently understood how poor the band's chances of escape were. Still, Joseph did what was expected of him to uphold the band's three avengers and their warlike chief, White Bird. Under the justice of the United States, they surely would have been found guilty of murder. Joseph had to know that the coming retreat and the battles which now underwrite his military renown were, if not hopeless, more likely to be paid in honorable memory than in land.

Of perhaps 800 of the non-treaty Nez Percés (some had joined the march after the events along the Salmon River), probably 350 died. Almost all of the warriors and their chiefs had committed themselves to what they determined to be an honorable fate in the service of those they stewarded. By the time they arrived at Bear's Paw there was less need to protect the young hotheads who had precipitated the war. Two had died fighting. Their fate, at least, would not be as convicts, but as warriors. A third escaped to refuge in Canada, and later returned to the Nez Percé reservation where he lived in anonymity in order to avoid prosecution.

It seems no amount of valor could survive this ill-conceived retreat, but that's not entirely true. Chief White Bird was one of the war chiefs and one of the older men who had roused the young warriors to fatal action back at the Salmon by challenging their manhood and courage. Unlike Chief Joseph, White Bird intended to fight from the outset; his was the *mens rea* mind. He is also probably due more credit than Joseph (along with other war chiefs including Joseph's younger brother Ollokot) for the band's military successes during the retreat. White Bird and more than two hundred others, a quarter of the band, escaped during the battle at Bear's Paw or shortly after the surrender. Most of those made it to sanctuary in Canada among the Sioux, and some, including Ollokot, eventually returned to the treaty reservation in Idaho. White Bird didn't like the Sioux all that much, but was murdered in 1882 by a fellow Nez Percé tribesman. White Bird had counseled honor killings and was victim of one. He was never prosecuted or even captured. He is not, however, remembered or revered as is Chief Joseph.

The Nez Percé band led by Chief Joseph Hin-mut-too-yah-lat-kekht (Thunder-rolling-in-the-mountains) played a poor hand expertly, but it was not enough. Chief Joseph had reluctantly gone to war and lost. Masterful tactics and a logical operation could not redeem a forfeit strategy. Most of his band not killed was captured and made to live in the Oklahoma Indian Territory. Chief Joseph was never allowed to return to the Nez Percé homeland to live, and was not buried near his father.

What can we learn from the Nez Percé war?

- *The Nez Percé did not have foreign support
- *Joseph did not measure his enemy's strength well
- *Impassioned young men sparked the violence
- *Most of the war was movement
- *Tactical supremacy could not overcome strategic error
- *Scale counts. Eight hundred was not a big number
- *Being trapped en-route to sanctuary meant decisive defeat
- *One cannot retreat to a sanctuary that does not exist
- *Technological advantage is advantage

Other relevant lessons are available from a thorough read of the history. For instance, all the four sources note that agents of the United States told the Nez Percés a series of lies, as was almost habitual in dealing with Indian nations. They were treated as foreign nations; strategy and stratagem were considered intimately related. The Indian nations were not quickly or fully welcomed into the social compact. A land privatization program was part of the approach to dealing with the majority of the Nez Percés who accepted the treaties. The events were broadly publicized; commanders acted in the light of national and worldwide journalistic attention.

The treatment of the non-treaty Nez Percés after Bear's Paw was almost as controversial a history as events of the retreat itself. Military decision-making was influenced by the US Cavalry's dramatic loss to the Lakota Sioux at the Little Big Horn only one year earlier. Surprisingly, it is difficult to argue that there was a lack of cross cultural knowledge or understanding. The two sides seemed to understand each other extremely well. The Nez Percés were expert militarily before the famous retreat. They had long enjoyed a reputation as dominantly competent warriors; and it was a reputation they did not get fighting against the United States government. They got their reputation as warriors by defeating other tribes


and controlling territory. This characteristic may well have entered into the balance of equities when it came time for the Crow or the Lakota to decide whether or not to support them against the Bluecoats.

Please see sections: 72, *Land Strategy*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 78, *Identity*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 88, *Escape Geography*; 67, *Points, Line, Spaces*; and 103, *Amnesty*.



“The Battle of Adowa, fought on March 1, 1896, between Menelek’s huge army of semi-barbarian warriors and Baratieri’s Italian regulars and native levies under European officers, was an epoch-making event. It was the first great victory won by a non-European race over the white man which had lasting and decisive results.”^[31]

A. Hiliard Atteridge,
Famous Modern Battles (1913)



Lone Watie: Actually, I was looking to gain an edge. I thought you might be someone who would sneak up behind me with a gun.


Josey Wales: Where'd you ever get an idea like that? Besides, it ain't supposed to be easy to sneak up behind an Indian

Lone Watie: I'm an Indian, all right; but here in the nation they call us the "civilized tribe". They call us "civilized" because we're easy to sneak up on. White men have been sneaking up on us for years.

from the movie
The Outlaw Josey Wales (1979)^[32]



— Montana circa 1878 —



The solid line is the Nez Percé’s approximate line of retreat. The dotted line is the approximate path of the US Cavalry pursuit. The retreat was tactically brilliant, but the pursuit, if at times less so, was operationally brilliant and ultimately overpowering. Among the US Cavalry advantages we can include the heliograph, to which the Nez Percé had no solution, along with the disperse deployment of well-mounted units, which the Nez Percé warriors could outrun, but their assemblage could not.

All armed struggles are decided by battle

Section 10, Decisive Battle

After you win a decisive battle, you can move safely to sanctuary and your enemy cannot. Armed contests revolve around battle. The assertion is as valid in irregular warfare as it is in classic maneuver and positional war, and maybe more so. A prudent guerrilla leader, for instance, seeks combat without committing to a fight with a superior force unless his route of escape is secured and a pursuit by his enemy unlikely to succeed. A battle in an irregular war is 'decisively' lost and won either when one force overwhelmingly destroys the other in the engagement *or when the engagement is followed by a failed retreat*. The winner can retire to sanctuary and the loser cannot.

Armed groups don't arm themselves just to be armed. Folks who do that are called gun collectors. The guns are for battles. Organized criminals, however, generally don't seek battle with the government. Meanwhile, most insurgents consider battle as imperative to their existence and identity. The 'decisive battles' an insurgent wants to avoid are the ones which are decisive in favor of the government, in which cases 'decisive' has a crystal clear definition – an insurgent unit's withdrawal to sanctuary (after realizing itself overmatched in contact with a government force) fails such that the insurgents are killed or captured. An insurgency without sanctuaries cannot survive long, and so the fact of decisive battle leads to the logical observation that an insurgent movement must develop sanctuaries and escape routes to them, at least for the leadership, before it attempts battle. Of course, some of the battles may be so small, or the investigative abilities of the government so insignificant, that some display of force is possible without too much care spent on sanctuary. Che never did grasp the imperatives of operational art. He thought that simply plodding around making friends in the Bolivian highlands would provide sanctuary enough. It did not.

The possibility of positively decisive battle is the centerpiece of the counterinsurgent's advantage. Routing the insurgent in a contact and sending him running high-tailed into the mist rarely constitutes decisive victory for the counterinsurgent, exhilarating as it may seem at the time. Such contacts may in fact be the immediate face of another decisive victory for the guerrilla. The government only succeeds decisively by way of successful pursuit. Of course counterinsurgent commanders will want to say they just won another battle, even when they did not even chance a dangerous pursuit. Maybe they won decisively if the cost to the insurgent enemy during a battle was terminally high. More probably the government actually loses any time it does not win the pursuit. The cop who doesn't serve the warrant or make the arrest doesn't go home feeling like a winner, even if he feels pretty good about still being alive.

Instead of one huge decisive battle or five, counterinsurgent strategy may have to accept the proposition of many potentially decisive battles. In an insurgent war there may never be a Battle of Midway, but then again, there might. Conversely, some military historians, like Russell Wiegley, opine that few battles in any kind of war are decisive in the long run.^[33]

All the above is not to deny there may be exceptions and viable strategic options. If a guerrilla takes too many casualties during his harassments, ambushes and sabotages, he may weaken over time. It seems, however, that time is increasingly on the guerrilla's side as time goes on, and that he can paint his initiatives as victories regardless of statistics suggesting otherwise. Indeed, every little attack that is not answered with an effective pursuit by the government may be a decisive victory for a guerrilla. Even for the guerrilla, victory after victory in battle might mean nothing if no effort were made to exploit them. The potential decisiveness of any series of successful actions can still be forfeited by subsequent inaction.

Regardless of the technological scope or geographic scale of a potential battle, the counterinsurgent should not presume even a clear advantage in power to be sufficient *unless his concept of 'battle' includes the pursuit*. In other words, the counterinsurgent must calculate and field an advantage in correlations of force at the points of engagement such that his units can mount and succeed in the pursuit of the insurgent enemy after contacts. Then the battles may be won decisively for the counterinsurgent. Conversely, the insurgent needn't be daunted by imposing combat advantages of government forces so long as he can disengage quickly and make a safe escape.

Sometimes you may hear an expression like, 'They lost a lot of battles but won the war' or, conversely, 'They never lost a battle, but didn't win the war'. We are better off not to assert that battles are won or lost without simultaneously considering the success of the retreats and pursuits. For the insurgent, a damaging attack against the State which doesn't end in the destruction of the guerrilla unit may be favorably decisive. Besides, most insurgents don't plan to always be guerrillas. Mao, for instance. English-language counterinsurgency literature all but forgets that the Huai Hai battles were the destination of Mao's guerrilla efforts. One professor, Dr. Gary Bjorge at Ft. Leavenworth, noticed the significance of these battles, so with his permission and guidance I paraphrase shamelessly from his *Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign*.

One of the largest and most consequential wars of the 20th Century was the Chinese civil war of 1946-1949 between the Nationalist government of China led by President Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Chairman Mao Zedong. Military forces numbering in the millions fought across the vast space of China in a struggle that ended with the Nationalist government taking refuge on the island province of Taiwan, and the Communists establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. The Huai Hai Campaign was the largest and most decisive series of battles of the war. It began on November 6, 1948 and ended on January 10, 1949. Initially conceived by Communist generals to push Nationalist forces away from the Long-Hai railroad and link together the Communist-controlled areas in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces, the goal eventually became the final confounding of Nationalist military options.

Over a period of several weeks, whole armies maneuvered on a grand scale. Maybe this wasn't the largest or most costly campaign in history, but to display the contenders' operational plans requires maps covering thousands of square miles. Five Kuomintang Nationalist armies totaling over a half million men were ultimately surrounded and confronted by the calamity of having failed the basic lesson of classic strategy. The Communists were now the stronger opponent and had compromised the Nationalist's options for escape. Communist columns pressed inexorably toward the headquarters of the Nationalist military commands. Nationalist commanders took breakout decisions too late, and the attempts were complete failures. A few officers and soldiers did make it through the surrounding net and eventually found their way to Nationalist lines in the South. However, for practical purposes, the entire Nationalist force was either killed or captured, and only a few scattered Nationalist units could still offer resistance. As a result of the loss, the United States stopped assisting the Nationalist Kuomintang government. Soon it fell to the Communists.

A Huai Hai campaign isn't the destination of all armed struggles. There is only one China, and 1949 isn't coming back. Still, guerrilla struggles often tend toward conventional battles, and insurgent leaders toward conventional military goals. There exists a developmental tendency in insurgent wars – from latency, to guerrilla warfare, to position and maneuver warfare. The formula that they develop in three distinct phases may be overdrawn, however. It is better not to distance 'guerrilla' from 'position and maneuver', as if they were distinct types of warfare. Rather, *guerrilla* is a sub-class of *maneuver*. The phases of insurgent campaigning are more accurately labeled as 'don't hit yet', 'hit-and-run', 'hit-and-hold'. The Huai Hai Campaign was the last chapter in a book of internal conflict whose earlier chapters were filled with guerrilla campaigns. From chapter to chapter, however, the essence of military strategy did not change.

An insurgent will always argue to the world, "There can be no decisive battle in this struggle, so don't look for it." Why does he say that? He is attracted by the effect that propaganda can afford him while he looks for favorable little battles until he can win big ones. If he follows prudent operational art, he doesn't chance contact with a superior force unless he has secured an escape route. His 'hit and run' battles feature both 'hit' and 'run'. To him, history can ignore even a huge lopsided military victory, but victory in battle remains the quintessential event. The counterinsurgent leader who dismisses its


centrality forgets his reason for being.

Please see sections: 122, *Ulm and Austerlitz*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 139, *Strategy of Aggregate Tactics*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; and 69, *Measuring Actions against Enemies*.



“The importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of victory and in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws near to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first exercise of authority is to demand that the victory should really be complete.”[\[34\]](#)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*



“There is no shadow of protection to be had by sheltering behind the slender stockades of visionary speculation, or by hiding behind the wagon-wheels of pacific theories.”[\[35\]](#)

May-ling (Madame Chiang Kai-Shek)



Irregular conflicts are not protracted by nature

Section 11, Protraction and Diligence

Armed social struggles, including insurgencies, are not by nature protracted or prolonged. Nature has nothing to do with it. Someone protracts a conflict for a reason. Insurgents typically make the argument that their conflict will be prolonged indefinitely if a political solution is not found (that government concessions must be made, negotiations undertaken, amnesties granted). The counterinsurgent is often quick to repeat the assertion of conflict longevity, sometimes in order to explain or justify slow progress. The pamphlet *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, which has been kicking around the US intelligence community for decades, makes the following typical assertion:

Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity...is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.[36]

A number of other US doctrinal materials state explicitly that insurgent war is a naturally protracted affair. It is not.

The Japanese were in near constant conventional campaign from September 19, 1931 until September 2, 1945. Che Guevara was beaten rapidly and badly in the Congo and then quickly dispatched in Bolivia. This isolated and improbable comparison of the two (the warring of Imperial Japan versus Guevara's bumbling) yields a result that conventional war is some ten times more protracted than insurgent war. Such an errant statistic doesn't offer any kind of rule, but it may be closer to the general truth than what is usually asserted. If we were to include *golpes de estado* (coups) under the semantic umbrella of 'insurgencies', then Western Hemisphere insurgencies would not average out longer than conventional wars.

American observers fixate on those insurgent wars that took a long time, thereby lending tautological strength to the theory of natural protraction, but even without including *golpes de estado*, a review of insurgent efforts in Venezuela, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Peru, and elsewhere does not suggest insurgencies are necessarily long in duration. There are too many exceptions to the supposed rule. As to those that are long-lived, someone *protracted* them, and that someone was almost always a guerrilla leader with uncommon capability and opportunity. That guerrilla leader was someone who understood the operational equation.

Pointing out the historical occasions of abbreviated insurgencies does not erase the fact some irregular wars of the twentieth century, including those in Latin America, have been all but interminable. The case this book uses most often is the struggle in Colombia, which has lasted decades. The central point here is not about average duration, but about the tendency to misrepresent or to lose the sense of causation by abuse of the passive voice. Statements to the effect that conflict 'is prolonged' or that guerrilla wars 'are protracted' are at best lazy. Worse, such statements encourage the dubious supposition that something other than the resolve, attitudes and decisions of the competitors is the cause of a conflict's pace, duration, or intensity. More likely is that as the mindset and decision-making of the leaders varies during a conflict, so too will the levels of violence and prospects for victory and termination.

Regain focus on the active voice. Insurgent, rebel, revolutionary, and criminal leaders all survive by keeping their lines of movement to refuge safe. To them, prolonging the conflict means staying alive and at large. Insurgents protract violent contests because the personal demise or incarceration of their leaders often means the end of the insurgency. Internal wars are never just *protracted*. Guerrilla leaders *protract* them as a matter of life and death -- theirs.

So why isn't it practically, linguistically, logically correct, if protraction is the common result of leaders' decisions, to call protraction part of the nature of a war? Because if an actor builds his designs and plans upon the assumption that a war is a naturally protracted affair, he is likely to suffer two negative consequences. One is a failure to recognize the precarious position of a challenger, perhaps born of tactical and operational disadvantages as to culminating points, potential correlations of force, and anonymity during an insurgency's early development. The counterinsurgent may plan the application of resources according to some pace intending to assign equivalent or slowly escalating resources over time. Such an approach exactly fails to respond to a guerrilla's basic problem. The guerrilla (any military leader, really) has to be wary not to attack a superior force and, when a guerrilla commander risks such an attack, he has to make sure his line of retreat to sanctuary is secure. Therefore, all else being equal, the counterinsurgent should want to accelerate the war by applying as many resources as practicable, especially early-on, in order to change the balance of anonymity, find insurgent lines of retreat and sanctuary, and to force the insurgent guerrilla into more and more encounters in which the probable correlations of force favor the government.

The second negative consequence of the natural-protraction fallacy relates to a government's own morale base. There are few examples of a democratic country not having their electorates grow weary of a war. This weariness is often pegged to the periodicity of elections. That is to say, the weariness can be highlighted in a political campaign at the expense of the incumbent. Weariness is often made into a political argument and asset, so any theory that assumes a conflict will necessarily last beyond the normal term of an executive is problematic. Suggesting that the war, by its nature, will last beyond the next political cycle may help lower public expectations, but may simultaneously lengthen the chances of a government victory. Government initiative will have succumbed to a standard insurgent psychological strategy. By presupposing a war cannot be won during some set period of time (say, the term of an executive), a counterinsurgent contributes to prolonging the war, allowing his enemy to survive what might be his most vulnerable period. If, on the other hand, an insurgent leader were to assume insurgent or guerrilla war were a naturally protracted affair, he might overlook the fact that it is he who has to do the protracting.

Ongoing financial profit may also be a protracting factor. This feeds what are called the 'war economy' theories. Especially when armed groups are involved in profitable criminal activities, like the Colombian FARC, for instance, they find they can prosper without political progress, making prolongation more attractive to them. Some constituencies, like security guards, arms manufacturers or military sutlers, also live well on war and thus may prefer theories that help keep a war going. These 'war economy' observations may have some weight, but they don't reverse the point. In most cases it behooves the counterinsurgent to reject insurgent argumentation that their war is necessarily a long one. A government military may sense a vested interest in persistent or prolonged conflict if it sees a link between larger budgets, organizational health, and public support. If the objective, however, is to *win* a war, the counterinsurgent should do everything to accelerate the insurgent's demise. It is not the reverse for the insurgent; it is only the reverse for the insurgent until he can gain military advantage, after which he can speed things up. It is a world of parry and thrust. Mao did not live and strive to be a guerrilla, or see guerrilla war as the ultimate path to victory.

The antidote to protraction is diligence. Diligence includes traditional military values of initiative and mass. It also means respectful and dutiful attention to a task at hand. Diligence is acting in a timely way with sufficient force in the right places and following through before the appropriate moment for action is gone. In irregular war, *diligence*, *follow-through* and *maintenance of the initiative* are all but synonymous with successful pursuits.

Please see sections: 102, *Negotiations*; 69, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies*; 52, *Sovereignty*; 41, *Dear Westy*; 6, *The Operational Equation*; 116,




“...it is the true policy to incur even heavy losses of a few hours’ fighting for an adequate object, rather than prolong a conflict for days and weeks by adopting the slower methods that in the end waste life...”[\[37\]](#)

A. Hilliard Atteridge




“There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.”

Sun Tzu (attributed)



“A prompt and vigorous pursuit is the only means of ensuring complete success.” [\[38\]](#)

General Phillip Sheridan (attributed)



“We just lost the initiative.”

General Garrison in the movie

Black Hawk Down (2001)[\[39\]](#)



A general's big decision

Section 12, Commitment of the Reserve

When and where to commit the reserve is traditionally one of the most consequential decisions the military leader makes. This aspect of classic military strategy is a little harder to apply in irregular war. When do we 'send it in'? How much of a reserve should we keep? Part of an answer to this question may depend on our having done a few other things first, like securing enough resources to begin with, or having found the enemy's lines of communication. None of the principles of military strategy is easy to apply if sister principles are ignored or violated.

If you are a guerrilla taking persistent, careful shots at government forces (being sure that you have safe lines of supply and retreat), you will once in a while catch a government unit especially off-guard. These are just the odds. Ten percent of any government army's leaders are that army's ten percent dumbest, laziest, and least diligent -- the bottom ten percent. Sometimes a bottom-10-percent commander, executive officer and senior sergeant all end up in the same small unit. Sometimes an army is going to make some simple mistake as to economy of force or soldier care, and just then Mother Nature or Murphy are going to align themselves to make things even worse. That one lousy small unit will be in exactly the wrong spot and the wrong time. Once in a while all the disparate chance factors for failure will concur to make an otherwise formidable army unusually vulnerable.

You, however, are persistent and daring (but prudent) with your guerrilla attacks. It is almost certain that uncertainty will eventually favor you but, if you are not ready to exploit the favor by having a ready reserve, you will miss an opportunity that could have vaulted you to an improved level of power. Luck is where preparation meets opportunity. As a military leader, you must always prepare for bad luck. That is why you are careful to maintain a secure route of escape. Preparation for bad fortune is your key to survival, but preparation for good fortune is your key to more good fortune. Keeping a reserve force handy in order to take advantage of an unusually successful attack is classic advice. Murphy delivers bad luck more than good luck, however, and you, too, have a hapless 10 percent. Now and then, in spite of your having trained and planned to keep the lines of retreat of your subordinate units secure to sanctuary, you need a reserve to check a pursuing army unit that is closing down the route of escape of one of your guerrilla columns.

A government reserve force needs a technology to help deploy quickly to contact (perhaps helicopters, motorbikes, or mules). In the past, we kept horse cavalry in the reserve for exactly that reason. Timely commitment of a reserve can help turn a battle which is seemingly won into a battle decisively won. To decisively win battles in today's irregular wars, governments have to win the pursuits. Since making quicker decisions as to where a reserve should go is part of the speed formula, intelligence derived from aerospace or electronic capacity can give governments an edge. The math of culminating points tells us that without a reserve fighting force, however, successful pursuit is unlikely.

The whole idea of a reserve is subject to *scale*. Whatever the 'level' of your unit, and whatever the size of the forces engaged, you will want to maintain a reserve fast and powerful enough for you to successfully pursue a retreating foe, or to save an endangered retreat of your own. That principle reigns whether you are a single beat cop, commander of a huge tank army, or anything in-between. Timely application of a reserve force may be as much the key to winning in irregular warfare as it is in more conventional, regular forms of warfare.

Please see sections: 120, *Misleading COIN Articles of Faith*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 63, *Cost-Distance*; 68, *Scale*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; and 6, *The Operational Equation*.



"It is in the use and withholding of their reserves that the great commanders have generally excelled. After all, when once the last reserve has been thrown in, the Commander's part is played...The event must be left to pluck and to the fighting troops." [\[40\]](#)

Winston Churchill



"The main reason the 'surge' in Afghanistan is on is because the conventional wisdom tells us the 'surge' in Iraq "worked." [\[41\]](#)

Diana West



No retreat, no more insurgent

Section 13, Puthukkudiyirippu

The Liberation Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) waged an on-again/off-again, but mostly on-again, war against the government of Sri Lanka from 1983 until early 2009, when the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) forced the Tigers to capitulate. During the last few years of the LTTE's existence, the SLA outmaneuvered the LTTE, beat the Tigers in combat engagements, and systematically closed down its lines of supply and retreat. Finally, at a place called Puthukkudiyirippu, on the northeast coast, a little south of the Jaffna Peninsula, the Army surrounded remaining LTTE units and killed almost all of the LTTE leaders.

Sri Lanka is an ethnically diverse land, ethnicity commonly tagged as one of the ingredients that led to the Tamil Tigers' fight. According to the *CLA World Factbook*, about 74% of Sri Lankans are Sinhalese; 7% Sri Lankan Moor; 5% Indian Tamil; and 4% Sri Lankan Tamil. Religiously, according to that source, about 70% are Buddhist; 8% Muslim; 7% Hindu; and 6% Christian. The *Factbook* also indicates that 74% of Sri Lankans speak Sinhala and 18% speak Tamil. These rough ethnic statistics can only be made to overlap in a ragged fashion, so 'ethnicity' itself is a soft concept on which to hang an understanding of the Sri Lankan war.

The political conditions which many Sri Lankans found intolerable and which, to some Sri Lankans, justified armed revolt, had a slow historic build. We can, however, trace the origins of the war efficiently by noting the Official Language Act of 1956. Making Sinhala the country's one official language, the Act was a statement of nationhood and a break with its British colonial past (with its English-language inheritance). The Act, democratically derived, had both a highlighting and degrading effect on the rights, honor and material well-being of the Tamil-speaking minority -- thus the Act is a milestone on the road to the Tamil insurgency. An azimuth had been struck toward the consolidation of an aggrieved yet powerful underclass identity. Sri Lankan tinkering with constitutional formulae did not derive a peaceful social compact. It led instead to a clarification of who was 'in' and who was 'out'. The cards given to the well-intentioned were not all good. The political history of Ceylon had rested on accreted arrogance, part of which was an advantageous relationship that an educated Tamil ethnic minority had enjoyed with the British. Then the British left.

The Cold War also provided a left-right/communist-capitalist flagging for political identity as a spur to radicalization and polarization. The Sri Lankan mix of real and perceived advantages presented a fertile environment for leaders who could translate resentment into organized action. Vēlupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic, ruthless leader of the LTTE, grew to represent the Sri Lankan Tamil. He was ready to take on leftist radical signage and accept whatever foreign support came with it. Sri Lanka was to suffer its own volatile concoction of caste, communism and comeuppance. Leadership of the Tamil minority as such, a minority historically associated as a surrogate of English imperialism, shifted in makeup toward a younger and more ruthless composition. That it then successfully donned the cloak of anti-imperial socialism complicates explanations of the conflict.

As is typical of insurgent leaders, Prabhakaran's goal was to rule a separate Tamil country, if not become dictator of the whole island. He variously allowed speculation on the viability of federalism or partial autonomy, but, in retrospect, had always been single-minded about who was going to be in charge of any resulting polity: himself. In the course of the war, Prabhakaran eliminated competition from other erstwhile rebel pretenders. The goal of the government of Sri Lanka, meanwhile, was peace, but a peace that did not divide the island into two countries. Until 2006, the government constantly sought some sort of ceasefire or negotiated settlement, with pressure for these 'solutions' coming consistently from international forums and foreign countries.

For a while, Prabhakaran made good military decisions and consequently attracted foreign financial and diplomatic investment. The government of Sri Lanka took a dual path of negotiation and a slowly escalating military response that was supposed to create conditions favorable for negotiation.

Sri Lanka is one of the world's smaller countries, but it is not *that* small, with over 20 million inhabitants and an area almost the same as Ireland's. The ethnically distinct identities are not evenly dispersed on the island, nor are they highly concentrated. The most likely supporters of the Tigers lived in the east and north. This distribution facilitated the Tigers' development of geographic sanctuaries, as well as an argument for either federalist solutions or territorially-based international recognition. Being an island, however, meant that an insurgent's lines of supply might have to pass over seawater. The most salient single piece of ground is not a salient, but a narrow neck between the main island and the Jaffna Peninsula in the north. Called Elephant Pass, it is historically the most contested piece of ground in Sri Lanka. The LTTE tried unsuccessfully to wrest Elephant Pass from the government in 1991, then did so in 2000, sweeping out a large, well-defended SLA garrison and capturing expensive pieces of military equipment in the process. The SLA did not retake Elephant Pass until January, 2009. When the government finally resolved to control the pass, its taking marked the beginning of the final chapter of the war. The LTTE won no more significant engagements afterwards.

Equality of citizen status was a perpetual issue in Sri Lanka. But for the insurgent war, Sri Lankan democracy probably would not have moved as quickly as it has to ease blatant political inequities. To Prabhakaran, inequities were to be resolved by military victory -- and his instrument was the LTTE. The government preferred the path of negotiation until the imbalance in visions about how political change was to be implemented became clearer to the Sri Lankan government and people.

After the election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in November, 2005, he radically changed the government's military objective. Although the exact moment of epiphany is debated among Sri Lankans, the strategic objective ultimately switched from creating the conditions for a peaceful settlement to crushing the LTTE. The SLA began to win battles and gain ground, and this happened because President Rajapaksa garnered substantive and extensive support from both India and China, and all but ignored the rest of the world's pleas for restraint. Rajapaksa and his military chief Sarath Fonseka resolved to eliminate the LTTE. The mechanism to resolve the conflict would be military victory, and for this the government built a more powerful military. The President and his military leaders discarded the political-versus-military dichotomy. They dumped complexity and ambiguity as guiding descriptors of the challenge. They identified Vēlupillai Prabhakaran as the target and decided they would no longer let Prabhakaran grant impunity to anyone. On March 18, 2009, Prabhakaran was dead and the war ended.

What lessons might we draw from the demise of the LTTE?

- Evolution of a social compact that permits and ratifies the existence of a clearly identifiable underclass favors creation of an armed resistance;
- A capacity to grant impunity to its followers means an insurgent group can recruit soldiers, not pay taxes, kill, kidnap, rob, trespass and nevertheless represent the aggrieved minority in foreign forums;
- Dirt and walls matter. The LTTE made extensive use of engineered earth bunds (berms and levees) as fighting positions;

- The government ultimately embraced the possibilities of asymmetric weight. The big advantage available to the government of Sri Lanka was its capacity to amass and concentrate greater physical military power;
- Sea and air power proved critical for reducing LTTE lines of communication for supply and retreat;
- LTTE leaders tried to be the exclusive agents of an aggrieved minority. Insistence on exclusivity can become a weakness;
- International peacekeeping and monitoring missions (for instance, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, SLMM) were effective only in protracting the conflict and were not trusted by the government;
- Foreign military intervention, in this case the Indian Army (known as the Indian Peacekeeping Force, IPKF), which fought indecisively from 1987 until 1990, will do little besides prolong suffering if it does not resolve to achieve victory. In retribution, the LTTE assassinated the Indian Prime Minister as he ran for reelection in 1991;
- Water struggles can present catalyzing events (in this case the LTTE closed the sluice gates at Mavil Oya in 2008, cutting off water to a large civilian population);
- A major natural disaster (in this case the Tsunami of late 2004) can change insurgent prospects. Because the tsunami hit the eastern part of Sri Lanka, the disaster caused havoc in rebel areas, opening the area to new observation and reporting, and perhaps shifted political attitudes in the rest of Sri Lanka, that led to the election of President Rajapaksa;
- The relationship of impunity and international extradition was almost always present. The Sri Lankan government wanted the United States to extradite a man they said was the leader of the LTTE, but was in any case a United States citizen living in New York;
- Until the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa, government leaders heard ‘Songs of Chu’ among its people, which disarmed the government and lessened its resolve (see Section 116);
- The LTTE’s identity, existence and survival were highly synonymous with the heartbeat of its leader, the ‘*mens rea*’ guy;
- Territorial control became and remained a central imperative;
- Suicide bombers are weapons systems. Although the LTTE invented the bomb vest and employed many women for placement and detonation, the LTTE leaders were not suicidal; they planned to enjoy power;
- Toward the end of the war, the insurgent leaders resorted to a strategy of hope -- hope that foreigners would come to their rescue. The counterinsurgency became a siege with the insurgents enclosed.

Sri Lanka’s insurgent war has much to tell us, with the above list just a start. Perhaps the overriding lesson from Sri Lanka, however, is about the supposedly protracted nature of insurgent war. Sri Lanka’s war was protracted only until the government resolved to win it.

Please see sections: 137, *Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective*; 106, *Massacres*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 52, *Sovereignty*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; 72, *Land Strategy*; and 116, *Songs of Chu*.



“The unforgivable crime is soft hitting. Do not hit at all if it can be avoided; but never hit softly.”

Theodore Roosevelt [\[42\]](#)




“I am not for war, I am totally against war.”

Mahinda Rajapaksa [\[43\]](#)



— Sri Lanka circa 2006 —



Lack of it doesn't spell defeat or a lot of it assure victory

Section 14, Legitimacy

We can divide the concept of legitimacy into two streams, popular and normative. One recognizes and measures legitimacy as a degree of public sentiment or support -- an attitudinal question; the other recognizes and measures legitimacy according to norms of goodness and achievement -- a behavioral question. One form of legitimacy is about acceptance and is a condition of an audience or population. Such public legitimacy can range from collective enthusiasm and dedication down to tolerance or even fearful resignation. The other legitimacy is about norms of behavior -- about incorruption, probity, rectitude, charity -- on the part of a government or opponent organizations and their respective leaders. The two legitimacies often mix, and certainly one may influence the other.

If you are a contestant in an irregular armed conflict, you will want to keep an eye on the legitimacy barometers for acceptance (votes, polling data, voiced opinions, investments, travel patterns) if such barometers already exist or can be devised. Be careful about defining your objectives according to legitimacy, however. The two kinds of legitimacy can compete against each other. If you assert that legitimacy is your goal, you need to be careful not to suppose that one form of legitimacy necessarily correlates with the other. All the normative legitimacy in the world won't assure victory, or a total lack of it assure defeat. Likewise, popular acceptance, whether enjoyed by a government or its opponent, may not achieve victory. And the question remains: how much legitimacy is enough?

You can maintain scrupulously clean behavior, but Pontius and the crowd might still turn on you (normative legitimacy was not what sprung Barabbas). On the other hand, some competitors in irregular wars gain all the committed popular support they need by perpetrating the most horrendous and vicious acts imaginable. Popular legitimacy, meanwhile, can be ephemeral, superficial and narrow. It can be based on unattractive psychological quantities such as fear, hate, humor or ignorance. Popular legitimacy can be at once democratic and foul, so a dilemma will often be created by striving for legitimacy: legitimacy-as-acceptance versus legitimacy-as-goodness.

Our hope may be that normative legitimacy will lead to popular legitimacy, and that popular legitimacy will change conditions in the battlespace -- that our increased popularity, earned by our virtuous behavior and deft propaganda, will tip the balance of anonymity in our favor so that our enemy cannot hide his whereabouts, movements and sanctuaries. We hope a high degree of legitimacy will bring more volunteers into our ranks, earn us foreign support, make it easier to finance our war plans, and even cause parts of the population to directly fight of their own accord against our mutual enemy.

According to a whole body of literature, whether you are counterinsurgent or insurgent, if you have legitimacy it means you *tax* instead of *steal*, that foreign allies rally to you, and that people voluntarily offer you information about your opponents. Legitimacy, as a north star for counterinsurgent planning, is well-argued by practitioners and theorists such as Max Manwaring and John Fishel.^[44] However, striving for legitimacy begs questions. One of the most disconcerting might be what to do with legitimacy once you have it. The military challenge doesn't take care of itself just because you have earned popular support or act in a scrupulously ethical manner. You can work toward greater legitimacy for all the reasons noted above, but don't count on even perfect legitimacy to defeat your enemies.

If, as a fighter, you sense that you must use the term 'legitimacy' in the explanation of your actions, then establish an explicit set of standards of behavior and achievements that can be made publicly transparent, with a baseline, and with reasonable goals. Set your own moral compass and your own standards for success. Embrace normative legitimacy. Do that because you think it the right way for you to be. It will help, but do not make it the goal of your war effort. Make stopping your opponents' manifestations of their illegitimacy your goal. Attend to popular legitimacy second.

If a criminal gang chops Stew up into manageable bits, puts his pieces in a 55 gallon plastic drum with mole, water, beer, peppers, potatoes, onions, tobacco, urine and sour cream, and leaves the drum outside Stew's mother's house over the weekend, that's not so good, either. There are, nevertheless, places not far away where groups do such things exactly and grow in popular legitimacy on the fame of it.

If you believe as I do that legitimacy is better measured in standards of behavior than in popular sentiment, the question remains what those standards for normative legitimacy should look like. The Internet is rich with indexes of the relative performance of the countries of the world based on one or another calculation.^[45] Most of the indexes purport scienciness, but contain a lot of political and ideological baggage. The *Failed States* (www.fundforpeace.org) website had an explanatory text with the following lead-in: "It is an accepted axiom of the modern age that distance no longer matters." That dubious assertion, if you accept it, will hurt your brain and your chances of success. A later sentence in the same explanation confesses something far closer to the truth you might want to digest: "The complex phenomenon of state failure may be much discussed, but it remains little understood." All of the sites and indexes are, in some way, commentaries on legitimacy and all of them mix notions of legitimacy-as-acceptance with legitimacy-as-good behavior.

Your irregular war is going to create, surface and irritate a lot of presuppositions. It will cause a lot of curious legitimacy ratings and arguments of one form or another. You will want to know what they are and, although the more elaborate arguments and attending web sites will come and go, the Internet is a place to start. The legitimacy-propagandists might help inform your strategic communications as regards to current prejudices. If you were to make a composite map of the countries most considered to be illegitimate or failed, however, you would find only partial coincidence among the various ratings. The indexes of state performance implicate a number of countries as likely places for internal struggle. They generally agree on a few of the most obvious places, like Haiti or Zimbabwe, but we need a better method for determining what polities in the world are actually likely to have an internal war worth our attention, irrespective of their *legitimacy*.

There exists a variety of ways to rate States or, as most of the indexes purport, their legitimacy. None of the indexes is made with the definition of State success used in this book. The closest is the *Transparency Index* or *The Bertelsmann Transformation Index*. (www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html).

If you can figure out the 'methodology' of the common indexes for legitimacy, you might be able to demonstrate progress in your programs by showing an improvement in a country's ratings (I put the word methodology between disrespectful quotation marks because some of the methodologies are un-replicable if not baffling.) I suggest instead that you set explicit standards of behavior for your force. Build an argument for legitimacy upon it (to include the greater ideology that your force supports); remembering that neither rectitude nor credit will win a war. On the other hand, if you name and locate all who are able to grant impunity to their agents, you might be able to map the geography of the perpetrators of illegitimate acts and then relentlessly pursue them with the assistance of members of the population.

Please see sections: 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 95, *Childhood*; 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 55, *Kidnapping*; 106, *Massacres*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 125, *Human Rights*; and 48, *Grading the Social Compact*.



Woman: Well, how'd you become king...?

King Arthur: The Lady of the Lake, her arm clad in the purest shimmering samite held aloft Excalibur from the bosom of the water, signifying by divine providence that I, Arthur, was to carry Excalibur. *That* is why I am your king.

Dennis: ... you can't expect to wield supreme executive power just because some watery tart threw a sword at you...if I went 'round sayin' I was Emperor just because some moistened bint lobbed a scimitar at me, they'd put me away.

from the movie

Monty Python and the Holy Grail (1975) [\[46\]](#)

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“The mere trade unionist, who thinks in terms of “union politics” and “power blocs” and little caucuses with little fakers to run for some little office, pushing one’s personal interest here and there -- why should he belong to a revolutionary party?” [\[47\]](#)

James P. Cannon

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“Thus the principle of collective right--its reason for existing, its lawfulness--is based on individual right.”[\[48\]](#)

Frédéric Bastiat,
The Law



What is to be done?

Section 15, NGOs, IOs, and Unions

Determine how you will deal with non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and unions. Liberal societies honor the individual's right of association -- the right to hang out with whomever we wish, talk with them about whatever, and obtain and spend resources together for projects ranging from alpaca shows to zombie dances. Some activities and organizations created in the firmament of this associational liberty tend to challenge the authority or instructions of the existing State, the government itself being but one of the organizations that the people of a liberal society form. Naturally, there is going to be some friction. In the context of a developed internal war, especially one in which foreigners take an active interest, many assemblages of people are going to try to be present to accomplish their goals, licit or illicit.

If you're willing to go just a little ways out on a philosophical limb with me, you could agree that all organizations that people form (if they are intended to accomplish anything) are governmental. That might be to argue that 'NGO' is a misnomer and that almost all the NGOs are really non-State governmental organizations (NSGOs?). It's not much more of a logical leap to argue that all governments *are* the State, even if not the big formal central one, and so therefore every human organization *is* State. You could argue that way, if you were falling in love with anarchy and wanted to confuse yourself and others into inaction. That is not my intention here. By 'government' I mean the government that can impose punishment on you -- especially corporal or privative punishment -- that is, *un*-grant you impunity. By NGOs, I just mean an entity (not the government) with a name, organization, plan, resolve, resources and enough presence within your conflict space that it might change the balance of prospects for or against you. It's only when one of the NGOs challenges a prerogative of the State government that a ruckus ensues. If the State wants into everything, obviously there is going to be more conflict or fewer NGOs or the NGOs are going to come to some kind of compromise, settlement, agreement, relationship, etc., with the State. Things get worse when an NGO is related to an insurgent or criminal entity and can also punish persons or grant them impunity.

There is plenty of logical and practical overlap between what are called nonprofit NGOs, 'civil society' and for-profit businesses. This is noteworthy because the list of NGO activities does not stop short at human services, physical protection, or peaceful resolution of armed conflict. Likewise, there is considerable crossover between some NGOs (or even willing subordination) and international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Pan African Union or the European Parliament.

In the coming decades, IOs especially may play increasing and increasingly independent roles as players in irregular armed conflicts. In the 1980s, a movement began in the United States to impose what some still call a 'Tobin' tax. Part of the idea, or an outgrowth of the original idea, is to automatically move small portions of international monetary transactions to a United Nations account, giving the United Nations an independent budget source based on international financial commerce. Once the United Nations is put on a more regular robust and independent financial footing, so the argument goes, it can tackle world problems like global warming, hunger, and pandemics. It perhaps could also deploy armed force with more agility in support of its resolutions regarding genocide, proliferation and the like.

Unions are a particular kind of NGO and they are not made equally. The classic model is a union composed of factory floor workers determined to strike and refuse both to work and to let anyone else work unless the factory owners and bosses pay a higher wage. That ideal, however, is rare today in most of the world, in part because of the distributed nature of production and the increased complexity and differentiation of people's productive contributions. So unions today are more sophisticated, interconnected and subtle in the ways they leverage what power they can attain. It is still, however, by way of geography and anonymity that the various unions can be distinguished for the purposes of your irregular war's order of battle. For instance, if a labor union has enough power, directly or through other agents, to demand that workers at a factory have to vote openly regarding whether or not the union will represent them, that union has greater power than if the voting among workers is done by secret ballot. A work force that does not enjoy a secret ballot as regards to unions is like a religious congregation that must go to confession. Of course, church organizations are NGOs as well. To the extent a union, church or any organization can punish people (and more so when they can provide their followers or leaders a degree of impunity from punishment) they are closer to being States themselves. Historically, the relationship of any NGO, especially unions, to revolutionaries or other anti-State actors in irregular wars has featured tension and ambivalence.

As a matter of fact, all they [trade unionists] had achieved was that the sellers of labour power learned to sell their "commodity" on better terms and to fight the purchasers over a purely commercial deal. These exposures could have served (if properly utilised by an organisation of revolutionaries) as a beginning and a component part of Social-Democratic activity; but they could also have led (and, given a worshipful attitude towards spontaneity, were bound to lead) to a "purely trade union" struggle and to a non-Social-Democratic working-class movement. Social-Democracy leads the struggle of the working class, not only for better terms for the sale of labour-power, but for the abolition of the social system that compels the propertyless to sell themselves to the rich. Social-Democracy represents the working class, not in its relation to a given group of employers alone, but in its relation to all classes of modern society and to the state as an organised political force. Hence, it follows that not only must Social-Democrats not confine themselves exclusively to the economic struggle, but that they must not allow the organisation of economic exposures to become the predominant part of their activities.^[49]

The above Vladimir Lenin quote is an archetypical expression by a violent radical of his impatient disrespect regarding what he sees as an insufficiency of resolve, vision, and selflessness on the part of the 'mere trade unionist'. The radical's disdain is tempered by common agendas and common enemies. The violent radical typically supposes he can steer, lead, and use a labor union, however, because he is especially willing to be ruthless.

In respect to this relationship of the radical to the less visionary and committed organizer, I offer the example of "*Mujeres Creando*" and the post-structural genius of Bolivian Alvaro Garcia Linera. A radical leftist, Dr. Garcia set out to identify and unify disparate elements of resistance, to articulate shared demands and mobilize these elements to act. He recognized that in late 20th century Bolivia, as in much of the world, the classic revolutionary/organizational geography of the factory building and factory worker had been shrinking and no longer offered sufficient mass to be the vanguard or front line of a mass movement. Dr. Garcia decided on a more complex, post-structural structure.

"*Mujeres Creando*" (Women Creating) or perhaps *Mujeres Creando Comunidad* (Women Creating Community) is a small NGO in La Paz dedicated to "recuperative women's strategies against patriarchic and repressive systems in society."^[50] *Mujeres Creando* is apparently of alternative or non-judgmental sexual orientation. I mention it as a proxy for a range of marginal or marginalized identities within Bolivian society that may not ascribe to any particular political platform, but which share a sense of rejection and resentment against established power.^[51] To Dr. Garcia, these identities could, in the aggregate, provide a force beneficial to his purposes of gaining national political power. Activities of such organizations just had to be practically orchestrated, even if only briefly. The potential of politically powerful action from these identities was basically three-fold: democratic voting and vote-capturing; propaganda (especially internationally); and timely participation in demonstrations and *roadblocks* (possibly a critical phenomenon in your irregular war).

Another relevant Bolivian group is known as the ‘*Ponchos Rojos*’, which translates directly into English as ‘Red Ponchos’, but many among Bolivia’s current opposition prefer to translate it as ‘Brown Shirts’ -- an allusion to the Nazi storm troopers. This may seem paradoxical. A strain of fascism has existed in Bolivia since before WWII. Bolivia was then home to various members of the post-WWI Nazi diaspora, including the infamous Klaus Barbie. Nevertheless, the *Ponchos Rojos* are ascribed to the left, having supported Evo Morales’s rise to power, participating in leftist mobilizations, roadblocks and demonstrations. They have been invested in the traditional labor movement. They are at the same time ethnically-based (Aymara) and are accused of extreme thuggish behavior, a thuggishness that was even displayed against *Mujeres Creando*.

The political party run by Dr. Garcia (and his partner, union organizer Evo Morales) held a foremost ability to communicate and represent the grievances of these disparate outsider identities (and, as a result, to convoke them at appointed times and places). Bolivia has a lot of space and a sparse road network. The people of La Paz, one of Bolivia’s two capitals, live at an altitude more than twice that of the people of Denver. The *Paceños* (people of La Paz) still live downhill from the half million people who live in El Alto, where the airport and all the communications towers are located and through which most of La Paz’ water comes. If rebels could set up successful roadblocks in El Alto, they could tumble the national government. It happened. Dr. Garcia provided a chapter titled, ‘The Multitude’ to Oscar Olivera and Tom Lewis’ *Cochabamba!: Water War in Bolivia*, wherein he examines the trend away from organizing plant or factory labor and toward the necessarily more nimble engagement of disparate social groups that have a variety of demands and grievances. That nimble engagement ended up meaning what amounted to military operational positioning. The MAS political party place human geographical barriers at the right times and places to successfully challenge the armed forces of a sitting government.

How does all this affect winning? The physical line of retreat to sanctuary (the central geographic concept in armed conflict) is covered with people. To classify and understand the potentially most dangerous people along that line of retreat, you can start by determining what level of control of anonymity various organizations enjoy or seek. Another thing to note is the flow of rents, tithes, taxes, commissions, distributions, etc. Going beyond the formal or informal nature of the organizations’ identities, if you don’t know where money is coming from and where it is going, that anonymity of wealth may be dangerous to you.

The practicalities of control are not difficult. Whether you are pro-State or rebel, know both the *de jure* and *de facto* rules that control various categories of NGOs, IO’s and unions. Control their anonymity, especially as to the origins and destinations of their convertible wealth. Of course, as with so many things, the physical location of assets and agents is going to be critical, revealing evidence. ‘GIS’ everything if you can. If you can’t, keep the other guy from doing so.

Please see sections: 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 1, *Impunity*; 137, *Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective*; 20, *Rule-of-law*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; and 135, *Borders and Anarchism*.



“License to kill gophers by the government of the United Nations. Man, free to kill gophers at will. To kill, you must know your enemy, and in this case my enemy is a vamin. And a vamin will never quit - ever. They’re like the Viet Cong -- Vamin Cong. So you have to fall back on superior intelligence and superior firepower. And that’s all she wrote.”

Carl Spackler in the movie
Caddy Shack (1989)[52]





“...the party member must not become a
‘mere trade unionist,’”[53]

Lev Bronshtein



-----Bolivia, La Paz and El Alto-----





Note the steep drop from El Alto to the capital city of La Paz.[\[54\]](#)

90% of presence is showing up

Section 16, Presence

Presence is a great and necessary word for the military and political leader in irregular war. It represents a quality of inspiration -- that you do not just put your corporeal self in front of other people, but rather your persona, your will, your personality and its effect -- there to be sensed beyond just seen. You matter because you are one who will affect change in the environment. A leader will not likely emanate this charisma, this influence, without somehow being there. He might not have to actually be standing physically in front of a crowd. It might be via radio or something. Presence can be imagined, cultivated, and maintained without much of a corporeal element. Some 'personalist' leaders have used a lot of posters, which are apparently being replaced by tweets. Hugo Chavez hung around without a brain wave for a while at the end of his presidency, still able to inspire followers.

The word presence has a similar, overlapping meaning as it pertains to the relationship between armed organizations and individual or collective audiences. There exists a physical presence and a non-physical presence. Guerrilla groups can use a small amount of the former to create and leave behind a lot of the latter, maybe in the form of admiration or hope, but often in the form of fear. The following is from a renowned Colombian historian about the war in his country.

When one talks of 'presence' of this or that actor of the conflict in a 'county', generally it indicates some place removed from the county seat, or better said, inaccessible, even to the most locally familiar. So then, what is 'presence'?: that of an encampment (of varying size, placement and equipment) or that of a furtive passing, generally under the cover of night, by some armed band? Moreover, when an illegal armed contingent announces its presence in a small town or inhabited place, or just passes by, they "take" the community by force of arms for hours or exceptionally days. In such cases it is possible that the local inhabitants know approximately where they are camped or where they came from. Nothing more. It is exactly because the "locals" have to keep their affiliations a secret (they sympathize, are neutral, or are opposed to the armed groups, legal or not), the armed groups in turn keep the map of their route secret. Their mobility, as this suggests, unfolds as "corridors" that are really a meticulously arranged string of points of support... [55] (my poor translation)

Please note the relationship between *Presence* and *Sanctuary*. Most of the time spent by contenders in an armed conflict is not in battle, moving to and from a battle, or in escape and pursuit after a battle. Most of their time is passed in activities we recognize as mundane if not banal. They look for food, water, sex, entertainment, medical attention, or maybe they stop to help the landlady carry out her garbage. "Leave the gun, take the cannoli." [56] Many of higher rank, taking a bigger bite out of life, spend a certain amount of their time and that of their underlings in activities intended to make themselves richer. They invest in retirement. Closer to the play of Section 7, Sanctuary, however, is preparation by the guerrilla for safe movement, and improvement of the safety of their sanctuaries. That safety (of movement and sanctuary) is tightly related to efforts to create presence. One begets the other.

A guerrilla might enjoy a distinct advantage in a local contest of presence. The guerrilla's communications can be made existential. He can explain that, while his band is only going to be around physically for a short time (in a person's face or in a town), it is going to stay close enough. The potential *return visit* is made as significant as the current visit. Perhaps conditions warrant a promise to protect the audience from harm, or perhaps the communication must be cruder -- that severe consequences will come swiftly if submission is denied or silence broken. Broader public expectations and rules of engagement might constrain a government armed force from making a similar message. In a peaceful county, the rules may tell a police officer not to serve a warrant between 10:00 in the evening and 6:00 in the morning, as such behavior is unpleasant and disrespectful to the neighbors. A gentle, liberal government instills some fear by suggesting that it will eventually serve process to prosecute unacceptable behaviors such as 'accessory to conspiracy to rebel'. In other words, there may be quite an imbalance in the influential incorporeal presence available to the contenders.


I do not suggest that the gentler side learn ruthlessness in order to redress such an imbalance, which is the advice of some. If we recognize the relationships between a) physical and non-physical presence, b) non-physical presence and the protection of movement routes and sanctuaries, and c) presence and distances, we can better measure our relative strengths. It then becomes apparent why the 'gentler way' of war is often that of position and movement. If we can truncate our enemy's physical presence we might diminish his greater, non-physical presence, which often as not is his capacity to generate fear.

If you concede sanctuary to an enemy, you postpone or forfeit victory. If you concede presence, it can lead to the concession of sanctuary. To allow, say, the nighttime to be unchallenged space for your enemy (or winter) -- or you decree that an enemy is not an enemy whenever he is not holding his weapon, or that he is not an enemy when he is on furlough mowing his grandmother's grass, then you concede a great deal of potential presence. You therefore permit his maintenance of movement and protection of sanctuary. It is not always possible to avoid this concession and forfeiture; it may be unavoidable in obedience to the honest calculation of relative power. You just might not be strong enough to shrink those spaces, but don't ignore them or wish them away.

Sending patrols out on 'presence' missions, to do 'presence operations' might be good, given that they might displace the enemy's opportunities for physical presence. On the other hand, they might be no more than an idle use of the word -- operational design by semantics. If patrols are just there physically and that's all there is to the *presence* (maybe because of disdain for the incorporeal part, or because they are casual and intermittent), the presence efforts could be counterproductive. The greatest value of presence operations will be realized if built in anticipation of incorporeal effects. What is the left-behind presence to be? How much physical presence will be needed to achieve it and how much distance must be covered or space occupied? What physical presence is needed to meet the goals for non-physical presence?

Soldiers need to know their enemy's physical location -- to close with and destroy him. Perhaps presence operations can produce some useable knowledge on that score but, in any case, presence operations should be closely related to sanctuary/anti-sanctuary operations.

Please see sections: 2, *Anonymity*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 137, *Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective*; 20, *Rule-of-law*; 65, *Smuggling*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 78, *Identity*; and 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*.



"If you're not confident enough to come talk then obviously nothing's going to come of it, because we're not even going to meet." [57]

Kate Upton (attributes)



“We promise according to our hopes
and perform according to our fears.”[\[58\]](#)

Francois de Rochefoucauld



Don't drop the backpack

Section 17, Keeping Secrets

Before declaring independence from King George, the North American revolutionaries formed the Continental Army, precursor of the United States Army. They had decided that creating some ability to provide impunity for their followers was a good step to take before voicing their dissent. They knew that at the beginning they had to keep the fact of the army's existence a secret in order to let it gain strength. Anonymity for the army's membership was essential, but even when preserving that anonymity was no longer imperative; the capacity to keep secrets remained one of the ingredients of victory.

Keeping secrets isn't easy. Rituals, rules, inspections, investigations and punishments can all help, but ultimately secrets are best-kept because of some freely-entered contract. Different ties bind differently and among the most binding are common identities based on family, place, common cultural experience (also tied to place), and common missions (especially if tied to place identity). There are all sorts of factors that can operate to cause people to leak information, including disaffection and dishonor. It doesn't always take big factors, either. Sex and money are often enough, or are part of the formula.

Some kinds of organizations can keep secrets better than others. Strength in keeping secrets is an attribute of winning armed organizations, whether pro- or anti-State. International organizations, meanwhile, are unlikely to keep secrets well. They rarely have a focused and inspiring mission, exclusive membership, tight member origins, and rarely can they punish disloyalty and sloppiness.

Secrets, because they are based on trust, engender mistrust. Section 106, *Massacres*, mentions a case in Colombia called Tacueyó, about a FARC leader who, feeling left-out by his leaders, stole a bunch of money from the FARC and created his own splinter group. Extreme paranoia (he had some good reasons to fear, however, given that both the government and the FARC wanted him dead) fueled his killing of almost two hundred persons, the great majority of whom had wished him no harm. Lack of trust, in the context of an ongoing armed competition, can have separate, but equally ruinous impact inside and outside the skull.

What is the fate of spies in irregular wars, or are they even spies? Under the traditional laws of war between States in the international system of States, a spy caught by one of the parties to a declared war could be summarily executed or executed after the briefest of military tribunals. If, however, that spy were to avoid capture or escape and make it back to his own side's lines, he was no longer to be considered a spy and could not be punished, even if he returned to the area of his enemy (that is, if he were no longer spying, of course). In other words, the traditional statute of limitations on punishment for spying was the spy's success at evasion. In these irregular wars there is no rule like that. What do you do when you find spies (maybe better to just call them infiltrators or moles) in your organization? Summarily dispatching them may be seen by the public as unpleasant. Most insurgent groups and most criminal gangs, however, don't just kill moles, they torture them to death. About the only category of human receiving worse punishment is the traitor/deserter, and if you are a traitor-deserter-spy, good luck with that. Ethel Rosenberg was executed for spying. The first electrocutions didn't work, so she was strapped back in and electrocuted some more.

A government law enforcement unit finding moles from a criminal gang (and who are citizens of the same country as that government) will arrest them and charge them under a number of available statutes. A government counterinsurgency force finding moles from an insurgent organization (also their citizens) will probably arrest them and charge them under a variety of statutes, perhaps including an espionage or treason statute. If they are from another country, but there is no war extant between the countries, the statutes will be a little harsher, the punishments probably a little more severe and the protections fewer. There may also be some diplomatic interchange as the government of the foreign country in question may wish to protect its citizens.

But what if a foreign force is helping an allied government with counterinsurgency and has its own troops in the territory of the foreign ally? The problem gets stickier. The government being defended is supposed to be the only one exercising a monopoly on the granting of impunity inside its territory. All else working well, the visiting troops, if they were to find a mole in their midst, could turn the perpetrator over to the host government and the appropriate prosecution would proceed. If the host country is not in condition to successfully prosecute, however, the mole might be released. That would be tantamount to allowing the mole's parent organization to grant the mole impunity. In such a condition, the visiting government is not keeping secrets well and not doing the basic job of providing protection for its own soldiers. One way of sorting things out is by defining sub-territories. The foreign force can set out a zone or zones of occupation. Inside those zones, the questions of justice, prosecution and impunity would be retained by the visiting government for the purposes of this one kind of offense. It is a partial or sliced sharing, or a loan of sovereignty. Another way is for the visiting force to participate in the processing of the captured moles. That could present some difficult language problems and surface some cultural divisions.

The question of what to do with moles is further complicated by differences between forensic evidence and military secrets. Most of these kinds of problems can be reconciled by thoughtful status of forces agreements, but the basic rules for winning armed conflict and the basic responsibilities of a government are clear. A military command that cannot maintain its secrets (perhaps by allowing infiltrators in its midst to go unpunished) is not responsibly protecting its soldiers.

In 1973, Fabio Vásquez, a leader of the ELN (now a waning guerrilla group) dropped his backpack during a skirmish with the Colombian Army. The backpack had in it a notebook with a long list of names of members and collaborators. The loss of the notebook all but doomed the ELN, which only survived on a thread for years. Similarly, when the Colombian government killed FARC leader Luis Devia (Raúl Reyes) in a 2008 raid across the Ecuadoran border, it found computers with similar, much longer lists. The loss was to that point the FARC's biggest single setback of the long war and may have constituted the decisive turning point in the fortunes of the FARC. The next big blow to the FARC came in 2010 when another major FARC leader, Jorge Briceño, was killed – and even more digital files taken. Gangsters and insurgents need to keep records and a compromise of these records is costly in the extreme. Not only do insurgent leaders have to enforce secrecy among their followers, they have to keep secrets. There is no way to just remember every person, place and thing. There has to be someplace to keep the records and, while the flash drive seems like a good idea, it is as dangerous as it is practical. Losing secrets means you are not controlling the balance of anonymity.

One of the less-debated freedoms of a liberal society is the freedom not to speak, including the freedom not only of association but of discreet association, and the right to reject association. Some feel that democracy is only valid when individual votes are transparent and each individual accountable to the whole group for his or her vote. This view of democracy, while sometimes attractive and just, is one that invites group pressure, extortion, and bullying. Anonymity is a highlighted theme of this book because control of anonymity lies at the heart of what it takes to win an organized conflict. It may also be a central value of the social compact.

Anonymity and secrecy are tightly related, with the word secrecy connoting a contract and intimacy, while anonymity connotes something impersonal. Rooting out traitors is a search for those who you feel have broken a trust, an intimacy – but laws that limit expression can actually lend anonymity to your opponents by suppressing their revelation of disaffection. The US Constitution constricts the labeling of people as traitors, which is understandable considering who penned the document and when. Americans don't like to have the term traitor thrown around too lightly given the American fondness for insurgency. Laws that limit free expression deter people from exposing themselves, however. Making it illegal to burn a certain flag, for instance, means suppressing the most obvious evidence of who would burn that flag.

You can lose secrets because of spying, treason, and your own sloppiness. All three can unbalance anonymity against you. In the process of designing against spies, traitors and the careless, however, you might create conditions that make your opponent's secrecy problem easier.

Please see sections: 3, *The Domesday Book*; 2, *Anonymity*; 77, *Sex*; 30, *Control Technology*; 43, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*; 58, *Condotierri*; 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; and 83, *Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?*.



Dunn: Uh, Captain, I'm picking up an overheat in the computer core.


Oveur: How serious is it, Mr. Dunn?

Dunn: Uh, I can't tell sir.

Oveur: Well you can tell me - I'm the Captain.

from the movie

Airplane II: The Sequel (1982)[59]



Peter: Before we go any further, all right, we have to swear to God, Allah, that nobody knows about this but us, all right? No family members, no girlfriends, nobody.

Samir: Of course.

Michael: Agreed.

Lawrence: (through a wall from the apartment next door) Don't worry, man. I won't tell anyone either.

Michael: Who the **** is that?

Peter: Uh, don't worry about him He's cool.

from the movie

Office Space (1999)[60]



Whole of whose government?

Section 18, Whole of Government

‘Whole of government’ is a term that hopefully refers to: (A) Unity of purpose and effort among the various institutions of a State to create or permit a social compact that maximizes human flourishing and builds toward a sustainable balance between material development and the health of the environment; (B) Correct weighting of administrative, health and engineering efforts in relation to the coercive or repressive responsibilities of the State; and (C) A plan of action intended to create a social compact not conducive to spawning, harboring or empowering smugglers and murderers.

We tend to assume that a comprehensive, unified effort is an obvious prescription for effective counterinsurgency, at least in the long run. The rarely asked question, however, is ‘Whole of whose government?’ Another lurking question regards who is in charge of this whole government and a third question is why someone who did not join the military should be expected to do anything the military asks. Sometimes unity of effort translates to ‘multi-agency approach’ but, again, whose agencies are we talking about and which agency is in charge?

This is where discipline as to definitions comes in. It is an immediately burdened argument that an army fighting in a foreign land is engaged in counterinsurgency. ‘Burdened’ does not mean wrong, but rather that the burden of proof is against it. In Colombia there is a need for a ‘whole of government’, approach to counterinsurgency, but there the challenge of the concept is clearer – a number of institutions within the Colombian State have for decades been populated by more than a few bureaucrats whose sympathies have lain with opponents of the State. Now that’s a whole of government problem.

If part of your military is bivouacked in some foreign country, it may be an invited and welcome guest of the local society and government. Its mission might be to help that State gain back a monopoly over the granting of impunity and to create a sustainable society that is not a threat to the United States. It would be reasonable in that situation to argue that your military is a counterinsurgent force and that it is conducting counterinsurgency (and stability operations, nation-building, security assistance, whatever). The government in ‘whole of government’, however, is that of the local society, not *your* government. This assertion suggests a pair of paradoxes, one a counterinsurgency operational paradox and the other a counterinsurgent organizational paradox.

The counterinsurgency operational paradox: If a foreign force assumes duties of governance and government services, like providing medical attention, paving streets, establishing courts or fixing pipes, it may well be seen as accountable – as the cause of dependency, as competitors for work, and as self-serving elements of foreign control. Those perceptions may have some truth to them, a truth sufficient to underpin and foment conclusions that the foreign force is an occupier, not a helper, and therefore a legitimate target of armed resistance. In other words, ‘whole of government’ may be a logical approach to counterinsurgency, but the wrong ‘whole of government’ elements and identities can fuel insurgency.

The counterinsurgent organizational paradox: If you have an armed force that is likely to go to foreign lands and stay there for any period of time, how do you design the force? If an armed force is organized, equipped and trained exclusively to close with and destroy the enemy by firepower, shock action, and maneuver, it will be able to do that mission best. As for the United States military, there exists a constant debate about whether or not a force primarily designed for big maneuver combat action can meet other missions and about how much capacity for nonlethal efforts should be built-in to the force design. How big does the force have to be, will it buy more tanks or more bulldozers, will it train sewage scientists or rocket scientists? So what’s the paradox? Senior US military leaders have generally favored maintaining a structure dedicated to winning the kind of wars this book is not about, and to handle ad hoc what they have considered lesser-included challenges along an imagined ‘spectrum’ of conflicts. Calling for ‘whole of government’, however, smells like incapacity. The military argues that others in the US government should contribute counterinsurgent elements because the military obviously does not have the institutional wherewithal. The more the military argues ‘whole of government’, the more it says that it is not designed to do counterinsurgency.

In many places and times, military leaders have tended to want to be the ones in charge of ‘whole of government’ efforts. Leaders of other agencies in ‘multiagency’ quickly see through this. In the case of United States’ presence in foreign lands, most US missions already feature what is called the ‘country team’, which is the intended ‘whole of representation’, and while there are various perturbations, they are usually, supposedly, led by a civilian.

If you have a military that is going to have regular foreign experiences, design accordingly or support the creation of a separate force that can in any given situation occupy and govern those little chunks of a foreign country that the foreign ‘whole of government’ is unable to govern. ‘Take, Hold, Build’ might have to mean, ‘Take, Occupy, Fix, Govern, Give Back’. If you really think that doing the latter is going to take a long time, why insist on using a force designed for big-combat?

The ‘whole of government’ question isn’t just about whose government or who is in charge; it is about whether or not the various non-police and non-military elements of a government owe support to the government’s police and military in pursuing criminals or destroying enemies. Every effort and every agency of every government everywhere should be counterinsurgent. A true insurgent is fighting against the system within which the government is the most obvious target. When a government is not honest, thrifty, courteous, kind, obedient, helpful, and loyal to its people, it invites insurgents. That assertion made, many elements within even a good government won’t see a legal obligation to help in the pursuit of criminals and enemies. Their leaders might vocally ratify their individual members’ explicit decisions to not join the police or military because they did not want to participate in the management of violence and did not want to go away from home. Especially if a conflict is distant and optional, it is easy to see why some people in the rest of the whole of government won’t pull on the same rope.

Police and military are special and distinct callings. These identities feature voluntary self-endangerment and a willingness to kill. Part of counterinsurgency can be done by people without this calling, since good government is perhaps counterinsurgent in effect. However, if the counterinsurgency has a military strategy part (perhaps because it has an armed and organized enemy that police cannot handle), that part probably entails a lot of moving and positioning in order to bring death to someone. In my personal opinion, the killing and dying part should not pertain to the rest of the whole of government. Efforts to cajole others outside the military to serve in military endeavors overseas might be seen as sneaky conscriptions.


Good insurgents have determined that their government has become a tyrant. As insurgents gain territorial control, they also are faced with problems of governance under conditions of resource shortages. A foreign force capable of providing interim services might be welcome – for a while. Bad insurgents want to be the tyrant and tyrants always preach ‘whole of government’.

Please see sections: 45, *Police or Military*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 115, *Academies*; 118, *Democracy*; 36, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 12, *Commitment of the Reserve*; 109, *Your Staff Work Sucks*; and 112, *DIME and PMESII*.




“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.”[\[61\]](#)

C. S. Lewis



“It is not difficult to govern.
All one has to do is not to offend the noble families.”
Mencius (attributed)



“Doing what’s right is not the problem,
it’s knowing what’s right...”
President Lyndon Johnson
(attributed)



Suffering is a price and a product offered

Section 19, Mercatus

Economics is decidedly relevant to the cause and resolution of your war, but economic concerns are difficult to isolate from everything else. That said, there are four theoretical points related to markets that might be especially useful and are favored in this book. They are: 1. Transaction theory and peaceful conflict resolution; 2. Borrowing and speculation as causes of organized violence; 3. The certain existence of markets in things tangible and intangible (especially land), and; 4. The unlikelihood of beating the market through central planning. These four are themselves all intermixed, so the following text is not perfectly divided accordingly.

You cannot: separate the market from the world; separate the market from money; or separate armed conflict from the future value of money. Money is both a measurement and a promise. Stable, agreed-upon measurement is one of the original human inventions for conflict resolution, an accelerator of trade, and a creator of trust. When we talk of the future value of money, we are talking about gambling and speculation, or about investment. Some friend of yours may disdain commoditization, mercantilism, commercialism, and Bill Gates. That attitude will not succeed to separate markets from the environment of your irregular war; don't let it disjoin your study of markets from your understanding of that environment.

Financial debts created under duress might be called an extortion market or time-fused extortion. The fact that people take advantage of others' needs by creating untenable debts or charging usurious interest rates is the fuel for entire political philosophies, religious edicts, works of art, and revolutionary thinking. What is an ethical price for the current use of future value? What is one's ethical obligation to give of one's surplus and what right should individuals have to decide where their surplus should go? Can central planners decide the best use of private surplus better than a free market? What right should an individual or group have to decide on the divestment of someone else's surplus?

If you are in charge of a military occupation, however (and 'occupier' might also be appropriate if you are an insurgent guerrilla leader) then the first question is whether or not you know who owes what to whom. If you pretend that there is no market for the current value of future wealth, you're lost. If you pretend that the lending of wealth for the purpose of investment is not happening or that it does not create resentments as well as appreciations and loyalties, you are likely mistaken. If you do not know if there is a collective identity of debtors and another of creditors, you may be missing an underlying factor of organized violence. If you do not know who has debts, who pays them and who collects them, you cannot be fully aware of the dynamics of violence.

It is not uncommon for some organizations to actively, purposefully create or promote a violent environment favorable for their investment. Shakespeare's Falstaff (*Henry IV, Part I*) says "you may buy land now as cheap as stinking mackerel." Falstaff, a swollen bag of dropsies, was looking forward to the bargains (not just in land, but in young maidens) that would present themselves due to the civil war passing through. The FARC and its opposite, the AUC, would create geographies of fear and violence in order to suppress the market value of land, and then extort its sale. Guerrilla groups are filled with Falstaffs.

Speculation about the future value of things, including money, is a frequent cause or catalyst of armed social conflict. A debt is often the product of a loan, interest accruing. People don't always want to pay up. Debts can take on sophisticated forms, too, like 'national' debts, worker pension plans or sub-prime mortgages. It is common to create secondary markets for debts owed and to provide secondary insurance for that debt, thus creating a speculative market regarding the payment. This latter form of market is essentially a betting pool on whether or not the debt will be paid and on whether or not the insurance will be paid if the original debtor doesn't pay. Other lenders will pay off (assume) debts now in return for a higher probability of payment over a longer period. All this 'securitization' can be confusing, but essentially it is all about the future value of money now. Knowing all this, and that it is really not complicated, can be a great advantage to you in armed social conflict, but you have to start by understanding there is a market for important things, and that the first important thing is land. There is also sex, retribution, absolution, etc., but start with land. It tends to stay put.

There is always a market in land. You may want to suppose not, because the form of ownership and the nature of records may be unusual to you. A right to charge rents may be ecclesiastical or clan-based. The rents might be paid in kind, labor or military service. If someone has the authority to determine a land-use, occupancy, or to exclude the presence of certain people on any areas of land — those authorities and powers are rights in land. The rights and their exercise can be traded and almost always *are* traded. Any trading in the privileges associated with determining rights to passage, occupancy, free use and enjoyment, rents, or the distribution or alienation of such rights and duties, constitutes the market.

Find out all about the market in land. You can intervene in this market, changing debt relationships, thus changing the cost of future value now. In fact, if you are involved in an armed conflict in some way, you probably are changing the market in land whether you know it or not, so it behooves you to know how — and to at least have some control or initiative over it. It is an easy condition to test. If you do not know who controls or exercises basic rights and obligations regarding occupancy, rents, access, divestment, etc., of key pieces of terrain — of any terrain — then you are probably not aware of the conflict-consequences of your actions or those of anyone else. The inevitable result is your not being situated to take efficient measures or to anticipate unintended consequences of your work and presence.

Banking is a realm into which few soldiers enter, but where sophisticated forms of parasitism have long been known to occur. Sometimes they cause a war. In the late 19th century, the government of Colombia began to use a combination of tax and monetary policies to divert an increasing share of the country's convertible wealth into the incumbent political party's coffers. Coffee growers, at least those of the opposing political party, were acutely aware of the profit their lands might earn in international markets and how much they were losing to inflation and to taxes. They resented the forced cheapening of the local currency, matched by having to pay export taxes in stable dollars. The government's attempt to redirect the rents of private land, via banking, and without returning value through public works, was one of the underlying causes of a costly civil war.

'More absolution, less tithing' is not a slogan likely to gain converts to a new religion, at least according to one observant economist, Larry Iannaccone. The Marine Corps recruiter who tells high-schoolers that being a Marine is easy won't meet quota nearly as fast as the one who tells the kids "You're not good enough, go home, you're a weenie; if you don't want to get yelled at, humiliated, exhausted, ridiculed and abused, don't waste my time." The market for some things seems to go against logic, but it doesn't really. As Iannaccone observes, you just have to know what's being sold and bought. The Marine recruiter is gleaning for the candidate looking for challenge, purpose, camaraderie, and honor. The Marines figure those prime recruits are especially not looking for comfort or efficiency. Honor is also in the mix for the Islamic radical. For the recruiter of the suicide bomber, the pitch includes existential purpose — an answer to desperation and despair.

Few Colombian Catholics are going to commit suicide for a religious or political purpose, and especially not for seventy-two virgins. Aside from suicide being one of the mortal sins, sex between men and women is apparently a less guarded event in Medellín as compared to, say, Fallujah. Nevertheless, Pablo Escobar knew what the local cultural equivalent to Jihadist suicide looked like. He knew he could recruit a young man to go assassinate someone even though to do so meant swift and certain (or rather, near certain) death for the assassin himself. The offer was to buy the young man's poverty-stricken mother a house and to throw the boy a celebratory party. No shortage of takers. The parallels are easy to identify. They have to do with dignity, honor, hopelessness, disillusion, and are tied to territorial identity, local culture, and the future material

value of current action. It seems that many Muslim fighters who volunteer for suicide missions are also aware of the material support likely to be bestowed on their families as a result of their sacrifice. Honorable death often leaves a residual of material benefit. It can create a form of debt.

At some point or other, you have been abused by thinkers who don't like market forces and consider them an over billed, false God of neoliberal capitalism, and a cynical justification of ethically undesirable outcomes. Some of that may be true, but if you so despise Adam Smith's invisible hand that you deny its presence and power in your thinking and plans, you will probably lose your war. Marxist revolutionaries, for instance, have often turned into some of the best, if most vicious capitalists. They want you to think the market is not happening and that price is a fiction, while they work the market hard to their business advantage. Post-structuralism (the zombie of marxism-leninism) argues that power flows throughout the social discourse, that all actors, to include perhaps even things, have immanent power that emerges in the context of specific events and struggles. Ethereal sounding, the economist might just call that same dynamic interplay of desires and influences the *market*; and *price* the market's way of measuring manifest power at a moment in time and place. For the purpose of winning your war, don't fall in love or hate with any academic discipline's way of explaining things, but definitely do not talk yourself out of the existence of markets and market mechanisms just because you like philosophers more than economists.

The great names in economics were, at any rate, almost all social philosophers. "...[T]hrough the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements." [62] The quote is from Adam Smith, who was talking about unintended but beneficial consequences of a free market and about the role of morality in all social dealings, including those most closely associated with money and trade. He was of course talking about the 'invisible hand' of the market, but the quotation is not from *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* but rather from *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which was published some two decades earlier, in 1759.

Unintended consequences always seem to tide-in when a government bureaucrat or politician supplants the priest or hacienda owner as philanthropist or patron. Among the unintended consequences are those related to the generalized payment of what some people call the 'social debt' – a debt supposedly owed by the more powerful to the less powerful. People don't always recognize a debt or want to pay the debts they do recognize; creditors naturally get anxious when they feel some debt is due. The radical activist advises the downtrodden not to ask for what is rightfully due, but to demand it. Some governments ratify such social debts, reinforcing the idea that payment on the social debt is forever due. It will be taken from the 'have' debtors, supposedly to be paid 'have not' creditors. In the process, the middleman government will pocket a handsome commission, and the creditors wait patiently in lines for the rest of their dependent lives.

How you define this basic question of credit and charity (spiritual, social, and personal debt) may come to backstop the approach you take to your irregular war responsibilities. You might dutifully repeat the notion that the government (a government that you might *be*) is justly measured in accordance with the services it provides. Good luck with that; the list of services demanded can expand fast and a population that is given much might produce little.

Speculation and debt are under-considered causes of organized violent conflict. They are all traded in markets. There is always a market for land, a most important object of desire. Know the markets – including for souls, money, and especially land.

Please see sections: 61, *The Geography of Dope*; 65, *Smuggling*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 54, *Extortion*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 126, *The Particularization of Power*; and 72, *Land Strategy*.



"The King of England brought seven dollars, and his prime minister nine; whereas the king was easily worth twelve dollars and I easily worth fifteen. But that is the way things always go; if you force a sale on a dull market, I don't care what the property is, you are going to make a poor business of it..." [63]

Hank in Mark Twain's,
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court



Joe Dirt: You're gonna stand there, owning a fireworks stand, and tell me you don't have no...spleen splitters, whisker biscuits, honkey lighters, hoosker doos, hoosker don'ts, cherry bombs, nipsy daisers, with or without the scooter stick, or one single whistling kitty chaser?

Kicking Wing: No... because snakes and sparklers are the only ones I like.

Joe Dirt: Well that might be your problem, it's not what you like, it's the *consumer*.

from the movie,
Joe Dirt [64]



The rule-of-law is written

Section 20, Rule-of-Law

We hear a lot about the rule-of-law these days, and a lot of programs are sold as providing or supporting it. I can suggest no single title to read, but advise you start with Wikipedia and go from there. On the other hand, *property* (ownership systems; how a society divides, distributes, and recognizes rights and duties; how these rights and duties are recorded and observed; and how conflicts over important disagreements are resolved) is, as a practical concept, inseparably tied to the rule-of-law. There are a number of good property titles, some noted in section 73, *Property and the Social Compact*. In the end, for winning, the key to grading a rule-of-law program will be whether or not it helps you gain advantage in anonymity and a monopoly over the granting of impunity.

There are two principal currents of thinking about the rule-of-law. One current argues that rule-of-law is about the process and coverage of law, but doesn't speak to the normative goodness of the laws themselves. In other words, we would credit a place as following the rule-of-law if the people had stable expectations about the consequence of behavior, and if everyone were treated even-Steven, regardless of whether or not the laws were harsh and stupid. According to this current, a tyrant could run a rule-of-law country wherein no other entity besides his State could grant impunity, even if the tyrant were consistently cruel. The other branch of opinion sees rule-of-law as a normative condition of justice. By this way of thinking we would praise a society as upholding the rule-of-law only if the laws and their application are reasonable, equitable and meet some minimum standards of gentleness. The two currents are similar to those attending *legitimacy*. One approach to legitimacy depends on acceptance and stability, but not a normative standard of behavior, while the other current asserts minimum behavioral standards. As with legitimacy, the currents that define rule-of-law are almost always mixed.

A notion commonly associated with rule-of-law is that nobody be above the law. You have to ask, however, *whose* law is it above which nobody can be. The relationship between corruption, rule-of-law, and impunity – one of sordid intimacy – comes into play here. When government officials sell impunity, it is corruption. If a government then grants its own members impunity, we can say not only that the government is above the law, but that it has dragged others above the law with it. The geography of sanctuary for such corruptionists is the geography of the government itself.

Many of us prefer to believe that real rule-of-law cannot exist under a tyrant or a corruptionist, no matter how accepting, obedient and pacific a people becomes. We would prefer to reserve the term *rule-of-law* for something better. In the cruel world, governance is easy without the rule-of-law; you can win at irregular war by assuring that only *your* State, good or bad, can grant impunity. If in your State the Man happens to be one man, then it is his law, his property, and he is the lord and ruler. A dictator can win an armed social struggle, an internal war, and an insurgency. It happens all the time and some would say that dictators often implement the rule-of-law. There are proponents of strong-arm *caudillos* in Latin America who will support a government that, while itself 'above the law', rules in such a way that other entities can't grant impunity to their own underlings for crimes against the public. Many Latin Americans are so starved of a peaceful social compact that stable expectations, procedures and institutions for quotidian conflict resolution are worth the price of losing the power to throw out the tyrant. They become willing to democratically vote themselves into slavery. That is the price of a flaccid standard for the rule-of-law.

Creating a noble rule-of-law entails two challenges. One is building stable expectations, procedures and institutions for conflict resolution – all of which can slow government down. For instance, under the best rule-of-law, civil courts expect to see contract documents, and police officers have to get warrants before they make arrests. The other challenge is cultural education and acceptance. Rule-of-law is elusive where people are ignorant of their rights according to the written law, or if they have so little faith in the execution and defense of the written law that the writings are empty and merely hypothetical. Some countries are chock full of legalities and statutes that purportedly protect everyone and everything, but the level of impunity is such that most of the paper is meaningless. There are two vertebral parts to creating the rule-of-law: paper and education, both of which are forfeit to impunity.

It is not uncommon in embattled areas to find individuals who are motivated only by the threat of violence or by money. They readily believe threats of force made against them because they are aware that the perpetrators are ruthless, practiced, and likely to go unpunished for the violence they commit. A victim population won't help the perpetrators' gentler opponents, whatever the attraction of the latter's gentleness, because victims fear the immediate cost of violating the rules of silence imposed by the ruthless. Rules of silence substitute for the rule-of-law. Money, meanwhile, often represents the value of a victim's risk, a value measured by how much it will cost to escape the ruthless tormentors. Violence is relatively cheap conduct, as is accessorial behavior of those who fear defying the perpetrators of violence. In such a situation, many people find too high the immediate cost of siding with a gentle contestant (who would establish a system of formalized justice).

The rule-of-law will not exist if the side determined to impose a gentle peace does not control the balance of anonymity and close down the routes of the ruthless to their sanctuaries. Little progress can be made against a ruthless, organized enemy who can hide or can hide corruption. Fortunately, many of the same processes that break down anonymity also serve as a foundation toward sustainable peace in which the cost of peaceful conflict resolution is less than that of violence. The rule-of-law is a combination of written evidence, institutions, and expectations regarding how evidence will be used by those institutions. To win peace and sustain it – to create the rule-of-law – means *written* inventories, statutes and procedures. There is no rule-of-law without recording.

Rule-of-law does not mean more policemen. The two main parts of rule-of-law are documents and public attitude about the documents. If those two parts aren't constructed, it doesn't matter how many more policemen you put on the street, unless you are satisfied with a tyrannical rule-of-law and individual liberties are of little importance to you. In this latter case, more policemen might be a good idea as long as they don't find a leader prettier than you or your tyrant (which tends to happen).

If you are going to win an internal armed struggle, your side has to dominate the granting of impunity. That is not the same as saying that people can't get away with crimes. Your side, your government, can grant impunity, but it has to be the only organization in the territory that can do so, otherwise violent conflict is still likely. If you want to keep organizations that challenge your monopoly (on the granting of impunity) from forming, then you are going to have to spend resources on the design of the society. A repressive society can easily succeed at eliminating competition in the granting of impunity. Liberal societies find it harder for the obvious reason that people freely exercise rights of association, privacy, and owning weapons. If you want to design a liberal society that also can dominate the granting of impunity, then you have to work harder. You have to create a lot of documents and a lot of people that can read them and believe in them. It takes readers – and that takes education, and that takes time. You need transparent markets, too, especially for the most important stuff, like land.


If someone is trying to sell you a program purporting to advance the rule-of-law in some territory, think through what the program does to the granting of impunity within the territory. One possible indicator is the relationship of the program to the balance of anonymity. If you cannot predict the effect of the program on anonymity or impunity, maybe the program is a misnomer and you can seek clarification. If you want to shut down an enemy organization, you don't want a program that does no more than provide your enemies a new avenue of legal escape. If, on the other hand, a program seems reasonably designed to create stable records and conflict resolution institutions and to educate people as to the economic and moral value of peaceful conflict resolution, it might well be a good program.

Please see sections: 14, *Legitimacy*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 42, *Brigands*; 78, *Identity*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; and 103, *Amnesty*.



“There is no person in this room whose basic rights are not involved in any successful defiance to the carrying out of court orders.”[\[65\]](#)

Dwight D. Eisenhower (attributed)



“Never can a new idea move within the law. It matters not whether that idea pertains to political and social changes or to any other domain of human thought and expression -- to science, literature, music; in fact, everything that makes for freedom and joy and beauty must refuse to move within the law. How can it be otherwise? The law is stationary, fixed, mechanical, “a chariot wheel” which grinds all alike without regard to time, place and condition, without ever taking into account cause and effect, without ever going into the complexity of the human soul.”

Emma Goldman[\[66\]](#)



A hidden conventional story

Section 21, Iximché

A lot was going on in Guatemala in the early 1980s. This rendition of the conflict highlights a relationship between small battles in Guatemala City and guerrilla warfare ranging the mountains west of the capital. The underlying war of position and movement, obedient to the principles of classic military theory, was more consequential than most histories remember. A major operation and turning point was named after an ancient Mayan ruin and piece of key terrain called Iximché. Of the personalities involved, Colonel Manuel Antonio Callejas y Callejas, who at the time directed the Guatemalan intelligence service (D-2), had the greatest individual impact on outcomes.

Sometime early in 1981, a member of the ORPA (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms) rented a big house from a dentist in the upper middleclass neighborhood of Vista Hermosa along the highway heading east out of Guatemala City toward El Salvador. The new tenant was a foreigner, apparently a Salvadoran who used falsified documents. His house guests, ORPA guerrillas, converted the home into a revolutionary headquarters, explosives and propaganda factory, and materiel transfer point. From there they supported guerrilla units marshalling in the highlands about fifty miles west of the city. Careful at first, they grew lax in their security under the growing weight of preparations for what was intended as a huge 'final assault' on the city sometime around Christmas that year.

At 9:45 AM on July 9th, the house was surrounded by upwards of 200 policemen and another 200 soldiers. The army sealed off the neighborhood with armored cars and troops from the Honor Guard Brigade. Kids at the nearby American School, attended by many children of embassy personnel, were kept at the school until 4:30 PM, well past their normal dismissal. Schools in the area were closed on the following day as well. Efforts were made to secure the surrender of the besieged guerrillas using loudspeakers, but the guerrillas disdained the ultimatums, choosing instead to fight it out. Around noon, one of the army's M-8 armored cars opened fire with its 37mm cannon. The explosion did more damage than expected, setting off a huge secondary explosion inside the house (no wonder, since the occupants were busy making landmines). The entire roof nearly collapsed. Fourteen guerrillas were taken out that day and another three bodies were taken out on the 10th. Four of the dead guerrillas were women. One soldier from the D-2 fell through the roof and died. There are conflicting reports as to whether any of the guerrillas were taken alive. Perhaps the army was able to conduct a few rudimentary interrogations. Regardless, the tenacity of the guerrillas in defending the safe house can be explained by the value of the house's contents. Not only did the army find an impressive stash of weapons and explosives, it also claimed discovery of guerrilla plans and valuable lists of other guerrillas.

The D-2 may have been tipped off by an insider. Two ORPA guerrillas had been taken captive and shown off in public two weeks earlier, on June 26. Both were young *campesinos* who had been taken prisoner in a rural area. In their public admissions, they spoke of their recruitment and international training. They probably gave far more information to their interrogators. Mario Payeras, leader of another leftist insurgent group, the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor) later suggested that the captives might have described the interior of the house and, with that information, the D-2 could deduce its type and neighborhood and then slowly check lists of rentals. In the search of those records, they would have been attracted by the suspect documents of this particular renter. Apparently, earlier in July, the D-2 had received a call from a neighbor's domestic servant reporting odd goings-on next door – too many lights on too late at night, too many adults, and not enough children. The D-2 confirmed the neighbor's suspicions and mounted the assault.

Mario Payeras wrote in *Trueno en la Ciudad (Thunder in the City)*:

According to the classic principles of war, any army, knowing that the fundamental factors on which it has based its strategy are threatened, had better change that strategy. To the extent that a severance of support between rearguard services and the frontlines occurs closer to the front lines, the effect is more immediate. The closer the severance is to the rearguard, the more global the effect. Inside the urban Front a similar military doctrine applies: to put the enemy commander in a dilemma. Either leave the city or risk having your forces destroyed in position.... In synthesis, that is what occurred. In the following weeks, having destroyed the rearguard, the anti-guerrilla offensive would have to proceed in phases in the countryside, exploiting the initial success and maintaining the initiative. It was the difficult logic of the laws of war that we were learning then. We paid for the lesson in blood.[\[67\]](#)

In the weeks that followed the July 9th assault in Vista Hermosa, the army was able to mount a series of attacks on insurgent safe houses that devastated the guerrillas' presence in Guatemala City. Army morale skyrocketed. Cracking the Vista Hermosa safe house was the good news the army had long needed and, as it would turn out, the officers correctly sensed that the 9 July attack was a major turning point in the war, perhaps *the* turning point.

The previous week, on July 4, the EGP held a dedication ceremony for two squads belonging to their urban military unit. On that day, the guerrillas noted an eerie calm in the city that they thought might presage bad news – perhaps the government was planning a house-by-house sweep (*cateo*) of the city – but the guerrillas discarded that possibility because of the huge number of soldiers it would take. The army couldn't afford to dedicate the men needed to make such an operation worthwhile. Nevertheless, in the first week of July, normal vehicle checkpoints in the city had all but disappeared. This might have put the guerrilla more on alert, but they attributed the situation to impotence on the part of the government. The Guatemalan president, General Fernando Romeo Lucas García, reconfirmed the insurgents' predisposition with a public speech wherein he admitted how strong the guerrillas were.

After the events of July 9, it might have seemed more obvious to the insurgents that indeed they had observed the calm before the storm, but instead they attributed the attack on the ORPA's Vista Hermosa safe house to errors made by that cell. The EGP did not yet sense an immediate danger to its own urban operations. The next day this hopeful perspective was demolished. On July 10th, a second redoubt was taken, this time EGP. Twelve more guerrillas were killed. Although the guerrilla counted on informants inside the government, the speed of D-2 operations outpaced the speed at which the insurgent moles could inform. Within one month, dozens of safe houses had fallen, and although the D-2 continued to clear some safe houses well into 1982, the ORPA and then the EGP was forced to abandon almost its entire urban presence.

Each week, Colonel Callejas would brief Minister of Defense Aníbal Guevara in increasing detail on two phenomena (coup plotting and climactic events in the guerrilla war), but the arrogance of the minister and his boss, Romeo Lucas, was by then strong enough that neither could process the information. The defense minister was devoting his attention to his personal destiny – which he thought meant becoming President. His busy preparations for that end made him oblivious to both the political and military upheavals that were taking place around him.

The public psychology in Guatemala in July, 1981 is both difficult to capture and significant for understanding the shift in momentum that was about to disfavor insurgent plans. For some time the revolutionaries had succeeded in creating that magic mixture of revolutionary messaging – that insurgent strength was growing; that the government military was impotent to fix and destroy them; and that insurgent success was inevitable. Guerrilla strategic communication, if formulaic, had the desired effect of gamering supporters from throughout the economic spectrum and internationally. It has to be said as well that the insurgents broadly transmitted the message of their inevitable rise to power while at the same

time never ringing an alarm bell that the Guatemalan Army's hierarchy might hear.

Both guerrilla military powers, the EGP and ORPA, hid the size of their military preparations by disciplined avoidance of head to head contests with any sizeable Guatemalan Army units. Now, however, after the first of the safe houses had fallen, the G-2 was gaining convincing evidence about the magnitude of the guerrilla challenge. More consequentially, the public as much as the army noticed how easily the guerrilla units might be beaten. The raids alerted the entire urban population to be curious about what was going on over at their neighbors'. Finally there occurred a palpable demonstration of public support; the D-2 began to receive hundreds of phone calls.

The anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua was also in mid-July. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega gave a long, Fidelesque speech to commemorate the occasion that fell hard on attentive ears in Guatemala. In his speech, *Comandante* Daniel laid out emphatically and with little ornamentation the radical course that had been mapped for the Nicaraguan revolution. Property confiscations were the order of the day. [68] The *Comandante* also outlined and justified control of the press, including the highly regarded newspaper *La Prensa*. Guatemalans of any material means were offered a stiffening reminder of the consequences of socialist revolution.

The number of guerrillas or guerrilla leaders captured or killed in the raids was by no means crippling, nor was the loss of materiel. The D-2's urban success had, however, four overarching consequences, as follows:

1. The raids greatly changed the distances of logistical supply to the guerrillas' rural units. The insurgents had to switch (quickly) what had been a main line of communication running thirty to sixty miles from Guatemala City into the mountains to the west. Now they had to run their support activities from Mexico — nearly a 180 degree reverse. In their urban raids, the D-2 had found hospitals, landmine factories, propaganda centers, and weapons smuggling devices. The bulk of these activities would now have to be conducted at five times the distance. The D-2 also uncovered things like papier-mâché facemasks, uniforms, national police car license plates, and so on.

These anonymity and infiltration activities would have to be re-constructed to be suitable in their Mexico context. At least, as the new intelligence also made clear, the insurgents could count on collaboration from within the Mexican government. They could obtain, for instance, official PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos, the national petroleum company) pick-up trucks to haul explosives.

2. They shifted the psychological momentum, giving the Guatemalan Army a vital morale boost at a critical point in the war, and making key sectors of the public reassess the possibilities. The D-2 had muffled the 'Songs of Chu'.

3. The raids unlocked a door to intelligence information that would help make the next chapter in the war unfold in the Army's favor. Between mid-July and mid-October, the D-2 obtained sufficient hard information not only to see the marshaling of irregular forces for a major offensive against the capital city, but to convince the Chief of Staff, General Benedicto Lucas Garcia (the President's younger brother) to act diligently. This was no small task considering the environment of cocksure oblivion into which the regime's leaders had fallen. Colonel Callejas arranged a helicopter tour of key points in the highlands for the new Chief (who had been transferred from command of the distant Poptún Brigade in mid-August). They flew to the nearby mountain village of Chupol where the General saw a network of Viet Cong-style defense trenches, tunnels and booby traps installed by the guerrillas. Finally, the senior military leader was a believer that Guatemala had a war on its hands and not just a few annoying rebels. The resolve of the Army's leadership changed tenor and planning for a rural counter offensive began immediately.

4. They eliminated part of the guerrillas' operational formula, which was to distract a major part of the Guatemalan Army's overall combat power in reaction to guerrilla urban actions and provocations.

The D-2 followed up on leads, uncovering a series of older rural insurgent materiel depots, as well as rural logistical improvisations that were occasioned by the collapse of the urban safe houses. Soon, Colonel Callejas could outline the shape of the planned insurgent offensive, measure its strength and point to its geographic heart, its operational center of gravity.

From urban to rural. Although it is hard to recognize on a tourist map, or during a quick drive along the Inter-American Highway, the ground around the Indian villages of Chupol and Xepol in Chimaltenango Department has always been a military geographic prize. The space that runs roughly from Chupol and Xepol, to Tecpán Guatemala and the ancient ruins of Iximché, and through Patzún to the south and Comalapa to the east dominates both east-west and north-south passage through the mountains. These towns sit near the continental divide — waters to the north flow to the Motagua River and the Atlantic, whereas streams to the south flow to the Madre Vieja or Xaya/Vega rivers to the Pacific. The departmental boundaries of Chimaltenango, Quiché and Sololá meet in the area, as do the *de facto* boundaries of three major (and historically contentious) ethnic groups, the Quiché to the north, Cakchiquel to the southeast, and the Tzutujil to the southwest. These indigenous boundaries are not contiguous with the modern departmental limits.

The territorial organization of the army (into *zonas*) had been based on the assumption of external invasion rather than an internal challenge, so the Xepol-Patzún axis was not a focal point for the design of the major military commands. A boundary between two military zones ran across the area, their headquarters located in distant Huehuetenango and Guatemala City, respectively. Insurgent choice of the environs as a focal point of extraordinary revolutionary effort was no accident and was not predicated on proletariat ripeness or ideological romanticism. The insurgents selected what history, movement, and enemy order of battle all indicated was key terrain, if not the geographical center of gravity. Both the ORPA and the EGP, whose territorial boundaries also met there, recognized the same military criticality as had the pre-conquest Mayas and conquistador Pedro de Alvarado.

The Army kicked off Operation Iximché at one o'clock on the morning of November 15, 1981 with about 1,900 soldiers. The terrain objective was that key crescent of land in northwestern Chimaltenango Department, but the underlying goal was to break up guerrilla preparations for their anticipated Christmas offensive and to wrest control of the rural highland approaches to Guatemala City. The guerrillas, overextended, overconfident, and not alert, were badly routed. The guerrillas had not anticipated the weight of the attack or the ferocity with which the army dealt with some of their most supportive villages. A clear message raced through the highlands: The revolutionary left, with its selective terror and Marxist bravado, was no match for its better-armed opponent. Insurgent marshalling for a Christmas offensive was dead. The army gained strategic initiative. The long-term implications could not be immediately seen by either side, and Operation Iximché, which was supposed to last 10 days, essentially went on for two years. The guerrillas would try to adjust, but they had no adequate 'Plan B'. They reeled, and in 1982 the army made surprising adaptations to exploit gains and frustrate any effective guerrilla return.

Beyond a final assault on the capital city, what was the insurgent plan? It is not clear whether the major groups within the insurgent political umbrella organization, the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) ever shared the same vision, but militarily there was some concurrence. They would isolate the northwestern areas of Huehuetenango and Quiché from Guatemala City and the eastern provinces, proclaim a liberated territory backed by broad international support (especially Mexican), then leverage this nascent autonomy for concessions from a

besieged central government. For this plan to work, the Xepol-Patzún axis had to be effectively controlled both day and night. The territory would be defended by a deep battle zone that extended east to Guatemala City, to be supplied from out of the northwest (especially after the Guatemala City guerrilla infrastructure was decimated). Guerrilla positioning and attacks would dissipate Guatemalan army strength by coaxing the army into static defenses and reactions against urban guerrilla initiatives. The ‘final assault’ might or might not take the capital, but the army’s strategic reserve (composed mainly of units in the urban area) would be so stretched to protect the city and its suburbs that it could not effectively answer the insurgents in the highlands.

If the urban guerrilla infrastructure was back in place in three months (as EGP leader Ricardo Asturias later claimed), it was back in place on a much smaller, more timid scale, like a re-grown salamander tail. The urban rearguard was no longer able to fill the same role. Three months, moreover, (in fact, it was more like six) meant that the urban front could neither distract army forces away from Chupol when the army launched its rural counterattack in November nor disrupt the general elections the following March. Whatever lessons the urban front might have learned, and however well organized it might later become, its moment had gone. It had three main missions: supply the rural units, misdirect Army resources, and confound the elections. It could do none of these. Now it just served to prove the guerrilla still had a pulse.

Destruction of the guerrillas’ Guatemala City network of safe houses was the first clear strategic defeat suffered by the guerrillas. Alone it would not have been sufficient to unsaddle revolutionary plans, but the urban campaign led almost immediately to the army’s rural counterpunch. That punch caught the revolutionaries overextended and in the midst of marshalling for their attack on the city, and not preparing for the army’s move. The balloon of guerrilla geographic presence quickly deflated, sending insurgent cadre streaming back into Mexico.


The Guatemalan Army could not definitively beat the URNG because insurgent sanctuaries lay inside Mexican territory. Eventually, the contenders would come to a negotiated agreement; the army had to accept a bitter half loaf. The Guatemalan government just didn’t have the power to beat an insurgent foe that had Mexico as an ally. But inside Guatemala, in 1981, the Guatemalan Army, guided by Callejas y Callejas – a student of geography, history, and strategy – beat a huge insurgent force militarily.

Colonel Callejas later became Army Chief of Staff, retired, and is aging gracefully. He is one of the graduates of the School of the Americas about whom the radical left is most resentful and vituperative. Mario Payeras lived anonymously in Mexico City and died young in 1995. His remains were exhumed by thieves and scattered. He left behind an appreciable body of literature, however, and has become a minor martyr in the leftist revolutionary firmament.

What are some relevant lessons from this obscure history?


- * Smart guerrillas think about the classic strategy principles;
- * Police forensics can have military operational impact;
- * Public records are powerful resources;
- * A guerrilla sanctuary in a foreign country presents a difficult operational and geostrategic challenge;
- * Internal wars are international wars;
- * Leadership is critical;
- * Timing matters;
- * Rural and urban are connected operationally;
- * Cottage industry explosives had become an insurgent staple;
- * Kidnapping had become an insurgent staple.

Please see sections: 34, *Urban or Rural*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 125, *Human Rights*; 55, *Kidnapping*; 137, *Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective*; and 136, *Weapons*.



Crowded the nations there were (Tzatz ri amaq' chu k'oje'ik).
Not counted people (Mawi ajilan chi winaq).
Warriors (E aj lab'al),
Also killers (E pu kamisanel),
Murderers (E kamisay),...
Not only two eight thousands (Mawi xa ka chuy),
Three eight thousands of nations (Ox chuy chi amaq')
They encircled (Xkotkomij)
Around citadel (Chirij tinamit).[\[69\]](#)


Allen J. Christenson
Popol Vuh: Literal Translation



“What chance would Christianity have to exist
if the truth were to be found in counting votes?”[\[70\]](#)
Manuel Ayau



----- Guatemalan Highlands circa 1982 -----



The black dotted lines are principal highways. The grey dashed oval indicates the approximate objective terrain of the Guatemalan Army in late November, 1981. As soon as the army controlled that area, the communists abandoned their military offensive and retreated in haste toward Mexico.

මහින්ද රාජපක්ෂ

Section 22, Badassoftheweek.com

Who leads insurgencies, drug mafias, separatist movements and the like? So many great examples are noted on the website *Badassoftheweek.com* it just seemed fair to name this section after the website, presented by Ben ‘Amazing’ Thompson. A lot of Thompson’s heroes are fictional, some aren’t even human or even vertebrate, but that doesn’t matter. There are still plenty of historic examples to profile the kind of person who becomes a successful anti-State leader. There is no single profile of attributes, but most of the successful leaders are most of the following:

Aggrieved; Athletic; Brave; Charismatic; Creative; Egoistic; Horney; Male; Perseverant; Rich; Risk-taking; Ruthless; Smart;
Student of military art and history.

There are plenty of examples of great insurgent leaders. George Washington is my favorite. Spartacus is a standout. Pick your own; they all understood and respected the operational equation inherent in classic military strategy. Washington was especially careful to secure his lines of retreat. He didn’t enjoy too many straight up victories in battle against the British, but he never got caught. Spartacus, in a funk, finally defied one time too many not just his Roman masters but the timeless principles of war.

Note that ‘male’ is on the list of successful insurgents’ basic characteristics. Few women rise to lead major criminal or rebellious armed organizations, although it happens. *Badassoftheweek.com* honors a few. The vast majority are male, gender holding true more than the other characteristics. Guerrilla war leadership is an alpha boy’s club.

As for counterinsurgent heroes, it’s harder to find historic cases. Abe Lincoln might be up there, depending on how you define things, and no, it is not simple jingoism that I pick Americans and it’s no coincidence either. Lincoln might actually fall into both categories, insurgent and counterinsurgent. Colombia’s president, Álvaro Uribe, might be in the making as one of history’s most successful counterinsurgents, but we’ll have to wait a little longer to see. Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapaksa or even his former Army Commander, General Sarath Fonseka, has a solid resume, and some would include Francisco Franco on the short list. Whether or not the successful counterinsurgent personality is the same as that of the insurgent is a question beyond the reach of this book, but it might be so.

Mao was not the prettiest man, but he beat the Kwomintang using strategies that have become clichés of irregular warfare. Che was hunted down and killed by a Cuban-American who is still alive forty years later drinking rum and coke and retelling the story. While Che wasn’t smart enough to hide his campfires, Mao mastered military strategy. According to some, Mao’s last words were ‘There is a serious tendency toward capitalism among the peasants’. Che’s last words are debated, but were probably not as his iconographers relate. I suspect he said, ‘Gee, I wish I had secured my line of retreat’.

The competent insurgent or gang leader can grant impunity to his underlings in defiance of the State. If an insurgent leader is dead, however, he is not going to grant impunity to anyone, so one conclusive measure of success, say, against a given insurgency group, is the destruction of its leadership. This destruction may not have to mean killing; it could mean disrupting the means of communication between insurgent leadership and subordinates or the suppression of receptiveness to the insurgent leaders’ message within a relevant population. I believe, however, that the physical bodies of the leaders are usually the optimal target. We hear arguments about some insurgent movements that they are spontaneous or ‘networky’ or that other phenomena of the age make the replacement of insurgent leaders all but endless. Reject such a notion. We just don’t know of any movements that succeeded without effective, named, flesh-and-blood leaders -- anymore than we know of effective governments without human heads. Effective leadership is a rare commodity and in the majority of successful insurgencies, the leadership appears both stable and jealous. Besides, spontaneity grants fleeting impunity, if any at all. Somewhere someone is granting impunity in defiance of your assertions of territorial sovereignty. You’ll want to make that stop. If you gain physical domination over the granter of impunity, he isn’t going to be a granter of impunity much longer.

The above assertion about ‘cutting off the head of the snake’ is not offered to argue that a counter-leader strategy is the only useful approach in insurgency or irregular wars. Do not dismiss other parallel, complementary efforts. It only insists that, ultimately, the engine of an insurgent movement is its leaders. Everything else about the insurgency – its financial strength, its public and international support – redound to the insurgency’s well-being, and so they are worthy of targeting in an overall counterinsurgent plan. It may likewise be useful for an insurgent to attack public and international support for a government, or to attack the economy. Regardless, all organizations are forfeit to a lack of leadership. The heart of an insurgency is also its head, the insurgent leader; of the revolution, the vanguard; of the mafia, the mafia don; of the dictatorship, the dictator; and as long as leadership remains at large, it can prolong or revive the insurgency (or revolution, rebellion, or criminal gang). The fact that a given counterinsurgent can’t find and fix his insurgent enemy’s leaders does not make the point any less valid. It only means the counterinsurgency is unlikely to succeed, this probably due to an inadequate intelligence function or simple lack of will to act diligently.

By the way, Chairman Mao and General Washington deserve their own sections as guerilla, insurgent and revolutionary military leaders, but only Washington as planter of revolutionary change. The political direction Washington set and the propositions for which he led have survived his death by centuries.

Please see sections: 85, *Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 76, *Gender*; 106, *Massacres*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 1, *What the Pirate Said to Alexander*; 58, *Condottieri*; and 81, *What a Clergy Wants*.



Before the boogeyman goes to sleep at night,
he checks under the bed for Chuck Norris.

Scientific fact



“For too long have we sat under the thumb of mankind!
The time has come to oppose that thumb!”

[Mojo Jojo](#) to his Simian Army

The Powerpuff Girls (2002)[71]



“We follow ideas and not men, and rebel against this habit of embodying a principle in a man.”[\[72\]](#)
Errico Malatesta



Who is the culpable author?

Section 23, Mens Rea

Mens rea means criminal intent. Someone can be held responsible, accountable or culpable for criminal activity. That ‘someone’ may include the intellectual author of irregular war. This book is about winning organized armed violence and, so, tautologically-speaking at least, it is ‘organized’ violence if someone organized it. The system or the structure of society might indeed be unworthy, be its own quiet organizer of violence and despair, etc, etc. Maybe that unworthiness is a motivating factor for the intellectual authors of resistance or insurgency, but insurgencies don’t just up and happen as a result of injustices.

Some academics disdain the notion of human nature and diminish concepts like guilt or shame as products of social constructs, the legitimacy of the latter being subject to constant reevaluation. If human guilt and shame are mere artificialities foisted upon us to keep us in a submissive state, then we are called to depreciate the guilty mind *mens rea* as an element of our forensics and our prosecutions. Such thinking forms part of the psychological foundation for the “It wasn’t me, it was society!” defense. Some of it may be true, but it is a tough wave for the jurisprudentially-inclined to ride. It asks us to take a difficult leap of logic -- to accept the argument that human nature is ‘merely a human construct’, together with the consequence that by so saying, human nature is invalidated as a reference for determining how to deal with our miserable species. In other words, under this selectively-applied progressives’ argument, guilt is called-out as a social construct that is not really real, and so we are cautioned to focus less on capturing and punishing intellectual authors of insurgencies or crimes, but instead to focus on fixing the things in society that create the resistance or survival desires and behaviors. If you are inclined to resistance against the establishment and simultaneously find wisdom in that post-structural mantra, you will want to press the argument that your personal criminal or rebel behavior is not your fault, but the fault of the system. The argument does not fall on deaf ears (like mine) alone; it might get you out on parole earlier, or give you a few more minutes to escape capture, or to formulate a plea bargain -- but don’t convince yourself. In Margaritaville and everywhere else, it is mostly your own damn fault.

The above-noted post-structural viewpoint about guilt notwithstanding, *mens rea* remains a basic element of criminal jurisprudence in our and in most societies. Fault, culpability, criminal intent, authorship of crime, badness -- *mens rea* is Latin for a fundamental part of why someone deserves to be punished. It is also an fundamental concept for winning an irregular armed conflict. It is connected to the definition of enemy. ‘Public enemy number one’ is a phrase the substance of which depends not just on the behavior of an individual, but on the intent of that individual, as interpreted by the rest of us, to lead himself or others to future unpleasant behavior with which we cannot abide. Leadership requires and exposes intent.

We might agree that: Public Enemy Number One’s mother didn’t love him; he was poor and just learned to survive; his Dad was an abusive alcoholic; that all these things are the result of a poorly formed society which spawned an underclass in which such conditions are woefully normal, as well as an oppressor overclass that eats too much stinky cheese on expensive yachts. Agreeing to all that, we might still disagree as to whether or not such observations should force us to transpose anger from the individual to the society, and so justify chancing his raping and stealing on a continuing basis. Maybe some crafty Public Enemy Number One crowns himself agent and vanguard of proletariat retribution, even though he is himself not poor, but rather a scion of an upper middleclass champion of selfishness. Either way, if his is the skull within which plans are made for doing harm to others, and especially if he is intelligent, guileful, ruthless and charismatic, he will guide others into violent action.

Mens rea, the guilty cogitation causing violent actions, can be located and followed. Bad things sometimes just happen, but usually the ones that really bother us are the product of nasty thinking. If you have no sub-plan to hide your nasty thinking, or to locate the physical geographic locus of your foe’s nasty thinking, you are making a competitive mistake. Killing Adolf Hitler might have worked. Capturing *Presidente* Gonzalo (*nom de guerre* of insurgent leader Abimael Guzmán) stopped the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso insurgency in its tracks. As time passes for an insurgency (or even for an unjust social structure) the *mens rea* can be spread out a little bit (more leaders, more places), making it a little harder to corner. The *mens rea* of insurgency or crime has precise geography, while the guilt of a faulty social construct has a nebulous geography. Insurgents would of course prefer to blame the construct; because they do not want to be located.

Some organizations are resistant to destruction by decapitation. In them, subunits act on independent initiative or the organization grooms many replacement leaders and has a formula for succession. Such durability doesn’t change the logic of Maguire’s synthesis -- it just multiplies its possible occasions. Armed organizations will toughen and vaccinate themselves against decapitation exactly because the Maguire equation is unavoidable. Its upshot can be ameliorated, but essentially, ultimately, it is the basic mathematic for victory or defeat in military operations. If leadership cannot be protected, if it cannot reach and enjoy sanctuary, whatever it leads is at mortal risk. Leadership is a precious commodity and a supreme element of relative power. Once leadership is neutralized, so is power. The quality of mind that makes that leadership an enemy of a State is called *mens rea*. It has a physical geography. The heads within which *mens rea* resides up sides can be kicked.

Please see sections: 39, *Socio-economic Causation*; 2, *Anonymity*; 9, *White Bird*; 99, *Postmodern and Post-structural*; 59, *Spontaneity*; 43, *Sam Spade’s Whereabouts*; 25, *Why Humans Don’t Fight*; and 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*.



“You can’t hold a whole fraternity responsible for the behavior of a few, sick twisted individuals. For if you do, ... isn’t this an indictment of our educational institutions in general? I put it to you...isn’t this an indictment of our entire American society? Well, you can do whatever you want to us, but we’re not going to sit here and listen to you badmouth the United States of America.”

Otter in the movie

Animal House (1978) [73]



“There’s no difference between one’s killing and making decisions that will send others to kill. It’s exactly the same thing, or even worse.”

Golda Meir (attributed)



Do people respond best to threats?

Section 24, Ruthlessness and Resolve

If you are not willing to kill someone, you won't win your armed conflict. You might get lucky, of course, and not have to, so if hanging on to that hope is helpful to you, OK. But I assume somebody has the will to kill you, otherwise we'd just be talking about global warming.

Roger Trinquier wrote a book titled *Modern Warfare*. He is one of a pair of deceased French Army officers often referenced in US military writing about counterinsurgency. The other is David Galula. Section 107, *Guerre d'Algérie* talks a little about that war, so suffice it here to say it was probably the worst counterinsurgent effort in history or at least since the French Revolution. Trinquier, however, thought he was doing pretty well as a counterinsurgent, for a short while at least. He attributed his success to attitude as much as to specific tactics or strategies. The marrow of that attitude was a conviction that the populace had to be put in mortal fear – scared to death or put to death.

A Guatemalan told me that the Communist guerrillas and the Guatemalan Army each had to prove to villagers of the mountain tribes that their opponents could not protect them. In other words, the guerrillas argued that the army could not protect a tribe from the guerrillas and the army would argue to the same tribe that the guerrillas could not protect it from the army. Each side would present their version of the argument by graphic example.

A culture of violence can become draconian inside guerrilla bands. Leaders of the Colombian *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army, ELN), for instance, thought it necessary to require from its recruits a proof of willingness to kill, a proof that could only be met by killing. They also required acceptance of death as a penalty for even relatively minor infractions, and certain death for betrayals, with betrayal sometimes defined broadly to include even minor infractions. In other words, to be part of the unit, you had to be willing to kill and die cheaply. Anonymity was especially to be guarded, and death was therefore the penalty for breaching anonymity. From *Lapham's Raiders*, about American and Philippine guerrillas fighting against the Japanese in World War II, we read,

First off, to be successful a guerrilla leader must become, in one way or another, the de facto ruler of the territory in which he operates. Failure to achieve authority will defeat all his plans and hopes. From this it follows that he must maintain the loyalty of local officials and local people, making it safer for them to give him such loyalty than to pursue any other course. That, in turn, requires that spies, collaborators with enemies, and anyone else who breaks down the trust between himself and the local population must be eliminated or neutralized without pity. Nothing less will suffice.

[74]

The two centrally significant violent events in mafia or gangster culture are retributions for bearing witness or informing against the organization (death to traitors) and proof of loyalty by way of the commission of murder and torture (can get the job done). For efficiency's sake, victims of the proof-by-murder will be persons who resist the payment of ransoms or for whom ransoms are not paid. These deaths are not part of the culture *per se*, but rather part of the business. Similarity to guerrilla violent culture, however, is evident.

A British officer explained the Irish problem to me succinctly: the Irish were stubborn and the British resolute. Resolve is neither the opposite of ruthlessness, nor always combined with it. Resolve is a significant quality, both for resistance to the Man and to the kinds of cultures of violence that often grow in guerrillas and mafias. Willingness to suffer and regain defiance in the face of ruthlessness, or to resist enslavement, is not the human norm. Most communities fold.

Please see sections: 42, *Brigands*; 16, *Presence*; 4, *Defining Enemy*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 106, *Massacres*; and 23, *Mens Rea*.




“Okay. You wanna play rough?

Okay. Say hello to my little friend.”

Tony Montana in the movie

Scarface (1983)[75]



“through our cruelty they will know who we are. And they will find the evidence of our cruelty in the disemboweled, dismembered, and disfigured bodies of their brothers we leave behind us.”

Lt Aldo Raines in the movie

Inglourious Basterds (2009)[76]



If it's cheaper not to

Section 25, Why Humans Don't Fight

It might help you to know why you want to fight and why your opponent wants to fight. It might be more helpful to know why people don't fight.

Why humans fight:

- A. 'That's my stuff'.
- B. 'You hurt my feelings', or 'You dishonored me'.
- C. 'I'm nuts'.

The three mix. 'That's my stuff' is easiest to understand and the most common. Some people are purists on the matter: 'What's mine is mine and what's yours is mine'. A tendency toward arrogation is one of those things some folk call human nature while others, who do not believe so much in the concept of human nature, will say it is the product of a flawed social construct. Either way, we try to tax other people's wealth so that we don't have to work so hard at just stealing it. If we can be the government, we can be legitimate thieves. Instead of self-righteous philanthropists, we can redistribute un-earned wealth to the downtrodden. Meanwhile, a standard act of insurgency is to not pay the king's tax. We might even rob from the government tax collector. *Ours* is better than *his*.

'That's my girl' might be used to bridge A with B, alluding to emotive reasons generally. Violence may be a response to dishonor, or it could even be an arrogation of spirituality. Someone venerates something and has sufficient ego that he wants the rest of us to venerate it along with him, led in worship by him. Naturally, he will tax us for the education. The object of veneration may be God or a theory but, since the effort to impose communion requires so much ego, the personality of the priest himself becomes the object of veneration. Lots of people are enthralled by and apologize for what today is called a 'populist'. Others prefer 'mullah'.

'I'm nuts' might be less common, but people do fight because they are not healthy psychologically. Many successful violent populists have seemed to be partially nuts, bi-polar nuts, or drug-induced nuts. We always ask if a leader who seems a bit eccentric or radical isn't actually a little insane. We often enter into debate about whether the leader of some foreign government whose behavior offends us is or isn't a little off his rocker. Are Ahmadinejad or Chávez messianic, crazy like foxes, or do we just not understand? The right answer is...they're probably a little insane. But we all are to some degree and we often admire and follow those who are just a little nuttier than ourselves, perhaps confusing irrationality with commitment or resolve. We often look to our radicals, to the activists, to the obsessively invested, for leadership. Resolve is necessary for action and extreme resolve is sometimes necessary for mortal action. We admire single-mindedness and perseverance against adversity. It just happens that these qualities aren't as sane a set characteristics as those that guide us to staying comfortable and taking the easy pathways.

There is a longer list of possible reasons why people fight. Domination and violence seem pleasurable to some people. There is also the notion of war economies, meaning that some people simply benefit economically from selling this and that to violent competitors, so it behooves them to warmong. There exist Hegelian-type notions that war is a crucible of history and nationhood, meaning that leaders feel and encourage the unifying emotions of mortal challenge.

Use of the concept of *mens rea* builds on these possible reasons for organizing to violence. Knowing the motivation of the authors of mortal action helps measure the possibilities for prosecution, compromise and restitution, or to temper vindictiveness. Organizationally speaking, it also helps us consider the likely effect of a change of leadership. If we capture Gonzalo, will his revolutionary organization keep the same unity, purpose and determination, or will it fold? If the country's president loses the next election will there be a change of strategy toward us?

As noted in Section 23, some scholars reject the overall parameters of thought within which the concept of guilt or criminal intent (*mens rea*) is a feature. These folk are more likely to express causation as a product of social forces, like the slow violence economic privilege perpetrates against an underclass. They are more likely to excuse the violence of an individual as being the product of an unjust social compact the construction of which the individual had little input. This 'resistance' perspective, with many sincere adherents, is perfectly subject to the three general categories of why people fight. Although the resistance perspective justifies violent actions of the underdog, the justification still accuses some elite or oligarch of a culpable *mens rea*, and still prescribes justice in the form of punishment. It is still a 'you've got my stuff' or a 'you've got my girl' proposition.

Why humans don't fight:

- A. Peaceful conflict resolution is cheaper
- B. They don't think they can win
- C. They are convinced fighting is wrong

To ask why humans fight presupposes that peace is the normal human condition and war or violent conflict the exception. If, however, the base condition of man is violent and territorial, and peace a recent improvement, then the efficient question is why peace occurs. Sir Michael Howard (*The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order*) would probably agree.^[77] A point made by John Powelson in *The Story of Land: A World History of Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform* becomes all the more intriguing. He noted that no country without a formal system of land ownership and written contracts has ever enjoyed long periods of internal peace.^[78] In everyday legal parlance, land outside the lines of formal property is subject to 'possession by force'. Without the unique controlling institution of formalized property, violent conflict is inevitable.

Looking at thresholds of peace instead of violence, we also see an inverse of the transaction cost approach taken by Douglass North and Robert Thomas (Please see Section 82, *Conflict Thresholds*). People are more likely to turn to peace when the cost of peaceful transactions is perceived to be less than the cost of violence. Peaceful transaction costs became less than the cost of violence when systems that encouraged fulfillment of contractual obligations were replaced. These include things like statutes of fraud and land surveys. If you are the counterinsurgent trying to win an internal armed conflict of some kind, it means that you will not achieve a condition of generalized human security and social peace without the tedious forms, papers, signatures, photocopies, files and maps of obsessive public administration. And...although indispensable, that will still not be enough. You will still need property courts, markets and elections. If you are an insurgent, the fluid functioning of these things could do you in. You might want to put a wrench into them.

Humans fight because our neighbor has stuff we want; or for pleasure, dominance or revenge; or because we're insane; or upon some combination or inverse of these. The idea of a peace threshold is more concerned with the when, where, who and how people come to live within a peaceful social compact. It doesn't delve so much into the basic question of *why* we fight as it does how we might create an environment where it is easier not to fight. Andro Linklater's *Measuring America* is one of the least heralded, but most remarkably well-argued books on this point. It relates the forming of the United States, framing that story within an observation about stable measurements and measuring devices as central innovations in human conflict resolution and in the creation of wealth. The 'gram' or the 'yard' reveal themselves as such obviously valuable concepts that we are impressed to return

to our plans to see if we have overlooked fairness and stability of basic measures as a concern in our plans for peaceful territories. Fairness in land measurement is a theme of the book *Property & Peace*, and of sections in this book that deal with the formalization of land ownership. The regulation of measurement goes beyond land, however, to expectations of monetary stability, time periods for governance, the value of a single vote, number of public school days, etc. The question of stable measurement as a column of conflict resolution reminds the most libertarian among us of the role that government might have to play in conflict resolution, a role that depends on something we so easily overlook – that an acre needs to be the same amount of land with every sale if we are to avoid fights.


Jealousy, greed, revenge and fear are common departure points for explanations of why people fight. It would be nice to know why you and your enemy are fighting. However, for winning you want to know your enemy's whereabouts. You want to attack his geographic anonymity. If you know where but not why, your chances of winning are greater than if you know why but not where. Moreover, to sustain peace and not create enemies, you want to know why people do *not* fight. You will want to encourage the historically-proven institutions that help people reach and maintain the threshold of peace. Chief among these is administration of the social compact based on transparent distribution of property.

Please see sections: 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 82, *Conflict Thresholds*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 124, *Slavery and Underclass*; 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 103, *Amnesty*; 106, *Massacres*; and 84, *Cultures of Violence*.



“Peace is not absence of conflict;
it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means.” [79]

Ronald Reagan



“*Mine* is better than *ours*.” [80]

Ben Franklin



Start small, think mean

Section 26, How Violent Groups Form

Some conditions favor and some disfavor the germination and coalescence of violent groups. We can predict which places are most likely to harbor or grow them, even if the exact mechanisms and processes of group formation are not well known.

General Conditions Likely to Stimulate Germination:

A. Availability of a franchise package for violent resistance behavior. There may be an attractive strategy-set available (objective, method, resources, ethic), which we can call a franchise package, that provides a ready-made theology/ideology; justification (of violence); pride identity/symbols; methodology; resources; objectives; and maybe active guidance. Detailed expression of a felt grievance may be significant in some contexts. Most people can't invent these things on their own. Examples include marxism, maoism, fascism, and various forms of religious fundamentalism. These do not just arrive as lone ideas; they often come in packages that include the elements just noted above. As with a typical peaceful business franchise, there is often a buy-in fee, a corporate headquarters, standards, inspections, rents, and even uniforms.

Not all of the above-listed franchise features are necessarily provided by each package, or are needed, and, unlike hamburger restaurants, they can overlap. One currently recognized and seemingly ascendant package is radical Islam (especially radical Wahhabi Islam). A form of marxism-leninism (revamped postmodern or post-structural socialism/communism) has cachet; and the Soprano (gangster, FARC, etc.) package is also popular and seems to require a lower start-up investment. Bolivarian-liberation is brisk right now in Latin America. Not all packages or features are available worldwide and there are many variations.

B. Inadequacy of establishment inspiration. The 'establishment' may fail to garner respect or to motivate. The government may be a violent criminal actor itself, an authoritarian regime or it may be a gentle, liberal, but existentially uninspiring democracy. A useful condition for germination of violent groups is that the establishment or reigning structure fails to inspire or channel the energies of those otherwise disposed to opposition violence.

C. Existence of attractive franchise motivational propaganda. If the possibilities of adopting a resistance franchise is made known to those disposed to participate in resistance activity, a resistance organization is more likely to germinate (it pays to advertise).

D. Existence of successful franchise examples. A person or entity that has taken up the franchise, been honored as a result, and (perhaps) not effectively repressed by the establishment, is a positive stimulant.

E. Elements in the cultural environment (legal, political, social) that make repression of resistance conduct more difficult.

Local Conditions Likely to Stimulate Germination:

A. Absence of resolute establishment authority. If the local institutions supposed by the population to wield physical force are reluctant to do so (or simply are not present) then a vacuum of resolve exists that can be filled by another, ruthless group. Impunity is quickly sensed, so any reluctance on the part of the establishment to apply force in uncommon circumstances (to stop looting after a natural disaster, for example) can quickly lead to group creation around ruthless actors.

B. Inadequacy of establishment inspiration. At the local level there may be a variety of competing legal and illegal visions for channeling energies (especially of young males). If they do not inspire, persons seeking inspiration will find it in an alternative franchise package.

C. Absence of outlets for sexual expression, especially male.

D. Presence of pro-franchise charismatic leadership. Opinion leaders stimulate. Leadership counts.

E. Availability of enabling resources. Vision without resources is fantasy. The abject poor, left alone, have rarely posed a violent threat to the State.

F. Effective presence of an agent of the franchise package. An expert is someone from out of town, especially if the agent offers money and adventure. An agent in command of an armed team of insurgents may be still more convincing.

G. Contested wealth, especially real estate, without a functioning conflict resolution mechanism.

H. Unaddressed grievances with a definable defendant(s).

I. Successful violent actions (success = accomplished with impunity).

Strategic Conditions Likely to Counter Germination:

A. Existence of a favorable option or leader opposed to violent behavior. — Gandhi, M.L.K. Jr., The Peace Corps.

B. Detailed expression of plans to address and redress grievances. — affirmative action, apologies, monuments, employment opportunities, upgraded services.

C. Adequate establishment inspiration: Focusing on a common, out-group enemy, or on a unifying mission. This includes potential within the system for aspiring leaders to ascend via peaceful mechanisms (elections, education, military rank).

D. Attractive non-violent motivational propaganda and counter-propaganda and education.

E. Presence of successful non-violent examples.

F. Elements in the cultural environment that make repression of deviant conduct easier. Cadastres, stable addresses, ID cards, complete census data, licensing, registries.

Local Conditions Likely to Counter Germination:

A. Resolute local establishment authority. Criminals are captured and punished. Impunity is denied. Orderly responses are made to environmental crises.

B. Adequate establishment inspiration. Local government, schools, civil society, churches exist to channel aspirations.

- C. Existence of outlets for sexual expression, especially male.
- D. Presence of charismatic leadership that is not pro-resistance.
- E. Absence of contested wealth.
- F. Existence of a functioning conflict resolution mechanism for contested wealth.
- G. Availability of establishment enabling resources, and capacity to repress violent franchise-enabling resources.
- H. Capacity to deny the presence of agents of a resistance franchise package. Elements exist in the cultural environment that make repression of resistance easier. Cadastres, addresses, ID cards, complete census data, registries.

What to do:

1. Establish a priority of localities requiring more study. Promote outside multidiscipline research of select localities.
2. Identify the worst places. Locate the congruence of conditions that favor the germination of violent resistance groups as described in the above paragraphs, highlighting the qualitative as well as quantitative characteristics of those places.
3. Shape conditions so that information on local conditions is freely available and willingly provided. Promote comprehensive, accurate census, personal ID, cadastral, mobile property and other property registry records, as well as inventory systems for dangerous instrumentalities.
4. Apply control technologies where your resources allow, and establish a continuous reliable information flow. Apply secret resources only where necessary.
5. Study the propaganda environment. Identify ways to diminish elements of the opposition message.
6. Neutralize opposition agents in locales and reduce the delivery of resources to them. Identify their lines of retreat and their sanctuaries. This requires comprehensive cultural knowledge.
7. Violent actions, especially those accomplished by impunity, are indicators of favorable conditions for the germination or expansion of violent actors. Whether you are a pro-government person or an insurgent, you probably want to make details of violent events available to outside researchers in order to establish a favorable public record for later use.
8. Gather knowledge about all groups and institutions, not only of resistance franchise packages and agents, but of the groups and institutions they oppose.
9. Identify grievances and contested wealth. Comprehensive conflict analysis identifies grievances and contested wealth, party (claimant) identities associated with these grievances or wealth; determines the locations of members of the claimant groups (cognizant that claimant group memberships will overlap, and that an individual can belong to numerous claimant identities and even belong to competing sides of the same issue); learns what will satisfy grievances or wealth claims; and measures the capabilities and capacities of the claimant identities. This knowledge is necessary for resolution of conditions likely to stimulate the germination of new violent opposition groups. (See Section 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*)
10. Build actor-origin databases. In order to help test hypotheses regarding the details of local conditions conducive and not conducive to the germination of violent actors, the database of origins and motivating factors of known violent actors should be expanded, unified, and refined. Compare the coincidence of that data to physical geography (origins of perpetrators against localities identified as having favorable conditions) to improve understanding of the conditions and where they exist.


This section makes how groups form seem a lot like ‘where groups form’. As such, the listed implications (what to do) seem to be almost entirely about gathering knowledge, and not so much about doing something more active. Not so. It is the kind of knowledge that is purposed for action, presumably violent action. At some point, you might have to go kill someone. The idea is to be especially careful about that.

Please see sections: 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 88, *Escape Geography*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 42, *Brigands*; 124, *Slavery and Underclass*; and 58, *Condottieri*.



Three German soldiers are sitting around drinking beer in a Bavarian pub after WWI:

Eric: So, Hans, what are you going to do now that the war is over?
Hans: I'm going back to Hamburg; my father has a sausage works there. Where are you going?
Eric: My dad has a watch shop here close-by. I'll apprentice with him. How about you, Adolf?
Adolf: Oh, I'll think of something.



Dogbert: "I'm forming a rebel army."
Ratbert: "Count me in. What are we fighting for?"
Dogbert: "You'll be fighting for social justice, and I'll be scheming to be an iron-fisted dictator. In the long run, I'll be a billionaire and you'll be a stain on a tank tread."
Ratbert: "Please, please say there will be looting." [81]

Scott Adams,
Dilbert

“And now,” cried Max, “Let the wild rumpus start.” [\[82\]](#)

Maurice Sendak,
Where the Wild Things Are



Squat and occupy

Section 27, 'Nonviolent' Action

In the fall of 2011, the 'Occupy' events briefly occupied center stage of American political news. From the perspective of mid-2014 it does not appear they earned the term *movement*, since it all but petered-out, but it was at least an organized mobilization of material and human resources designed ostensibly to challenge the existing power structure. Its organizers imagined it would have sufficient strength to deserve respect as a social movement, that is, as a coordinated group action able to attain political goals and reach a level of self-sustainment by attracting new supporters. The organizers seemed to obey certain established and published principles or guidelines for such activities and as far as I can make out, the Occupy leadership was usefully informed by the writings of Saul Alinsky and Gene Sharp. Outside of the United States, Gene Sharp is considered a guru whose ideas guided the actionists of political change in Eastern Europe and, more recently, the leaders of actions we refer to haphazardly (maybe euphemistically or ironically) as 'The Arab Spring'. Gene Sharp, on the politics of nonviolent action, states,

Nonviolent obstruction is similar to nonviolent interjection, except that the human bodies are used not only for psychological intervention but as a physical obstruction. Such physical blocking occurs when the obstruction is undertaken by very large numbers or when the obstructers are so placed that the work, vehicle, police, troops, or the like cannot proceed even though they injure or kill the demonstrators. As in the previous method, the risk of arrest, injury, or death is involved. Such obstruction is unlikely to last very long unless: 1) the numbers are exceedingly large, are maintained over a long period, and are beyond the control of the personnel, equipment, and weaponry which the opponent is able and willing to apply; 2) the opponent is unwilling simply to kill all the obstructers by whatever means may be available; 3) the workers or the enforcement officials, police, or troops are, or become, sympathetic to the demonstrators; or 4) the demonstration of public opposition to the grievance, or to repression of the actionists, is strong enough to induce the opponent to abandon the objectionable activity or halt it for a time.^[83]

Professor Sharp pretty much sums it up, but to militarize and drag things out a little, let's compare it to what Frederick the Great had to say. Frederick (1712-1786) was being great at warring well after the age of castles, between the times of Marlborough (1650-1722) and Napoleon (1769-1821). If Marlborough was Napoleon's Clausewitz, then Frederick was Marlborough's. In any case, Frederick referred to his system as *position warfare*, within which he greatly esteemed the capability to establish survivable encampments. The military term for this camping art was *castrametation*. "Castrametation. A camp is a battlefield that you choose, because it becomes one as soon as the enemy attacks you."^[84] For today's nonviolent occupiers, the encampment might be in a park, plaza, or stadium, but the math is similar. How much water and food can the occupiers count on, and how resolute are they? Do they have allies who can interrupt an impending assault by the authorities? Can they keep the place clean enough that it does not sicken them? Do they, or at least their leaders, have an escape route to sanctuary? Frederick used another term we can apply, *coup d'oeil*. That was Frederick's term for a leader's ability to quickly comprehend the advantages and disadvantages of a particular piece of terrain. *Coup d'oeil* can be directly translated as a glance, a knowing glance, or as the ability to understand a great deal at a glance, but for Frederick it was the glance made to measure the potential effect of occupying a piece of terrain on relative competitive strength. "[B]y far the most superior talent is to know how to distinguish at first sight all the advantages that can be drawn from the terrain."^[85] (Tim Thomas notes that this is comparable to the Chinese 'shi' – see *Section 110, Unrestricted Chi Whiz*) Professor Sharp's *nonviolent interventions*, because they so often involve invasion and occupation of territory or the blockage of passage, are successful or not depending on the quality of their leaders' *coup d'oeil*, or if you prefer, on their sense of *shi*. Perhaps today's nonviolent *coup d'oeil* must absorb a broader set of human geographic factors than what Frederick needed to notice. Advantageous terrain for occupations will be selected partly according to legal accommodation and political temperament, or perhaps the economic value of a nearby activity against which some stress might be applied.

The other organizer I mentioned in the first paragraph is Saul Alinsky, whose work *Rules for Radicals* is a staple of American protest. Alinsky taught "how to create mass organizations to seize power." Alinsky explained his life purpose in adversarial terms. "The Prince was written by Machiavelli for the Haves on how to hold power. *Rules for Radicals* is written for the Have-Nots on how to take it away."^[86] By way of example and as part of the identity he chose for himself, Mr. Alinsky evoked the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War, asserting, "this means revolution." *Rules for Radicals* was to "propose certain general observations, propositions, and concepts of the mechanics of mass movements and the various stages of the cycle of action and reaction in revolution." Fundamental to the Alinsky method is creation of stark differentiation. "As we have indicated before, all issues must be polarized if action is to follow." Part of the process is inducement to overreaction on the part of the government. Occupation places are battlefields where the actionists choose to have the government attack them. Beyond polarization, *Rules for Radicals* proposes thirteen specific tactical rules, my three favorites being:

Rule number 1: Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have;

Rule number 7: A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag;

Rule number 9: The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself.

While Professor Sharp seems to have lately inspired actionists across a long gamut of ideological fascination and intention, Mr. Alinsky is more clearly tied by style and intellectual heritage to the political left. It seems to me that outside of the United States, Mr. Alinsky is less of a source for radical organizational planning because there are many other sources who have said the same, these running from Vladimir Lenin to every other radical leftist since. In the Alinsky/Sharp method (allowing myself the luxury of throwing the two together, something probably neither of the two would like), potential actionists are asked for more than their voice, vote, or financial contribution. They are asked for their physical presence at a specific place and time. In this they are subjected to and the object of the principle of *mass*, so we return again to the age of classic strategy. Henri Jomini had this to say:

... There exists a fundamental principle of all the operations of war, a principle which ought to preside over all the combinations in order that they be good. It consists:

1. In carrying ... the mass of the forces of the army successively upon the decisive points of a theatre of war...;
2. In maneuvering in such a manner as to engage this mass of the forces with fractions only of the hostile army;
3. In directing equally, on the day of battle... the mass of one's forces upon the decisive point of the field of battle...;
4. In managing so that those masses be not merely present upon the decisive point, but that they be put in action there with energy and concert, in a manner to produce a simultaneous effort. ...

I am far from pretending, nevertheless, that the whole art of war consists merely in the choice of a good direction to be given to masses, but it could not be denied that it is at least a fundamental point of strategy.^[87]

Jomini put *mass* at the heart of Napoleonic strategy. We can put Jomini's observation about mass somewhere in nonviolent strategy, if not at its

heart. If nonviolent actionists can be easily surrounded because so few demonstrators are convoked or can remain together, a nonviolent action could easily be made to fail. The Los Angeles police department figured out the numbers and simply overpowered their 2011 park occupiers.

More than 200 people were arrested in the operation that involved 1,400 officers... It was a stark departure from old LAPD crowd control techniques, Beck said. In years past, police would have used a single skirmish line to sweep through the park and push people out. [88]

Can action leaders convoke enough people and keep the actionists in place long enough to exact a concession or cause an over-reaction? Can they accomplish such massing while maintaining their anonymity, or at least get to legal or diplomatic sanctuary? If 'action' leaders cannot pull off that trick, the authorities can make their future actions less likely.

Actionists may make short term or limited demands, like prisoner releases or amnesties, money payments, or suspension of the enforcement of some law. Their leverage often derives from the potential to interrupt commerce and is created by the implication that the actionist group can either prevent or incite some future action. For instance, if actionists can close a port for any appreciable period, they can exact concessions from port authorities or shippers who despair of finding a less costly resolution. Again, if the actions have no physical staying power, the leverage potentially available to the actionists is likely forfeited. Longer term or strategic goals are likewise dependent on the capacity of the actionist leaders to execute repeat performances.

Great potential exists for 'nonviolent' actions to put local and foreign national interests at risk in places across the world. Some actions may present to us little obvious extortionary value, but might nevertheless be diversions in solidarity with other occupations at more lucrative places. Using the 'Occupy Wall Street' example, perhaps a solidarity demonstration in Lawrence, Kansas comes across as effete, but many such demonstrations might lend a kind of cover to a more financially consequential event in the port of Oakland. Hundreds of ports around the world are more vulnerable to effective nonviolent action than is Oakland.

To recap how to be a successful organizer of a nonviolent action:

1. Create and maintain sufficient mass (physically advantageous correlation of force at a place of occupation). This may be the main determinant of success at that location;
2. Select the place for a nonviolent action carefully. This is the *coup d'oeil* (or perhaps *shi*), a uniquely valuable leadership skill;
3. Anticipate the culminating point of all actions (both physical and psychological/political);
4. Prepare and improve encampments (castrametation) because they are battlefields the actionist leader chooses;
5. Try to orchestrate multiple, simultaneous actions. Create an expansive, interwoven geography of places, events, opportunities and potential influences, rather than a mere compilation of many places of occupation and confrontations. Some confrontation locales may be diversions, tests, or accidents, while the most consequential locales may be revealed as such only in the course of unfolding events, and;
6. Your defeat is less likely and any future leverage you generate more secure if the authorities cannot mount a successful pursuit of you, the actions' intellectual and logistical leader. In other words, don't get caught. **Basic rule of strategy: plan for a secure escape to sanctuary or don't leave it to begin with.** (Unless you want to be a martyr, then, by all means, knock yourself out.)

On the other hand, to effectively counter these Alinsky/Sharp power transfer schemes, a government can establish or change in the public mind what constitutes *violent* and what does not. A government can assert and emphasize that blocking passage is *ipso facto* a violent act that provokes more violence, and that sending unwitting masses into physical danger is also a violent act. *Coup d'oeil* is not just a quality for actionist leadership. Authorities do well to have the assets and plans ready to quickly achieve superiority of mass at likely locations for nonviolent action. (fustest with the mostest) Finally (send me a note if I failed to mention this elsewhere), if you want to take away the capacity of 'nonviolent' actionists to take away your power, don't let the actionist leaders go scot free. Pursue.

Please see sections: 59, *Spontaneity*; 54, *Extortion*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 32, *Land-use Planning*; 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; and 94, *Poop*.



Eric Cartman: Ma'am, I need to clear out your giggling stoners and your drum-circle hippies RIGHT NOW, or soon they're gonna attract something much worse!

Elderly Woman: Ooooo, what's that?

Eric Cartman: The college know-it-all hippies.

from the TV series *South Park*

"Die, Hippies, Die" episode [89]



"It is not that one general is more brilliant or experienced than the other; it is a question of which general has a better appreciation of the battlefield."

Erwin Rommel (attributed)



"They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party...to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by the common counsels and modified by mutual interests." [90]

George Washington



"Oh great, real bullets."

Lucky Day in the movie

The Three Amigos (1986) [91]



Negotiate or die

Section 28, Takeovers and Sieges

Sieges attempt to turn sanctuaries into the last stop on someone's line of retreat. Let's say the Grand Vizier surrounds your town and bombards it with dead horses and rutabaga. If the Vizier can breach the walls, enter, and start slaughtering everyone and you have no escape, you better have some sweet negotiating skills or you are about done. However, it is often just as hard to keep a siege army fed and watered as it is to keep the people inside a castle fed and watered. In order to beat the siege, you want to stay alive and resisting, your walls more or less intact, until his provisions run out and it is too risky for him to continue. The Grand Vizier will have to lift his siege if some Polish field army threatens his Janissaries and his line of withdrawal. On this matter, Machiavelli had counseled, "I judge those (princes) to be in constant need of help who cannot take the field against their enemies, but are obliged to retire behind their walls, and to defend themselves there."^[92] Maybe you're just in a small castle and don't have Polish king friends. You do your calculations and decide it best to negotiate, so you offer to give back your besieger's daughters and to offer him a higher percentage of the water that runs through your little realm or maybe just to pay him the tribute he asked for to begin with.

Things haven't changed. The castle might only be a remote police station or a forward operating base, but the math is the same. How good are the walls and roofs; how much food, water and ammunition have you stored up, and how resolute are you? Do you have a field force or allies that can interrupt the siege? Do you have an escape route? Sieges are a permanent feature of armed conflict. They are communal tests of will. Resolute resistance to sieges provides the material of military legend and national heritage. Texans have the Alamo, the Spanish Numancia; the French Camerone, the British Khartoum, and so on. Sometimes it is the siege that provides national pride, like the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu. Sometimes these battles are merely heroic footnotes and sometimes they are milestones of change in political history. If you build a fort or fortify a town, provision it well. If you conduct a siege, bring extra lunch and be sure to keep your route of withdrawal secure.

Takeovers (say, of a governor's office, or a foreign embassy, or a court building) are a common feature in many of today's armed conflicts. The takeover is usually done by an insurgent or resistance group, followed by a siege of sorts from the authorities. In a typical takeover, the insurgents intend from the outset to negotiate. When you conduct a building takeover, you turn your nose up at the operational equation. You don't expect to escape, but rather you have such confidence in the negotiating position that you have or will gain that you figure you'll walk out with a net win. Your withdraw plan leads out the front door after having gained the respect of your opponent.

Building takeovers are spectacular and daring. Like roadblocks they combine classic strategy (operational art) with extortion. There are some rules, however. You need to assure you have the necessary provisions, and you need to measure the psychology of your opponent correctly. If at all possible, you want to have help on the outside.

One of the most famous takeovers in history occurred in Bogotá in 1985. The M-19 guerrilla group invaded the Colombian Supreme Court Building and took all of the judges and a bunch of other people hostage. The takeover had been carefully planned, even to making sure weeks' worth of extra food was on-hand in the cafeteria. The M-19's idea was to put the president of the country, Belisario Betancur, on trial. While they prepared the show trial, they were also going to destroy some prosecutorial files pertaining to some drug lords, including Pablo Escobar, who had funded the operation.

It might have gone well, but these things are subject to chance and confusion. Supporters of the M-19 were supposed to produce a huge student & worker demonstration in the great plaza outside the court building, which would have made military and police siege operations difficult. Unfortunately for the insurgents, some local army units reacted immediately, beating any large crowd to the scene. Then government leaders made an early decision that there was going to be no negotiating with the guerrillas. The M-19 had expected that President Betancur would capitulate, but communication with the president was all but shut off. The building caught fire and, while the details of who and when are still being debated to this day, the result was that the building was gutted. The invaders executed most of the judges, but could not themselves escape the conflagration. Most of the assailants and many of the hapless bystanders died. The event invited a national soul-search, and to major political changes, including a new and more liberal constitution. Within five or six years, however, the M-19 was almost completely disappeared.

That the M-19 risked such a violation of the principles of operational art might seem curious, except that they had successfully taken over the embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogotá in 1980, a hundred diplomat hostages being ransomed for a lot of money and a flight to Cuba. They had also stolen Simon Bolivar's sword (still missing) and in a separate coup robbed thousands of weapons right out from under the Colombian Army's nose. The M-19ers were takeover champions. They calculated well and were immensely daring, but the operational equation always includes chance. Some days the bear just gets you. By the way, the M-19's legendary co-founder, Jaime Bateman, had died in an airplane crash in 1983. That'll happen, too. The other co-founder, Alvaro Fayad, died holed-up in an apartment in Bogotá in 1986.

Takeovers don't need to be strategy-defying all-or-nothing rolls of the extortion dice, either. They can be planned so that escape routes and outside help are in place. They can be combined with other strategies, perhaps to lure your enemy into a trap from which *he* has no viable escape. Takeovers of the right places can yield useful things like money, information, hostages, and munitions. In an urban world, if you are a rebel and you never takeover anything, you're not much.

On the other side of the ledger, you want to pay attention to control architecture so that takeovers of your most valuable places are more difficult and containing a takeover is easier. Inspect your reaction plans building-by-building, site-by-site, and make sure that the reaction plans are not one-size-fits-all. Every takeover force will have different capabilities and different leadership. In a given case it might be best to do little. Just waiting may be enough to disarm an opponent who is inside a building. There have been some terrible siege force failures. One occurred in Waco, Texas in 1993.

Please see sections: 91, *Forts and Walls*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 6, *The Operational Equation*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 34, *Urban or Rural*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 1, *Impunity*; and 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*.



"It is sometimes wise, Gordon Pasha, to provide the man with a few sunny hours of fraudulent hope so that when night comes he will have a more perfect inward vision of the truth of his hopelessness."

[The Mahdi in the movie](#)
Khartoum (1966) ^[93]



"Sir, this is a really bad idea," said Whittaker. 'A. Really. Bad. Idea. Anyone we drop off there is going to die.' As he said it, he thought he saw Lochner's eyes glaze over."^[94]

Jake Tapper,
The Outpost



Caterpillars are bugs, too

Section 29, Heavy Machines

Drones, cell phones, DNA forensics, genetically modified foods, the suite of machines that make up GIS technologies, and of course the Internet all seem to be transformational technologies. The landmine was the most influential insurgent weapon of the late 20th century, with the radio-detonated explosive device the most troubling so far in the 21st. This section underscores something old-school, however, not electronics or high-tech items, or even weapons, but big wheels, levers, drills, etc. -- heavy machines. We have not neared the limits of creativity in their use, especially in irregular war. It may be due to conservatism or to failed experiments or to obsession with electronics and miniatures, but here is some iron we may see take on more of a role in irregular armed conflicts:

- 800-ton bulldozers. (The biggest commercial bulldozer is the Komatsu D575 at about 150 tons) There are a lot of huge dump trucks and cranes. Eight hundred tons is not a fanciful size for a machine. Such a bulldozer just wouldn't cross European bridges. It would have to be transported modularly. It could shape urban terrain and reform it with favorable observation, fields of fire and control.
- Boom guns. Putting remotely fired machine guns or sniper rifles on 100-foot cherry-picker boom-extension trucks is a natural. New tactics have to be devised to best exploit the advantages.
- Tunnel Boring Machines. For both tunneling and tunnel discovery. Hezbollah has employed these to great effect.
- Barrier Transfer or Zipper Machines. For high speed barrier emplacement in urban environments.
- Scissor-lift trucks. A throwback to medieval siege engines, they allow protected access to upper stories in an urban area.

Cities are man-made geographies. Heavy machines allow the side that has them to more rapidly change physical geography to its advantage. Today, most machines can be operated remotely, without a human occupant, like the new aerial vehicles.

Some people think the tank has run its historical course as a weapon system, but don't count on it. Infantrymen are vulnerable and therefore admire and respect things that are faster, better protected or carry bigger guns. Something like the US Stryker may prove itself soon enough. Technical trucks (a Toyota Hilux with a machinegun in the bed) still provide mobility and firepower, and heavy robot tanks are definitely coming soon. Not having tanks and being an insurgent is a coincidence of poverty, but cost-points change. A tank is a vehicle that combines mobility, firepower and protection. Protection may come from not having to be on the vehicle and the firepower from the increased urban visibility that a network of cameras affords the gun position.

Because of the resources required to develop and deploy them, we can suppose that the potential advantage of huge machines would go to governments, as opposed to the enemies of government. It may be that fashion and fascination with electronics, miniaturization and flight has caused a major area of potential advantage to be overlooked. Asymmetry does not necessarily spell disadvantage to the side with more weight.

The other side of the coin is seen in intemperate application of heavy machines. Scenes like a large armored vehicle crashing into the Branch Dividian compound in Waco, Texas, or of Israeli armored bulldozers flattening parts of Jenin may cause a reaction that makes their use counterproductive. In any case, when and where to use a bulldozer, the railroad, or any heavy machine, is a significant question for irregular conflict. A potential advantage held by most counterinsurgents is the capability to design, acquire and employ heavy machines.

Please see sections: 34, *Urban or Rural*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; 19, *Mercatus*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; 33, *Engineers and Built Environment*; and 68, *Scale*.




Mr. Prosser: Do you know how much damage this bulldozer would sustain if I just let it roll over you?

Arthur: How much?

Mr. Prosser: None at all.

from the movie

The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy (2005)[\[95\]](#)



“Railroad iron is a magician's rod, in its power to evoke the sleeping energies of land and water.” [\[96\]](#)

Ralph Waldo Emerson



Section 30, Control Technology

There are always new technologies available for invading people's privacy and since most of them have other, positive, uses these things will become cheaper and won't go away. Control technologies, however, are found along a wider gamut than just electronic devices. Walls, overhead walkways, even gondolas can be part of a control design. Electronics and architecture do not exist in different worlds. As expressed in Section 64, *The Statute of Frauds*, legal and organizational innovations combine with new uses of physical technologies to form part of the suite of available control technology.

Personal identification (ID) cards are not optimal unless they can be made much more cheaply than it is to counterfeit them. 'Good' for an ID card means accurate, inexpensive and hard to fake. If you're the one trying to remain unidentified, you want a bad ID card system.

Accurate, durable, easy-to-read, hard-to-fake cards can now hold or cue up more and more personal information. For the controller, one useful upshot of comprehensive ID-carding (beyond determining who someone is) is the revelation of strangers -- those who are out of place. 'What are you doing here?' is an easier-made and stronger question if everyone has to carry an ID card and every ID card tells a story. Apparently, unique systems are under development that don't require 'carding', but instead can make near-perfect identifications on the basis of facial recognition technologies and the like. Wearing masks is likely to become more popular.

If you are planning a revolution or an insurgency, start propagandizing against government individual identification systems (sometimes referred to as *biometrics*), and, when the time comes, try to sabotage the digital archives.

Mass, remote photography can help detect anomalies in human activity, especially when the collected images are combined with automated change detection technology. One of the latest related technological curiosities is GigaPan® and its similars. Used during the Obama presidential inauguration, it makes taking comprehensive photography of big areas inexpensive and easy.

Vehicle GIS registries are another thing. To help control truck traffic and truck-borne contraband, you could require that all the trucks carry GPS tracking devices. Tagging select purchase items can also be a powerful aid, especially when combined with camera monitors. Another interesting technological development is shipping containers with GPS activated locks that only open at pre-set destinations, thus helping to control shipment pilfering.

City governments have historically controlled their populations through bureaucracy, statute, religion, education, and by:

- Controlling commodity access;
- Segregating castes, races, classes, and trouble-prone businesses into designated neighborhoods;
- Controlling movement to and through key neighborhoods and centers;
- Controlling services, especially waste removal;
- Maintaining a system of rewards and punishments for public behaviors;
- Establishing a routine of entertainment and socializing times and spaces, such as stadiums;
- Controlling demonstrations, marches and parades via licenses and fixed routes.

These aspects of urban control can help further military and police objectives. Some cities have rebuilt key centers to incorporate control architecture. While perhaps appearing to improve access to an area, this new architecture actually allows a small security element to control or deny access. Many of these city centers are self-contained with their own water, food and electrical supplies. All of the control measures can be augmented with electronic monitoring technologies.

Some technologies especially contribute to the efficiency and effect of urban forts. Extensive, closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring is a fact of life in most European, Japanese, Canadian, and US cities. CCTV watches high-traffic areas, high-crime areas, isolated loading docks, passenger terminals, store displays, parking lots, and the like. The average urban US citizen might appear on a CCTV screen many times in the course of a normal day of city living. Traffic light and speed zone automatic cameras increase this coverage.

The counterinsurgent will want to install CCTV throughout as much of the urban area as possible, starting with high-incident areas and key facilities, but then surreptitiously along theoretical routes of insurgent escape to sanctuary. CCTV and other sensors, mounted on buildings, vehicles, robots, aerial vehicles, fencing or even tethered blimps provide semi-permanent urban and even outlying rural coverage. The urban fortress provides a safe place to house or monitor the various electronic sensors. Land-use planning can incorporate security into spatial planning. Control technologies can be a cost-effective part of the design.


Control technologies make it harder and harder for a dumb insurgent to succeed in urban areas. Strangely, although the global population is on the rise and we are finally admitting the imperative to address security challenges of the urban environment, there seems to be more and more accessible and relatively unpopulated rural space and increasing reason for insurgents to design their survival as a rural formula. Maybe the world is not shrinking and the conflicts not necessarily going urban. There are few histories of purely urban or rural insurgencies. They are more likely both.

Please see sections: 78, *Identity*; 34, *Urban or Rural*; 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; 43, *Sam Spades Whereabouts*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; and 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*.



"It seems that you've been living two lives. One life, you're Thomas A. Anderson, program writer for a respectable software company. You have a social security number, pay your taxes, and you... help your landlady carry out her garbage. The other life is lived in computers, where you go by the hacker alias "Neo" and are guilty of virtually every computer crime we have a law for. One of these lives has a future, and one of them does not."

Agent Smith in the movie
The Matrix (1999)[97]



Handler: You will notice that I have told them they may smoke. I've allowed my people to have a little fun in the selection of bizarre tobacco substitutes... Are you enjoying your cigarette, Ed?

Prisoner: Yes ma'am.

Handler: Yak dung. Hope tastes good, like a cigarette should.

from the movie

The Manchurian Candidate (1962)[\[98\]](#)



One technological answer to the Man is to dig

Section 31, Holes in the Ground

By holes in the ground I mean holes in the ground. Digging, making bunkers and tunnels and improving caves was a feature of State military expenditures long before the appearance of the airplane, but has become more so since. Digging is a life-saver for any force without enough money to gain air superiority. The tendency increased with WWI and has been so strong since World War II that any consideration of the irregular warfare operational environment that does not address the unseen underground geography would be incomplete. The under-dirt-and-rock realm is a fourth plane of today's military operations.

Many strategies, such as 'peoples' war', depend greatly on underground facilities for headquarters, communications, population protection, materiel storage and so on. Although US planners haven't paid much attention to the underground plane of military operations, history tells us that subsurface space is critical in irregular war. In Colombia, the government only recently uncovered 'Mono Jojoy's Caves', where the FARC maintained a headquarters for years in spite of dogged efforts by the Colombian government to find it. Vietnam was a tunneled war. Much of the arms trafficking into Gaza is through tunnels. The Hezbollah dug tirelessly in southern Lebanon -- far more than the Israelis estimated. Add to this the vast below-ground built environment of almost every modern city.

Underground battlespace doesn't just demand special tactics, techniques and procedures. It calls for explicit strategies, intelligence efforts, and equipment acquisition. Today, the price of machinery for digging, hardening and preparing underground facilities for occupation are high enough to give an advantage to governments but, as the sophistication of Mexican drug trafficking tunnels attests, advanced underground works are within the reach of many organizations. The tunnel is a technology of secrecy and anonymity.

It would be a good idea to explicitly address the underground plane in your plans, strategies, training, and equipment. Classic strategy demands attention to the security of your and your enemies' lines of communication to base (sanctuary). In the century of the drone, many of these lines will run under the surface of the earth. Tunnels are part of the geography of impunity. Their main purpose is protection -- and to get away with something.

If there is a single glaring item of equipment shortage in modern government armies, it is the absence of high speed drilling machines designed to conduct remote underground reconnaissance for discovery of and reporting about underground facilities. If there is a single gap in operational military intelligence collected at the national scale, it regards the extant condition of underground facilities in likely irregular conflict areas, and about the capability or propensity of potential enemies to operate underground. If there is a single major overlooked area of in US military doctrine, it is about how to approach the fourth plane.

Please see sections: 8, *Linearity and The Line of Retreat*; 29, *Heavy Machines*; 34, *Urban or Rural*; 92, *Graves Registration*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; 67, *Points, Lines, Spaces*; 65, *Smuggling*; and 57, *Dogs and Mules*.



“Food for five years, a thousand gallons of gas, air filtration,
water filtration, Geiger counter. Bomb shelter...
Underground...goddamn monsters.”

Burt Gummer in the movie
Tremors (1990)[[99](#)]



“I would not rule out the chance to preserve a nucleus of human specimens. It would be quite easy...heh, heh...at the bottom of ah...some of our deeper minesh shafts.”

Dr. Strangelove in the movie
Dr. Strangelove (1964)[[100](#)]



“Now remember, walk without rhythm,
and we won't attract the worm.”

Paul Atreides in the movie
Dune (1984)[[101](#)]



Section 32, Land-use Planning

Land-use planning is a counterweight to Madisonian property systems (those based on a market for highly divisible real estate rights), or a complement to them, depending on your ideological preferences. Land-use planning has become a universal language among city government managers. The term ties itself to central planning and government-oriented and directed solutions, so for some it carries an anti-private property bias. Zoning is an early and still popular form of urban land-use planning, but the theories have evolved to tackle issues like density versus sprawl, or saving cultural patrimony. The ‘built environment’ is land-use planning’s result, but preservation of the non-built environment is typically part of the concern. One of the bywords of land-use planning is ‘sustainability’, which supposes a balance or reconciliation of environmental stewardship, social equity, and economic maximization over the long term.

Municipal and regional land-use planners in Medellín, Colombia internalized the design values supposed by ‘sustainability’, but the city had to wrest land-use dominance from violent illegal armed groups. To provide the urban population with both immediate security and longer-term conflict resolution services, the *Medellinenses* have had to innovate beyond the confines of mainstream urban planning theory. ‘Sustainability’ in a violent urban geography has to comprehend security goals. In the long run, attainment of basic sustainability goals should facilitate a peaceful social compact and vice versa. Urban designs that ease policing are also likely to help against an urban guerrilla enemy. Sustainable land use plans for cities suffering organized violence have to assess control architecture and technology, address disputed territories, measure citizen cost-distances in terms of fear and extortion, and measure the relative power of numerous armed groups.

When an administrative territory or jurisdiction fits neatly within a single level of a hierarchy, we say it is *nested* (townships ‘belong’ to one county, counties to a state, the states to the federal union). By and large, administratively nested territories are not as prone to conflict as un-nested territories. As noted in Section 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*, overlaps in territories mean conflict. If your goal is to pacify an area, you probably want to nest territories, at least the administrative territories. If you don’t know what territories to look or know if they are appropriately nested, then you are facing a significant gap in your knowledge of the area. It behooves you to fill that knowledge gap as soon as practicable, hopefully before tackling other related challenges.

If you are trying to build a more peaceful society, you won’t want to tolerate geographically overlapping tax, service, and representation territories if you can help it. Administrative territories, say, an Afghan *alaqadari*, have boundaries that were established by someone for a reason. That reason had some administrative logic associated with something such as water conflict resolution or taxation, the edges of ethnic groups, or watersheds. You want to know the original logic of the boundary to see if the logic is still valid and still has meaning. The lines, in other words, represent or represented something. You want to know the history of the reasoning and of the parties to the reasoning. You may, on the basis of that knowledge, decide to adjust the boundaries or attempt to give them a new meaning. Lines (or color fades or map measles, whatever) may not say much at all to some local societies, but that does not mean they can’t have a lot of explanatory meaning for you. They may have a proscriptive value at different levels of a conflict. If you are in a military, you are comfortable with the idea of a battalion sketch delineating the areas of responsibility between two subordinate companies. Your enemy might like to know where that delineation is as well. As for other people’s maps, including those showing some national borders, the people who made the lines originally might not have been any smarter than you. (*Might* not have been.)

As far as achieving a peaceful social compact is concerned, while administrative units are best nested, it is sometimes good to have human identities overlap. Such an overlap can mean that the human tendency toward ‘we-versus-they’ is softened. This is in line with the frontiers theories mentioned earlier.

To ‘imbricate’ means to overlap in a pattern, like roof tiles or fish scales. To ‘tessellate’ means to side pattern elements against each other, like the squares of a checkerboard. You’ll want to imbricate your roof and tessellate your floor so you won’t trip up on the tile edges of the floor or slide on water leaking from the roof. As mentioned above in terms of nesting, you’ll generally want to assure that public administration is tessellated. Mostly you’ll want the identities (like Nijmegenites and Arnhemites) to match the nesting of the administrative units, that is to say, be likewise tessellated. That way you won’t have administrators tripping over each other or playing we-and-they with physically proximate communities. But some of the identities you’ll want imbricated. (There is a city-region called Arnhem-Nijmegen.) Court jurisdictions, for instance, especially for real property matters, need to be tessellated according to the location of the land in question. At the same time, jury catchment areas can be imbricated, depending on the nature of the case, because their function is one of cultural leavening and disinterest. When people have tried to tessellate transportation districts, they have sometimes ended-up with one width of railroad track meeting another width at the territorial border. This can perhaps promote the cohesion of a national identity, but doesn’t keep the train on the rails. What you tessellate and what you imbricate is a choice you will make, consciously or unwittingly, when trying to implement a social compact. Cultural affinity and sensitivity is hard to tessellate. In the process of territorial scrutiny, noticing nested and overlapping territories is revelatory, but so too is identification of tessellations and imbrications.

Land-use planning, as a modern professional and academic endeavor, depends heavily on GIS technologies. It daily concerns itself with the interface between the logic of sustainability and the logic of optimal positioning for collective land uses, especially public enterprises such as airports, parks, water systems and other infrastructure. However, although land-use planning usually connotes this technical approach to the spatial distribution of human activities, it is also inextricable from political philosophy about the social compact – the relationship among members of the polity within geographic space.

This book was written in Kansas. Fort Leavenworth is located near the geographic center of the United States and was seen from its founding as an appropriately central launching place for military operations intended to dominate and pacify much of a continent. When historians return, as they regularly do, to the entertaining debate about where the Old West began, Ft. Leavenworth has a good argument, as do Abilene and Dodge City. Although Kansas is a sparsely populated state that derives much of its identity from a 1930’s movie, it is also nicknamed *The Free State*, after a role it played at its birth – a spark in the timing of the American Civil War. Liberty, as an American proposition, has been a land-use plan, an idea about human nature tied to land, boundaries, and the administration of the social compact. Kansas is one of those imagined and then executed plans for a better world, and to a degree it is because of Kansas that American exceptionalism is more than a notion, but a provable fact on the ground. Kansas territory was not just an idea, it was a land-use plan. Especially if your irregular war unfolds in an urban environment, be familiar with the vocabulary, theories, methods, and fashions of land-use planning.

Please see sections: 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 94, *Poop*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; 47, *Why the County*; 87, *Water Wars*; 18, *Whole of Government*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; and 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*.



“The construction of Popular Power is based on the territorial-organizational emphasis that the New Geometry of Popular Power gives us. With this

emphasis, the strengthening of the base social movements is promoted.”[102]

United Socialist Party of Venezuela,
Red Book



Article the First: No person demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments in said territory.

...

Article the Second: The inhabitants of said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by Jury; of a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature, and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law; all persons shall be bailable except for capital offences, where the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great; all fines shall be moderate, and no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted; no man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to take any persons property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same; and in the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and declared; that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously formed.

Thomas Jefferson, excerpt from the
Northwest Ordinance 1787[103]



It can be rebuilt to suit

Section 33, Engineers & Built Environment

'Built environment' is a term for all the man-made physical terrain we associate mostly with cities, but also other man-made elements outside the cities -- buildings, roads, dams, cell-phone towers, etc. It includes things built with stone, sand, mud, wood, glass or steel. It connotes a broader range of geography than the word infrastructure, in that burned-out factories, abandoned quarries, old graveyards, or even agricultural terracing are all part of the 'built environment', but are rarely considered 'infrastructure'. The shape of the built environment can advance or impede the competitive aims of parties to almost any conflict, so competitors with the capacity to change the built environment to their advantage should probably do so. Oddly, beyond the scale of single buildings and some business parks or downtown areas, few irregular warfare planners seem to have latched onto the advantages available through the calculated re-design of the built environment.

Urban land-use planning theory in the United States seems preoccupied with aesthetic arguments, like density versus sprawl, and not so much with the challenge of organized violence. Not all foreign cities have been able to afford that indifference. Medellin, Colombia is an example of a city where planners have had to build ease of policing into their concept of land-use sustainability.

Space is a key concept in Geography and, for our purposes we'll focus on spaces of association and communications. A lot is said of the revolution in electronic communication that defies both space and distance. A chat room doesn't need a room with walls and the geographic distances between individuals in the virtual room don't matter. Nevertheless, when armed conflict comes into play, the weapons weigh something and people have to get together. As organizations grow, bigger spaces are often needed. If an organization is to remain geographically anonymous, the spaces are either going to be hidden in difficult terrain, like caves and jungles, or hidden in plain view like hotels and churches.

The synagogue, in fact, may be one of the most consequential architectural inventions ever. Synagogues may have inspired the most attended association and communication spaces in more than half the world. It isn't just that a church building is used for something spiritual or religious, but that for centuries it was often the only space available for indoor meetings. For clergy, the church building represents a way to get people together for the purposes of guidance, comfort, harangue, organizing for action, and financing.

Architecture (design at the scale of single buildings or complexes), while important, is dependent on urban land-use planning, which is more concerned than architecture with the relative location of urban elements -- with distances. Distance is a geographer's obsession, and it is with distance that engineering of the built environment can have the greatest impact. In cities, the calculus of distances in time between your or your enemies' likely sanctuaries and likely targets is based on the structure of the built environment. You can rearrange that structure to your advantage. If you have no plan for doing so, you are leaving that initiative to your enemy by default.

If you ask Engineers to build something, like a bridge, they will, regardless of how wide the gap or difficult the terrain. They will, in fact, design and build anything, but they are generally not so good at deciding why. We also know that if engineers are not given something to design or build they can still figure out how to blow stuff up -- which goes to a significant oversight in irregular war thinking and preparation over the last half century. The most creative and influential participation of engineers in irregular warfare has been the 'blow stuff up' part.

Irregular wars, or at least the leftist revolutionary insurgencies of the recent past, are about tearing at the fabric of the establishment or of the system. Even insurgent philosophers use terms like 'deconstruction', hence a convenient marriage between the violent political activist and the indolent engineer. The counterinsurgent, meanwhile, has not found enough ways and occasions to tell engineers what to build where. Civil engineering's contribution to recent counterinsurgency has been late in coming and reactive. It has been how to make a vehicle that is harder to blow up, or how to make a device that will make it more difficult for an insurgent to detonate his bomb.

In 1994 author Mike Davis wrote *Urban Control: The Ecology of Fear* on the control architecture of Los Angeles (really how engineers were being put to the service of the establishment to make protest and resistance difficult). What Professor Davis saw was actually the rarest of exceptions. Davis' fears were drawn from the modest assumption that more than a handful of persons were as astute as he, and had figured out the urban Dot Game. In fact, few government planners have taken full advantage of civil engineering as a means to control civil resistance, with the Israeli government being a possible exception.

So much of the world is urban now, you almost have to build or rebuild something if you are going to contribute to the structure of life. The question should almost never be whether to build, just what to build with the money and expertise available, and where. Bridges are usually a great choice. Sports complexes seem to be what the Chinese like to build, maybe partly because schools and hospitals, though they sound good, are like churches in that they are not just structures, but include the people and institutions in them. They require educated professionals and professional materiel. It's easy to build a school building, but if the educational effort is not sustainable, the psychological effect of an empty school building can be a worse than no school at all. Pure water systems are a contribution in most places, but they always seem more expensive than expected because of environmental impact and competition for source waters. Sewers are good, especially when the engineers find an adequate place for the waste material to go. Roads are also good, but not necessarily so much as people will claim. Every road benefits someone more than someone else. The road-building constituency rarely talks about the differentials. Road building can be a great idea, but it is not a great idea *ipso facto*. Some say, 'The insurgency begins where the road ends'. Most roads have two ends, however, so if you don't have a good idea in advance about whom specifically a road will favor or disfavor, you might want to re-think. 'Engineering' means building thoughtfully.

Please see sections: 101, *Magical Realism*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; 29, *Heavy Machines*; 77, *Sex*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; 115, *Academies*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; and 62, *Bank Robbery*.



"If it ain't baroque, don't fix it."

Les Grau (attributed)



Construction Worker: I think we need more dirt.

Construction Boss: Yes, more dirt.

Brian Biggs

Everything Goes: On Land [\[104\]](#)



City is where insurgency goes to die

Section 34, Urban or Rural

We all know what a city is, but what does the difference between city and country mean for winning or losing an armed conflict? Many writers will refer to an armed group like the Colombian FARC as a *rural* guerrilla, but what does that observation mean and what do we do with it?

Urban means a lot of buildings and people. Exactly where rural ends and urban begins geographically and historically is a question we will skip for the most part. Some of the answer is statistical protocol. The United States government, for example, uses several categories for a variety of purposes, including a thing called the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) which is somewhat arbitrary, but more or less means a place with a core of more than 50,000 persons and a surrounding population of more than 100,000. Definitions also often include a legal concept such as incorporation of some kind. Urbanites generally share services such as a power source, entertainment, potable water, and a sewer system. Some would say that a restaurant is the beginning of urban.

In rural environments people supply their own basic services. The more rural, the fewer shared services, until there are so few shared services, an area is no longer considered even rural, but primitive or wild, so maybe 'rural' correlates to independence. Bottled propane is a sign of ruralness in some countries. Propane can be sent through a pipe network or delivered in a truck. If your place is so rural you have no delivery system but have to get it yourself, then you might be rural. If you are using wood and coal you mined yourself, you're really rural, although you just might be so urbanite you can play at being rural. At any rate, more rural means less dependence and fewer networks. It does not necessarily mean less wealth. In America it is unmistakably rural for farmers to dedicate a half million dollar to building an insanely powerful pulling tractor solely to compete against other tractors in sled-pulling contests. Economic measures may not be the best distinguisher of rural versus urban.

Maybe eighty-five percent of Colombians live in cities of over fifty thousand people, most of which have centralized sewer systems. Debates about rural versus urban are often won with behavioral and linguistic arguments rather than according to infrastructure statistics, however. Where rural and urban begin and end in Colombia are academic curiosities and matters of self-identity. If a person rides a *chiva* (a colorful bus-like truck conversion with a wooden cabin, no doors and a pithy saying on the bumpers) as an economic necessity, he or she probably calls the *chiva* a *misto* and is almost certainly a rural Colombian, scientifically speaking. The geographic extents within which *chivas* roll as *mistos* has shrunk a lot because suburban areas have reached out, roads have improved (allowing lighter-framed buses), and fewer people live in some of the more remote areas. If you live in Colombia and regularly ride what the city folk call a *chiva*, but which you call a *misto*, you have also ridden a lot of mule, and you are a rural person, a *campesino*.

A map of Colombian National parks gives a 75% solution to the location of guerrilla sanctuaries inside Colombia. The parks are remote. If we were to identify those points in Colombia farthest from the cities and from the main roads in terms of cost-distances, those points would mostly fall within areas Colombians considered suitable for designation as national parks, which the FARC use as refuges. The FARC is a rural movement, which makes sense because its early leaders were born in rural areas, but also because it has had to depend on lines of communication that lead out of the country. Remote locations are distant from the controls that government can efficiently put on anonymity. Staying rural and remote means learning how to walk (a lot). Rural people can walk. Because of the need to maintain long lines of communication in rural areas, FARC leaders had to depend on rural people and consequently assumed many of the perspectives, knowledge, habits, and values of rural life. The FARC indeed has had urban cells and urbanite leaders and for many years. The FARC's overall insurgent military strategy was to surround and then take the cities. In the forty-plus years since the beginnings of the FARC, however, Colombia has seen a huge increase in urban life while the percentage of the population that can still be called rural has greatly shrunk. The cities to be surrounded grew larger and larger while the rural population on which the insurgency depended grew smaller and smaller. The FARC did not implement or change its strategy fast enough to keep up with the pace of Colombian demographic change. Paradoxically, much of the impetus for urbanization in Colombia came from the violence that the FARC embraced in rural areas.

Cities seem to be where insurgencies go to die. This is probably because the insurgent organization cannot control anonymity there. There is so much anonymity available as a consequence of urban life that too many people can safely inform on the outlaw. This depends, however, on how the insurgent uses city terrain, and on timing. On moving into the city, the insurgent may encounter criminal organizations already in control of key neighborhoods and key smuggling routes. The criminals are urban, with urban skills at controlling anonymity, keeping secrets, and imposing violent will. The rural insurgent is used to walking, while the criminal gangsters roll. They are more used to the speeds, technologies, timing and pitfalls of urban life. This presents a challenge for the rural guerrilla wanting to 'take' a city. He confronts a paradox of city life: the city offers the possibility of great anonymity, but simultaneously presents an organization with greater difficulty in controlling that anonymity. Gangsters and guerrillas alike depend on codes of silence, but enforcing that code in a city with which you are not familiar is a trick.

Some urban geographies are more amenable than others to the insurgent. One is the university campus, especially in Latin America, where a great deal of tolerance and amnesty is available for youthful and scholarly reflection and expression. On campus a radical can get away with having some public personality profile and remain at-large. Poor, mostly peripheral, and densely crowded neighborhoods are also more likely to host insurgents and crime bosses. People refer to relatively poor urban wards in US cities as slums, which suffer some unique challenges associated with phenomena like high crime rates and illicit drug use. The mix of social characteristics that cause people to refer to neighborhoods as slums in the United States, however, is not quite the same as in the marginal, informal sprawls in the developing world. The zones that we casually refer to as slums in Latin America (*favelas*, *turgorios*, *barrios populares*) are heavily populated, covered with ramshackle housing and perhaps suffer a lack or shortage of waste removal systems, potable water or electric power. They are often exposed to costly environmental events like mudslides or flooding. They may be home to populations with nowhere better to go. Although these areas are almost always worse off in terms of basic services and conveniences than the slums of the more developed cities in the United States, that disadvantage does not equate to a community of incapacitated people, broken families, criminal culture, academic underachievement or even lack of hope (although some of these ailments are patently present). The human capital in the slums of many cities is often capable, mobile and successfully aspiring.

The most obvious distinguishing characteristics of a Latin American underprivileged urban area may indeed be the most easily changed. The civil engineering, or physical arrangement, architecture, street pattern and urban plan can greatly assist government or anti-government elements. The side with the capacity to reform the built environment in its favor should do so.

The kinds of things that can be done to gain advantage from the physical environment include the creation of controlled passage-ways and elevated bridges, and construction and relocation of walls. These things are sometimes called control architecture. The advantage normally pertaining to the government stems from greater capacity to change the physical structure. Administrative devices, such as the imposition of street naming conventions and the formalization of addresses, also break down anonymity. Re-organizing streets and traffic to speed the safe flow of persons, especially children and home makers to and from schools, as well as unimpeded, un-extorted access to basic services also seem to give government an advantage over insurgents and criminals.

For understanding geographic advantages and disadvantages in irregular war, it appears there really are revealing differences between rural and urban. Rural ethics, habits and necessities don't always mix well with their urban counterparts. However, concentrating too much on the distinction between rural and urban might itself throw us off. The in-between, suburban or transitional areas may be the hardest to understand and the greatest challenge. It is too easy to speak of urban conflict as distinct from warfare 'in the field'. Maybe the most difficult vital areas are the transition zones around cities.


Please see sections: 29, *Heavy Machines*; 27, 'Nonviolent' Action; 37, *School Lunches*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; 94, *Poop*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; 32, *Land-use Planning*; and 97, *Oviedo*.



“The lowest and vilest alleys in London
do not present a more dreadful record of sin
than does the smiling and beautiful countryside.”

Sherlock Holmes in

The Adventure of the Copper Beaches [\[105\]](#)



Stranger on the highway: I'm from the city...Doesn't matter what city; all cities are alike.

Billy: Well, why'd you mention it then?

Stranger on the highway: 'Cause I'm *from* the city; a long *way* from the city, and that's where I wanna be right now.

from the movie

Easy Rider (1969) [\[106\]](#)



Section 35, Comuna 13

On the 30th of May, 2002, Medellín's mayor, Luis Pérez Gutiérrez, assembled his municipal cabinet and a group of newsmen, mounted a tour bus and headed over to the western hillside borough known as *Comuna 13*, or San Javier. People of the borough had been complaining. A major police sweep into the borough a week earlier had left bitterness and bad publicity. Public order was flagging, and so the mayor decided to visit the borough, take a sounding, and show his interest. As they arrived, a lead car was shot up and immobilized by gunfire, blocking the way. The adrenalized bus driver managed to back up to safety from the bullet storm. The residents' complaints had been understated. For the mayor it was a frightening experience, but it was also degrading and embarrassing to realize, finally, that an entire sector of his city was completely outside the constituted government's civil authority. *Comuna 13*, an area of over seven square kilometers and a hundred thirty thousand people, had fallen outside the *de facto* territorial limits of government control. Outlaws, rebels and gangsters had gained a zone of complete impunity from government authority. For several years they had been fighting mostly among themselves for dominance. The population of the zone, many with few economic options, had become terrorized by that fight and were all but enslaved by the various violent groups.

The month before the mayor's bus ride, the country's president, Andrés Pastrana, ordered the Colombian Army to retake what was known as the *Despeje*, a demilitarized zone in south-central Colombia that Pastrana had conceded to the FARC for the purpose of conducting a national peace process. Pastrana had been elected on a campaign of seeking a negotiated settlement with the insurgents and he had fulfilled his promise through a series of demarches and concessions. After what seemed to the public and government to be a long, violent series of insincerities on the part of the FARC, President Pastrana reversed course and ordered the *Despeje* to be retaken by the Colombian State.

The end of the peace process led to a changed security dynamic in Medellín. During the years of efforts to maintain cease fires with the rebel groups, the Pastrana administration had been loath to authorize substantial offensive operations. During the peace process period, the FARC planted units outside Medellín and attempted to create a presence within the city, or at least within a few of its peripheral zones, *Comuna 13* in particular. The FARC took active measures during the peace process to improve its geographic positioning. It exploited the depressed pace of government military initiative. Now the peace process had collapsed and, to a degree, the green light went on for more aggressive counterinsurgent operations within Medellín. Attention and resources from Bogotá, however, were to be aimed at retaking the *Despeje*, to addressing the presence of FARC units nearer to the capital and closer to the upcoming presidential elections. Also, the scale of urban insurgency in Medellín may not have been correctly measured in Bogotá, or even seen as an integral part of larger insurgent strategies. At any rate, Mayor Pérez would not find a responsive ear in Bogotá until after the inauguration of a new president.

On May 21st, a week before Mayor Pérez' rejected visit, about seven hundred police officers and soldiers implemented Operation Mariscal, descending more or less simultaneously (in this case more like *ascending* since the borough is almost all hillside) mostly on residential addresses in the borough. The objective was to issue outstanding warrants to members of the various armed groups and to interdict what government intelligence warned might be an organized attempt to disrupt the presidential elections that were scheduled for May 26th. Mariscal, which met organized resistance, indicated to the public forces how thoroughly infested the borough had become. It also exposed some weakness in government operational practices.

Liberal party presidential candidate Álvaro Uribe Vélez won the May 26 elections by a large margin. He had campaigned on a platform of toughness against the various insurgent enemies of the State, especially the FARC. Colombian voters not only rejected the failed Pastrana 'peace process', they were attracted to the idea of beating the FARC definitively. Uribe's inauguration in early August marked not only a sharp turn in national military strategy, but a change of fortunes for *Comuna 13*.

Medellín was returning to hyper-violence. During some days as many as twenty five murders occurred. The city suffered over two thousand murders in the first half of 2002. The violence actually never deteriorated to the levels suffered during the early 1990s before Pablo Escobar was taken out, but the people of Medellín had every reason to fear it might.

On October 14, during a spike in inter-gang violence in *Comuna 13*, a stray bullet entered an apartment in an adjacent sector of the city, killing the beautiful only daughter of one of the mayor's friends, a prominent doctor. At the wake, the mayor was not only moved by the total deflation of his friend, but by the parallel depression of another man whose college-age son had suffered the same fate. The war had reached the heart of an otherwise oblivious elite. Calculating that the city itself did not have the resources to deal with the problem at the appropriate scale, Mayor Pérez called the new president on the phone asking for help with *Comuna 13*. President Uribe picked up the phone and ordered the head of the chief of the armed forces to take back the borough.

On October 16, 2002, a joint force of Colombian army, national police, municipal police and other government agencies, a force more than twice as large as in Mariscal, surrounded and entered the borough to serve arrest warrants. This 'Operation Orion', the shooting part of which lasted only twenty-four hours, resulted in about four hundred detentions. Not all the warrants were served, the government forces suffered several casualties, and more civilians were killed. It was the single biggest urban operation ever attempted in the country, however. It did not bring economic equality to the borough or eliminate desperation in the lives of many of its residents. It was a successful counterinsurgent event nonetheless.

On Tuesday, October 21, Mayor Pérez again loaded up his cabinet and a bunch of media people and headed for *Comuna 13*. This time he went to the middle of the borough, led a public prayer, raised the national flag, and took a long march up and down the borough's labyrinth of stairway streets. Colombian flags had been distributed generally and were flying and hanging everywhere. There was cheering, no shooting, and no mistaking that a change had occurred.

Orion was the last of a series of operations, but it was different than its predecessors. Previous operations had failed to create a permanent government presence. Government units had gone in, often with uncertain destinations, to serve warrants on the basis of fairly good information about suspects, but not about the overall operational options of the enemies they faced. The police had approached the problem without visualizing the flow of movement in and out of the borough, nor had they planned any assault on the relationship between the enemy and the population. They had not assembled sufficient resources to remain with sufficient power to address that relationship -- especially to change the nature of the competition for information. Although the authorities had always hoped to enter and stay, they had never assigned enough personnel even to protect the policemen themselves.

Finally, after Operation Mariscal revealed itself as another rung on a ladder leading nowhere, an army intelligence sergeant with an integral view of the problem (perhaps from the experiences of a humble background) spoke up at a brainstorming meeting and laid out all that had to be accomplished. The authorities had to seal off the zone, go in big, clear the entire area, stay there, and then create conditions in which the residents were confident that they could talk to the police so that it would be easy to sort out the criminals. That meant involving everyone in and with the government, including engineers, social workers, teachers, local NGOs -- everyone -- and that meant not offending the population with high-handedness or mistakes. The military and police commanders, and the city's civilian leadership, listened.

Lessons from *Comuna 13* might include the following:

Achieve resolve at the top. If the bosses aren't on board, failure is likely. In the *Comuna 13* case, the president and the mayor were resolute and committed. Sadly, the resolve came only after a long period of obliviousness, wishful thinking and half measures.

Effect military-police coordination. Operation Orion was unusually favored in this regard. The senior police officer was General José Leonardo Gallego and the senior army commander was General Mario Montoya Uribe, commander of the army's 4th Brigade, headquartered in the city. The two were friends, familiar with each other and the area since boyhood. This relationship did not hurt. The two knew the practical capabilities and cultural expectations of their forces as well as the personality of their partner, so appropriately dividing up roles and missions was not a difficult challenge.

Surround the area. The terrain in and around *Comuna 13* is steep and broken, with a mixture of built environment (much of it of precarious) and undeveloped rural terrain. Surrounding the neighborhood could not be done with police assets alone and, in fact, was never completely accomplished by the army. Sealing off the borough had several positive effects. One was to keep out reinforcements from nearby rural-based insurgent units. Another was to frighten insurgent leaders within the borough to try to escape. (Perhaps the fact that holes remained in the cordon actually lessened the violence.) Another was to secure dominant terrain so that the outlaw groups would not take the best firing and observation positions. Finally, the cordon also helped prevent innocent civilians from accidentally straying into harm's way.

Take dominant terrain and own it. The mayor had given an order well before Operation Orion for the police to buy key properties on which to build new local police stations. Getting hold of those properties took a little more legal and financial effort than originally anticipated, but the decision to dominate key ground permanently proved smart in the long run. Covering militarily significant terrain with a police fort makes future control of the area by an insurgent force much more difficult.

Start building. The city determined that staying in the borough meant making a constant effort to improve everything to the extent resources allowed. A huge highway tunnel project, a gondola extension off the city metro line, and a major urban housing project all evidenced government presence and commitment.

Control anonymity. One control on anonymity was the simple presence of more policemen. It became harder for a stranger to go unnoticed. Less visible, but effective to the mid-term success of the operation, was a local one-stop center where residents conducted mundane business with the city (connection of services, payment of fees and bills, enrollment of children in school). The building was organized in such a way that residents felt confident of their anonymity should they choose to denounce criminals in the neighborhood. A small architectural and administrative innovation helped the city attack the law of silence or *omertà*. Such rules of silence are built partly on a foundation of loyalty and mostly on one of fear – but such fear does not constitute an intractable cultural human condition. A simple opportunity for discreet conversation can defeat it.

Once control of the balance of anonymities became a focus of the government's operational design, ideas to address anonymity came easily, and the whole outlaw 'culture of silence' was put at risk as the flow of information from the public to government authorities increased. Because the carrying of cell phones had become common in Medellín, an anonymous call-in number to the police was maintained. Vehicle registries were also groomed as an anonymity-control measure. It became increasingly more difficult for a stranger to gain or maintain anonymity inside *Comuna 13* and easier for peaceful citizens to exercise it.

Control the location and movement of children. As noted in Section 37, *School Lunches*, a number of programs were developed to address the quality of life for children in the borough. Schools were the natural geographic focus of these efforts. Since 2002, horror stories about accidental shootings, drug-related kidnappings, and other tragedies in *Comuna 13* have occasionally been published, but most stories coming out of the borough are hopeful.

Encourage community. Medellín's public administrators built a modern library and funded parades, art programs, and other events to garner participation, encourage joint effort, and engender community pride. These things were not relegated to the status of details. The government, in conjunction with local and international NGOs strived to increase the provision of basic services to the area. City administrative leaders saw equitable, orderly distribution of services (as opposed to violent pirating) as intimately connected with civic culture and education.

Address cost-distances. City planners poured over maps to determine service access points, school locations, military outpost locations, and transportation hubs, and adjusted these to the extent possible. Medellín's municipal management corporation, *Empresas Públicas de Medellín*, is highly GIS competent.

Support rule-of-law systems. The city's security office coordinated with other city managers to perfect street names and the formal addressing of residences and businesses. This facilitated the formal service of criminal process by prosecutors. Before the streets and addresses were formalized, it had been difficult to serve warrants and to follow other rule-of-law practices.

Add local support to demobilization, disarmament and re-insertion/reintegration. The city government also collaborated with national and international organizations to conduct Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs of ex-guerrillas and paramilitaries. While these have had mixed results, most observers praise them over the alternatives. (See Section 103, *Amnesty*)

Be careful making alliances. An accusation exists that the precipitous drop in crime after 2002 was not due to the government's presence, but to a select group of outlaw being aided by the government. The history of collaboration between the government and illegal rightist armed groups in Medellín is yet to be fully exposed or understood. Some coordination and alliance occurred in Antioquia as elsewhere in Colombia, especially between the government and elements of the United Colombian Self Defense Forces, AUC. As the AUC evolved into an uglier and uglier component of the country's outlaw violence, however, those associations became an embarrassment and a political yoke. Some of the calm reigning in *Comuna 13* since 2002 may owe to the dominance of a single surviving criminal gang. The larger truth, supported by a great deal of evidence, is that the borough returned to the fold of municipal, civil governance. It is no longer being organized politically or militarily by insurgents.

Don't take victory for granted. As great as the Operation Orion victory was, underlying weaknesses in the social compact, especially in the control of corruption and the power of illicit drug organizations keep *Comuna 13* vulnerable to social deterioration. In late 2009 and 2010 Medellín and *Comuna 13* experienced a renewal of high violence levels, even if not compared to earlier periods. This violence was apparently the result of turf battles between small, ascendant new criminal gangs battling over the same drug trade corridors.

Go in big and stay. 'Take, hold, build' has no better example than Operation Orion. After all, operational art in irregular warfare isn't just about the lines of communication and not getting caught during a retreat; it is also about not retreating. Start with unified, resolute leadership. It took a couple of epiphany moments for Medellín's mayor to commit, but when he did, he not only went to his president to assure support, he listened to a sergeant explain what governance meant.

Understand the connection of rural and urban. *Comuna 13* lies along the main east-west route in and out of the city, and not going through the borough entails a costly detour for people, materiel, and merchandise moving between the Panamanian isthmus region and the middle of Colombia.

Outside *Comuna 13*, a number of insurgent and criminal groups maintained rural connections for supply and escape.

Buy informants. The city created a hefty fund to pay informants inside the borough. This direct assault on anonymity paid dividends quickly.

Expect legal attack. First General Gallego and later General Montoya would suffer legal demands and accusations stemming from their conduct of operations in Medellín. A cursory check of Internet sites reveals a cyber realm populated mostly by left-apologetic criticism of these officers, their institutions, and the results of their efforts, especially Orion. The Colombian government branches are differentiated and independent enough that accusations of government abuse can be effectively forwarded regardless of the political or ideological stripe of the chief executive. That's the good news. The bad news is the degree to which radical anti-State individuals gained positions within the government, the low prices at which some government personnel were purchased, and the ease with which outside perceptions were manipulated. Had these two officers acted during the regime of a different president, they might have been far more vulnerable to legal attack, independent of the nature, ethic or effectiveness of their decisions. Paradoxically, a key factor in making these two leaders vulnerable was the spectacular degree of their counterinsurgent success, especially in Medellín.

Remember terrain. Although *Comuna 13* is an urban area, the land is precipitous. High ground in and around the borough is key terrain. This matters in even the lowest-intensity of armed encounters, especially due to the new prominence of snipers.

Train for explosive booby traps. One of the first serious government casualties in the borough was produced by a cadaver-bomb.

Find money. The actions, activities, and programs required money. Medellín was lucky enough to have had some. Peace requires a social investment. Medellín has been trying to make that investment and, sincere arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, recent history tells that in the midst of a larger, complicated national armed struggle, Medellín tackled what seemed to be an intractable problem and succeeded. The self-concept of the people of Antioquia, *Paisas* as they are known, is one of can-do problem solving, and in that spirit, the *Paisas* opened their checkbook. They are not much for existential angst. Post-structuralism is not catching-on in Medellín.

The physical and human geography of *Comuna 13* is unique and the lessons are not all easy to generalize. This successful counterinsurgent vignette doesn't delve into the causes of the conflict or identities the anti-State actors. For that background, and for additional sources, there are three books of note, all in Spanish. They are Ricardo Aricapa's *Comuna 13*; Yoni Rendon's *Comuna 13 de Medellín*; and Pablo Angarita's *Dinámicas de guerra y construcción de paz*. Of particular interest in the history is an episode of organized land squatting.

Please see sections: 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 25, *Why Humans Don't Fight*; 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 86, *The Dot Game and Go*; 2, *Anonymity*; 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; and 95, *Childhood*.



Riff: We gotta stand up to them Doc; it's important.

Doc: Fighting over a little piece of street is so important?

Gang: To us it is!

Doc: To hoodlums it is.

Gang: Who're you callin' a hoodlum?

from the movie
West Side Story (1961)[107]




“It was all about a invasion [organized squatting] of one of the farms that a man, whose last name was Arroyave, had in the uphill part of San Javier, on the extreme western side of the city; a farm that was as neglected physically as it were the tax payments -- so much so that the back taxes were worth more than the farm itself. That is to say, its owner was, in fact, the Municipality of Medellín.” [108]
(my translation)

Ricardo Aricapa
Comuna 13



--- Comuna 13, Medellín, Colombia circa 2002 ---



Comuna 13 is shown in the west of Medellín. Dark lines are main roads, dotted lines the Antioquia border. Except for Santa Fe de Antioquia, the included towns are scenes of historic violent events.

Section 36, The Denver Broncos

Entertainments, including sports and games, can tell a lot about a culture – about society, including how people from or within that culture are likely to fight. Knowing thoroughly about entertainments also helps in the control of anonymity. Entertainment rights are valuable property, so their locations, times and modalities are clues to personal whereabouts.

The fall football schedule: In Oklahoma, on a Friday evening in October, a small town high school will host a football game. That game was scheduled in advance and the schedule published on the Internet, carried home as flyers by members of the student body, put up on posters in local businesses and printed in the local newspaper. All of the town's high school players are listed by name and position. It will also typically include their year, weight, height, and jersey number. The high school football schedule is a formal property record. In fact, it is one of the most formal and most effective property records in the society. It states exactly where a very specific group of humans has a right to do a very specific thing at a very specific place and time. The individuals who have a right to play almost always show up to do so. The record is accurate, rarely in error, and transparent. The system of such records is comprehensive in that all the high schools in the league also have schedules. Rarely do more than two teams show up for a ballgame. The document is the most disseminated of a larger weave of other documents that the schedule reflects. In that weave is a league charter, an agreement regarding gate receipts, about contracting referees, about the location of the playoff and championship games, and so on. The football schedule is what we see of an entire rule-of-law apparatus of written documents.

The schedule also reflects a central aspect of community identity. The football game is a moment of collective expression. The players represent not just a town, but a dimension of life. Meanwhile, and while participating in that moment of hotdogs and energy, Spencer, a private investigator, sees the football game and the football schedule from a vocational angle. He knows that the coach will put Grayson, a fast, fearless kid, in for the kickoff as the 'gunner', whose job it is to fire himself down the field at breakneck speed to tackle the also-fast kid who will catch the kickoff. Spencer knows Grayson will be standing on one of the forty yard hash marks at seven o'clock on the evening on 8 August wearing the number 3 on the back of his jersey. He also knows that Grayson's mom and dad will be in the north stands wearing the school colors, one or both of them even wearing a matching number 3 jersey. That's when Spencer will politely (since Spencer's daughter is one of the cheerleaders) serve Grayson's dad a summons to appear in court.

The game itself. American football explains a lot about America, and a description of that sport can illuminate many of the themes in this book. A football field is divided by many lines, with the opposing teams fighting not only for every yard, but for every inch. A pair of officials on the sideline measures progress with a chain, not coincidentally evocative of the survey chains used to square up the new territories of the early republic. Other officials keep time, because the game requires constant decision-making regarding what is time-in or time-out. Different amounts of time are accorded to different activities, which are measured to the second. Lack of promptness is invariably punished. While the number of players on the field is unremarkable, each has a specialty. Many of these specialties match patterns of natural gifts – a 230-pound athlete will more likely be a linebacker, whereas a fleet 160-pounder more likely a wide receiver and a 300-pound youth an offensive lineman. The coaching staffs and batteries of officials are organized by specialty as well. The game requires a lot of gear. Players are variously armored, electronic communication is ubiquitous, and practice fields are replete with blocking sleds, targets, and obstacles. Football is an athletic contest, but games are considered incomplete if not surrounded by collateral activities. There are bands, cheerleaders, food, coronations, awards, recognitions, lotteries, food, parachutists and even jet planes if you've got 'em.

The rule book for American football is about eight-feet thick. Few living humans know all the rules, such that games require a committee of five people to regularly confer. The players' jerseys are all numbered and most leagues require players' surnames be put on the jerseys. This helps the officials control anonymity and assign accountability for infractions. Once every few years, the sports journalists report a football game in which no infractions occurred, but most games don't go five minutes without some rule being broken. Many of the coaches' playbooks are immensely complex, the combinations and permutations of their strategies being marvelously varied. This leads to a whole industry of scouting and spying, since a marked advantage goes to the defensive coordinator who anticipates his opponents' plays. Not only are the players specialized as to their skills and attributes, they each have a particular task to complete during a given play – a specific block, running pattern or throw to make in order for the team to effect any of the myriad plays the coaches devise. Any failure of individual responsibility can cause failure of a play, meaning that teamwork is built on responsibility for completing individual assignments.

Finally, and essentially, American football is violent. People regularly promote efforts to tame the game or at least make it safer and less likely to injure the players. Violence, however, is part of what makes the game not only enjoyable and exiting, but probably why so many young males are attracted to it and so many young females attracted to them. Accordingly, with this atavism undaunted, each new generation of linebacker defines the game and the linebackers' personal mission in it as one of separating quarterbacks and running backs from a few moments of light.

American football is territorial, flamboyant, sexual, and (perhaps being repetitive here) violent. It is also complicated, technology-heavy, legalistic in the extreme, and incrementally and minutely measured both as to time and space. It is tied inextricably to money, contracts and place identity. It is about individual prowess and responsibility in a group context. It is serious business and fun at the same time. Especially... it is violent, but the violence is poured on and poured over by a thousand rules and banks of judges. It is a legitimated violence. Rarely do young men fight in the stands at American football games. The young men most prone to face-smashing are getting their faces smashed on the field.

There are two major points that this section tries to make, and they are not about violence, American football or the Denver Broncos (paragon of the activity).^[109] First, many cultural activities, especially entertainments, are inseparable from place identity. Entertainment activities imply sets of rights and duties that people are highly likely to exercise – because they want to. Knowing about these activities is to know, with actionable accuracy, where groups and individuals will be, what they will be doing, when they will be doing it, and who they will be supporting. Property systems are social compacts, but which associate people with specific places and rights. Property systems don't just tell us who has the deed to the ranch, they tell us the *where* of civil and human rights generally. The Sam Spades of the world understand this well.


The second point, related to the first, is that enjoyable voluntary activities describe manners of thinking and organizing. They will even reveal hierarchies and interpersonal relationships that will carry over into what might seem to be more serious enterprises. If you disdain learning about fun and pastime, you will fail to learn people's predispositions, who they admire, to whom they sense a debt, who they voluntarily follow, and when people are likely to be where. Property analysis is the detailed study of power relationships as revealed by exercised rights and duties, including pastimes.

Please see sections: 47, *Why the County*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 118, *Democracy*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 78, *Identity*; 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*; and 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*.




“Football is an honest game. It's true to life. It's a game about sharing. Football is a team game. So is life.”[\[110\]](#)

Quarterback [Joe Namath](#)



“Football linemen are motivated by a more complicated, self-determining series of factors than the simple fear of humiliation in the public gaze, which is the emotion that galvanizes the backs and receivers.”[\[111\]](#)

Lineman [Merlin Olsen](#)



“When I played pro football, I never set out to hurt anyone deliberately -- unless it was, you know, important, like a league game or something.”[\[112\]](#)

Linebacker [Dick Butkus](#)



Not all social programs are bad

Section 37, School Lunches

Several sections of this book are dedicated to the simple idea of cutting the enemy off at the pass, that to win armed struggles you better pay close attention to physical routes of escape to sanctuary, yours and his. It is about the bottom line of biological survival, about beating your enemy in physical time and space. That is indeed the book's attitude, so admiring mention of a social program like government provision of school lunches might seem out of character. Not at all. Routes are composed of people, not just space and distance. The time scale of strategy includes time to recruit, to convince, to be the legitimate font of power and governance, or not. This book does not suggest that the essence of strategy is all geometric, all physical or all anything. It doesn't even define the essence, except to tie it to an equation about the timing and placement of power by strategizing enemies. To win at irregular war requires having a grasp of victory in time. Is victory or defeat to be determined after a week, a decade, a century? Winning at irregular war can mean just eliminating the enemy or it can mean that plus achieving a social condition less likely to spawn new enemies. Besides, a meal can keep a child in a building and off the street during that one critical hour.

A school lunch is probably a good thing in its own right. A hungry student is not a good listener and is a poor learner. Beyond compassion and the compelling logic that human brains are society's most valuable natural resource (and that the bodies housing and fueling those brains need to be nourished), there is your goal -- to win. If a child is inside a school building to get fed, he or she is not being a messenger or a look-out or a carrier of contraband, or a thirteen-year-old assassin. The child is not participating to change the weight of a factor in the operational equation. You don't want child enemies.

The geography of armed conflict does not get much simpler than this. Programs are good that keep children in safe places where it is difficult for some gangster to recruit them. If children are progressing in peaceful pastimes, that's good. The ancillary benefits for the responsible insurgent or counterinsurgent leader, or for law enforcement, is the better development of human resources coming out of childhood.

This book chooses school lunches because government programs to provide meals have been shown, in places like Medellin, Colombia, to be effective in drawing underage participation away from armed conflict. There are probably other useful programs as well. Western militaries are fond of completing certain kinds of projects in foreign countries that take advantage of what seems to be excess engineering capacity. They like to build schoolhouses and medical clinics. The 'build something' notion promises an amorphous ephemeral change likely to benefit the builder. The basic idea is that doing something useful will be appreciated. It probably will, but a school is not just a building, and a *good* school is much more than a place of learning. A good school is a place where kids are taught by competent teachers who are not teaching hate. The building, faculty, administration and families all factor in to what defines a good school, and how the educational environment will resist the recruitment of underage children into armed conflict.


Seek programs that keep children in safe places advantageous to them and to you. A building alone is never a school. Create places that protect, inspire, equip and enlighten. Keep track of the enemy's side of the school question. Plenty of places dishearten, instill hatred, teach methods of destruction, and preach slavery. Those places are schools, too, and may even have school lunch programs. It would be a shame if you were helping to pay for such a negative education.

Please see sections: 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 95, *Childhood*; 55, *Kidnapping*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 40, *Popular Support*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; and 30, *Control Technology*.



“The miser, starving his brother's body, starves also his own soul, and at death shall creep out of his great estate of injustice, poor and naked and miserable.”^[113]

Theodore Parker



“Well, the puke pile is over there. It's a pretty big pile of puke.”

Miss Clipper in the movie

Joe Dirt (2001)^[114]



Own deception

Section 38, Cultural Study for What?

Interest in foreign cultures is now fashionable in military educational circles. The new interest, however, begs a question: What is the purpose, from a military competitive point of view of understanding foreign cultures? The answer can be divided into seven parts as follows:

1. To find people and things. Cultural knowledge helps locate individuals, their wealth and their supporters. 'Locate' means establish their precise whereabouts -- where they will sleep tonight, where their mother is buried, the number of their bank account and the bank routing number, where their motorcycle is sitting, their email address, where and when they play golf...and where they feel safe. For the competitor in a violent struggle this is the first and most compelling reason for cultural knowledge. It is what Sam Spade, the private investigator, knows. The rest is important, too, but if he knows where you are while you don't know where he is, you are the prey. To control anonymity, you must know the culture.
2. To communicate good. Cultural knowledge can improve communications with others so as to endear and not offend, to facilitate collaboration and compromise, and to settle disputes peacefully when preferable. This involves language beyond the verbal, and into customs, prejudices, habits, mores, expectations, fears, historical grievances, community pride and the like. All knowledge is grist to the mill. It will be especially productive to identify aspects of the culture related to honor and dishonor.
3. To identify objects of desire, sources and holders of power, grievances, agents (especially 'exclusive' agents), resolution mechanisms, debts, tax relationships, jurisdictions and expectations. In short, to comprehend the territorial geography of conflict and conflict resolution.
4. To set reasonable objectives. Knowing how or if to change the social compact, how long it might reasonably take you to implement such a change, and how long the changes might last. This may include determining the interrelationship between peoples' behaviors and their surrounding environment in order to derive durable improvements in human flourishing and harmony. When good intentions are not built on sufficient knowledge, the reward may be a set of nasty unintended consequences. In a domestic legal setting we demand due diligence of doctors and lawyers -- that they avoid negligent practice. Strategic due diligence presupposes the programmed and resourced study of foreign cultures in order to avoid strategic negligence.
5. To put things in the right place. Whether you want to optimally place a fish pond, police station, camera, or a shooter, it is local cultural knowledge (and usually the kind that cannot be gained via remote sensing) that will guide best.
6. To correctly time actions and activities. Knowing when to act and not act is a much easier standard if we are steeped in local cultural knowledge.
7. To get the joke or make the joke. Jokes work the same mental pathways as military deceptions. For practical purposes, military deceptions *are* jokes. Irregular armed conflicts are generally clothed in law, economics, propaganda and other aspects of quotidian, civilian life. Not being able to get civilian jokes means being vulnerable to the dangerous military or criminal ones. Just as the insurgent can move from military uniform to civilian attire, so can military thought hide in civilian guise.

The best time to get cultural knowledge of a place is well before participating in organized armed violence there. It is never too late.

Please see sections: 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 43, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; 78, *Identity*; and 19, *Mercatus*.



A Moscow radio host puts out a question on his call-in show:

“Какая часть речи диван?”
(What part of speech is ‘couch’?)

After receiving various incorrect answers, e.g., “A noun?”,

“A verb?”, the show host gives the correct answer:
“Это местоимение.”
(It's a pronoun.)



“Zander: My God. How could this happen?”

Carmen: We thought we were smarter than the Bugs.”

from the movie

Starship Troopers (1997)[\[115\]](#)



Of course, so what?

Section 39, Socioeconomic Causation

Improving overall socioeconomic conditions in a country suffering some kind of organized armed internal strife probably won't help the counterinsurgent win, and might just as likely do the opposite. Economic development measures often aren't targeted so as to influence the specific sets of individuals positioned to help the government. Furthermore, there are examples of violent groups, such as Spain's ETA, about which the economic causation model seems wholly irrelevant.

The idea that insurgency can be traced to human suffering has been lavishly serviced by studies sponsored by the US government and others. For example, the 1966 *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, one of a series of works from the Special Operations Office at American University that, during the Vietnam War, held considerable sway on US government counterinsurgency thinking. In 1966, word was that "There are few comprehensive studies on the relationship between economic factors and insurgencies."^[116] The work mentions that one contemporary comparison of Gross National Product (GNP) and domestic political violence showed low levels of violence in countries with high level GNP and with a low GNP. The middle range countries seemed most susceptible. In Latin America, the work noted, some of the highest economic achievers relative to the region – Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba – had suffered insurgencies while others had not. (Since 1966, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, and Guatemala have all been stricken with insurgencies, as well as other countries to a lesser extent.)

A more recent and influential example of the kind of effort sought by the 1966 study is a sequence of three reports on "state failure" by the State Failure Political Instability Task Force (PITF), the latest of which is titled *Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-Most Recent Year*.^[117] The PITF authors define "state failure" as revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides or 'politicides'.^[118] A 1995 version of the report found that three factors predicted seventy percent of all insurgency problems: failure of international trade, high infant mortality and undemocratic elections.^[119] Near the center of their analyses lay the same unshakeable assumptions regarding the significance of underlying socioeconomic conditions as a cause of state failure and insurgency.

The big danger of the assumption of socioeconomic causation to your winning is this: constant mention of socioeconomic performance leads inexorably, even if unintentionally (but it is probably intentional), to prescriptions aimed at improving general socioeconomic conditions. Unfortunately, *nobody* has a clue about *how much* overall economic performance improvement might move a given society away from spawning, harboring or empowering insurgents or terrorists. Worse, little has been done to trace the effects of an economic assistance program on insurgent or criminal finances. Likewise, a little improvement in, say, electoral democracy might not be a stabilizing move, all else remaining equal. According to one of the later PITF reports, the "odds of state failure was seven times as high for partial democracies as for full democracies and autocracies."^[120] Sidestepping the issue of the validity or usefulness of the reports or the definitions on which they were based, it seems on the surface that moving a place from really poor to poor (or from poor to a little less poor and from undemocratic to somewhat more democratic) might increase instability.

Colombia is a mixed or middle-performing country economically. Things inside Colombia aren't the same everywhere. There are 1,100 counties for which there is pretty good socioeconomic data and pretty good violence data. Some of the 1,100 counties are poor, some rich, some violent and some not. The country isn't geographically homogenous as to violence or economic prosperity. According to a 2002 study by Mauricio Archila, et al titled *25 años de luchas sociales en Colombia 1975-2000* (25 years of social struggles in Colombia 1975-2000), there was little correlation between poor counties and violence in those counties, but there was some correlation between violence and counties that were doing better economically.^[121] Counties with the most protests and the most violence didn't coincide with where there was the most poverty. According to the authors, Colombians didn't appear to fight because they were poor. Perhaps some fought because they perceived that they were *comparatively* poor; or, more probably, because they were led to perceive their comparative poverty and then, retributively motivated, led to fight.

Some years ago I was shown a georeferenced map of Colombian counties where the government had mounted economic assistance programs, and other georeferenced maps where the worst armed violence had occurred. Nothing jumped out of the maps regarding a possible correlation between the programs and the violence, and the briefer claimed that none existed. Enough longitudinal (over time) data was available that such a correlation analysis could be made. It is often against bureaucratic interest to make any such careful analyses because what is suspected might be proven true – that there is little correlation geographically between changes in violence and economic assistance programs. More troublesome is that it is probably now possible to overlay maps of the timing and location of assistance programs to parasitic and extortion efforts of insurgents. There may have been a correlation between economic assistance programs and efforts by the insurgents to siphon off wealth distributed or created by those programs.

There might have been little spatial correlation between economic assistance programs and amelioration of violence because so little effort was put into auditing the effects of the assistance programs. (Apparently, by the way, things have improved in recent years.) Having accused those aid programs of little correlation with achievement of counterinsurgent goals (and this is only correlation, not causation), however, there surely have been some significant exceptions, with the best of these exceptions situated geographically along insurgent lines of communication.

If you are able to provide economic aid, be careful to analyze the effects by starting with a geographic detailing of where comparative wealth will be generated and what the psychological effects of changed wealth comparisons is going to be. Oftentimes, roads don't make people richer; they make *some* people richer. It would be useful to have some way of measuring if the wealth your programs create ends up in the hands of your enemies, keeping in mind that the amount of financial wherewithal a typical insurgent needs to create an explosive device may be one tenth what the government will need in order to deal with it.

A poor insurgent might wish to find ways to quietly encourage all kinds of foreign economic assistance programs, especially going to locales where he enjoys impunity. Those programs will rarely be formulated so as to reduce his impunity. He will find ways to take much, if not most, of the money generated by the programs.

Geographic specificity of economic programs is valuable because dominance of the operational equation demands relevant placement and timing. Every attempt should be made to anticipate the likely effect of an economic program on insurgent sanctuaries and routes to and from those sanctuaries. If program proponents cannot address this effect, it may be counterproductive in the extreme.

Insurgents justify violence by pointing out economic suffering, often blaming that suffering on government failure. Governments, however, are rarely able to make positive changes in economic performance, but the socioeconomic argument is never taken away from the agile insurgent. Socioeconomic improvements may be good ideas in their own right, but an observation regarding socioeconomic injustice should not be allowed to pass as the first part of some logical syllogism that demands government effort at socioeconomic improvement as a feature of government counterinsurgency. Miserable economic conditions are a motivating factor for foot soldier recruitment, especially among young males, but this is as true for a government army as it is for an insurgency. Economic assistance can also motivate individuals to inform, but the most effective of such programs pay informants directly.


If you are the counterinsurgent, you will prefer that government economic programs not fund your armed enemy. You want to have a way to measure the extent to which money spent ends up going to your enemy. Even if you do use such measurements, you will want to know not just how much socioeconomic progress has been achieved, or even how much it may have bought you in terms of the public attitude. You need a measure of the change in the balance of overall advantages between you and your foe within the relevant frame of time. That is a tall order.

Please see sections: 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*; 19, *Mercatus*; 66, *GIS*; 102, *Negotiations*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; and 16, *Presence*.




“We must reject the idea that every time a law is broken, society is guilty rather than the lawbreaker. It is time to restore the American precept that each individual is accountable for his actions.” [\[122\]](#)

Ronald Reagan



“The pirates would burn any building they passed and kill any peasant they met; but as a rule they were in a hurry to reach a safe camp, and had no time to plunder aside from the line of march.” [\[123\]](#)

Alfred Duggan
The Right Line of Cerdic



“The fact that the black market involves breaking the law is something against it. It's an undesirable feature.” [\[124\]](#)

Milton Friedman



You may have to do something with it

Section 40, Popular Support

The importance of 'popular support' as a theme in American counterinsurgency literature can be summed up by the clichéd admonition, 'The civilian population is the center of gravity'. After all, if we are not servants to the betterment of the condition of our people, what are we? A problem quickly arises, however. Once we have asked the big softball question, 'Are the people most important?' and answered purely, 'Yes, of course!' the challenge of the enemy still remains. Depending on how one measures it, there is little to suggest that broad popular support is necessary for the success of an insurgency, even though logic insists that such support would be helpful. Any cursory review of insurgencies in Latin America reveals that some of the longest running 'revolutionary movements' have continued to profit, protect and encourage their insurgent leaders for decades on the back of marginal public support. The numbers in Colombia speak clearly. President Álvaro Uribe was elected with over 62% of the popular vote during a first round election that was essentially a referendum on his hard line against the country's illegal armed groups. He was then reelected with undiminished support for having progressed militarily in the war. Active supporters of the leftist insurgent guerrillas probably do not exceed 2% of the population and some indications hold it as low as 0.2%. It appears that only the amount necessary to secure routes of escape, places of refuge, and a surviving black market is actually necessary for FARC survival. With sufficient financial and international support, the FARC barely needs any Colombians at all.

The mixture of relevant public psychological quantities includes ambivalence, apathy, fear, confusion, etc. These vicissitudes all bear on the resources and options available to the contenders in an internal conflict. It would be foolish to suggest that public psychology does not matter. It does, and so contenders in internal wars attend vigorously to the various components and dimensions of public attitude. That said, the optimal public attitude for successful insurgency or counterinsurgency is situation-specific and valid knowledge about that attitude is usually sparse. Ignorance on the part of the majority population may alone suffice for the outlaw, and a little fear among the right sectors seems to go a long way. Yes, the government could usefully expend resources on the general morale and behavioral propensities of the population, and more particularly on those elements of the population that can immediately assist in defeating the insurgent. Obviously, depending on its type and level of command, a given military unit might be wholly dedicated to the material wellbeing of a civilian population. A construction battalion working on a hospital can easily assert that the civilian population is its 'center of gravity'.

The counterinsurgent operational planner might do better, however, to not swallow whole insurgent arguments that the conflict is principally a psychological question, an ideological fight, a political contest or a fight for justice. It will be all those things, but insurgents' arguments that fix on public attitude are almost always obedient to the knowledge that danger lies in being captured, not in being out-debated. They know the names and addresses of the few members of the civilian population to whom they need to apply the effective dose of persuasion. A government usually does not know the names and addresses of these persons, and so the government usually administers its psychological medicine *en masse*. The wholesale dose rarely has the intended effect on the specific individuals needed by the insurgent, and the government effort often suffers the side effect of enlarging the profile of the insurgent. As long as an insurgent leader enjoys the minimum overall mix of public attitude and consciousness that allows his secure movement from points of action to sanctuary, he will be able to prolong his insurgency. With rare exception, an insurgent leader must be physically defeated or be made to conclude that his physical defeat is unavoidable. The same holds true for the warlord, mafia don, etc.

The above argument downplays popular support and emphasis on the civilian population in operational planning in favor of physically intercepting insurgent leadership. Don't fall in love with the argument. Successful interception of insurgent leadership can depend on active support of the population at large, and there may be a direct relationship at the national level between popular support and a counterinsurgency budget, or between popular support and a preferred counterinsurgent strategy, or between popular support and international support to the government or to the insurgent. Still, watch out with the 'center of gravity' stuff. If you're the counterinsurgent, the indices of support for you, your efforts, and the government can skyrocket – and you could nevertheless have an enemy as strong as or stronger than ever. The argument wams – especially if you are planning or leading something in the military dimension of counterinsurgency – that your job focus is the enemy, and that public support needs to be sought, aimed or translated in such a way that you can better adjust the variables of the operational equation to your advantage. If you are the insurgent and find that you enjoy a lot of public support, hey, run a candidate. It worked for the Spanish Communists in 1936 and for Hugo Chávez in 1999.

Information from members of a motivated public often exposes insurgent leader *whereabouts*. However, the counterinsurgent leader can take a lesson from the Colombian electorate. President Andrés Pastrana was elected in 1998 on the promise to engage the FARC guerrillas in negotiations to seek a peaceful settlement of the war. By 2002, the electorate came to perceive that the FARC had not negotiated in good faith and the public persona of their president had been reduced to one of submissiveness. Their reaction was to elect Álvaro Uribe, whose stated intention was to defeat the FARC militarily. After Uribe's election, the Colombian government and military continued to enjoy high levels of public support, but the chore of defeating the FARC remained. The challenge of popular support for the Colombian military was clear: the military gained and enjoyed overwhelming public support, but the public expected the military to do something with it. Without public support, counterinsurgent success is difficult, but support of the people is a tool and an advantage, not the ultimate goal. It might be appropriate as an intermediate goal, but it is not *the* goal. The Colombian military has progressed, but has yet to close FARC lines to sanctuary.

Mao said, "Propaganda materials are very important. Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone."^[125] Also,

There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms'. It is vital that these simpleminded militarists be made to realize the relation that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method to gain a political goal.

While military affairs and political action are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.^[126]

And on the relationship between the people and the troops he said,

The former may be likened to the water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.^[127]

This last statement may be the most often cited, especially in support of the idea that the people are the center of gravity for counterinsurgency. Mao's comment was made in the context of the war against a foreign occupier, the Japanese. It follows a list of rules for the troops, guiding them to not steal, to replace what they borrow, be honest in their transactions, etc. Much of the rest of Samuel Griffith's *Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare*, the text from which most of these ideas entered American strategy literature, is about movement, speed, position, mass, correlation of force, the goal of constructing regular units, etc. The rest of the book, in other words, is about the operational equation.


Please see: 16, *Presence*; 43, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*; 98, *Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 78, *Identity*; and 130, *Globalization*



What makes a man?
Is it the power in his hand?
Is it his quest for glory?
Give it all you got,
to fight to the top,
so we can know your story.

from the theme song of the movie

Orgazmo [\[128\]](#)



“...the generation that carried on the war has been set apart by its experience. Through our great good fortune, in our youth our hearts were touched with fire. It was given to us to learn at the outset that life is a profound and passionate thing. While we are permitted to scorn nothing but indifference, and do not pretend to undervalue the worldly rewards of ambition, we have seen with our own eyes, beyond and above the gold fields, the snowy heights of honor, and it is for us to bear the report to those who come after us. But, above all, we have learned that whether a man accepts from Fortune her spade, and will look downward and dig, or from Aspiration her axe and cord, and will scale the ice, the one and only success which it is his to command is to bring to his work a mighty heart.”[\[129\]](#)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.



Advisors. Ha.

Section 41, Dear Westy

The text below is a abbreviated transcription of a declassified personal letter written by Major General William Yarborough to Lieutenant General William Westmoreland in February, 1964. Yarborough was commanding the United States Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg, and Westmoreland was on his way to command MACV in Vietnam. This is advice from a buddy who had direct experience with the geography and the mission. How good was it, and was it followed?

[From here are deleted brief introductory paragraphs about the importance of the letter and the adequacy of current doctrine]

As I see it, the biggest problem of all relates to the "isolation of the battlefield" and this is not within the capability of MACV to do completely; I refer to the political isolation of the battlefield, particularly to the role which Cambodia and Laos, as havens for Viet Cong activity continue to play. It is quite evident that our weak handling of Sihanouk and our "no solution" solution to the Laotian affair have played strongly into the hands of the Viet Cong, who could not ask for anything finer than safe havens not only in North Viet-Nam but in the two countries I have just mentioned. I neither saw nor see on the horizon any stiffening of our attitude toward Sihanouk, no black propaganda attacks on his lack of neutrality, nor any hard-boiled solution to the Laotian imbroglio. These areas must be sorted out eventually by our Department of State as a matter of national policy and, in my view, should invariably be mentioned in the same way as a field combat commander, in discussing terrain, talks about obstacles which lie in his path.

Cambodian units are known to be operating inside the Delta area. Those fighting in the Delta believe that they are being directed from Cambodian military command posts across the Mekong. The fact that they believe this, whether it is true or not, is ample indication of a serious propaganda void. The disputed status of various provinces inside Viet-Nam vis-a-vis their Cambodian affiliation is a political and psychological matter bearing upon the Viet Cong activities in that area. The propaganda approach of the Vietnamese Government in general is too flamboyant and is not being communicated in a meaningful and usable way to the forward fringes where conflict is raging. Propaganda in "rear" areas is voluminous and often garish, but the propaganda of the deed the areas of contact with Viet Cong or Viet Cong supporters requires first attention and practical application. Government promises are too ambitious and are not, in many areas, being carried out to the letter—essential in the propaganda field.

A completely new look has got to be taken at psychological warfare in an overall sense and I would not be adverse to hiring the world's finest specialists, whether they are American, German, British or whoever. It is quite obvious that we are going to have, for a long time, difficulty finding adequate psychological warriors in the uniforms of our country or any other country unless they are reserves called to active duty, I cannot emphasize too greatly that the entire conflict in Southeast Asia is 80 percent in the realm of ideas and only 20 percent in the field of physical conflict. As long as the Viet Cong continue to believe as strongly as they do in their cause, there can be no peace. As long as the Vietnamese and the unassimilated Montagnard lack belief in their cause, the same condition will prevail. No war can be lost physically through perpetration by the enemy of repeated terrorist acts, but a war can be lost mentally and morally through these means. This, in my view, is a danger to be guarded against at all costs.

We may continue to lose small outposts for a while longer and continue to suffer the loss of innocent non-combatants but this does not, by any means, mean the physical defeat of the military forces of the country.

Again the propaganda value to the Viet Cong of these acts must be compensated and overshadowed by competent propaganda put in the right place by the Republic of Viet-Nam. Under no circumstances that I can foresee should US strategy ever be twisted into a "requirement" for placing US combat divisions into the Vietnamese conflict as long as it retains its present format. I can almost guarantee you that US divisions entering a "G" conflict area could lie almost un-attacked for months or years, would reap nothing but propaganda reverses as alleged "representatives of a new colonialism," and could find no targets of a size or configuration which would warrant division-sized attack in a military sense. The key to the beginning of the solution to Viet-Nam's travail now lies in a rising scale of population and resources control. Whereas under Diem's regime the Armed Forces were prevented from entering into this field of endeavor, now that situation is changed, and the Army must be trained to carry out such operations, otherwise the result will be more Viet Cong than ever. *[From here is deleted a sentence about an enclosed tape]*

To counter accusations that the Republic of Viet-Nam, in establishing population and resources control measures, has itself become a police state, skilled propagandists must be brought into battery to point out that even in the freest nations, in times of stress certain rights and freedoms must be held in abeyance temporarily while the nation is in danger. Only through population and resources control will the currently unimpeded movements of the Viet Cong be brought to a halt. Only through population and resources control can the Viet Cong recruiting systems be interrupted and destroyed, but I stress again the absolute requirement for thorough training on the part of the Army and the police in order to avoid counter-productivity in this. I have left with Dick Stilwell copies of the British training manuals, "Keeping the Peace (Parts I and II)" which go into great detail concerning training and training objectives in this area. Note carefully the repeated British emphasis upon a legal basis for population and resources control. This means that if there is not in being a legal basis for the Army to act, it must be obtained. Thereafter, the Army must stay within the legal bounds imposed, and it goes without saying that both the Army and the people must know what these limitations are. Population and resources control measures should not be advertised as being imminent or in effect if the Government does not, in fact, have the power to enforce.

The strategic hamlet program is obviously a part of the population and resource control systems. It is, admittedly, no panacea for the entire country but good beyond question in those cases where it is feasible from the point of view of adequate defense, sufficient civil servant administrative types, medics, means of livelihood for the populace, etc. Strategic hamlets established without this framework are doomed to failure from the outset and it is folly to try to establish a strategic hamlet if it cannot be protected, if the people are not indoctrinated in the reasons for its establishment and if there is no civil administration, medical support or the other things I have mentioned. *[From here is deleted a paragraph on the need for low level administrators]*

Of deep concern to me since I am providing about 50 percent of the special forces in country is the problem of border control. As you know, special forces working with CIDG groups, and more particularly with Strike Forces,

are attempting to control the Laotian and Cambodian borders by combat operations. These borders can never be controlled completely by military means alone. Again, the border security is another facet of the overall population control system which must be in effect, meaning that Viet Cong or any unauthorized person having succeeded in evading military Strike Force personnel and penetrating inland must still be forced to negotiate the population control system inland under numerous conditions, involving showing of credentials, interrogation as to reasons for movement and the other mechanics of a really effective control system.

The military cannot always be fully employed in the internal security business without permanent abandonment of a democracy's freedoms resulting from permanent subjection to some degree of martial law. It seems to me, therefore, that right now a considerable segment of the ARVN should be designated as national police operating under the control of ARVN in the emergency but destined to take on civil police roles at the end of the emergency. It should be these police forces which are left in permanent residency inside areas that have been "cleared" of Viet Cong. They should not be left, however, without first having established adequate communication nets consisting of both teletype and radio, and without having built chopper pads and air strips and tying them into quick reaction military forces. Nothing is more futile than a large-scale military sweep through Viet Cong country since always there must be left behind a tangible symbol of governmental power and authority. Obviously, you don't want the ARVN scattered in small packets throughout the country. Just as obviously, you want national police scattered in police garrisons throughout the country. This must be an objective. I do not feel that police systems such as we know in our United States are adequate for Viet-Nam and would look upon our police advisors with some sang-froid. I would be inclined to urge search for police advice in Germany or even France.

My long conversations with General Nghiem, the Commander of the Special Forces High Command, indicated to me his strong feelings in support of aggressive cross-border actions. These tactics are years overdue and, in my best judgment, can no more provoke massive intervention by Chinese forces than should Viet Cong activities provoke massive intervention by US forces. General Nghiem feels that actions outside Republic of Viet-Nam borders would do a tremendous amount to raise the morale of the beleaguered people in the South and would show those in the North that we are not so fully occupied with the Viet Cong that we do not have the capability of doing anything else. It would also give hope to the people in the North, a hope which they are hard-pressed to muster at this point. I am aware of what is in the mill on this score but here, since I have had personal experience in organizing a force for this kind of action, must point out very strongly that real experts are needed in order both to plan and to execute this kind of a deal. This is an Army operation into which the Agency must be integrated completely and for which support must be provided by the Air Force and the Navy. *[From here are deleted two paragraphs about getting the right advisors]*

The great J-2 weakness in MACV I hope has been remedied by the new incumbent. I was not impressed at all by my J-2 briefing from the former intelligence chief, considering the inescapable importance of intelligence to counterinsurgency. Still lacking as of the time I was there was a central repository for intelligence information which is one of the major weapons needed for fighting subversion. I mean a central registry to which every member of the intelligence community contributes -- not a series of registries compartmented by the various intelligence organizations.

[From here is deleted some text in which Yarborough opines that the Viet Cong are not particularly good]

The fact that this war can be won is beyond question but the overriding requirement is for an amalgamation of all of our instruments of national power -- the economic, definitely the psychological -- with the military power. The orchestration is what has been missing. In attaining this orchestration, the world's successful counter-insurgency experience has shown that very frankly the military commander must queue up along with the other policy-making and action elements of the government and cannot always be pre-eminent. The clear-cut decisions and direct action that we think so highly of in the military may have to give way to political expediency and economic facts of life, and the courses of action evolving may have to be watered down and emerge as a compromise in order to take into account the semi-military-politico-sociological aspects of the counterinsurgency problem. *[From here I deleted three paragraphs recommending another expert, an assessment of the Malay situation, a copy of the Special Warfare Center's Counter-insurgency Planning Guide and a study of two Buddhist sects, the CAO DAI and the HOA HAO. I also delete the closing pleasantries]*

There are hundreds of Vietnam War histories and analyses, and it is from among them you will have to decide to what extent Westmoreland followed Yarborough's advice. Some touchstones in the letter for assertions made elsewhere in this book include:

- Database creation
- Action against sanctuaries
- Defining police vs military roles
- Border control and cross-border operations
- Population and resource control
- Rule of law observance
- Propaganda and propaganda of the deed

Please see sections: 45, *Police or Military*; 66, *GIS*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 86 *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 109, *Your Staff Work Sucks*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 117, *Strategic Communication*; and 85, *Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck*.



Journalist: "What do you think about the U.S. involvement in the war?"

Animal Mother: I think we should win it."

from the movie

Full Metal Jacket (1987) [\[130\]](#)



“We was always taking long walks, and we was always looking for a guy named ‘Charlie’.”

Forrest Gump in the movie
Forrest Gump (1994)[\[131\]](#)



“In a way, all of us has an El Guapo to face. For some, shyness might be their El Guapo. For others, a lack of education might be their El Guapo. For us, El Guapo is a big, dangerous man who wants to kill us. But as sure as my name is Lucky Day, the people of Santa Poco can conquer their own personal El Guapo, who also happens to be *the actual* El Guapo!”

Lucky Day in the movie
The Three Amigos (1986)[\[132\]](#)



Section 42, Brigands

(Much of this section is adapted from *Property & Peace*.)

Brigandage is evil combined with social organization and a plan. Brigands (gangsters, organized criminals, thugs, pirates, etc) are often the master employers of terror and terrorists. They combine organizational expertise, aggregated disposable wealth, and amorality; and are to be feared in direct relation to the destructive capacity of the weapons that may come into their hands. Bridging what is a police problem and what is a military one, brigandage also straddles the cut-line between civilized-but-unlawful and uncivilized behavior. Sir Michael Howard recommends we use the medieval term *latrunculi* for them, to distinguish the fight against these common enemies of mankind from wars against *legitimus hostis* or legitimate enemies. Physical coercion for profit is wedded by the brigand to the timeless political aspiration of avoiding government regulation and taxation, and of acquiring impunity for criminal acts by any means – best by assuming government power itself.

Governments can become confused or divided by what may be seen as a question of ‘public safety’ versus what is ‘national security’, and so respond inappropriately. Parts of government go ‘on-the-take’ and further confound successful governance. When states fail initially to confront organized crime, they risk grave errors of omission – moving from simple irresponsibility or appeasement, to corruption perhaps, then on to criminal negligence – until the state has neither the power nor the willpower to contain the criminal enterprise. When this happens, a government has forfeited a country’s sovereignty and, if that government were supposedly stewarding sovereignty belonging to the people, then it has lost to the brigands the people’s status as sovereign owners. Logically, a government losing to brigands (in the fight to maintain a monopoly over the granting of impunity) could more surely relegate a people to slavery than by losing to insurgents or to another country.

Today, some criminal enterprises have global reach, and their day-to-day activities, while perhaps not rising to the dramatic level of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, are often of a similar character and lead to a similar result. Far more people have fallen in Colombia (or Nigeria, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere) to the piecemeal terrorism of armed criminal groups than died in the World Trade Center. For decades the Colombian FARC murdered, kidnapped, and bombed on thousands of occasions, finally becoming too powerful to destroy without concerted military effort. Originally motivated by political confrontation, it lost its ideological compass when its funding changed from political donation to drug profiteering. It continued to cloak itself as a revolutionary force engendered and motivated by Colombian social injustice. The FARC ‘contextualized’ its violence using the argument of political necessity. While that argument is still used by some foreign governments as a justification for accommodations they make to the FARC (accommodations sweetened by FARC money and anti-American sport), the idea of FARC as a champion of justice is all but exhausted within Colombia. The FARC’s brigand colors are transparent.

Brigand organizations metastasize, internationalize, and politicize. They call at first for routine compromises of the law, using minor coercion, perhaps justifying themselves as a social rebellion. Their initial presence and activity rarely inspires a reaction at the level of strategy or of military response. When finally it does, it is often too late for a peaceful cure. Many of these organizations plague the world and, as a convenient part of their efforts to establish or feign legitimacy, they often disparage, or even target, the United States. Most of the world’s countries acquiesce or collaborate with these outlaw organizations to one degree or another, so some foreign banks and governments impede US efforts to curtail outlaw finances – either because they fear domestic political repercussions or because they gain directly from the illegal enterprise. Others simply disagree with the US view of the nature, progress, or virulence of the problem.

Operationally, most criminal organizations depend on smuggling to one degree or another, and smuggling means routes and speed. Competent (surviving) smugglers become experts at logistics. There is the world of lines of communication and the math of escape. Because that geographic math is so often contiguous with the geographic math of military strategy in irregular warfare, the two activities (profit smuggling and politically motivated armed violence) can hardly help but trip over each other.

(I stole this following paragraph from Lucas Winter, who knows about these things.) In March 2008, 30 gunmen ambushed Guatemalan drug trafficker “Juancho” León in Zacapa (near the Honduras border), killing him and nine companions. León was relatively new to the business, with a background in theft rather than contraband; his practice of seizing and reselling others’ shipments irked the country’s more established smuggling families. Amidst the discord, the “Zetas,” one of the region’s most ruthless and powerful drug trafficking organizations tripped upon a convenient way of making business inroads – force and intimidation. With these innovations they seized key smuggling routes along Guatemala’s Mexican border. By the end of 2010, they controlled much of the mountainous and underserved province of Alta Verapaz, including its capital, Cobán. The province is relatively near Guatemala City and to the northern province of Petén, which hosts major smuggling routes into Mexico. In December, army and national police units were sent into Alta Verapaz, after locals pleaded that something be done about Zeta enormities. While a handful of operatives were arrested and some equipment and weapons seized, most of the contraband merchandise had already been moved to safety (some say with government complicity). The Zetas felt more than simply inconvenienced, however, forcing three provincial radio stations to read an open threat of war on President Colóm (“in shopping malls, schools and police stations”), who they accused of receiving from them \$11 million for favors that were never returned. The government lifted martial law in February 2011 and, although troop reinforcements remained in the area, the Zetas soon returned.

A government may have to use its military to contain and dismantle a corrupted police unit. Military units and other parts of a government can become corrupted as well, however, and the police, if ethically healthy, must be readied to capture and jail errant military or other government personnel. This is one reason why the oft-touted virtue ‘unity of command’ has its limits. If you are an insurgent, some brigand may seem like a natural ally because of a shared State enemy. Nevertheless, the Brigand poses a threat to the morale and integrity of your organization, to your best lines of communication, to your allies, and to both your substantive and perceived legitimacy. Be careful to determine if the alliance of convenience should be you with the brigand against the State, you with the State against the brigand – or if the brigand and the State are one-in-the-same, or both separately and equally to be opposed. All brigands are smugglers, but not all smugglers are brigands. Junior Johnson from Wilkes County, North Carolina was a convicted moonshine smuggler, but not a brigand. Junior just liked to drive fast; Ronald Reagan pardoned him in 1986.


I don’t agree with most professional critics’ film ratings, but I agree that *The Godfather* is among the best ever, so I offer here part of my take on that movie. The first scene of *The Godfather I* and the last scene of *Godfather II* are the same. I like that bow. The undertaker had fled the tyrannies of Europe to America’s promised rule-of-law, and it was good – until that rule-of-law was, for him, belied. When what he loved was endangered, his aspired America neither protected honor nor avenged dishonor. He slumped back into the arms of the familial dependency he had wanted and tried to escape. I bet I’m more optimistic about the American dream than Francis Ford Coppola is, but it is a worthy subject, well treated. The movie is not so much about gangsters, but a little bit it is.

Please see sections: 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 40, *Rule-of-law*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 45, *Police or Military*; 65, *Smuggling*; 126, *Particularization of Power*; and 144, *What the Pirate Said to Alexander*.



“And his partners in the posse ain't tellin' off****...
...Cause damn it feels good to be a gangsta.”[\[133\]](#)

Geto Boys from the song
Damn It Feels Good To Be a Gangsta



Van Cleve: I now ask you, sir, do you remember the names Charlie Monger, Red Dog Johnson or Carlos Rameriez?

Devereaux: No.


Van Cleve: The incident may be too trivial to recall. But isn't it true that you summarily hanged three of these men on the afternoon of June 4th?

Devereaux: They were stealing my cattle.

Van Cleve: I thought you didn't remember them.

Devereaux: I didn't ask their names.

from the movie
Broken Lance (1954)[\[134\]](#)



“Concentrated power has always been the enemy of liberty.”[\[135\]](#)

Ronald Reagan (attributed)



Section 43, Sam Spade's Whereabouts

Probably every plaintiff's law firm in the United States has on staff or compacts a private investigator, a PI, a Sam Spade. That's because in America, if you want to stick it to someone else using the legal system, you, your lawyer, or his PI have to find your target and give him or her a piece of paper. That is what Sam Spade is paid to do: find your opponent and give him an unfriendly piece of paper that puts him on notice or calls him to court: 'You've been served'. It is called *service of process*, fair processes being considered an inseparable element of justice. Your lawyer also wants the PI to find your nemesis' things — a car, boat, house, bank account — because lawyers want to be paid. Sam Spade does too, and to keep putting food on the plate he has to find his mark, and he almost always succeeds in spite of not having satellites, phone taps or maybe even a good camera. There are two main reasons why Sam Spade succeeds. The first is because he knows local culture. He knows what's going on in his town or county. He has few local knowledge gaps and he doesn't have to ask 'cultural study for what?' For him, every bit of knowledge about the local culture helps him with the whereabouts. He knows which bumper sticker goes with what congregation, what vehicles will show up in the parade, who organizes the service club charities. He follows all the sports teams and knows the favorite cigarette brands. He understands sex and sexuality.

The other big reason Sam always finds his prey is that he is familiar and competent with public records. He can get hold of school registration lists, team rosters, cadastral records, and can decode the license plates and tombstones. He can read a map. Sam might not worry that for a liberal society to thrive, the public records must be transparent and stable. For him, public records are simply part of what makes it possible to find people and their property so that he can successfully serve process and get paid. If the public records are shoddy and inaccurate, if they are hidden from inspection, are not comprehensive or are subject to manipulation and fraud, it is harder for Sam to succeed — and the social compact is at risk.

If you want to measure the condition or progress of an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign, and you are apprised of the fact that the public records are inaccurate, incomplete, and hidden, then you can be sure that the counterinsurgency program is not sustainable and probably not going all that well. No social compact is sustainable without solid evidence. It is like a contract with no writing. A society without solid, accurate, comprehensive public records is a society that will eventually be in conflict. Sam Spade will fail and with him the likelihood of peaceful conflict resolution. As a counterinsurgent, you might not be able to teach the would-be sleuths enough culture, or give them tracker's instincts, but you can work to improve and perfect the system of public records.

There are Sam Spades around the world as well as other categories of people, like real estate agents, prostitutes, bar tenders, truck drivers, and taxi drivers, who have inside knowledge of local culture and who know where people are likely to be when. They are the best computers for finding people, and they are most effective when transparent, comprehensive, accurate public records are available to them.

Place is a central theme of this book. The idea includes 'sense of place', and distance, especially as understood by costs in time, money and cultural affinity. Putting 'where' back into the 'who, what, when, where, why, and how' question set is a uniquely useful contribution of Geography. To do so (to put the *where* back), helps resist concentrating too much on why governments fail or why there are insurgents or why there is crime. Not that these aren't good questions, but being an insurgent or a criminal is about keeping your whereabouts and the whereabouts of your sources of power hidden from your enemies. It is especially about protecting the routes of escape that you and your people may have to take between the places of your offensive actions and your sanctuaries. If the counterinsurgent knows exactly where the insurgent is, but can do nothing about it, that's called a political problem. If he can't locate the insurgent or the sources of his wealth, that's called an intelligence failure. If he knows exactly where the insurgent is and can confound insurgent retreat to sanctuary, the government is close to a win.

Most people, bad people included, have a mother or a mother-figure they favor. The relationship they have or had with their mother is a prominent factor in their makeup (or so Sigmund tells us). Finding where a person's mother is or is buried can be a significant start to fixing the whereabouts of a person in time, and for better understanding that person, if that's worth something. If you're serious about finding a hard-to-find enemy, go find his mother and, if you are really serious about finding enemies plural, establish systems that make finding everyone's mother easy. Fouling this up is also a good way to create all the enemies you'll ever need. Don't disrespect peoples' moms in the process of figuring out where they are. There aren't that many cross-cultural constants on which we can depend, but this is one of them. Most mom's love their babies. Maybe there is some culture that doesn't love its mothers, but I am not aware of any. See if your system of knowledge regarding your enemy or potential enemy or his supporters or yours, includes knowledge about where all persons' mothers are. Especially useful is when and where an adult son is likely to visit or send a message to his mother. Don't forget your own mothers; protect and love them.


Big Brother is not built on weaponry; it is built on scrupulous civil administration and cultural knowledge. To the extent whereabouts cannot be hidden, insurgency is difficult. The prospective insurgent must learn to live 'off grid', but, if he were to stay entirely off-grid and completely anonymous, how would he accrete and maintain fungible wealth sufficient to present a threat? How would he gain broad popularity? It is tough to be public and private at the same time, to move from a latent stage of insurgency to a mobile stage without exposure. For many, it is tough just to keep from communicating with their mothers.

Please see sections: 108, *Common Knowledge*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 66, *GIS*; 8, *Linearity and The Line of Retreat*; 30, *Control Technology*; 40, *Popular Support*; and 78, *Identity*.



"It's not fer me, it's fer me ma."

Mickey from the movie
Snatch (2000)[136]



Kasper Gutman: You're a close-mouthed man?

Sam Spade: Nah, I like to talk.

Kasper Gutman: Better and better. I distrust a close-mouthed man. He generally picks the wrong time to talk and says the wrong things. Talking's something you can't do judiciously, unless you keep in practice.

from the movie
The Maltese Falcon (1941)[137]



Can you find those files or not?

Section 44, Political/Military/Administrative

It takes administrative effort and excellence to create a peaceful, liberal society. Aside from that, it takes administrative effort and excellence to win militarily, at least in some armed struggles.

Too often, conversations about how much military effort is appropriate begin with ‘military’ somehow counterpoised against ‘political’. This is especially curious coming from the pens of Clausewitzophiles, one of whose mantras is that ‘war is politics by other means’. Most of the time we have a pretty good idea how to translate the terms, though: shooting people is an activity thrown into the ‘military’ column and building a society in which people are not disaffected or indifferent is thrown into the ‘political’ column. The distinction makes some sense and echoes the two goals of neutralizing the enemy and not making more of them. A website called *The Mudville Gazette* has a little piece called ‘20% military/80% political’ that outlines arguments attending the war in Iraq. The question really being asked, however, is whether military organizations should do all the things that are not archetypically military.

If a military goes someplace and destroys or clears away enemies, that military will still have to remain in place facing the question of what to do so that it can leave and not have its efforts wasted. Large spaces have to be occupied, even if the enemy is only located in a few small places. As a result, militaries are forever confronted with challenges that they may not deem spiritually martial.

A lot of the sections of this book are about the traditional martial vocation – how to close with and destroy the enemy – which is a notion dependent on the definition of enemy. A soldier might like to say that either there are battles or potential battles or, if not, then let’s go home. Experience tells us, however, that there is a lot else that the soldier (or the insurgent) can or has to do besides combat. The situation boils down to this: You are there, someplace, and you can’t just stand around whittling, not able to get that decisive battle to occur. What do you do?

The answer about what to do is spread throughout a number of the sections of this book. Mostly they are engineering, knowledge creating, or administrating. The proven innovations in long-term conflict resolution aren’t headline-worthy, like combat or elections. They are folded into the boring details of civil administration. The long-term stability of a society seems to require many different pieces, but a lot of those pieces depend on things like statutes of fraud. The statutes of fraud require written evidence of duties and rights in order to ease administration of justice and services. Uninspiring, perhaps, but therein lies another question: Can peace be solidified administratively? The answer is that apart from whether peace can be solidified, it cannot be solidified *without* administrative excellence. It might not be enough, but it is essential.

The good news is that not only can conflict resolution mechanisms be designed and implemented, but the exact same civil systems that operate to release people from the perceived advantages of everyday violence can also provide a system of intelligence that helps expose the lines of communication and retreat of intelligent enemies.

Don’t hesitate in creating the inventory, your *Domesday Book*, on which administration excellence depends. Build what almost every sheriff uses to find a perpetrator, fugitive, or witness. The human environment can be shaped administratively to cough up detailed information about the connections between individual habits and precise locations. This means that the military may have to attempt what would ideally fall to civilians – to create a comprehensive, precise and transparent census, impose a system of individual identification cards for everyone, and map exactly who owns what and with whom, who is resident where, what the tenancy and debt relations are, the marriages and business associations, tax duties and destinations, the descriptions of cars, bicycles or mules, who has licenses to practice medicine and law and to sell real estate, cut hair, ordain, or circumcise. It means street signs, phonebooks, and license plates. With the availability of GIS technologies, the locations and linkages can be exposed almost instantaneously, once the data is input. Will there be gaps in the data; will people try to hide their assets and identities? Of course, but so what? That’s all detective fodder. When soldiers start talking “take, hold, build,” they’re right, but probably the first thing to build is the inventory.

If this smacks of Big Brother, it should. Both the rule-of-law and population control are created on the basis of records, not batons. If a person wants to create impunity for his actions, he is generally obliged to maintain anonymity for himself and his wealth. Once the authorities know the particulars of his motorcycle, phone, or apartment, it is harder to act outside the law without consequence. It is difficult even to stand distant from home without that fact being apparent.


As long as no system of institutional knowledge regarding individual identity and wealth is created, other cultural and physical geographic knowledge is rendered less valuable for the capture of enemy leaders. If the lines of communication, especially the lines of retreat and sanctuary of enemy leadership, are not identified, military success against that enemy is not likely. In order to see the finely-scaled placement geographies of insurgents, as opposed to the lines of communication of an army tank corps, maps must be drawn on the basis of individual identities linked to wealth. That wealth exists everywhere in the form of preferential rights to the use of places and things. Such recognized preferential rights are what we have come to call property, and records of such rights either exist or can be created. Once a system of laws and administrative and technical capacity are married in such a way as to enable the mapping of property rights, then control of a population is, if not easy, practicable. So maybe Hans Morgenthau was right about power, that it is simply influence over behavior. Influence over the behavior of a population lies in the condition and use of mundane administrative records.

Please see sections: 113, *Unrestricted Chi Whiz*; 132, *Turducken and Hybrid*; 66, GIS; 72, *Land Strategy*; 4, *Defining Enemy*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 40, *Rule-of-law*; and 1, *Impunity*.



“Throughout past history liberty has always walked
between the twin terrors of tyranny and anarchy.” [\[138\]](#)

Theodore Roosevelt



“Tell all those pencil pushers, better get out of my way.”

Mr. Lynyrd Skynyrd in the song
Gimme Back My Bullets



Real distinctions beneficially observed

Section 45, Police or Military?

Americans distinguish between what is police and what is military. They know that, at least archetypically, one wears blue and the other green; one makes arrests and the other goes overseas. Further articulating the differences gets a little harder, but one of North America's criticisms of Latin America in the second half of the 20th century centered on militarism-- that Latin America had too many military governments or too many military men in power. In most cases, military governance tended toward a rightist and 'anticommunist' flavor of oppression. As such, this military governance was often excused and sometimes coaxed by the United States government during the height of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. As the Cold War played out, the US expected rightist regimes to democratize and armed forces to go back to the barracks and away from political life. To a considerable degree this did indeed happen, such that by the mid-1990s almost all the countries of Latin America were experiencing democratic electoral practices and were putting civilian institutions in charge, even if the armed forces in many States continued to wield political influence.

Although the negative term 'police state' might have been used here and there to describe dictatorial regimes, the core offense was called 'militarism', even while, in the firmament of disabling *isms*, fatalism, medieval Catholicism, sexism, and cronyism probably played greater roles in maintaining what for many seemed a stagnated and unjust status quo. Militarism was targeted, especially by academe, as the most offending *ism* because it was rightist and because it was conveniently wearing a uniform (often designed after a US or German uniform). With this as the inferential parameter, aid from the US to Latin American countries after the Cold War took a shift toward police organizations and away from the military, even while an analysis of the effective differential in repressive capacities of the two types of organization was hardly attempted. The difference between what is police and what is military is nevertheless central to understanding of the rule-of-law, limitations on political power, and the control of government excess. Furthermore, few conversations can go to the marrow of irregular warfare more quickly than those about the proper separation of things police and things military.

Legal distinctions between what is police and what is military vary from country to country and many countries have organizations that seem to confound distinction. The linguistic cognates are treacherous in translation. The variation should interest us because the nature of public forces influences counterinsurgency efforts, the rule-of-law, and even reflects traditions about the definition of tyranny versus good governance. Americans may take the concept of police for granted. For instance, the word 'police' is used at least 183 times in the US military manual *Counterinsurgency*, but the definition of that word has to be inferred. Also, the question 'What is the difference between a police officer and a soldier?' is a little different than the question 'What is a police situation and what is a military one?' We'll go over both. Below is a list of hints from a North American cultural and institutional perspective.

A. *In flagrante delictu*. Obligations are as defining a set of distinctions as authorities. Obligations are intimately tied to public expectations and police ethic. Police officers have an obligation to pursue persons in the act of committing a crime. Military personnel normally do not. If a crime is not in progress, but the police know, or are pretty sure they know, who did it they have to go get a warrant to that effect from a judge, or assure that an arrest warrant is extant. In many jurisdictions, if the police have time, they are required to present it to the suspect at the time of arrest. In normal military circumstances, even if the military know who they are going to go 'arrest', they don't need a warrant.

B. *Dead or alive*. Police are granted leeway in applying deadly force in their self defense or the immediate defense of others. The 'dead or alive' announcement, however, is one in which prosecution and sentencing have been achieved before capture, this because someone is considered so dangerous that nonlethal action is deemed ineffective in stopping grave harm (See Section 4, *Defining Enemy*). The use of snipers is an interesting area of overlap and of definition between police and military. Police snipers are ready to kill someone who poses an immediate threat because they are armed and dangerous, are holding hostages at gunpoint, or are threatening a vulnerable public personality. Military snipers are often able to take targets of opportunity, kill enemy leaders, take out vehicle drivers, and so on. Police and military snipers are distant relatives in terms of their respective authorities. Military personnel are granted advance immunity from prosecution for premeditated killing. The police sniper's State-granted immunity will be more limited than that of the military sniper. Theoretically, the police officer will not enjoy impunity. He is not going to rest beyond the reach of indictment and judgment if his target's status and behavior did not rise to the thresholds that permit the sniper to kill. The military sniper, on the other hand, might be granted impunity by his State in defiance of any moral or legal characterization that another State or entity might make of the sniper's action. Killing by the military sniper is a creature of state sovereignty. His State might discipline his excesses or misjudgments, but will probably not allow any other entity to do so.

C. *Incoming*. Military people are authorized to use indirect fire weapons and area weapons in certain contexts. This again is tied to what I call the premeditated immunity of the State as it applies to weapons that are generally useless for making an arrest. We should hope it would be an extreme situation wherein the police would use an armed aerial drone, for instance.

D. *Not on my beat*. Police are commonly used as a deterrent presence. That is to say, the police chase and capture perpetrators and serve warrants, but they also just cruise for the purpose of dissuading criminal acts -- what they might call 'presence patrolling'. Criminals are the police's counterpart and are often distinguishable from insurgents because criminals usually do not attack government forces, while insurgents make it their business to do so. You can hardly be an insurgent if you don't attack your enemy. You're a dumb (or a tad crazy, and that's not so uncommon) criminal if you make it your business to attack the police. Hence, it is reasonable for a police officer to be on patrol deterring criminals from acting, whether or not that officer is looking for any particular criminal or intent on serving some warrant.

The soldier can be put at counterproductive risk if sent on patrol simply to deter insurgent action and not for the purpose of closing with the insurgent at a known location. Insurgent guerrilla military initiative presupposes attacks on government forces, so a soldier might become no better than bait, rather than a deterrent to insurgent initiative. When soldiers are sent on 'presence' or 'deterrence' patrols, we might say they are on police missions. In a better plan of patrols, one designed to perplex insurgents as to their lines of communication, what we might still label a deterrence patrol can be a key activity in offensive operational art.

The above delineations expose what in some situations can be a principal conceptual error in counterinsurgency. We may like to say that the police are the backbone of the counterinsurgent force, or should be. In a way this is certainly true, since good governance, application of the rule-of-law and so forth will provide the best long-term counterinsurgent condition. Nevertheless, if a violent armed insurgent force exists, it will likely conduct premeditated attacks against police. In such conditions, a counterinsurgent force often cannot safely exist and operate under a police ethic of criminal deterrence. When the public force is the natural target of a politically motivated armed enemy, to send elements of the force out without a fixed notion regarding when and how to enter into battle is to leave that force at a disadvantage in terms of initiative and strategic planning. Not only is it not the predator, nor even prey, but simply bait. Here are some other relevant tendencies:

E. *Plea bargains*. The military might turn a prisoner over to the police, but when would a police unit turn a prisoner over to the military? (This may have been the case, briefly, with Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian bomb terrorist in late 2009.)

F. *Evidence versus intelligence.* Eventually the police (in situations we would honor as within the rule-of-law) must expose the source of their evidence in order to succeed in bringing a suspect to conviction. The military is not expected to reveal its sources. Police intelligence is constrained by prospective use in a court as evidence, while military intelligence is constrained from using information as evidence in order to protect sources and methods. This is not simply a matter of habit. It is also one of the reasons that the wistful goal of world government will not be realized in our lifetimes or those of our children.

G. *Longevity of personal relationships.* Police officers are usually married-in permanent members of communities. Soldiers are more often from somewhere else. The soldier is naturally a traveler and a visitor. Local cultural knowledge, including of public records and community ethics, takes a longer time for the soldier to grasp. The soldier is someplace foreign exactly because something *there* has offended something *elsewhere*, whereas the policeman is from there, and is the more appropriate repressor when the problem is from within.

H. *Territorial scale.* Police beats are often delimited by the legal relationships that a police department or office has with the judicial institutions that empower it with warrants, prosecutions, etc. Legal jurisdictions and police jurisdictions generally correlate.

I. *Chains of command.* Military personnel often report up through a chain of command that is within or leads into the federal government, while most police chains of command do not. Many military combat units suppose the maneuver of at least dozens of elements, while only the largest and most complex police operations suppose the coordinated physical movement of more than a few elements.

J. *Crew-served and automatic weapons.* When would an American police organization appropriately use a machine gun?

K. *Knowledge cultures.* Police investigators tend to form investigations around clues and focus their theories on suspects. Military intelligence officers tend to form collection around requirements and concentrate analyses on enemy units. The difference draws the importance of personal identity. These days, criminal gang membership has created an overlap in this tendency.

The difference between police and military moves to the top of American political debate when internal organized violence poses a threat to the viability of the State, the economy of part of the country, or to some basic value of our national exceptionalism. Use of the military along the Mexican border is a recurring issue with some politicians and pundits calling for more military and others calling for less. I personally prefer the no-military option and think the US Border Patrol is the right force for that job. I also think the events in Waco, Texas in 1993, during which federal police tried to serve an arrest warrant on David Koresh at a compound of the Branch Dividians religious sect, and the events at Ruby Ridge, Idaho in 1992, should be required curriculum material for both federal police agents and US military officers. The Wikipedia site for Ruby Ridge includes the following sentence: "FBI HRT sniper Lon Horiuchi was indicted for manslaughter in 1997 by the Boundary Court, Idaho prosecutor just prior to expiration of the statute of limitations for the crime of manslaughter, but the trial was removed to federal court and was quickly dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity." Sometimes key violent events can supply aspiring insurgents with what they perceive to be legitimate purpose, argument, rallying cry, and targets. Timothy McVeigh cited the events at Ruby Ridge and Waco as motivations for his bombing the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995, the second anniversary of the Waco siege.


If police can adequately suppress crimes (including such crimes as sedition, insurrection or subversion) within the confines of police attributes and the rule-of-law, then counterinsurgency is perhaps *ipso facto* successful. If the capacity of the police is exceeded and the State finds itself obliged to employ military units to suppress crimes, such a condition may be evidence of an organized, armed challenge to the State, and at least of inadequate police capacity. If a State must employ military force to stop some organization from granting impunity, the condition begins to define State failure, at least in those areas where the State's monopoly on granting impunity is defied. Employing military force, meanwhile, can exacerbate lawlessness, making it harder to regain a police ethic and the rule-of-law. A State may, instead of employing military units, change the attributes of the police toward those of a military organization. That too may be evidence of a failing rule-of-law or of failing counterinsurgency.

Please see sections: 52, *Sovereignty*; 16, *Presence*; 82, *Conflict Thresholds*; 37, *School Lunches*; 13, [Puthukkudiyirippu](#); 50, *US Persons*; 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; and 136, *Weapons*.



"People who live in large towns have no idea of the tyrannical conduct of the police in country places far removed from court; they have no idea of the harsh and overbearing manner in which they execute their duty, or how they neglect their duty and abuse their powers." [139]

Ned Kelly (1879)



"This line is the best place to kill the Chinamen.
It's better to do it here and now..."

I want lots more wire and mines expended, not human life." [140]

James A. Van Fleet (1951)



Section 46, Taxation and Debt

Taxes are one of the two certainties. Whatever your job in your irregular war, find out who taxes whom, and how.

The power to tax is the power to destroy, and taxes aren't always called taxes. If an entity is redistributing wealth it did not earn, it's probably a theft or a tax (or both). In *The Geography of War and Peace: From Death Camps to Diplomats*, one of the authors, David Newman, looks at tax boundaries, tax-taking records and evidence, because tax so often appears as a theme in genocide research. Tax assignments can outline a vulnerable minority, and tax rates might measure how much a submitted or duped population can bear. A tribute system is a kind of debt arrangement that is almost purely extortion-based. The Ottoman *vilayets* and *sanjaks* are sometimes cited as examples. Little in the way of governance service was provided by the greater Ottoman State in many of its subordinate territories. Internal matters were left to local custom and structure, but an imperial tax was nevertheless collected.

Debt and taxes are closely related. When someone is owed money they usually want to collect it. Of the various lines of investigation that this book advocates for unraveling and dominating armed conflict, knowledge about debt is one of the least practicable to obtain, but most likely to prove useful if obtained. Who owes what to whom is a significant index of power hierarchy. Part of that relation can be painted by understanding taxation. Debt can itself be treated as property in that it can be bought, sold, given, or inherited.

Purgatory is a tax territory, a virtual geographic space invented by religious clergy. It is not a nice place, either. It is worse than the mortal vale -- it is a place where the soul suffers. The amount of time one spends in purgatory is correlated roughly to the quantity of unabsolved sins one commits here on earth, but even in a 'state of grace', some believe that additional purification is needed to assure speedy entrance into heaven. There is nothing about purgatory in the Bible, so why invent the place? Because as clergy you can collect an *indulgence* from your parishioners so that they, through your intervention with the Almighty, might reduce time spent there. Since being rich is tantamount to needing more purification, the Roman Catholic clergy managed a progressive tax scheme (or reverse toll) that extracted indulgence money in accordance with one's wealth. Improvements to the innovation came soon enough -- parishioners could pay to shorten the suffering in purgatory of relatives already deceased. In the face of such an option, clergy could profitably encourage a sense of guilt on the part of family members for allowing their stinginess to let their deceased relative suffer. The collecting of indulgences continued for centuries even past Martin Luther's protest against the extortion. It funded the construction of magnificent cathedrals in many parts of the world, especially Latin America. The cathedrals became toll booths to heaven.

Purgatory was an invented geography over which a church had sovereign tax authority. For efficient collection of that tax it was necessary for the clergy to develop and cultivate a belief among the congregants that such a place existed, that the congregants had a debt to pay, and that the clergy were exclusive agents of intervention. Many debts and many taxes, although not as obviously artificial as indulgences, depend at least in part on the establishment and maintenance of a belief that the taxes are necessary or a debt owed and that the tax or debt collectors are the rightful middlemen for fulfillment of the purification.

The issues of taxation and debt will be woven into your war. They are a possible cause of the war, might shape the locations of your war's costs, guide the struggle over anonymity, and determine power to make war. The most consequential objects of debt and taxation are highly physical, like land, but can also be entirely fabricated. Find them.

Please see sections: 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 54, *Extortion*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 65, *Smuggling*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 62, *Bank Robbery*; and 14, *Legitimacy*.



“Someday, and that day may never come,
I will call upon you to do a service for me.”

don Vito Corleone in the movie

The Godfather (1972)[141]



“Over 4.5 Billion people could die from Global Warming related causes by 2012.”[142]

headline in *The Canadian*



--- Hell with Limbo (Purgatory?) circa 1300 & 1888 ---

A more useful scale than country

Section 47, Why the County

Almost every country in the world has an administrative or formal territorial unit approximately equivalent to what in the United States is known as a county. In Iran they are called *rayons* and in Colombia *municipios* and they generally have a great deal in common as a geographic unit. They are often the object of considerable local geographic data collection. Most Mexican counties (also called *municipios*), for instance, have their own website, which is usually informative. In Colombia, every *municipio* government is required by national law to prepare a land-use plan (*Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* or POT). Even rural, under-populated and poor *municipios* often produce sophisticated POT. For instance, Toribio (a conflictive *municipio* in southern Colombia through which FARC smuggling routes pass) received an international grant and the help of foreign specialists to prepare its plan. It is exquisitely detailed and includes numerous GIS-generated maps that represent both physical and non-physical cultural phenomena. Included are the lines of privately owned plots along with tribal boundary lines, township lines, and environmental risk areas.

The Canadians have managed to confuse the county level of governance, but within most of their Provinces they have something akin to the county. A few of the smaller US States have eliminated the county. Counties today are one of the greatest employers of practical geographers, who earn their livelihoods on the basis of expertise in geographic representation and analysis. For them, GIS has almost become the universal epistemology for land-use planning. Precise geographic predictions regarding traffic, floodplains, or development costs have become an administrative expectation at the county level. County governments do almost nothing in the absence of knowledge about land ownership.

Not only does most knowledge about real property ownership reside at the county level, the size and shape of the county is often intimately associated with familial histories and shared ownerships, physical compartmentalization of terrain, peculiar economic phenomena such as watersheds, mines or a popular beach, or other fairly obvious factors that guide decisions, affiliations and identities. For internal or irregular armed conflicts, the county is probably a good choice of scale for analysis and operational design -- or at least a good place to begin. The county can be a useful tag upon which to build an understanding of the relationship of residents with their surrounding environment, and of the local fit in the greater world. In many countries, including most in the Western Hemisphere, the county is a focus for tax collection and redistribution, developmental programs, land-use planning and reform programs, quality of life statistics, distribution of government services, voting representation, marriages, notaries, cadastres, school planning, etc.

To not have a collection of county-level data and a grasp of problems at the county scale might equate to being out of touch with the most revealing administrative events and social performance facts. Rural insurgents especially know counties; understand differences among counties; and deal with county governments. Innumerable popular seasonal events ranging from religious celebrations to concerts, fairs and contests are planned and organized at the county level. Many profitable extortions occur at the county level as a result. In Colombia, for instance, the central government redistributes a percentage of the national oil, gas and coal production profits to county governments, with those counties that produce hydrocarbons receiving a larger percentage. From some rural counties the FARC would threaten away large portions of those hydrocarbon royalties.

Mexico has about 1,500 counties and Colombia about 1,100. China has about 2,000. Iran has over 300 and Liberia about 15 (which have Senators). The point is that while the country, national or federal level is impressive, the right knowledge or operational starting scale for your approach to an internal war might be the next level down (state, province, department), and more probably the next one down from that. If there is a rule regarding scale, it is probably that we should not bite off more geography than our resources can chew. Also, it is good to dominate land and property knowledge, details of which are often only available or understandable at the county scale.


This book stresses the importance of lines of communication, and the lines of communication of almost any armed group will lead in and out of a county, which means that the county level will almost never be the right scale for the whole geography of winning. Nevertheless, it is probably a good idea to orient your search for relevant geographic knowledge at the county level. You can adjust from there.

Please see sections: 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 35, *Comuna 13*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; and 78, *Identity*.



“My first book on Faulkner bears the title *Yoknapatawpha: Faulkner’s Little Postage Stamp of Native Soil*.” The title of this volume was chosen to signify that I am following Faulkner’s progress from the provincial to the universal...”[\[145\]](#)

Elizabeth Margaret Kerr,
William Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha:
A Kind of Keystone in the Universe



“Jesse Duke has been to two places in his life:
Hazzard County and Korea.”

narrator in the movie
The Dukes of Hazzard (2005)[\[146\]](#)



----- Yoknapatawpha County circa 1936 -----

Section 48, Grading the Social Compact

Many thoughtful scholars believe, kindly and with reason, that not only is it a dubious exercise to make normative judgments about the quality of a foreign society, it is the kind of presumption to which US Americans are especially prone. Let's do it anyway. Some cultures or polities are more likely than others to promote human flourishing and to exist in a respectful relationship with the surrounding natural environment. Some social compacts are more peaceful, better at stewarding the environment, more successful materially, and happier than others. Others are just plain offensive. In the long run, any claim we might make to victory in an irregular conflict will be vulnerable if we can't accept the notion that it is acceptable to judge societies. After all, revolutionaries have all judged their societies. They measured it, it failed in their eyes, and they acted to 'improve' it. Rebels aside, societies are not equally worthy. This section offers a way to measure better and worse.

We can measure the success or failure of a State can, as argued throughout this book, on its control of impunity. That definition holds that competitors who can grant impunity are the likely enemies of the State. Normative qualities of State behavior that we can somehow relate to State failure are also touched-on throughout the book. They have a similar relation to impunity that 'neutralizing the enemy' has to 'not creating more of them'. In other words, maybe, to a degree a society in which humans are fulfilled in their material lives are less likely to foment the disaffections that lead to rebellion against established systems. Perhaps we will disagree as to how the material cup is to be filled, or regarding who is responsible to fill it. First, however, let's disagree about human nature, and whether or not rebelliousness and disaffection are really dependent on lack of fulfillment, or if there exists a latent and natural tendency toward territorial competition. My thinking tends in the direction of the latter; that rebelliousness and disaffection operate independently of the level of material well-being. I think you will find that many historic observations support that position. Nevertheless, there remains reason to believe that the manner of organizing a society greatly influences the methods of territorial competition, the social and material costs of that competition, and the diffusion or concentration of power that the competition requires and creates.

This section deals with measurement of the normative condition of a society's social compact, especially the extent to which, as a system, it is likely to create enemies within itself and for its neighbors. 'State' is not equivalent to 'society'. I presume that government could be minimal, probably should be minimal, but in any case that a healthy social compact requires a healthy government. My advice is that, irrespective of what you consider government's proper role, you measure a society (as to its vulnerability to violent territorial competition) via close inspection of the property regime. Begin by describing in as much detail as possible the following three aspects of the real property ownership system:

1. Quality of the evidence that delineates rights, duties, and the identity of owners of valuable things (this is sometimes referred to as *clarity of allocation*);
2. Capacity of owners (or claimants) to act on conclusions logically drawn from the evidence (this is in some contexts referred to as *ease of alienability* or as *security from trespass* depending on the mix of owner rights and government duties involved); and
3. Basic rules delimiting participation in the compact (this we at times refer to as *liberality*).

'Valuable things', by the way, means land, water, transportation means, taxation and creation and control of negotiable instruments, but especially real property. We are measuring the quality of the social compact using one of the closest proxies, the real property regime. We can break the three streams of inquiry down further, as is offered in part A of the Appendix: Miscellaneous Lists.

Transparency or its absence in public records of ownership may be the first clue to the overall condition of the social compact. A quality of evidence in a functioning liberal social compact, transparency is the principal antidote to government corruption. Governments tend to want to keep some forensic information close-hold, and there exist valid justifications for doing so. Nevertheless, no amount of technical precision or completeness of coverage will cause a system of public records to serve the purposes of human flourishing if those records are kept for the exclusive consideration of a few. Sometimes lack of transparency may seem to be due not so much to some attempt to hide data as it is to the simple lack of good record systems. This may be true, but if a leadership group exists, and that leadership is able to aggregate wealth, then there are probably records someplace and that leadership group controls them.

A property system is not just public records. Property is relationships. Who has what rights and duties as recognized by others, how is that recorded, and how is that evidence used. The property system is a contract about contracts, agreement about agreements. How good the property system is will tell you how good the social compact is, how good the society is.

Please see sections: 72, *Land Strategy*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 95, *Childhood*; 130, *Globalization*; 118, *Democracy*; 77, *Sex*; 62, *Bank Robbery*; and 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*.



"There's only two things I hate in this world: people who are intolerant of other cultures, ... and the Dutch."

Nigel Powers in the movie
Austin Powers in Goldmember (2002)[147]



"The Killdozer does its homicidal work with much enthusiasm, ... and I'm still wondering how a 50-ton machine with a roaring diesel engine which belches huge clouds of black smoke could possibly sneak up on and surprise anyone. But the Killdozer manages to do just that, much to the detriment of the workers. Another issue is the one lesson I learned from this movie: If a maniacal bulldozer controlled by an alien force is lurking about – don't get drunk."

from a review of the TV movie
Killdozer (1974)[148]



"Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can." [149]

Thucydides



Overlapping territories exposed

Section 49, Territorial Scrutiny

Territorial scrutiny is a map-based investigation and analysis method that is built upon human territorial nature. The idea is to expose, understand and relate the nature of conflicts through territorial mapping. It happens that over time and because of new technologies, human territoriality has become increasingly mappable. The issue of what actions to take on the basis of detailed territorial knowledge is considered elsewhere throughout the book. A few suggestions about how to organize human territories, based in part on the theories used in this section, can be found in Section 32, *Land-use Planning*.

People's rights, duties, privileges, delimitations, obligations, powers, capacities, and trespasses are almost all associated with territories. It might be a shoe salesman's territory, a telephone billing exchange, a sports league school set, a catchment area for insurance patients, fire vulnerability zones, a language-group density gradient, a Kiwanis club membership spread, and on and on. It might also be something more legally formal and consequential, such as a gas or water line easement, a building setback line, or a noise abatement zone. There could be a theoretical area where people might be at risk of mud slides, or where they might be fearful of UFOs. It could be a territory where people pronounce a word in a curious and distinguishing way. It might be the estimated borders between the zones of action of two gangs or guerrilla groups or it might be the series of way-stations used to move stolen emeralds. It might be the boundary of duties or privileges to organize a public event (such as a religious celebration or parade) in one locale as opposed to another.

With some exceptions, there exists a potential conflict whenever territories overlap. *Nested Identities* is the title of an interesting and useful anthology edited by Herb Guntram and David Kaplan.^[150] Some human collective identities coincide with administrative or formalized territories. People often have a hierarchically/geographically linked set of identities typically growing from the self to the family to the school to the town and so forth to the nation-state. As such, you will want to name, to your own satisfaction, the competing identities related to the place you are scrutinizing. This is not to suggest that individuals who are members of a given competing identity will necessarily be located in the place you are studying, just that they have some influence on the rights, duties, conditions and events in the place. Try to map the whereabouts of the identities' members, what the members of each identity consider to be 'theirs', where the agents or representatives of the identity are located. Map all the significant administrative territories. See which administrative concepts and identities are cozily nested and contiguous, that is, if the power identities and administrative boundaries are copacetic.

The likelihood that a territorial overlap exposes a conflict increases as the distance between the proponents of each of the territories increases. In other words, if the engineer who is in charge of servicing the water line is the same individual who services the gas line, then the distance between the proponents is nothing. The guy might have a conflict in his own head about whether the gas line goes over the water line or vice-versa, but that hardly presents much fuel for armed social conflict. Maybe he just says to himself something like, 'I'll run the gas line over the top of the water line since it is smaller and it is more urgent that I get to it quickly if there is a problem'. That's not much of a conflict, and resolution is easy. If, on the other hand, the water pipeline engineer sits in Omaha in a large company with a number of subordinate engineers, and the gas line company headquarters is in Wichita, then there could be some digging arguments that will be harder to resolve. If instead of talking about a couple of simple utility easements, we are talking about a couple of lucrative drug smuggling routes, overlapping turf boundaries of two violent cartels, a fiber optic cable line, and the edges of two soccer team fan-bases, the conflict is going to be rougher.

In the context of armed conflict, especially if it has been ongoing, the organization with the headquarters that is further away from an area in question is probably the more powerful organization overall. This may seem counterintuitive since one of the basic theories of geography is that everything influences everything else and that closer things influence more than distant things. It takes strength to maintain armed force at a distance, so, if an organization can maintain defiant armed force a long way from its base, it is probably powerful in accordance. (More on the relationship of distance and power is considered in Section 64, *Measuring Power*.) This does not mean that the identity with the more distant headquarters is the more powerful organization in that one little place at a given moment in time, however. Also, again, distances should be measured as cost-distances, not just Euclidean distances.

The scale of map images matters. In the context of visual analysis some territories are more easily depicted as lines such as airline routes, or retail distribution networks. They are territories nevertheless, and so exposure of the legalistic and strategic-competitive importance of relationships (such territorial jealousies) has to be guarded from semantic distraction. Don't let words like 'flow', 'network', or 'assemblage' distract you from exposing territorial overlaps. You are seeking to unravel organized human conflict and that means analyzing places and privileges (territories) that are coveted enough for humans to fight over. Those things are going to have a spatial manifestation or reference. Scale mistakes are easy to make. Pick the right scales for the interpretation of territorial conflict, and do not let your thinking become frozen at one scale of space or time. An image of a network of airline routes can give the impression of 'flows' in and out of territories. When the pilots land, however, they will do so under some territorial agreement allowing them to fill a passenger gate or refuel. All routes are territory.

Plenty of misleading and stupid things can be done with maps. A current conversation in international matters revolves around the present meaning of some national borderlines drawn long ago by the cartographers of colonial powers. Sometimes observers accuse the lines as being artificial, arbitrary and damaging because they were originally drawn indifferent to or disdainful of local territorial matters such as tribal or economic relationships. Commenting on the British challenge in the northwest of India in 1893,

Sir George Robertson an, expert in frontier politics, puts the matter so clearly that his words on the subject may be quoted at length: -- 'To the superficial observer', he says, 'nothing could seem more statesmanlike than to lay down distinct boundaries demarcating respectively the spheres of influence of the Amir of Afghanistan and the Government of India, and so to prevent all fear of collision of those two powers. A weak point, however, in the plan, was the practical ignoring of all the intervening tribes, who, as they owed allegiance neither to the Afghan chief nor to the Government of India, not unnaturally objected to what they imagined was the parceling out of their country without their consent.'^[151]

The lines, however, were in few cases arbitrary as to the relationships between the colonial powers. Today, although they may be locally dysfunctional, national governments are generally loath to change the colonial lines.

It is constructive to map identities of persons and collectives who consider themselves to be in the legitimate current exercise of significant rights ('owners') as well as groups and individuals who are not in exercise of those rights, but claim they should be ('claimants'). When nominating owner and claimant identities it is useful to keep in mind that any given individual can belong to multiple, competing identities; can be ambivalent, capricious and indecisive over time; and that some identities can be as fleeting as they are powerful.

The fact that owner identities (which for a lawyer might become classes of plaintiffs or defendants) can overlap even while the territories in question don't appear to overlap, is what makes territorial scrutiny a 'postmodern' concept. A collective identity has members, but is not

necessarily an organization, and it is not the same as the sum of its membership. Collective identities are key to your conflict analysis to the extent they influence the conflict at particular moments in time and in places valuable to you. Territorial scrutiny is suitable for use in forensics, but also in support of a property approach to understanding and improving a social compact. By specifying the spatial and temporal condition of territoriality, the manifestations of abstractions like sovereignty, human rights, civil rights, property rights, power and wealth can be visualized and analyzed on the same plane. Territorial scrutiny can reveal the practical overlap of those concepts. The object of conflicts is often reflected in tax plats, resource concessions, easements, building codes, land-use plans, development and aid schemes, service boundaries and schedules, school districts, and sports events schedules. The movement of objects of desire (opium, emeralds, water, prostitutes, bananas...) is also consequential. These details of property can be visualized, compared, correlated, and even modeled because of the GIS revolution. Ultimately, all territorial lines represent power relationships. Every formal territorial construction reflects preferential rights and duties that together reflect at least part of a social compact. These reflections of related power can be collated and correlated and in so doing many dangerous imbalances can be recognized.

On top of any of these possible layers just mentioned we can place a map layer of the areas in which a suspect collective identity (let's say a clergy, a guerrilla band, or a police unit) is able to enjoy impunity from punishment for a specified set of actions (like harboring fugitives, kidnapping, or extortion). The patterns and anomalies exposed in the spatial comparisons might speak volumes. The complexity of created, shared, traded, excluded and denied rights pertaining to a locale is something that a GIS can help us see and test, the various layers and scales of territorial information resting in unseen relational databases.


Lines on a map express human power relationships, as well as relationships with the natural environment. In those places where the details of competitive territoriality have not been recorded in maps, revealing lines and spaces can be created. Territorial scrutiny can even help us visualize such phenomena as indifference, ambivalence, distraction, confusion, whim, anger, forgetfulness, etc., when these are discovered by suitable methods. It can, in other words, allow for rational input of the seemingly irrational.

Please see sections: 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 66, *GIS*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; and 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*.



“It is a common habit to blame life upon the environment. Environment modifies life but does not govern life. The soul is stronger than its surroundings.”[\[152\]](#)

William James (attributed)



Cowboy: Okay, what are we gonna do now?

Swan: We're going back.

Vermin: You mind tellin' me how? ... Coney Island must be 50 to 100 miles from here!

Swan: It's the only choice we got.

Cochise: Yeah, real simple. Except that every cop in this city is lookin' to bust our heads.

Swan: We got somethin' else to think about then the cops.

Vermin: Yeah, what?

Snow: The truce. Is it still on?

Vermin: If it ain't, we're gonna have to bop our way back.

from the movie

The Warriors (1979)[\[153\]](#)



The Constitution exported by decree by decree

Section 50, U.S. Persons

The saying, 'Countries don't have friends, they have interests', is a realpolitik staple ascribed to de Gaulle, Kissinger, Bismarck, and numerous other geopolitical alpha males of lore. We want to be careful with its use these days, even if it still serves to explain some government decisions and behaviors. The United States is home to so many families with international membership that in the case of some countries, US bilateral relations are not just a matter of friendships, they are a matter of families. To suppose that a democratic government could rise above those familial relationships to assert an ostensibly greater national interest is the more naive view. It isn't just the United States and its 'US Person', either. Irregular conflicts will involve many countries with shared families, companies and migrants. Millions of Colombians live in Venezuela and vice versa, for instance. For the United States, the obvious examples are Cuba, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Israel and Mexico. The existence of family ties is a complicating factor that itself should invite careful examination, not just at the philosophical level, but at the operational one.

There now are several overlapping definitions of 'US Person' that can be easily googled, but, more or less, a US Person is a United States citizen, a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a US corporation unless directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. You may see the inclusivity expanded or contracted a bit depending on the agency and context, in any case, US Person status engages a range of constitutional protections including those relating to illegal government searches, invasion of privacy, and warrantless arrests. It is an example of a self-imposed dilution of State power. For many law enforcement purposes, the rights accruing to United States citizens have been extended beyond US borders. Along the US-Mexico border, US federal officers apply a broad interpretation of US Person. Guided also by the intent of another requirement, the Posse Comitatus Act limiting military authority in domestic territory, US federal officers are normally cautious, presuming almost anyone within the United States to be a US Person. They may presume, for instance, that anyone heading toward Mexico from the interior of the United States to be a US Person.

The 'US Person' is a human identity category that can be traced at least back to a Ronald Reagan executive order (No. 12333), and it was a substantial invention. To a degree it mooted many arguments about whether or not the US Constitution applied to noncitizens. Most rights we claim as Americans are not granted by the US Constitution; rather the Constitution asserts protections of those rights from infringements by the government. It is perhaps an interesting historical note that the US government would constrain itself as to infringements on the rights of persons who are not citizens of the United States, but creation of the 'US Person' was born of the same spirit that motivated the founding fathers to keep the government at a distance from tyrannical practices. Creation of the US Person was recognition that to lord it over the relatives or foreign interests of US citizens was too close to infringing on the rights of the US citizens themselves. Does it make law enforcement harder? Yes. Does it lessen the rule-of-law? Perhaps not.

Every day the number of persons who fall into the US Person category increases, especially in the United States' near-abroad. Any irregular conflict in which forces of the United States government might find themselves engaged in the Western Hemisphere will encounter an ever-increasing proportion of US Persons. If we were to add to the definition, as is likely, close family member of a US citizen, it would be exceptional in a country like the Dominican Republic to find a non-US Person. Today, for the United States, in the context of some potential irregular wars, the idea that countries have interests and not friendships becomes a dangerous intellectual anchor. Beyond friendships there are families by the hundreds of thousands. The implications of operational law in such situations, tied as families are to democratic politics and to tort law if nothing else, should sober all commanders to think about the golden rule. It would be the exception for the United States military to find itself in a place in the Americas where they would not be at once in a foreign land -- and not so much. Many Americans outside the US know this better than do Americans inside the US. An operations plan for a United States government unit that does not explicitly address the phenomenon of the US Person might be a dangerously incomplete plan. The depiction of an operational environment that does not attempt to define the social and legal geography of the US Person might be a dangerously incomplete depiction.

Anonymity is a central theme of this book. The fact of the US Person cuts in both directions as far as the creation and control of anonymity is concerned. On one hand, the individual rights of US Persons, backed by their access to grievance mechanisms, can hamper investigation and surveillance. On the other hand, the condition of 'US Personship' can make the establishment of comprehensive biometrics, perfection of public records, or the creation of Big Brother easier. In any case, and for all parties, the extent and implication of US Personship should be a matter of attention, as should analogous conditions elsewhere.

In the 1970s, a dominant current of American opinion and emotion, soured from the Vietnam War, turned against what was perceived to be overreaching by the federal government in the name of national security. The Church Committee, among other things, investigated a project carried out by the US Army called COINTELPRO, under which military intelligence personnel secretly collected and filed private information about US citizens, especially on college campuses within the United States.

In the spirit of discipline imposed by public reaction to the perceived violation of civil liberties, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency were led to maintain separated geographies of responsibility. The FBI worked inside the country and the CIA worked outside the country. They rarely traded files and, when the 2001 World Trade Center attack came, this failure to share information was perceived as a weakness. New laws, The Patriot Act among them, increased cooperation between the two agencies (broke down the geographic boundaries), as well as among other principle components of the US intelligence and law enforcement communities.

In 1983, Executive Order 12425 gave the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) status as a public international organization entitled to the immunities accorded under the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945. The 1983 order expressly excluded some immunities regarding search and seizure, as well as regarding taxation. Some tax exclusions were dropped in 1995 (Executive Order 12971). In 2009, Executive Order 13524 further amended EO 12425, exempting INTERPOL from search of all INTERPOL properties and files. In other words, the 2009 amendment released INTERPOL from oversight by the United States. It is too early to say if INTERPOL is beyond the reach of civil actions for abuse of process, or if it is relieved from Freedom of Information Act requests. However, it seems that, whereas the US Person executive order was designed to limit infringements by the US government on the rights of individual humans, even if not fully US Citizens, Executive Order 12425 goes in the other direction, releasing foreign police from accountability. During the period in which I considered the rewrite of this section, many controversial changes occurred or were exposed regarding surveillance laws. These changes affect not just US Persons or NGOs; they affect US citizens. Their complexity and opacity make brief comment difficult.

'US Person' is a legal innovation, as is 'US Citizen'. Your performance in irregular war may be subject to such legal innovations; and winning could depend on how well you understand such concepts of identity and their relationship to other concepts, like sovereignty, impunity, anonymity, and sanctuary. If you are a US service member, you took an oath to defend the fundamental outline of a legal innovation.

Please see sections: 2, *Anonymity*; 124, *Slavery and Underclass*; 60, *War Nouveau*; 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 45, *Police or Military*; 52, *Sovereignty*; 84, *Cultures of Violence*; and 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*.




“If I were to live my life over again,
I would be an American.
I would steep myself in America,
I would know no other land.”[\[154\]](#)

Henry James



How soft your fields so green, can whisper tales of gore,
Of how we calmed the tides of war. We are your overlords.

from the Led Zeppelin song
The Immigrant Song



Man Stoner: What's the Immigration Service doing here, man?

Pedro: My cousin needed a ride to his brother's wedding in Tijuana; so he called the Emigras, Man. They'll deport the entire wedding party, Man. They get a free bus ride across the border and lunch. When the wedding is over, Man, they'll just come back across the border.

from the movie
Up in Smoke (1978) [\[155\]](#)



Section 51, Get Willy

On November 4, 2011, in Popayán, Colombia, orderlies wrapped the carcass of Guillermo Sáenz in plastic after some forensic work to confirm his identity and satisfy the public. Sáenz, who used the *nom de guerre* Alfonso Cano, had been the overall commander of the FARC since late May, 2008, but had spent most of the time evading capture, rarely able to regain his footing or take military initiative. On news of his death, Colombian officials and commentators immediately pronounced the opening of possibilities for another round of peace negotiations with the FARC. Among the reasons for the government to consider negotiations – it had a more favorable hand than a decade earlier when those peace talks failed. Now, whoever replaced Sáenz at the helm of the FARC inside Colombia could reasonably fear for his life. The remaining senior FARC leadership would be harder to hunt; most were in foreign lands, probably Venezuela. Bagging Sáenz was nevertheless a significant military and political achievement, accomplished at cost.

The government's decapitation strategy had been proving itself, but it had never been conceived of as a simple matter of killing the insurgent boss and watching the organization wither away. The FARC was long-established, with a systematic leader replacement strategy. The government intended to target the leaders because they were, by police reasoning, the authors of the organized violence. By military reasoning, putting the FARC leaders to flight meant denying them the initiative. Whomever the FARC leader at a given moment, he was consubstantial with the physical location of the FARC's headquarters, which meant the location of the organization's personnel, contract, and inventory files, as well as keys to the principal communications means. To go after the leaders logically also meant going after the most significant terrain and the greatest intelligence treasures. Finally, to kill the FARC leadership seemed the ultimate 'propaganda of the deed' when it came to public perceptions. Killing FARC leaders would place the FARC in a weaker bargaining position in the event of some return to negotiations.

The hunt itself unfolded in south-central Colombia, in and between several national parks (Nevado de Huila, Las Herosas, Puracé, Munchique, Farrallones de Cali, and Serranía de Los Picachos). See map on page 209 following this section's text), often at high elevations, obeying headwaters and remote mountain passes. *Remote* is the key word. The counties (*municipios*) around where the departments of Cauca, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, and Huila approach each other are remote in all kinds of ways. Roads end, electric service is sparse, and there are few stores or gas stations. Keeping their commander alive became the FARC's central military preoccupation, and in service to it, the guerrilla planners counted on the combination of remoteness and movement options.

The protective troops were organized in three rings, the innermost composed of about a dozen highly trusted and experienced guerrillas, and the outermost with as many as three to four hundred foot soldiers. Ten to fifteen counties comprise most of the geographic extent in which Sáenz' final failure to escape took place. The highest point on the map is the volcanic peak Nevado de Huila (17,600 ft.) in the national park of the same name. The Saldaña River and many of its key tributaries gather on the northeastern slopes and flow in Tolima Department northeast headed for the Magdalena River. The Páez River rises on the southwestern slopes of the Volcano then flows south-southeast into the Magdalena in Huila Department. On the other side of the mountain crest just west of Tolima's border the rivers flow toward the Cauca River in either Cauca or Valle del Cauca departments. There are a lot of streams and a lot of water. Water, slope, vegetation, altitude, few roads, and few people.

Curious but understandable, descriptions of the area made by residents and officials of all political types extol the region as a communications hub from which one can go east to the jungles and plains of Meta and Caquetá, north toward the nation's capital, west to the Pacific port of Buenaventura, or south passing out of the Colombian Massif to Ecuador. It is obviously true and simultaneously ridiculous. Every map of Colombian road or river networks or of altitudes or seasonal weather disruptions tells the same story, one that everyone knows: it is a region *around which* one travels to get places, not *through which*. But it is nevertheless a roundhouse for those who wish to elude law enforcement and to have open travel options. It is indeed a hub for transportation -- of contraband and escape. The transportation geography of furtive or fugitive traffic is different from that of innocent traffic. At altitude, the headwaters are easier to cross, ancient pathways lead everywhere, and the intent traveler can impose intolerable costs on his pursuers. That is to say, the escaper can shorten his pursuer's distance to the pursuer's culminating point. The traveler has to be patient, as passage is not as fast as it would be going around the 'long' way, and for the guerrilla it helps to have rifles and landmines.

Southeast of the volcano we find Páez county, sometimes called Belacázar, the first name taken from a predominant local indigenous identity and the second from a conquistador. Toward the eastern border of the county is a small town called Riochiquito, famous in Colombia as a place according to guerrilla legend where the FARC was named, if not birthed, in the 1960s. At that time, the Colombian army was chasing Pedro Marin, the man who had preceded Sáenz as FARC commander. Five decades in, the FARC still counted on the geography of the area for sanctuary or escape thereto. It was never just a matter of the topography. The makeups of the local populations are one with their surroundings. It is said they are predisposed to self-reliance, distrust of government, and physical durability. What's not to like? The FARC, even after the bulk of its leaders hailed from elsewhere, engaged the local cultural predispositions. Apparently, we need to be careful in describing the local attitudes, however, as they vary more than the popular accounts reaching foreign audiences suggest. There is a considerable black community in Páez, for instance, and romantic notions of rural communes in sustainable balance with nature, busy resisting the Man, should be held with reservation if not cynicism. The area around Riochiquito, geographic center of FARC lore, has a higher degree of private property land ownership than many of the surrounding zones. Relationships between the locals and the FARC are spotty at best. According to some who might know, there has existed a changing patchwork of sympathy, enthrallment, fear, indifference, and rejection. The place is rough terrain.

The hunt for Sáenz began in earnest in early February, 2008 when the Colombian Army launched a major operation to go dig him out of the Cañon de Las Herosas area in Tolima Department where he was thought to be holed-up at over 11,000 feet. Although the army did not find Sáenz, it did considerable damage to the FARC security units in the area. By October, intelligence had again fixed his approximate whereabouts to the Barragán paramo in Ronesvalles county. During 2009, the G-2 slowly improved its intelligence nets, but in spite of an otherwise successful bombing of a FARC headquarters camp in October, Sáenz continued to evade successfully. In February and March of 2010, the FARC security rings absorbed additional losses in attacks against encampments in the Las Herosas area. In early 2011, Sáenz apparently moved toward the headwaters of the Atá River and by late June the trail led back to Páez, Cauca, near the border with Huila Department, northwest of Riochiquito. Around July 3, 2011, the army almost caught Sáenz in La Honda township, still in Páez. In late September, news came that the 6th FARC Front was protecting his movement back toward Planadas County, Tolima. There, the FARC's Jacobo Arenas column was to accompany him back south toward the coast. The fabric of the protective circles had been rent, and a decision made to break out of the encirclement and head for the Munchique National Park area east of the Panamerican highway toward the coast. The little hut in which Sáenz was briefly lodged was under observation from other dwellings. On November 4, 2011, government special operations forces and police killed Sáenz near Honduras Township, Morales County, then transported his corpse to the Departmental capital, Popayán. The government had put the offending *mens rea* and the privilege of *habeas corpus* together.

It appears the FARC had long since demoted the area around Nevado de Huila as a sanctuary, knowing it could only provide temporary relief and could not serve as a base in which to recruit, recover or rearm. There are too many unfriendly bugs, animals, plants and temperatures; human

population is sparse, radio signals weak; and repeated movements invite the enemy to reverse ambush tactics. Still, FARC units could escape hot pursuit, and columns carrying supplies or contraband could rest briefly on the way to and from safer areas in Meta or Caquetá. It is from the internally remote high ground that FARC units descended on the communities between the parks to enforce silence about the movement of their columns, attack pesky police posts, make payments to collaborators, and receive ransoms, prisoners, or portions of other parasitic schemes. By 2011, however, technology and an increased government resource base extended the distances to police and army culminating points during the pursuit, and shortened the practical, service distances to remote civilian populations. People with an affinity to the government, who were indisposed toward the FARC, could get everywhere faster and with more strength. At the same time, more and more information broke into the backwoods to convince some of the independently minded to think more independently. Sáenz' use of the central cordillera was doomed in part by the fact of shrinking sanctuary. In late October, his security rings falling apart, he was hustled out of the bubble toward Munchique. Although a likely choice for escape for some of the aforementioned reasons, Munchique is a smaller reserve, and the surrounding population not well prepared psychologically to host a FARC leader. Morales County, for instance, had a Conservative Party voting history. It was not good sanctuary. There Sáenz met an inglorious, exhausting little marxist martyrdom, literally run to death.


The hunt for Guillermo Sáenz' was one of numerous by-name manhunts conducted by the Colombian government as a central column of its overall counter-FARC strategy. To then say that the FARC leadership was the enemy 'center of gravity' or that the population was therefore not the government's 'center of gravity' would be an unnecessary and perhaps damaging semantic exercise. The leaders of the FARC are the intellectual authors, the *mens rea* perpetrators of acts that the people and government of Colombia cannot abide. They are the men who grant impunity to an organization of violent perpetrators. That they were to be hunted down obeyed its own logic within the social compact.

Please see sections: 88, *Escape Geography*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 78, *Identity*; and 137, *Foreign Support and Perspective*.



“All the approaches could be observed from concealed positions. Yet what I sought was a way of escape. As Platus has said, not even a mouse trusts himself to one hole only.”^[156]

Mathurin Kerbouchard in
The Walking Drum




“How long have you been living here?” I asked. ‘About two months, *bwana*’. ‘Did you know of the surrender talks between your leaders and the government?’ ‘*Ndiyo*’. ‘But you did not wish to surrender?’ The terrorist was silent. I thanked him for his cooperation and then shot him twice through the head.”^[157]

William W. Baldwin,
Mau Mau Man-Hunt



South-central Colombia circa 2012



The white dotted line traces the approximate path of Guillermo Sáenz' last effort to abscond. The hash-marked areas are National Parks. Sáenz exploited the high ground and historically FARC-dominated places. He tried to reach an old smuggling route to the Pacific Coast. He failed. He was caught and killed at Chirriadero, to the West on this map.

I own this place, not you

Section 52, Sovereignty

Some political scientists like to define sovereignty as a *summa potestas*, a unified authority supreme in internal affairs and independent with respect to external affairs. Anytime anyone invokes sovereignty, however, they are almost sure to be saying something pretty close to, 'I'm the owner of this place and you're not.'

There are some particular ownership rights and duties that we can usefully tie to the word sovereignty or to territoriality at the level of States in the international state system. The trick is to determine what individuals control these rights, where those people sit, how much power they have to freely exercise their claimed rights and to limit others' behaviors. Roughly, how might we, in this age, identify a sovereign?

1. It alone can conscript soldiers from the population within a delimited territory;
2. It alone can impose taxes within the territory;
3. It can deny entrance to the territory;
4. It delegates those who uniquely represent the territory to international organizations;
5. It has a monopoly on granting impunity for acts committed within the territory.

When a State or government cannot effectively control who can grant impunity for behavior within its asserted territory, adherents of a defiant entity might enjoy impunity for acts of violence there. If so, they probably also choose not to pay the State's taxes, refuse service in its army (except subversively), and come and go as they please. Things are not copacetic. Impunity and sovereignty are correlative if not coconstitutive. Sovereignty, in a sense, is the ultimate geography of impunity. Salient among the details is international respect of the above-listed items. Extradition, for instance, is tied to this sovereignty-by-recognition. Member countries agree to support each others' control over impunity.

Land outside the formal lines of property ownership is possessed by force. As with property systems at every scale, regional and global membership societies recognize certain boundaries for the purpose of conflict avoidance and resolution among the members. It has been a long time since the world had much territory outside formal international boundaries. Almost all the land on earth now falls within the lines of some internationally recognized country, although some irredentism still exists. This isn't the same as saying that the boundaries and borders all work all the time, just that somebody thought they were divvying up rights and duties and made some commitment, idle or otherwise, to help enforce the club's concept of rights and duties. Almost all territorial borders and boundaries relate to a commitment to effect eviction (to deny entrance or use by someone who has no right according to the agreement of the social compact). The idea of international recognition seems sometimes to throw people off. It shouldn't. If the United Nations uses the argument that it is protecting the principle of sovereignty when it goes in to kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait, it is saying that the club leaders made agreements about the lines and that they aren't going to accept a violation of those lines.

The rules of the bigger clubs come from multilateral agreements like the UN Charter, from customary international law, bilateral treaties and business contracts, but the point is always the same. There are some agreed-upon rights associating member States with specific land and water. The agreements are in place to avoid constant fighting. Some people suggest that there is no international law or that international law doesn't work, but this is simply not true. Most leaders of States want to have recognized property rather than constantly have to possess by force. Otherwise, there would be a lot more international fights than there are. A leader wanting to gain more rights on the other side of some internationally recognized line may have to trick or defy the rules, and since enforcement is expensive, lesser violations often go unpunished.

The clubs of countries in the international property system grant representational exclusivity. One of the big benefits of membership is that (for the most part) club members agree to do business only with one recognized representative entity. The United States Government sends a representative to the United Nations, not fifty. There are exceptions and odd cases. For instance, Puerto Rico sends its own representatives to some international bodies. If an international body admits a delegate from a defiant entity (a delegate not endorsed by the State), the international body affronts and diminishes that State's sovereignty saying, "You are not the full or wholly legitimate owner of that territory." Recognition in international forums of an entity such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization is an example.

If a State can't maintain a monopoly over the granting of impunity within its borders, it might not be able maintain other characteristics of sovereignty, even to include not being the only entity invited to send a representative to the meetings of some international body. We might argue in a given case that a 'non-State' entity is illegitimate (in the normative sense of ethical standards) and so does not deserve representation to an international forum, or to send ambassadors to other sovereign States. We may argue instead that a State needs the assistance of the other members of the club to help it regain rights lost to unworthy trespassers, claimants, and usurpers. On the other hand....

These questions come up all the time. Sometimes the cases are clear-cut. In South America, Hugo Chávez proposed that the international clubs recognize the FARC as a legitimate international representative of Colombians. His idea was a direct insult to the Colombian government's claim of unique sovereign representation in the international system. In a way, Chavez' assertion made sense. The FARC was able to grant impunity to its members in much of Colombia, FARC members could come and go against the wishes of the formal State, didn't pay government taxes, assessed their own taxes, conscripted soldiers, and often murdered without consequence. President Chávez' proposal came at a time when the fortunes of the FARC were waning precipitously, however, and when the hyper-violent *modus operandi* of the FARC had become more evident to the world. If President Chávez had been acting as a good member of the international clubs, he would have supported the rules of those clubs recognizing and guarding Colombia's sovereignty -- which includes Colombia's right to a monopoly over the granting of impunity within Colombia and the right to send unique representatives to international forums. Chávez would have helped seal off the FARC routes to sanctuary in Venezuela and helped eliminate the FARC leaders' granting of impunity. President Chávez did not want to be a good club member -- and Venezuela gave him enough power that he didn't have to be.

A confusing political drama in Honduras raised questions about the nature of the international system. Components of the Honduran State decided in 2009 that their president, José Zelaya, was breaking the law. Following orders from their Supreme Court and congress, a Honduran military unit arrested President Zelaya. It then deposited him on the tarmac in neighboring Costa Rica. No internal armed conflict ensued, but some international bodies and foreign governments refused to admit delegates from Honduras after the ouster. They continued to recognize the booted executive and not the rest of the government that, apparently in accordance with the Honduran constitution, kicked him out.

In front of a house in Boiling Springs, Pennsylvania, sets a curious plaque commemorating the house's first owner, abolitionist Daniel Kaufman. Daniel provided a way station on the 'underground railroad' established to secret slaves out of the antebellum South and to freedom in Canada. Maryland slave owner Mary Oliver sued Kaufman in property court and won, costing the Northerner about \$4,000.00, a lot of money at the time. Although northern states had abolished slavery and many citizens were morally offended by the institution, others in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania were still slave owners well into the 19th century. Daniel's older brother David (who moved to Texas as a young man where he died in 1851) was apparently pro-slavery. Most citizens of the North admitted the human, owner/not property status of Blacks (notwithstanding the

Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 or Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court in 1857). Legal conditions, however, were such that a citizen of the North did not have the right to defy the slavery laws of the South. In fact, violation of Southern property law drew a sanction. A central fight-causing dilemma of sovereignty existed. Nice people advocate cross-cultural understanding and tolerance, but the most conflictive aspects of culture involve property. It may seem that varying systems of property can live together in a globalized world, but there is no way to respect sovereignty while simultaneously defying property laws. Sovereignty and property are the same quantity. When the ownership regimes of two States differ radically in terms of the basic rules regarding who can own what, the potential for a fight exists.


The list of five ownership rights at the beginning of this section typifies national sovereignty. Transnational gangsters often recruit foot soldiers within a particular ethnicity, tax a select set of products or smuggle them across international boundaries. They protect their members from State prosecution and mock the territorial map (and therefore the whole scheme of rules) of the countries in the international club. That's why pirates and terrorists are explicitly considered enemies of the State system. It boils down, again, to the words territory and impunity. Anonymity remains the sibling of impunity at the international scale. If a State, supposedly a member in the club of sovereigns, provides anonymity for the identity and wealth of a transnational gangster, that State is really violating the terms of the club agreement and undermining someone's national sovereignty. Some bankers have been so good at maintaining fiduciary discretion (euphemism for secret bank accounts) and so many people appreciate the anonymity that they have provided for individual wealth, that they have been given a pass on what most analysts understand as willful, continuous accessorial behavior to massive international crime with purposeful disrespect for international sovereignty. Secret international bank accounts constitute major sanctuaries in the firmament of irregular wars. Of course, if your cause is legitimate or your government a tyrant, you will not consider your secret banking accessorial behavior; but rather a noble risk.

Please see sections: 118, *Democracy*; 20, *Rule-of-law*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 97, *Oviedo*; 137, *Foreign Support and Perspective*; and 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*.




“One result of identifying sovereignty with might instead of legal right was to remove it from the sphere of jurisprudence, where it had its origin and where it properly belongs, and to import it into political science, where it has ever since been a source of confusion.”[\[158\]](#)

J. L. Brierly,
The Law of Nations



New occasions teach new duties,
time makes ancient good uncouth,
They must upward still and onward,
who would keep abreast of truth.

from the James Lowell hymn,
'Once To Every Man and Nation' (1845)



“If goods don't cross borders, soldiers will.”[\[159\]](#)
Frédéric Bastiat (attributed)



Lawyers are lazy

Section 53, Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis

The name of this section is both an admiration of and theft from Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's ideas about how to analyze complex cases (especially property cases) in civil legal practice. He's been dead for many decades, so he won't mind; apologies to his great-great grandchildren. Hohfeldian Analysis is adapted here as a practical way to dissect existing or nascent violent organized struggles for the purpose of determining the likelihood that one party or another will prevail, how much effort that might take, and the best way to win. It could be applied to forecasting future conflict, but for explaining if or why a given society is likely to experience chronic conflict, I recommend something more like what is offered in Section 48, *Grading the Social Compact*. For identifying which of the many locales in the world might demand the attention of their neighbors because of such problematic conditions, I suggest public participation, as proffered in Section 108, *Common Knowledge*.

Every day, some process akin to Hohfeldian Analysis is applied by practicing civil lawyers for quickly analyzing the situation of a prospective client during initial consultation. Let's say the lawyer is competent, honorable, and wants to give the prospective client an honest estimate regarding his chances for a positive outcome. This actually happens, really. The lawyer will try to accurately identify:

1. The object(s) of the conflict;
2. All rights and duties potentially at issue;
3. All interested identities of potential parties to the issue as they relate to each right and each duty (and the identities' agents and any overlaps in identity membership and affinity);
4. Preferred and acceptable goals of each interested identity (and of the leadership agents of each identity, especially exclusive agents);
5. Resources and capabilities that each of the identities can bring to bear on the issue (especially of the prospective client: Get the money up front!);
6. Jurisdictions (derived from the location of the objects, rights, parties, and courts);
7. Mechanisms of resolution (court, settlement, police, prayer) and procedural rules;
8. Likely outcomes under a variety of circumstances; and
9. The likely costs and risks of distinct courses of action.

There aren't many simple civil cases, so this process goes on in one form or another, at varying levels of efficiency, thousands of times every day, and it generally leads to favorable results for someone, even if only for the lawyers.

The identities of the parties may be precise, like 'Cullen Barclay Demarest', or they may be amorphous, such as 'theatergoers', 'the environmentally responsible', or 'patriots'. The membership of the identities can overlap and members can enter and drop out of an identity at will, even whimsically. The significant identities exhibit some level of intent and resolve, however (depending on the quality of their leadership or agents, which includes their lawyers), and one key to a useful analysis is to correctly match the objects at issue with the right identities and the identities to their resolve, resources and objectives, and leadership. If this is done well and quickly, it is then not so hard to determine jurisdiction, resolution mechanisms, chances for success either in settlement or trial, risks, costs and potential rewards. It is also easier to game the inevitable counterclaims and cross claims.

To best analyze property disputes, Hohfeld noted that the relevant rights and duties were not derived from relationships between persons and things (like land or personal possessions) but between and among persons. Rights, according to Hohfeld, are formed by the nature of multiple interrelated relations among people. In this light it makes sense that 'social compact' be understood as almost synonymous with 'property regime'. Terms like 'rule-of-law', 'justice', 'sustainability', or 'peace' fit comfortably within the meaning of the social compact and within Hohfeldian analysis. When contemplating and listing the 'objects' of a civil conflict, it is an easy shorthand to say, for instance, 'the lot at the northwest corner of 121st and Washington streets', but the object is really a less tangible set of rights and duties, such as the right to exclusive use of that lot along with duties to pay taxes and keep it safe. We say that the thing is the object, but we are really talking about a concert of rights and duties that will be recognized by the rest of the community. That is what transforms the lot from being a mere thing or location into being property.

A similar process, with some adjustments, can be helpful for the analysis of armed conflicts of the type contemplated by this book. As to armed conflict, however, we'll add some elements to the question list.

To number 5, resources and capabilities of the parties, for instance, we'll highlight the capability to maintain or dominate anonymity.

To number 7, the mechanisms of resolution, we can add 'physical elimination of the enemy'.

We could add a specific 10th question directed at sanctuaries and routes to and from sanctuaries, or we could consider physical sanctuaries as part of the jurisdictional problem contemplated by number 6.

Please note that this is a heuristic device, meaning it is built for speed. It is supposed to assist your common sense in getting to some practical answer to a problem. It does not matter which of the categories of analysis you land on first -- the collective identities, the objects, the agents, etc. It also does not matter if they overlap a little. Keeping the identities consistent with their agents and understanding the real power of those agents *does* matter. Section 64, *Measuring Power*, looks closer at the question of measuring power. After all, part of classic strategy is not engaging a stronger foe unless you have a secure route of escape. You don't want your measurements of strength to be faulty.

A country like Bolivia, with a constant, complicated internal struggle that includes competitive, overlapping identities, organized criminal activity, strong political parties, high regional income differentials, regionally specific international economic dependency, a politically astute population, and so on, is a laboratory of social conflict. We can usefully dissect that conflict by applying the Hohfeldian lawyer's approach suggested above. If it helps you remember key questions to ask, that's good. It might even serve for the paragraphing of some sort of report. Checking boxes, however, can threaten thought.

Depending on who 'we' are, however, the scale of our contemplation might be outsized in relation to our interests and power, or at least it might be too large a scale for efficiently dissecting the relevant interests and identities at play. The Department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia, for instance, might be an

appropriate scale of analysis. Time is the other inescapable scale-setter. If we were to need final resolution of some issue within the period of a president's remaining term in office, the relevant objects, identities and goals would take a different form than if we were serenely planning the inheritance of our great grandchildren. In this regard, the fashionable term 'sustainability' seems to argue a lengthening of the time period for valid objectives. One of the common sources of self-delusion or confusion, and a technique for deceiving others, is the mismatching of practicable scales of time and space with proposed goals and rationales. You can always stump your opponent or yourself by lowering or rising to different scales in time, geography or concept.

A weakness inherent in many approaches to the analysis of human competition is insufficiency in identifying and locating the agents or brokers representing an identity to the conflict or their sources of power, their ability to maintain anonymity, and the locations of their sanctuaries and routes thereto. Hohfeldian Analysis is vulnerable to criticism as a technique for irregular armed conflict because of the anonymity typically at play in armed struggle. The dispute environment in which Wesley Hohfeld proposed his formula was, and remains, one in which 'discovery' is enforced by the regime of laws and in which public records can be made transparent if they are not already. The lawyers' environment is one in which all parties are forced to submit to a common information rule and where unnamed entities rarely exist or where at least their agents are made known. Not being able to precisely establish the names, home ground and wealth of the competition identities and their agents can make Hohfeldian Analysis hard to employ. This fact serves to highlight again the importance of *anonymity* as a central issue of irregular conflict. It also suggests another way to determine how well things are going in your irregular war. That is to say, if Hohfeldian Analysis cannot be effectively practiced, it is probably because anonymity reigns, in which case we can be sure that measurements of the attainment of 'rule-of-law' or 'control over the granting of impunity' are not going to look good for the government. In any case, consideration of an armed conflict using something like Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis might speed planners and leaders to reasonable appreciations of a given conflict.

Hohfeld asserted that relationships among people regarding valuable things (interests in land always considered valuable) could be paired as correlatives or as opposites. Hohfeld also insisted on the need for clarity and precision in the use of the language. Let's just say, however, that his pairings were not patently clear and so we'll take the liberty to change those pairings a little in order to further our aims as to the analysis of armed conflict, as follows:

Pairings: Right/Duty; Privilege/Restriction; Power/Duty; Immunity/Liability

The pairings can be useful for testing the relationships associated with objects of contention. If you gain a right related to a piece of land, what are the duties and to whom do they belong? If you gain some power, such as control over who gets to take the SAT exam, what duties of fairness do you incur? If you win the privilege of serving as mayor, what restrictions does that place on other aspirants?

Adding one more twist to the process, we can apply a juridical contribution of one of Hohfeld's contemporaries, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes is credited with what is called 'legal pragmatism'. The gist of legal pragmatism is the idea that the duty owed as a result of making a contract is not to fulfill the contract, but rather to fulfill the contract *or* to pay the monetary consequences of not fulfilling it (often called damages). This was a big deal, a significant innovation, because it took away some of the sense of revenge and punishment in civil law, thus ameliorating the judgmental logic of morality, and replacing it with a practical, or pragmatic, sense of restitution or fairness. This is valuable to your analysis of grievances because it can offer an easier path to conflict resolution. It is not a universally understood or necessarily cross-cultural concept. In other words, the philosophy of justice with which you begin your analysis of a fight will also impose itself on the options you have for conflict resolution. You might have to teach legal philosophy.

Please see sections: 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; 68, *Scale*; 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*; 112, *DIME & PMESII*; 20, *Rule-of-law*; and 77, *Sex*.



"Common sense and a sense of humor are the same thing, moving at different speeds. A sense of humor is just common sense, dancing."

William James (attributed)



"And so, when the sacred months are over, slay those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may come upon them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place! Yet if they repent, and take to prayer, and render the purifying dues, let them go their way: for, behold, God is much forgiving, a dispenser of grace."

Surah 9, ayah 5, Koran [\[160\]](#)



I'll protect you from me

Section 54, Extortion

Extortion is an activity, like smuggling, that all but defines organized crime. It is also one of the main strategy alternatives applied by both regular and irregular armies everywhere.

Every extortion is a protection racket. When you extort you create a threat to your target and allow him to buy his or her way out of the threat. You offer to protect your target from you. Sometimes you have to communicate the threat discreetly, because a sense of dishonor can increase the stakes. Sometimes you have to communicate the threat more openly, but in every case you have to make the threat credible. If your target does not believe that you will carry out your threat, your extortion won't work. You may want to make a threat especially indiscreet, so that others can be extorted more easily. Mexicans, for instance, are hard to impress, so if you are a Mexican gangster, you may have to roll a half dozen or so heads (formerly attached to the bodies of some of your enemy's employees) onto a nightclub dance floor. Extortion knows no scale limits. You can make money by protecting a parked car from having its paint scratched (by you) or assure an emperor that you won't destroy any more of his cities. You might just stand near a stop light and wash windshields with a squeegee then ask to be paid or you might point out to the CEO of a large company that you can provide diversity education to help protect the company from some unfortunate race riot.

Kidnapping is the queen of extortions. You take something of the highest value, a daughter maybe, and ransom her back to her distraught father. If you do this well, you can make it seem as though you're the good guy for sparing her delicate life. One of these days someone is going to come up with a great movie plot wherein a father finds that his wife is murdered and his daughter kidnapped. He then spends the rest of the movie plotting and executing the rescue and a gruesome revenge. That is to say, kidnapping can be a high pay-off activity, but it entails some risk.

Extortion's little cousin, bribery, requires less technical expertise and physical risk than kidnapping or outright theft and requires less post-act logistical preparation for product movement, storage and fencing. You might be able to bribe a government official with some money to allow you a particular privilege, speed a bureaucratic process or overlook an infraction, and maybe this can proceed with no threat of violence. For this reason, bribery is often considered less of a crime than extortion. Bribery leads quickly to extortion, however, when the government official starts getting uppity and asks for too much or doesn't respond to your needs diligently, in which case you may have to threaten to expose his corruption, along with the photos you took of him with that one prostitute. Be careful with police officials, however. You need to know how far their corruption has reached. The police department has guns, too, and you could start a fight you cannot afford. Your extortions have to be in proportion to your capacity to fulfill your threat and to withstand any incidental retaliations or mistakes.

Extortion warfare might be a suitable term for the course of action most favored by gangsters, insurgents, or terrorists. Extortion may be collective or highly individual, and is often both. The particular tactic of communicating a threat might be a letter to a local government, a kidnapping or bombing, or just a kiss on the right cheek, but kidnapping defines a recourse to violence that can be applied in the absence of revolutionary strategy, with or without a political goal, and *almost* regardless of advantageous correlation of forces save that advantage gained by amorality. Extortion is an available option for a whole array of identities, and is aided by every advance in communications and information technology. It is supremely flexible in that some form of violence can be leveraged against almost any vulnerability.

Successful extortion, as well as resistance to extortion, requires detailed knowledge of the wealth to be extorted and where the extortionists can most efficiently and safely endanger that wealth. The extortionist must nevertheless have a sanctuary and be able to move to it safely in case the target resists. So, while the use of extortion can sometimes free a leader from having to find his enemy's line of retreat and maneuver accordingly, it does not mean he can then ignore operational equation of classic strategy. If you resort to extortion, you not only have to be sure you can make good on the threat (actually you might be able to deceive that part), you will probably run some risk of exposing your own route to sanctuary.

Extortion is the principle alternative way to defeat a foe besides confounding his route of retreat to sanctuary. The key is to threaten something of such essential value to him that he is compelled to surrender to you in exchange for its salvation. For instance, if NATO begins to destroy all of Belgrade, the Serb Army, otherwise neither perturbed nor dislodged, gives up. Or, in the face of spectacular and disheartening loss, the Japanese Emperor spares the Americans a counter guerrilla campaign on the main islands of Japan. The strategy of holding at risk things of value requires a certain flexibility of moral boundaries, a requisite level of ruthlessness. In a sense, extortion is an attack on the sanctuary of the spirit from which there is no physical retreat.

Another strategic approach, gentler, and one to which we might aspire under the moniker of legitimacy, is to create a social compact within which (A) a great majority of citizens enjoys a sense of belonging, and (B) anonymity for reporting illegal behavior to the State is assured. Under such conditions, resistance forces cannot plan secure routes of escape to sanctuary; and their management of risk for an anti-State movement is problematic at best. It is then hard for a rebel organization to enjoy the secrecy and impunity needed to grow, or when beaten, to return. Unfortunately, while positive changes in society can rarely be made to outpace changing grievances, there is always time for extortion.

Please see sections: 62, *Bank Robbery*; 95, *Childhood*; 102, *Negotiations*; 76, *Gender*; 106, *Massacres*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; and 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*.



“Catapultam habeo. Nisi pecuniam omnem mihi dabis, ad caput tuum saxum immane mittam.”^[161]

Brutus Maximus



“You can't catch me, you don't have a hope of catching me,
so you take my friends instead.”

Ned Kelly in the movie
Ned Kelly (2003)^[162]



Dr. Evil: As you know, every diabolical scheme I've hatched has been thwarted by Austin Powers. And why is that, ladies and gentlemen?

Scott: Because you never kill him when you get the chance, and you're a big dope?
from the movie
Austin Powers: International Man of Mystery (1997)^[163]

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

The basic extortion

Section 55, Kidnapping

Kidnapping is the paradigmatic extortion, a version so mean that it deserves its own policy prescriptions and its own counter-strategy planning and resourcing.

Kidnapping is the ultimate protection racket. If you are the kidnapper, you promise to protect the hostage from harm if the hostage's family (or company, government) pays up. Interestingly, although kidnapping is one ruthless option to military operational math, the modern industrial version appears to be dependent on mastery of similar map algebra. The kidnapping mastermind establishes a formula to communicate terms, setting up contacts and exchanging goods in such a way as to minimize the risk of having the victims pursue his people with any success. He attacks in such a way that he can withdraw to or remain in sanctuary and negotiates in such a way that the mechanisms of the negotiation do not give away the geography of his lines of communication.

High kidnapping rates spread wildly from Colombia to Argentina, then to Mexico and other places after the FARC learned to industrialize it, formalize it, and give business clinics on how to make a safe and profitable go of it. Part of the genius of the industrial kidnapping business-plan is a total consciousness of geography. Time, distance, and location are key factors in successful industrial-scale kidnapping.

Of course, control of anonymity and secrecy are inherent in successful kidnapping as well, making a secure means of communicating with the mark critical. Therein also resides a major weakness for kidnapping as a criminal enterprise. Security of communications is always dependent on codes, technology, and tradecraft, and those are always subject to compromise.

Given the nature of this particular criminal enterprise, tied as it is so closely to anonymity, a trend of increasing kidnapping can be seen as a measure of State failure. If you are working for government and you cannot stop kidnapping, you are doing poorly. If you are the insurgent and you can kidnap with impunity, you are doing well. However, there may exist a slowly building legitimacy toll against any organization that becomes too closely identified with this particular funding activity. During various peace conversations with the FARC, the question of admissions of kidnapping activities and the rights of victims to restitution has been a great stumbling block. It can prove especially difficult for a government to sincerely offer amnesty to perpetrators of this particular crime, since the government may have little control over the efforts of victims to recur to autonomous judicial institutions.

The existence of kidnapping is its own proof that a government must try to neutralize the criminal mastermind. When should we negotiate the release of a hostage, pay the ransom? On occasion, some amount of negotiation should be undertaken and maybe a payment made, even if the stated policy is never to do so. The fact of the kidnapping shows that the kidnapper has power. Once in a while we have to buy time. Then we are doubly accountable for breaking the impunity.

Please see sections: 95, *Childhood*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 16, *Presence*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 25, *Why Humans Don't Fight*; and 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*.




Ethan: Well Reverend, looks like you've got yourself surrounded.

Clayton: Yeah and I figure on getting myself unsurrounded.
from the movie
The Searchers (1956)[164]



Bad Guy: Please understand...it was all business.
It wasn't personal.

Bryan Mills: It was all personal to me. (*kills Bad Guy*)
from the movie
Taken (2008)[165]



I'll try to make the stars shine brighter for you
And I'll take you...on my shoulders, hold you way up high
I'll even chase the rainbow hangin' in the sky
Cause after all is said, after all is done, I'd do anything for you
from the Phil Collins song
Come With Me



Self-defense units, paramilitaries, vigilantes...

Section 56, Militias and Gun Control

Here *militias* represents an entire set of armed groups that aren't national armies, gendarmeries, police or national guards, and aren't necessarily anti-government insurgent armed forces or criminal gangs, either. I also put the subject of contractors into a separate section, *Condotierris*. That may seem a long list of what militias might not be, but the naming conventions can include paramilitaries, community self-defense forces, private armies, private guard forces, tribal militias, political party armed wings, vigilantes, and posses. All the names and definitions are contextual, overlap, and are subject to imperfect translations. Whatever these less formal armed forces are called, they can change the face of an irregular war and change prospects for the success of any of the players. Notably, the framers of the Constitution of the United States used the word *militia*, and used it in the same paragraph as *arms*, closely associating the two with an essential political right.

Don't be diverted by debate about whether or not militias can be effective against insurgents or criminal bands. They can be. They might also *become* the insurgent or criminal bands. Any debate will depend for its logic on local situational variables, but the bottom line is that when it comes to the question of whether to design, create and employ irregular forces, all sides of an irregular war *will* consider it.

The fact that there are so many names and organizational formulae for militia is hint enough toward a method for categorizing, evaluating and treating these organizations. Don't do so according to their name. You don't have to call anything a militia, but there are a number of characteristics that demarcate the interest you will take in militia-like organizations. A number of other notes in this book cover the pertinent characteristics of armed forces and the milestones of armed conflict. You will recognize some of them in the discussion below.

Foremost is the question of impunity. Let's say for the sake of fluidity that you represent a national State. You want to know if some militia under consideration is able to grant impunity to members of its force. If the militia can grant impunity independent of your grant, then you may have a problem. If, on the other hand, you can arrest and punish members of the militia, including its commander, then that militia is part of your armed forces, and you might be responsible for its actions. How you delimit its missions, territories, obligations, armament, and recruiting is of interest, of course, and is in no way a mystery. If, on the other hand, the militia can grant protection to its members from punishment by your government, you might want to ask the following four questions:

1. Is the militia leadership able to convey some sort of immunity to its people for violent acts in accordance with some form of written social compact such as articles of confederation or a hierarchical system of sovereignty that limits the types of actions for which immunity can be granted? In other words, maybe the members of the militia enjoy some sort of immunity apart from what would be granted by the central government, but it is limited within a known geographic space, or only applies to certain kinds of acts or categories of person. Instead, the militia might enjoy impunity because of some written or unwritten negotiation or treaty-like agreement that your State acceded to because the militia in question was strong enough to force it or because you wanted that militia's help to defeat some other armed force. It happens all the time, even in the context of major wars, e.g. the Sicilian mafia and its dealings with the United States government during WW II.
2. What are the militia's obligations and authorities? Is it required to muster and deploy if there is a natural disaster? Are its members obliged to serve warrants or chase a criminal *in flagrante delicto*? Can they implement dead-or-alive orders such that they do not have to attempt capture and arrest? Do they have formal geographic limitations or otherwise observe jurisdictional or territorial boundaries outside of which they do not go? If so, you will want to know exactly why, because the answer might form the basis of a method for your re-asserting control over it later.
3. How hard is this bunch? Levels of ruthlessness and resolve often come into play when dealing with a militia. What is it, by the nature of its membership, willing to do? The platoon chasing Rambo in the movie *First Blood* might be about average for a militia. That comedic militia was willing to shoot at Rambo, but not if it entailed any danger.
4. Finally, there is the mundane and sordid question of how rich the militia is. Does it have its own trucks? Transportation forms half of Maguire's operational synthesis and, if the members all have to walk, it is not the same kind of militia as the volunteer force of private pilots and plane owners that helped the Guatemalan Army during the 1980s. The other half of Maguire's formula is about battle strength. How much machinegun ammunition can the militia get or carry?

These are the four big questions (impunity/authorities and obligations/resolve/wealth), but the militias theme is better divided into two parts. One is legalistic and turns almost completely on the question of who can grant impunity and for what acts. That part relates directly to State success. The observation about impunity implies that you seek a complete understanding of the legal framework within which a militia exists, to include what flexibility you have to influence the laws or other rules that limit the militia in terms of leadership, territorial powers and obligations. If what you confer is the only immunity or impunity the commander and personnel of a militia are likely to enjoy, then it is your militia and its actions are probably your responsibility. The other part is the practical one revolving around what the militia can do for you, independent of the impunity question. That part can be tallied according to the last three questions about the militia's obligations and authorities, its psychological hardness, and its material capacity.

OK, the question was just divided into four parts, then put back into two parts and now we will try three parts: A local militia might be an autochthonous organization (locally birthed and not created by the central state as an extension of its power), or it might have been created by an outside entity, but the challenge for the State regarding a militia can almost always be divided as follows: (1) how to maintain its discipline and loyalty, (2) what to specify as its missions and mission parameters, and (3) how to get rid of it when it is no longer needed or goes bad.

To maintain discipline there are some tried and true aids. One is recordkeeping. Another is control of material sustenance. Another is co-opting or extorting its leaders. Training and indoctrination can also help a little. Section 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*, mentions imbrication and tessellation. Correct tessellation (assuring clear, non-overlapping administrative boundaries) and imbrication (assuring an overlap of identity) can be useful. If you do not maintain discipline of a militia, it will obtain its own power to grant impunity and it will become part of your State's failure. Even in a condition of pure challenge to the State, however, a militia can be of assistance in defeating another State enemy. There is little doubt that the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), for instance, became a tremendous problem for the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla in some locales. Meanwhile, as the AUC grew in power, it also grew in its capacity to defy the Colombian government. Eventually the Colombian government had to defeat and dismantle the AUC.

The missions and parameters you give to a militia should be limited geographically if at all possible, and specific rules of engagement delivered and explained. Militias can be immensely useful in a conflict that features many roadblocks and checkpoints. Your government's (or maybe your insurgent movement's, if you are the insurgent) monopoly over the granting of impunity should be made explicit and proven at early opportunities. The militia's mission types and territorial limits should be clearly expressed in terms of the impunity. In other words, if one of your militias has a member operating outside its designated territorial space, you want to have the militia itself punish the infraction and, if it does not,

you will probably want to punish the commander of the militia. Such a move can entail a price in loyalty and effectiveness, however, so you will have some weighing to do in relation to every militia.

Technically-identified militias, such as civil air patrols, can be useful and easy to control because they depend for their existence on outside deliverables such as fuel and their activities are easy to monitor. One of the tricks to creating effective militias is control of their initial identity and role. Weapon types are consequential. You cannot make an arrest with a mortar, nor can an armed unit that does not have indirect fires compete against an enemy unit that does. If you are going to deny indirect weapons (or other crew-served weapons) to a militia as a control measure, for instance, you might want to assure that, if necessary, you can provide timely artillery cover. If not, you might be setting up for some kind of failure. The introduction of unoccupied armed aerial vehicles (armed drones) complicates the matter.

If a militia defies the central State's asserted monopoly on the granting of impunity, the State might have to fight militia as it would any other insurgent organization. Autochthonous militias more likely to form where the State (via either the central government or some subordinate or affinity government) is not providing the service of conflict resolution and justice, especially as those terms apply to questions of land and trespass on land. If the State is not present in the land/trespass equation (if the government cannot effect legal eviction), the result historically and universally is violent self-help. When no effective property regime defends the lines of land ownership, the almost certain result is devolution to a condition of possession by force. Unless your government or the society through some working division of obligations and authorities provides a service of eviction of trespassers, you will more than waste your time with a decree that there be no militias. Such a decree will be worse than idle. Not only will militias form, they will do so out of resignation to the fact that your government is not adequate. The militia will form in a context of disrespect to your State. It will be born with a need to grant impunity to its members and with a need to organize surreptitiously for the use of armed force.

Once a militia begins to use force, it will harden. So, although a decision to form militias must be tempered by the fact that disciplining militias entails high risk, keep in mind that militias will form where the State does not provide property conflict resolution. If militias do not form even though a *de jure* government is not providing property services, it is probably because those services are being provided by an insurgent or criminal. Some anti-State group is probably now sovereign over that land. That is State failure.

Debate about militias is tied to debate over gun control, and to the issue of autochthony. Gun control is a visceral issue for many Americans. The founding fathers of the American republic decided on language in the US Constitution that tied citizens' right to bear arms to a co-relationship between a free State and a 'regulated militia'. Nobody at the time supposed that the militia they had in mind would be regulated by the central government, however. The militia was conceived as all able-bodied males and the regulation they had in mind was locally autochthonous. Many of the American revolutionaries felt that political power grew out the barrel of a gun and that the technology of firearms was singularly significant to the experiment in liberty.

Rounding up all the weapons seems to be an historically popular measure for governments and occupation forces to take when they set out to pacify or bring stability to an area. It is what the Romans did in Britannia. However, a generalized condition of gunlessness can make extortion of a local population by insurgents or organized criminals easier. Numerous indigenous villages in Colombia have found that out. Militias that are truly autochthonous, meanwhile, are likely to seek independent sources of weaponry.

Privately owned weapons can also help challenge a government that improperly and exclusively grants impunity. Let's say a government, especially a local government, improperly tries to let its agents get away with criminal behavior, but cannot disarm the local population. Even if that government doesn't suffer discipline from an outside entity, it may face effective challenge from the local citizenry.

If you do a good job of organizing local militia, the militia may end up being called the police. If you do a really good job organizing local militia, they not only end up policing, they will not grant themselves impunity for violent acts. Your success in irregular war may be tied to the formation of incorrupt militias, whether they are formed by a central government or are autochthonous. Tied to that formation is the question of who gets guns and where they come from.

A State's monopoly over the tools and application of coercive force is not as great an element in State failure as the monopoly on granting impunity. Either a wider or a more restricted dispersion of lethal tools might help a State maintain unity and control over the granting of impunity, depending on other factors.

Please see sections: 44, *Political/Military/Administrative*; 45, *Police or Military*; 19, *Mercatus*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 1, *Impunity*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; and 103, *Amnesty*.



“Who has seen a militia without weapons?”

Hugo Chávez [\[166\]](#)



Kit Carson Holliday: Oh, Jeb, what does pride got to do with guns?

James Ewell Brown 'Jeb' Stuart: Kit, the two things kind of come together down South. You can't pry them apart. Not even with guns.

from the movie
Santa Fe Trail (1940) [\[167\]](#)



Dogs are heroes; mules are mules

Section 57, Dogs and Mules

Dogs are good people. There are bad dogs and, for those of you who don't believe in the concept of human nature or dog nature, consider at least if it is possible to build a social construct for bad dogs. In the sixteenth century the Spanish created the Canary Island Hound, a vicious canine used to threaten, scatter and tear apart indigenous villages and villagers in the Americas. But those aren't our dogs. Our dogs find people buried in the rubble, check luggage for drugs, find landmines even if there is no metal in them, and protect our bunker from rats. In the context of irregular war, dogs are usually counterinsurgent, but with the right indoctrination and some rib roast, they could be insurgent.

It is good to have a plan for the treatment and employment of canines, and, depending on the human cultures involved, to make evident their allegiance and care. No insurgency was ever won or lost on the basis of canines; canines are no 'center of gravity', but, again, they are good people. In Colombia, the government army and police have used dogs extensively for mine clearing, drug sniffing and victim recovery.

Mules and other beasts of burden (mules get to represent the set) may or may not be endearing, but their care and application lie closer to the nub of winning and losing, at least in the context of active insurgency. A 'demobilized' FARC guerrilla leader related to me that in his block mules were an integral part of FARC logistics and operational movement. For years it was puzzling and reassuring to the guerrillas that the Colombian army disdained the use of *bestias*. The guerrillas, meanwhile, maintained sizeable units dedicated to animal husbandry and pack-loading. The mule provided a means to transport water or mortar components too heavy for the individual guerrilla fighters. They also changed the formula of speed and distance when the government units were pursuing them in rough terrain, which Colombia has. The mule was a significant element in the strategic math of creating advantage in aggregate culminating points. The landmine was an extremely influential to this same end, but mule-handling was also a technology that gave the guerrilla a capability to gain separation from pursuing army units. The culminating points of army units in contact were shortened by landmines and those of the guerrillas lengthened by mules. A simplification to be sure, but in general this formula that worked hundreds of times over.

Search for applicable technologies that change weights of the variables in the operational equation, most of which has something to do with movement, time, distance and weight. The Colombian State sought the help of dogs, who have given their lives in combat and have been honored for their service. FARC snipers have shot many dogs trying to sniff out landmines. The government, however, had until recently been less astute than the FARC in the use of animals that could change advantage in operational art, this in spite of Juan's *bestia*, Conchita, radiant on the national coffee symbol. By the way, dogs often make heroic sacrifices, but never commit suicide. Mules, on the other hand, have been known to shoot themselves in the head.

Please see sections: 79, *Suicide*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 23, *Dogs Rea*; 95, *Childhood*; 125, *Human Rights*; 84, *Cultures of Violence*; 31, *Holes in the Ground*; and 41, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*.



"Well! The last to go will see the first three go before her. And her little dog, too."

Wicked Witch of the West in the movie

The Wizard of Oz (1939)[168]



"Be thou comforted, little dog, Thou too in Resurrection shall have a little golden tail."

Martin Luther (attributed)



Pedro: Man, what is in this ... man?

Man: Mostly Maui Wau, man, but it's got some Labrador in it.

from the movie

Up in Smoke (1978)[169]



Squints: Quiet! Are you trying to wake it up. It just went to bed!

Smalls: What just went to bed?

All: SHHHH! The Beast.

from the movie

The Sandlot (1993)[170]



Fine print of outsourcing

Section 58, Condottieri

Mercenary armies were the norm among the Italian city-states in the fifteenth century and well into the sixteenth. Machiavelli didn't like them. He said, "Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous," then he went on and on about it.[\[171\]](#) Not a fan. He favored a state militia system. The Italian mercenaries were called condottieri and condottieri means contractor, so there's a bit of perjorative linguistic residue that we might find on the image of current day defense contractors. At least I enjoy finding it, but it's more fun than fair. There is a strong logic of efficiency for exploiting professional capacity that for whatever reason is found outside the active force. Plus, most defense contractors are not gun-toters. American experience with contractors is more that of the sutler, in the supply and logistics tradition.

In recent years, the United States has drawn on an increasing number of contractors to provide training and education. Nevertheless, it seems that the demand for qualified special operations personnel has led to an increase in the hiring of individuals who serve in roles that seem closer and closer to 'shooter' positions. These might include personal security members and combat trainers. The trend has occurred in conjunction with the prevailing distaste for conscripted service, and also in view of a legacy of overlap between military special operations forces and covert action capacity in some civilian agencies.

The above-noted trend pressurizes certain legal, ethical and political issues. These include the fighter-contractor's status in international law, for instance, or the contractual obligations a government has or ought to have toward wounded or prisoner contractor-fighters. At play are questions regarding how long a military career should last (some contractors are soldiers who left active service before retirement age), what the fair market value is for military services, what amount of transparency we should demand regarding contract-fighters and their salaries, and what level of 'deniability' we should afford leaders who recur more and more to the employment of contractors.

There is another dimension to contract-fighters that is and will remain a feature of irregular wars. The irregular armed elements, whether revolutionary armies, drug gangs, separatists, a hybrid, or whatever, generally count on some form of hired fighter. The FARC, while it invests in political indoctrination for recruiting and retention in its primary units, outsources many aggressive activities, such as kidnapping or highway robbery, to criminal elements. Many footsoldiers have switched among the various guerrilla organizations in Colombia, irrespective of ideology. Members of a dying M19 might change over to the ideologically compatible FARC or join the anticommunist AUC seeking better remuneration. After defeat in irregular wars, former guerrillas need something to do, as do government veterans. Machiavelli was not sanguine on this angle of soldiery either.

Do you not have within the memory of events of your time, many soldiers in Italy, finding themselves without employment because of the termination of wars, gathered themselves into very troublesome gangs, calling themselves companies, and went about levying tribute on the towns and sacking the country, without there being any remedy able to be applied? Have you not read how the Carthaginian soldiers, when the first war they engaged in with the Romans under Matus and Spendius was ended, tumultuously chose two leaders, and waged a more dangerous war against the Carthaginians than that which they had just concluded with the Romans?[\[172\]](#)

Today, the young male ex-combatant might adhere to a government reintegration plan of some kind, or become a freelance condottiero.

Please see sections: 19, *Mercatus*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 137, *Foreign Support and Perspective*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; 16, *Keeping Secrets*; 95, *Childhood*; and 142, *Dignity and Honor*.



Silent Rip: "You sure this is where the topplegangers' hideout is?"

Gunhaver: "I hope so. If not, we're surrounded by an entirely different ragtag band of mercenaries."[\[173\]](#)

from the web comic

Homestar Runner, Cheat Commandos



Lt. DeBuiin: How many are watching?

Ke-Ni-Tay: One man see as many as ten.

Lt. DeBuiin: Can we find him and kill him?

Ke-Ni-Tay: You cannot.

Lt. DeBuiin: But Ke-Ni-Tay can?

Ke-Ni-Tay: (nods yes)

Lt. DeBuiin: But will he?

Ke-Ni-Tay: Ke-Ni-Tay sign paper. Ke-Ni-Tay soldier.

Lt. DeBuiin: All right. Find him and kill him.

from the movie

Ulzana's Raid (1972)[\[174\]](#)



Rare, but technology helps

Section 59, Spontaneity

Spontaneous public action, in favor of one side or another in an armed contest, is more urban legend than historical phenomenon. Maybe it happens, but it is rare. The Cairo riots in 2011 that led to the downfall of President Hosni Mubarak were at first widely acclaimed as spontaneous uprisings. Here is what more careful reporting uncovered:

On January 25, the first day of protests, the organizers from the youth wings of Egypt's opposition movements created what appeared to be a spontaneous massing of residents of the slum of Bulaq al-Dakrou, on Cairo's western edge. These demonstrations weren't, as the popular narrative has held, educated youth who learned about protests on the Internet. They were instead poor residents who filled a maze of muddy narrow alleyways, massed in front of a neighborhood candy store and caught security forces flatfooted....That protest was anything but spontaneous [175]

The core of planners in Cairo had decided they would try to replicate the mobilization successes that ousted Zine al-Abidine Bin Ali in Tunisia. Major events in Tahir Square were designed and executed to foil the capacity of the security forces to manage large crowds without the imposition of excessive force.

Most of the time in most places, crowd actions are organized, fomented and directed by nameable leaders. Here is a famous episode from Mark Twain's *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* in which Colonel Sherburn faces down a mob that has come to his home, ostensibly to lynch him.

'Why don't your juries hang murderers? Because they're afraid the man's friends will shoot them in the back, in the dark – and it's just what they WOULD do. So they always acquit; and then a MAN goes in the night, with a hundred masked cowards at his back and lynches the rascal...You didn't want to come. The average man don't like trouble and danger. YOU don't like trouble and danger. ...But a mob without any MAN at the head of it is BENEATH pitifulness. Now the thing for YOU to do is to droop your tails and go home and crawl in a hole. If any real lynching's going to be done it will be done in the dark, Southern fashion; and when they come they'll bring their masks, and fetch a MAN along. Now LEAVE – and take your half-a-man with you' – tossing his gun up across his left arm and cocking it when he says this. [176]

Mark Twain tells us that the courage of a crowd and most of the individuals in it is derived from its leaders. Lenin criticized what he called the cult of spontaneity. He believed the great problems of history had to be resolved by force and that meant a militant organization, and that meant leaders. Today, myriad post-structural activists may halfheartedly distance their philosophizing from Lenin's, but regarding this insistence on the necessity of a vanguard they remain constant. The proletariat might sometimes just up and do something, but for that something to induce class struggle, it must be directed. Much of leadership in armed conflict is 'encouragement' and the amelioration or control of fear. This aspect of human nature can be adjusted in the short term by alcohol, drugs or enthrallment. In the longer term, anonymity helps, as does superior firepower. Training and indoctrination is a proven tool and engagement with the courage of a leader is heralded in literature and art. Not all groups have a 'fearless leader', even while leaders invariably are so-called. Few psychological operations are more effective for damaging a mass following than those which expose the leader as a coward. Although spontaneity of action is rare, spontaneous dissipation of mass action is common. After a crowd is panicked or disheartened, whether by gas canisters in a plaza or by exposure on an Internet chat forum, followship is hard to regenerate.

In January 2008, Carlos Andrés Santiago, a 22-year old pharmacy student, initiated a march against kidnapping and against the FARC guerrillas. The result was a protest march of more than four million persons against the leftist revolutionaries, an odd event given that mass action was supposed to be the domain and purview of popular leftist movements. It must have been disconcerting for leaders of the FARC to witness the new technologies of globalization being used to turn the vehicles of conscientization and public mobilization against them.

There exists what we might call a Hobsbawmean effect (after Eric Hobsbawm, who wrote about these things), in which the power of the mob or potential power of the mob is harnessed and leveraged by leaders adept enough to attach themselves to certain identities and grievances. The grievances do not have to be against the establishment, as proven by Mr. Santiago. Many palpable, shared grievances need little organized leadership for translation into action. One of the legendarily effective propaganda messages of World War II was a simple poster of how to prepare a Molotov cocktail (wine bottle half filled with gasoline and a kerosene rag). The resistance did not need much by way of orders or messages. Those inclined got the message.

The leader who successfully represents the potential mob can transmute mere potential into leverage against almost whatever group might be harmed by mass action. The leader who learns to influence a small group of psychologically tenuous individuals has a related and potentially more fearful power. If the leader can convoke a crowd to listen to her sing, she's an entertainer. If she can convince a lot of people to go vote for her, maybe she's a democrat. The point being that motivational ability is not what separates those who would form an anarchic mob from those who would motivate us to go to a concert or vote. The difference is in the match-up of a propensity in the audience to do something violent and individual *mens rea*. When an audience is motivated to take mortal action, there is almost always a pre-existing propensity, plus a leadership that harbors an element of ill will. If we are talking about 'organized' violence, someone is organizing.

In 2009, Ms. Susan Boyle sang in a television competition called *Britain Has Talent*. She was an unlikely competitor. Few occasions are filmed in which a crowd is caught being so genuinely, spontaneously surprised and delighted. Well, they weren't asked to go kill anyone. The promoters who had encouraged Ms. Boyle to sing were backstage, and they were absolutely certain about what the crowd reaction was going to be. So was it a spontaneous reaction? The crowd had been targeted.

Because of the new huge anonymous communications, a lot of people can be immediately motivated to do little things, bad and good, like send a few bucks to save a kitten from microwave doom. For the audience there is no fear, no mortal risk, no accountability, no Colonel Sherburn to face – just the amassed gratification from a million poignant instances of no moral dilemma at all. The generated poignancy is then fungible. That is, the organization dedicated to saving kittens can also be putting up roadblocks. Although Lenin was correct that there is little spontaneity, we have to add that now there is a huge Internet-resident crowd that has within it every human propensity and impulsivity.

There are no spontaneous armed uprisings, no rhizoidal insurgencies, no headless, starfish armies. There might be some interesting and annoying phenomena, like flash riots, that you will want to keep your eye on that don't entail much hierarchical direction. If you are in an armed competition, your competitor is being organized and led by somebody. Not all armed organizations are built like a German infantry battalion, but someone has the *mens rea*, is the intellectual author, the distributor of funds, the cheerleader or ideologue, or plans to be in the nucleus of the vanguard, or the bishopric of the clergy. If an insurgency were to break out and no one in it wanted to lead or intended to take over, what would that leave, exactly? For some inexplicable reason, it seems to be those most taken to the cult of leadership who most talk up the idea of chaos and


spontaneous, swarming movements. If there is one thing we have learned from twentieth century revolutionary movements, it is that the anarchists get killed by the organizers. To win at irregular war, find and pursue the organizers.

Please see sections: 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 117, *Strategic Communication*; 76, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; 54, *Badassoftheweek.com*; and 142, *Dignity and Honor*.




“A human group transforms itself into a crowd when it suddenly responds to a suggestion rather than to reasoning, to an image rather than to an idea, to an affirmation rather than to proof, to the repetition of a phrase rather than to arguments, to prestige rather than to competence.”

Jean François Revel, attributed [\[177\]](#)



“But our current best assessment, based on the information that we have at present, is that, in fact, what this began as, it was a spontaneous, not a premeditated, response to what had transpired in Cairo.” [\[178\]](#)

Susan Rice



“We reject wholesale references to the “spontaneity” of the movement.” [\[179\]](#)

Leon Trotsky



Small war just before air power

Section 60, War Nouveau

The turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed an eclectic, near-simultaneous stew of small wars, all in the context of accelerating globalization. Each contest was unique in terms of cause, motivations of the protagonists, strategic consequence, as well as in weapons and methods employed. The principal conflicts occurred at about as great a set of distances from one another as earthly possible and while their participants were often ignorant of goings-on in other parts of the world, each conflict nevertheless influenced efforts and outcomes in distant theaters. Military strategic thinking drew on centuries of conflict in which the variables of time and distance had changed little. Railroads and steamships had matured in the 19th century to make a difference in logistic calculations, but soon the radio and airplane, among other technologies, would help unhinge confidence in classic strategic theory.

Among prominent pieces in the conflict stew of 1900 were the Second Boer War, which pitted the British Empire against a group of transplanted Europeans; Colombia's Thousand Days War, a federal/anti-federal contest; the coalition expedition to put down the Boxer Rebellion in China; the United States' suppression of insurrectionists in the Philippines; the foretelling armed defiance of the 'Mad Mullah' Mohammed Abdullah Hassan in the Horn of Africa; and, throughout 1900, American military governance in Cuba lead by General Wood.

The year 1900 started what some call the 'American Century'. As a flourish, three events from 1899 and three from 1901 are offered to frame those of 1900 in the following table of *fin de siècle* events:

1	4 February 1899	Philippines	Private William Grayson kills a Filipino
2	24 August 1899	Southern Africa	Boers place an order for six wireless sets
3	15-17 December 1899	Colombia	Battle of Peralonso
4	19-24 January 1900	Southern Africa	Battle of Spion Kop, Natal
5	2 February 1900	United States	Hawaii becomes a US territory
6	4 March 1900	Horn of Africa	Mohammed Abdullah Hassan attacks Jijiga
7	15 April 1900	France	Exposition Universelle opens in Paris
8	26 May 1900	Colombia	Battle of Palonegro
9	10 June 1900	China	International force dispatched to Peking
10	11-12 June 1900	Southern Africa	Battle of Diamond Hill
12	16 June 1900	Cuba	The Cubans hold local elections
12	2 July 1900	Germany	First Zeppelin flight
13	14 August 1900	China	International Relief Force reaches Peking
14	17 September 1900	Philippines	Battle of Mabitac
15	1 October 1900	Southern Africa	Dutch De Gelderland recovers Kruger
16	27 February 1901	Cuba	McKinley signs the Platt Amendment
17	23 March 1901	Philippines	Aguinaldo captured
18	15 September 1901	United States	President McKinley killed by Leon Czolgosz

1. **February, 1899.** Commodore George Dewey had taken Manila in 1898, but did not allow the Philippine revolutionaries, who sought and expected popular recognition as liberators, to enter the city as victors over the defeated Spanish. This affront notified the Filipinos that the Americans did not intend to grant the locals immediate independence. Tense relations led to an incident in which two American soldiers on guard duty, one of them Private Grayson, killed at least two Philippine nationals, who were looking to provoke an overreaction by the Americans. Legendarily, at least, the incident sparked the Philippine Insurrection.

2. **August, 1899.** Invention of the radio was an incremental process, and recognition of a single most-deserving 'inventor' became a global public controversy, much of the evidence highlighted in patent suits and propaganda. Nikola Tesla, Guglielmo Marconi, and Thomas Edison stood out among the contenders. By 1899, in any case, working production models of wireless communication devices were on the market. The Boers immediately recognized the advantages the device would lend to an army in defensive positions, needing to take advantage of internal lines in a large theater. They placed orders for six wireless machines, but unluckily for them, the British intercepted the delivery. The Boers were described by the British popular press of that time as being "solitary, uneducated, solemn people who were resistant to change."^[180] Their appreciation of the radio showed they were not resistant to innovation if it involved fighting the British.

Arguably, the most prolific and ingenious were the Americans Tesla and Edison, but this did not prompt the US Navy to apply the device to military purposes quickly. Newly-launched American naval vessels would not incorporate this technology until after 1906.

3. **December, 1899.** Peralonso was the first significant battle in a federalist/anti-federalist civil war that eventually cost the lives of perhaps as

many as 150,000 Colombians. It was a set-piece confrontation of regulars, or as close to regulars as the contenders could afford at the time. The insurgents, the Liberals, sent the government army, the Conservatives, into a ragged retreat. Victory for the Liberals is credited with securing long-term leverage for Colombian liberalism after the war. Nevertheless, an inexperienced Liberal general failed to exploit the opportunity that presented itself. He, like General Meade at Gettysburg, did not, or perhaps could not, pursue the broken Conservative army, preferring instead to recover and marshal strength. The battle (won, but not decisively, even though it seemed to be) lent false hope regarding Liberal military prospects.

4. January, 1900. Boer general Luis Botha defeats a larger British force using modern weapons fired from well-entrenched positions. Earlier, in 1881 during the First Boer War, the British had lost a quick series of battles at Majuba Hill, Bronkhurst Spruit, and Laing's Nek. The Boers won those by fighting from fixed positions and using more rapid and effective infantry fire. As a result, in an 1887 military history text (*A Summary of Modern Military History*) T. Miller Maguire stated,

Still another point of great importance seems not to have been fully recognized, and this was that rapidity of loading, with increased accuracy and range, would no longer permit infantry in masses approach as heretofore a position defended by troops using breach loading arms...the attempt to move in masses under fire had to be absolutely abandoned.[\[181\]](#)

Maguire's 1887 reference, however, wasn't even to the lost battles of 1881, but rather to a Prussian victory over the Austrians in 1866. The Austrians lost because they charged the Prussians, who were waiting in prepared positions and equipped with superior breach-loading 'needle guns'. In other words, Maguire was complaining in 1887 that by 1881 the British hadn't learned a lesson that they could have learned in 1866. At the turn of the century, Maguire was dismayed further. The Battle of Spion Kop in 1900 indicated that the British had still not absorbed the exact same lesson. Maguire lamented a continuing tendency of British tardiness to respond to key technological changes. WWI would see the British make the same mistake again. Makes you wonder.

5. February, 1900. The transition of Hawaii from island kingdom to member in the American union reached the milestone of official territory, in spite of some American attempts to reject imperialism. US involvement in the Philippines predated continued possession of the Hawaiian Islands. Dewey had been at a clear disadvantage for coaling and rearming during the events in Manila in 1898. The long Pacific lines of communication made incorporation of Hawaii a logical and comfortable decision for the American strategist, but conditions also had to present themselves to offset American public embarrassment at its own imperialism. A commission appointed by President Grover Cleveland in 1893 had found the United States guilty of dishonorable behavior, but subsequent investigations claimed otherwise, and that competing outside actors, specifically Japan and China, were meddling to influence the outcome. Strategic military necessity occasioned by the Spanish-American War settled the issue. America asserted permanent possession.

6. March, 1900. Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, a Somali, overran an Ethiopian garrison to recover a number of camels the Ethiopians had previously commandeered. Not a seminal historic event, it is instead an emblematic tick mark in a long and successful career of resistance against foreign presence. Hassan was charismatic, astute, and identified strongly with Islamic jihad against Christianity, especially Ethiopian Christianity. Surviving all British and Ethiopian expeditions to discipline or destroy his 'Dervishes', Hassan operated in un- or under-governed territory that was of secondary importance to the British. The British had larger strategic concerns, beginning with the Boers and proceeding to the Germans, so it was not until after World War I that Hassan felt a level of imperial attention that destroyed his following. Never himself capitulating, Hassan died of the flu in 1921.

7. April, 1900. The official artistic style of the 1900 Paris World's Fair was Art Nouveau. As a style of architecture and applied arts in vogue for perhaps twenty years, it featured floral and nature-conscious themes, flowing lines and softened hues. It reflected optimism and cultural confidence, but at the same time harbored a sense of rebelliousness and defiance against the older design schools. America had its enthusiasts and prime examples, such as Tiffany lamps and Maxfield Parrish illustrations, but other, more technological currents and ideas tempered the American version. A euro-centric style, and a fanaticism for some, Art Nouveau was short-lived, giving way to Art Deco and other Modernism. Art Nouveau is perhaps the first artistic style to be swept along by the phenomenon of globalization, and its spread reflects the Western imperial stamp of the times, even to the extent of America's competent participation, but incomplete enthusiasm. As for France, new imperial adventures in West Africa, Madagascar, Siam and elsewhere generally were going well.[\[182\]](#)

8. May, 1900. In Colombia, only five months after the battle of Peralonso, the Battle of Palonegro dashed Liberal pretensions of fielding military forces able to defeat the Conservative government in open battle. This time the Conservative army won, but, as at Peralonso, the winning army could not or did not pursue its routed foe. After Palonegro, the Liberals felt compelled to pursue a guerrilla strategy that prolonged the war and undermined any moral containment of the horrors about to be visited on the Colombian nation. Military command inexperience and failure at conventional warfare led to a long and destructive guerrilla contest. As a result of national prostration, Colombia would soon be made to concede a huge swath of territory to Brazil in the southeast. The definitive peace agreement was finally signed in late 1902. It would become known as the Wisconsin Treaty, its eponym the American battleship *Wisconsin*, on which the treaty was signed. The name evokes the American imperial surge as well as the geostrategic consequence of internal war that befell Colombia. It would also lose Panama.

9. June, 1900. Logistical challenges held up the international mission to relieve the foreign legation in Peking. The principal delay: so many horses and mules had been expended in southern Africa to support the British prosecution of the Boer War.

10. June, 1900. The Battle of Diamond Hill was the last formal, or set-piece, battle of the Second Boer War. Unlike the Colombian battle of Palonegro, it was not especially bloody, with fewer than 250 casualties on both sides. Like Palonegro, its indecisiveness was followed by months of destructive guerrilla war.

11. June, 1900. Cubans successfully implemented General Leonard Wood's Military Order 164, which called for local elections. Suffrage was granted to Cuban males over 20 years old. The elections went well, and maybe they had a beneficial counterinsurgent effect. Wood's war on the mosquito population was definitive, however, all but eradicating malaria and yellow fever as health factors.

12. July, 1900. The first Zeppelin flight lasted for eighteen minutes, and was followed by other, longer flights. Lack of investment or government interest resulted in the ship being scrapped. Not only had the American Century begun, but the Century of Flight.

13. August, 1900. The China Relief Expedition reaches Peking. The Boxers resisted European commercial exploitation and foreign constraints on Chinese sovereignty. The intentions of the United States government were arguably purer than those of its coalition partners in the sense that the official policy of the United States was one of universal openness and not privileged concessions. The difference may not have been perceptible at the moment; the United States participated in the foreign military coalition. American capability to contribute to the international relief force rested in good measure on the proximity of American units in the Philippines. American diplomatic leverage rested partly on America's commercial engagement with Japan. America's participation in a coalition was rare; perhaps the first time America participated in a multinational force since the American Revolution.

14. **September, 1900.** One of few Philippine victories in the insurgent war, the Battle of Mabitac involved a futile American infantry charge against a prepared Filipino defensive position. About twenty US soldiers were killed. Pickett's Charge was no more instructive to these Americans than the First Boer War had been to the British.

15. **October, 1900.** The Netherland's Queen Wilhelmina evacuated President Paul Kruger and his Transvaal government cabinet aboard the *De Gelderland* in open defiance of the British blockade. A European power had identified with the underdog and with common ethnicity, even if not to the extent that it could openly side against the British. Sending the armored cruiser was a gesture, and a bittersweet one at that. Kruger's wife was too ill to travel and died soon after. Kruger himself died a few years later, still in exile. (And he wasn't even Dutch)

16. **February, 1901.** The Platt Amendment was made to a US military appropriations act. It partly defined the terms of Cuban-US relations and effectively replaced the Teller Amendment, which had been more of an anti-imperialist gesture. The Platt Amendment mandated that Cuba would contract no foreign debt that could not be serviced from ordinary revenues, and facilitated US intervention in Cuban affairs. It limited Cuba's span of action in foreign diplomacy and prohibited other foreign powers from obtaining basing rights on the islands. It is a milestone in the development of a form of partial American control that would mark some of its relations in the coming century.

17. **March, 1901.** As a Philippine insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo had a history of being irresolute. He had accepted a payoff from the Spanish and later accepted one from the Americans. His personal capitulation greatly aided a favorable outcome for the United States, and apparently for Aguinaldo himself. He died of heart disease at the age of 94.

18. **September, 1901.** Philippine insurrectionists/ liberationists hoped for the election of anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryant. When Bryant was not elected, morale among the insurgents slumped. McKinley's assassination by anarchist Leon Czolgosz brought no relief in that regard. McKinley had actually been dubious about America's overseas adventures. He was succeeded by his Vice President, Teddy 'Big Stick' Roosevelt, who was hard to kill.

Art expert Paul Greenhalgh opines,

Art Nouveau was developed by a brilliant and energetic generation of artists and designers, who sought to fashion an art form appropriate to the modern age. During this extraordinary time, urban life as we now understand it was established. Old customs, habits, and artistic styles sat alongside new, combining a wide range of contradictory images and ideas. Many artists, designers, and architects were excited by new technologies and lifestyles, while others retreated into the past, embracing the spirit world, fantasy, and myth. [183]


This 'extraordinary time' was one of rapid globalization -- of both theory and activity. Some strains of thought which blossomed at the time would bear bitter fruit, like violent anarchy or ethnic nationalism. Coincidentally the United States of America came of age as a world power -- in a global stew of irregular war. It was a turning point for the old customs, habits, and styles of not just art, but military art as well. Some of the more enlightening observations regarding the new technologies, however, would go un-recognized until WWI or after. The best observations appreciated how all those new technologies radically changed the variables of time and distance, but did not discard time and distance. The best military thinkers did not forget the decay that power suffers with time and distance.

Please see sections: 123, *Sea and Aerospace Power*; 130, *Globalization*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; 99, *Postmodern and Post-structural*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 11, *Protraction and Diligence*; 83, *Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?*; and 29, *Mens Rea*.



"At Sagamore Hill we loved a great many things -- birds and trees and books and all things beautiful, and horses and rifles and children, and hard work and the joy of life." [184]

Theodore Roosevelt



"The deepest instincts of the nation told it it must fight and win, or forever abdicate its position in the world." [185]

Arthur Conan Doyle,
The Great Boer War




"At the present moment, July 26, the British have communication from Johannesburg and Pretoria to the sea-coast by two routes -- to Cape Town and to Durban. The actions of the Boers show that it is not in their power seriously to incommode either the one or the other. The trivial raids performed by their mounted men under De Wet and Botha may protract the sufferings of the war, and add to the close of the struggle a certain luster of persistent resistance; but, barring events now unforeseen and scarcely to be anticipated, they cannot change the issue, which has become simply a question of endurance between combatants immeasurably unequal in resources." [186]

Alfred T. Mahan,
The Story of the War in South Africa



World Map circa 1900



¿Quién peca más?

Section 61, The Geography of Dope

‘¿Quién peca más, la que peca por la paga, o el que paga para pecar?’ (‘Who sins more, she who sins for pay or he who pays to sin?’) Sexist saying? Maybe. As for an answer to the question: Who cares? That’s not the point. This Spanish saying is often used to introduce a weighty, heartfelt argument from Latin Americans about the drug trade and drug war. The allusion is to prostitution, but is extended to the relationship of men and women generally in machismo society. The strategic application of the reference is obvious enough (at least as extended to the illicit drug trade) – that buyers of illicit drugs are as bad as sellers. The idea of she and he is then combined with a personalization of countries as in ‘The United States buys the drugs, so why is Mexico any more of a sinner for selling them?’ The practical application of the saying is connected to arguments about whether to attack illicit drugs at their source or instead to invest in demand reduction – source versus destination, supply versus demand. The argument is not weightless and when made by the agile lawyer seems to resonate, especially inside the stereotyped ‘Catholic mind’ wherein a little sense of guilt can go a long way to unhinging logic. Here are three defenses to keep in your mind, whether you are on the defense or not:

1. The great majority of persons in both seller and buyer countries don’t participate in either sale or purchase of illicit drugs. The dichotomy, if not entirely false, is one of displacement and projection of identity. The battle is between, on the one hand, those majorities in all countries who neither sell nor buy and, on the other hand, those individuals involved in illicit trade, whether producing, processing, moving, wholesaling, retailing or consuming.
2. Regardless of any moral equivalence between seller and buyer, the suppression of illegal drug use at the demand or user end invariably means invasion of private space. In the process of empowering police to inspect and repress the use of drugs, there will be a costly consequence in terms of civil rights. One might say, ‘Well, that is what you get for bogarting that joint, Buddy’, but law enforcement often entails an invasion of the spaces and rights of third parties and a destruction of privacies and associations that touch accidentally beyond the use of illicit drugs only because of physical geographic proximity. In the process of empowering police to repress drug use, it is impossible not to both empower but also embolden police to peek at other behaviors and effect other intrusions into private lives on the wings of expanding and maybe enjoyed suspicions. Drug use suppression at some point has the side effect of violating citizens’ rights. Suppression of the seller, on the other hand, has a distinctly different geographic signature. Sellers must build contraband routes, supply chains, production facilities and source contracts. Clearing *marijuaneros* out of a national park is not the same as searching an apartment.
3. Illicit drug production and sale enterprises cause more governmental corruption than does drug use. The money at the profit end and the structures needed for the industry,= are far more toxic to the functioning of government than the post-distribution use of illicit drugs. Use-suppression does little to relieve the extortive pressure put on governments in illicit drug producing lands.

Offering the above arguments is not to say that demand reduction is not worth doing and the ever-present, if wistful, ‘third way’ is legalization. Legalization is a chimera, however. In a world of tort law wherein cigarette manufacturers are sued for producing something patently poisonous and plaintiffs’ lawyers present secondhand smoke as so intolerable that few public places are left for it, it is hard to see how a more dangerous poison could be made legal and also lawful. Unless lawful, a black market will still reign, and along with the black market all the other unpleasantness follows. Anyway, we tend to forget *mens rea* in our economic analyses. What kind of person knowingly sells dangerous drugs to children?

Not all drugs are equal. A weakness in commentaries about the drug trade (including the one above) comes from throwing all illicit substances in the same bag. Marijuana is not the same as heroin. Growing habits and habitats, processing needs, transport challenges, effects on the human body – all are distinct one from another, and suppression of their markets are likewise dissimilar, except for the fact that the same criminals often are involved with trade in various drugs. Suppressing the dealers usually means suppressing someone who is responsible for a variety of nefarious behaviors. Suppressing drug use of one kind or another does not offer the same, multiplied benefit.

As an aside, allow me to address a standard libertarian argument – that what an adult puts into his or her body is simply no business of government; that the answer to the drug war is a no-brainer – government should not be allowed to care. Not wanting to be called coy on this matter, I assert emphatically that I consider this a wrong-headed and wrong-hearted argument. Libertarianism, as I would design it, is about choice and more especially about the individual’s right and power to make choices. So in the first instance it might seem I would join in any call to make drug use legal. I have to side, nevertheless, against the infatuating availability of choices that destroy choice, that is, of freedoms that are likely to forfeit freedom. Drugs are like democratic elections (or maybe vice versa). They can smell like choice for a while, but the choice-making condition can be destroyed in the process.

Illicit drugs are a feature of many irregular wars and probably a feature in yours. It may even be the central feature, motivating its own outlaw, national, and international armed strategies. There exist large, resolute, well-organized and well-equipped criminal drug-armies that rudely defy the State by granting impunity to their members. The drug trade may also be a columnar logistic element to an insurgent’s or even to a government’s capacity to sustain their war efforts. In any case, debate will ensue about whether resources, perhaps resources that would flow toward you, should be used to suppress illicit drug use or drug supply. You will want to have an opinion on the matter.

Successful illegal business requires organization and secrecy. Organized armed groups already have some organization and enforce what secrecy they can. They also are always in need of funds, so they get mixed up in capitalist enterprise. Meanwhile, even criminal gangs dedicated to direct robbery (rather than to the sale of some desired commodity) find themselves in business because they have to launder stolen money, fence stolen goods, or negotiate ransoms. There seems no way for the outlaw to avoid stretching out to Adam Smith’s invisible loving hand. It’s out there, even where the long arm of the law can’t reach.

Among commodities traded illicitly, cocaine and heroin seem to have the greatest impact on armed conflicts today. Colombia and Afghanistan, respectively, are the obvious focus countries. Marijuana and methamphetamines also weigh in as kindling for organized internal and international armed conflict. Illicit agriculture, or agro-industry, is distinct in its physical geographical footprint. Crops take up rural space, which changes the dynamic of communications

routes, who is likely to control access or to tax, and where labor will come from. When smuggling is tied to rural lands, the geographic distribution of money is also distinct. Someone has to pay someone else for labor and inputs, as well as for raw harvest and production.

A prevailing theory in the early years of Colombia's struggle with the coca leaf was simple: Money from coca was the lifeblood of the FARC and other major criminal organizations plaguing Colombian society and challenging the Colombian government; reducing illicit income from the coca agro-industry would reduce the power of these antigovernment armed groups; and as a result, the government would be able to gain the upper hand.

President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 73, August 3 (PDD/NSC 73) was published while US support to the Colombian government was picking up momentum in the late 1990s. The decision explicitly distanced counternarcotics from counterinsurgency, allowing the former but not the latter. Here is the text:

As a matter of Administration policy, we will not support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts....This Administration remains convinced that the ultimate solution to Colombia's longstanding civil conflict is through a successful peace process, not a decisive military victory, and believes that counterdrug progress will contribute to progress towards peace.

"We will not support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts." How goofy does that sound in retrospect? The directive made spending money in favor of the Colombia's fight against its armed opponents confusing if not more difficult, since the insurgent FARC was already up to its bandoliers in the cocaine trade.

Organized armed groups have to feed and pay their soldiers, so they get money from someplace. It could be a foreign State, legal enterprises, direct predation, or it could be from illicit commerce. If it is illicit commerce, the organization's lines of withdrawal to sanctuary are likely contiguous with the lines of commerce (product-to-market; inputs-to factory) because of the need for secrecy.

Money laundering and fencing are downstream crimes or after-the-fact crimes. They can be a weakness of almost any criminal enterprise. After something is taken illegally, it has to be bartered or converted into a liquid asset. Cash, although liquid, has both physical form and unique identification. In most organizations the handling of money is delegated to persons the top leaders trust or it is not delegated at all. For this reason, the geographies of illicit money transactions are often the geographies (sanctuaries and lines of escape to them) of the leaders.

The world of irregular conflict is linear and the critical lines are often those along which illicit product, inputs, and financial instruments flow. The physical and human geographies of lawbreaking, whether simply criminal or politically insurgent, overlap so much that policies which artificially distinguish them can be counterproductive.

In 1943, allied war planners suggested that a bombing raid on the Romanian oil fields around Ploesti could be a knockout blow to German war-making capacity and thereby shorten the course of World War II in Europe. Churchill called the Ploesti fields the taproot of the Nazi war machine, so a huge air raid was mounted against the fields. The Ploesti raid was no knockout blow; the immediate results were insubstantial. Fifty-four of the 177 B-24 Liberators sent on August 1, 1943 did not return. A resilient, determined enemy took countermeasures and found alternatives. Eventually, however, Nazi use of Romanian oil was reduced by as much as 85%, at least by the time the Russians occupied the fields in 1945. Hurting the Nazi oil resource base was a good idea and later bombing campaigns against Nazi fuel infrastructure did speed the end of the war. The Battle of the Ardennes in late 1944, in which the final German offensive stalled for lack of fuel, is often cited as evidence.

Starving the Nazi war machine of Romanian oil was accomplished more by railhead interdiction and destruction of rolling stock and production facilities within Germany than by bombing facilities in the production fields. Not only that: airpower may have been most effective in Europe when, during major allied ground operations after D-Day, it weakened Wehrmacht operational reserves. The strategic air campaign attempted to hit as many critical industries as possible. Ultimately, for Nazi Germany to be defeated the Allies had to close with and destroy the Wehrmacht on the ground.

How does the history of Ploesti apply to irregular conflicts? The aerial glyphosphating of plants in the coca fields of Putumayo, Colombia, for instance, proved inefficient in hurting FARC guerrilla finances (never mind stopping the market flow of cocaine). Massive aerial attack against the dense Putumayo coca crops was supposed to cause grave harm to the FARC's cocaine-based financial health -- just as the raid on Ploesti was to deprive the Nazi war machine of its supposed lifeblood. The coca fields were seen by some planners as the taproot of the FARC war machine. Perhaps if aerial spraying could have been done simultaneously throughout the entire coca cultivation area, it might have had the intended effect, but that was never physically possible. Putumayo was densely cultivated in coca, and therefore the locus of a significant amount of the FARC's overall war-making strength. The long-term value of eradication spraying has turned out to be, as many anticipated, underwhelming. Spraying achieved the immediately visible result of knocking out a lot of commercially valuable vegetation, but the guerrillas shifted to other income sources, protected other crop areas, dispersed cultivation, replanted, improved the species genetically, shipped from storage, increased kidnapping and other extortions, exerted political pressure to end the spraying, and took other countermeasures. Aerial eradication made it a little more difficult for the guerrilla groups to fund their respective wars, but they did.

Neither the raid on Ploesti nor the Putumayo coca eradication was an abject failure, even if neither were decisive. The costly experience at Ploesti led to better planned and executed follow-on operations that evolved with the broader counter-oil strategy. Like Ploesti, the coca field targeting may have been the result of the obvious. That is to say, oil field infrastructure in the World War II case and coca plants in the Colombia case, stuck out in aerial photos, prompting a planning momentum that left little room for the painstaking identification of less dramatic and more disperse transportation nodes and infrastructure. Had there been a methodology in place that could precisely scale the relative economic-military value of European transportation terrain, then perhaps the Ploesti fields themselves might never have been rated as the optimal target area as compared, say, to more distant railheads. In Colombia, while drug traffickers use all means at their disposal for product shipment, cost constraints have them employ roads and rivers, probably in a measure consistent with the routes' carrying capacities.

The Putumayo aerial eradication strategy recognized a place in Colombia as particularly valuable economically to the outlaw enemy and, therefore, a valuable military target. Unfortunately, the Putumayo spray plan, perhaps like the Ploesti bombing raid, was not based on a sufficient understanding of the relative economic value of terrain as a targeting guide. The Putumayo plan didn't do enough to identify terrain that might have influenced the overall value of the final product, cocaine, more than the coca fields. It was not based on a geographic concept of inputs that included transportation routes and means as being of equal or greater importance than raw material source locations.

The importance of the coca plant itself was perhaps over-rated as a factor in the commercial value of cocaine. Consider another widely available product on which there can be some physical dependency -- water. Bottled water is an extremely lucrative offering in the United States and bottled water can sell for more money than the soft drink on the shelf next to it, even if the water was drawn untreated right from a municipal water service. This might make you question the value of sugar, but don't be fooled into thinking the price of bottled water is closely associated with the quality of the H₂O. The plastic in the bottle is not worth much either. To choke off water-profits from some ill-doing water-trafficker, we might try drying up the sources of water, maybe because it is easy to see an offending lake on an aerial photo or find a water main. That strategy seems unlikely to succeed. It might be more efficient to knock off the

truck on the way to the store. Where is the most valuable geography in the bottled-water industry? It is not the lake, but rather the bottling plant or some point on the road to the convenience store or maybe the shelf in that store. The value of bottled water is the fact that it is found in a portable form *in the convenience store*, not simply that it is water.

While this analogy of water to oil or coca is soon overdrawn, the question it highlights regarding relative geographic value – ingredient source vs. factory vs. route to market – is valid. The coca fields are not as relatively significant in the business as they appear in an aerial photo. They are more replaceable than other parts of the product-to-market geography. This question of relative geographic value is more easily understood when land is considered as property and lines of communication are accepted as being as necessary as sources or destinations. Still, maybe in all cases the truly critical geography sets between the ears of the *mens rea* mind.


Brenda Fiegel, who has studied the Mexican drug geography extensively, offers the following anecdote: On 20 April 2011, Sinaloa Cartel operator Frediberto Pineda was arrested in Gaston, South Carolina. This same individual was originally, and unsuccessfully, deported from the US almost 10 years earlier and was living in the country illegally. Phone taps initiated by the DEA had recorded multiple conversations from the residence where Pineda was arrested to locations throughout Mexico. The majority of those conversations concerned cocaine shipments and the earnings they generated. In the wake of this arrest, residents in Gaston (population 1,034) began questioning how a prominent Mexican drug cartel was able to establish itself within their small community without anyone noticing. It was common knowledge that Mexican drug cartels were operating in large metropolitan areas like Los Angeles, Houston and Chicago, but it seemed nearly unfathomable to residents of Gaston that these same organizations would target small town America. Part of the answer can be found in information that goes beyond what was provided by police regarding this case – the Mexican cartels were diversifying their methods in an attempt to expand their operational bases into previously uncharted waters, to include outlying areas like Gaston. That diversification effort included the exchange of gang attire for khakis and polo shirts and to having tattoos removed. More disturbing, perhaps, was news that had surfaced in January of 2011 that Mexican drug cartels were cavorting with Afghan heroin dealers to amplify distribution of that drug, leading many to speculate on just how far-reaching the tentacles of these billion dollar drug trafficking organizations really extended.

Please see sections: 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 42, *Brigands*; 19, *Mercatus*; 65, *Smuggling*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; and 54, *Extortion*.



“And now, my pretties, something with poison in it...but attractive to the eye, and soothing to the smell... poppies, ...poppies.... poppies will put them to sleep.”

Wicked Witch of the West in the movie
The Wizard of Oz (1939)[[187](#)]



“I’m sorry, Bruce. These boys get that syrup in ‘em, they get all antsy in their pantsy.”
Captain O’Hagan in the movie
Super Troopers (2001)[[188](#)]



Because that's where the money is

Section 62, Bank Robbery

Bank robbery is a classically romantic activity, something Bonnie and Clyde do, and, as difficult as human genius can make it to rob a bank, someone always does. Banks are forts for money. In spite of successful robberies, their existence proves that sometimes defense is or seems more economical than offense, and passive defense sometimes better than active defense. If this were not the case, there would be no banks.

If you have some responsibility for the planning or conduct of some activity related to irregular war, you ought to know where the banks are. These days they might be piggy banks, ATMs, money order stores, computer servers, armored cars, or brick and mortar banks. Know where they are; somebody is going to rob them, maybe you – and it won't be well done or well stopped without understanding the escape routes.

Once dollars get into a bank they are not only economically fungible, they become unloved. They become the money of nobody but the system, making bank-robbing more ideologically palatable than robbing from stores and individuals. Centralized account insurance can make it worse, as the depositors then don't care if the bank is robbed. Also, there's more money at the bank for robbers to rob. Here are seven typical bank robbery *modi operandi*:

* Enter the local bank building wearing Richard Nixon facemasks and holding some white nylon bags and machine pistols. Tell everyone to get down, leap over the cashiers counter, go to the vault, withdraw cash, stuff it into the bags and then leave, making some violent threats on the way. Jog a block and a half to the getaway car, get in, take off the masks, drive around the block past the bank and away.

* Practice printing money until your bills pass the tests at the local bank counter, then start distributing it and exchanging it for real bills.

* Watch who has bankcards and is buying durable goods with them. Pick up a daughter in one car and the Dad with the bankcard in another. Tell him his daughter is fine, ask him for his personal identification number for the bank card and go to an ATM at a convenience store and withdraw money. Repeat until there is no more money in his account. Let the Dad and daughter go somewhere near each other and not near a phone.

* Learn a lot of math and figure out how to generate your own PIN and break into other peoples accounts without the kidnapping.

* Forget individual accounts and learn a lot more math to break into the banks accounting systems to move money into your account.

* Don't bother with the childish math and get to the uber-math. Learn how to shave points off some kind of reverberated commissions on money market speculation, put it into an algorithm that is timed to make automatic buy and sell decisions at the conjunction of certain dates and market conditions, and... whoosh.

* Mix banking with government and get the government to give your bank money out of its reserves or new issue. This may not seem like bank robbery, but the money is a measure of confidence and the money of the bankers isn't really theirs to begin with. They're supposed to be doing something with it on behalf of their depositors that maintains or increases the financial power of the depositors, so when they do things that reduce the money's relative value, it is almost the same as the counterfeit scheme above, or plain robbery, it just takes a larger scale in numbers and time for the effect to set in.

This section is not meant as a sideward comment on the shenanigans and robberies surrounding the United States financial melt-down and bailouts of 2008 and 2009, although they did bother. It is about the geography where your irregular war is unfolding. If you are the insurgent you have to know about the banking system and it behooves you to rob it. Banks are core places – physical, mathematical and psychological – of the system you think you are trying to overcome. One of the absolute basic services that government performs is the provision of fair measure, and money is the most basic of these. Trust in the money can be imputed as trust in the government. If the government can't maintain the worth of its measures, its legitimacy will wane. It isn't called the 'coin of the realm' for nothing so, if you're down on the system, you will want to take away its coin. Besides, someone is going to rob the bank, why shouldn't you? You may not have the mental or educational wherewithal to implement the high-end econometric robberies toward the bottom of the above list, but that's OK; you can kidnap the daughters of the people who can.

If you fancy yourself as the counterinsurgent, on the other hand, then you want to know where the banks and bankers are and, if it is at all in your power, to reshape the geography of money to your best advantage. Depending on the level of commercial development, you may find it advantageous to limit some kinds of transaction to cash or have certain control technologies placed on banking machinery. If you are the counterinsurgent, the system of exchange is one of the basic things you are supposed to protect, since it is one of the basic things that government is supposed to provide. It may be that the public has lost the sense of linkage between the official money and personal ownership, and so you may want to make that linkage more psychologically meaningful. When a bank is robbed anywhere in your land, that robbery redistributes a little slice of everyone's rights. That slice of power often goes to someone who is either an insurgent or a criminal. If your enemy robs a bank, he gets stronger. So if you do not understand the measurement and geographies of fair exchange, you might not have sufficient grasp on one of the classic means that your enemy has for increasing his power relative to yours.

Bank robbery is more than just another outlaw activity. It moves to the essential purpose of government. If you are an insurgent, you need to figure out how to rob banks. Everyone needs a 'money and banking' class.

Please see sections: 42, *Brigands*; 55, *Kidnapping*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; 97, *Oviedo*; 30, *Control Technology*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate and Tourism*; 65, *Smuggling*; and 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*.



Doug (FBI Agent): You're a pretty good judge of size, right?

Krista: Size of what?

FBI Agent: (shows a \$20 bill) What do you think? 6 inches? Under or over?

Krista: Under.

FBI Agent: Wrong. 6.1 inches. See, I know everything there is to know about money. Thickness: 0.0014 inches; weighs about 1 gram. You know what that means? That means this \$20 bill isn't even worth its own weight in Oxycodone.

from the movie
The Town (2010)[189]



Chief: How can we believe a man who would sell out his friends?

Siegfried: Dumkopf! Who else are you supposed to sell out? You can't betray *enemies*.

from the movie

Get Smart (1965)[\[190\]](#)



Section 63, Roadblocks and Checkpoints

Roadblocking should be highlighted in military analysis, planning, and measurement of success, irrespective of the side you are on. If you want to win an irregular conflict, strategizing roadblocks is a gimme. Roadblocks offer a way to effect strategic extortion, steal wealth directly, kidnap selectively, take initiative away from the enemy, and improve chances of enjoying a favorable correlation of force in distant encounters with the enemy. Roadblocks can be quick, only intended to instill fear or they can be planned to cause some piecemeal or clumsy reaction by the enemy force. They can be mounted through popular movement organizations on the back of some real or trumped-up social question. In this form we can expect them to last for as long as a suitable response fails to mount. A roadblock by a labor union-type of organization, a transport union perhaps, can be placed quickly. These can be ruinous to overall commerce and industry and yet can be selectively targeted so that extortion demands can be made to specific individuals. In addition, they can be disassembled before government authorities can assert dominance of the situation.

Blocking the passage of people and things almost always hurts something and someone. Blocking passage *is* violence. It is also a popular component of taxation, extortion or just outright robbery. Roadblocks and checkpoints, moreover, adjust the weight of variables within the operational equation. A roadblock planner can apply map algebra to determine the relative cost-distances of effective violent action and an opponent's response to that action. A highway robber can anticipate the correlation of forces likely in the event of a confrontation with the authorities at different points along the road, or within a network of roads, as well as what security he will need along escape routes from the loci of potential confrontation to safety. His risk analyses will weigh time against the wealth he might happily redistribute by conducting the roadblock. Highway robbery can be profitable if the math is right.

If a government has no strategically practicable plan to address the problem of roadblocks, a smart outlaw can mock law enforcement, and a strategizing insurgent can all but paralyze and certainly bleed road-bound trade. Roadblocking links the two major strategy options (position and maneuver in anticipation of battle, and extortion). As insurgent, you set up a roadblock as a place of battle chosen by you, and with it you hold the free functioning of the society at risk. The government is all but obliged to respond to a roadblock and so your action gives you the added possibility of inviting a hamhanded response, which you will then further exploit.

It seems everyone everywhere thinks a successful government can assure free flow on roads. The street is psychologically, if not legally, public space. People tend to disrespect a government when some group defiantly collects 'taxes' along a road with impunity. If such a force can continue to make movement so costly or dangerous that wealth is held at risk generally, a government will be seen to fail. When a government cannot *effectively* assign culpability to highway robbers or subversives for blocking public ways, the public will quickly assign accountability for the road blockage to the ineffective government.

Roadblocks are a building block or basic move of operational art position and movement in irregular warfare. A basic example: A resistance (insurgent?) leader plans a roadblock on a highway 20 miles outside a provincial capital, just on the city side of a road junction. The intersecting road leads to remote areas. He uses a group of radicalized union members, but he doesn't want them jailed; he plans for them to leave the roadblock in the hands of some local supporters when sufficient government force begins to arrive. The leader calculates that in order to dislodge his thirty male and female activists, the government will try to reach the roadblock with at least twenty police or military personnel dressed in riot gear and carrying smoke weapons and clubs. Not wanting to chance failure, however, the government will want to send closer to fifty police. Because of the locations of the police stations in the city, the time of day, and the time needed to collect the force, the insurgent can count on at least an hour before a force strong enough to dislodge the roadblock arrives. During that hour, the protesters erect a large barrier on the road about a quarter mile in the direction of the city that will take a backhoe or other piece of heavy equipment ten minutes to remove. In the other direction, at the far side of the junction, they set up a barrier that can be removed quickly, but that stops the traffic going toward the city. So, when the police finally start to arrive with sufficient force, the roadblockers let traffic move across the junction and pile up behind the main barrier, providing them an additional ten minutes. The organizers then pack up and move out along the side roads enjoying at least a fifteen minute head start. They're gone. Before the police get to the junction, the protest leaders might already be at home stupid drunk while they watch the police chief on TV explain why his troops are shooting teargas at teenagers. The cost-distance to the junction for the government was fifty times the pay of one policeman, transport for all of them and a backhoe, and the cost to commerce of having the road blocked for an hour (not to mention having had to keep police available in reserve), plus an opportunity cost of not having some of the police where they otherwise might have been. To these costs are added the psychological and political weight of having clever rebels stick it to the Man. Government overreaction to roadblocks might be the only goal an anarchist or insurgent has, especially if he is clever enough to use surrogates to build and occupy the barriers. Blocking people's passage against their will is a form of violence, but the nimble practitioner of the roadblock can make only the reaction to the roadblock score as violence in the public's eye.

The above simplification gives a basic pattern of roadblock warfare -- the basic move in a roadblock *Go* game. Real operational environments include many routes and potential constrictions, public events and special days, the locations of police stations and public transport, lookout locations, synchronous armed actions, and so forth. Some moves in that game can be contemplated and calculated in advance; with the side willing to do the necessary calculations getting a step or two ahead of their opponent.

There exists, however, an emergent phenomena, being used now as a counter to anti-government demonstrating. Venezuela's regime, in response to anti-government roadblocks, created a form of modern cavalry based on the motorcycle -- the *colectivo* -- not exactly a gang, not exactly a military unit, and not exactly a militia. A leader, perhaps from the National Guard or the communist party, calls on whoever is available from his cell phone's contact list, rallies them at a convenient location not too far from the roadblock but out of Molotov range. The wannabees watch the bikes while some dismounted gentlemen go beat the snot out of the student demonstration leaders, take their identification cards and send part of the posse over to the students' homes to trash the place and beat up family members. In other words, the *colectivo* commander nimbly mixes quick position and maneuver with ordinary tactics and extortionary bullying.

In English, we generally refer to police or government roadblocks as checkpoints. The term connotes an event or contraption that is not designed to impede traffic or collect a tax (that's a tollbooth), but simply to conduct inspections. Checkpoints can help crack anonymity, make smuggling more expensive, improve the balance of culminating points in relation to actions and battles, and apprehend fugitives and scouts. They shouldn't just be set up anywhere. If the design is to increase the cost of smuggling, they need to be placed in accordance with an economic analysis of source location, warehousing, transshipment processing, etc. The viability and efficiency of the inspections, protection of the checkpoint personnel, their rules of engagement, and their vulnerability to corruption should be explicitly addressed in plans, tested and inspected. The checkpoint plan should include an integrated legal concept. In this regard, the government can announce off-limits routes for commercial passage. That is to say, along with major inspection points, the government can make legal checkpoints, inviting licit traffic to flow through main routes. Places where people or things are moved from one form of transport to another (trans-modal locations) are typically used as taxation points, legal or illegal. Whether to government bureaucrats, longshoremen, mafiosos, insurgents or some combination, trans-modal localities present special opportunities for siphoning wealth. When stuff is transferred from a truck to a train or a train to a boat, or even from the trunk of a car to a suitcase, the places where these transfers occur

have a regular and often predictable physical signature. They should be identified and considered according to the quality of the opportunity for wealth diversion that they offer. Trans-modal places are special and should be a key feature in place inventories and geographical analyses. Crime statistics show over and over again that transport-change locations are high crime areas. They are among the most likely places guiding the logic for locating roadblocks and checkpoints.

Please see sections: 6, *The Operational Equation*; 88, *Escape Geography*; 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; 57, *Dogs and Mules*; 103, *Amnesty and Restitution*; 136, *Weapons*; and 54, *Extortion*.



“The government of Colombia and even the United States do the same thing... If you don't pay your taxes, you go to jail. Here we don't have jails, so we detain people.”[\[191\]](#)

Raúl Reyes (dead narco-guerrilla)



Roy Boone: Ready?

Gator McKlusky: I was born ready!
from the movie

White Lightning (1973)[\[192\]](#)



How far away is it really?

Section 64, Measuring Distance and Comparing Power

Geographers obsess about distance, and so should anyone competing in an irregular war. Distance and strength are intimately related, so an accurate sensing of relevant distances is indispensable, especially when a leader dares to defy the classic principles of war.

Distance has an inverse effect on influence and power; power or influence diminish as distance increases. It is sometimes called 'distance decay'. According to Geography Professor Waldo Tobler, everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things. That assertion is called the First Law of Geography, and I haven't heard anyone credited with a Second law of Geography yet, so there's that. Our choices about what we can do at the end of our trail have to be scaled according to how far down a trail we expect to go. When you calculate relevant distances to likely confrontations in an armed struggle, the distances will have a relationship to the correlations of force at the points of potential contact with your enemy. If a point of intended contact is so distant that you will have inferior relative strength at that contact point, you are overreaching as to your goal. The Dutch have a museum at Arnhem where they go to discuss this very topic.[\[193\]](#) If there are potential points of unintended contact short of your planned destination -- points where you might face a stronger opponent -- your plan is that much riskier. Risk is highly correlated to distance.

Military planners are familiar with the conceptual 'culminating point', a term which was first mentioned in Section 5 and will be beaten to death in Section 140. (The culminating point exists at a theoretical distance in time and space beyond which our risks of continuing are too great.) The 'risk distance' is the distance to the culminating point. We want long risk distances. Our risk distances will have a complex interrelationship with the cost distances, the risk distance usually shortening as the cost distances increase, as I will mention again below. There may exist several potential geographic routes to our objective. These routes will present varied risks; the distance to our likely culminating point might be shorter along route option A than it is along route option B. Elementary rookie first-day stuff, yes, but for some reason *distance* is missing as a factor in many current contemplations of why an irregular force might be able to defeat an ostensibly stronger force. Comparisons of strength (whatever mundane or exotic factors we might consider) cannot be reasonably made without involving the factor of distance. The amount of strength we have as we sit at home is almost meaningless. It is only the relative strength we bring to the point of contact with our enemy that matters, so the distance to that point matters much.

Distances in irregular war are best measured as cost-distances, relative cost-distances, and risk distances. Cost-distance is such a common concept we tend to take it for granted. How far is it from Colorado Springs to Denver in terms of the gas or time? Those measures are cost-distances, also sometimes called friction distances. The practical distance between Colorado Springs and Denver is longer or shorter depending on the vehicle we use, the price of gas, the weather, the traffic, and so on. In urban areas, cost-distances can be especially complex, even involving such quantities as the emotional cost of fear due to criminal risk or the opportunity cost of aesthetic preference (as in: you would have preferred to walk through the park). Distance can also be expressed in terms of opportunity costs. Given the same inputs, would another pathway or destination yield a better result or advantage?

Multiplicity of route options complicates comparison of relative cost-distances, that is, your cost-distances relative to those of your enemy, or, say, of a riot population relative to riot control personnel. Construction of a public mass transportation line can drastically change relative cost-distances, as can the interruption of bus service, or the location of public transportation stops and stations. What slows you down may not slow down your enemy *as much*. Manipulations of the built environment, especially the calculated use of walls and bridges or watercourses can change the aggregate cost-distance advantages as to specific human collectives. Student protestors, for instance, tend to move via public conveyance from a university; farm protesters tend to drive tractors in from farms; and so on. An armored vehicle might shorten a cost-distance by reducing a risk factor, but simultaneously lengthen a cost-distance by increasing the factors of time and fuel -- and exposure, or because it can't use a particular road or bridge. One footstep into a certain gang's territory might be a 'bridge too far' for a couple of beat cops.

A lot is made of how modern information technologies shrink distances. Compared to just a couple of decades ago, it takes a lot less time to spread an idea to millions of people on the other side of the globe, but the amount of time it takes to send a rifle bullet or a grand piano has not changed much. Ideas are powerful, to be sure, but when you determine to apply physical coercive force, the mass inherent to the exercise slows things back down, lengthening the calculated cost-distances, and shortening the distance to that theoretical culminating point. In most irregular wars, the world is not so much smaller than it was when T. Miller Maguire made his observations about globalization around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is especially true in regard to remote smuggling geographies, given that the requirements of clandestine transport are so dissimilar to those of licit transport.

Because they seem to live in a realm of pure math and electrons, computer trespassers give the impression they act beyond the parameters of the military operational equation. Nerds seem to escape the concept of those distances which impel classic military strategy. They seem to escape the bounds of mortal earth on gossamer boogers. False. Think in terms of cost-distances: In the case of a computer criminal, the distance from his keyboard to the desk of some FBI agent correlates with the protection the hacker is afforded by the legal and political regime at the place where he sits at his keyboard. For the FBI agent, the distance in flight hours might be longer from the agent's desk in Miami to Memphis than it is from his desk to the criminal's keyboard on some island in the Caribbean. The 'real' or at least the operational or effective distance between the FBI agent and the perpetrator may be far greater than the distance to Graceland because the government of the country where the criminal sits has created a condition of anonymity and impunity that immensely changes the relative cost-distances for the FBI agent. Practically, it could be a much longer trip from the agent's desk to the criminal's keyboard, so long that to bring power to bear on such a nerd might take a sovereign decision and a different implementing agency -- someone with a different licence. Measured as Euclidean problems, distances are often reduced to little more than getting an airline ticket and a taxi then checking your watch now and then. Measured in terms of impunity, however, the comparison of distances involves visas, possible extradition orders, local police cooperation, or maybe all the costs of a military operation in defiance of someone's sovereignty. Such impunity derived cost-distances can nevertheless be mapped and measured. Sometimes, just the cost of the airline ticket creates enough distance to abet impunity. On the *Michelle Malkin* blog, 'Hangfire' stated,

Bad guys here (and the cops) count on visitors not being able to come back to Hawaii to testify against the perps. If you have to save money for years to spend five days here, you really can't afford to come back and spend weeks in a hotel waiting for the defense to stop all delaying tactics. All the defense attorneys here demand that their client face their accuser in person, as is their right. Written affidavits just don't cut it.[\[194\]](#)

Historical affinities can also change the map of psychological cost-distances. Perceptions make some places closer in terms of political action, and these, in turn, can bear on the factors noted above. Many Americans perceive the Philippines to be closer to the United States than Nigeria, even though the air distance from Los Angeles to Manila is about 7,300 miles and from Miami to Lagos only about 5,600 miles. Influence of one group of humans on another is usually greater as distances are closer, and again, influence-distance (or culture-distance or affinity-distance) is a cost-distance.

The maps that are appropriate for the accurate use of artillery fire, with their scale representations of almost frictionless distance and their gridded division of two-dimensional space may be perfectly inappropriate for expressing distance in conflicts where artillery rarely is used. This is not a

call to take charts away from artillerymen or pilots, but it is a suggestion that in your irregular war you might do better to configure some maps in terms of relevant cost and risk distances, which are likely to include factors as seemingly abstract and unrelated to distance as fear, law or aesthetics.

Since one of the keys to winning armed conflicts is to pick fights with weaker opponents (or at least a place and moment in time when an opponent is most likely to be weaker), it is good to practice measuring relative strength. A lot of measuring the strength of armed groups has to be done the old-fashioned way, with spies and photos and bean-counters. Below are a couple of tips relevant to some of the new kinds of armed groups. One is based on distance and how distance and power correlate. Another has to do with what is called a 'power-law'.

1. **Distance to the boss.** The scale of a group's territory or the distance from its boss to his foot soldiers is one way to measure the group's power relative to other groups. Since distance diminishes power, any sustained presence of an organization's people at a distance from its headquarters can be correlated to its relative overall power. For instance, in Medellín, Colombia, during the height of the violence in the mid 1990s, a neighborhood might suffer the presence of any of more than a half-dozen illegal armed groups. The least powerful groups would be the ones with little territorial scope, and whose boss was close-by. These would include small neighborhood groups of locally-spawned bullies organized around control of pirated and makeshift services such as water hoses, power lines, or TV cables. Other small groups organized in response to dishonors associated with the lack of sewage and refuse removal.

The Medellín Cartel was less local but more powerful. Its boss lived on the other side of the city and controlled high-profit crime in most of the city. Cali is another Colombian city about 200 miles away. If the Cali Cartel could maintain personnel with impunity in Medellín, it was either because it could defy the Medellín Cartel or because the two had come to some kind of an agreement. Meanwhile, the national-scale revolutionary movements, like the FARC and the ELN, wanted to establish their own territorial advantages inside a few of the boroughs of Medellín. Their headquarters were in distant parts of Colombia. They were more powerful organizations than the cartels.

Being a more powerful organization overall does not mean it has more power *in the neighborhood at a given time* than one of the more local groups. The FARC might have enough power, and reputation of power, to keep someone on the block for a while, but even the most local thugs get good information on the outsider's location and habits, and maybe don't like the way he looks at their girlfriends. Calculating distances will not lead us to a measurement of an entity's absolute power. We observe, however, that those armed groups able to maintain presence at a distance from their bases and bosses are usually more dangerous than those which cannot. Nevertheless, they are not necessarily the more dangerous entity at a specific place or given moment.

2. **The power law.** The 'power law' proves something with math and economics that soldiers have known for a long time.^[195] You don't want to attack an opponent unless you can marshal enough force to get the job done safely. It is the same old operational equation again. What the power law predicts is that, given rational guerrilla leadership, the guerrillas are going to make smaller attacks and kill fewer people per attack if they can't marshal enough force at a given place and time to do something bigger, safely. Over time and in the context of a lot of space, it is logical that if the guerrillas' attacks begin to cause larger numbers of casualties, and they attack larger size government units or other targets, that they are getting better at marshalling forces, which means they are getting stronger. Changes in weaponry can make a difference, as can improved transport, information, etc. This is where the ideas of correlation of force and creation of mass apply to irregular war. However, while it may seem that economics' 'power law' only proves the obvious, it at least provides a way to extract from many disparate events (which individually may not say much) some indicator about the course of the combative capacity of an established guerilla force. It also suggests a way to classify individual events as being unique or not.

The inverse relationship of distance to strength has been consequential for the structure and positioning of modern armed forces. The risk to large ground formations necessarily increases as they might move farther from the shore on distant continents. Much of the world's land surface simply lies beyond the culminating point for a force of any great size. Accordingly, one way to increase risk distances has been to use small units able to move quickly, avoid detection, and perhaps persuade the locals to help. One might say that the essential role of special forces has always been to increase the extent of the earth's land surface on which a general prudently can bring ground force to bear.

Please see sections: 7, *Sanctuary*; 69, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies*; 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; 68, *Scale*; 30, *Control Technology*; 16, *Presence*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; and 130, *Globalization*.



"I fancy that the American, quite apart from any love of money, has a great love of measurement. He will mention the exact size or weight of things, in a way which appears to us as irrelevant. It is as if we were to say that a man came to see us carrying three feet of walking stick and four inches of cigar."^[196]

G. K. Chesterton,
What I Saw in America



"Yesterday, about 1 P.M., Brydon, an Assistant Surgeon, of the Shah's Service, reached this place, (on a horse scarcely able to move another yard) wounded and bruised from head to foot with stones, and he, alone, has arrived to tell the fearful tale."^[197]

Dr. William Brydon
(report of the massacre of a British army in Afghanistan in 1842)



"I just took the short cut and got there first with the most men."^[198]
Nathan Bedford Forrest



Damn near killed `em

Section 65, Smuggling

Smuggling means moving valuable things secretly and contrary to the law. Pretty much all criminal organizations have to smuggle, and smuggling almost defines the difference (as well as the overlap) between an archetypal mafia and an archetypal insurgent organization.

We know that the prudent leader does not risk getting into a shoot-up with a stronger force unless he has secured a route of withdrawal to his own base or sanctuary. The insurgent, however, wants to maintain the initiative, looking to effect battle against government forces when conditions afford. The criminal leader, on the other hand, is not looking for that battle, but rather, almost always, to avoid it. There are in-between cases, but, by-and-large, that's the operational difference -- the insurgent is looking to take shots against the army or the police; the criminal is not. Still, successful leaders of both types will have secured their routes to sanctuary just in case they suffer a run-in with a stronger force.

The quality of an insurgent's supply routes (and these may be highly dispersed) delimit the strength the insurgent's units will enjoy at chosen points of attack and during his units' escapes to sanctuary. The routes are an integral ingredient in the insurgent's capacity to battle the government forces. The routes of insurgent supply are often the same as those of withdrawal. For the smuggler, supply routes are integral to his enterprise; they are not established or maintained in order to enable expenditure in battle against the government. For the smuggler, any battles against the government constitute overhead that should be reduced as much as possible. Smuggling routes are for moving merchandise from source to buyer without being taxed or punished. Secure routes for the smuggler are part and parcel of the main event, and their quality determines the margin of profitability. The supply route is what the smuggler does and who he is, while the insurgent is defined by battle, with continuous success in battle dependent on the routes.

If advanced in his art, the head smuggler will only sometimes be found along the smuggling route. He will rarely be involved directly with the activity. The operational equation, however, tells us that he will almost always stay on what amounts to his route of escape to sanctuary (or in it). The accomplished insurgent leader often has a different leadership problem, and may have to place himself where battle might occur, or along supply routes. If he is a survivor, however, he will rarely move without confidence in a secure escape route to sanctuary.

Smugglers and insurgents, often the same entity, make every effort to establish relationships with people at important way points and constrictions along smuggling routes and along safety valve escape routes to sanctuary. These relationships may be coerced, but they are often romanced and voluntary.

When smugglers and insurgents share or intend to share the same geographic space, a common problem imposed by physical geography is likely to occur. The smuggler is probably going to know the best routes, have the informants and have imposed the necessary silence. As a result, the insurgent is likely, unless he is one-in-the-same with the smuggler, to be the newcomer. While the insurgent might get lucky and be able to bring coercive, extortive force to bear against the smuggler and his family, it is also highly possible that the smuggler will hold an advantage of knowledge. The insurgent will likely have to negotiate and use the same routes for supply and escape. The latter is especially significant, because unless the insurgent has achieved some semblance of peaceful coexistence with the smuggling organizations, the insurgents' movements to sanctuary from points of contact against government targets could be compromised by the smugglers. Failing to pay old smugglers their due can be counterproductive.

Smuggling is done by amateurs, individual professionals, and by experienced organizations. Basic smuggling for individual consumption or sport-risk differs in a number of ways from the smuggling conducted by organized criminal organizations. The operative difference for our purposes is the development of established routes. Routes can be graded as good or not so good in accordance with their security, throughput, and speed. There is no single business model for establishing and protecting a viable smuggling route, but achieving and maintaining the silence of persons along the route or who participate in warehousing along the route is always a central feature.

A criminal smuggling organization will often use newbies or 'virgins' as a method for testing security systems and other observation. This is akin to flying over radar stations so that they will turn on and identify their frequencies and fans. The more mature smuggling organizations will also preplan cooperation with official agencies of governments by giving up hapless or rival smugglers to the authorities. This tendency to compromise, as well as what appear to be natural phases or stages in the life of smuggling organizations, suggests opportunities for cooptation by insurgent or counterinsurgent organizations.^[199]

Not all smuggling is going to be seen as a bad thing, even by the most respected governments. Rare earth elements are critical to Japanese manufacturing, Japan getting most of its rare earth from China. Maybe 20% of that arrives via the black market, so maybe the Japanese government isn't going to mount an aggressive campaign against that particular smuggling phenomenon. Meanwhile, some governments, like North Korea, have been accused of being outright sponsors of smuggling, including of outlawed commodities.

People smuggle things with nominal weight, like personal identification cards, or heavy things like other people and weapons. Smuggling is a universally encountered activity in irregular warfare. It is linear (there are no 'nonlinear' armed social conflicts or irregular wars). Where there is smuggling you might have an apparent rule-of-law, but not an applied rule-of-law, at least as to the movement of the contraband. Usably, criminal smugglers tend toward political compromise.

Please see sections: 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 25, *Why Humans Don't Fight*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 136, *Weapons*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; and 67, *Points, Lines, Spaces*.



"We have a little closet there, a little suitcase....For people who smuggle contraband, the human body, the alimentary system, is a handy pocket....Hooping is a way of life in prison."^[200]

Mary Roach



"It didn't seem to worry most of the boys. They put in their time, looking ahead to payday. But not me. That paycheck wasn't money, it was a bill of sale. Three months of that, back to whiskey. It's been hard on your ma, but damn foolishness to one person is breath of life to another."

Eloy Jackson Sr. in the movie

The Last American Hero (1973)^[201]



The new empirical

Section 66, GIS

GIS stands for Geographic Information Systems or Geographic Information Science. Sometimes the 'G' turns up as *georeferenced* or *geospatial* and the 'I' as *intelligence*. The term is thrown around freely to encompass the physical and organizational technologies that together allow data on every kind of phenomenon to be organized in database form—perhaps to be visualized on a computer screen and made subject to calculations and analyses otherwise difficult for the human mind.

As a knowledge revolution, GIS is almost as consequential as the Internet. Tens of thousands of licenses for commercial GIS software are sold all around the world to academic, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, which are using the software suites in combination with GPS-derived data to create massive files on everything from endangered species to real property ownership to the wiring of buildings. GIS is not new epistemology, but it might be thought of as empirical epistemology revisited and restated to engage the new technology. Because the technology is so powerful and investments in it so great, it is hard to see a reasonable way around it short of something like deep ecological rejection of and abstention from history. That might be a good idea; let's not reject the option out-of-hand. Nevertheless, for those of us at least temporarily committed to vacuous and futile human competitions, GIS is big.

For decades, US military doctrine has prescribed a process of information management, visualization and analysis known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). IPB goes in and out of popularity, probably depending on how welcome or unwelcome the word *intelligence* is at any given moment. At any rate, the purpose of IPB is to define the battle environment, describe the likely effects of that environment, describe human threats within it, predict the likely actions of those threats and identify propitious times and places for action. GIS is applied to a much greater and more complex set of variables and endeavors, many not associated with a threat but, practically speaking, GIS is how civilians spell IPB.

A consolidating set of analytical and presentation protocols also emerged in the wake of recognition of the suite of technologies associated with the term GIS. Consensus as to what constitutes a best-practice in GIS methodological science to some degree depends on the specific practical application or on theoretical preferences and traditions within a given academic discipline. Perhaps because the explosion of GIS is occurring within and as part of the accelerating pace of globalization, the currents of GIS knowledge and method are highly internationalized.

GIS is the certain future of both intelligence organizations and public administration. It is the technological/ methodological key to a universe of knowledge in the files of government agencies, public administrative units, non-governmental organizations, business enterprises, and in the best-practice research efforts of university scholars. GIS is raising quality standards in social science research, making the research of disparate disciplines compatible for comparison and enrichment and allowing research to be more easily tested for veracity and scholarly diligence. The same tools, the same processes and almost the exact same body of knowledge that allows citizens to check tax equity, the effects of and responsibility for environmental harm, or optimal traffic design, are those that can help you find your enemy before he finds you. The universe of GIS-based knowledge, almost wholly unclassified and outside formal government intelligence, has within it the material needed to name your enemies and to trace their wealth.

The US federal government has barely applied GIS to questions of national security. As yet, almost all of the extensive investment in GIS by the various US government agencies still revolves around the precise location and representation of physical phenomena. Government interest in GIS is tied to remote sensing, targeting and precise movement of friendly units. While this is all useful, the US government has only recently picked up on the importance of GIS for building knowledge about human geography—about culture, cost-distances, whereabouts, ownership, land value, and the integration of these with the many other themes scattered throughout the sections of this book. Although some might fear so, the US military has not yet figured out Big Brother.

We might already be going into a post-GIS era in which the so-called *neogeography* is the more powerful, if dependent, phenomenon. Not really as new a term as it seems, *neogeography* refers to dispersed, nearly spontaneous and generally voluntary public participation in creating GIS data files about all kinds of interesting phenomena. An age of nearly spontaneous map creation by millions of personal GPS recorders is beginning. This phenomenon of ubiquitous amateur but accurate geographers could be used to advantage in human competition.

The way knowledge is organized and presented contributes to or detracts from the success of any endeavor. The way words and terms are related and distributed in the columns and lines of a GIS makes a difference in the way priorities will be determined. The human mind, however, does not seem to work like the GIS we've created with computers. The human brain is still better at the most complicated tasks and transcendent matters. So the interface between GIS and humans will remain an uncomfortable one. There are some people, 'deconstructionists' perhaps, who see GIS more negatively still. They see GIS as some ultimate perfection of a Western, positivist, realist, rationalist, and imposed reality that is, for them, not the best way to go. They might be right. As far as irregular armed competitions go, however, if you build a good GIS and your anti-GIS enemy doesn't, he'll be lamenting his mistake from his prison cell.

Military planners are forever being asked to think critically, meaning be aware of logical fallacies and impoverished assumptions. One of the logical fallacies of which we are constantly being warned is called *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, the rooster fallacy, or 'after this therefore on account of this'. It is risky illogic because events are not necessarily caused by preceding events, however proximate they are in time and however often the correlation occurs. The rooster crows, then the sun comes up, but it is illogic to assert that roosters cause the sun to rise. *Post hoc ergo propter hoc* fuels jokes and deceptions, but this fallacy is not the rooster booster of evil logic. In social science it is more probably the inverse. Although a correct sequence of events does not necessarily evidence causation, it is a rare phenomenon indeed that does not obey logical sequence of causation.

This is where the disciplining value of GIS comes in. A common laziness (or perfidy) allows excessive abstraction in place or time. The assertion, 'The very year the new national government was elected there were seventeen murders of union leaders', is not the same as saying 'Seventeen union leaders were murdered in Gong Province in June of 2007 and national elections occurred in September of that year'. The first sentence is a typical dissemblance, implying that the government was connected with the murders. The second tends, by the logic of sequence, to argue the opposite. Lies often appear on thematic maps that aggregate statistics in time and space.

Responsible GIS uses a scale and resolution of data that is as consistent geographically and as sequential in time as the data will allow or at least that confesses whatever geographic or temporal illogic might hide in the representations. GIS will not establish many theories of causation with certainty, but it will demolish many theories of causation. We can suppose that some social scientists do not care for the challenges of GIS-based research because the demand for precision is made greater and because the logic of temporal sequencing and physical proximity is likely to ruin pet theories of causation. For this reason and others, the measurements and observations of a place experiencing organized armed conflict should be mounted in a geo-referenced relational database if at all possible within the technical and financial means available. GIS is no secret to success, but it is the best methodological lie detector of the age.


'A' GIS might be no more than a spreadsheet of no greater value than the data that goes in to it. On the other hand, the term can be made to mean

a superior epistemology that allows transparency of knowledge and replicability of method. In studying places, it can make for better science. Please see sections: 112, *DIME and PEMISII*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; 47, *Why the County*; 136, *Weapons*; 111, *Knowledge Cultures*; 88, *Escape Geography*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; and 1, *Impunity*.



“Historical geography means putting place at the center of history. No supercomputers are required.”[\[202\]](#)

Anne Kelly Knowles



Q. What do you call a map of outhouses in the woods?

A. A shaded relief map.

Gishumor.com



If you like pencils, this can be useful

Section 67, Points, Lines, Spaces

When faced with the need to manage violence over a large area, thinking in terms of points, lines, and spaces can be a valuable exercise. A lot of this book is about returning the strategist’s mind to the importance of ‘where’. ‘Where’ has a shape, and that shape determines a lot about how to find the *right* where and what to do with it after it’s found. At different scales the *wheres* change shape. On a 1:100,000 scale map, a family residence, if it can be fairly depicted at all, is but a point. To the owner of that lot, meanwhile, a problem with the neighbor over the common fence line is a big deal. One man’s point problem is another man’s line problem.

If a proposal arises to disassemble a crew of malevolent computer geeks, the appropriate force selection might be a special operations or SWAT team; if closing off an enemy tank army were a valuable strategic option, some powerful set of fast, armored maneuver units would be the better fit; or if the general’s problem were returning a whole province from internal violence to a peaceful social compact, then a larger force composed of police, medical, engineering, intelligence, and social service personnel might be the right prescription. Depending on the scale of map, these three challenges might be fairly characterized and depicted as point, line, and space, respectively.

Geographic Information Science is heavily invested in the trigon of visual power just described. But the point is not that because programs like ArcGIS® are glued to a point-line-polygon mental skeleton, the strategist should follow suit. Rather, when the designers of ArcGIS® attacked the problem of organizing knowledge for ease of analysis and depiction, they responded to the common conditions of life and language as we see and hear them. Things happen at a point on the ground or point in time; or they happen along that river, ridge, road, or border; or ‘over time’, in that county, or during that period. That’s the way of things as we generally conceive of them – as points, lines and spaces. The GISers, figuring within the confines (or liberty) of 0s and 1s, saw that lines could be formed of points and polygons of lines – albeit when we get right down to pixelating things it’s hard to say if the pixels are points or little boxes. No need worry about that. It’s not about following the GISers, it’s about following what they followed.

In Colombia, some of the fiercest fighting in recent years has taken place in the context of enormous manhunts -- for leaders of the FARC. Some of these have unfolded in what can be described in terms of points, lines and spaces (or polygons if you are GIS-nerdy). Special operations units have been sent to assault high value targets (FARC leaders) when distances, assets and surprise warranted (point operations). Regular units were maneuvered to fix, attrit, and flank FARC units deployed to protect its leadership (line operations). In the meantime, the government designated various counties and communities, mostly rural and remote, as ‘consolidation zones’. Therein, long-term presence work (developmental and informational) would hopefully change the balance of anonymity. This, in turn, might dry up FARC support along lines of communication to sanctuary on which their leaders depended for survival (area operations).[\[203\]](#)

Part of what is successful in ‘Western’ culture revolves around the innovations that moved talking to publishing -- ink, paper, Gutenberg, and all that. Mapping is part of it. Having the right maps at the right scales depicting the right points, lines and spaces will help you win. Without them, the mind has to work harder to reach useful interpretations of physical and cultural phenomena.

Please see sections: 7, *Sanctuary*; 51, *Get Willy*; 47, *Why the County*; 31, *Holes in the Ground*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; and 111, *Knowledge Cultures*.



Q. What did the little acorn say when he grew up?

A. Geometry



“We ... declare it to be our Royal Will and Pleasure. that no Governor or Commander in Chief ... do presume, upon any Pretence whatever...to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West and North West...”[\[204\]](#)

King George
The Royal Proclamation of 1763



Size matters in things, time, and ideas

Section 68, Scale

You will want to create hierarchical systems (of administration, control, law, representation) of the appropriate size, with the right intermediate levels covering the right amount of space. Creating organizations or territories, conducting analyses at inappropriate levels, or thinking in inappropriate amounts of time (using inappropriate scales) will hurt you.

Cartographic scale, sometimes called representational fraction, is a neat invention that gives map readers a useful idea of the relationship of distances on a map to distances on the ground or sea. Map people also use the word *scale* as a synonym for extent (usually the extent of earth represented by an image on paper or a computer screen) or they will use it in the sense of granularity, resolution or detail, that is, the amount of information on a map. All these definitions of scale are interrelated and around them swirls a lively intellectual debate. But that debate is not what this section is about.

Scale is also used by geographers and others to classify levels of phenomena. This meaning of the word *scale* can be related to its meanings noted above, but it is more of a homonym. It sounds and looks the same and, in a given case, may even share some meaning, but it is a different concept. The fact that the concepts sometimes appear in the same paragraph or sentence is confusing. Geographic scale, for the purposes of this section, is not about how big you make the squares on your map – it is about your selection and ordering of categories of human activity, their relationship, how much territory they cover on the ground, and how much time they consume. You can make the map later. Having said that, you will probably have to use a map to establish your scales.

The phenomena you categorize will have some human ingredients and some non-human ingredients. Water catchment areas are a good example. Part of what defines a water basin and, therefore, part of what would define the categories or levels (scales) of water catchment areas, will include ancient geological formations, the fact that water flows downhill, and rainfall. Another part of what defines the categories will be dams, pumps, aqueducts and water laws. Your scaling, in other words, will be informed by a combination of manmade contraptions along with factors that are not manmade.

You will probably find many scaled territorial units already established in the geography of your armed conflict, and others you can find and map if you look. The scales you find are not magic. If they don't work for you, if they do not distribute power, provide justice or services or security in a way that you think is optimal, you can change them. People get used to the inefficiencies and injustices they have, however, so do not trifle with administrative territories. Still, if you don't like the voting districts, or the school tax districts, consider changing them.

Imagine if you came into a large area where there was some kind of water management problem, but you knew neither the administrative history of water districts, where to find the records, nor the people in charge. Nevertheless, you want to study the stewardship and application of the water resources. You would want to select some scales at which to study the phenomenon of water management. In other words, you need to be able to say this much water comes from this watercourse, goes to this use, and is taxed this much within such and such a sub-territory. You might invent a set of categories that exactly matched the categories as were invented by the people who set up the system that is already in place, or your research scales might be different. If different, it will be hard to use older data. If it is overly focused on the non-manmade aspects of the resource (like how much water is in the various watersheds and sub-sheds) then you might find that your categories don't match the political boundaries where water decisions are made or at which money is accumulated for a project. This is no small problem since the scale at which decisions are made to fund and build dams might not have much of a relation to where the water naturally flows.

Water is valuable, but this section is not about water. It is about proper scaling as it applies to water, militias, taxation, church dioceses, school boards, electric power, cell phone use, county commissions, zoning ordinances, sports leagues, and on and on. All these things will impinge upon the lines of communication and existence of sanctuaries. If you have the power to impose a hierarchy of territories, it is one way you can structure the social compact to concentrate or distribute political influence, to create or dissipate grievances and to reveal relationships. In your study of administrative scales, explicitly address the scalar distribution of political power relevant to the particular issue at hand.

Some phenomena are only revealed at certain scales. For instance, if high school textbook content decisions are made by a federal-level board whose members are elected to life tenures by representatives of an international association, then studying the preferences of schoolbooks among students, teachers, schools or even school districts might be a waste of time. They maybe aren't the right scale. You might do better to go directly to the level of the international association, unless perhaps you wish to show that the textbook choices do not reflect the needs or desires generated at lower scales.

False study categories will throw off your understanding and clumsy administrative categories could cause you to lose your war. Strategies for social development, security, knowledge generation, or whatever can be greatly enhanced by the explicit discovery and recognition of scales (particularly administrative power scales) and especially of hierarchical and nested scales.

Scales are cultural and often natural. The term 'natural' is derided by some social scientists as a semantic contraption, but consider the difference between woodworking and house-framing, that is, between furniture or cabinet-making and home construction. These are two closely related but distinctly different scales. At the furniture scale, the direction and appearance of wood grains is a significant matter, the aesthetics of visible joints a concern. Distances are related to things like the height of human knees when sitting at table or the width of an average human derriere. The house builder is not as often worried about wood grains, but is worried about insulation and roofline. Furniture fits inside the house, not vice-versa. The scales are distinct, if they overlap a bit, and are commonly related to the normal size of the human body. They, like most scales in human geography, are in this sense 'natural'.

The measurement of distance and location are intimately tied to the passing of time, so to ignore or mistake the scale and form of places or spaces is a formula for mistaking the relevant quantities of time. Carpenters like to say 'Measure nine times, cut once'. Many philosophers like to throw space and time together, which usually means they like to see geography and history thrown together as well.

Add weight to the mix of scale problems. Distances seem to be shortened by speed. Karl Marx, commenting on the role of capital on globalization back in his day said space was being annihilated by time.^[205] He was saying that capital was shortening distances to markets by technological advancements in the speed of product movement. In the 19th century, however, Karl could not send a grand piano over the telegraph lines. If something is heavy, it can un-annihilate space. Appropriateness of scale applies to space, time, weight, and, if you want to get fancy, resolve.

In an armed conflict, the scales of knowledge and the scales of organization and operations have to be in sync. Learning that most of the people in Mexico speak Spanish doesn't help as much as knowing that in that one county where the dental unit is going to work most people speak Tenik, a rare indigenous language. To say that there are only 8,000 FARC guerrillas left in Colombia might be good, but if you are going to a *municipio* where 2,000 of them are running around, your concern should mount. *Scale* and the classic military concept of mass are closely related, as are scale and the relative measurement of power. Your care in determining scale will weigh heavily on the time it takes you to win.

Seeing things as scale problems can help you measure those things in better geographic detail. Not seeking the geographic footprints of problems (in other words, calculating the balance of resources, objectives and methods in the abstract and apart from geography) is a formula for failure. To a lesser degree, so is indifference to administrative power scales. Time is the same way. All things are possible in time, they say, but they don't say


how much.

Please see sections: 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; 87, *Water Wars*; 34, *Urban or Rural*; 66, *GIS*; 139, *Strategy of Aggregate Tactics*; 29, *Heavy Machines*; and 47, *Why the County*.



“According to the map, we’ve only gone four inches.”

Harry in the movie
Dumb and Dumber (1994) [\[206\]](#)



“What is this? A center for ants? How can we be expected to teach children to learn how to read...if they can't even fit inside the building?...I don't wanna hear your excuses! The building has to be at least...three times bigger than this!”

Derek in the movie
Zoolander (2001) [\[207\]](#)

(on being shown a mock-up of the proposed ‘Center For Kids Who Can't Read Good And Wanna Learn To Do Other Stuff Good Too’)



It's not that hard

Section 69, Measuring Effects of Actions against Enemies

We find, given war-making and other cultural habits, that efforts to stop an existing enemy are not always consistent with the job of bettering the physical and psychological conditions that create more of them. This section and the next deal with the problem of how to measure the effect of action in service to a reasonably expressed goal – a problem complicated by the confounding relationship just noted. How do we measure progress in neutralizing our enemies and simultaneously determine if we aren't creating more of them?

When an armed conflict doesn't rise to the level of international war in which a country's government might be able to surrender, evacuate territory and pay reparations, the word *victory* may seem to have less weight. Nevertheless, in irregular war just as in any other, citizens, soldiers and comrades demand and deserve to know how things are going. They demand to know what their blood and treasure are paying for and if their aspirations are being fulfilled.

Measuring success in irregular armed conflicts shouldn't be difficult unless the goals are wobbly. As Ulysses S. Grant once said, "This isn't rocket surgery." Criticism to the contrary notwithstanding, the United States national security goal for places like Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines or Colombia is obvious enough: that those places not be cradles, harbors or exporters of contraband and murder. Whether the specific object of smuggling is drugs, people or plutonium; or if murder is perpetrated by way of suicide, landmine, or a weapon of mass destruction; America's best understanding holds some places more likely than others to be enablers or source-grounds of internationally dangerous behavior. When we cannot timely deter or punish smugglers and murderers from doing you grave harm, we might label them national enemies and try to visit violence on them. The lead documents of US national security strategy name a few such enemies and express the observation that underlying social, economic and cultural conditions help a place to become one of those wherein enemies of the US are formed or aided.

We can divide our measurement instrument into three levels of success as follows:

CONCLUSIVE: The extent to which an action or program ends an opponent's grant of impunity is the conclusive measure of success. Ending the opponent's grant of impunity is victory. Tied closely to this is the extent to which one side captures or kills the other side's leaders (their *mens rea*).

CONDITIONING: Overall, items that measure the likelihood that, in any given encounter, one side will enjoy an advantage in culminating points and correlations of force are substantial indexes of conditioning success. To this we must add decisions and actions taken over time to improve the probabilities that subordinate leaders will encounter their enemy. Also tied closely is whether an enemy leader's routes of escape are blocked, thereby denying him sanctuary. Finally, if an enemy's sanctuaries are forced away, an increase in practical distances faced by that enemy may constitute a reasonable proxy for reduced enemy strength. All these are conditioning (battlefield shaping?) measurements. They are not conclusive as to victory, but they are measures of conditions that reasonably lead to victory.

ENCOUNTER: Records of whether encounters with enemy elements result in local victory or defeat can form a significant contributory measurement. The outcome of armed contacts must be considered along with the outcome of pursuits after the contacts, however. These contacts, pursuits, and their outcomes may or may not be indicative of anything beyond the events themselves. We can reasonably suppose that continuous failure to best the enemy in contacts, or failure to win the pursuits (whether escaping or pursuing) will lead to negative results in the conditioning category, and ultimately as to conclusions.

(1) Conclusive indices of success: On the government side, the ultimate grade should depend on whether or not a challenger continues to grant impunity in defiance of the government. If the government kills its enemy, that particular enemy is not going to protect anyone from the government's laws and punishments. If not defined and identified correctly, however, the real enemy will continue to protect his followers. Honest measurement is tied to correctly and precisely defining an enemy. Of the indices of conclusive success, first and foremost is the measure of impunity being granted by an identity other than your own. (You might not have to kill your enemy. You might win conclusively by just capturing him, 'psyoping' his people against him, taking away all his financial strength, or extorting him by placing something of great value to him in jeopardy) Regardless of how you achieve it, if you have not stopped the unauthorized granting of impunity by your foe, you have not beaten him.

(2) Indices of success conditioning: To what extent have you improved the probabilities that in any given combat contact with the enemy your subordinates will enjoy advantage in the correlation of force? Short of those contacts, what steps have you taken to change the balance of anonymity in your favor? Overall, what have you done to set the conditions for conclusive success?

If you are to kill or capture your enemy, you will probably have to block his route to sanctuary. (Remember, if you catch him in his sanctuary or close his sanctuary, it is not his sanctuary.) In order to establish indices to measure success in blocking your enemy leaders' lines of retreat to sanctuary, you first have to find those lines. If you have not found them, some measurement of their being blocked may nevertheless be possible, but it is a more difficult task.

A senior insurgent or criminal leader sometimes resides outside the territory at issue. If a FARC Commander, for instance, sleeps someplace in Venezuela, he at least keeps some subordinate level of command inside Colombia. To close with and destroy second-tier leadership, the same truth reigns as for the top leadership: you must close the routes of their escape. 'Closing' need not necessarily be conceived in a physical sense. That is, if the enemy leader cannot move along his chosen route of escape fast enough to prevent effective pursuit, the route is effectively closed. It does not have to be crossed in a purely geometric, two-dimensional or Napoleonic sense.

(3) Indices of encounter success: What is the level of victory or defeat during encounters with the enemy (battles, firefights, ambushes, etc.). An encounter might be as limited as service of a warrant by the police, or as extensive as a division-size operation. It might entail the destruction of materiel, capital assets or inventory. An encounter might be a simple terror attack. Indices in this category should not be used to measure success overall, but only to test and validate the selection of techniques, tactics, procedures, combat leaders, equipment, training and intelligence categories. Record of contact success and failure might be kept on a national scale for a variety of reasons. They are highly situation-dependent and in the aggregate can mislead. Nevertheless, over time a change in the averages may indicate some change in overall relative strengths.

Your rival's measures are similar, if opposite. If your rival kills or captures all of your leaders, including you, he wins conclusively. Your death may be an unnecessarily radical requirement for conclusive evidence of his success, however. For instance, you as a government leader might negotiate terms with an insurgent, which for the insurgent might be a partial victory or a measure of conditioning success. His just staying in the business of insurgency might be a sufficient, fulfilling level of success for a given insurgent. By not being defeated, especially if, coming out of negotiations, he can grant some measure of impunity (or has saved himself or his followers from being punished for past offenses), he may have won conclusively. His conclusive measures might just be those that prove an avoidance of failure. Half a loaf for the insurgent might be victory.

The three categories, Conclusive, Conditioning, and Encounter, are revealing in that order, and whatever success story the conditioning and encounter numbers purport, your detractors can cogently argue that your efforts are not progressing well if the numbers in the conclusive

category are not substantively improving. However, if the enemies you identified as having wielded the power to grant impunity are dead or in your controlling custody, *and* you can show that you regained a monopoly on granting impunity throughout the territory, you've won, at least for now.

Unfortunately, if impunity is the norm for criminal behavior in a society you are trying to defend -- because of the lack of law enforcement, generalized corruption, prosecutorial ineptitude, lack of judiciary resources or institutional infrastructure, overcrowded prisons...or whatever -- it will be hard for you to tell if the leaders you've named as your enemies are giving their followers impunity or not, since they might have it anyway. You may have to settle for counting dead or captured enemy leaders as your substantive measurement of success. Monopoly by the State over the grant of impunity would be the truer measure, but if that is elusive, at least the enemy leaders you named and neutralized will no longer be protecting their followers.

Let's say you can name and neutralize enemies, but are hard pressed to confirm what portion of the total number of enemy leaders you are neutralizing. Depending on the capacity of your enemy to replace its leaders, it is difficult to know how many must be neutralized before you have doused the *mens rea*.

Battles and other actions are hard to hide and should be carefully recorded as to time, place, participants and results. Governments are wise to make data about actions public as soon as possible so that a public ground truth stabilizes. This can go a long way to avoiding false accusations and claims but, obviously, if the government has done something wrong, such as a clear human rights violation, it may find itself on the wrong side of life's ledger and the beauty of transparency. Individual government and anti-government leaders may calculate that hiding things is personally advantageous. These days, 'truth commissions' or 'truth, reconciliation and restitution commissions' are common features of the political landscape. The data on which these commissions rest their findings is often opaque, but does not have to be.

Some information can be more powerful if made public, the location of landmines being the obvious example. Not only does public knowledge of the presence of landmines in an area directly increase safe practices, it encourages submission of information on landmines that only the public might possess. Reasonably, however, some data cannot be released to public scrutiny until after an appropriate time lapse. This is because the public includes violent partisan members and some information has a time value that directly influences military or forensic operations in progress. Some information is kept confidential because public exposure is too likely to adversely affect the acquisition of more information or hurt an informer. In some individual cases, child or other victim protection is involved. For instance, the results of prisoner interrogations, if made public, could discourage cooperation from prisoners, endanger their lives or change the quality of information. Nevertheless, ultimately public opinion matters, and there probably exists a publicly presentable truth about every event that is precise enough for public decision-making, not detrimental to current operations, and not likely to endanger anyone.

Depending on the situation, it may be useful psychologically and practically to identify publicly some or all of your targets in advance, and then to announce their demise. The deck of cards of most wanted Saddam Hussein regime leaders worked well for the Americans in Iraq, and the rapid crossing-out of the top fifty of the ousted regime clearly showed progress against the former regime. That set of leaders is not coming back. In Colombia, a similar set of cards was proposed and prepared, but Colombian leaders made a determination that its use there was culturally inappropriate. An insurgent can make similar public announcements and tallies to considerable psychological effect.

One conclusive measure of victory over an enemy leader is his death. If you isolate on this measure, or over-rely on it and the methods leading to it, you may suffer the unintended consequence of creating more enemies. *The* conclusive measurement is of the ability to grant impunity, which can be depicted on a map. You can probably map *where* impunity is the result of organized defiance.

Measures of personal success for the insurgent (or crime boss, etc.) probably do not match those that generally apply to the liberal politician or his generals. The insurgent can be successful without eliminating the government's capacity to grant impunity. A given insurgent may only have to keep the government from keeping *him* from granting impunity. So long as the insurgent leader is at large and perpetrating, he is successful, if not victorious. We would suppose, however, if an insurgency's true goal is the control of national power, that *conclusive* success is the same for him as for the government -- to attain exclusive power to grant impunity. This, too, is a practical exaggeration. Insurgents might take the reins of a country's government, control the banking system and the national military, and enjoy recognition from international forums and bodies. They could gain these powers and privileges of national governance without having completely wiped out the ability of the old regime to grant some degree of impunity to its people.


The text offered above to introduce three categories of index items to measure effects of actions we might take against our enemies (CONCLUSIVE, CONDITIONING, and ENCOUNTER) give a general description and explanation. If you were hoping for more detail, say, to include individual index items or proxies that might be sought and presented to trace progress in your irregular war, please look at *Appendix: Miscellaneous Lists, LIST B*.

Please also see sections: 4, *Defining Enemy*; 66, *GIS*; 54, *Extortion*; 103, *Amnesty*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 106, *Massacres*; and 16, *Presence*.



"If you're not sure why you're measuring what you're measuring,
any measurement system will do."

Rick Sinnreich (attributed)




"These figures speak for themselves, and their verdict is conclusive. They tell us that, in the closing days of the twentieth century, when the world's population will have at least doubled or trebled and when the World-City will have become an accomplished fact, railway-trains will have recaptured the primacy, as conveyances, that they possessed during the century ending in the nineteen-twenties, when automobiles began to win from them an ascendancy that has been sensational while it has lasted but that is now proving to be ephemeral."[\[208\]](#)

Arnold Toynbee (1969)

(referring to a chart of measurements of the 'single lane' carrying capacity of various modes of transportation)



Infamous 'Hockey Stick' Climate Graph[\[209\]](#)



Will the place you create spawn enemies?

Section 70, Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure

The last section suggested ways to measure the impact of actions taken to close with and neutralize an armed enemy. Those actions can affect both the enemy and conditions in the society, conditions which in aggregate we can call the structure. Your actions might further the creation of more enemies or not even address whatever conditions helped spawn, motivate or empower your enemies. So you might try to measure what effect your actions against the enemy have on the structure of life, in addition to measuring those actions you take to change the structure directly, if you are taking any action at all. As with section 69, this section is not so much about what to do; but rather how to measure the effects of what you do.

Besides closing with and neutralizing an enemy, success in armed social conflicts may mean establishing conditions from which new enemies do not spring. Maybe if liberty and property are protected and material progress is a reasonable expectation for everyone, such conditions are met. We see that even in places where all parts of the trinity of human flourishing (freedom, security and material prosperity) are abundant, disaffected elements exist, armed and angry. Misery does not equal insurgency, either. In many of the poorest, disease-ridden, illiterate areas of the world, where the populace is barely eking out an existence, the people do not rise against the government. Conversely, there are insurgencies or violent opposition groups in economically developed, healthy, literate countries; and leaders of the discontented often emerge from the educated, upper-middleclass children of privilege. It seems that the measure of successful action against an insurgency cannot validly found itself on an assumed correlation to material improvements.

Whether or not the poorer strata of a population are provided with government services may be crucial or of little importance. A population may tolerate government corruption or fight it. Good governance to some societies may mean an all-encompassing social welfare system, whereas other societies may view good governance as non-interference in the lives of the populace. Measuring the success of governance, therefore, may require some measurement of popular perceptions and expectations. New schools, roads and inoculation programs are often popular, visible signs of government interest, but are they measurements of counterinsurgent success, the fuel of propaganda, or nothing at all?

Violent insurgent ideologies today are variously described as religious, nationalist, ethnic, or regional; of a marxist tint, or ambiguous in their intellectual determinants. They often involve competing armed groups vying for supremacy over control of the movement in question. Even while political hegemony might remain an insurgency's ultimate goal, the insurgency's leaders might enjoy financial profitability and renown by merely staying alive. You might not want to measure the success or failure of a given insurgency by the degree to which it has attained some proposed political goal. Being the champion of a utopian dream, even a pipedream, can be a materially rewarding career path.

In a counterinsurgency, might a spike in violence in a territory be evidence that the government is losing control? Contrarily, if violence slowly diminishes, does that mean the government is doing something right? Associated statistics might include the numbers of incidents of violence, identities of victims, number of victims per event, identities of perpetrators, or the logical purposes of the violence. Whether the violence occurs in primarily one-sided attacks or in clashes between armed groups is also significant. One-sided attacks suggest initiative or maybe the capacity and resolve to bully and extort. An increase in attacks or clashes initiated by government forces against an outlaw armed force may mean that the government is gaining ground. This may be a false reading, as the initiative of government forces may be due to a mere increase in resources or to newly aggressive leadership. Evidence that government forces are taking the fight to outlaws (and only perhaps thereby protecting civilian populations) might be a positive sign of government effort, but the same evidence might tell us nothing about the overall condition of the society as to its likelihood of producing more outlaws.

Offered below is a laundry list of indices that might serve to measure progress of a counterinsurgency to establish conditions of human security, along with an improved likelihood that more insurgent enemies are not being created. For a suggestion regarding specific items to track in order to measure the effects of actions on structure please look at *Appendix: Miscellaneous Lists*, LIST C on page 582. You may find some of the items in the *Appendix* inappropriate to the level of education and economic development in some societies. Some are highly universal, however. One is tourism. There are few societies where some form of tourism will not provide a useful measure for changes in human security. Another is the price of real estate. Tourism and the price of real estate are considered in Section 75.

Regarding baselines, stability, testability and availability: Whatever indices used, you may want to fix a baseline for measurement, as well as durable measurement increments. Our ruler should be armored against manipulation or it cannot give an honest measure over time. To aid in credibility, the instrument must be subject to repetition and testing by those disinterested in the upshot of the measurement, as well as by those who are stridently invested in the arguments that the data might support or undermine. Be careful with definitions used in statistical presentation. For instance, in regard to landmines, 'Known Landmine Locations as of 01/11/2008' is a more durable map title than 'Landmine Locations', given the typically incomplete nature of these datasets, not to mention the danger and liability caused by a map negligently claiming to display all current locations.

It may be possible to form a baseline of data regarding how many felonies are committed in relation to cultural norms. A map can be created based on the number of felonies that the State fails to investigate, lead to arrests, successfully prosecute or punish. Such data gives an idea of overall impunity for the commission of crimes, but the impunity may be caused by simple State inefficiency or prosecutorial weakness. If the impunity is particular to a specific entity (say, to members of a specific mafia or guerrilla) then it becomes apparent that the State does not have a monopoly on the granting of impunity. In some places, data on felonies is so hard to build and the prosecution of felonies so unlikely that the above measures are impossible to create or are meaningless. If such is the case, what level of respect is the State due as a representative of the territory or the people in it? This is exactly the question posed by some insurgent group, given that they, through ruthless efficiency, strictly prosecute even petty crimes.

Metrics based upon practically unavailable data (or which could so become) are formulas for frustration, misdirection, and loss of credibility over time. The collection of some kinds of data depends on unsustainably expensive collection assets. The best longitudinal data is resistant to purposeful influence, either by opponents or proponents of the policies under scrutiny.

Regarding causality: Can we ever be sure of causation? Even if available data clearly show the insurgent force to be weakening and the conditions of society improving, it may be difficult to claim that the government's (or anybody's) policies caused such trends. What is to say that other policies might not have worked better? There will always be room for logical (never mind merely argumentative) attack. However, some faith in data can be built on the basic logic of proximity in time and space. As mentioned in Section 66, GIS events can suggest causation when there is a continuing pattern of correct temporal sequence and spatial proximity. Although anecdotal evidence might suggest that the implementation of a particular government tactic was followed by a reduction in political violence, a stronger argument for causation is available if that same tactic, implemented in town after town, were followed by a similar decline in violence in each place. In such a scenario, the burden of proof regarding causality reverses and those who would deny causality are invited to prove their contention with better data. Because of the logical power of physical proximity and temporal sequence, the most convincing indices of causality (convincing because of their durability under honest examination) are those that can be

presented geographically over time. Although causation is hard to prove, factual misalignments in time and space can easily disprove many theories of causation.

Regarding State failure: We can draw a map of spaces within a State's territory wherein entities other than the State successfully grant impunity. Such a map will show where the power of the State is incomplete – where it is not sovereign. If the map (supposing it is an accurate, comprehensive depiction) shows few places where impunity can be granted by an entity other than the State (including the State's acquiescence or licence), the State is not failing. If the map shows that in the greater portion of space and population the State does *not* hold a monopoly on the granting of impunity, the condition instills doubt that the polity within that territory could function as a democracy in the context of that State. It may be that the State has an attractive philosophy, sincere leaders fairly chosen with many loyalists, but is simply under successful attack. It may be that the State is under-powered, or that it is corrupt.


State is not synonymous with *society*, *system*, or *structure*. I at times confuse myself and thereby my usage of *State* with *central state* or *government*, or even *nation*, but these also are not equivalents. The grant or denial of impunity can be divided in various reasonable ways. A system, structure, society, or polity is not necessarily better-off because a central government has the monopoly. On the matter of State failure, US Army doctrine aligns itself with other US federal agencies. As one might expect, our federal doctrine is distinctly statist. It ties success to virtuous government and government virtue to the extent to which government provides for peoples' needs. Many of us do not agree with such a manner of describing success and failure.

Please see sections: 66, *GIS*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; 109, *Your Staff Work Sucks*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 142, *Conflict Geography*; 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; and 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*.




“Some people wonder all their lives if they've made a difference. The Marines don't have that problem.”[\[210\]](#)

Ronald Reagan



“...you may fly over land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground...”[\[211\]](#)

T.R. Fehrenbach,
This Kind of War



1-47. Fragile states can be defined as either vulnerable or in crisis. A *vulnerable state* is a nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. In vulnerable states, the legitimacy of the central government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. A *crisis state* is a nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. It is unable or unwilling to provide security and essential services for significant portions of the population.

US ARMYFM 3-07 Stability Operations



Land promise

Section 71, Jerusalem

The Hymn *Jerusalem* (built on William Blake's poetry from the early 19th century), the histories of the song and poem, and even the lives of the authors and artists befit themes in this book. Here are the lyrics:

And did those feet in ancient time
Walk upon England's mountains green?
And was the Holy Lamb of God
On England's pleasant pastures seen?

And did the Countenance Divine
Shine forth upon our clouded hills?
And was Jerusalem builded here
Among those dark Satanic Mills?

Bring me my Bow of burning gold:
Bring me my Arrows of desire:
Bring me my Spear: O clouds, unfold!
Bring me my Chariot of fire!

I will not cease from Mental Fight,
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand
Till we have built Jerusalem

In England's green and pleasant land.[\[212\]](#)

'Dark Satanic mills' became Brit-speak for poor human stewardship of the natural and human environment. It has been interpreted in other ways, all 'subversive', and it could have become a catch phrase for the global insurgency, or at least parts of it. Maybe it is paradoxical that the music now mated to the poetry was written during World War I in an effort to brace British national resolve. In one way or another, the poetry is seditious, protesting as it did the failed observance of labor rights and women's rights and the rights of British subjects generally. It speaks of the desire to create the idyllic Jerusalem, the just City of God, in England. In time it became a beloved national song representing the best that the British would believe about and aspire for themselves. Its singing in the 1981 movie *Chariots of Fire* brought the hymn to the American ear in a particularly apt way.[\[213\]](#)

At the beginning of the movie, a young, self-consciously Jewish sprinter is singing the hymn along with the rest of the Cambridge choir. Not far removed is allusion to a contemporary Zionist movement that would have liked to see a New Jerusalem created on earth. Many of the Zionists didn't see Jerusalem being built in England any time soon; however, the Jerusalem they had in mind was *the* Jerusalem.

This brings us to the central issue confronting Zionist strategists between about 1897 and 1949, which was the mortal vulnerability of the European Jewish population in its dispersed condition. The Zionists reasonably feared massacre. In response, they resolved to create an independent Jewish state in Palestine, but the Nazis (rather than the Russians as earlier Zionists had predicted) engaged in murder at a pace and scale that overcame the capacity of the Zionist enterprise. Before the appearance of the Nazis, however, and before Arabs in Palestine could consolidate a common identity with leadership able to oppose them, the Zionists had already formulated and launched their unique land strategy.

As it formed in the 19th century, the national purpose of the Jewish collective contained within it three parts. One was fulfillment of the Scriptures as interpreted by Jewish religious leadership; a second was simple survival in the midst of variously hostile polities; and a third was prosperity. Establishment of a Jewish presence in Palestine concerted with the first of these purposes. Redemption was to come through human effort to gather the scattered of Israel into the Holy Land. By the end of the 19th century the still small but growing set of Zionist leaders interpreted the messianic significance of redemption in and from Palestine as necessary for the second purpose, survival. Regarding the third purpose, prosperity, those same Zionist leaders had to create arguments and conditions to overcome inertia of complacency, logical doubt, intra-ethnic distrust, and divided national loyalties among disperse elements of the European Jewish Diaspora.

Jewish grand strategy, or strategic vision, would be provided by Zionist leaders. If we begin in the late 19th century with Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann, we can say that Zionist leaders faced not only the task of translating national purpose into a practicable vision, but also the task of consolidating Jewish cultural and religious identity into a national secular one accessible to Zionist strategic leadership. In this respect, these late 19th century Zionists already enjoyed a strategic legacy of sorts. One of the innovations necessary for a project of national geographic consolidation was the secularization and broadening of the study of Hebrew as a language. Earlier leaders, beginning perhaps with Yehuda hai Alkalai, willed Hebrew to become not only suitable for religious purposes, but for secular communication among Jews for the explicit purpose of enabling a common Jewish political life in Palestine. To this we can add strategic recognition by the Zionists of a relevant global trend: accelerating globalization.

Globalization was more than a phenomenon at which to marvel; it meant opportunity to communicate and implement an un-Diaspora that had not previously been practicable. It allowed Zionists to apply tithes and other donations from areas where economic conditions or moral empathy provided surpluses to fund migrant families from other areas where the domestic environment and social conditions created pressures for migration. Like today, globalization meant more than advances in financial communication and transportation technologies. The expansion of free market principles also eroded feudal land ownership patterns within the Ottoman Empire, opening a door for Zionist strategic thought. For the Zionists, useful globalization occurred incrementally. Throughout the period, occasions increased during which liquid financial means, effective diplomacy and travel potential coincided with localized Jewish demands for an escape.

Growing nationalism, especially in Eastern Europe, was another relevant international trend that Zionists recognized as both a force for Jewish unification and a factor increasing discrimination and ethnic resentment. Warfare in the Balkans before World War I spurred a varying mix of local alliances and coalitions that in every case seemed to prejudice Jewish populations. The wars not only produced waves of migration, they also spawned specific national and international policies based on ethnic movement and redistribution. In every case, a central issue was land ownership.

In order to implement Zionist national policy, the construction of a strategy formulation process was also necessary. On October 29, 1897, Herzl and other continental Zionist leaders convened the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland. This was the beginning of a process of process-formation that ultimately increased capacity to excite solidarity, marshal resources and induce action from a dispersed and disparate collective

identity. By 1903 and the Sixth Zionist Congress, Herzl was trying to steer the concept of a Jewish homeland to include a site in eastern Africa -- not a concept appealing to other Zionists, including Weizmann, who considered the notion a betrayal of the national purpose. When Herzl untimely died in 1904, Zionist leaders and especially Weizmann (who became president of the World Zionist Organization) permanently resighted the decision azimuth solely toward Palestine.

We might say that according to Herzl's analysis, the Palestine goal would achieve the desired ends, the Jewish population would support it and consider it entirely ethical, but it was not feasible to achieve it directly in that the means did not appear to exist. The rest of the Zionist leadership, which would prevail, made a different assessment, believing that an Africa detour was not suitable because presence in Palestine was an element of the basic national identity that gave the strategy meaning. Whether in Palestine or eastern Africa, the national objective of the Zionists from the outset was the construction of an independent Jewish homeland. Although Herzl despaired of its being immediately established in Palestine, there was little divergence among Zionist leaders that an independent state was the goal. European Jews needed a place where the granting of impunity did not belong to their enemies.

The operational strategy to support the Zionist goal centered on incremental migration and real estate purchase and development. It was not a land strategy in the abstract. It was a buy land and live on it strategy. Such a construct reconciled well with available Jewish national power in the form of intermittent flows of migrants, a growing amount of liquid financial capital, but limited physical force. It could be tailored to disparate and incremental migrations at the family and community level. It also presented a legal approach that did not challenge ethics shared by Jews with non-Jews. Furthermore, it entailed less risk of sparking Judeophobic reaction. It was subject to support by quiet diplomatic efforts tailored to whichever geographic, judicial and bureaucratic paths presented themselves.

This real property strategy had to be supported by the creation of specialized organizations and processes, key examples among these being the Palestine Land Development Corporation and the Committee for Population Transfer of the Jewish Agency, which were ultimately composed of specialists in the areas of land purchases, settlement, economics, law, and local Arab culture. Also indispensable was the development, beginning in 1921, of a loyal, organized armed force. This became increasingly evident as strategic competitors analyzed Jewish intentions and finally began to take and then execute decisions against the Zionist strategy.

The Zionists recognized they could begin the process of land acquisition with a company chartered from the Turkish government, this in spite of protestation from some anti-Jewish Ottoman diplomats to whom the strategy was apparent. Up until World War I, official Turkish resistance was also subject to amelioration indirectly through intervention by the British government. After the war, the Ottoman strategic actor disappeared, but the fact of Ottoman governance had postponed consolidation of other Arab Palestinian leadership entities.

The League of Nations mandate to the British ratified and legitimized British pretensions of rule in Palestine, making the Zionists one of the first non-state actors to be a significant party to a decision of a 20th century international organization. The Zionists with whom British functionaries dealt were often patently British (Chaim Weizmann's youngest son died serving as a Royal Air Force pilot in World War II) and some of the British functionaries were themselves Jewish. As the early 20th century passed, the 'British Imperial Self' surrendered to the fact of diminished British power. Meanwhile, the claim of a Jewish right to a homeland grew morally attractive in the Anglophone popular imagination. The British government also did not understand their own constant contribution to the foundation of Zionist operational power inside Palestine. British institutions and economic assumptions furthered the secularization, bureaucratization and marketing of real property, thus facilitating a Zionist terrain-objectives strategy that British military experts would not grasp.

The Zionists recognized the long-term weakening of the British imperial proposition. They also recognized that moral support against that proposition could be translated into operational power as financial contributions allowed land acquisition through purchase, especially growing contributions from the United States. Finally, the Zionists understood that the land acquisition strategy was difficult for the British to see and therefore difficult to oppose by force. Significantly, Zionist strategy was not dependent on British goodwill or reactive to British imperialism. It attempted instead to maintain initiative through broad diplomatic maneuvering and resource positioning that would produce the greatest amount of migration to and land acquisition in Palestine. Key events such as the Balfour Declaration are milestones in the relationship between the British Government and the Zionist project, but the overall Zionist strategy was to constantly change the facts on the ground, plat-by-plate. The idea was not to seek grand strategic acts, but to constantly act -- incrementally but with strategic intent.

Raphael Lemkin, one of the 20th century's most famous activists, conducted a parallel media and diplomatic effort. Lemkin, inventor of the term *genocide*, dedicated his life to the idea that 'sovereignty' should not lend impunity to a government for collective murder. (Lemkin's efforts are put into context by Samantha Power in *A Problem from Hell*.) Lemkin immersed himself in the history of the massacre of the Armenians. Although his celebrated campaign was not about Zion or the Jews, the underlying connection with Jewish history was easily inferred, especially in North America. Lemkin's personal strategy was to build the structures of international law that might help protect peoples from their own governments. The Zionists felt a less idealistic approach was necessary. Neither strategy, as it turned out, was implemented fast enough.

So did implementation of a patently land-based strategy itself delay fulfillment of the objectives? If Uganda (or perhaps Arizona?) had been an acceptable substitute for the literal Palestine, or if Jerusalem could indeed have been built in England's green and pleasant land, would the strategy have had a better chance to succeed before European Jewry was stricken? The sunk costs of the enterprise were of a spiritual and millennial nature. A refuge other than Palestine might only have been temporary, a return to the Holy Lands remaining the mythical redemptive prize. Reallocation from one European state to another, or to America or Africa, could not have had the same emotional magnetism as a return to Palestine.

The Zionist effort was briefly supported by the Nazis themselves. It was fitfully endorsed by the British, but was simultaneously resistant to any countering British military response. It matched details of facts on the ground to national purpose, national interests and operational objectives. So powerful was the Israel land strategy, it was imitated by Hezbollah.

Please see sections: 105, *Genocide Geography*; 31, *Holes in the Ground*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; 78, *Identity*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; 44, *Political/Military/Administrative*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; and 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*.



“Our forces saved the remnants of the Jewish people of Europe for a new life and a new hope in the reborn land of Israel. Along with all men of goodwill, I salute the young state and wish it well.”^[214]


Dwight D. Eisenhower



“We Jews have a secret weapon in our struggle with the Arabs; we have no place to go.”
Golda Meir (attributed)



1920-1920-Palestine circa 1920-1920



This image is found on many websites and used for a range of political/historical arguments. What is labeled 'Palestine' is approximately contiguous with what was known as the British Protectorate of Trans-Jordan/Palestine or 'Palestine under the British Mandate' from 1923-1948. [\[215\]](#)

From agrarian reform to ethnic cleansing

Section 72, Land Strategy

Unless the duration of your role in your conflict is going to be breathtakingly brief, and regardless of what side you're on, you need a land strategy. If you ask your people, 'Who owns the land here?' and they can't say, then the chances are you don't have a land strategy and you need one even more. If you do not have a grasp of how the land is owned, you cannot really win one of these conflicts. The best you might be able to do is get things calmed down a bit so you can yell 'victory' and get out. The winners will outlast or trick you, but they won't listen to you because you don't know enough about them.

To win, know what the relationships are among your people and among others regarding land so that you can change what is possible in favor of your goals. Do not unwittingly let someone change something that you don't see. Knowledge about land might help you not try to change what is impossible to change. Tenancy is complex. These days, people don't just own land in fee simple absolute (meaning the entire basket of possible rights). They hold life-estates or occupancy certificates or they sharecrop, suffer debt servitude, and on and on. Land reform is not a detail to be left to any anthropologist. It has to be at the heart of *your* understanding of the society and the possibilities for change. You especially want to know exactly who will gain and who will suffer from transference of rights related to the most valuable pieces of land. Some of the most valuable pieces of land are sitting along your enemy's lines of retreat to sanctuary, or along yours, or may be the source ground of his wealth and power to fight you, or of your power to fight him. Some of the most useful cultural questions are about land and how it is owned. If you have a bunch of cultural experts running around and they do not know all about land ownership, they are not the cultural experts you need.

It may be that all the dimensions of land ownership are so ingrained and cemented in existing cultural, administrative, legal and customary practices that your leeway for change isn't great. You will nevertheless want to know this. More than likely, if there is an internal armed competition, it is exactly because something is wrong with the property regime.

Your entrance onto a piece of land might be denied by barriers and destructive fires (as in artillery fires, landmines, bombs). If you have enough gas for your tanks and they don't have enough barriers and destructive fires to stop your tanks, then you can enter. That's in big maneuver wars. In these other types of war you're already on that land and probably so is your enemy. If you haven't located your enemies' lines of communication or their sanctuaries, some of the public is helping your enemy or, covering their bets, helping both sides. And there might be more than two sides. And people might change their minds three times a day. Unfortunately, because of all this, you might want to think that the conflict is not about taking land. It is. It always is. It is just that owning land is a beautiful thing, not a perfect thing. Maybe you only have the right to be inside that restaurant while you eat and buy drinks, then you're expected to leave. Maybe you have the right to be there, but not to smoke. Maybe you have the right to be there, but not to go upstairs. It will be a matter of law and culture. Nevertheless, all the rights to every square inch are divvied-up somehow. If nobody has the right to exclude anybody else or keep them from doing anything, it is either worthless or people will fight over it.

If you are a United States American, your entire political heritage is wrapped up in land strategy and property. In 1785, the Congress of the Confederation (which had been the Continental Congress and would become the United States Congress) owed debts to officers and men of the Continental Army. The Congress worried about the land west of the Appalachian continental divide and wanted to manifest the principles of the revolution. So, in fulfillment of the Northwest Ordinance, it sent surveyors out west to measure the land. The survey started at what the surveyors called The Point of Beginning along the Ohio River where East Liverpool, Ohio is today. The parcels were sold at auction in New York City in fee simple absolute. That means you bought the whole thing, all the rights from the heavens to the core of the earth. You could do what you wanted with it and all the government kept was the duty to make sure that what was yours was yours.

That was a land strategy. It manifested a revolutionary change in the relationship of the individual to the government; it placed an affinity population in an area that might have otherwise been populated by opposition identities; it paid down a national debt; and it ignited an era of exploration and productivity. It framed the relationship that Americans were developing among themselves. Those relationships were about the land, but among people. Most of the founding fathers knew well that the ugly exception, slavery, was an error that would exact its payment. Slavery was made unlawful in the Northwest Territory even before it had been banned in some of the northern states. Writs of *habeas corpus* would be respected. Proof of one's whereabouts was to be part of an individual's right to live. The government was to be prevented from 'disappearing' people.

America's revolutionaries understood that land rights, civil rights and human rights overlapped almost completely. Rights enjoyed are enjoyed in places. They will be enjoyed in those places only in the context of a social compact that is the result of an actual strategy. Sometimes part of the strategy has to include force and weapons.

The American revolutionaries had a lot of land, no money and a revolution to manifest. They sold land. The Zionists had no land, some money, and a people to save. They bought land. These are two huge examples of land-centered strategies. Each of the land strategies is wrapped up in questions of property and property regimes.

Land reform is a broad-brush label given to a wide array of land-focused strategies for resolution of political struggles. Many land reform schemes were promoted by the ideological left during a twentieth century in which geopolitical advantage was often tied to polarized ideologies. Results have been mixed and depend ultimately on subjective measures. Too many land reform notions, however, have been bad ideas.

Almost any strategy aimed at attaining objectives beyond the immediate physical possession of terrain could be considered a land reform strategy. The flaw has usually been a presumption that the land itself is the dominant source of wealth and therefore political power. Lost has been a full understanding of the nature of property. Property, even real property, is not the thing, but rather the concert of rights associated with the thing. Strategies that begin with a complete understanding of the preferential rights and duties of all owner interests are more likely to succeed than any strategy that only envisages preferential occupancy of a delimited space. It is hard to find a land reform project that hasn't suffered unexpected and unintended effects of tinkering with forces and relationships that were incompletely understood. For those interested in securing and centralizing government power, however, land reform has had a long record of successes. Economic progress, individual liberty and upward mobility have not fared as well. As Professor John Powelson expressed in *The Story of Land*, "The most disheartening conclusion...may be that whenever a reformer (such as a king, a government, or a revolutionary junta) has changed the land tenure system by fiat, he, she, or it has retained a substantial portion of the rights instead of yielding them to the peasant."^[216]

The concert of rights that constitutes land ownership includes the right to divest, sometimes called the right of *alienation*. This single characteristic of ownership can probably be blamed for half of the whole failure of land reforms. If a peasant is given redistributed land, he will sell it unless he can afford to be the owner and wants to be. If a plan includes incentives for the peasant to stay on rural land — seed credits, extension service advice, and technical capitalization — the government is in effect entering the agricultural industry in a pervasive, expensive way. Even with all necessary aid having been provided to the small farmer, there is little a government can do to assure the market value of food staples.

The next logical step is price support buying by the government or other interventions into the market mechanism. Pressures build toward redistribution of ownership portions either in new mortgages, resale to original owners, or uneven taxing schemes. In order to avoid the immediate

frustration of land redistribution programs (caused by individual decisions to sell and go elsewhere), reform regulations tend to include tenure requirements such as residence during a fixed minimum number of harvests before the occupant receives title. In these cases, not only is part of the ownership retained by the government, the government has created a new form of serfdom. As with most government intrusions, the process is subject to corruption and to loopholes that allow the black market sale of quit claims, false appraisals, and so on. What the head of land reform programs always seems to understand best is how to sell the program and almost never understands the nature of property. Property is a relationship among people. Land is a most important object of the social compact, but it is not the substance of the compact.

In order to influence the lives of a large number of persons, land or 'agrarian' reforms too often involve overarching central government control of prices and movement of labor. If successful on a large scale, agrarian reforms can slow a process of urbanization that, however painful, may be necessary to shift an economy away from subsistence farming. Having said this, there have been occasions in which the forced reapportionment of rural terrain may be said to have positively supported strategic interests because of the changed property relationships. Accordingly, land reforms sometimes appear at the outset to be good ideas even to the anti-statist. A quotation from the United States military governor of Korea in 1945 says everything:

The program of Military Government included taking over all Japanese properties as rapidly as possible for the benefit of the Korean people, relieving labor from the conditions of absolute servitude under which it has existed for the last forty years, returning to the farmers the land which had been wrested from them by Japanese guile and treachery, and giving to the farmer a fair and just proportion of the fruit of his sweat and labor, restoring the principles of a free market, giving to every man, woman and child within the country equal opportunity to enjoy his fair and just share of the great wealth with which this beautiful nation has been endowed. (Gary L. Olson, *US Foreign Policy and the Third World Peasant: Land Reform in Asia and Latin America*)[\[217\]](#)

In post-World War II Korea, land reform measures were taken by a military occupation force that followed another foreign occupier. Probably the most determinant policy impetus was a desire to undermine the appeal of socialist and communist arguments within a large rural population. In that case, large tracts of virtually ownerless properties were available for redistribution.

We also learn from Olson that in the case of the American occupation of Japan, the number of pure owner-cultivators was increased from 52.8 percent of the total farming households in 1946 to 61.8 percent of the total in 1950. Pure tenant households dropped from 28.7 percent to 5 percent. In the process, one million former landlords were dispossessed. Rights in land had been purchased by the central government by instruction of the Supreme Command Allied Powers. The plan had its roots partly in pre-war academic appreciations of a relationship between feudal tenure systems in Japan and the power of militarist elites. General MacArthur's directive to the Japanese government stated in part:

In order that the Imperial Japanese Government shall remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmer for centuries of feudal oppression, the Japanese Imperial Government is directed to take measures to insure that those who till the soil shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. (Also from Olson, *US Foreign Policy and the Third World Peasant: Land Reform in Asia and Latin America*)[\[218\]](#)

It is speculative to claim that these land reform efforts led to the economic successes of Korea or Japan; too many other factors weigh in. At least, they did not prevent economic development and perhaps the redistribution of wealth broadened the base of material expectations. The land programs in both countries seem to have had a direct effect on elections that favored pro-United States elements. One observation is essential: These reforms were imposed. In one case they were imposed on a defeated enemy. In the other they were imposed on a country that had been previously occupied by a foreign army. The observation does not lead to a conclusion that such changes must be imposed but it does discredit off-hand pandering that changes must be indigenous or locally motivated, even while that might be preferable.

In summary, if what you are doing is to be of any sustainable consequence, you need a land strategy. If what you want to achieve has any chance of longevity, you need a land strategy. The American Revolutionaries had one, the Zionists had one, the occupiers of Korea had one. It can't be a complementary notion, a detail or addendum to your overall design. It has to be the main thing. Someone may try to sell you on the idea that the centerpiece of your effort should be the 'rule-of-law'. That's OK. Rule-of-law for a Kansan means that if she is in her home and the police want to come in to arrest her, they need to have a piece of paper with her name and address on it signed by a judge. Part of the Kansan land strategy says there are some private spaces where strangers need special permission to enter, including – and especially – agents of the government. She also has rights on the street in front of her home, including a right to be safe and not harassed. You might be thinking I'm stretching the meanings of strategy, land and property so that they are forced to overlap. No, they just do overlap. By the way, closing off your enemy's route of retreat to sanctuary is a land strategy.

Please see sections: 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 20, *Rule-of-law*; 87, *Water Wars*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 115, *Academies*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; and 91, *Forts and Walls*.



“When the Argives were disputing land boundaries with the Spartans and were maintaining that theirs was the fairer claim, he (Lysander) drew his sword and said: ‘The man who has this within his grasp argues best about land boundaries.’”


Plutarch, quoting Lysander (circa 395 BC)[\[219\]](#)



Jublain: In a new land a man might become a king. He might take hold of land as did the Normans when they came to England or the Saxons before them.

Barnabas: I do not want to be a king. I said, ‘I want only freedom to grow and do and be as much as time will allow.’

Louis L'Amour, *Sackett's Land* [\[220\]](#)



There is no private property

Section 73,

Property and the Social Compact

(Much of this section is adapted from *Property & Peace*)

Property is not a tangible object, but a set of recognized rights and duties associating a tangible item (perhaps a place) with an owner-identity. Those rights and obligations constitute the details of a contract among a society's members. The social compact is an agreement to enforce lesser agreements (and to resolve disagreements) regarding advantages and disadvantages. So the property is not the place, but the mix of recognized rights and obligations that some group of persons has sorted out among each other about the place and things in it. 'Creating property' means the entire process of establishing and solidifying an *agreement about agreements* regarding rights and duties associated with places and objects. The creation of property is a process of institution building.

If a place does not have a formalized property ownership system, it will not be peaceful or materially successful.

If the property system of a country or a county or anyplace is not formalized — that is to say, the evidence of who owns what is not precise, comprehensive and transparent, that place is not going to enjoy peace for long or at least it won't live in peace and also enjoy liberty. For humans to flourish in today's world (for them to enjoy material success, establish human and spiritual relationships as they see fit and to treat their surroundings with respect), the social arrangement has got to include a formalized system of property ownership.

You are probably wasting your time engaged in a project, program, strategy or movement aimed at improving the material performance of an economy if that effort is not built around, cognizant of and informed by the construction of a formal property regime. Property is man's most successful conflict resolution invention, and I know of no examples, save small isolated communities, where peoples have long survived in peace or even enjoyed long periods in the absence of violence, where the property regime was not formalized.

Saying that a place will not enjoy peace unless there is formal property is not the same as saying it will have peace if there *is* formal property. The assertion is unfortunately negative. Formal property is a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition for social peace. The formalization of property is mostly to be associated with the evidence of ownership. There still needs to be ways to do something with the evidence. That is to say there must be property courts, markets and democratic processes. Then, even if the evidence of ownership is excellent and there exist vibrant courts and markets, there is still likely to be trouble if the basic rules of ownership are illiberal or out of balance with the basic expectations of the culture.

If you are a natural rebel, taken to the language of resistance, you would be wise not to reject out-of-hand this assertion about the importance of formalized property. The question does not revolve around the epochal and fantastic argument regarding private versus public property. There is no private property. When things are 'owned' outside the bounds of community formalities, they are merely the objects of possession by force.

They are only 'property' as the result of a community's agreement. If you're an up-and-coming gangster, then you want to have records of who lives where and who owes you money (unless you're content to be a small-time gangster and can remember all that in your head). If you fancy yourself the vanguard of the proletariat, you will eventually need records of who is supposed to be where, and what they and the bourgeoisie and elite have (unless you are content to represent and redistribute to a select proletariat). If you fancy yourself as intermediary between a flock of souls and a spiritual master, you will need records of who the sheep in that flock are and what is ten percent of theirs (unless you are content to be a poor pastor of a small flock).

Still, the upshot of the assertion about formal property is that you, on whatever side of social conflict and irregular war you find yourself, will want to have some plan, program, intention — something — that directly addresses the administration of evidence of ownership. This ought to start with real property — with land and the things attached to it, but it should reach into all significant forms of wealth, from motorcycles to bandwidth, attorney's licenses, savings accounts, phone numbers, voter registration, even names. If you have no good plan to win administratively, you do not have a winning plan.

Property & Peace is pretty good, containing some of the points made elsewhere in this book, plus a few others. You can download it free. It is not the best book on property. Several that are better include Tom Bethel's *The Noblest Triumph*; Andro Linklater's *Measuring America*; Richard Pipes' *Property and Freedom*; John Powelson's *The Story of Land*; Hernando De Soto's *The Mystery of Capital*; and Douglass North & Robert Thomas' *The Rise of the Western World*.

A property regime is *formal* to the degree that documentation regarding ownership and tenancy is accurate, comprehensive, and transparent. The regime is effective to the extent people observe the agreements and can do something with the evidence. It is liberal to the extent that many individuals can participate in the distribution of the rights and duties. The property system probably cannot be effective or definitely won't be liberal unless it is also formal.

A column of Western cultural progress is the use of technology to improve the faithfulness of evidence regarding everyday rights and duties, including the duties of government. Formalizing real estate records can involve considerable technical effort — interviewing, surveying, monumenting, mapping, registering, filing, digitizing, web-mounting and so-on.

Much of the success of Western societies, and much of what is often alluded to as the American Way, is bound to the systemic creation of irrefutable evidence regarding rights and duties related to things, particularly to real estate. However good the evidence, rights remain inchoate unless they can be exercised. This exercise of rights requires that an authoritative body (a court) can consider and act upon the evidence if the rights are disputed, or that a functioning market exists within which rights and duties can be traded. That is why we judge the strength of the social compact according to its *observance*, by which we mean to tie the evidence together with its practicable consequence. Observance of the social compact: the combination of solid evidence and the realistic possibility of doing something with that evidence give the contract strength within its basic rules. These basic rules, however, may still be unjust according to one perspective or another. For instance, if we can determine easily to whom rights and duties pertain within the system and all of the designated owners have access to efficient enforcement mechanisms; but there nevertheless exists a category of people that is excluded from owning; then there still exists great potential for conflict. Such a system, well-named 'apartheid', can be quite formal.

Some people are stressed by the very word *property*. They become preoccupied with the idea that it is synonymous with 'private property' and a tattoo of capitalism and Western cultural arrogance. Indeed, formalized property is a hallmark of Western culture and a basic institution in most materially successful economies, if not all. The most defensible goals of human development: freedom of expression, association, movement, worship, physical health, and non-violent resolution of conflict, are more likely achieved where rights and duties associated with land are formalized — regardless of the name given to the overall political system. Private property and semi-private property exist everywhere, whatever the nature of a property regime's broad outlines. These property advantages can be made explicit and protected wherever the social compact agrees to their existence.

Property systems are *agreements about agreements* or *contracts regarding contracts*. Contracts are best made freely among parties somehow capable of negotiating terms, albeit at times indirectly. To the extent fewer-and-fewer individuals exercise more-and-more of the rights we associate with real estate (access and exclusion, profit, safe enjoyment, alienation, preservation, collection of rents, distribution of occupancy) a property

system tends toward tyranny. Tyrannies in a property regime may grow from the cultural fabric as much as from political formulae. One way of slowly reducing the number of persons who actually exercise rights, as well as the number of persons who determine the distribution of rights and duties related to land and other material wealth, is through taxation.

Liberal and *formal* are not the same qualities. Formal property ownership entails comprehensive, precise and transparent evidence of ownership, the logic of which can then be duly enforced. *Liberal*, meanwhile, refers to the most basic rules delimiting the distribution of rights, however evidenced. A property regime is more or less liberal to the extent different categories of persons are admitted as owners and a broader array of rights are obtainable. The ultimate expression of private ownership -- total, independent, unencumbered and uncompromised individual exercise of rights in land -- may not constitute property ownership at all. Such a condition is sovereign lordship (meaning that an owner enjoys complete impunity for whatever he does on his land), which must be defended by unyielding force. It is only when lords reach agreement with their neighbors that property is created. That is to say, in order to speak of property at all, an agreement must exist regarding conflict resolution -- which leads inexorably to the recognition of a role for government. Mundane facts of ownership show how complex and subtle the lines between private and common ownership rights actually are. So, rather than focusing solely on owner rights, we want also to underline duties, especially those of government in the social compact. We see that where the State fails to shoulder its immediate duties (conflict resolution and prevention or amelioration of trespass) the property regime is less likely to promote human flourishing. The reverse is true also: to the extent governments *do* shoulder duties; the balance in the social compact favors the prospects of peace, prosperity and freedom. Rather than claim that this or that balance between individual and communal ownership is best, the argument here favors liberal property regimes featuring fluidity, divisibility, precision and transparency in determining the balance.

There are, then, two broad points about property: The first is about formality because without precise, clear, stable evidence regarding who claims what, any question of how to divide the pie is subject to corruption, deceit and extortion. Clear evidence makes the observance of contracts far more likely and peaceable. There is almost no practical amount of additional formality in a property system that would be detrimental to the cause of peace. Without formality of land ownership no long-term peace is likely. The second point is about liberality. A liberal property regime maintains a broad range of potential owner-identities and allows those identities to exercise and protect the fullest range of rights by way of efficient courts, free markets and a participatory democracy. If a property regime encourages flexible, rapid and precise markets for rights in real estate, it may be more conducive to peace than one in which decisions are made more centrally or by political processes. In this, however, there reside questions of balance and timing, the optimal measure of liberality being susceptible to specific cultural and political details. As we tinker with who is allowed to own what in a society foreign to our own, we can directly threaten cultural basics. The property rules related to gender that the West confronts in Islamic lands present an interesting example. As a property regime becomes more liberal it may become more conducive to social peace, but disclaimers and exceptions are obviously required. To the extent a system of ownership is informal, however, liberality is an empty notion and the prospects of peace dim.

Most of the books noted earlier were written as the Soviet Union died or shortly afterwards, with the exception of *The Rise of the Western World*. Later in the nineteenth century the topic had been shuffled off to law schools as of only local vocational interest. The Communists painted the whole notion as theft and a trick of the capitalist system. One benefit of victory over the Soviet Union is the re-positioning of property as a topic of political discussion. How does property relate to winning your war? Why is creating a property system indispensable? Classic military strategy is about possession by force. When an army takes land, it tries to become, in the pure sense, the owner of the 'fee simple absolute', the owner of all the rights, protected by force as the sovereign lord, exempt from the law of the previous owner and able to maintain a total monopoly over the granting of impunity within its conquest -- at least for a while. However, everything that is not quite classic international warfare is subject to some kind of property rules. In other words, if some other law is still extant, if some sense of the previous social compact remains, or if one is immediately being implemented somehow, then the military commander is obliged to know the property regime or build one.


Section 72 warns that a land strategy has to be a property strategy if it is going to have any longevity or effectiveness. That and other sections of this book divide the irregular war challenge into two parts: one is how to get rid of enemies and the other how to not make more of them. The creation of a formalized property regime can help you succeed at both the military challenge of closing with and destroying your enemy and with the additional chore of creating a society that does not spawn and abet your enemies. Some of the classic principles of military strategy apply, but their application does not imply the renunciation of civil law.

Property is much of what distinguishes classic war between States from the irregular wars that are the subject of this book. In classic (declared, international) war, the relevant property regime is a thin set of agreements among States in the international community. In irregular wars, the relevant property systems are rich, detailed, culturally-specific, and often broken or inadequate.

Do not separate the idea of property rights from human or civil rights. They are quickly recognizable as the same quantity. A property approach, however, puts a lot of emphasis on 'where', and 'who'. It allows the application of our best innovations, like maps, cadastres and quiet title courts.

The question may arise whether or not to adjust an existing social compact, leave it to its own evolution, or scrap it and start over. While there is no rule for that question, the path you take will be imprudently risky if it is not built on thorough knowledge of the existing contract and on an informed feel for the potential of cultural change. If you are not familiar with the concept of property and property systems and the specifics of the property ownership systems pertinent to your war, you can improve your chances of winning by gaining that knowledge.

Please see sections: 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 32, *Land-use Planning*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 124, *Slavery and Underclass*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; and 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*



"Logic...has never played more than a small part in the history of weights and measures. The rest has been about the distribution of power. In its rawest guise, greater accuracy has given empires the power to explore new areas and to exploit them at the expense of the less accurate. But measurement is also about the power of society to allow a just exchange of goods and cash, and at its most fundamental level it has, like language, the power to express a personal value between the individual and the material world."

Andro Linklater *Measuring America* [221]



"...so I bought the field at Anathoth from my cousin Hanamel and weighed out for him seventeen shekels of silver. I signed and sealed the deed, had it witnessed, and weighed out the silver on the scales. I took the deed of purchase -- the sealed copy containing the terms and conditions, as well as the unsealed copy -- and I gave this deed to Baruch son of Neriah, the son of Mahseiah, in the presence of my cousin Hanamel and of all the Jews who had signed the deed and of all those present in the courtyard of the guard. In their presence I gave Baruch

these instructions: ‘This is what the Lord Almighty, the God of Israel, says: Take these documents, both the sealed and unsealed copies of the deed of purchase, and put them in a clay jar so they will last a long time.’”

Jeremiah 32: 9-15 New International Version



Section 74, Refugees and Displaced Persons

Out-of-place people are a regular feature of organized armed conflict. Generally, the connotation of refugees is of people away from their country homeland, perhaps exiled. 'Displaced persons' usually connotes displacement within a country, the currently fashionable term in international organizations being Internally Displaced Persons or Internally Displaced People (IDP), of which there are tens of millions in the world. For our purposes, all persons who are forced away from their homes are displaced, or out-of-place, the significant aspect being separation of the human body from its owner's preferred place of identity and geographic connection to livelihood.

Internal armed struggles invariably displace persons, families, communities, or even whole populations. At one end of the spectrum are peoples removed by force, the option being death, while at the other end of the spectrum an insecure environment contributes to voluntary individual decisions to uproot. The displacement may be an emigration from the country and continent or it may be a house change from an outlying area to a nearby city. Every point on the plane of displacement types and motivations has some effect on your prospects for winning. In one way or another, the demographics of where people go to live affect your chances of success.

Displaced persons are a challenge and an opportunity. They are displaced for a reason and sometimes there is someone to blame. Many persons are displaced by disasters of one kind or another. It should be obvious how useful it can be to gain an understanding of where displaced persons have come from, where they wish to go, the impediments they face, what their survival needs are, and why they are displaced. Certain population cohorts can show distinct behaviors during forced relocations. Young men especially tend to leave refugee flows in order to forage or find some answer to their displacement and sometimes to seek revenge.

Nomads can be refugees. Nomads have a special sense of place that connects to seasonal activities and special events. Their place identity is tied to a set of rights and duties they claim or expect in various places. The lives of nomads are less revealed by such contraptions as cadastral maps, but the rights and duties pertaining to, presumed or demanded by nomads can still be mapped.

Some displaced populations, or parts thereof, may be participants in or pieces of a concerted strategy that uses migration to change demographic facts to thereby gain political leverage. The speed of such migratory strategies can vary, which will in turn influence what possible responses a destination polity might make. Whether to welcome, resist, or take indirect measures is dependent on so many factors, it is futile to make any non-contextual suggestions. Still, it behooves you, if population displacement is a factor in the midst of your irregular war, to consider if any part of it is the product of a competitive strategic design. As noted in Section 135, *Borders and Anarchism*, and in the vignette about Bleeding Kansas in Section 127, representation according to place-identity is often at odds with pure democracy, and those two at odds with demography.

A lot of off-putting stories seem to come out of Africa. Robert Feldman, a close observer of things Africa, gives us the following: In late September, 2005, the UN High Commission for Refugees reported that approximately 300 armed Arab men riding horses and camels attacked the Aro Sharow Internally Displaced Persons camp in West Darfur, Sudan. Most of the camp's 5,000 or so residents (subsistence farmers) fled into the countryside, though not all...29 were killed. The conflict in this impoverished western section of Sudan had been going on for several years. Tensions between the Arab pastoralists in the northern section of the region and Black African farmers in the southern section were already inflamed when drought struck in the 1980's. With shrinking pasturage to the north, the Arab herders pushed further south where their livestock began grazing on land farmers used to raise crops. Essentially, three different groups became embroiled in fighting: (1) armed southern rebels, including the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), who accused the government of oppression and claimed to represent the rights of southern farmers; (2) an armed northern militia, the Janjaweed; and (3) the Sudanese government, which, backing the Janjaweed, brought its military power to bear against the southern farmers and their rebel groups. The UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs condemned the September attack [222]. He went on to criticize all parties -- the Janjaweed, government, and the southern rebel groups -- for increasing attacks on humanitarian workers.

Displaced persons can be offered new identities, but usually only if that identity is accompanied by acceptable new places. In some situations, the longing for original lands is insoluble except by commitment to help return people to their former places. It can be difficult to fulfill a promise of full restitution to a displaced population, especially when they and those who would help them are under violent pressure, but the effort can be a powerful motivator. Forcing displaced persons into camps, although it can ease logistical burdens related to the immediate needs of a displaced population (and concerns of the hosts in hosting locales), can quickly sour any advantageous human potential that a displaced population might have presented. Not only can a refugee population become dependent and lose self-reliance skills, it can be made an easy target for violent enemies.

Displaced persons had rights in land somewhere beforehand, before gaining the empty identity of 'displaced persons'. They may have thought they had right not just to *be*, but to be *somewhere*, and somewhere of their own choosing at that. What were those rights and what happened to them? You can probably best express solidarity with groups of displaced persons by actively addressing questions about those rights and duties that previously existed and about the future of rights and duties that might associate them honorably with some new place. Doing nothing about their place-identity will be a poor option.

Please see sections: 72, *Land Strategy*; 78, *Identity*; 9, *White Bird*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; 95, *Childhood*; and 124, *Slavery and Underclass*.



"I prayed for twenty years but received no answer until I prayed with my legs."

Frederick Douglass (attributed)



"Home is where you make it. Everybody knows that."

Old Cajun Man in the movie

Joe Dirt (2001) [223]



Russian Interrogator: Why are you here?

Emmett: Why am I here? Why are you here? Why is anybody here? I think it was Jean-Paul Sartre who once said, 'How do you spell Sartre?'

from the movie

Spies Like Us (1985)[\[224\]](#)



The true measure of security?

Section 75, The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism

The Price of Real Estate. There are several connections that tie the price of real estate to winning irregular war, especially if the conflict is widespread.

Key terrain is key terrain. Military people are used to the idea of key terrain and what makes the terrain key, or at least so they think. What terrain is most important in an irregular conflict may have little to do with cover from weapons fire, and everything to do with the marketplace. People tend to fight over the places of greatest value in relation to material wellbeing and, while some places may have great emotional value, others may have purely military value. A good way to detail variation in value over a broad area is to encourage and allow a market in real estate to operate, and to create mechanisms that reflect the price decisions of that market.

Measuring Success. Regardless of what else might be used to measure operational success during an irregular war, relative success or failure over time will manifest itself in an improved overall value of the real estate. For an organized crime boss, the overall value of *his* real estate is a pretty good measure of *his* success.

Find extortions, corruptions and money laundering. Abrupt changes in market prices bespeak all these things, but if the market is invisible, so too are these activities. Make the market for real estate both vibrant and transparent, and by so doing, many activities and places will be vaccinated against violent illegalities.

Pay for the conflict. There is often a spatial logic between where costs of conflict fall and who owns land and other valuable things. Determine the spatial logic so that the persons causing or benefiting from the placement of the costs of the conflict are those burdened.

Real estate people know everything. If there is a real estate market, there is someone who will act as an agent for sale and purchase. To be an effective agent for the exchange of something valuable, the agent needs to know about the thing being sold and about both buyer and seller and about the environment. Few people know more about the details of value in a community than do real estate brokers and appraisers.

Property is the foundation of conflict resolution. Property statutes, courts and processes lie at the heart of day-to-day conflict resolution, but much of the content of arguments over real estate have to do with the real estate's value. Where there is no market to establish value, there is only the argument.

Land strategies can work, but they should not be attempted in the absence of knowledge about what places are really valuable and which places aren't. If you fancy yourself as a planner or leader in irregular war and you have little clue about the market value of land in the operational area, you'll want to change that. If other people are around who are acutely aware of the market value of real estate, they almost certainly know more than you do about what's going on in that place.

Look for cadastral records. Cadastral records are usually tied to a land taxation system that is based on value appraisals done by a government or by certified professionals, and the appraisal values are generally tied by formula to an anticipated market value or to a theory of tax equity. If the cadastral system is broken, fix it. If there is no cadastral system, maybe create one. Societies do exist where literacy is the exception; resolution of land conflicts follows patterns of familial seniority or ancient feudalism-like inheritance; evidence is oral; debts are paid entirely in kind; and there are few public records. Such places are rare. They are themselves not likely to be the source grounds of much danger to the world. To the extent they become so, due perhaps to foreign presence, the creation of formal records can still proceed if it can be shown (especially to those who make decisions regarding occupancy of land) that a material and social benefit will accrue from the records.

Tourism. Tourism locations, patterns and rates provide a significant index of human security, especially if we expand the idea of tourism to include recreation and entertainment. If people are willing to vote with their feet and wallets to be someplace other than their home because to do so is pleasurable, it says a lot about a place. In addition, data for tourism and recreation is relatively easy to find, establish and maintain.


Recreation and tourist sites can include anything from religious pilgrimage destinations to neighborhood swimming pools. The point is that people make voluntary decisions to be someplace. People don't keep going to places that are too unsafe, expensive or not pleasurable in some way. Tourism and recreation geographies include the destinations and the routes to and from them. The geography of tourism can be organized along common scales according to tourist origins and administrative peculiarities. For instance, international tourists need to obtain passports and visas, exchange money, and make bookings through travel agents. Local recreational sites have other fiscal and territorial features. In every case it is possible to create a baseline of destinations, origins, and visits, and maybe amounts of money spent.

Tourism and recreation measurements (such as the number of miles traveled, by how many people, and down what roads or to what ports) can provide a publicly accessible and geographically clear appreciation of the progress of an internal armed conflict.

As a measure of progress in providing human security, there are few things that a government can do that are more innocuous (even helpful) than the careful calculation and transparent presentation of tourism and recreation data. Tourism industries, their expansion and success, are heavily dependent on the built environment. Tourism is cosmopolitan and urban, even when it is nature or eco-touring. As such, there are few things more subject to planning, or more subject to the market. A tourism plan has to be a business plan.

An insurgent group may wish to create a psychology of insecurity or follow a counter-economy strategy in which tourism and recreation are targets. Measuring tourism is then all the more instructive -- its presentation may have the added benefit of exposing destructive extortion strategies.

Please see sections: 70, *Measuring Effect of Actions on Structure*; 66, *GIS*; 68, *Scale*; 59, *Spontaneity*; 92, *Graves Registration*; 47, *Why the County*; 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*; and 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*.



“Out of the land we came and into it we must go.

If you will hold your land you can live -- no one can rob you of land.

If you sell the land, it is the end.” [\[225\]](#)

Wang Lung in Pearl S. Buck's,
The Good Earth



Guard at Walleyworld: That's not a real gun, is it Clark?

Clark Griswald: Are you kidding? This is a Magnum P.I.

Guard: It's a BB gun.

Clark: Don't tempt me. I could put an eye out with this thing.

Guard: You couldn't even break the skin with that thing.

from the movie

Vacation (1983) [\[226\]](#)



Section 76, Gendering

Killing and dying in irregular wars is done or suffered at a rate of about twenty young males or more to each female.^[227] Twenty times as many males as females are mortal victims in most armed conflicts. The ratio of male killers to female killers far higher still. In some other difficult cost categories, like limbs lost to explosives, the ratio of males to females is higher still. Few females become leaders of armed guerrilla or criminal organizations and even in the most female-welcoming guerrilla armies, the female roles tend strongly away from combat action and toward service, supply and information. Irregular warfare is a young man's game, the few exceptions proving the rule. Why this is the case I do not know, except to recur to human nature and territoriality. Testosterone, he explained.

Having asserted the above about the male character of armed conflict, I believe that most governments (and maybe most insurgent groups) would be better situated to succeed in irregular conflicts if they counted on ground forces with much closer to a fifty-fifty gender mix. For readers who take that assertion as disqualifyingly un-macho, here is the disclaimer: combat actions, whatever their level of conventionality or regularity, will continue to be athletic events that generally favor the male. That is to say, there is a significant dimension of physical strength, speed and exertion on which success in irregular warfare depends and in which males will best, in the aggregate, females. At least this will be true for ground combat, especially combats in 'low intensity' contests. The National Hockey League hardly fears that crazed gendermongers will prevail upon its teams to put two or three women on the ice every shift.

Among the technologies that could force a change in the above assertion, the armed aerial drone stands out. Armed drones markedly decrease the physical strength needed to bring death at a distance and simultaneously lower the level of ruthlessness and spirit of physical domination that seems necessary in order to kill. The armed aerial drone may be about to take much of the need for testosterone out of the combat formula.

In the government armies of Latin America, young women appear to have contributed to counterinsurgent success beyond the weight of their relative numbers. Guatemala's special operations units (including the renowned *Kaibiles*) began assigning women in the 1980s to civil affairs and psychological operations duties. Women in many of Guatemala's highland tribal groups would only talk with other women. To open communication with what amounted to an unheard half of the population, the army applied the parsimonious solution of adding women to their force structure. The result was a flood of useful information about guerrilla infiltrations and whereabouts.

Women influence formal armies more than people realize. In Guatemala, a senior retired army officer told me about the matriarchy. Whenever a coup threatened (often), the intelligence unit in charge of suppressing such things fanned out to spy on some women's coffee klatches. As it turned out, several generals didn't wear the pants in their families and officer assignments were made by the older wives. The assignments were indeed a feminist conspiracy.


In cities suffering extreme violence like Medellín, Colombia, the vast bulk of all violence is done by males. In contrast, the bulk of actions like lobbying for community services and infrastructure improvement, self-help education programs, food distribution and child care are conducted and led by women.

Colombia's FARC has had a relatively high percentage of women, at times as high as 30% according to some sources, even in some combat units. Colombian army observers say that the female guerrillas are often competent, durable and committed fighters, but that during ground pursuits they are often caught first because they are slower runners. Most women who have reported their experiences in FARC and other guerrilla ranks claim to have been demeaned and sexually abused. They also become pregnant. Many are forced to abort. Not aborting further slows their track times, increasing their vulnerability and that of their unit. Inspired instead toward nurturing and protecting their young, away from killing and dying, many guerrilla women wish desperately to escape the guerrilla.

Having asserted that combat will continue to be an athletic event, one of the most often fronted arguments in favor of equal gendering in armies touches on the fact that so many women in military service have to endure equal endangerment – that is, the positions in which women find themselves are equally dangerous when compared to those in which the men find themselves. This equality of danger is, in an appreciable portion of cases, the truth of the matter. Less debated (often ineffable), but more poignant, is the duty to kill. The positions of most maleness in the US military are those in which the soldiers anticipate and are expected to kill and to do so at a close enough range to lend a personal aspect to the act. Whether or not a society would or should place female youth in that drama is a central question.

Back to the assertion about 50/50 gendering in government armed forces: To improve the overall capability of a force to win in irregular war, a military should aim toward a 50/50 balance of men and women, both in leadership and in the ranks. Most irregular war tasks do not directly involve killing. Instead, they are jobs like psychological operations, police investigation, civil affairs, medical attention, and road building. Failure to include sufficient women in the force is a failure to recognize that the populations with which militaries will deal are 50/50, and that gender-match matters. This is not to say that the sexes should be treated equally – if by 'equally' we mean the same. I don't think they should be. Unless I'm missing something, the sexes are different. To me it is reasonable that they should be treated differently, to include different accommodations, different privileges, and even different rights and duties. To me, the tension that goes with figuring out what are the reasonable and appropriate differences...is just life.

Please see sections: 115, *Academies*; 96, *Combatant Status*; 109, *Your Staff Work Sucks*; 106, *Massacres*; 35, *Comuna 13*; 28, *Oviedo*; 94, *Poop*; and 121, *Dignity and Honor*.



“Women hold up half the sky.” (Mao, attributed)

“Women fill all the best bleachers.” (Yogi Berra, attributed).



“Behind every scheme to make the world over,
lies the question: What kind of world do you want?
The ideals of the past for men have been drawn from war,
as those for women have been drawn from motherhood.” ^[228]

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.



Motivating environmental change

Section 77, Sex

Sex is attractive, powerful, dangerous stuff. It is more of an element in armed conflicts than people want to admit. For many people, it is a more delicate subject to address, ethically and emotionally, than even the most extreme violence. Sex, or human sexuality, is a driving factor behind or within many conflicts. It...

- influences physical and social differentials in urban built environments;
- provides a way to make money, which encourages agency (pimping);
- increases affective values that can make extortion and kidnapping more lucrative. It is difficult to distance kidnapping, illicit trade and slavery from the subject of sex;
- creates taboos and constraints related to ethnic, religious or other collective identities that can indicate the existence of an underclass or of a group potentially the victim of massacres or genocide;
- affects soldier and unit performance;
- drives power relationships that cause some groups to dominate sexual opportunities or to carefully control sexual property (as in the maintenance of sexual roles, privileges, and constraints);
- causes pregnancies, leading to babies – or abortions, legal and illegal.

To a degree, cities organize around sex. This is due to the nature of markets, moralizing tendencies, and sometimes fear, especially of sexually transmitted diseases. City leaders often try to concentrate prostitution, or at least low-price prostitution, into 'red light' districts where bordellos, strip clubs and streetwalkers are more densely situated. It isn't just that cities have pay-for-sex areas. Young single people also seek healthier sex. This hunt manifests itself architecturally in bars, nightclubs, singles gymnasiums, restaurants, etc. Married couples often seek to gain some separation from the hunt and look for places to live and work that are specifically not close to the places of sexual fervor. Tourist hotels begin to distinguish themselves according to family atmospheres or hunting atmospheres. Accordingly, some locales will have architectures favoring safety, parental control and movement limitations, while other architectures are designed to provide intimacy, anonymity and suggestiveness, along with the opportunity for contact and negotiation (not to mention the coincidence and varying permissions of alcohol and recreation drugs). Hence, there occurs within most cities a sexual geography, a geography with which police detectives are familiar.

A similar sexually-induced or influenced geography can be seen at the scale of the single home or at the global level. Some places become known for particular practices, sexual license or taboos. Because of the taboos and the social and physical dangers attendant to sex, discretion (anonymity) is often sought as a complement in sexual endeavors. As a result, those geographies that provide anonymity are often used not only by those with rarified sexual hunting practices, but by those with anti-State proclivities. In other words, the whereabouts of non-standard sexual practices and insurgency or organized crime can coincide because of the care taken to provide secrecy.

Criminality is integral to most irregular armed conflict and, as a rule, one thing leads to another. There are all kinds of illicit trade and once criminals get the hang of keeping secrets, making bribes, and smuggling, they tend to diversify and rarely specialize in a single vice. The sex trade probably got started fairly early in human history. Maybe the trade is one of the negative phenomena of globalization or perhaps its exposure an achievement of globalizing information. Some places are more notorious than others for some kinds of sex trade, but there is little to indicate that the industry is weakening. Greater awareness of the international sex trade, including human slavery and even including child sex slavery, has sparked some increase in direct international law enforcement cooperation.

Prostitutes learn a lot and, apparently, don't always keep the knowledge secret. Additionally, madams and pimps, if they are going to do well in the business, need to keep records and these records, which tend to get subpoenaed, often become trading chips for other information.

The lines of withdrawal to sanctuary for many leaders in irregular conflicts take detours through sexual geographies. To be more specific, insurgent leaders are especially likely to visit their wives, lovers, or favorite prostitutes, or have boys, girls or women shipped to them. This is a traditional security weakness. Venereal diseases can have a destructive effect on small unit efficiency. Guerrilla units often detour from preferred mission routes or risk exposure in order to seek medical attention for all kinds of diseases; sexually transmitted diseases are high on the list.

Proscriptions against sexual contact between members of separate races or religions are common worldwide. Where those proscriptions are formalized it may be a good indicator of the existence of an underclass and of a potential victim identity. Numerous unchallenged interracial, interethnic or intercommunion sexual liaisons and marriages, on the other hand, may indicate group adhesion -- or be a warning of potential social stress if such sexual intermixing could be made into a divisive issue.

Cross-cultural sex shock can cause barriers to communication, disagreement and distrust between allies. Typically, North Americans are subject to sex culture shock, especially when confronted by some of the practices of soldier-aged young men on other continents. By and large, they seem less shocked by the women.

Religions, castes, and classes can diverge as to sexual privileges. A clergy or a dominant caste may create and maintain special sexual privileges for themselves, as well as permit or foster a market for the satisfaction of sexual desires. These systems of preferential property rights in sex rarely favor control by females. Females in most societies have less negotiating strength regarding the value of sexual acts and opportunities. Among males, small minorities often control the market for the highest-value sexual prizes. Because of systemically weaker power positions, most females face highly circumscribed sets of sexual choices, while some women are reduced to outright sexual slavery. Many children, sharing a similar relative weakness, are also reduced to being sexual commodities. These relationships, in which women and children have little negotiating power regarding themselves as objects of sexual desire and performance, are often perceived as being integral to a culture. However, what members of one society might paint as a cultural norm, members of another may see as violation of physical integrity or as an illegitimate discrimination against a category of humans.

When a power relationship considered normal within one social compact is perceived from the context of another social compact as the perpetration of a crime, the question of impunity can become a cause for inter-cultural conflict, even among allies. What if nobody in a neighboring county investigates or prosecutes what, in your country, is considered sexual abuse? Legalistic contraptions intended to respect the neighboring State's monopoly on the granting of impunity, like extradition, cease to work. It becomes harder for one society to respect the prosecutorial culture of another. Lines of retreat to places of impunity begin to follow cultural differentiation. Sexuality is not the least of factors that drive such differences.

Open discussion of sexual topics can exact responses of embarrassment, revulsion, titillation, or fear. It is nevertheless advantageous to surface those sexual issues that will affect your likelihood of having to fight, where to fight, and winning. Your military efficiency especially can be

negatively affected by ignorance regarding sexual practices. In addition, sexual practices and geographies present an exploitable link to information about the whereabouts of your enemy or even regarding impending violent events.

Please see section: 102, *Negotiations*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 61, *The Geography of Dope*; 65, *Smuggling*; 55, *Kidnapping*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; and 130, *Globalization*.



“I am a very good shot. I have hunted for every kind of animal. But I would never kill an animal during mating season.” [\[229\]](#)

Hedy Lamarr (attributed)



“I see your spacesuit saved you from the acopaplypse -- so do you wanna, like, recopulate the earth?” [\[230\]](#)

Beavis on the TV show
Beavis and Butthead



“Repugnance is some kind of wake-up call that there is something untoward going on and attention must be paid. These passions are not simply irrational. They contain within them the germ of insight. You cannot give proper verbal account of the horror of evil, yet a culture that couldn’t be absolutely horrified by such things is dead.” [\[231\]](#)

Leon Kass



How many names can a person have?

Section 78, Identity

Personal Identity. Anonymity and personal identity are inseparable. Anonymity means you cannot be identified as you, nor can your things and relationships be identified as yours. Personal identity, beyond simply being the most particular of ownerships, often rests on our relationships, possessions, memories and aspirations -- these things and our personal identity might be considered co-constitutive. If you gain perfect anonymity, you run the risk of losing personal identity or maybe the ability to express that identity. You might suffer...an identity crisis. Spies sometimes suffer these, insurgents not so much perhaps -- maybe since at some point they have to express their identity if they are going to translate it into power. Anyhow, anonymity is a dilemma for the insurgent. Criminals, meanwhile, want to enjoy their ill-gotten lucre and so they're often in the same boat as the insurgent, needing to keep their anonymity, but finding that conspicuousness was one of the goals of their illicit behavior. Finding the right balance of anonymity and profile is of central value in every thoughtful, organized challenge to the structure of things. Therefore, the destruction or preservation of personal identity is concomitantly worthwhile.

Careful ID carding of populations -- and centralized ID inventories -- can serve either to protect or to endanger personal identity. Creating firm evidence of identity is a practical step against theft or fraudulent use of personal identity. On the other hand, identity and marking systems have been implicated in assisting the perpetration of genocides, so ID cards are not necessarily or always a positive tool of peace or moral behavior. Nevertheless, no property system that orders rights and duties related to land, professional licenses, bandwidth, etc., can be fully functional as a tool of a peaceful social compact unless there is a parallel, transparent method of ensuring correct personal identification. Owner and owned are absolutely co-constitutive. Accuracy and transparency of the things owned is almost meaningless without accuracy and transparency of the identity of owners. This might seem to create a practical and philosophical dilemma with privacy values, but not really.

Moderation and reasonableness in transparency as to types of wealth, location, timing, etc. are built into the best identification systems. For instance, while real property might be subject to the transparency of public knowledge, purchases of personal items might not be. Although records pertaining to real property might be available for public inspection, the property itself (at least from the ground) might not be. While there might be a requirement to carry an ID card, a requirement or the right of the government to inspect the cards can be limited to specific places and times. In this regard there are common and varying practices in jurisdictions around the world -- which should suggest considerable room for creativity in balancing the needs of anonymity and privacy against the needs for transparency and forensic power.

Recent discoveries about DNA coding have so changed television crime stories it is a wonder anyone watched them before. We also have to wonder, however, if DNA falsification and planting (instead of dropping a weapon at the scene of a crime, a lot of faked DNA gets spilt around) isn't coming soon. In the meantime, all personal identity systems are two-edged swords that can favor good governance and bad.

Family. Family identity, like personal identity, can become the fuel of tortuous debate. Almost everywhere, the definition of who is *in* and who is *out* is a central cultural question. It is too easy to say, 'Oh, family is so significant in this culture', or 'family values must be respected'. For one thing, it is more than likely that in whatever land you find your irregular war, you will encounter what, at some point will be an unacceptable level of nepotism, that is, someone will overstress your appreciation of family values. On other occasions they may act unbearably cruel to whom you might have supposed to be family. That in mind, in the course of your inventorying, definitely categorize and mark family relationships, nearly-family relationships, para-family relationships and anything that seems close. Be careful regarding the definitions of *in* and *out*. Find shared property ownership and understand the rubrics of *family* events. Your mapping of debt and obligation can start here, as well as your quest to find the disaffected cousin.

Collective. 'Family' may be the first and most obvious collective identity, but our ability to artifice other equally powerful collectives makes such effort a central focus for understanding human competition. It can be hard to fake a place of common origin, or a common mother, but it can be easy to create a sense of belonging in a ginned-up category. Race is one of them, because, while they have dubious scientific boundaries, there are enough palpable clues to give the notion meaning enough. Every leader wants to represent a collective identity of some sort and, if an activist leader doesn't trip across an identity suitable for his leadership, he should be able to fabricate one.

Sense of Place. 'Where you from, Son?' must be the number one cliché question that the General asks the Private. Trite, expected and unimaginative, everyone likes it and is almost always happy to answer. The General can't go wrong, because it is an essential question for most people. It is almost like asking, 'Who are you, really?' Personal identity, who we are, is often tied to physical geography and even to some imagined and remembered physical geographies. We might be Southerners, Yankees, Paisas, Texans or whatever, and we can be more than one thing at a time and feel ourselves more from one place than from another depending on a whole raft of other situational factors, including not only where those making up the rest of the 'we' are from, but where 'they' are from. Some say it's harder to get people to fight for the revolution than it is to get them to fight for Mother Russia. Strangely, we can be *we* and keep them *they* for only the duration of a basketball game, or for generations. When nested identities become un-nested, internal conflicts of identity can grow, as well as conflicts of loyalty. Oftentimes, leaders intent on creating certain kinds of collective identity do so for the purpose of overcoming place identity. They want to avoid the power of place origin and place representation by appealing to identities that are more amorphous and place-non-specific. Typically, those leaders at some point feel they have to build a palace, and that has to be located someplace. In fact, they often become a place. "What does the Kremlin, the Vatican, the Pentagon, the *Casa de Nariño*, think?"

Creating or tapping into the sense of place is a staple of effective leadership. A country with powerful national symbols can motivate citizens more easily toward national missions. The United States, held together by frail ideas, nevertheless counts on many symbols of the whole -- the Stars & Stripes, Statue of Liberty, Rock and Roll, the Golden Gate, hamburgers, Coke, Mount Rushmore, Muhammad Ali, the ice cream cone, Winning Irregular War. The master of irregular conflict will know place-identity language, which symbols communicate what to whom, and the master will try to manage them accordingly. It is not just about psychological operations or diplomacy either. Knowing where people are from helps identify not just who they are, but where they are.

'Everywhere we go-oh, people wanna know-oh, Who we ah-are, where we come from'. Pride of action is often tied to pride of origin. The city where you find yourself might be pleased at having a sister city wherever you came from, that is, if you don't screw up. If both those cities are proud of what you're doing, that's good. If not, it behooves you to know why. When Americans are abroad, they should never be just from America. America is all the places from which its citizens hail. There are some persons for whom this rule (that identity is tied to locale) does not apply. Some people have led a roaming existence, including in our own military. Some individuals, maybe just due to the possibilities of wealth, have become so traveled and sophisticated they take pride in everywhere and no place. Most of us aren't like that. I don't want to be like that. I want to be from right here. God made this corner of the earth. He was sleepy when he coughed up your little trash-hole, unless you're from Steamboat or something.

Please see sections: 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; 65, *Smuggling*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 92, *Graves Registration*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 113, *Unrestricted Chi Whiz*; and 27, *'Non-Violent' Action*.



Pinkley: Where are you from, son?

Soldier: Madison City, Missouri, sir!

Pinkley: Never heard of it.

from the movie

The Dirty Dozen (1967)[\[232\]](#)



I've got a name, I've got a name

And I carry it with me like my daddy did,

But I'm living the dream that he kept hid

from the Jim Croce song

I've Got a Name



Is what's worth dying for worth living for?

Section 79, Suicide

Eschatologists generally agree that King Solomon wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes, a middle portion of the Bible. It is an existential essay by a man who has everything and is yet tortured by a sense of meaninglessness and hopelessness. Solomon believes, however, that something exists greater than his self and that a Savior is to come. Solomon banks his hope in that salvation. It's a sizeable chunk of the Christian message, even though at first glance the book seems so out of place that some think it is a wonder it was included in the Bible at all. It doesn't say much about the history of the Jewish nation or the old covenant or anything about the life of Jesus and the new covenant. It is, however, about hopelessness, meaninglessness, and that these afflictions are not limited to the poor. Christ's mission, apparently, was about this health and sickness of the soul, rather than about material well-being. Nevertheless, although hopelessness may be dispensed irrespective of worldly fortune, worldly misfortune can create and conjoin with hopelessness. Furthermore, luck often has nothing to do with it. Other men are sometimes to blame straight up for creating or allowing conditions that engender and fuel existential crises. These conditions are well known to us – poverty, degradation and physical illness can weaken the spirit. Sometimes suicide is late evidence of something or somebody in the human experience that needed fixing. Who should have fixed it is a question we often find at the heart of armed struggle.

Some of us, not as astute as the leaders just mentioned above, notice that some of the other kids in high school are into a bunch of seemingly unhealthy, counterculture, gothic, *emo* psycho-babble. We do not grasp why they don't stop all the whining and go out for wrestling or cheerleading or something. Not afflicted, we have a tough time sensing the urgency of the search for the meaning of life, or why 'existentialism' should be counted as a movement of literature and art (often foisted on us) instead of being roundly dismissed. Most American art tends to be pretty sweet. Beer commercials, mostly; good stuff. There is another vein of art however, including American, that taps into, exposes, and expresses Solomon's suffering. It is so much present in the art world, and so many souls drawn to that art, that many critics don't admit art as being art unless it suffers. Authenticity becomes a reflection of some sort of pain. Everything else is mere illustration or commercial schlock.

How does existentialism, depression and pained-art lead back to winning insurgent war? It is because of their connection to the perception of *them* versus *us*, insiders and outsiders, the resistance and the system. It is also about the strong connection between failed or missing dignity and honor. Dignity and honor bear especially on the mindsets of young men, many of whom are attracted to violence. Desperation, existential dilemma, unhappy sexual outlet, the search for honor, testosterone and guns make for a common and volatile soup. The mix doesn't necessarily lead to suicide of course – homicide is more often sufficient. It only needs an organizer for it to become organized homicide.

Once in a while, an individual gifted with the requisite combination of charisma, intelligence and wealth recognizes existential stress in others (perhaps, but not always wrestling with it themselves) and can translate that stress into action. Sometimes this same leader is ruthless, selfish, creative and energetic. That's when things get interesting.

The person resolved or coerced to commit suicide-homicide is someone's enemy, but the intellectual author of the suicide-homicide usually survives. The intellectual author usually just commits homicide or perhaps just an efficient act of war. Most suicides are committed by heroes or chumps. The worse enemy is the leader who spots, vets, develops and convinces chumps and heroes to become suicide-homicide weapon systems. The leader (agent, intellectual author, or *mens rea* guy) is the more difficult operational challenge for his enemies. An act of suicide-homicide appears to present no route of withdrawal to sanctuary, but that only seems true because focus is drawn to the weapons system and not to the *mens rea* author. The latter scrupulously observes the operational equation by launching a weapon that affords himself, the intellectual author, a short distance to sanctuary. If he is really good, he can establish not only the appearance that there is no line of retreat, but can motivate heroes and chumps in such a way as to create the public notion of spontaneity and broad moral acceptance, whereas in fact, he is a much more unique and vulnerable leader.

The attentive criminal, insurgent or counterinsurgent leader will seek to dominate the explosive mix of existential stress, the search for honor, and violent propensities. However, local cultural knowledge is more useful than vague acceptance of the existence of existential plight. While a good deal is made today of the willingness of some radicalized Islamicists to commit homicide-suicide, the phenomenon is cross-cultural. Only the details differ. As Section 54, *Mercatus* noted, recruiting assassins requires an understanding of the local interpretation of the dilemmas presented by poverty, honor, faith, and suicide. Drug lord Pablo Escobar contracted young Medellín men who knew they would be killed after they made a hit. But the deal included a guarantee that the hit man's mother would have a house provided for her to live in for the rest of her life. The local envelopment of happiness, home, motherhood, and honor with the meaning of life were served in the sacrifice. Of course, the police were *Paisa*, too, so eventually the tracing of moms with new houses, dead sons and going-away parties started leading back to the *mens rea*.

Please see sections: 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 93, *Diseases and Disasters*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 95, *Childhood*; 13, *Puthukkudiyirippu*; 100, *What the Foucault?*; and 23, *Mens Rea*.



“There is as much courage in supporting with firmness the afflictions of the soul as there is in standing steady under the grape of a battery of guns. To give one's self up to grief without resistance, to kill one's self to escape it, is to abandon the battlefield defeated.”

Napoleon Bonaparte (1802)[233]



“When the nerves break down, there is nothing left but to admit that one can't handle the situation and to shoot oneself.”[234]

Adolf Hitler (1943)



Dr. Evil: Scott, I want you to meet daddy's nemesis, Austin Powers.

Scott Evil: What? Are you feeding him? Why don't you just kill him?

Dr. Evil: I have an even better idea. I'm going to place him in an easily escapable situation involving an overly elaborate and exotic death.

from the movie,

Austin Powers: International Man of Mystery (1997)[235]



The propaedeutic of winning

Section 80, Why You Should Like Geography

All kinds and categories of knowledge, all disciplines, and all approaches to knowledge can help the astute competitor win an armed conflict. Among the modern academic disciplines, however, Geography is probably the one that gets to the most relevant knowledge fastest. It obsesses about distances, fascinates about the interrelationship between human activity and the natural environment; and revels in travel and exploration. Vocationally, geographers solve transportation puzzles, order ownership records and land-use plans, and calculate the environmental costs of human activities.

Property is where Geography, Law and Economics cross. It is difficult to understand property regimes, urban planning, or agrarian reform on any significant scale without a grasp of geographic theory. Peaceful plans depend on geographic knowledge. So do not-so-peaceful plans.

Geography is probably the most hyphenatable discipline. Most geographers in the major geographical societies of the United States consider themselves to be human geographers of one stripe or another. They are economic geographers, cultural geographers, and so on. The common denominator of Geography, however, is recognition of the importance not only of place and distance, but of differentials in environmental conditions, human approaches to that environment and the potential for peaceful or conflictive interaction.

Again, all knowledge is grist to the mill, but Geography should be the discipline of choice for those who want to win violent struggles. It teaches the measurement of distances, inventorying everything, cultural exploration, and precision mapping in time and space. It accepts a broad range of the meaning of truth, without abandoning latitudes, longitudes, wind directions and soil samples. Below are ten reasons to favor Geography and geographers:

Distance — perhaps the most profiting theoretical concepts special to Geography revolve around distance. The dissipation of power as distance increases or the increase of influence and identity as distance decreases; the idea of cost-distance and its various measurements by time, money, fuel, etc.; and distance as a question of cultural affinity or perception -- these are easy to Geography. The distance to the culminating point (what I call the risk-distance) is a key to planning. Distance is passed over by other disciplines even while it is central to the study of armed conflict.

Place — Place is also prominent in other disciplines like Anthropology and Sociology, but concepts of place-identity and the relationship of these to nested and un-nested, formal and informal territoriality is more thoroughly considered by way of Geography.

Maps — Attacks on mapmaking by 'critical geographers' may be all the evidence the discipline needs of its theoretical uniqueness. Even English Literature cannot claim language or writing as a special purview, while maps and map-making are stuck to Geography. As one of the first and still spectacularly effective methods to communicate ideas, Cartography belongs to Geography.

Inventories — While the tendency to catalog and count is derided by some, it is a theoretical as well as a habitual strength of Geography in that it bespeaks a basic empirical intention. Truth, for most geographers, is not a floating matter of pure perception and human invention (although these matter), but is still an objective quantity that, more than likely, has a latitude and longitude, a moment and second.

Exploration — Other disciplines explore, but geographers will explore anyplace. Going out and reporting back is more than research, it is search and research.

Hyphenation — Geography is always a willing partner to other disciplines. Geography is often the ecumenical keystone of many multidiscipline research efforts.

Embrace of Technology — It isn't just that Geography dominates GIS, but that as a thought culture, Geography embraces new ways to make its maps, descriptions and discoveries. GIS allows us to better match the right temporal and spatial scales to our objectives, projects, and analyses.

Environment and Human — The interrelationship of humans and the environment has always been one of Geography's central themes. Man's domination of that environment (and of other men and women) has been more prominent in, and more favored by Geography than by other disciplines, but this fact does not diminish the strength of its methods and habits in service to other passions.

Conflict — Geography is criticized as a discipline of empires, but what is lost in such criticism is that Geography has been the one discipline to take head-on the question of power and human competition in ecological space. Nothing in the discipline today insists on taking one side or another in human competition, only that the natural environment, distance, weight, time and space are central considerations. Terrain and weather can favor either contestant in combat, but generally favor the side that understands and engages or adapts them best. Likewise, the contestant is favored who best understands and engages principles from the discipline of Geography.

Attitude — I think Geography is by and large a happier discipline, more optimistic than the other social sciences. Geographers, by-and-large, are more pragmatic problem-solving types. Other traditions offer more psychological space for accusation, lamentation, cynicism and suffering-as-authenticity. Geography's tone of discovery, meanwhile, is almost always buoyant. In any given university, others are more likely to be post-structural. Geography generates a winning mind-set.

Please see sections: 83, *Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?*; 43, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*; 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 31, *Holes in the Ground*; and 142, *Conflict Geography*.



“War is God’s way of teaching Geography.”

Alexander von Humboldt
(attributed)



“I don't want to be a product of my environment;
I want my environment to be a product of me.”

Frank Costello in the movie
The Departed, (2006) [\[236\]](#)



Section 81, What a Clergy Wants

Clergies want to provide a service, which can be valuable. They want to be paid for that service as well. Clergymen would like to be your agents, middlemen, go-betweens, representatives, spokespersons, lawyers. When life is good for the clergy, the clergy invents its own vocabulary or speaks its own language, has its own licenses and schools. When things really get good for a clergy, it no longer has to expend energy selling the idea of their agency to the clients. They just presume clergy is a natural and necessary part of life. Tithes, indulgences, pledges and donations are too often the equivalents of commissions, retainers and fees. Offensive as it may sound to put religious clergy in the same bucket with lawyers and sports agents, the point here is not about charlatanry or even about religion. I want to underline that spirituality or theology are questions apart from an establishment of religion's leadership, just as ideology is a question apart from the quality of the vanguard. We can measure the justness of a law separately from the caliber of the bar and the judiciary. Our arguments about the value of the workers' labor can be assessed independently of the virtues of the union bosses.

The concept of clergy and exclusive agency are almost the same; only the linguistic protocols for their use vary. A vanguard of the proletariat seeks almost the same kind of exclusive agency as some religious leaders do, so when I use the word clergy, I don't mean to disparage religion, but only warn that clergies bear watching because of their tendency to seek exclusive agency.

You will be helped in your armed conflict if you understand the rents of agency, especially exclusive agency. Where rents of agency are collected, who exactly pays them, to whom they go, and what they pay for is key. It is a property issue. The places and methods of delivery of tithes and indulgences, the catchment areas and variety of paid services all have a geographic mark and, as the clergy system becomes more complex, it begins to consecrate seminaries, require examinations and perform ordinations. There arises a concomitant sense of jealousy and fierce protectiveness regarding the 'right' to exclusive agency. If there are too many lawyers, it will cheapen the bar. Bolsheviks don't abide by other Communists wanting to be the vanguard. Remember, by clergy I don't just mean religious clergy; I mean a collaborative institution of exclusive agency. Take inventory of agents and agency of all kinds, because through clergies flow matters of morale, followership, enthusiasms, and enthrallments.

Freedom of and opportunities for speech and of assembly are closely tied to some powers and opportunities for representative agency and it can be hard to remember that the profitable feature of exclusive agency is not freedom of action and expression, and not fiduciary responsibility, but *exclusivity*. Separating the two for analysis can be difficult and has been a thorny question for Americans since the founding of the Republic. It appears in the form of a debate about whether or not churches, for instance, should be taxed or whether a given organization even is a church such that it should not be taxed.

Where is all this going? The last section of the book is about a successful State versus a failed State and that a successful State has an exclusive power to grant impunity. Religious clergymen (at least your ambitious types) aspire to be the exclusive granters of absolution. If they get enough power they will protect that exclusive agency (that they will call a right) with apparatuses like inquisitions and the simple control of private spaces. Impunity and absolution are not so far apart that if you can combine the Church and the State, there is hardly any difference at all. You can ease the defense of your right to exclusive clerical agency by building a theology and creating a religious belief among followers – your clients – for whom you intend to be the exclusive agent. Please keep in mind that defining the success of the State in accordance with its capacity to maintain exclusive agency in the granting of absolution (impunity), is not to say that such success makes the State good – just successful at being a State.

When a State asserts that to be successful, a State has to provide this and that material benefit, it might be a subterfuge for claiming a right to exclusive agency. Once people are convinced that their care is properly in the hands of a good State, then it is a lot easier for those lucky and wily enough to put themselves in charge of the State to establish the same sense of exclusive agency that clergy wants. They will claim that *only* the State can rightly provide this and that.

Hopefully the concept of exclusive agency makes it easier to see why some religions want to make sure they control the State and why some States want so badly to either *be* the religion or kill off religions, or at least organized clergy. Whenever you see a group bent on maintaining any kind of exclusive agency, and especially when they try to get others to believe they have some spiritual right to exclusive agency, you have also found a font of grievance and resistance.

Exclusive agents, by the way, tend to create specific geographic spaces for the exercise of their advantage. It is easier for a rabbi to create and maintain influence if he has a synagogue. If you want exclusive agency for bringing big league football to the American fans, you need stadiums. If you are going to maintain exclusive agency for the provision of civil justice, you want court buildings. These spaces are not hard to find and they lead back to the operatives and owners. As is highlighted in other parts of this book, it is often easy to find geographies of power, and if you have the capacity to change the built environment; you have the capacity to greatly adjust the shape and possibilities of exclusive agency.

It can be dangerous to posit one religion as better than another, either for the good of the universe, or for winning your war. Consider, nevertheless, a handful of desert prophets – which of them did not kill and which did; and consider, from among the beliefs and religions they inspired, which are oriented toward sparing souls from desperation and hopelessness, which are based on free will, which demand taxes, which invite or exclude, and which are jealous.

Please see sections: 42, *Brigands*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 119, *Declaration of Counterinsurgency*; 95, *Childhood*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; and 120, *Misleading COIN Articles of Faith*.



“The real religion of the world comes from women much more than from men - from mothers most of all, who carry the key of our souls in their bosoms.”[\[237\]](#)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.



“The Clergy is the greatest hindrance to faith.” [\[238\]](#)

Martin Luther



You cannot make an arrest with a fighter jet

Section 82, Conflict Thresholds

Sometimes we claim armed struggles fall along a ‘spectrum’ of violence (less to more), a convention that may or may not reflect the relationship of one conflict to another, or be helpful for determining which struggles are more urgent than others, or when to change our strategies for dealing with them. There are some thresholds, however – ethical, technological, economic, legal, territorial and emotive – that are distinct enough to help guide our strategies. None of them exists independently. They don’t act sequentially to announce the status of a conflict nor do they, singularly or in the aggregate, describe war. Thresholds nevertheless illuminate a field of organized human conflict that includes thermonuclear war and peasant roadblocks. A few of the thresholds inspire other sections of this book, like *Weapons*, *Mercatus*, *Kidnapping*, and the first section, *Impunity*. Conflict-as-thresholds is a device, not a philosophy. Some of the thresholds might be milestones in a struggle with which you’re dealing. If you establish a shared understanding of the thresholds relevant to your struggle, you might be able to anticipate arguments and decision-points, and maybe even push the thresholds backward or forward in time a little.

Ethical Thresholds — It is hard to make an arrest with a 155mm howitzer. A potential act of killing has been anticipated before its use. The cannoneer who pulls the lanyard and all ranks above him, to include those who ordered the forging of the tube, presuppose their permanent impunity from prosecution for some future willful act of killing. We pass a distinct ethical threshold when the cannon fires, but even before forging the tube or training the artilleryman, impunity (or sovereign immunity) had been bestowed. The forgers and trainers foresaw an act of war. We cross another ethical threshold we excuse the killing of persons who are clearly not resolved participants, such as small children. If we assert ‘collateral damage’, for instance, as morally justified, we cross an ethical threshold. That we might ponder whether such thresholds engage *immunity* or *impunity* is exactly what makes them ethical thresholds.

Technological Thresholds — Use of a cannon heralds and emblemizes war beyond the expectations of trial justice, to say the least. Other technological thresholds include manufacture and use of the unmarked landmine, instruments which are also extremely difficult to employ within contemplation of a law enforcement process. They come into play beyond the normal rule-of-law. Employment of an armed aerial drone would be a clear technological threshold. Use of this technology is too new historically to allow us to analyze its full impact on armed struggles, but it is grist for impassioned debate, especially as the low per-unit cost of the machinery spreads the technology to more and more potential contenders.

Economic Thresholds — In *The Rise of the Western World, a New Economic History*, Douglass North and Robert Thomas outlined the idea of transaction cost as that concept relates to conflict.^[239] They asserted that people resort to violence when the cost of violence is perceived to be less than the cost of nonviolent transaction. The nation-state, they argued, could afford high-end means of applying organized force, and so could make the costs of violence seem high to a would-be challenger to the nation-state’s authority. (Here we would say that impunity is the absence of such a cost for violence.) Peaceful transaction costs would generally be higher than the costs of violence if it were not for the invention of systems that encourage fulfillment of contractual obligations. If contenders were to calculate the transaction costs of peaceably resolving a land dispute, for instance, and found it uneconomically high compared to the use of violence, they might prefer the violence. Depending on your part in an irregular war, you may or may not want to see an administrative and judicial environment in which land disputes can be peacefully resolved at economical advantage.

Territorial Thresholds — The economic thresholds strongly influence another category – territorial. These are perhaps the most naturally understood thresholds in that they relate closely to what many think is a natural element of human character. The title to Robert Ardrey’s popular work, *Territorial Imperative*, is succinct. The territorial thresholds are reached by the physical act of crossing a demarcated boundary in a way not authorized by the occupiers (perhaps sovereigns). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq or the taking of the Falkland Islands by the Argentines are easy examples, but so are property trespasses by squatters, or tossing a bag of excrement onto the roof of a downhill shack. In the broader range of human conflict, almost every territorial trespass is subject to spatial mapping, and those territorial violations that imply war are often the most ardently mapped. Spaces outside the lines of formalized mapping are known as no-man’s land and are usually subject to possession by force.

Legal Thresholds — Legal thresholds overlap the territorial thresholds, and tend to delimit the geography of military action, rather than the geographic object of the conflict. For instance United States domestic law places clear boundaries on the physical space of action of the United States military. The Posse Comitatus Act exists because of concerns that the whole panoply of American civil rights and duties might be overmatched by an organized armed force, however noble its leaders, whose members might enjoy immunity from civil prosecution and, as the reasoning goes, impunity for socially dangerous behaviors. Thus, with some exceptional prescriptions, the US Army does not operate within the geographic boundaries of United States territory. The Colombian government has had to face many of these questions in recent years. For instance, in 2008, the Colombian armed forces raided just across the Ecuadorian border to take out a major FARC headquarters. The Ecuadorian government claimed the attack was a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty. The Colombians saw it as more of a hot pursuit of a terrorist organization and an action within the common defense agreements of the two neighbors. Some Ecuadorians have moved to prosecute the Colombian Minister of Defense in their or international court. Our first reaction to that notion might be ‘Fat Chance’. Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian stance does encumber the Colombian State, not to mention the defense minister. In this kind of context, the denial or rejection of extraterritorial jurisdiction can be considered a threshold marker.

Emotive Thresholds — Any dehumanization or demotion from privilege can become or lead to a conflict threshold. We are talking here about the formalized establishment by fear and hate of vulnerable and resentful collective human identities. Persons committing trespasses or violence against such a collective are sometimes led to expect impunity for those acts. In other words, a nation, premeditating impunity, could designate a category of humans as a target, abuses against which impunity would be granted. The Nazis, for instance, not only crossed the threshold of publicly identifying Jews, they premeditatedly established a public understanding of impunity for violence against them. This is an historically extreme example, but by no means the only. A sense for those locales around the world where human disqualifications occur would be a good start to predicting organized violence that could escalate toward war or genocide. As with the disqualification of the European Jews, disqualifications often start in the realm of property rights, reaching the thresholds of war only in late stages. The emotive threshold can become wrapped tightly to other thresholds, such as the territorial. For instance, Bolivians have indoctrinated themselves to hold the loss of Pacific coastal territory as a shared emotional void, the recovery of which is now an article of patriotic faith.

We might hope that our domination of the technological thresholds of war will appropriately match our understanding of the other thresholds, but we probably always perceive an imbalance. Israeli angst in their decisions to use a 500-, 1,000-, or 2,000-pound bomb is exemplary. Might we conduct war with nonlethal weapons that stun and disable without permanent harm? Using nonlethal force where possible (in order to meet standards of proportionality and discriminate use) may be a good thing in its own right, and might secure the blessing of Sun Tzu’s ghost. The overmatching advantages that perplex and confound an enemy can sometimes be found beyond lethal weaponry.

In *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, contributor John Shy quotes of Jomini, “strategy, like politics, must find some ‘juste milieu’ between wars of the past fought by professional armies and the new yet old barbaric warfare unleashed by the Revolution.”^[240] Jomini was talking about the French Revolution. The ‘Revolution’ is a little different these days. The thresholds may arrive as dissonance or cacophony. In the analysis of irregular wars globally, however, a solid sense of the thresholds can be useful. The passing of various thresholds fuels premonitions that the

time is coming when established governments will launch militarily against enclaves that harbor, train, promote or aim powerful math minds against digital systems. Meanwhile, more athletically-oriented organizers of violence will continue to manage the more traditional kinds of violence.

Please see sections: 25, *Why Humans Don't Fight*; 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 39, *Socioeconomic Causation*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; 76, *Gender*; 94, *Poop*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; and 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*.



The very existence of flame-throwers proves that some time, somewhere, someone said to themselves, You know, I want to set those people over there on fire, but I'm just not close enough to get the job done.

George Carlin (attributed)



“The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends...”

Abraham Lincoln (second inaugural)



Section 83,

Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?

Why does a government sometimes lose or not win? Why do insurgent or other irregular forces fail? Below are my lists of reasons, starting with why a government might fail. A government might fail at irregular war if it makes mistakes, that is, if it does not...

1. express clearly what winning is, what it will look like, that is, clearly express the goals, the objectives.
2. act quickly to neutralize opponent irregular leadership at the first clear opportunity;
3. control anonymity;
4. identify and locate the insurgent leadership, the *mens rea*;
5. effectively pursue enemy guerrillas after contacts;
6. locate enemy guerrilla sanctuaries;
7. trace the routes, the lines of communication, to and from enemy guerrilla sanctuaries;
8. cut distances to anti-government sanctuaries (That is, the government fails to shorten the distances to culminating points of government units when they are in pursuit of the enemy);
9. develop a sense of collective resistance against the irregular forces;
10. prevent a generalized atmosphere of impunity for crimes;
11. deny international support to the irregular force;
12. address palpable socio-economic and political grievances.

The above omissions aside, a government can also lose if the executive loses heart, or for whatever reason doesn't care or gives up. Why might anti-government forces lose or not win? Maybe if they do not...

1. maintain anonymity early in their organizational development;
2. plan escapes carefully when planning offensive actions;
3. prepare physical sanctuaries;
4. ever attack government forces or take offensive actions;
5. develop a sense of collective resistance against the government;
6. develop international support;
 7. secure a dependable flow of financing;
8. shorten the risk distances of government forces when those forces pursue them during their escapes to sanctuary;
 9. develop a peaceful, systematic way to replace leaders;
 10. measure strength correctly/ hold terrain only when they can prevail;
 11. keep secrets, especially of rosters and accounts;
12. correctly identify grievances within the population/effectively grow the consciousness and intensity of grievances;

Some readers may be off-put at seeing competition about palpable socio-economic grievances in the number 12 spot on my list of things that might cause a government to fail. They would have given that cause a much higher priority, maybe at the top. History and logic will defend my assertion that the failure of a government to take care of human material needs does not have as close a correlation to the prospect of State failure as do the other items listed. While government resolution of public grievances may be a good idea and occasionally a reasonable part of a long-term prescription for a peaceable social compact, grievances can be generated out of nothing and attempts to satisfy them effectively ridiculed.

Please see sections: 2, *Anonymity*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 137, *Foreign Support and Perspective*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; and 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*.



Male Announcer: The THX account is six percent over budget. The case is to be terminated.

Female Announcer: Discontinue Operations.


from the movie

THX 1138 (1971)[[241](#)]



“It matters little who wins. To make a people great it is necessary to send them to battle even if you have to kick them in the pants.”

Benito Mussolini (attributed)



“They’re not gonna catch us. We’re on a mission from God.”

Elwood Blues in the movie

The Blues Brothers (1980)[\[242\]](#)



Section 84, Cultures of Violence

Culture is a broad, amorphous something. For the purposes of winning, it is useful to talk of ‘Mafia culture’, ‘gang culture’, or ‘guerrilla culture’, and to avoid painting a whole people as having a violent culture. There are two principal characteristics of violent organizational behavior that focus attention in this regard. One is the rule, law, or ethic of silence (or culture of anonymity), the other is proof of resolve to kill (which feeds a version of existentialism).

Colombia is a violent place, but a look through the ample Colombian literature on violence reveals that some physical object of contention is nearly always present in the formula (some piece of *Covet-geography*), not just human foible. And that is only what is seen. What is not seen is the absence of a functioning mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts over rights and duties associated with the objects of contention, particularly land. Violent behavioral habits exist, but they matter in the presence or absence of certain characteristics of the political, administrative and economic surroundings, many of which can be changed rapidly. This hopeful thought should be tempered by recognition of a psychological reality reflected by the very first words of the final section (*He didn't ask Al if he wanted fries with that*). Those words evoke the emotion-turned-philosophy of simple resistance that cannot be appeased by cost calculations of almost any kind and, while we allow as how a talented economist can price out anything, the idea that life gains meaning through rejection of oppression from all external authority has its own cultural labels and adherences. Still, peace might be achieved more surely by changing administrative conditions than by trying to change human behavioral dispositions. Colombia is a violent place, but Colombians aren't innately more violent than anyone else.

According to economists like John Umbeck, people resort to violence when the cost of so doing is perceived to be less than the cost of nonviolent transaction [243]. In practical terms, this counsels governments to create a chance for peaceful coexistence by putting in place rules and mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. Establishing institutions to resolve conflicts about the use and occupation of land is the most obvious and positively consequential. Large polities have done this successfully, however, only with the use of formal records and some kind of property courts. The likelihood of social peace increases as more agreements are openly published, land ownership mapped, titles granted, courts made available for eviction of trespassers, and markets created for the realization of the transferable economic worth of rights and duties.

Does all this disciplining of contractual obligations constitute culture? Arguably yes, but the suite of innovations that make a social compact stronger does so in great measure because of the simple destruction it causes to anonymity. That is to say, in peaceful societies, the right to privacy has some specific exceptions. The identity of wealth, especially the nexus between individuals and valuable property (real estate, vehicles, significant chattel, professional licenses) can be made precise, comprehensive and transparent. Making publicly visible the identity of wealth leads to accountability, tax equity, and environmental responsibility. It is hard in an administratively open society for individuals to hide their personal identity and sources of power in relation to quarrels about land and other things of value.

Cultural understanding – knowledge of pertinent elements of human psychology, sociology and geography – can further competitive success in internal conflict. Social network analysis, for instance (identifying nodes and linkages in human relations) has long been a staple of competitive intelligence efforts. This book stresses knowing who owns what, and that knowledge includes the *who* and the *where* as much as the *what*. The step from social network to social compact, however, is an essential one – one that involves evidence, institutions, and stable expectations. That said, practical mechanical and organizational innovations are readily available that trump and obviate many human phenomena that we might too respectfully honor with the term *culture*. Simple infrastructure investments that alleviate dispiriting conditions and invite human aspiration are often powerful in the long term. To the extent these kinds of things (transportation systems, toilets, property registries, school lunches) are cultural, so be it. They can beat the cultures of violence.

There are violent places in Colombia, but it is becoming a more peaceful country as its leaders finish putting in place those innovations proven to strengthen the social compact and alleviate simple human urgencies that can be exploited by amoral entrepreneurs and charlatans. As this book was being written, the Colombian government, with broad support of the Colombian electorate, is investing its hope for a peaceful future on land reform and restitution. Many Colombians acknowledge transparent, divisible rights and duties as the civic key to long-term peace and see a transparent and robust public GIS, like those known in so many US counties, as a central supporting technology.

Their optimism stated, Colombians may never be able to build a peaceful society if powerful armed groups, bent on defying the Colombian government's monopoly on granting impunity, enjoy sanctuaries in neighboring countries. Cultures of violence follow the basic rules of operational art and strategy. They follow anonymity and sanctuary. They feature leaders able to grant impunity to their followers for violent acts. Sometimes those leaders enjoy a special protection afforded by international boundary lines. Often, with a view to geopolitical advantage, a foreign national leader cedes sanctuary to a violent group, secretly condoning its presence. That complicity might help fuel the impression that his neighbor suffers a violent culture, when the truth might be closer to that of the violent impact of international war.

Please see sections: 103, *Amnesty and Restitution*; 25, *Why People Don't Fight*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 95, *Childhood*; 76, *Gender*; and 42, *Brigands*.



“Where’s my money, Man.”

Stewie on the TV series
The Family Guy [244]



Guillermo: The people we've encountered since things fell apart? The worst kind. Plunderers. The kind that take by force.

Rick Grimes: That's not who we are.

Guillermo: How was I to know? My people got attacked and you show up with Miguel hostage. Appearances.

T-Dog: Guess the world changed.

Guillermo: No. It's the same as it ever was. The weak get taken.

from the TV series
The Walking Dead [245]

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

What's a Moschi?

Section 85, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

About this officer's WWI exploits, popular military history writer Edwin P. Hoyt wrote,

For what it is worth, my opinion is that von Lettow-Vorbeck was the most successful guerrilla leader in history, and that his record has never even been approached by any others, in terms of impact on his enemies, in terms of survival in the field with no sources of supply for months on end, in terms of managing a racially mixed fighting force with enormous skill, in terms of sheer courage and heroism, and finally in terms of superb generalship that kept his enemies almost constantly guessing.^[246]

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was not an insurgent leader, even if we stretch the definition of insurgency about as far as it can go. He was fighting for the Kaiser against the British Empire. Some anti-colonial 'narrative' might be wedged into the history because a decade earlier, Lieutenant von Lettow-Vorbeck had fought in actions to suppress native uprisings on the other side of Africa. Of the potential for a subtext of native resistance against European overlords, the Prussian remembered it mostly as an unrealized worry. "The fear of a native rising had been expressed in many quarters... But none of these fears turned out to be justified. Later, a very intelligent captured Belgian Askari told me outright: 'You know quite well that the natives always side with the stronger party', and an English Masai admitted frankly: 'It is all the same to us whether the English or the Germans are our masters.'"^[247]

Regardless of the insignificance of insurgent or self-determination energy during the war, in his introduction to Battery Classics' 1990 edition of von Lettow-Vorbeck's reminiscences, Dr. Thomas Ofcansky asserts, "*My Reminiscences of East Africa* has gained a reputation among military strategists as a crucial treatise on insurgency warfare."^[248] Reading that, I couldn't help but think of the exalted position in which American military curricula have placed Lawrence of Arabia in recent years. Crediting T. E. Lawrence as an excellent writer and his work *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* as a milestone in the literature of warfare, not to mention Lawrence's having been a tremendously successful guerrilla leader, we are left wondering if Hoyt's superior praise of von Lettow Vorbeck wasn't a bit high. Looking into it, however, I don't think so. The Prussian artillery officer confounded the British and remained undefeated for four years until after the armistice in November, 1918. That von Lettow-Vorbeck is not as well remembered in English-speaking military imaginations owes to Germany's having lost the war and to von Lettow-Vorbeck's not having the likes of a Bertrand Russell for an editor or of a Lowell Thomas for a publicist. Measuring from events and the impact that a single military leader had on those events, however, the Prussian looks pretty good, even by comparison to Lawrence.

The first shots of the war along the east coast of Africa can be attributed to the British cruiser HMS *Astraea*, which bombarded Dar-es-Salam on August 8, 1914, trying to knock out a radio tower. (The British could count on buried cables for communications with their distant colonies, while the Germans had to rely mostly on long-range radio transmission. Communication between Germany and its African colonies would soon be all but cut-off.) Von Lettow-Vorbeck, however, initiated the first significant engagements northeast of Mount Kilimanjaro along and across the border with Kenya. His goal was to make his presence felt in British territory along a significant economic line of communication in order to draw British forces in reaction. That line was the Uganda Railway running from Mombasa past Kilimanjaro through Nairobi to Kisumu on Lake Victoria. In 1914, a parallel railway, called the Usumbarra or Northern Railway, ran in German East Africa from the Indian Ocean port at Tanga to a town called New Moschi, southeast of Mount Kilimanjaro. The British had hoped to move a force from Longido (northwest of Mt. Kilimanjaro) to Moschi, take the railhead and move eastward along that rail line to pincer and destroy any German forces between Kilimanjaro and the port city of Tanga. By securing the Moschi area in advance, however, von Lettow-Vorbeck denied the British any hope of mounting timely pressure from two directions during the ensuing battle for Tanga, which took place between November 3rd and November 5th. The British landing at Tanga was one of the most bungled moments in British military history.

Military leaders are at times made to appear effective by the ineptitude of their opponents. Major General A. E. Aitken, commander of the British invasion force from India, performed so badly at Tanga he was subsequently reduced in rank and retired, his actions and demeanor held in contempt as (negatively) exemplary. As such, some of the reports of his hubris and nonchalance may have since been exaggerated for educational effect. In any case, by Jove, he did not do well. One chronicler reports him to have said at the outset, "The Indian Army will make short work of a lot of niggers."^[249] We can add that at least he did not limit his ethnic disdain to the Africans. "The German troops are ill-trained, ours are magnificent and bush or no bush I mean to thrash the Germans before Christmas." General Aitken had held an officers' conference at the Bombay Yacht Club prior to the departure of the expeditionary force for the east coast of Africa. There he apologized to the officers for their having to be involved in such a simple affair and that he would do his best to get them all reassigned to France when it was over. He expressed his central concern: "There is one thing, gentlemen, about which I feel very strongly. That is the subject of dress. I wish officers and men to be always turned out. I will not tolerate the appalling sloppiness allowed during the Boer War. That is all gentlemen, thank you."

However incompetent General Aitken might have been, the uber-competent German commander was the principal author of the outcome at Tanga. Before the battle, an Askari NCO reported to the Colonel, "*Adui tayari*" (the enemy is ready). Actually, the Germans were ready and the British not so much. The *Schutztruppe* (name given the German colonial protective forces) had blocked any British hope of pressuring Tanga from inland and, consequently, it was the Germans who were able to move reinforcements down the rail line from the west. A resolute, competent, energetic defense assured that an eight to one advantage in troop strength was not nearly enough for the British. Beyond not taking the port, they left behind sixteen machine guns, 600,000 rounds of ammunition, and sufficient other gear to equip three more German companies. At the start of what proved to be a grueling four-year campaign across thousands of square miles, the British Empire gave a valuable gift to a clever foe.

Soon after the Battle of Tanga, von Lettow engaged the British in another more or less fixed battle at Jassini near the border with the British East African Protectorate. He had won that second battle decisively as well, but decided that the high cost his force had paid required he thenceforth place nearly complete reliance on guerrilla tactics, guerrilla operations, a guerrilla strategy. He would fight the British on his terms, which meant rarely giving the British much of a battle at all, and always making them suffer a failed pursuit. For more than a year the *Schutztruppe* lived well, basing around the Moschi area southeast of Mt. Kilimanjaro, attacking the Uganda rail line inside the British East Africa Protectorate. After finally being pushed away from Kilimanjaro, the *Schutztruppe* and its native allies marched, converged, dispersed, and re-converged in obedience with the imperatives of their hit-and-run war.

United States Army Major Thomas Crowson, who perceptively chose to write his military thesis on this episode, included among a selection of quotes a passage from the *Schutztruppe*'s pre-war field training manual. The extract reflects the German perception of the native Askari fighter.

He has no fixed line of retreat, for after a defeat his forces break up into small parties, which retire in all directions, and concentrate again at points previously agreed upon, often in the rear of the victorious troops. ... The natives think themselves beaten in a fight only when they have suffered great loss: flight and escape with small losses they regard as success.^[250]

“Aha,” you say, “no fixed line of retreat.” Yes, but let us highlight the word *fixed*, and remember that von Lettow-Vorbeck wisely adopted and adapted the Askari sense of guerrilla war. Like the Askari, he chose his rally points to lead either to safety or to again threaten his enemy’s columns or lines of communication. At the scale of a single engagement, the Askaris’ and the Germans’ disengagement tactic might not have been uni-linear, or even mucho-linear, but at an operational scale it most certainly was aligned to their own and to their enemies’ lines and to a studied understanding of distances and sanctuary. It is possible to imagine an entire war in which both sides, with many warriors and camp followers, never march to battle, but rather by angelic anticipation and resolve descend, each individual fighter of his own accord, on places mutually and consensually chosen for battle. Afterward they disperse as though blown out of a perfume atomizer. Possible to imagine, it just never happened, including not in East Africa. They had marching orders.

The WWI actions in East Africa were not insurgent, counter-insurgent, revolutionary, separatist, or anything transnational, sub-national, religious or ethnic. They compose, nevertheless, an episode of irregular warfare set within a conventional global contest of empires. Victory in the greater contest ultimately went to a nation whose resolve, resources, and alliances prevailed. In this theater, meanwhile, military victory was achieved over and over by a commander who imposed the cost of his aggressive attacks on his enemy, while always assuring the security of his escape routes. That security was, in turn, built on a foundation of geographic acclimatization, empathy for another culture, technological innovation, and the application of basic leadership principles.

The perseverant British did finally win in East Africa, themselves learning and adapting. They deployed troops to East Africa from the far reaches of their Empire, including from Africa. Africa is large, however, the steaming distance from Cape Town to Dar-es-Salam as far as from Indian ports, and the climate as distinct. A quantity of cultural proximity did assist the South Africans, but famed Boer general Jan Smuts did not best the Prussian.

It is worth adding that in the various writings about von Lettow-Vorbeck, his leadership is not counterposed only against that of General Aitken or other British military commanders he faced, but against that of the German governor of German East Africa, Dr. Heinrich Schnee. Dr. Schnee aimed to declare the colony neutral -- to countermand von Lettow-Vorbeck’s intention to fight, opining that the colony could do little to help Germany win. Von Lettow-Vorbeck was the governor’s subordinate, but could not abide such a decision. The officer chose loyalty and action over obedience and quiescence. By the way, Dr. Schnee was married to an Englishwoman.

Please see sections: 68, *Scale*; 38, *Cultural Study for What*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 132, *Turducken and Hybrid*; 47, *Why the County*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 7, *Sanctuary*; and 142, *Conflict Geography*.



No one could make a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could only do a little.

Sir Edmund Burke (attributed)



Dexter Griff: It’s just a box canyon in the middle of nowhere. No way in or out. The only reason that we set up a red base here is because they have a blue base over there, and the only reason they have a blue base over there is because we have a red base over here.

Dick Simmons: Yeah, that’s because we’re fighting each other.

Dexter Griff: No no, but I mean, even if we were to pull out today, and they were to come take our base, they would have two bases in the middle of a box canyon. Whoopdie f---in’ doo.

Dick Simmons: What’s up with that anyway?

from the online video comic series

Red vs Blue: Why Are We Here? (2003) [\[251\]](#)



--- East Africa circa 1914-1918 ---



I approximated the line of movement based on von Lettow-Vorbeck's Reminiscences [252]. The distance between Dar-es-Salaam and Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika is a little over 800 miles.

Radix malorum est cupiditas

Section 86, Shifting Covet-geographies

Some places are more desirable than others. Organized armed violence often ensues when the relative value of real property changes abruptly and there are no systems in place to handle the change peacefully. An index of real-time changes in real estate market value can be highly revealing, if not the easiest thing to maintain, if you were to want to anticipate the changing places of armed conflict in the world. When a new source location for oil, gold, leavortite, or any saleable commodity is discovered, people fight over control of the location, transport nodes to it, labor resources necessary for its exploitation, associated tax revenues, insurance coverage, proximate business locations, and even related trademarks. Everything that can be sold, traded, or held at risk for the purposes of extortion: water, coal, bananas, guano, cardamom, feathers, emeralds, coca, heroin, ink, cattle, gold, silver, salt, bandwidth, goldfish, babies, hardwood, medical cadavers, rare earth, and on and on, will be violently fought over in the absence of alternative means of coming to agreement about ownership.

The cost of violence takes its own geographic shape (where the natural environment is damaged, landmines are placed, people thrown in unmarked graves, innocents hit by stray bullets). The phenomenon is true at every scale. Not only can the locations of covet-geographies be mapped, so can the 'where' of the cost of violence can be mapped. The reasons *why* the costs of an armed struggle are located *where* they are located can be explained in part by changes in the geographic locations and values of saleable material.

Shifting covet-geography tells us a little about why people fight. The logical leap from *why-the-where* to just *why* isn't that far, except that for the latter we would have to rest on some philosophical assumptions about the nature of man, the nature of social constructs, and all that falderal. I think it is called greed. However, the observation about the changing geographic loci of commercializable things tells us more about where to expect violent actions to occur and where the costs of violence might be imposed. The question *Why-the-where?* can speed our doing something about the situation, however. We have to be careful, however, in how we conceive and map the geography of a commercializable item. Take Colombian coffee, for instance. The geography of Colombian coffee is not just the coffee fields, but those plus the transportation routes to the processing plants; those plants then routes to the ports; the locations of farm, processing and transportation labor; plus the location of associated banks; and so on. A significant change in the value of any part -- to a mountain pass, for instance -- could be a cause of violence.


There is a major exception to the above observation that the geography of armed conflict and the costs of armed conflict correlate to changes in the commercial value of places. That exception is battle plans. When groups travel to attack each other in obedience to their understanding of military strategy, the places where battles occur are generally not related to changing differentials in real estate values, but to the possibilities of attacking a foe and either being able to withdraw safely or pursue successfully. The terrain of operational art and the terrain of real estate values coincide in some way. Perhaps it is exactly when the terrain of organized violence is not related to commercial value that it must be related to military strategies.

Please see sections: 25, *Why Humans Don't Fight*; 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*; 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 47, *Why the County*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; and 142, *Conflict Geography*.



"Unfortunately there is one thing standing between me and that property: the rightful owners. ...Wait a minute... there might be legal precedent. Of course...Land-snatching. (He thumbs through a legal casebook index.) Land, land...(He finds the entry he is looking for): 'Land: see Snatch'. Ah, Haley vs. United States. Haley: seven; United States: nothing. You see, it can be done."

Hedley Lamarr in the movie
Blazing Saddles (1974)[253]



"Moses dragged us for 40 years through the desert to bring us to the one place in the Middle East where there was no oil."
Golda Meir (attributed)



Section 87, Water Wars

It wouldn't seem that water would be much different than any other commodity or that it is so scarce it would merit constant mention. However, the human body is 95% water and can't long endure without replenishment. We can divide water conflicts into three categories: Water we need for combat; water we possess or can control in order to make money; and water we figure to deny others because we just hate them and want them dried-out dead.

1. **Water for fighting.** Soldiers in the United States military are logistically well-supported, but still sometimes run out of water at the front, which endangers them and impairs their fighting effectiveness. At the fighting end of logistical distances, which might just as likely be measured in yards as miles, the weight of water is increasingly felt. Water doesn't move over the Internet. A soldier has to carry it and he consumes it more rapidly as he does more work, so getting an ocean tanker full of fresh water to the closest port may not be enough, close enough. Big-war water moves in huge ships, cisterns and pipes, but in the more usual conflicts it is a canteen problem. From Colombia, which is one of the four or five freshwater-richest lands in the world, come many anecdotes of soldiers and guerrillas fighting fiercely over some damp streambed during the dry season or at altitude during a dry spell. When soldiers find themselves too many hours away from water resupply, other determinants of strength begin to fade toward insignificance. In the aggregate, small unit water problems can spell a significant strategic advantage for the side better able to assure that its fighters have water. More water is a classic ingredient of advantageous risk distances and correlations of force. It might even constitute a fair distinction between police work and a military operation, because military operations so often require consideration of water's urgency.

2. **We want a better deal.** Contests over the price of water are ubiquitous and happen at many scales, from small urban residential areas to bordering nations. Sometimes you or the neighbor, the municipality, the evil corporation or the uphill country wants a better price or maybe even needs it to keep providing the water. Water sources, courses and distribution systems that serve multiple ownership identities are always a potential object of conflict. That is why water courts of all kinds exist and why there is a whole regime of international water law. One of the best-used arguments is that water is so elemental to human life it should be free and not subject to commercialization. This is a great emotional argument that works all the time, but it is also highly problematic. If water is worth something, then waterworks, water delivery systems and water storage facilities are worth financial investment, and that means dealing with the market for money, which means borrowing. That means we get to the question of interest rates and how much is a usurious rate and how much isn't. This generally gets us to a question of who gets to commit extortion, the guy with the water, the guy with the money, or the guy that organizes a bunch of people who demand water, but don't want to pay its worth. Sometimes the water is tied indirectly to a parallel problem of money and future value, such as when the water is contained in order to produce electricity.

3. **Thirsty?** Restricting water as a toll of extortion is common in irregular war. FARC units have on many occasions isolated and shut off intake pumps or interrupted municipal aqueducts in order to announce their presence and power, and therewith to extort concessions from towns in Colombia. If the international conventions held sway, which they don't, such actions would be in violation of the rules of war as postulated. I mention those wistful rules only to point out that some deliberative bodies, interested in the normative course of civilization, have at times concluded that leveraging the scarcity of water to extract concessions is illegitimate behavior. It seems, however, to be effective.

If there is a fourth category, it is the unintended effect of changing or damming a watercourse — ruining its drinkability with toxic waste; overtaxing it; or changing its course and destroying habitats in the process. This kind of water negligence or crime can cause human population displacements and armed conflict. They are not exactly about water, but a result of poor resource management or stewardship.

The rise of Evo Morales to power in Bolivia is tied in recent urban lore to his participation as a leader of the aggrieved underdog in a 'water war' in the medium-sized city of Cochabamba. The facts revolve around a municipal potable water distribution system the management of which had been privatized. The company may or may not have overreached on prices, but in any case made a few boneheaded and culturally unacceptable revenue strategies. Evo Morales' personal participation or effectiveness in the actual events is debatable and the whole history is a lot less engaging than the term 'war' merits but, in the end, the distribution and appraisal of water was catalyzed political competition, some of it violent. Meanwhile, the Bolivian government, backed by everyone along the Bolivian political and ideological spectrum, was claiming from Chile a higher price for water that flows from Bolivia into Chile and which is used there by a combination of residential areas and mining concerns.

Water is one of many natural resources over which people fight. It has some special characteristics, not the least of which is the fact that it flows downhill. Watersheds and streams often mark human territories. Availability of water often determines the relative value of real estate. Entire court systems are built around the need to resolve conflicts over water. Today, there may be a few places in the world where water could spark an international incident or even start a larger war. Those rarities aside, it is highly likely that the irregular war in which you find yourself will feature within it one or more of the types of water fight listed in this section. Don't lose the water fights.

Please see sections: 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 19, *Mercatus*; 142, *Dignity and Honor*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 54, *Extortion*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 125, *Human Rights*; and 107, *Price of Real Estate*.



“Moisture is the essence of wetness, and wetness is the essence of beauty.”

Derek in the movie
Zoolander (2001)[254]



Lt. Escobar: You must really think I'm stupid, don't you Gittes. **Jake Gittes:** I don't think about it that much but, gimme a day or two and I'll get back to yuh.

from the movie
Chinatown (1974)[255]



Not an even playing field

Section 88, Escape Geography

The geographies of greatest relevance in irregular wars tend toward remote areas, but it is not the remoteness *per se* that is significant. Certain geographic phenomena favor the escapee. Those involved in clandestine transport are likely to seek, gravitate to, or be naturally selected toward those geographies most favorable to the escape. That which might otherwise be the least passable terrain becomes transportation hubs – for clandestine transportation.

If a US or allied force were fighting for a government or against one, at one point or another it will find itself in a deadly pursuit, either chasing or being chased. The prospects of success in that pursuit are tied intimately to the relationship of the culminating points of those forces. Each can anticipate arriving at a point in time and space where it would no longer be prudent to continue. Wet, sloped terrain holds its own advantage for the side trying to escape. When the chase is in wooded, mountainous terrain, the pursued usually knows which direction he will take when he gets to the junction of two watercourses. His pursuer, on the other hand, is often obliged to make a blind decision as to which stream to follow. If for no other reason than this mundane fact of slope, water, and gravity, an advantage is given to uphill escape. Every left-or-right dilemma presented to the pursuer shortens the distance to the pursuer's culminating point (his prudent risk distance). With a little help from landmines and snipers, the fugitive can augment his enemy's perception of the cost-distances, that is, greatly shorten his enemy's risk distance. Other terrain can be made to do the same. Tunnels can be dug or jungle paths cut to confound the follower. As it happens, long upslopes and jungles are also often 'remote'.

The geographic phenomena that can shorten the risk distances of the pursuer more quickly than those of the pursued are not limited to physical geographic phenomena. Boundaries, especially international borders, can do the same trick. If we were to imagine a daring, defiant rabbit whose mission in life was to eat carrots right in front of every dog in the neighborhood and then run, and if every dog in the neighborhood were collared to a long chain, the rabbit would only have to outrun the dogs to the ends of the dogs' chains. That space beyond all of the chains is sanctuary for the rabbit, but if there were no space outside the length of all the chains, the rabbit will likely be consigned to his fate – if all the dogs are alert and resolute. The chains define a specific geographic limitation for each dog. It is imposed by the dog's master because the master feels he or she takes too much risk to allow the dog to go free, not perhaps because of the danger posed by pirate rabbits, but because of other dogs and other masters. International borders act on units of armies and police in a similar way as the chains work on the dogs. So it is that an upslope, a jungle and an international border can have a similar, commonly measurable effect – they serve to shorten the pursuer's risk distance more than they shorten that of the fugitive.

Some groups of persons, communities perhaps, are either predisposed or purposefully convinced to not tell which way they went (that is, the fugitives). Such people, too, form part of the escape-favorable geography. It is both wise and common for groups that are compelled to prepare routes of escape to prepare the people along those routes. That preparation may include a threat to return and punish if the people snitch. It should come as no surprise that many small communities that experience this form of left-behind 'presence' are located in what we would call remote areas.

Distances, including risk distances, involve start and end points. For the fugitive during a pursuit, the happy end point is his sanctuary. A start point might have been a place where he attacked a government unit or a piece of infrastructure, or it might be where he went to receive the fruits of an act of subsistence – a logistical act. Perhaps it is a place where he receives a saleable quantity of drugs or a kidnapping hostage or the proceeds of a robbery. From those places he moves to sanctuary. Financing of irregular armed groups often revolves around the proximity of commercial valuable substances to sanctuary.

River barriers have long been a central geographic planning factor for Western armies. Their significance has in the main revolved around the being crossed – by either friend or foe. While techniques for crossing streams continue to occupy small units in irregular war, more attention needs to be paid to the longitudinal control of navigable rivers. What goes upstream and downstream may be more germane than what goes across. Opportunity also resides in the proper design and deployment of riverine vessels. Riverboats, like helicopters, can become the workhorses for resupply, communications and deployment. In addition, because river courses in low-lying areas constitute principle economic transportation arteries in so many lands, the thoughtful distribution of riverine support services can give an advantage in establishing favorable relationships with remote communities.

A special leadership aspect of operations in remote areas is worth mention. It is regularly noted that when placed in primitive conditions, soldier attitudes and standards of behavior can become increasingly atavistic. Preparations for irregular war should seek not only to master physical movement and actions on contact in difficult terrain, but an appreciation of the psychological effects of continuous existence in such places. It is good to teach the Boy Scout how to light a fire, but he may also need to be forewarned about the Lord of the Flies.

Although urbanization has seemingly proceeded everywhere, the world is not covering over with cities. Many urbanizing countries have seen rural populations decrease and remote expanses expand. The urbanizing world demands we heed its built-terrain and land-use vocabulary. As a consequence of that same urbanization, however, some rural communities experience new isolation that makes them vulnerable to the biddings of irregular armed groups. The world's tank-brigade-free extent (where it is highly unlikely that the US would deploy a tank brigade) probably covers 75% of the world's land surface. (I claim absolutely no science behind that estimate.) What's left is still sizeable, includes a desert or two, as well as a lot of mountainous and jungled terrain closer to the equator where that tank brigade would have a rough go of it anyway. The amount of earth open to potential meddling via special operations forces is far greater. Considering the broad range of reasonable scenarios applicable in the lower latitudes, observe that they are rich in escape geography.

Please see sections: 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 65, *Smuggling*; 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 85, *Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 16, *Presence*; and 142, *Conflict Geography*.



The reaches opened before us and closed behind, as if the forest had stepped leisurely across the water to bar the way for our return. We penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness. [256]

Joseph Conrad
Heart of Darkness



“Old longings nomadic leap,
Chafing at custom's chain;
Again from its brumal sleep

Wakens the ferine strain.”

Jack London

Call of the Wild [\[257\]](#)



Take, hold, sign

Section 89, The Dot Game and Go

The Dot Game. The Dot Game is a fine and dangerous pastime if you're the parent of a small child -- fine because little kids love it and can play it for hours on a long road trip; and dangerous because you, the parent, are delighted in it for about two minutes. Beyond that, it is instructive as the essential 'Take, Hold, Build' game. Try it out. Make a bunch of dots at the interstices on a page of graph paper. As a first move, you draw a line between any two points on the board then let your doobie-picking opponent take a turn. When you can make an enclosed square, you can mark that square with your initials -- it's yours. Also, whenever you fill in a square you get another turn. The winning objective is to end the game (when all the dots are connected and squares signed) with more squares than your opponent. It might be the most basic territorial board game possible.

But what if you could take three turns to every one of your progeny's? You could destroy the child's fun and self-confidence and save some time in the process. In armed struggle, while the dots have to be adjusted to the nature and value of the landscape, you will do pretty much the same thing, especially in an urban setting -- gain moves to possess more squares. Just as in the Dot Game with your kid, the lines don't always have to be drawn contiguously. Unlike the kid's game, you can create urban lines with physical barriers and control technologies that especially favor your side. And you can apply various methods in various parts of a city simultaneously. Your priorities regarding which squares to possess will usually be based first on control of movement and then on control of market value, the latter related to the former. The right choices will maximize placement of your signature on the most valuable pieces of terrain and deny use of those pieces to your enemy. It apparently took a while for US forces to figure out the imperatives of the dot game in Iraq, but they finally started getting it.

Think about what it means to put your signature on an urban square. Hopefully it means your enemy cannot move into it, and at least not through it. Scale matters; don't make the squares so big that you might be lying to yourself about being in control before initialing. Unlike the Dot Game you play with your kids, you won't concede any territory in armed conflict that you don't have to, so if your enemy puts his initials on a block, you'll want to go after it and get it back -- but maybe not right away.

Go. Go is an old Chinese board game played on a 19x19 line grid. While the Dot Game becomes predictable almost immediately, Go is unrelentingly complex. Played by two, the object is to control more of the board than your opponent by denying him options for movement while maintaining your own. Players have to find a balance in the use of their resources (the playing stones) between close-in and more distant positioning. An earlier name for the game was *weiqi* (pronounced wei ch'i) meaning 'encircling territory'.

Games can be good mental exercise. They can teach basic lessons and create psychological awareness of and disposition toward basic strategic phenomena -- such as uncertainty, deception, or the significance of distances and the balance between the concentration of force and economy of force. Is there a board or electronic game that sufficiently mimicks the complexities of irregular war? If it were to exist, it would combine something of the Dot and Go games, allow multiple players with changing alliances, reward successful deception, and punish mismeasurement of strength.

Please see sections: 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 36, *The Denver Broncos*; 32, *Land-use Planning*; 19, *Mercatus*; 67, *Points, Lines, Spaces*; 101, *Magical Realism*; 30, *Control Technology*; and 131, *Is it an Insurgency?*




"But Big Jule cannot win if he plays with honest dice."

Harry the Horse in the movie
Guys and Dolls (1955)[258]



"Most actions do not aim at anybody's defeat or loss.
They aim at an improvement in conditions." [259]

Ludwig von Mises



"...actions should be considered as links, as steps leading to the operative principle, never as the operative principle itself" [260]

Carl von Clausewitz



Section 90, Prisons & Prisoners

Prisons can be places where human rights are violated or where gangs form or insurgents communicate, recruit and train. People organize amnesties and prisoner exchanges around prison populations. Prisons always seem to be too small for the number of prisoners and when the prison capacity grows, that growth just seems to invite judges to send more prisoners. There never seems to be much racial or social equity in prisoner mixes, either. Some scholars will argue that prisons are the architectural manifestation of a system that punishes behavior that is itself the result of the way the system is organized and, anyway, the difference between some prisoners and some prison guards is just a matter of conviction. Prisons can become high value targets for armed groups wanting to spring their comrades. Wardens and staff become targets for kidnappings and vengeance attacks.

By way of example, consider the jail break sprung by the radical Islamist group Boko Haram (which translates to something like 'western education is a sin') at the Bauchi Prison in Nigeria. On September 7, 2009, shortly after the close of Friday prayers and the breaking of the fast of Ramadan, gunmen riding pickup trucks surrounded the Bauchi Central Prison and began shooting at security guards from four well-chosen locations. Simultaneously, fifty men wielding AK-47s, knives, and cutlasses hacked past the guards to gain entrance to the prison. There, the attackers moved from cell to cell, freeing some 721 of the 759 prisoners. The scene, known in its aftermath as the 9/7 attacks, was one of the largest prison breaks in African history, but it was hardly the only nor the last.^[261] Closer to home, consider the Baltimore City Detention Center where inmate Tavon White, ostensibly the leader of something called the Black Guerrilla Family gang, was indicted for having allegedly fathered five children with four of the guards, along with less productive illegal activity.

Where you put prisons, how you build them, who you put in them and for how long, and who guards the prisoners are all substantial issues. If you are not going to kill all of your opponents, you need a system of incarceration. Having to maintain a growing prisoner population is one of the accelerating costs of allowing a war to drag on. This problem alone is a big reason why you ought not to accept the notion that insurgencies are by their nature prolonged.

Courts are intimately tied to prisons. While the functioning of a court is not as dependent on the architectural design of its walls as is the prison, the courts' functioning and rules are closely tied to the functioning of the prison walls. If legal requirements are such that prisoners are too easily released, the result can be a tendency on the part of those doing the capturing to choose a more severe and immediate justice, i.e., killing instead of capturing.

What to do with abandoned children is a related and potentially sensitive question. Institutions like orphanages and reform schools quickly approach the status of prisons. Actually, a lot of regular schools do, too. The inconsistent functioning of other architectural manifestations of the social compact, like oldfolk homes and insane asylums, influences internal armed conflict to a lesser degree.

Invest in an optimal built environment for detainees, prisoners, captives, the incapacitated, and highly dependent populations. Design policies that do not confound their use. Get your conflict over with as quickly as possible. If you let it drag on, you will have prison and prisoner problems. That said, all of these comments about government prisons pertain to an insurgent force as well. Maintaining a population of kidnap victims in miserable conditions became a major operating cost for the FARC.


Please see sections: 37, *School Lunches*; 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 96, *Combatant Status*; 95, *Childhood*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 11, *Protraction and Diligence*; 97, *Oviedo*; and 69, *Measuring Actions against Enemies*.



“Me they can kill.. You they own!”

Papillon to Dega in the movie


Papillon (1973)^[262]



“You probably heard we ain't in the prisoner-takin' business; we in the killin' Nazi business. And cousin, business is a-boomin'!”

Lt Aldo Raines in the movie

Inglourious Basterds (2009)^[263]



“Danbury wasn't a prison, it was a crime school. I went in with a Bachelor of marijuana, came out with a Doctorate of cocaine.”

George Jung in the movie

Blow (2001)^[264]



Section 91, Forts and Walls

T. Miller Maguire, whose words are used in Section 6 to help introduce the operational equation, believed that nobody could build an impregnable fort. He said, "A fortress once invested is certain to fall, unless a relieving field-army can beat the besiegers away."^[265] He also claimed forts were almost indispensable in both the defense and offense. While chiming in with the maneuver generals' contempt for fortifications, Maguire included a clear exception when it came to the "works devised by ourselves to meet the exigencies of irregular warfare." Military architects are rare today. In a world ever more dominated by urban terrain, built environment, building takeovers and sieges, the disdain toward forts and walls that this rarity implies just can't be right.

As for walls, the Chinese didn't keep building their Great Wall because it didn't work. Forts and walls, like locks, are best rated according to the cost, time, or effort it takes to breach or go around them. Forts and walls work best when part of a greater system of defense or offense that is planned around cost-distance. The venerable 1940 US Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* recommends establishing fortified advance bases for logistics support to units moving inland from the coast. What does that say? It reflects the fact that for the American Marines, their lines of supply or withdrawal reached the US Navy. It also says that to be effective inland, the Marines had to lengthen the distances to their culminating points. They had to change the geographic facts of cost- and risk distances. They had to lengthen their risk distances. Forts have always been part of the military answer to geographic reality, even when not recognized as such. Almost every port becomes a fort. The Marine manual said their little forts would:

1. cover productive areas and their lines of communication with their markets;
2. afford protection to the local population in that area;
3. form a base of supply, rest, replacement, and information.

Forts can be an effective part of an offensive campaign when placed across enemy LOCs, placed to endanger enemy lines of retreat, shorten the distance in time and space to enemy culminating points, and lengthen the time and distance to friendly culminating points. The Marine manual put less emphasis on using forts to interdict enemy LOCs because identifying the enemy line of retreat or lines of resupply had been so difficult. If you cannot find your enemy's lines of communication, it is harder to place your forts correctly.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the forts of continental Europe were deployed in such a way as to promise an invader that, if he did not take them, the forts' garrisons would play havoc on his line of communication and retreat. The forts were located not so much for protection of the area where they were built but as part of a greater strategy of defense in depth. They also served expansionist aims by extending and protecting friendly lines during strategic advances. In 21st century Colombia, many new, fortified police stations have been placed abreast known guerrilla LOCs. The police presence serves to counter the isolation and marginalization of rural communities affected by the internal conflict, affect the flow of information, and to increase the operational range of friendly military forces by maintaining supplies. The driving idea behind the location of the new stations is to change the shape of the Colombian battlefield by confounding guerrilla resupply, corrupting the guerrilla's 'rule of silence', and thereby making guerrilla escape routes less tenable in the face of Colombian military pursuit. In other words, while police stations will help protect and service remote communities, the strategic logic for their geographic placement is part of a military offensive plan, not the simple defense of towns or infrastructure.

The offense-minded Colombian military logic followed an appreciation of Colombia's compartmentalized geography and a mutually supportive relationship between police and military. The police, anticipating being magnets of attack by the FARC, fortified their stations. The military high command knew that almost any station was subject to besiegement and to being overrun if a relief force could not be dispatched in time. 'In time' is a math that correlates the speed and weight of the relief column with the amount of time the fort's design affords its defenders. In other words, fort architecture can have the same kind of influence on the military operational math as the speed of the maneuvering force. A fort and a helicopter have something in common.

Fortifications can be permanent or temporary. They can be large, super-modern government or commercial buildings or a knocked-together site consisting of barbed wire, an observation post, and a communications center. They can also be used in urban networks to disrupt enemy movement, fragment enemy neighborhoods and safe havens, and force the enemy to abandon key corners. The key is location, location, location.

A one-story police station in a high-rise neighborhood located at the end of a dead-end street might not be well-placed. Fortifications are best situated to dominate their surroundings and allow rapid deployments in multiple directions. Obviously, it is not the building itself, but the forces it protects that must be enabled by location to disrupt enemy capability to move, marshal, and transport. The best fortifications are located and constructed for ease of defense, ease of relief, and ease of launching raids, sweeps, and counterattacks. Fortifications are often necessary to support a system of roadblocks or checkpoints, the positioning of which should also support offensive operations. Forts can...

- Seal off distinct, reasonably sized sectors;
- Back up patrols with a reserve force;
- Provide or withhold from the residents access to electricity, fuel, water, and food, as well as services such as medical care, sewage processing, garbage collection, and firefighting;
- Segregate or isolate suspect individuals from the general population;
- Protect shipments and convoys;
- Remind the population of your presence and strength;
- Support networks of roadblocks or checkpoints.

Well-placed fortifications (combined with normal city infrastructure such as freeways, tunnels, railroad yards, rivers, factory blocks and walls) can seal off areas to create funneling and filtration points. Forts should provide control, information and ease of action, and deny these to your enemy. Forts can also provide a useful show of force. Also, fixed fortifications can allow foreign contingents to participate in a coalition strategy without the political exposure of direct offensive action. If your forts do none of these things, you might want to close them down or move them.

Insurgent forces must maintain access to their supplies, redoubts, arms caches, hospitals, and sanctuary areas, both internally and in neighboring countries. When government fort placements disrupt insurgent LOCs, constraints on the insurgents mount, and the probability of insurgent tactical advantage in any given encounter diminishes. A government fort system that focuses exclusively on friendly force protection or the protection of economic targets is not as dangerous to the insurgent as one designed to create operational advantages, to disrupt guerrilla operational and logistics movements, to shape the battlefield, to be part of the offense, and to wrong-foot the insurgent. The insurgent line of withdrawal to sanctuary is the most significant geography.

Forts have been shortchanged in recent military technological innovation efforts. Insurgencies end in various ways, often including political and economic agreements, sometimes due to military actions, and rarely on the application of any single technology. Forts, however, can be an effective part of either counterinsurgent or insurgent effort.

Walls, like forts, are supposed to slow people down. The wall systems you devise will be tested in the context of a movement and space-control game with your enemies. Can he out-race your reactions to his attacks or he to yours? You want to anticipate pursuits after contacts to see how a wall affects or might affect the relative culminating points and probable next-contact moments. Walls are for keeping people out or in and for separating groups one from another. Wall placement can make a checkpoint plan more effective, can separate licit from illicit commerce or help protect valuable infrastructure. Walls aren't high tech, but you need a wall plan, especially in an urban environment, even if you are the insurgent. In San Salvador in the 1980s the Communist guerrillas created some almost invisible routes and walls by opening a series of holes through the adjoining walls of adjacent urban homes. The routes were protected from visibility by the street-facing walls, allowing the movement of combatants parallel to streets without being on the street. Walls change the advantages in the *Dot Game* that is urban warfare. Forts and walls begin to be the same thing at certain scales. A gated community, for instance, starts to look like a fortress.


Be confident in rebuilding the urban 'built environment' to your competitive advantage. The walls you build can be above or below ground, just as are routes of approach and escape. Heavy machines can help you control the pace of change in the built environment to your liking. You want to build your walls and tear down his at the speed that best suits your analysis of the moves. Deciding to design forts and walls into a strategy is also a decision to revisit the design of heavy machines.

While placement is the first, most critical question for putting forts and walls into a security strategy, fort and wall locations in urban areas can incorporate other design elements. A war will eventually end and the structures will either be used for something else or destroyed. They can be constructed for multiple uses so that the eventual success of a military strategy does not have to lead to scrapping the structures.

Because forts and walls can contribute to offensive or defensive strategies, your engineers might revisit control architecture, doctrine writers look to where forts and walls are missing in their literature, planners practice geographic analysis for the proper placement of forts and walls, and police organizations consider the manning and provisioning requirements implied by a fortification strategy.

Put debate about defense versus offense behind you. You sometimes have to rest and refit in order to not exceed your risk distances. In irregular war, if you are the government, you want to be on the offensive as much as possible, because if you are not on the offensive, you are either being beaten or you allowing your enemy to get way where he can gain strength. Forts and walls are not inherently defensive. They are terrain that you can build to suit your rhythm of defense and offense at the scale of time and space that you can best handle. They can be placed to help you to gain or regain the balance of advantages in risk distances and the probable correlations of force in battle. Proper urban forts can help you gain advantage in the balance of anonyms. Ultimately, if your enemy is alive and well, you have to close with and neutralize him.

Please see sections: 28, *Takeovers & Sieges*; 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 6, *The Operational Equation*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 138, *Raids*; 31, *Holes in the Ground*; 69, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies*; and 89, *The Dot Game and Go*.



"And he...showed me the holy city Jerusalem...having a wall great and high; having twelve gates...on the east were three gates; and on the north three gates; and on the south three gates; and on the west three gates. And the wall of the city had twelve foundations...and he that spoke with me had for a measure a golden reed to measure the city, and the gates thereof, and the wall thereof...and he measured the wall thereof, a hundred and forty and four cubits, according to the measure of a man, that is, of an angel."

Book of Revelation, 21, 12-17



Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down." I could say "Elves" to him,
But it's not elves exactly, and I'd rather
He said it for himself.

from Robert Frost,
Mending Wall



RIP

Section 92, Graves Registration

You will want to know all the laws, customs, expectations and sensitivities related to the care and disposition of human remains. Be scrupulous, disciplined and respectful in preparing and registering all human deaths. Caring only for the mortal remains of your own people can become an offense of its own. The first and most consequential step is to precisely identify cadavers and to safely record that information. Today, there are few unknown dead, only remains that might be temporarily difficult to match to their correct name; every human corpse has a unique genetic identity. With some ugly exceptions, there is normally no reason to be anything but exact as to the identity, storage, and burial of remains.

Informal burial has been a constant, poignant and politically abused issue in Colombia. Recently, as the country overcomes organized violence and increases the rule-of-law, it faces the question of thousands of nameless remains buried in hundreds of counties. Eventual identification of these remains is expected to clarify the fate of tens of thousands of individuals who have been reported missing over the past few decades. One locale becoming an emblem of that challenge is in a remote area southeast of Bogotá known as the Macarena. A few NGOs (all with a leftist ideological lean) announced the existence of an unmarked site with almost 2,000 corpses – what would have been the most horrendous mass grave since the war in the Balkans. The attending accusation was that Colombia's national army had negligently or criminally disposed of the bodies in order to hide extrajudicial killings of one sort or another. The Macarena area is all the more significant because it had for years been a stronghold of the FARC until after 2002 when the government began to reoccupy the region. Extensive multi-agency investigations, however, turned up no such common gravesite, and none of the accusers provided evidence of a specific place, leading to counter-accusations about the propagandistic nature of the accusation.

A large gravesite does exist in Macarena, however. It is a formal cemetery next to a military camp. Some four to six hundred persons were buried there in recent years, but individually and on many separate occasions. According to the government, the cemetery is open to the public and has kept careful records of each interment. Nevertheless, the government also says that the vast majority of those buried were members of the FARC, or other illegal armed groups, killed by the army in combat actions. Exhumations and autopsies may have revealed that a handful of the corpses correlate to what are called 'false positives' in Colombia. That medical reference is to a scandal in which at least one military unit murdered innocent young men in order to claim higher numbers of killed enemy guerrillas. That accusation is also subject to a judicial process still under way when this was written.

A mix of statutes and administrative processes causes the government of Colombia to pay indemnities for murders or wrongful deaths for which it is responsible. This legal responsibility may, depending on the circumstances, even include deaths directly caused by armed enemies of the State -- or at least that is an active legal theory. This potential for financial restitution has spurred the government to greater care in protecting basic rights, but also acts as an incentive to accuse the State and generate evidence against it for the independent purpose of profitable litigation. In the case of the Macarena gravesite, the curator claimed to have been offered bribes to say that unregistered burials had occurred. The curator also asserted that his family received death threats for refusing the bribes.

All in all, the human remains of the armed conflict are a persistent evidentiary, jurisprudential, emotional, and therefore political lesion. One of the wisest things that Colombian senior military leaders did in the last few years was to order scrupulous record-keeping of interments of all corpses. Not to say that the orders were everywhere followed, but they at least generated a record of accountability and due diligence regarding dignity in death, rule-of-law as to the location of a person's mortal remains, respect to surviving family and estates and the preservation of forensic evidence. The Macarena case, instead of becoming the emblem of government human rights abuse, was reduced to its still formidable role as emblem of a complex national challenge to correctly honor the deceased, heal anguish, and strengthen the rule-of-law.

Also related to the Macarena accusations, the government counterattacked in a sense, releasing news of a whole series of informal grave sites encountered and recorded over the past several years in territory previously dominated by the FARC or one of the other illegal armed groups. Rather than a single huge common grave, some 400 bodies were distributed into about forty grave sites, mostly unmarked. The remains are thought to be of guerrillas who were executed for having committed disciplinary infractions. The disposition of these former guerrillas may take some time, but as that time passes, more and more friends and relatives of deceased guerrillas will be willing to come forward and express their concern or curiosity. Because the government captured FARC computers with files containing the names of thousands of guerrilla foot soldiers, it is at least possible that many of their fates eventually will be revealed. It is doubtful, had the FARC gained political power or even been able to remain sovereign in the Macarena, that it would have done anything to reveal the whereabouts of the remains of these departed.

The process of resolving missing person cases, especially of rural teenagers in the most conflictive counties, is a morbid prologue of the conflict. The war in Colombia is hopefully winding down now and as it does more and more disappearance and missing person cases will be closed. Since there is no statute of limitations on murder, the process could conceivably generate a continuing flow of homicide cases as well, although not only is the evidence deteriorating; many of the responsible leaders are themselves dead. Plus, extracting a financial recovery from the defendants is much more likely if the defendant is the government and not, say, the FARC.

Prerogative writs are orders from superior courts to other courts or government organizations that they do or stop doing something -- and that the burden of proof for showing that a writ is unreasonable belongs with the government, not with the citizen petitioner. The historical appearance of prerogative writs was a significant step in Western liberal governance, although most of the writs have counterparts in other jurisprudential cultures. The writ of *habeas corpus*, which means 'produce the body' or 'show the body' is probably the most commonly known. The idea is now related to imprisonment -- that a custodian of a captive person must show he has detained someone, why and usually where. This is connected to the theory that a person cannot be held '*incommunicado*', that whatever offense or crime he might have committed, a person has a right to communicate his or her existence to the outside world. The idea of clandestine imprisonment is in turn connected to that of clandestine disappearance, kidnapping, murder and obstruction of justice. According to many thinkers, clandestine confinement is almost the same as burial. Secret confinement is often done as part of some anticipated extortion -- e.g., kidnapping. Clandestine imprisonment, informal burial, and kidnapping draw close to one another. The prerogative writs are an historical expression of preoccupation about the right to personal identity, to proof of life, and to proof of death. The writs have been advanced in the past forty years by GIS and DNA technologies.

Today it is harder to escape the forensic unraveling of a crime even if bodies are buried or discarded. Not only is it harder to get away with murder in a world of genetic mapping, it is harder to get away with false accusations of human rights abuses, not only because of new technologies, but because researchers, journalists and even common citizens are equipped and increasingly expected to give plausibly accurate location data with their denunciations. Rule-of-law is about people knowing and believing in certain rights. It is also about things written down -- like the prerogative writs and maps. Human identity carries into death.

Because human identity, dignity, place, and liberty so overlap, it behooves you, if you are involved in an organized violent contest, to be respectfully scrupulous regarding human identity, even after death. The writ of *habeas corpus* is one of our great jurisprudential inheritances. It was invented with the understanding that human rights have a geographical reference. Where people are is part of *that* they are.

Please see sections: 106, *Massacres*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 69, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies*; 17,

Keeping Secrets; 90, Prisons & Prisoners; 78, Identity; and 121, Dignity and Honor.



Here Rests in
Honored Glory
An American Soldier
Known But to God

The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier



Section 93, Diseases and Disasters

This section was written in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, mooting any intended assertion that disasters are practicably predictable. Every once in a while a disaster will be of such a magnitude that 'no one could have predicted it'. Not only was there no way to anticipate the level of need that the Haitians would face, there is no rationale and logic that can be emotionally adequate in the face such enormity. More people died in Port au Prince than in Hiroshima. Nevertheless, so many earthquakes, hurricanes, and volcanic eruptions occur in Central America and the Caribbean Basin it seems irresponsible to call them unpredictable. We might not know exactly the where and when of an earthquake epicenter, but our response preparations can cover quite a range of effects. The effects of floods are more predictable still and we at least know from where most of the volcanoes will spew.

Attacks from weapons of mass destruction are more frightening because other humans are working the surprise issue, and diseases seem so egalitarian and cruel that, regardless of our knowledge of their method of reproduction, we are afraid. Still, locating populations at risk and calculating probable material and environmental costs in the event of potential occurrences is the work of an increasingly competent community of scientists and humanitarian workers.

Predictable or not, big events can change the direction and character of irregular war. A big earthquake in 1976 in Guatemala was followed by a long civil war. That may have been mostly coincidence; the timing of the internal conflict may have had more to do with the lives of the revolutionary leaders and the development of external support in relation to the Cold War in the late 1970s. That said, a lot of political history is blamed on the earthquake and on the nature of aid programs and the intentions of foreigners during the response and reconstruction stages. New money, coming in on top of a people whose normal leadership hierarchies and expectations had been disrupted, gave space to new organizational forms, new ideologies, and new debt relationships. How such things might play out in Haiti or elsewhere is to be seen, but there is no doubt that big events can be game changers providing competitive advantage and opportunity.

In Guatemala, the activist left not only did a good job inserting itself in an organized way within communities affected by the earthquake, it also did a good job propagandistically, painting the government and allied aid as self-interested and as privileging the already-rich. Regarding reconstruction after the earthquake, one anthropologist who had long worked in Guatemala, Robert M. Carmack, asserted in *Development and Social Effects of the Guatemalan Earthquake*: "The wealthy, who owned the materials, vehicles to transport them, and companies of construction greatly profited from the earthquake. Engineers, lawyers, architects, and other 'professionals' similarly benefitted from the increased need for their services. Many of them raised their prices, an added burden partly shouldered by the already broken poor." [266]

Devastation from the tsunami of 26 December 2004 drove both the government of Indonesia and the Islamic separatists on the island of Aceh to resume peace talks. The same tsunami had a dissimilar effect in Sri Lanka, where the eastern coast was hard hit, weakening the position of the Tamil insurgents, who controlled that part of the island.

As for Colombia's war, the most transcendent natural disaster occurred November 13, 1985, when Armero, Tolima was wiped out by lahars after the eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz volcano. More than twenty-three thousand Colombians in Armero and other towns perished. Geologists had predicted the eruption and some ineffectual warnings were made and hazard maps produced. A less effectual evacuation effort and worse response saved almost nobody. A number of factors added to the scope of the disaster, including a simultaneous and severe storm that made communication about and perception of the onrushing mudslide difficult. The government was severely criticized for its inadequate response before, during, and after the event. The timing of the disaster could not have been worse for the government, as it happened one week after the M-19 takeover of the national Supreme Court building, which ended in an inferno. The general mood of the country and confidence in the central government was at ebb. Colombians will point to the results of the 1986 elections as a near term reflection and to public willingness to reform the national constitution as a longer term consequence of the paired disasters, one man-made and the other environmental.

Depending on the physical geography, it will behoove you to create a plan for the next natural disaster and the situation of populations it puts at risk. Plan accordingly to quickly and effectively ameliorate suffering, set a sustainable course for recovery, and take political and military advantage of changed conditions as appropriate. Address within the plan how to keep your enemy from being advantaged by disaster conditions. Apply to disasters the adage that luck is where preparation and opportunity meet. Check to see if the balance of anonymity is radically changed for or against you because records have been destroyed, control of human movement made impossible, etc. Act quickly if key walls and bridges are compromised, which might give your side a distinct physical advantage or disadvantage. Determine if there will be a displacement of communities.

On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 undersea earthquake off the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, unleashed a tsunami that affected more than 14 countries throughout south and southeast Asia and stretched as far as the African coast. Within six hours, the deadly waves traveled more than 3,000 miles and carved a trail of death and destruction as they arrived on land. More than 220,000 people died and millions of others were affected, including injured, missing, and displaced. The World Health Organization (WHO) determined that an estimated three to five million people lacked the basic necessities for survival during the immediate aftermath of the tragedy. In many places the physical environment was badly damaged or destroyed, including entire communities, homes, businesses, tourist areas, and infrastructure (roads, bridges, power and telephone systems, and public buildings). For many, their means of livelihood and way of life had been wiped out. The island nation of Sri Lanka saw 35,000 people killed, 500,000 displaced, and the entire eastern coast affected. In India some 12,000 died and 600,000 were displaced. The nuclear power station on the east coast of India at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, was stuck by the tsunami, but successfully shut down; no damage to the reactors or release of radiation was reported. Wide-spread inundation of the India coastline occurred. The US pledged and provided over one billion US dollars and used US military forces extensively to help with rescue and recovery. Dealing with diseases is its own reward. A competitive advantage lies in the legitimacy of doing the best work that resources allow on behalf of those afflicted and in appropriately condemning practices of your enemy that reduce opportunities for medical progress. Governments are usually far more capable than antigovernment challengers to work on disease prevention and control.

One of the entertaining characteristics of the old 90- and 105-millimeter recoilless rifles was the speed and volume of the ignition of the rocket when the shooter would depress the trigger mechanism. The firing is a surprise even to the person shooting it. Some things will be surprising if they are big enough or happen fast enough, even if they are perfectly predictable. Don't be surprised by something you set off.

Be aware and vigilant regarding charlatans of all kinds. They may be religious, ideological, or (most commonly) government or NGO bureaucratic. They will be present, along with the sincere and well-meaning, to exploit for the health of their own agendas the vulnerable psychological conditions that often reign in the wake of a disaster. You could be one of these, if you're a jerk.

Please see sections: 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 15, *NGOs, IOs, and Unions*; 105, *The Geography of Genocide*; 18, *Whole of Government*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; and 116, *Songs of Chu*.



Markoff: How do you feel tonight, Lieutenant?

Lt. Martin: I'm dying.

Markoff: I hope not, sir.

Lt. Martin: I'm going to die. I'll be buried under the sand and forgotten. When I was a little boy, I thought soldiers always died in battles. I didn't know there were so many soldiers...and so few battles... and so many fevers.

from the movie

Beau Geste (1939)[\[267\]](#)

-----~~CSB~~-----

Eyjafjallajökull...see Puthukkudiyirippu.

-----~~CSB~~-----

A town this deep in the crapper's got nowhere to turn but GOD!

Jonas in the movie

Leap of Faith (1992)[\[268\]](#)



Excrement meets dignity

Section 94, Poop

A poignant, irritating and significant section in Mike Davis' *Planet of Slums* is titled "Living in Shit."^[269] Unvarnished is hardly a sufficient descriptor. The paragraphs examine a pitiable human urgency and failure of decency on a massive scale due to the lack of basic facilities. Davis describes, for instance, how whole populations of Moslem urban women cannot evacuate during the daylight hours. This tactical, personal matter presents both strategic necessity and opportunity, but not if it goes unmentioned. Excrement, with its frustrating disposal and dishonoring presence, has been shown repeatedly to be a factor in generating the kind of existential despair that can inspire violent behavior. The geography of fecal matter matters.

This subject of excrement is so disagreeable it is usually ineffable, but it can't remain so for the person asked to win a war or enable social peace. It is in some places tied too closely to the problem of human honor and dignity; to the practicalities of security architecture; and to securing the support of the population. From the history of Medellín, Colombia we learn that during the worst of the uncontrolled 'squatting', in which marginal neighborhoods rapidly overpopulated, some shanty dwellers couldn't or wouldn't take the time to act civilly. Ricardo Aricapa writes,

The problems arose as the squatting [no pun intended] increased, the distances to the ravine grew; and people forgot their decency. They then preferred to do their business inside their shacks and later put their bodily waste in black plastic bags — there was always someone who used transparent bags — which they would throw wherever, as slyly as possible, like someone pretending not to have thrown the rock by hiding the hand. These flying leftovers almost always landed on the roofs of other homes.^[270] [my translation from the Spanish]

To this unpleasantness is reasonably ascribed a portion of the city's gang formation and no small number of machete events.

The Johnson County, Kansas *Rural Comprehensive Plan* pays considerable attention to issues such as density versus sprawl, aesthetic and lifestyle preservation, environmental stewardship and so forth. Chapter Eight, however, wherein the hydrological engineers opine, reveals something at the heart of what is urban — what to do with wastewater. The problem of city annexation, questions of density, economic development, environmental carrying capacity and ecological protection depend in many places on the flow of water and the flow of human waste. This is true in Johnson County, one of the richest, flattest American counties. It is more so in most of the rest of the world. The processes of city annexation, at times contentious and at other times collaborative, are built around a well-established mix of rights and duties — the city's right to plan and taxmatched against a duty to provide services. Among the most coveted and valuable services is sewage removal and processing. It turns out the stuff indeed flows downhill, and so it is that the sewage engineers have more to say about the efficient shape and growth of a city than other planners, who might prefer to concentrate on higher-order, genteel challenges such as cultural heritage. Still, the poop has to make its way to places where it can be processed or dispatched. That problem solved, engineers can tackle roadbed suitability, potable water provision, or power lines, but the real challenge is sewage. To be urban is easy; to be a functioning city takes a sewer.


Poop is nasty. Doctors associate it with diseases that can have an unpredictable and never pleasant impact on the course of any kind of warfare. Waterborne illnesses, such as cholera, are spread through sick people's poop that contaminates the water supply. You might want to have a plan for poop. Find someone who can explain to you in detail the cultural and engineering condition of human waste in the battlespace of concern to you. You might have a clean, clear opportunity to take positive action. This argument about the management of excrement applies also, with different variables as to cultural sensibilities and physical mass, for other forms of human waste — trash, garbage, grey water — these are all consequential, if execrable, substances.

Please see sections: 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 79, *Suicide*; 34, *Urban or Rural*; 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 19, *Mercatus*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; and 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*



"Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf."^[271]

William James



"To kill a human being is, after all, the least injury you can do him."^[272]

Henry James



Section 95, Childhood

We like to think all peoples prize their young and place them in a special, separate category of protection. Legal concepts like statutory rape, custody, guardianship, or juvenile prosecution all draw off social norms that set the developing human being apart from the fully formed adult. Most societies recognize that the child is not yet sufficiently developed emotionally, physically or mentally to make valid independent decisions. We want the human child to have the opportunity to grow up – *then* do stupid things. This separation of status – child or adult – is significant to the shape and conduct of armed conflict.

Childhood becomes an issue in irregular war in a variety of ways. The most obvious is in the recruitment of the under-aged for soldiering. While there is a general international standard of eighteen years for military service in more formalized armies, many national militaries allow for voluntary service by seventeen-year-olds, and there are many stories of successful military service of younger soldiers who lied about their ages. In guerrilla armies, the foot soldiers are often younger. Use of pre-teen children as lookouts, couriers and servants is common, as is sexual enslavement of teenage girls. International slave trading is becoming ubiquitous or at least has become more visible. In other theaters, children are paid to deliver or even plant explosive devices or pieces of them. Simple abandonment of children is also normal in the context of hostilities and forced displacements.

Theories asserting a causal relationship between distressed childhoods and internal armed conflict can be tenuous or confused, however. After all, it seems the leaders of insurgencies, criminal empires and revolutions are as often the scions of the rich as they are the sons of poverty. Still, the criminal gang or rebel army sometimes consciously improves the condition of an abandoned child, giving identity, respect and material opportunity. It is hard to say with any exactitude what physical or psychological malnourishment is produced by a sociopathic parent as compared to a noble rebel. Regardless, it takes no leap of faith to believe that the neglect of children leads to bad results for any society. Societies suffering internal conflict always seem to experience the exacerbating participation, at one level or another, of abused or neglected children, and of adults whose childhoods were less than ideal.

Children can in fact make good soldiers. A fourteen-year-old can be a ruthless, obedient, enthusiastic, courageous fighter. Kids are easier targets for recruitment arguments and lies. In sum, it makes sense for an armed group to recruit children when older youths are resistant.

Programs, laws, and campaigns that address the fate of marginalized children are more than a good idea. They might not only shrink the universe of potential recruits for your enemy, they increase human capital capable of finding peaceful pursuits and solutions.

Organized crime often leads to the organization of youth groups and the outsourcing to such groups of specific criminal activities. The go-betweens or intermediaries between children's gangs and adult organizations should be an early target of investigation. Separation of the two entities is a step toward possible recovery of the younger participants.

International sex tourism is often linked to child abandonment, abuse and use in other organized criminal behavior. Governments can profile and monitor sex tourism as a method for identifying child abuse and for tracing that abuse to other criminal organizations.

An appendix to the US Army's field manual *Counterinsurgency* has a warning to "keep the children at arm's length."^[273] It may be necessary to teach rules of engagement for how soldiers are to interact with the children they meet. Admittedly, care must be taken that those interactions don't individually or in the aggregate endanger either the soldiers or the children. I reject the attitude presented by that manual, however. It should have addressed the larger question of where children should be, who should be taking care of them, what they are being taught, what their aspirations become, etc. It would be preferable to promote a structure of life that can handle specific rules of engagement with children. If a dull point of military instruction must be given to harden one's heart to them, then there should be another set of instructions dealing with the reasons why that first unfortunate instruction was necessary – so as to make it as unnecessary as it is unattractive. It takes five years for a twelve-year-old to become a seventeen-year-old. If you are going to let a war go on for six years, then how you treat a twelve-year old might be how you are treating a future combatant.


Childhood deserves direct, formal consideration by any who presume to make plans and decisions in the context of an irregular war. Assertions abound as to the legitimacy of governments, insurgents and social movements. In this one area, however, we have a sort of litmus test. If an organization willfully abuses children, that organization should not be considered legitimate. If you find that your organization is not explicitly, actively considering children who are vulnerable to conditions imposed by an armed struggle, you have an opportunity. The actions you take to address the fate of children can change the nature of your physical lines of communication and those of your enemy. They can also build substantive, substantive legitimacy.

Please see sections: 14, *Legitimacy*; 124, *Slavery and Underclass*; 74, *Refugees and Displaced Persons*; 78, *Identity*; 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 15, *NGOs, IOs and Unions*; and 48, *Grading the Social Compact*.




“Which brings me to my second point, kids:
Don't do crack.”

Lawrence Taylor in the movie
The Waterboy (1998)^[274]



“Each new generation born is in effect
an invasion of civilization by little barbarians,
who must be civilized before it is too late.”

Thomas Sowell (attributed)



“Great is the man who has not lost his childlike heart.”

Mencius (attributed)



“May you grow to be proud, dignified and true
And do unto others as you’d have done to you” [\[275\]](#)
Bob Dylan (or Rod Stewart?) from the song *Forever Young*



Legitimacy meets impunity meets amnesty

Section 96, Combatant Status

We can address some of the more consequential characterizations of anti-State actors by using the lens of impunity. Who can confer impunity, and where might that person go to enjoy it? Let's say a guy who is not a US citizen sets off a bomb in the United States, but gets caught. If he then were to escape, where would he go? Or rather, will authorities where he goes extradite him back to the United States or will they absolve and maybe protect or even honor him? If the person were designated a combatant, he might enjoy some exception from an extradition treaty and maybe therefore impunity for his actions. A foreign country might protect him from the processes of justice in the United States, and do so while remaining within the rules of the club of countries. Like other things, the concept of impunity has a relationship to geography. Generally, distance and time from the place of the action lessen the power of the State and increase the possibility of impunity.

Gaining 'belligerent status' could be a useful achievement to move an insurgent force toward becoming more than an insurgent force. As influential as words like *belligerent* and *combatant* can be, they beg a warning about cognates in foreign languages: These terms and others that surround them are translated with fair consistency within the formal regime of international law pertaining to armed conflict. There is less consistency among interpretations inside various countries' legal systems and still less consistency among public arguments, commentaries, and their translations.

What it means that an individual prisoner be classified as a *combatant* or as an *unlawful combatant*; or that an armed political movement gain *belligerent* status, are not questions to address haphazardly. Planners and their leaders should build an early, shared understanding of the pros and cons of attaching these legalistically-charged terms to specific sets of individuals, and should not allow such understanding only to stay within legal staffs. Try to establish theoretic coordination and agreement among those in charge of your operations, legal analysis, and propaganda (among lawyers, press secretaries, ambassadors, and commanders). The bottom line has to be tied to the State's monopoly on the conference of impunity.

The documents and concepts of international humanitarian law generally express aspirations for humane behavior and treatment, especially as to defenseless humans, the natural environment and cultural patrimony. At its best, humanitarian law can be used to protect people by overcoming or sidestepping arguments about the categorization of individual participants or entities. In practice, however, international law can be as much political argument as it is juridical statute and process. It is itself subject to use as leverage in irregular conflicts.

An approach that neither dismisses the importance of legalisms nor relegates the discussion to lawyers: frame the semantics according to their effect on you're gaining or losing the control your organization seeks over the granting of impunity. Especially to be considered in this regard is the effect on likely lines of retreat to sanctuary, yours and his. If, for instance, a majority of members within the international club of countries were to succumb to the late Hugo Chávez' argument that the FARC be considered a belligerent, the lines of escape for FARC members to sanctuaries within Venezuela would be strengthened.

Please see sections: 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 77, *Sex*; 43, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*; 128, *Particularization of Power*; 103, *Amnesty*; 40, *Rule-of-law*; 133, *Snipers and Assassins*; and 111, *Knowledge Cultures*.



Barnsby: Sorry about Marko.

Lescovar: Thank you. It's a risk we all take. He was a brave man and a good friend. Then he got careless.


Mallory: You think that big sergeant spotted him as a partisan?

Barnsby: I can't buy that. The sergeant wasn't that bright. He saluted you [Lescovar] - you're wearing a corporal's uniform. That doesn't rate a salute in the German army.

Mallory: Not in anybody's army. Why do you think he saluted you, Lescovar?

Lescovar: Perhaps he recognized my natural superiority.

from the movie
Force 10 from Navarone (1978) [276]



Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Sailor, Rich Man, Poor Man, Beggar Man, Thief
skip-rope rhyme and codename source



When does revolution begin?

Section 97, Oviedo

In early October, 1934, the city of Oviedo, (in the Principality of Asturias, Spain) suffered a violent leftist revolutionary attack. Military and police garrisons loyal to the Spanish republic resisted the uprising, other government troops were sent to relieve the besieged and in two weeks the government had restored order. More than seven hundred buildings in a city of about 100,000 inhabitants had been gutted or leveled, almost entirely by the insurgents. The revolutionaries willfully killed a number of unarmed civilians, including clerics, some of whom became the first Roman Catholic martyrs of the 20th century as recognized by the Vatican. Government forces also committed un-justifiable killings. Both sides acted with more discipline and charity than was painted by the propaganda that followed, however. The government threw almost 30,000 rebel leaders and followers in jail. Oddly, because the government left so many insurgents in jail without timely disposition of their cases, their plight became a highly influential issue in the elections that were called for 1936. Section 98, *Jorge Verstryngue and Pio Moa*, mentions a debate about the start-date of the Spanish Civil War. This section adopts the view that it started that first week of October, 1934 with the armed uprising in Asturias and complementary events in the rest of Spain.

Remembrance of the Spanish Civil War is a matter of academic faith that continues to fuel emotional and political contentiousness.^[277] In many Spanish hearts the war did not end; its causes and debts have never been reconciled. Some Spaniards will say that today's youngest generation of voters is no longer knowledgeable or cares about the events of the 1930s, but the shadow of those events is a long one and it is impossible to escape the war's influence on political philosophy and organization. The flags of political parties in Spain are designed, in one way or another, in relation to the civil war. Both leftists and rightists tend to record, if not remember, Spain of the 1930s in romanticized, vituperative, and moralizing political tones. In the English-speaking countries, meanwhile, that war is all but unknown and of no emotional stature, except among a few Europe-historians and the ideologically-inclined far left, for whom it remains an icon. The ideological left (marxists, post-structuralists, some socialists) prefers a selection of facts about the events of the 1930s that forms a sort of liturgy and leftist imaginary. That liturgy, chanted not just by the Spanish left, but worldwide, intones the Spanish Civil War as a robbery of democracy by fascists. (Spanish facism, similar to communism but less internationalist, was a form of class-based state socialism. Its most articulate voice was that of Antonio Primo de Rivera, killed by the communist 'republicans' in 1936.)

Some basic facts: Nobody knows exactly how many Spaniards died in the war, but estimates start in the hundreds of thousands; the contending armies reached perhaps a million armed participants each; Francisco Franco came out as leader of the winning side in 1939 and stayed in power in Spain until his death in 1975.

Why did Spanish leftists decide to take violent revolutionary action in October, 1934? The timing related back to a victory by rightist and center-right parties in the general elections held in November of 1933. Further back still, in June, 1931, Spain had held its first constitutional elections. In those first elections, Largo Caballero's PSOE, *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Workers Socialist Party), won the largest number of parliamentary seats (115 of 272). There were over thirty political parties at the time, but while it was necessary to make alliances in order to form a government, the numbers greatly favored a leftist direction away from the monarchy and dictatorship of the past. The Spanish Second Republic was under way (the first experiment in republican democracy was a disastrous mess in 1873-1874). The 1931 elections were a huge victory for republicans and socialists, and a defeat for monarchists and religious conservatives. In that environment, Caballero was offered a cabinet post as Minister of Labor and Social Services, an offer he accepted. During the ensuing two years, the government implemented a number of policies that promised to change Spanish life greatly. One aspect unpopular with many Spaniards (perhaps more than half and including the sitting President) was that of turning a blind eye to physical attacks against the Roman Catholic Church. These were perpetrated by leftist radicals and anarchists. No doubt the Church was a bastion of the old system and a direct participant in traditional governance, but the burning of churches, basilicas, and Catholic icons did not set well in a still deeply religious land.

In anticipation of the elections in November of 1933 and in light of considerable social unrest, Caballero resigned his ministerial post. He had probably been an active fomenter of the growing social unrest. During most of 1933 and although he was a cabinet member, Caballero's PSOE organized a series of strikes, including a general strike in Zaragoza that lasted over a month, as well as a widespread agricultural strike. Then, in the November elections of that year, the PSOE only won 58 seats. This time parties tending toward the ideological right achieved a sweeping victory. The political map had completely changed colors. Now, instead of left and center-left, the parliament was right and center-right. Ironically, one of the major democratic reforms of the new republic had been women's suffrage. The numbers suggest they voted heavily for social peace and for the church.

In the formation of governments, it was generally expected that the parties would be represented in accordance with the number of parliamentary seats they had won in the most recent election. In other words, the president would choose cabinet members from the various parties in some ratio appropriate to the level of representation that the parties had demonstrated in the elections. The number of cabinet members (ministerial posts) that a party might fill was a rough measure of the practical political power gained, given that the ministers had broad authority to act within their portfolios. The PRR, *Partido Republicano Radical* (Radical Republican Party), had been the winner of the second greatest number of seats in both the 1931 and 1933 elections. In a sense, the PRR was a more centrist party, although definitely republican and generally anti-clerical.

To form the first three governments following the 1933 election, the PRR was offered the greatest number of cabinet seats. The right-leaning CEDA, *Confederación de Derechas Autonomas* (Confederation of the Autonomous Right) was offered no ministerial portfolios in the first two governments formed, even though it had won the highest number of seats (115) in the elections. Later in the year, however, on 4 October, the president formed a government that included three CEDA ministers, in Labor and Social Services, Justice, and Agriculture. It looked to the PSOE that what it considered social progress was about to be undone and, therefore, the continued utility of the electoral process was questionable. Caballero and other leftist leaders apparently felt that the value of the electoral process had run its course and that the left would not again be able, or perhaps allowed, to re-take the reins of government. To the PSOE and other parties of the Spanish left, the historical moment for implementing violent revolution was at hand.

The revolutionary planning, however, was incomplete at best. The Socialists' estimates of relative physical power at any place and time were overly optimistic, their alliances shaky and resources inadequate. Caballero was not a consolidating charismatic figure (no Hitler or Mussolini) and had to share power and influence across a range of personalities. Spain had little experience with parliamentary democracy or socialist revolutions; the many political parties were bound to the foibles of their leaders and to tenuous sources of financial support. Opinions on all sides indicate Caballero was a scrupulously incorruptible, personally disciplined, and nationalistic man. His fortune at the time was the failure of his opponents to wholly understand that his was the *mens rea* behind a lot of violent subversive activity. His misfortune was being a poor military strategist. By mid-November, he found himself in jail for treason.

There cannot be any real-world histories more convoluted and multi-faceted than the Spanish Civil War. No single book could possibly do the drama justice. Militarily, however, the actions in Asturias in 1934 are relatively simple to understand. Asturias presented a most favorable human and physical geography for a leftist armed revolution. On Spain's northern coast, its millennial ports of Avilés and Gijón connect the Iberian

Peninsula to the ports of northern Europe. Inland, the Cantabrian mountains are home to coal mines and coal miners. For years, communists, socialists and anarchists had organized coal miners, stevedores and factory workers. Oviedo, in the center, is the principality's capital. By 1934 it and the surrounding area were also home to several weapons and munitions factories and to a few major banks. Had the armed uprising enjoyed better cooperation among the leftist parties, been led by more militarily capable leaders, or witnessed any appreciable success elsewhere in Spain, Asturias might have proven a formidable refuge and springboard for further revolutionary action.

From Madrid, the Socialist leaders sent orders via Oviedo to start the uprising in Asturias. They also sent the basic military plan, which was for the local committees, using the union locals, to take over several key towns in the mining areas, and then march on Oviedo. The thought was to secure the center of political and economic power. Radical leaders initiated military actions in mining areas of the high grounds south of Oviedo. Mieres was the first significant town controlled by the revolutionaries. From there, as well as from near Trubia to the southwest (where there was a munitions factory) and La Felguera to the southeast, revolutionary columns marched successfully to Oviedo against some government resistance. The Minister of Defense in Madrid, counseled in part by General Francisco Franco, sent a column of regular troops commanded by General Bosch-Balmes north from Leon toward Oviedo, but this approach was ably blocked by revolutionary militias. The main government column, led by General López de Ochoa, approached from Galicia in the west, moving north to Avilés and then south toward Oviedo. Another column was sent from the east, passing the port of Gijón and then moving south to the La Felguera region east of Oviedo. Finally, a column that included a contingent of legionnaires was sent by sea from African posts, disembarking at El Musel just west of Gijón then marched south to Oviedo.

Anarcho-syndicalists who controlled much of Asturian port and coastal factory labor were slow to contribute to the uprising and proved irresolute. Had they planned and resisted the movement of government troops into and through the northern ports, the outcome might have been significantly different. For their part, the communists and socialists were slow to provision the anarchist elements with weaponry and munitions. Bitter dissension among these revolutionary groups had been bandaged over by agreements together called the Workers' Alliance, but remaining distrust contributed to failure in Asturias. In total, revolutionary leaders probably motivated around fifty thousand people to participate directly in the uprising. The government suppressed the rebellion with a total of about eighteen thousand soldiers and constabulary. The government troops had to travel far greater distances than the revolutionaries to arrive at the points of contact, but the insurgents were only able to stop one of the government columns -- in the mountainous terrain with which the miner militias were most familiar.

The leftist leaders did not respect the northern approaches to Oviedo and did not close that backdoor. In retrospect, they did not think in terms of operational art or classic military strategy. They did not plan in accordance with the central significance of lines of communication. They were in effect hoping to control an area that could resist long enough that larger political truths might allow local gains to stabilize; but hope is not strategy. What they had done was take a centrally-located city, becoming themselves surrounded, and this only after ruining the electrical power and fresh water supply. By the short time it had taken to dominate most of Oviedo, the uprisings in the rest of Spain were already cold dead. There could be no effective international support in such a situation as that which the Workers' Alliance had created, so the possible routes of escape for its leadership closed fast. The revolutionaries had quickly captured enough weapons with which they might have armed all of their supporters, but the military moved immediately. The most effective aspect of the government response to the revolution was its diligence.

General López, in charge of the overall operation to repress the uprising, was a decided republican, an atheist, and not a rightist. There is no evidence that he acted other than honorably in his treatment of the defenseless, yet, in an injustice normal to the civil war, he was assassinated in 1936, having gained a reputation as the 'Executioner of Asturias'. Francisco Franco, who later led the rightist Nationalists in the later phase of the Civil War, did not arrive in Oviedo until after the uprising had been suppressed. Almost no *falangistas* ('phalangists' -- far right or fascist elements) participated in the repression of the uprising.

Several individuals were executed for treason following the October events, but hardly any of the leaders. In fact, many of the leaders were then able to commune in jail. In a sense, they had made it to the sanctuary they needed -- fed, housed and clothed by the government where they could review failure and better plan the next attempt. Largo Caballero was let go after a few months. The left propagandized widely on the issue of releasing the rebel prisoners, and successfully accused the government of heavy handedness and cruelty during the suppression of the Asturias revolt. As the February, 1936 elections approached, the right and center right formed a loose political alliance, while the PSOE and parties furthest to the left formed the more successful Popular Front. Although the division of votes was close, the newly formed government greatly disfavored the right. The new president, Manuel Azaña, put only leftists in the government. He quickly released all 30,000 leftist prisoners and restored the positions of those who had led the uprising of 1934. (Although he opposed union cooperation with the Republican government, Largo Caballero would become Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in September, 1936.) The PSOE instigated 'victory parades' that often turned into provocative street demonstrations. President Azaña reposted General Franco to virtual exile in Tenerife, a move that would turn out to be one of Azaña's gravest mistakes. Church properties were newly under attack and the Spanish right, scared and now seeing no possibility of another electoral opportunity, would initiate the next armed uprising, in July. It would be against the Republic incidentally, while decidedly against the Socialist, Communist and Anarchist left. It would be much better led militarily than the revolutionary attempt of 1934.

The themes illuminated by just the 1934 beginning phase of the Spanish Civil War are countless. They include as a minimum the relationship between urban and rural, the timeless importance of leadership and lines of retreat, money, foreign support, massacres, elections, religion and the prerogatives of clergy, prisons, amnesty, strategic deception, the artificial creation of history, vanguards as clergy, weapons, and the value of sea power. The Spanish Civil War is often seen as a precursor of WWII, rather than as an independent but related phenomenon. It is more valuable as a font of lessons about irregular war. The 1934 Asturias Revolution was the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Although it involved some foreign ideological presence, especially from the Soviet Union, it was relatively free of foreign meddling. Still, Europe was lurching toward Armageddon. Spain's internal struggle was influenced by the ideological battle among liberalism, fascism and communism, the latter two but flag-holders for similar propositions.

The answer to the question about when the war began bears on the assignment of blame, and to competing claims regarding the word 'provocative'. The ideological left maintains the argument that the Spanish Republic was forced to resort to violence only after the repeated violent provocations of the radical right -- that fascists robbed the people of their democracy. The geography and timing of acts of violence, and the names of the perpetrators, make the left's assertion of innocence and self-defense unsupportable. Without siding ideologically with the Spanish monarchy or the power of the Roman Catholic Church, we can say confidently that the *mens rea* causing the Spanish Civil War resided in the minds of socialists, communists and anarchists. They believed power grew out the barrels of guns and that revolution had to be effected by force. Their use of republican, parliamentary electoral processes was convenient and insincere. Spanish leftists came to use *República* and *Revolución* interchangeably, and to assign along with them a kind of divine bolshevist right to rule, a right they called democratic. Today those sympathetic with the left see a Honduran like Mel Zelaya as a minor Largo Caballero who would only use violence in defense of democracy. A fascist tyranny like that in Syria or Iran, meanwhile, gets an ideological pass because what matters is not left versus right, but rather upholding a value system of power forged in the crucible of violent struggle to be concentrated in the most ruthlessly resolute individuals.


Please see sections: 34, *Urban or Rural*; 1, *Impunity*; 137, *Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective*; 118, *Democracy*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 52,

Sovereignty; 15, NGOs, IOs, and Unions; and 42, Brigands.



“The Falange regards man as a combination of a body and a soul; that is, as capable of an eternal destiny and as the bearer of eternal values. Thus the maximum respect is paid to human dignity, to man’s integrity and his freedom. But that profound freedom entitles nobody to undermine the foundations of public social life....;... a nation is a unity of destiny in the world order, it is a plane to which a people has risen when it fulfils a universal mission in history.” [278]

Don José Antonio Primo de Rivera y Sáenz de Heredia, 1st Duke of Primo de Rivera, 3rd Marquis of Estella, Grandee of Spain



“The Nazi is ready to dally with the Communists.” [279]

G. K. Chesterton




“If he were not of great ability he would have died last night. It seems to me you do not understand politics, Inglés, nor guerrilla warfare. In politics and this other the first thing is to continue to exist. Look how he continued to exist last night.”

Ernest Hemingway,
For Whom the Bell Tolls [280]



— The Revolution of '34 in Asturias —



Note that the Spanish Army was fighting for the Republic. [281]

Is authenticity at odds with honesty?

Section 98,

Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa

Jorge Verstrynge. For about a decade until the late 1980s, Jorge Verstrynge was an active member of the conservative *Alianza Popular* political party of Spain, but, after leaving the party, his writing veered almost 180 degrees. He is now an anti-globalist marxist professor at the Complutense University in Madrid. He is the author, among other works, of *La Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, reglas y ética de la guerra asimétrica*. (2005) (I translate this to 'War in the Periphery and Revolutionary Islam: origins, rules, and ethics of asymmetric warfare'). In *La Guerra Periférica*, Professor Verstrynge weaves together total war, unrestricted war, insurgent war, every kind of war. His explanations are fluid and measured. He treats Mao well, Che roughly, and discusses the Algerian War with care, but something more significant arises from the book's admiration of Islamist radicalism.

Asymmetry is a word some Americans hoist to lament the fact that weaker countries sometimes win, because the United States is easy to surprise or because nobody will stand up straight and fight Midway rules (aircraft carrier-a-aircraft carrier). Professor Verstrynge effectively co-opted the term and nudged 'asymmetric warfare' toward meaning 'The Asymmetric War'. In the course of Professor Verstrynge's presentation in *La Guerra Periférica*, asymmetric warfare ceases to be merely a taxonomic category of warfare in which ostensibly weaker forces fight against ostensibly stronger ones. Instead, while maintaining a format of academic indifference, Professor Verstrynge's definition of asymmetric warfare becomes fighting against the United States, its interests and its allies. *Resistance* would at times be a more appropriate term than fighting, however, and broader concepts such as globalization, the North, the West, neoliberalism, capitalism, etc., could be substituted for United States in a given instance. Hence, what might have been a workmanlike explanation of 'postmodern' warfare escapes revolutionary disdain for being naïve or edgeless. It escapes being a book for the mere trade unionist. Instead of leaving 'asymmetric' as only a category of conflict to be compared with other types, or filled-out by other terms, Professor Verstrynge clothes it as a stage in the evolution of conflict, mimicking the idea of capitalism being an evolutionary step toward communism. For him, the asymmetric war is not just total or unrestricted war, it is tantamount to the 'totalitarianization' of war.

Professor Verstrynge's work hit a perfect note for Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Hugo Chávez set his chips down as being anti-American, perhaps needing anti-Americanism as part of the signage on his jacket. Lieutenant Colonel Chávez was apparently not much good at military art. He was, after all, the militarily least effective leader among the plotters in their failed 1998 coup attempt. Nevertheless (or maybe fittingly), Chávez made *La Guerra Periférica* required reading for his military officers. For President Chávez, The Asymmetric War justified much, and the admiring of it to attract appropriate company. Professor Verstrynge praised the resolve shown by Islamic fundamentalists. His admiration of existential power was not so much for those who commit suicide-murder, but for a charismatic, strategically competent leadership that could tie ruthlessness to a project of resistance. The radical Islamists could convince and send people to commit suicide-murder on behalf of a grand concept which the leaders framed. Professor Verstrynge and Hugo Chávez, in turn, admired the radicals as ruthless in their willingness to expend human life, and as both clever and resolute in their defiance of the great Satan, America.

Aside from philosophically framing opposition to the United States for the likes of Chávez, Professor Verstrynge's book offers another little problem for global security. It advises countries 'in resistance' to obtain nuclear weapons. It is pro-proliferation and in no uncertain terms. 'Asymmetric' includes nuclear deterrence in this formulation.

Let us be clear: true sovereignty now means possessing 'the bomb'. Furthermore, today, those who can, will, in search of maximum efficiency, combine nuclear, conventional, and asymmetric warfare to achieve maximum effectiveness. No potentiality is ruled out, in the manner that today the fighters are volunteers and conscripts, professionals and mobilized forces, unpaid soldiers and condottieri, reluctant heroes and kamikazes, old men of the *Völkstum* or members of passive defense, and child soldiers, i.e., everyone and everybody... Nothing is disdained in the war...

[282]

Nevertheless, and following Chairman Mao on this point, Professor Verstrynge opines that the war will ultimately be won by regular forces.

Pio Moa. Pio Moa is another Spaniard, maybe the un-Verstrynge; or conversely, Verstrynge the un-Moa. During his youth, Mr. Moa was active as a militant for GRAPO, a Maoist armed wing of the Spanish Communist Party. (Moa the Maoist) President Franco, good at counter-insurgency, caught young Pio and threw him in jail. Not idle in captivity, he used the quiet time to educate himself and study history. His learning journey steered him away from the radical left, and to a transformation diametrically opposite that of Professor Verstrynge. Mr. Moa published several works around the time that Verstrynge's *La Guerra Periférica* was published, including *1934: Comienzo La Guerra Civil Española* (1934: The Spanish Civil War Begins). It is really a popularization and summary of several more involved investigations Mr. Moa did of the Spanish Civil War. The title itself was an instant provocation because establishment academia in Spain, Europe and beyond holds the Spanish Civil War to have begun in 1936. The difference in starting dates reflects uncomfortable historic facts.

As Mr. Moa points out, the men and women who became the leaders of the Spanish Republicans (the 'left' during the war from 1936 on) were the self-same violent subversives and communists who had tried to take power by violence in 1934. Mr. Moa's statement is clear and his factual assertions well documented. The radical armed leftists who failed in 1934 to take power by way of arms subsequently succeeded through organization, luck, and the democratic electoral process, but they never had any intention of preserving a system that might put their party out of power again, peacefully or otherwise. Just as Mr. Moa doesn't see anything unusual about communists calling themselves republicans, he also doesn't equivocate in pointing out that *how* the communists took power in Spain is relatively insignificant in the face of the fact that they planned to quickly dismantle the system that elected them.

It can be said that the Spanish Civil War is still played out daily in Latin America. Manuel Zelaya, for instance, after almost a full term as President of Honduras, was booted out of office by nearly the entire political elite in Honduras. He started to smell to them like the Spanish Republicans of 1936 -- elected, but planning to dismember the democratic framework in order to stay in power.


In his youth, Pio Moa was a genuine violent revolutionary. He effected propaganda of the deed. His insurgent activity and consequent jail time lend Mr. Moa a street credibility and authenticity that Professor Verstrynge lacks, thus fixing for us a neat question: Is Verstrynge's work edged and authentic because it admires the untethered ethic of political resistance, and Moa's work the dull servitude of a man beaten down? -- Or, is Verstrynge's the work of second-hand experience and jilted ego, while Moa's a reflection of earned experience, unpressured scholarship, and preference for the truth? Asking the question from a distance, it appears to me that Mr. Moa tends toward confident, informed argument, and Professor Verstrynge toward romanticized argumentation. Whatever, this pair of personalities and experiences frames for us a major portion of today's ideological struggle, as well as the relationship of that struggle to the prosecution of irregular conflicts influenced by it.

Please see sections: 23, *Mens Rea*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 103, *Amnesty*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; and 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*.




“Perchance he for whom this bell tolls may be so ill, as that he knows not it tolls for him; and perchance I may think myself so much better than I am, as that they who are about me, and see my state, may have caused it to toll for me, and I know not that.”

John Donne,
Devotions upon
Emergent Occasions (1623)[\[283\]](#)



“But some will rise and return to feed,
preying on the living with murderous greed.”

Bad Acid Trip song lyrics to
Kernkraft 400 tune *Zombie Nation*



“Steel isn't strong, boy, flesh is stronger. Look around you. There, on the rocks; a beautiful girl. Come to me, my child.
[girl willingly jumps to her death] That is strength, boy! That is power! What is steel compared to the hand that wields it?”

Thulsa Doom in the movie
Conan the Barbarian (1982)[\[284\]](#)



Section 99, Postmodern and Post-structural

For our purposes, 'postmodern' is best used as an adjective for the style of warfare that a sophisticated insurgent, or maybe counterinsurgent, might wage these days. 'Post-structural' is more appropriate for labeling the kind of attitude and political philosophy held by many current activists and apologists for armed violence, especially if it has an anti-American scent. The two terms are related, but not the same.

Postmodern

The etymological roots of 'postmodern' lead back through, among other things, the study of architecture. The Sony Building in New York City, built in 1984, is a normal-enough, boxy-looking building — except that it has a Chippendale top: a skyscraper with a sense of humor. It is often cited as an example of the postmodern style in architecture. In general, architectural postmodernism is (or was) characterized by at least partial rejection of the starkness and pure functionality of modernism. Modern meant carrying building design to the limits of technological possibilities (Sears Tower in Chicago), while postmodern teaching encouraged incorporation of evocative symbolism touching on group identity and even ornamental inefficiencies related to human characteristics such as whimsicality. It also rejected purity in design styles, allowing combinations of formality and informality, traditional and 'pop', federal and baroque, etc. The term postmodernism was then applied to all kinds of creative efforts from literature to factory assembly lines, and with a variety of intentions all the way from making material things more ergonomic (or less boring to assemble) to the rejection of imperialism. For a lot of people postmodern pretty much came to mean 'better considered than just modern'.

Postmodernism can be tied to a sequence of design time-periods, but, in the true spirit of the idea, that's not necessary. The 1959 Cadillac had huge fins, a design element common to numerous makes and models around that time. By 1964, no more finned models were offered and American cars were squared-off, modern. The 'fifties' cars were postmodern and the 'sixties' cars modern. Detroit made the fifties cars look like aircraft dream machines, flamboyant, sexy and confident, and today the fifties cars are preserved and cherished more than the sober, boxier cars of the sixties. And just to bring the idea back to buildings, the Chrysler Building in Manhattan, with its hubcap and hood-ornament gewgaws, remains one of the most beloved and valuable icons in the world. (In a standard art history book, the Chrysler building would be more likely found under *Art Nouveau* or *Art Deco*, and not *Postmodern*, but so what?) For the purposes of understanding irregular warfare, we can get a lot of mileage out of the term postmodern, as follows:

Beyond hybrid. Postmodern architecture is associated with a pastiche, mixture, or cocktail of styles and themes. Today's irregular wars may be hybrid or as the *Turducken* section quips, one thing inside another. A more encompassing description, postmodern, would have them as an uncertain mixture of components and conflict types in varying measure.

More than technical. Postmodern architectural design often made a direct appeal to human emotion, or at least obeyed a logic informed by human vicissitudes. In irregular conflict, related, partly-related or unrelated human identities can seize on emotional quantities as weighty as liberty or as flighty as sport. Motivations can include long-term financial gain or a moment of *schadenfreude*. Decisions may seem premeditated in agile yet patient calculation or they may look like dumb mistakes that appeal to people anyway. Leaders, especially insurgent leaders, will put together coalitions of groups for temporary purposes using what seem to be highly inconsistent and unrelated motivations. What holds them together logically is something like a roadblock strategy, as described in section 138. The only thing that the various groups have to do in consonance is stop traffic at the same time.

Spatially aware. Architectural postmodernism recognized sense of place. Community styles, like Spanish Colonial style in Albuquerque, relate architecture to peoples' sense of pride, heritage and recognition of home. Successful leaders of contending identities in postmodern warfare are cognizant of the same sense of place and identity. They almost invariably try to connect the legitimacy of their leadership and the cohesion of the identity they are purporting to lead with place-association, even if it means creating identity out of whole cloth.

Technologically advanced. Postmodern buildings still incorporate modern technological advantage. Although postmodernism was a rejection of the tendency to build to the limits of technological possibilities at the cost of other values, it was not a rejection of technology. The idea of combining successful styles allows acceptance of high technology as long as that does not inhibit affective expression. Today's irregular conflict winners are ready to combine obscure mysticism with cell phones, Twitter, or whatever gizmo and organizational innovation seems to further the cause. Postmodernism admits human complexity and remains pragmatic.

A couple of Chileans wrote well about postmodernity and armed conflicts. One is Arturo Contreras and the other Cristián Garay.^[285] Neither of their books is in English, however. The term postmodern fell on hard times since the heyday of its use in English academe in the late 1980s and 1990s. Apparently, it is now academically behind the times to be *postmodern* or even to talk about postmodernism without a disclaimer. Rejection of postmodernism in liberal arts perhaps rested on the observation of overuse. Not only was every un-rebellious Tom, Dick and Harry calling himself a postmodernist, he was using the term to justify old modern, structural stuff, too. Postmodernist posing made it harder to authentically represent the suffering human condition as a rebel and still call oneself postmodern. You could hardly take it to the Man and call it postmodern while some petite bourgeois just opens a Starbucks® in a hotel lobby and calls *that* postmodern.

Post-structural

When applied to political ideology, political philosophy, or geopolitics, postmodernism was supposed to be a resistance movement, that is, an expression of rejection of modern structures, the United States or neo-liberalism being prominent among those structures. Discerning intellectual anti-ists (maybe that global subversive who rejects colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, commercialism, commodity-ism) started using *postmodern* before the end of the Cold War, before the failures of the two Communist giants. Many of these resistance postmodernists might also have identified themselves as marxists or marxist-leninists. At some point, say, in the late 1960s, the philosophical left began to see the Soviet Union as overbearing, overly 'modern' and too 'structural'. Slowly, some erstwhile marxist-leninists would become just marxists and/or something else.

For them, however, deflation of the term *postmodern* led not so much to *post-postmodernism*, but to *post-structuralism*. Some of the latter term's heritage can be traced to *deconstructionism*, which was connected to literary criticism. In other words, part of what today is called *post-structuralism* has some parental lineage in architecture (postmodernism) and some in literary criticism (deconstructionism). From the latter parentage especially comes the idea of tearing something down — to tear at its basic vocabulary, assumptions, institutions, mores, codes, and so on. Tearing at the structure or at structuralism, which is like tearing at modernism, allowed you (as a marxist) to go after errors of the stalinists and maosists, and remain a marxist. This is significant when we consider the timing of the appearance of the terminology, given that many political/philosophical unhappy types struggled with a conscious or subconscious need to recalculate, re-justify and reinvigorate Marxism in the face of the geopolitical mega-failure of the Soviet Union and the capitalistic treason of Red China. By the time the Parisian philosophical left officially snubbed postmodernism as passé, some momentarily would-be 'post-postmodernists', looking to put radical edge back into whatever postmodern no longer was (and to raise and include all kinds suppressed grievances),

began denying they were post-structuralists. And thus post-structuralism was born. Whenever it was exactly, it was not on a 4th of July. If you are anti-globalist, against neo-liberalism and opposed to US hegemonic power, you could call yourself a post-structuralist (but probably won't since that would seem conformant). The bulk of post-structuralism-speak seems to originate from within a European and particularly a small French philosophical community that has a number of its own codes and characters. That community is born and embedded in the strain of French thinking that is viscerally anti-American.

There are several reasons why the terms postmodern and post-structural should interest you. For one thing, you may notice them in what you read; you may notice someone calling themselves or an analysis or perspective *post-structuralist*. They might just be pandering, mimicking or posing, but if you're anti-American he is probably your ideological fellow traveler. Another reason has to do with the shape of your arguments and the flexibility of your own designs for winning. Note that postmodern architectural or engineering style was a near-universal success. It really was better than modern for all the reasons noted. You probably want to be postmodern in your design philosophy. Curiously, the post-postmodernist, or post-structuralist (that person who thinks postmodernism went sour, wants to remain a marxist, but has to get over the sweeping failures of marxism), can't do better than postmodernism for designing armed conflict. Still, the post-structuralist's critique of 'postmodern' includes its supposed moral devolution into compromise with the old modern structures. That means he thinks postmodernism sold out to the establishment.

Hugo Chávez was trying to mount a postmodern war. He was flexible and creative in combining old styles and new in accordance with whatever seemed to work at the moment (warfare that some people might want to call 'hybrid', or other people want to call 'unrestricted'). He weaved together appeals to peoples' sense of place, historic inheritance and current ethnic identity, age-relevance, and once in a while even an accountant's logic. He was undeterred by any suggestion that baseball, Bolívar, marxism, pre-Colombian ethnicity, beauty contests, hip-hop and Persia might not be happy companions. He bought tanks, dug holes, nationalized factories, hosted a TV show, and meddled in foreign electoral politics.

Fortunately for the enemies Hugo Chávez chose for himself, he wasn't too good at classic military strategy. Bolivian President Evo Morales and his Vice-President Álvaro García Linaera, on the other hand, not only figured out strategic postmodernism, they have intellectual post-Soviet, post-structuralism figured out as well. Fortunately for *their* enemies, they're stuck in Bolivia.


Postmodern relates to a design freedom and creativity that at its best doesn't throw out proven practices, technological advances or working structures. *Post-structural* is globally recognized code for a stance against what is perceived to be the whole symbolic, semantic, jurisprudential, moral, institutional and geopolitical structure of the overdog (the US, the West, neo-liberalism, neo-colonialism, globalization, capitalism, rapacious environmental irresponsibility, anthropogenic global warming denial, etc.) *Postmodern* is more design style; and *post-structural* more political flag. The first has little to do with existentialism; the latter tends to embrace and apologize for an existentialism that centers on domination and killing, so long as what is to be killed evokes a concept listed inside the parenthesis just above.

Please see sections: 116, *Songs of Chu*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 76, *Gender*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; 66, *GIS*; and 19, *Mercatus*.




“And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
The element of fire is quite put out;
The sun is lost, and the earth, and no man's wit,
Can well direct him where to look for it.”

John Donne,
Devotions upon Emergent Occasions (1623) [\[286\]](#)



“Integrity is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness, just as honesty is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake existence.” [\[287\]](#)

Ayn Rand,
Atlas Shrugged



I killed myself so many times I don't even exist anymore.

Phil in the movie,
Groundhog Day (1993) [\[288\]](#)



The intellectual débris of French Man's defeat

Section 100, What the Foucault?

Section 99 mentions post-structuralism. If you are involved in an organized armed conflict these days it is advantageous for you to know a little about the idea and where it comes from. In sum, it is the zombie of marxism-leninism. It lurches around, soulless, on the same campuses and in the same agencies and headspaces trying to eat the flesh of the surviving 'structure' which it still calls capitalism, neo-liberalism, or something related. Post-structuralism is also the name of an ideological franchise package that can be adopted and adapted broadly – more broadly than marxism-leninism could be. It appeals to many identities who feel they are on the outside of power or consider themselves the despised 'other' or underdog. It exists as a movement that a left-leaning intellectual can join if he or she has a need to belong. In this respect it is both a presentation to and a request for participation in a population of persons who want to follow something that they can believe is ethical, intelligent, has a political effect or purpose, and is not a lackey of or apology for the Man.

About the time of the American military involvement in Vietnam, a small group of French ideologues nearly cornered the trademark of Philosophy. This didn't happen all at once and was never complete, but under the auspices of the authority gained, post-structuralism was slowly spawned. Some of the French persons' names, in no particular order, are Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Luce Irigaray, and Gilles Deleuze, but chief among them was Michel Foucault. He died, apparently of AIDS, in 1984 at the age of 57. A little bit of his intellectual popularity is as a sort of martyr. At any rate, below is my take on the history of why marxism didn't just stay buried and why post-structuralism prospers either to give an intellectual backstop to your war aims, or to cause you a headache as it makes it harder and harder to tell the truth.

The pertinent history doesn't begin or end at any special moment, but to lighten the load I'm going to start with Blackjack Pershing and the American Expeditionary Force, the AEF, in World War I. Blackjack was an American alpha male. He refused (more or less) to have American soldiers fight except as an American Army unit, instead of becoming a troop replacement pool (thus telling the French that the American wasn't just there to help, but to *be*), and ultimately the AEF tipped the balance in the war in favor of the Allies. Even though the Allies won the war, the French alpha males did not fare especially well. This failure of France's Man opened a little space in the French discourse (about strategy, politics, power, philosophy and, well, everything) to other voices besides that of the French Man. Notably, marxism-leninism was taking off in a big way just at that time, with the Russian Revolution in full swing when World War I ended.

Paris became the kitchen for ideas that would take on monikers like existentialism, nihilism, structuralism, etc. Long a philosopher's destination, it becomes even more so, especially for marxist philosophers, as Germany was then tending toward fascism. When World War II arrived in France, France's Man did worse than in World War I. In fact, he was an abject failure. Unable to protect France, in came German Fascist Man in his stead. This opened up more room in the philosophical discourse about power. American Man looked potent by comparison and, again, saved France. After the war, France's Man took a beating in Southeast Asia from Vietnamese Man. Then, in almost the instant that French manhood is embarrassed in Indo-China, he decides that he will regain dominance or at least face by winning at all costs in north Africa, but that turns out to be the cost France pays. France loses terribly, including all of Algeria and French Man with it. This opened up a tremendous amount more room for 'other' voices in the French discourse, and what those voices were saying especially included an abiding anti-Americanism. This anti-Americanism was conveniently agreeable to the marxist-leninist currents for the obvious reasons of the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As the Cold War progressed and many in Europe begin to sense the stale quality of Soviet governance and promise, some of the French philosophers, who by that time had braced the parameters of fashionable European academe, began to think in terms akin to the postmodernism described in Section 99. The year 1968 looms large in all this since it was a good year for dissidence in the United States and an active year of rebelliousness in Europe. Distaste for the high-handedness of the Soviet Union (Prague Spring?) sent some erstwhile marxists looking for something to spruce up their resistance thinking.

Sooner than the philosophers might have predicted, however, the Soviet Union was in precipitous collapse. In the face of political reality, their philosophy had to evolve quickly. The result was a contraption that took big chunks from Marxism (like criticizing the self-perpetuating structure and voracity of capitalism), still gamering for itself the look of moral preference for the downtrodden, but escaping the need to consolidate any specific outcome or vision. There was no longer a new communist man or a communist condition or some substitute utopia to which aspirations had to be aimed. It became a sort of anarchism with social empathy that could take or leave bombs as suited. It claims, falsely, to have invented critical thinking. It eases its own burden of illogic by disdaining things like objectivism, positivism and realism. It tells scholars that they should include emotive, affective, and politically responsible content to their analyses and that *responsible* means *progressive*. It is sort of a virtual, linguistic framework for radical goodness in which almost any grievance can be made to fit, although there have always been some conditions, such as anti-Americanism.

There exist gatekeepers to post-structural approval. To be gonged post-structural and, therefore, to enjoy some of the other benefits of membership such as being called progressive, one must pay homage to that group of French founding fathers and preferably to a coterie of other popular marxist or 'new' marxist thinkers. Also, there are a number of issues the wrong side of which you must not fall. For instance, it appears difficult to gain post-structural approval if you are pro-Israel, do not agree that carbon emissions from North America are the main cause of global warming (and that therefore the United States should pay a monetary debt); or express faith in Christ as the Messiah (you may, however, worship Allah).

Less and more than a philosophy, post-structuralism is a political platform the planks of which are provided by leftist-radical *du jour*. Older leadership is peopled by radicals from or supporting organizational remnants of Cold War communist or socialist political parties. The Forum of Sao Paulo is a good example of a consortium of these parties. Although the followship may not be as responsive as what we might have sensed in the relationship of marxist-leninist thinkers to the geopolitical agendas of the Cold War communist parties, there is nevertheless a strong connection. It is, as the systems theorists like to say, a complex system, but there is a clear, namable community of leadership and guidance (the descendant and inheritor of what used to depend on auspices of the Soviet Union or Communist China) to which many self-described post-structuralists attune. The activist post-structuralists rail about the false dichotomies of conservative thinking, but they are themselves often guilty of a Manichaean (old religion from Persia that stressed a lot of Light versus Darkness) tendency to line up everything as either good or neoliberal.


Take note of all who claim they're post-structural. They may be as normal as you and I. On the other hand, sneaking, some of the ideologically contentious may call themselves postmodern and admire others as post-structural. If these contentious postmodernists expressly admire that French crew, they are quite possibly post-structural anti-Americans, and you'll want to know why.

Please see sections: 71, *Jerusalem*; 36, *The Denver Broncos*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 79, *Suicide*; 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; and 142, *Conflict Geography*.




"It's a complex fate, being an American, and one of the responsibilities it entails is fighting against a superstitious valuation of Europe."

Henry James [289]



"Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No.
Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.
Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." [290]

David Hume



"All music is folk music. I ain't never heard a horse sing a song."
Louis Armstrong (attributed)



"The way to gain a liberal view of your subject is not to read something else, but to get to the bottom of the subject itself." [291]

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.



Section 101, Magical Realism

Sometimes the thirst for truth is hard to satisfy with scrupulous science and measurement. In your war, truth will also be a product of propaganda and its delivery. The construction and reconstruction of reality itself, activities off-putting to some of us, will be a feature of your war. The 'post-structuralist' especially seeks to own the construction of truth, so the competitor in today's irregular wars needs to be keen to the making of truth beyond the arguments and beyond the numbers.

'Magical Realism' is a genre of fictional literature, born in, associated with, and even emblematic of Latin America, that intermixes attention to worldly detail (respect for 'objectively' factual conditions, events, locations and time of occurrence) with fantastical interludes, incorporeal characters, and intangible dimensions of human experience. Genius writers bring us the interplay between greater truths of the spirit and the mundane or technically necessary. More than requiring a suspension of disbelief, magical realism requires an intention to understand larger truths about life, love, and justice: truths that perhaps cannot be explained without the intervention of the supernatural or whimsical. Gifted novelists tease out of magical realism the most difficult to explain quantities -- like dignity, honor, fate, or even environmental determinism. In the hands of a less gifted writer, magical realism becomes a cheesy trick to get the plot out of some corner.

When some story tellers attempt to explain the meaning of life they create an existentialist marvel. Gabriel Garcia Marquez is an often-cited master of magical realism, but hardly inventor of the style. Argentinean Jorge Luis Borges might be closer to the creative beginnings, while another Colombian writer, Jose Rivera, can be credited with innovating a precursor or perhaps parallel style known as the jungle novel. These writers and their emulators also owe a great deal to their Spanish and American inheritance, but that's not the point -- the point is that there exists a named style of literature in which the supernatural is accepted not as science fiction or horror or fantasy, but as a dimension of reality that exceeds the boundaries and importance of the thought processes or social expectations we build around the idea of 'objective' truth. Magical realism proffers a truth of equal or greater importance than the truth of our five senses. It is the literary rejection of corporeal realism, positivism, empiricism, etc. Just because things happen, or just because you can prove they happen in logical space and correctly sequenced time, doesn't make them the truth that we should care about.

So why talk about magical realism? Because of its evil political twin. Magical realism serves an entire universe of ethical justifications in politics and ideology. It not only encourages 'ends justify means', but glorifies use of what used to be called the 'big lie' as more than an admirable propagandistic achievement. Beyond propaganda tactics, it forms up an alternative beauty and an alternative honesty. It encourages and praises the creation of identities, histories, grievances, hate memories, and absolutely anything that furthers political goals. After all, it can be cogently argued that truth does not exist outside the mind, that it is all perception. This understanding of truth is called solipsism. Magical realism in fiction, which draws in some way on solipsism, can be a powerful aid to understanding. In politics and war, it can destroy the ethic of replicability in science, of trust in fiduciary relationships, and of pride-worthy historical inheritance. The political version of magical realism is not a calm romanticism; it is a license for strident partisanship. It is not an egalitarian proposition available to all contenders, but rather a purely competitive reality trick that feeds cults of personality and vanguardism.

There are two principal categories of wrestling in the United States. One is called amateur or folk style. In that category we can also include intercollegiate rules and the Olympic styles called freestyle and Greco-Roman. The other category can be subsumed under professional wrestling, featuring organizations such as the Worldwide Wrestling Federation, WWF. My favorite US professional wrestler was 'The Rock' (Dwayne Johnson), with his 'People's Elbow', 'People's Eyebrow' and other gimmicks the infringement of which could cause one to find out "what the Rock was cookin'" and be slammed by the bad end of the 'Rock Bottom'. It is wrong to say that professional wrestlers like Mr. Johnson are not great athletes or that the winners of a professional wrestling match are not winners. It is a different victory, and it is a different set of attributes that takes a professional wrestler to the top of his profession than the set of attributes that takes an amateur wrestler to the state finals or the NCAA Championships.

We can liken folk style or intercollegiate wrestling to argument and professional wrestling to argumentation. When we see a hand raised in amateur wrestling, we are confident that the athlete won on the basis of a superior set of athletic attributes -- quickness, strength, durability, resolve. The athlete paid in advance in hours of physical sacrifice, discomfort, disappointments, and foregone social opportunity. It is unlikely that his hand was raised because of the votes of the fans, because the referee was bribed, or the rules unevenly applied. Neither poverty nor wealth, while they might have helped, was the reason for his victory. His opponent probably won't claim to have failed because of other people, either; he will blame himself.

In the other world of wrestling there are other qualities -- qualities of showmanship that reward and understand the aspirations, prejudices, and self-concepts of potential followers; of the balance between dangerous physical maneuvers and the way they appear to the audience; of the close connection between skill during interviews and skill in the ring; and of money and social timing. These professional skills are just as, if not more, precious than the difficult moves learned by the intercollegiate wrestler. The skill sets are not the same and sometimes must overlap; making those individuals doubly prized who offer competence in both skill sets.

In the world of legal argument and argumentation, a good lawyer cannot scoff at one or the other. He has to master both. Johnnie Cochran was known as a master of argumentation, just as Dwayne Johnson was a master of professional wrestling. Mr. Cochran knew how to apply 'tricks' like juxtaposition, change of subject, and other argumentational tradecraft that could lead a jury to nullify legal argument and the sober presentation of what might otherwise have seemed compelling facts, but Mr. Cochran was hardly helpless in the realm of argument. He knew the law, what motions had to be made to the court and when, why one logical argument was more dangerous for his client than another. He made sure his team dominated both worlds. He knew when argument might not be enough to win; when it was time to resort to argumentation.

Magical realism as it is expressed in politics and ideology is like one side of that Johnson/Cochranesque professional wrestling/trial lawyering dimension of today's political truth-making. Somewhere else in this book I might refer to it as an element of postmodernism. The postmodern designs are strongest when they don't reject the old reality, new technology or the physical realm of time and space. They must, however, pay particular attention to personal and place identity, imaginaries, grievances and all the vicissitudes, curiosities and ailments of the human mind that allow a competitor to build an alternative reality if the 'objective' one does not suit competitive purposes.

What do you do about this political magical realism? Use it or, to confront it competitively, you may want to go back to sections 54, *Badassoftheweek.com* and 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*, remembering that ultimately we are not talking about some reality floating around inside a propagandist's or intellectual's head, or about the reality he is trying to create inside the heads of other people, but about the physical head itself -- the bone skull housing and gooey brain of the *mens rea* guy. Don't get thrown off. If you have an enemy, he sleeps and defecates. He has or had a Mom. If he is armed and intends to do you harm before you can bring arguments to bear, you want to close off his line of retreat to sanctuary, put that brain in a cell and *then* talk to him about all kinds of fun philosophical stuff.

Magical Realism can be easily dismissed by the engineering or mathematical mind or compartmentalized as a frivolous enjoyment. That would be a


competitive mistake.

Please see sections: 16, *Presence*; 114, *R.V. Jones*; 27, *'Nonviolent Action'*; 66, *GIS*; 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; 117, *Strategic Communication*; and 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*.



“Who ya gonna believe, me or your lyin’ eyes?” [\[292\]](#)

Marx




“You cannot know yet whether what you see is what you are looking at or what you are believing.” [\[293\]](#)

William Faulkner,
Absalom, Absalom!



“...others are using convoluted Orwellian Newspeak of the crudest kind hoping to camouflage their treachery.” [\[294\]](#)

Hamid Dabashi



Louden Swain: Can 800 million Chinamen be wrong?

Tanneran: Frequently.

from the movie
Vision Quest (1985) [\[295\]](#)



A move, not the goal

Section 102, Negotiations

This is a recurrent topic in insurgent wars and there seems to be a school solution for both the insurgent and counterinsurgent. For the insurgent, it is always a good idea to appear willing to negotiate and to do so if the government is willing to give ground on something valuable, perhaps a demilitarized zone, some sort of international recognition for the movement, or the exchange of prisoners. A moderately successful insurgent (one who has mastered the operational equation of classic military strategy) holds the advantage of being able to offer a non-thing and make it seem as though it is a something. That is to say, the insurgent can offer to explode, rob, and kidnap less in exchange for some kind of actual advantage such as the trappings of international recognition, which could quickly lead to a belief on the part of members of the international State community that the insurgent organization has the *right* to grant impunity to its soldiers for acts of armed violence against government targets. There is never a right to grant impunity.

Since almost all insurgents hold a relatively weaker position geographically and militarily, if not financially, the insurgent is generally more careful about the security of routes to sanctuary. The result is that the insurgent usually needs to play it safe and prolong his life, and that, in turn, means prolonging the conflict. Negotiating can help do just that, so one of the first negotiating goals for many insurgents will revolve around the negotiation process. The process itself may offer much of what the insurgent needs, if that happens to be time, and it often is, so delaying is good, for as long as possible, if it can be done, until it is annoying. Requiring a specific geographic area for negotiations is a ploy that can provide useful temporary sanctuary. Extending the timeline of the negotiations by seeking 'honest brokers', working around executive schedules, getting sick and the like can provide the insurgent with months of government latency and lack of substantive diligence.

Toward the end of the term of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana, he told the Colombian public it was necessary for him to accede to an ELN (National Liberation Army, a leftist guerrilla group smaller than the FARC) demand for a demilitarized zone in a strategically valuable part of the country because if he did not, the ELN could do the country a lot of harm. That was pretty much the final straw confession of presidential submissiveness. In the next election, the Colombians voted in Álvaro Uribe, who campaigned on a pledge to seek peace through victory over the guerrillas, rather than appeasement.

A government should always appear willing to negotiate, provided that the government actually means it will offer the insurgent leniency or amnesty upon surrender. If the insurgent makes reasonable demands, such as a change in patently unfair labor practices or the failure to prosecute known criminals, the government might do well to just resolve those issues without attributing its decisions to the insurgent demands. On the other hand, it might behoove the government, if it intends to take certain actions anyway, to appear to concede the points in return for surrender. The government should waste no time in the planning processes of the negotiations, for the reasons expressed above. The government should not, in most cases, unilaterally establish a cease-fire or lift military pressure due to the negotiations. The principal negotiating chip possessed by a government is the offer to lift military pressure and thereby lessen the possibility of the death or capture of the insurgent leaders. The exchange should be their surrender. Some will argue that this is a best-case answer or that this attitude toward negotiating strategy is logical or available to a government only if it is clearly superior militarily and is in a position where such arrogance might bear fruit. Perhaps, but if this were not the government position, it is because the government is willing to give up something that does not belong to it, or it is being forced to surrender something of great value, like land. Sometimes a government must give up space for time.

The release of kidnap victims in exchange for the release of imprisoned insurgents is a touchy dilemma. To announce a fixed or school solution would presume too much and it would be gratuitous given that the relevant executive decisions are always from a subjective and pain-ridden point of departure. The notion of cold objectivity is too cheap. Here's a school solution anyway: Offer leniency for the release of hostages; do not allow family members, even and especially those powerful families with political influence, to direct and pressure the government position. The necessary separation can be created by isolating the chief executive by way of a series of lesser negotiators. The insurgent will, of course, demand that the chief executive be directly involved in negotiations. A chief executive should avoid being an active negotiating element.

The principle strategy against kidnapping should never be to negotiate, even if an occasional negotiation is done covertly because of some especially valuable hostage. The smart insurgent will try to gain politically influential hostages. If the play works even once to secure a valuable negotiation, the insurgent is well paid for the behavior.

Please see sections: 96, *Combatant Status*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 117, *Strategic Communications*; 4, *Defining Enemy*; 11, *Protraction and Diligence*; 55, *Kidnapping*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; and 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*.



“Diplomacy is the art of being able to say ‘Nice doggie’
...until you have time to pick up a rock.”[\[296\]](#)

Will Rogers (attributed)



Korben (*from behind a wall*): We need to find the leader,
Mangalores won't fight without the leader.

Mangalore Aknot: One more shot, and we start killing hostages!

Korben: That's the leader.

Mangalore Aknot: Send someone to negotiate.

Fog: (*to Korben*) Uh, I've never negotiated before.

Korben: Do you mind if I try?

Fog: (*to Korben*) No, sure, sure, sure.

(*to Aknot*) We're sending somebody in to negotiate.

(*Korben walks into the room and shoots Aknot in the forehead.*

All the other Mangalores drop their weapons)

Korben: Anybody else want to negotiate?


from the movie

The Fifth Element (1997)[\[297\]](#)

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“You can get much farther with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”[\[298\]](#)

Al ‘Scarface’ Capone



Section 103, Amnesty and Restitution

Amnesties are like a mix of plea-bargaining, granting of executive pardons and conditional surrender. Their significant political and ideological content raises the stakes for all sides to a conflict; a hinge issue is usually how an amnesty candidate is likely to fare after he is given amnesty. Considering the first assertion of this book -- that a State fails to the extent some other entity can grant impunity, the negotiation of amnesty can be seen as an admission of State failure. Once again we are back to the word impunity, but in this context it is impunity that the State would grant in the context of a process of reconciliation. The State's options are influenced by the bargaining power of the perpetrators, and by how the balance of justice is perceived by victims and their agents. As with so many things, an amnesty plan has to be culturally appropriate. Considerable cultural space exists in Latin American culture for the design of amnesties. In Colombia they have been a historically recurrent strategy, if with mixed results.

An Internet search for discussion of amnesty will hit on Amnesty International, but that organization is as interested in the justice of punishment as it is in amnesty, a phenomenon that marks the theme generally. Amnesty sounds nice, but it has become complicated by the global spread of 'Western' law. It is one of the ironies of ideological history since World War II that justice activists have achieved not only the spread of public criminal law in order to confront what they see as State impunity for the violation of human rights, but also the spread of civil tort law, including internationalized mechanisms not only of institutionalized forensics but of civil discovery. International (or extraterritorial) jurisdiction has spread civil actions such as wrongful death. As a result, it is now difficult for a government to grant amnesty to an insurgent leader if that leader has been the intellectual author of, or accessory to, kidnapping and murder. To provide effective amnesty, the government might not only have to forego its criminal prosecution, it might have to extend special legal and physical protection for perpetrators against the motions of civil claimants or foreign prosecutors.

An essential function and economic contribution of formal penal processes is the dampening of the human tendency (or perhaps satisfaction of a perceived human necessity) for revenge. In other words, good governance includes keeping people from taking violent revenge on their own initiative (vigilantism). The world of extraterritorial civil law can undermine this State function, punishment sometimes being driven more by third party observers than it is by the victims. International activists begin to define justice on a global scale, rather than on a local one, and provide otherwise unavailable resources to fuel the pressing of grievances. For better or worse, your enemy may be able to find international support for the idea that he should be granted amnesty for his felonies, while the people on your side of the ledger should be subject to the justice of punishment. This is the stressful formula that many Colombians have had to face.

The book, *Walking Ghosts*, by journalist Steven Dudley, is a riveting and enlightening account of an 80s-90s peace process in Colombia that included the creation of a political party, the Patriotic Union, from amnestied ex-guerrillas. It didn't go well. Many of the open members of the Patriotic Union were murdered and the party eventually withered away. Many ex-guerrillas, officially amnestied by the government, were forgiven neither by some of their former enemies nor by some of their former comrades. Regardless of what we call a legal process, or what it pronounces, perpetrators and participants may go unforgiven, with the goal of the system to control revenge frustrated.

Don't throw the idea of amnesty around as though it is an automatically good idea. The potential to offer an amnesty should be thoroughly reviewed in terms of victim acceptance, participant survival, international jurisdiction, and the effect of precedent setting. Dilemmas are created by the spread of the rule-of-law. As courts, legal theories and investigations become more available to victims, amnesties can become more difficult to devise. How would Pablo Escobar have ever atoned had he been captured and not shot down? His history alone is a roadmap of the difficulties presented. Earlier he had surrendered to the law to wait comfortably in a luxury non-prison until he decided he had had enough of that gambit and drove away. Finally, the only logical end for Pablo Escobar was to be killed like a rabid dog. In 2009, Pablo Escobar's son, emotionally burdened, reached out to the families of some of his father's victims, asking for their forgiveness. At least by some, it was granted without reservation.

In the last decade, the Colombian government has gained the surrender of tens of thousands of guerrillas, mostly former members of the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC), but many ex-leftist guerrillas as well. The process has included a variety of programs for their reinsertion and reintegration into the fabric of peaceful society. Generally, these are referred to as Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs. The Colombian effort attracted some international funding, but was not one of the seven or so ongoing UN-mandated DDRs. There have been successes and failures, the latter caused by lack of resources, bungling, resentments and unmet expectations. Beyond the fact of forgiven crimes, the programs had at least the appearance of giving ex-outlaw fighters more economic and educational assistance than what the government gave to ex-soldiers who served in the army. In addition, jobs are often not available, appropriate or appealing enough to the demobilized young men. As a result, crime bosses can still bid successfully for that combat-experienced manpower.

Smaller, functional amnesties and rewards programs such as drug material amnesties and firearm amnesties can give some individuals a second chance, take a few dangerous instrumentalities out of circulation, and are relatively painless. Having a set of amnesties of this nature can be a good idea. On the other hand, they can also confound some evidentiary efforts and give the wrong kind of second chance. That is to say, criminals can game such programs to ditch evidence.

Some amnesties have taken the form of buy-in programs. In El Salvador in the 1980s, for instance, the government initiated a program that not only gave amnesty to individual guerrillas who surrendered; it gave them an amount of money if they turned in a rifle. The purchase was of a weapon, but really the government was buying a cooperative interrogation in order to find caches of other weapons. The program met with some success, although a lot of worthless weapons were purchased and there is a distinct possibility that some of the money was funneled to the guerrilla command. Adam Smith's invisible hand can slap you silly.

Note the relationship of amnesty to our definition of State success. A State with a monopoly over the granting of impunity never has to grant amnesty. Nevertheless, by so doing, a challenged State might return rule-of-law initiative to itself. Amnesties are culturally sensitive and their success may be inseparable from questions of honor and dignity.

Restitution is a closely related theme, as it invariably occurs to victims that they should be recompensed by perpetrators as a condition of their forbearance in any negotiation of amnesty. In Colombia, President Santo's flagship land restitution program was to dovetail in some way with the peace negotiations into which he entered with the FARC. However, the number of those justly claiming victim status is enormous, especially victims of the FARC. The FARC has connected its demands to land reform, like the government recognizing the huge number of rurally displaced persons, but the FARC leaders are more obviously seeking impunity. As of this writing it is uncertain how the tensions will be resolved, if at all. To me, the FARC exhausted its moral equity long ago, and so these particular peace negotiations, if not fundamentally a (conditional) FARC surrender, will fail.


Please see sections: 84, *Cultures of Violence*; 95, *Childhood*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 103, *Foreign Support*

and Perspective; 90, Prisons & Prisoners; 42, Brigands; and 76, Gender.



“By now the police had uncovered a whole series of Ravachol’s crimes, including a grave robbery for the jewelry on a corpse, the murder of a ninety-two-year-old miser and his housekeeper, the further murder of two old women who kept a hardware shop—which had netted him forty sous--and of another shopkeeper, which had netted him nothing. “See this hand?” Ravachol was quoted as saying; “it has killed as many bourgeois as it has fingers.” At the same time, he had been living in lodgings, teaching the little daughter of his landlord to read.”[\[299\]](#)

Barbara Tuchman
The Proud Tower



“It’s sad that governments are chiefed by the double tongues. There is iron in your words of death for all Comanche to see, and so there is iron in your words of life. No signed paper can hold the iron. It must come from men. The words of Ten Bears carries the same iron of life and death. It is good that warriors such as we meet in the struggle of life...or death. It shall be life.”

[Ten Bears](#) in the movie
The Outlaw Josey Wales (1976)[\[300\]](#)



“We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.”[\[301\]](#)

Eliezer Wiesel



Modern paradox of hypocrisy?

Section 104, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

The territory presumed by the word extraterritorial is the national State (member of the world's international club of countries), and a counterpart term would be 'extradition'. The various countries of the world keep treaties between and among other States within the system and under the terms of the treaties one State will deliver up a fugitive to the authorities of another.

An extradition treaty is recognition of State sovereignty while extraterritoriality is denial of sovereignty -- an assertion that a State should not be allowed to grant impunity. Extraterritoriality can be a bit softer on the civil side than on the criminal side, if the courts in question obey some distinction between civil and criminal law. That distinction has been closing over the decades, even while civil process has been globalizing. No one statement can be made about the effect of international jurisdiction on the war you are in, except to say that the legal environment as regards extradition treaties and extraterritoriality are worthy of your concern. They relate to the physical and temporal geography of your potential sanctuaries and the impunity you can practicably grant, and that your enemy can grant and for how long.

A favorite cliché of popular jurisprudence informs us that no entity should be 'above the law'. Against that prosecutorial hope, American courts tend to stress protection of the rights of individual defendants. Say someone has been arrested and charged with a crime. The government tends to protect its investigatory and prosecutorial agents, even when they overreach. If they follow the wrong suspect, interrogate him brutally, don't chase other reasonable leads, or drop an extra weapon at the scene of a crime, the tendency of the State agencies is to protect their own and to believe their own. Thus, in the process of providing the service of justice, the State tends toward providing impunity for a whole slew of process-induced crimes of its own, setting itself above the law. Since Americans don't like the granting of impunity or governments above the law, we have laid on a lot of rules that protect individuals against abuses of the State and allow accused citizens to take legal actions against the government on the grounds of unjust processes.

The tendency of government entities to provide impunity for their own abuses, and the cultural response that favors the individual underdog against the State overdog, is significant for understanding irregular wars. If a foreigner, that is, someone who is neither a US citizen nor a US Person, commits a crime inside the United States, Americans usually confer on him the protections against the government that are afforded to citizens. Again, Americans don't like the State to grant its own agents impunity for their abuses. However, what about a case, such as the 2009 Detroit 'underwear' bomber, who appeared to represent a foreign organization dedicated to waging war against the United States?^[302] In that case, a question arose as to whether or not the bomber should have been tried in an American civilian court where all the protections against the abuse of process would apply or be tried in a military court where the protections *might* be fewer.

In the underpants bomber case, some protections against abuse of process would have existed in either the civilian or military spheres. In fact, a nearly simultaneous case involved a US Army major at Fort Hood, Texas who was being tried in military court for killing fourteen people.^[303] The major, a US citizen, was being tried in military court while the foreigner was being processed in civilian court. In this we witnessed the tension between competing values of sovereignty and civil liberties. How much protection should be offered to defendants from abuse by governmental process? How much justice and security (for the victims) might be lost by acceding to foreign jurisdiction or mischoosing domestic jurisdiction? How much sovereignty is lost?

Let's say that a US military court were to convict and condemn a foreign defendant and the defendant were executed without his having been given the full panoply of protections from abuse of process normally enjoyed by US citizens. In such a case, would and could the United States Government protect the members of the military court from prosecution by some foreign court? Status of forces agreements (SOFA) cover some of the legal relationships, rights, duties, privileges, etc., pertaining to the personnel of one country when they are invited to stay in another. Sometimes these agreements require that the visitors relinquish the protection of their State from foreign prosecution. If agents of one country operate in an allied country, they might or might not be subject to prosecution by the courts of that ally or, in turn, by an international court. Such situations are problematic, given that the protections against abuse of process may vary widely by jurisdiction. This problem of abuse of criminal process is usually generated in the context of some crime committed outside the soldier's official activities. In other words, if a soldier is downtown shoplifting or date-rapes someone, the sending country is likely to accede to the local jurisdiction.

The problem is much different when a killing is done during activities related to the sending government's reason for their soldier's presence in a foreign land. In those cases, the sending State is greatly responsible for the situation in which its soldiers (or some other category of agents) find themselves. The people of the sending country may deem it irresponsible for the sending government to relegate its agents to less protection than they would be afforded in their native land. Moreover, the sending State may wish to assert not just its sovereign immunity, but its monopoly over the granting of impunity. This is logical because, in situations that are emotionally, geopolitically and ideologically charged, some other entity (a third government or a non-state actor perhaps) can use a jurisprudential system (the host nation's or an international system) as an attack mechanism. Thus, a third foreign entity could, premeditatedly, grant impunity to its own agents for the purpose of attacking those of the host or sending country. It would indeed be an attack on sovereignty.


The above may seem merely an opinion regarding the legalistic parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction potentially affecting your irregular war. Be forewarned that any applicability of extraterritorial jurisdiction to your war will be determined by some set of persons' 'opinions', and you will want to know exactly what those opinions are, whose they are, and where those persons sit. Depending on your status and the policies of your government, you could win your war, and then go to jail for it in some foreign land.

Please see sections: 1, *Impunity*; 137, *Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective*; 103, *Amnesty*; 96, *Combatant Status*; 97, *Oviedo*; 20, *Rule-of-law*; 130, *Globalization*; and 77, *Sex*



"I have nothing to do with this justice, that for me does not exist."^[304]

Augusto Pinochet
(upon being detained in London)



"a grand jury would indict a ham sandwich, if that's what you wanted."^[305]

Judge Sol Wachtler in
The Bonfire of the Vanities



Slicing away at a people's property

Section 105, Genocide Geography

Genocide is a 20th century word with a legendary etymology. It is invoked to overcome the barrier of sovereignty, that is, to justify physical intervention into the internationally demarcated territory of a foreign State. Genocides are bigger than massacres. For one thing, the word genocide has specific legalistic import as an accusation of the breach of international humanitarian law. It also carries greater emotive power related to the targeting and destruction of whole human collective identities. When a State kills its own people *en masse*, the perpetrators will try to grant impunity to themselves and their agents. The word genocide was invented as part of the legal arsenal to deny that impunity.

Mass killing is a motivator for those being killed to start an insurgency, and not necessarily because their government's acts were illegal. If your definition of the rule-of-law is tied to the stability of laws (or to popular legitimacy or democracy), note that the actions the Nazis took against the Jews were legal. It may be hard for you personally to justify military intervention into a foreign land absent some quantity of national interest unconnected to the morality of the killing, but you may not have a choice. Places that suffer genocide face internal violence afterwards. Survivors and/or perpetrators fight over whatever the dead leave behind. Genocides cause flows of refugees and it is not likely that they or the violence will obey the proscriptive suggestions of international borders. This section is about where genocide occurs and where it is likely to occur. Public knowledge about genocides can be readily improved, that is, the signs are fairly obvious; and, better armed with knowledge of the reality, we can ponder the morality. (In the *Appendix: Miscelaneous Lists, List D*, page 581, you can find a taxonomy for genocide intelligence.)

Although there are a number of obvious warning signs that remote technical sensors can provide (villages burning, for instance), cultural geographic knowledge reveals more about potential mass murder. Multidisciplinary geography expeditions could be used to create a fairly continuous presence of outside observers in locales with susceptible populations. Such an enterprise would depend, however, on some system of prioritizing that could reduce the number of places to be scrutinized. There are maybe 75,000 county-level territorial units in the world and, if only a tenth of one percent of them are potential scenes of mass killings, it means people live at risk of mass murder in 75 counties. If this is indeed a reasonable guess regarding the scale of genocidal danger in the world, it nevertheless implies a need to expose which 75 counties, which implies the building of an organizational engine that can maintain the fielding of considerably more than 75 academic research efforts at a time.

Research on genocide points to authoritarian, radical or dictatorial regimes as a common characteristic correlated to mass killings. A number of national-level regimes exist in which power is highly concentrated in a single ruler or clique and where peaceful change away from that leadership is unexpected. Liberal regimes that undergo regular peaceful selection and de-selection of leadership, and which enjoy formalized property, are relatively unlikely to perpetrate mass killings.

An ongoing armed conflict is logically to be associated with the potential for mass killings. This is evident from killings in Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, the Ottoman Empire, and many others. The potential for a mass killing increases rapidly when young men are armed, gain a habit for killing, need to secure a line of communication, do not have ready means to care for prisoners or refugees, feel that a population poses a risk or believe a population gives aid to their enemy, or that a population is guilty of past offenses against them. If a natural line of march for an armed contingent passes through a populated locale, that locale should be a prime candidate for monitoring. Depending on the circumstances, an event we would characterize as a massacre or as genocide is more likely to occur in such places.

Another characteristic worth monitoring is the incapacity of a potential victim population to escape due to terrain, lack of mass transport, etc. Lack of ready means of communication and expression with the outside world is a logically dangerous condition, especially if combined with others. This is also a phenomenon that is readily detectable and mappable. Those counties in the world that are without Internet service, or even working telephone systems may have vulnerable populations due to the perception of anonymity that such incommunicado conditions logically create. A world map of counties with the poorest communication to the outside world could be created.

Collective legal impairments can exist for years without there being a mass killing or genocide, but changes in the impairments can be a valuable clues. Changes in legal systems that clearly weaken the power or capacity of a potential victim group to protect itself should be considered endangering events. If a clearly contrasted collective identity exists within a polity (especially if led by a dictatorial regime) and government leadership does not belong to the potential victim identity, then the occurrence of *newly* prejudicial legal and administrative impositions can mean impending trouble. The following list of impairments is adapted from Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*.

- Restrictions on professions
- Restrictions on divestment and purchase of real estate
- Special physical or clothing markings
- Special naming conventions
- Marriage and intercourse restrictions
- Off-limits locations or concentrations
- Any form of mandatory migration
- Marking of transactions
- Special taxes

Restrictions on intermarriage and sexual relations are especially significant as in-group/out-group separators. Such restrictions are easily detectable as either a social norm or formal restriction. They might be imposed from within the potential victim identity or by the potential perpetrator. This classic phenomenon is an inspiration for literature, art, and feud and is also one of the clearest markers of group cohesion and inter-group friction.

Taxation is another item worthy of special note. Few other subjects mark and measure the physical territorial limits and spaces of human conflict, or are able to measure conflict as precisely in time or material as is taxation. Tax differentials, tax anomalies, tax evasions and tax inequities can be detected, described, measured, and mapped. It can be fairly stated that wherever a severe tax inequity is matched to a vulnerable collective human identity, that tax announces potential violence.

Another indicator of potential mass killing is hate language, especially official hate language. For instance, in Rwanda *Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines* helped fuel Hutu anger at the Tutsis before the genocide there. Hate literature that appears in schools should be of special concern. If the hate literature appears in texts that are centrally published or the product of educational literature review boards (as is often the case) the phenomenon can be documented and mapped. At least the addresses of publishers, review boards, or schools have specific physical geographic signatures, and mapping such signatures can have a pronounced effect on outsiders' ability to influence the hate.

Another possible predictor is high contrast in ethnic, racial or linguistic identity. Much ethnographic mapping has already been done in the world and, along with updates to local census data, a worldwide by-county inventory of highly contrasted populations can be made. There have been genocides and other mass killings not associated with highly contrasted linguistic, ethnic or racial identity (Cambodia comes to mind, but anecdotes suggest that even in that event ‘educated’ speech was a sufficiently contrasting determinant for selection for elimination).

Impunity is a key feature in genocide history. Benjamin Leiberan (*Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe.*) noted that when Nazi Germany expanded into neighboring lands, the newly arrived German overlords did not have to force foreign populations into violent action against Jews. The Germans had only to establish the enabling environment of impunity and its psychological complement of release from ethical dishonor. With those conditions emplaced, many populations willingly and perhaps eagerly set about to destroy their Jewish neighbors. Pre-existing anti-Semitism was a factor. Hitlerian plans called for much more than just the displacement of the Jews, however, although the value of the Jew as a scapegoat was never underappreciated. Hitler’s plan for the Reich was such an immense ego-national project that mass murder could be reduced to a mere technical and administrative challenge.

Some of the activities proffered above to predict genocide could actually facilitate genocide. For instance, ID-carding and human inventorying might be used to monitor the protection of a human identity, but it might also be used by a genocidal government to more carefully and completely single-out members of an identity for destruction. In some cases, the very effort to discover, monitor and report could increase danger to an at-risk group.

A debate exists among those peoples with the capacity to stop genocides. One side of the debate (the side less inclined to act) often summarizes its argument as an absence of ‘national interests’. The other side of the debate invokes a higher, moral responsibility to act. In this I am going to take sides without detouring into much argument. If a nation has the wherewithal *competently* to prevent genocide, it should do so. Genocides, however, are rarely just based on hate. They are never just disasters or spontaneous combustions, either. They are politically motivated, and so a response designed only to stop immediate killing is probably only going to be temporarily effective. The structure that emboldens and empowers groups to commit murder with impunity has to be changed. The *mens rea* of genocide has to be located and nullified.

The *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 (combined with the Security Council Resolution of 1674 of 2006) offers an international legal path to override formal State sovereignty and legitimize foreign intervention into lands whose States appear guilty. Government impunity has its limits according to this law. The sanctuaries drawn by international borders (the geography of national government’s immunity) can be legitimately breached. The existence of this line of formal international law presupposes its eventual use.


You might ask, “Why would we need legalistic justifications from or for a feckless world once we were confident we could act competently and decisively, and we knew independently what was the right thing to do?” Yes, I formed it as a rhetorical question. When good people know the right thing to do, have the capacity competently and decisively to act, but do nothing, that omission can irritate a guilty conscience as much as would clumsy action. On the other hand, there is a lot of empty stupid in the conditioners. “Competently and decisively” are not low bars to overcome, and prideful sanctimony is a blinder to the size of those barriers. This paragraph was written during a week in which the President of the United States made a speech to the American public in which he made a moral case for taking military action against the regime governing Syria because that regime had reportedly used chemical weapons. The President simultaneously suggested that military action might be less wise than diplomacy. Physically punishing a regime on moral grounds, possibly then to see that regime collapse while uncertain regarding what leadership might fill the vacuum (what the moral content of a follow-on leadership might be, or what attitudes they might have toward the United States) perfectly spelled conundrum.

Please see sections: 66, *GIS*; 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 48, *Grading the Social Contract*; 78, *Identity*; and 108, *Common Knowledge*.



“The territorial imperative is as blind as a cave fish, as consuming as a furnace, and it commands beyond logic, opposes all reason, suborns all moralities, strives for no goal more sublime than survival.”[\[306\]](#)

Robert Ardrey,
Territorial Imperative



“The fundamental difficulty of subjecting states to the rule of law is the fact that states possess power. The legal control of power is always difficult...”[\[307\]](#)

J.L. Briery
The Law of Nations



“When studying ourselves, we are looking at a fresco with a magnifying glass. Consequently, these early impressions which great men have given of themselves are nearly always slanders upon themselves, for the stronger man is weak to his own conscience, and Hamlet flourished to a certain even inside Napoleon.”[\[308\]](#)

G. K. Chesterton
Robert Browning



“If a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.”[\[309\]](#)

G. K. Chesterton
Robert Browning



Mile markers of armed conflict, their details surprise

Section 106, Massacres

Internal conflicts are often chaptered by massacres. A massacre can change the direction of public psychology, mark changes in the fortunes of contending groups, and expose severe internal divisions or loss of leadership in a government army or inside a violent nongovernmental armed group. Sometimes massacres are just horrible mistakes or the work of the criminally insane.

Be aware that there are various working definitions and that the definitions have an effect on statistics and stories. One recognized measure of a massacre is four persons killed in a single incident. I was told by a Colombian official a number of years ago that if fewer than ten persons -- soldiers, policemen, civilians -- were killed in a single incident, the Colombian public wouldn't take notice, inured as it was to news of homicide. He felt that to earn the term 'massacre' an event had to reach some appreciable level of public recognition and impact, which meant at least ten dead victims. Another word, *atrocities*, is commonly used in propaganda pieces. Atrocity spans both massacres and genocides, but the word seems to have gained no legal or mathematical definition as have the other two. Below are seven notorious Colombian cases, out of many dozens, highlighting divergence in the nature of massacres. They are all named after the place in which they occurred.

Ciénaga Grande -- In 1928, the nascent Socialist Revolutionary Party organized a large workers strike against the United Fruit Company at its Colombian Plantations at Ciénaga Grande near the Atlantic Coast town of Santa Marta. A local command of the Colombian Army broke up the strike by firing into the crowd. The number of victims has become one of the adjustable elements in Colombian political narratives. The strike was a failure, even causing a schism among the party organizers. That schism birthed the Communist Party of Colombia. The massacre at Ciénaga Grande is the grandfather of twentieth century Colombian massacres -- a failure for the banana workers became, nevertheless, propagandistic gold for the radical left.

Tacueyó -- A man named José Fedor, who had been a trusted member of the Colombian communist insurgent group, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC), fell into disfavor with the FARC senior leadership sometime late in 1981, stole a lot of money from the organization and with it founded an even more radical splinter group called the Ricardo Franco Front (after a former guerrilla leader). Many of the foot soldiers of Fedor's dissident group came over from the FARC and he recruited others. Paranoia got the best of him and in late 1985 he perpetrated an especially vicious torture/execution of between 160 and 180 of his own men, a few of whom might have been infiltrators and all of whom he suspected of being infiltrators. The massacre came shortly after an unrelated guerrilla takeover of the Colombian Supreme Court Building, a coincidence that would amplify the public impact of the massacre. Although it was mostly FARC renegades killing themselves, Tacueyó not only left an impression on the Colombian public, it is generally marked as the event that took away much of the opinion (held perhaps by a majority of Colombians) that the FARC was a guerrilla movement worth, noble.

La Chinita -- In the La Chinita neighborhood of the town of Apartadó, Antioquia, an evening attack during a town celebration on January 23, 1995 left 35 dead, mostly young men. (Apartadó, by the way, means remote). The action was a reprisal for failure of commitment, growing out of differences between the Frente Popular, the political party of the EPL guerrilla organization and the Union Patriótica, the political party of the FARC (Aranguren 2001, p. 21) (Museo Casa de la Memoria 2011). As with other Colombian massacres, La Chinita cannot properly be considered in isolation. FARC had been attempting to wrest power in the zone from the EPL, and attacked demobilized EPL fighters as traitors to the revolution and to arrest increases by the EPL in legitimate political power. According to the late AUC leader Carlos Castaño, many EPL fighters joined the AUC. Chinita was really just the beginning of another round of hyper violence, during a year seeing several massacres in the same area. On August 12 that year, AUC guerrillas killed seventeen persons in Bosque de Chigorodó County at a discotheque called the Aracatazo. It was followed quickly on August 19 by a mass killing perpetrated by the FARC in Churio Pueblo also in Apartadó County. On August 29 the FARC killed another sixteen in Zungo Corregimiento in neighboring Carepa County, then murdered six more in Pueblo Galleta on September 6, and so it went. Apartadó is located along a smuggling corridor and not far from the upslopes leading from the Panamanian border to the Paramillo high ground to the east. However, the Chinita massacre was not one in which one group was fleeing and another group chasing. The victims had no chance to confound the decision-making of their pursuers by the use of landmines or to otherwise tighten the risk distances of their pursuers. This massacre, like all the others included in this section, was a milestone of the war that exposes a variety of criminal motivations and organizational schisms.

Machuca -- Machuca is a small town located along the Pocuné River in Segovia County, in eastern Antioquia. Unfortunate about its location is that one of the major oil pipelines passes near the town upriver. On October 18, 1998, the ELN blew up the pipe, spilling thousands of gallons of oil into the river, which caught fire, burned down the town and killed eighty-four people, half of them children. At first, the ELN tried to deflect public outrage onto the police, but eventually admitted the crime, plausibly claiming that the killing was an accident. Segovia borders on the southern Bolívar Department, known as an epicenter of guerrilla presence and organized violence. A decade earlier the AUC had entered the nearby county seat, and killed what is still an uncounted number of persons, perhaps into the dozens. The county is also a center of gold and silver mining, much of it informal. Today, FARC and perhaps ELN remnants are taxing and extorting miners and mining concerns. It appears that the dreadful plight of families in Machuca owed little to poor economic conditions. Their heritage reached back to the successful resistance of escaped slaves and the establishment of the eighteenth century autonomous *palenques*. They were at Machuca as a direct result of an ancient escape. They had no settled in a poor place, but in one with a wrong combination of lucrative targets and terrain suitable for getting away with violent acts.

Bojayá -- In 2002, the FARC launched gas cylinders at a church in which maybe five hundred civilians were taking refuge from an ensuing battle between units of the FARC and units of the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC), an anti-Communist guerrilla group (generally categorized as 'paramilitary'). The gas cylinders are a primitive style of artillery, but effective. One of them went through the roof and exploded on the altar, killing around 120 civilians, many of whom were children. Although the AUC was cited by the United Nations for violating human rights (using the villagers as a shield and pillaging), there was no way for the FARC to avoid international condemnation. The government, meanwhile, was also found culpable for not doing enough to have stopped the event, having been warned that the two warring parties were in the area. The Bojayá massacre occurred in the context of a battle between two contending guerrilla groups (while there were instances in which the government and the AUC colluded, that was not one of them). However, the incident cemented an idea that the government could be condemned and sued for a failure to protect its citizens, even if the government was not itself a participant or perpetrator. This result suggested a bit of a military operational problem, implying that the government was obliged to assign forces to protect civilian populations on the basis of information about pending clashes between other armed groups. Needless to say, a lot of initiative could be stripped away from government military leaders. Under such rules of legal obligation, armed government forces could disperse or deceive the government into reactive defense.

Trujillo -- Trujillo is a county north of Cali, Colombia. Trujillo is actually the name given to a series of massacres in about the same place. Well over three hundred persons were killed, mostly by members of the AUC and the Cali drug cartel, who dumped many of the body parts into the Cauca River. Almost all of the victims were union activists or others accused by the perpetrators of supporting the leftist guerrillas. Some collusion occurred, at least early on, by officials of the government armed forces. The details form a complex drama that is still being investigated by a truth commission. The various explanations of why this place would become emblematic of the war and of its massacres all mention its geography.

proximity to a major smuggling route to the Pacific coast.

Jamundí – In 2006, an army unit, on orders from a drug lord, ambushed and killed all the members of an elite counternarcotics police unit that had been trained in good part by the United States. In Colombia, both the national police and the army belong to the Ministry of Defense. The shock wave of questions, investigations, inter-institutional accusations, self-doubt and slumped morale was palpable, even while the action was only tangentially related to the insurgent war.

The above massacres weren't perpetrated using planted explosive devices, although there have been many mass killings in Colombia involving explosive artifacts, including some notable urban attacks on civilian targets. (In 2003, a car bomb ripped open the elite Club Nogal in Bogotá, killing thirty-six persons and wounding about two hundred.) None of the above-listed massacres involved contact between an anti-government armed group and a unit of the government armed forces, either. Plenty of those occurred, but these massacres are part of an odd array of excesses, each with its own character. The motivations include control of territory, paranoia, and revenge. The preservation of anonymity regarding illegal and materially profitable activity is often a factor. It seems that in Colombia remote towns can be especially vulnerable if they happen to be located between something of great (and transportable or convertible) market value and places perpetrators consider likely sanctuaries. Such a hypothesis is encouraged further by a parallel fact that hundreds of remote Colombian towns not enroute to a criminal sanctuary, but otherwise equivalent to the victim communities, have passed through decades of conflict without seeing any organized violence at all.

Many of the massacres in Colombia have been followed by forensic efforts, some better than others. Those efforts have been getting better over time, which has meant a growing body of evidence that can be made available not only for criminal prosecutions, but for civil litigation. If a guerrilla or criminal force (or for that matter, a government unit) commits a massacre, how are they to fare in the context of a peace process that proposes amnesty for criminal perpetrators?

Massacres, a category or scale of unethical killing that falls somewhere between simple murder and genocide, will probably mark and possibly define your irregular war. Their occurrence will be used propagandistically by you or by your opponents. You will do better to have stated, then inspected and enforced your intentions to discipline your people against massacres, and to investigate and illuminate massacres as quickly and completely as is practicable and beneficial.

Please see sections: 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*; 27, *'Nonviolent' Action*; 86, *Shifting Covert-geographies*; 97, *Oviedo*; 103, *Amnesty and Restitution*; and 16, *Presence*.



Sweet song-bird, fly back!
Wheel hither, bald vulture![\[310\]](#)
from the John Greenleaf Whittier poem
Le Marais du Cygne




Swimmer: "People are dying! Do something!"

David Hasselhoff: "First of all, I'm not a lifeguard; never was. Secondly, that was what natural selection was all about."

from the movie
Pirhana 3DD (2012)[\[311\]](#)



— Colombia, Various Locations —



ثورة جزائرية: Worst counterinsurgency ever?

Section 107, Guerre d'Algérie

On November 1, 1954, the Front du Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN), launched the 'day of insurrection' against French sovereignty in Algeria. That day became a fabled milestone in, if not the start of, the Algerian resistance and independence movement. Charles de Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on July 3, 1962. France lost over half of its territory and the lowest estimated death tolls from the war claim around 350,000 dead. Otherwise, it was a disaster. The constitution of France was replaced, military mutinies mounted, and millions of persons displaced. The history of French Algeria is one of insurgent victory and near total counterinsurgent failure. Dedicated insurgents and counterinsurgents do

well to study French experience in Algeria. Here is a woefully brief English-language bibliography on a subject worthy of its own course:

- Alexander and Keiger, *France and the Algerian War 1954-1962: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*;
- Aouiss, *The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture*;
- Chaliand, *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*;
- Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958*;
- Home, *A Savage War of Peace*;
- Johnson, "Algeria: Some Problems of Modern History" (*Journal of African History*, v. 2, (1964), pp. 221-242);
- O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962*;
- Shrader, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962*;
- Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000*;
- Talbot, *The War Without a Name: France in Algiers, 1954-1962*;
- Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*;
- Wall, *France, The United States and the Algerian War*.

Maybe we can delineate some military operational lessons from the civil-political or socio-psychological ones. As for the latter (given French objectives, the moral balance, and the abysmal results), the case of French Algeria seems to present all bad examples and only a few, related to operational military matters, are especially positive. Among successful French counterinsurgent operational innovations, however, are their use of the helicopter, territorial barriers, detailed census records, and the creation of anonymous reporting systems. The use of militias and of propaganda seem to have had mixed results.

The French also recognized how central to the conflict questions of land-use and ownership equities were, including inequitable relationships between ownership rights and tax burdens. Recognizing is not the same as doing something, however. The French did not do enough to change the basic unfairness of the Algerian social compact, or to change perceptions of inequality. Even though it recognized severe inequities, the French government did not make decisions or implement enough changes to quell insurgent energy. This central feature of the Algerian case -- that real estate ownership and taxation matters were basic issues to be resolved -- might serve as a guiding lesson for almost every internal conflict.

The French military had earlier absorbed a defeat in Indochina. Their recent failure there had been built on disrespect for their North Vietnamese enemy and on disregard for the basic lessons of classic military strategy. Dien Bien Phu became a place from which there was no route of withdrawal in the face of an enemy who grew to have a four-to-one advantage in firepower.^[312] Dien Bien Phu was indeed an historically decisive battle, booting French colonial power out of Indochina. The Algeria challenge, however, was geographically closer, much more significant to power in Paris and the results were far worse.

The Algerian War naturally draws our attention today, given that the principal insurgent identity was Islamic, and the counterinsurgent a western power with an apparent technological, logistical and financial advantage. Algerian physical geography also seems similar to Iraq's in that it features a dominant urban area surrounded by a harsh hinterland. Passing these similarities, the differences are considerable. Physically, the aggregate logistical distances challenging France in Algeria were one-tenth what the United States faced in the Middle East or Southwest Asia. Moreover, the cultural barriers to effective French counter-insurgency (especially the language barrier) were not nearly as severe for the French in Algeria.

French objectives were also inherently different than anything the United States had or is likely to have anywhere. The French government and people, and most of the people of northern Africa and the world, believed Algeria to be part of France proper. The French government's aim, at least at the outset, was to maintain its sovereign territorial status. Today, American goals in whatever theater are unlikely to include the protection of long-established settlements of Americans inside US borders. Parts of the American Southwest might someday make for an interesting exception.

Because counterinsurgent operational plans should be linked to strategic objectives, some significance attaches to differences or commonalities of purpose in overall national strategies. That is to say, because the geographic relationships and national strategic objectives were so radically different for the French in the 1950s as compared to the Americans in the 21st century, it would require quite a stretch of logic to apply the Algeria experiences to United States overseas operations.

The Algerian war is frequently mentioned in US military curricular materials, however, prompting the following observations:

Torture. The French used systematic torture, which some Frenchmen, like Paul Aussaresses, have since justified. The United States manual *Counterinsurgency* is explicit, repetitive, emphatic and unequivocal about the illegality and immorality of using torture. A typical sentence on the subject in that manual states, "Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is never a morally permissible option, even if lives depend on gaining information. No exceptional circumstances permit the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment." The fact that US manuals seem to dote on French operational experiences in Algeria should not be taken as a ratification of the French officers' attitudes toward interrogations and interrogation techniques.

The application of torture and terror is presented by French military writers as a factor in whatever success they think they achieved. It is a simple

fact that within just a few years after the French military withdrew, it became clear that they had achieved nothing positive on the strategic scale. The link between the two (French operational ruthlessness and their strategic failure) is not necessarily causal. Several other factors are implicated in the French defeat. Nevertheless, in a final section of *Pacification in Algeria*, David Galula lists what he considers the three principal causes of failure in the execution of counterinsurgent strategy in Algeria. One of these three he says was “lack of firmness toward the population.”^[313] In this regard, Galula apparently advises that...“it is necessary to punish in exemplary fashion the rebel criminals we have caught...The Rebels’ flagrant crimes must be punished immediately, mercilessly, and on the very spot where they took place.”^[314] I seriously doubt that the spectacular French loss was due to their coddling of the rebels or the population, and I believe this remarkable assertion by Galula indicts his mindset. This kind of language, by the way, does not appear in his derivative *Counterinsurgency Warfare*.

Psychological warfare. Some French plans officers stressed psychological operations designed to wrest control of the civilian population from the enemy (meaning generally the FLN). According to Jorge Verstryngne (see Section 98, *Jorge Verstryngne and Pio Moa*) many of the French officers favoring psychological operations were influenced both by Nazi Joseph Goebbels and by Soviet doctrine, or by Karl Marx’ writing itself. Verstryngne mentions the 1938 work *Viol des foules par la propagande politique*, (Rape of the Masses through Propaganda) by Serge Tchakhotine. Apparently that book appeared in a new French edition in 1952. Roger Trinquier (*Modern Warfare*) participated in a counterpoint or complementary current to the French enthusiasm for psychological operations. Trinquier defined the Algerian war as a clash of systems -- political, economic, psychological, and military. Trinquier, like most of the pro-psychological operations thinkers, instructed that the support of the civilian population was the *sine qua non* of victory; that, taking from Mao, it was as important to the combatant as water to fish. For Trinquier, popular support had to be spontaneous, terrorism to Trinquier an effective technique for inspiring ‘spontaneous’ support.

Population control. The priority placed on organizing the civilian population led Trinquier to criticize exclusively psychological methods. He saw it necessary to dismantle the political-administrative structures of the enemy, and then to build similar, affinity organizations. Such work could take place concurrently with psychological activities, but the overriding goal became the control of guerrilla physical movement and infiltration. In ratification of his thinking, the French high command authorized Trinquier to deploy the Dispositif de Protection Urbaine (DPU, Urban Protection Detail) in the Algerian capital. Jorge Verstryngne writes in his book *La Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario*,

DPU operations were based on a tactic of population classification, using coordinated neighborhood volunteers who contributed information about the goings-on of these areas. Within this system, each house was given a number, which was the equivalent of a record containing the number of inhabitants, profession, etc., by which it was possible to control any kind of change. To a certain extent, the DPU became the French equivalent of the Organisation Politique-Administrative (OPA, Political Administrative Organization) of the FLN, although this organization invented by Trinquier -- which was commonly referred to as *the GPU* in reference to the Soviet political police -- did not generate any kind of economic funding. Proof of the system's effectiveness came after information provided by DPU members led to the arrest of Ben M'hidi, one of the FLN's leaders in the battle of Algiers.^[315]

It seems that operational theories adopted by the French officers, in conjunction with disillusionment with Paris politics, emboldened them to consider themselves legitimate fonts and representatives of political power. Perhaps because things political and ideological were woven into the new counterinsurgency theory as part-and-parcel of the war effort, it was natural that the officers would begin to assign themselves political and ideological roles and responsibilities. It seems these new ‘military’ responsibilities had sprung from the informational and administrative requirements of occupation. Some officers considered expropriating large colonists' agricultural properties to redistribute them as part of a kind of national communism. Many officers ended up participating in mutinies against the government of France.

Galula or Trinquier? (Some of this material is lifted from the July-August, 2010 *Military Review* article ‘Let’s Take the French Algeria Experience Out of US Army Doctrine’.) A brief 1965 book review in *International Affairs* of both Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare* and Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (both were first published in English in 1964) favors Galula’s work, asserting that “Mr. Galula has a much wider view of the problem, partly no doubt because his professional experience is wider.”^[316] The reviewer also supposes for his readers that Trinquier, having first published his book in French in 1961, may have still held false hope that the war offered a positive conclusion for the French. Available biographic information about Trinquier and Galula, however, indicates that Trinquier was older, more experienced, a more prolific writer, and much more widely known than Galula. Alistair Home, in his 1977 *A Savage War of Peace* (widely considered a seminal English-language work on the subject) indexes Trinquier heavily, but Galula not at all. Jean Lartéguy apparently modeled characters in his novels after Trinquier, but it is unknown if the life or experiences of Galula impressed that author at all. It is hard to believe that Trinquier and Galula were not familiar with each other and especially that Lieutenant Colonel Galula was not perfectly aware of the existence and influence of Colonel Trinquier, at the time a chief of intelligence in Algeria. Still, Galula, although he almost undoubtedly read Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare* before working on his own 1963 *Pacification in Algeria* (from which his less-revealing *Counterinsurgency Warfare* was then derived), does not cite Trinquier in either of his own works. The curious absence of citation by Galula to Roger Trinquier invites us to consider professional jealousy, personal differences, or a rule of silence (in view of possibly feared retribution) as reasons.

Regardless of the interpersonal or professional relationship of the two Frenchmen, it is not reasonable to assert that Galula’s writing is more reflective of French military thinking about Algeria than Trinquier’s. Galula seems to take a less brazen stance in favor of the use of torture and terror for breaking into the cellular organization of the Algerian insurgency, but maybe Galula was just coy. Note for instance, his comment, “Under the pressure of a press campaign against “tortures” (in my [Galula’s] view 90 percent nonsense and 10 percent truth), a special unit was created in the fall of 1957 under the name of D.O.P.”^[317]

In *Pacification*, Galula offers some basic laws, or principles, of counterinsurgency, to replace the classic ones, as follows:

- 1) The objective is the population
- 2) The support of the population is not spontaneous. It can be obtained only by a minority among the population that supports the counterinsurgent
- 3) A pro-counterinsurgent minority among the population will emerge, but only if the counterinsurgent is seen as the ultimate victor. An early success is necessary
- 4) Effort must be concentrated area-by-area. “Which side threatens the most, and which offers the most protection?”^[318]

Like Trinquier, Galula intones that the counterinsurgent should dominate the psychology of fear. Perhaps his advice about the importance of psychological operations is tainted by his uncertainty regarding exactly what messages he felt should be sent by those operations. It is not clear from the English-language literature what is meant by his principle number 4 in the above list. Did Galula imply, as Trinquier made explicit, that the counterinsurgent must present himself to the population as a more palpable and certain physical menace than the insurgent?

The Algerian armed struggle is a nutritious episode for any student of irregular war. It should be approached cautiously and from several angles.

The French did not do well. Either they lost because of something they did, or in spite of it. Only a few activities fall clearly into the latter category. These include use of the helicopter, careful inventorying of the population, the construction of border barriers, and the organization of neighborhood watch organizations. In the not-good category we can put systematic torture, terrorizing of the public, and failure to make property ownership equitable.

Classic principles of military strategy (operational art) apply mightily in irregular war. In this regard the French military commanders did what they could to lengthen distances to the culminating points of friendly units, confound enemy lines of communication, and contain the enemy's movement options. The French Army had in fact learned from the debacle at Dien Bien Phu. The significance of *anonymity* is a related highlight of French adaptability. The French were attentive and industrious to reduce insurgent anonymity.

The French may have been overly respectful of international boundaries. The following, insightful text comes from Edgar O'Ballance's *The Algerian Insurrection*:

The barriers on the Algerian frontiers were a far greater success than has been realized. Publicity was usually given to the few insurgents and small quantities of arms that got through, but less was said about the thousands of armed and trained ALN soldiers who were forced to remain in helpless idleness because they were physically unable to enter Algeria. ... Although claiming, and at times practicing, a right of pursuit over the frontiers, the French stuck to the rules – ...Not enough is made of French restraint in this matter. Such an action (pursuit of the ALN across the national borders) might have caused international repercussions, but it would probably also have destroyed the conventional part of the ALN...[319]

O'Ballance and others also point to Charles de Gaulle's resolve to let Algeria go as an ultimately decisive ingredient in the French loss. Therefore, in light of four huge things: the immense operational impact of a simple physical innovation like the border barrier; failure to attack the enemy army concentrated in its nearby sanctuaries; inattention to land and tax inequity; and (perhaps the trump) that the senior political leader resolved to not win the war – in light of these huge things, what relative weight should we assign to arguments about the efficacy of psychological operations aimed at parts of the population?

Another issue might be the overall strength of French counterinsurgency forces in-theater. French counterinsurgent troop numbers (It is not clear who-all to count, but probably European-France-originated troops, French Foreign Legionnaires, Francophone Algerian police, etc.) seem to have been at least several hundred thousand.

The *Guerre d'Algérie* didn't only leave us positive lessons in military operational art along with negative lessons in overall counterinsurgency; it fueled left-leaning resistance philosophies, centered in France, that all but formalized late 20th century anti-Americanism.

Please see sections: 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 125, *Human Rights*; 3, *The Domesday Book*; 91, *Forts and Walls*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 8, *Linearity and The Line of Retreat*; and 100, *What the Foucault?*



“You don't understand our mentality – the French officer mentality. At first, we lose in Second World War. I don't say that you Americans win, but we lose. In Dien Bien Phu, we lose. In Algeria, we lose. In Indochina, we lose. But here, we don't lose. This piece of earth, we keep it. We will never lose it, never!”

Hubert in the movie

Apocalypse Now (1979)[320]




“This must be the place where they empty all the old hourglasses.”


Turkey Jackson in the movie

Road to Morocco (1942)[321]



— French Algeria circa 1954-1962 —





These two maps were adapted from those found at two Internet sites. They were not further cited. [\[322\]](#)

Tai Shan is a great mountain

Section 108, Common Knowledge

It would be nice to know in which of the tens of thousands of counties in the world conditions exist such that anyone cares enough to send weapons or soldiers there. It would be even nicer to know if something can actually be done to improve the situation. It would be nice to know where we can win and where we can't. Maybe 'nice' is the wrong word. Picking the right and wrong places to fight has got to be one of the essential talents for achieving military victory. To win at irregular war, it is a good idea to start early and win fast, if that can be accomplished. Every place and every conflict is different, so having a logical way to prioritize the most likely places and contestants makes sense. I think that an unclassified, broadly participatory public effort would greatly help governments, especially the United States government, decide where in the world it should focus attention and preparation for the possible deployment and use of coercive force. For a nation drawn out into the world by interests and responsibilities, but subject to democratic conscience, greater transparency about national geopolitical knowledge and ignorance makes both practical and philosophical sense, at least to me.

Few pieces of advice on how to win are more obvious than to choose the right places to go. Current processes and methods for determining the right and wrong places are secretive and apparently not good enough. Furthermore, few systems exist for determining who among all the analysts really makes the best predictions over time. A public knowledge engine would provide one way to code the world according to the likelihood that a given locale will experience the presence of a foreign force or needs that presence. Such an engine would also be more subject to evaluation of its descriptive and predictive capacity than are the current, secretive, institutional systems.

A couple of decades ago, law enforcement agencies in the United States experienced an abrupt increase in accident and crime reporting from the general public that coincided with the explosion in cell phone ownership. While helping law enforcement, the phones and cameras have also empowered the public to hold police more accountable for their behavior. How this movement of electronically-armed crowds affects prospects in some yet undefined irregular war depends. Like physical terrain, the leader who understands and exploits the potential will gain the advantage. *Crowdsourcing* and *Neogeography* are a couple of terms used for the phenomenon, but whatever we call the seemingly unruly part of the phenomenon, the side that organizes the knowledge is the side most likely to gain a competitive advantage.

In the context of recent conflicts comes the story of the avocational descendants of British bird watchers and train watchers who began recording aircraft tail numbers. The tail watchers were able to trace aircraft they suspected were being used for rendition flights carrying captured terrorism suspects. Now flocks of tourists upload tens of thousands of images to the Internet to map whole cities in ill-matched and patchy detail. The fearful will highlight crowdsourcing's lack of discipline, consistency and quality control -- and ease of falsification. Valid worries, but for the optimistic the trend promises a massive and revealing new body and way of knowledge.

Neogeography is part of the particularization of power. Individuals participate of their own volition in the production of public knowledge to the extent of their propensity to travel, click and access the Internet. If anonymity can be preserved in the individual's use of the Internet, neogeography will deliver new and extensive knowledge about distant places and subjects. Neogeography, crowdsourcing, or whatever name survives, is a milestone in the history of technological applications related directly to transparency.

The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, at least as expressed publicly, is not a national strategy, but rather only a strategy for the US Intelligence Community (IC). That exclusivity entails a huge opportunity cost. The United States enjoys a knowledge creation and management advantage over most of world, but it is an advantage that exists outside its federal government. Rather than simply entice quality minds into collaboration with its intelligence services, the US knowledge strategy (about foreign areas and armed struggles) could become truly national. Comprehensive global knowledge exists within nongovernment heads and institutions, more than it does within the IC. The underlying ethos of the American nation is not averse to supplying its public institutions (to include its government) with knowledge of the world, both to avoid the wrong fights and to win the right ones. An inclusive knowledge strategy could coax out the pent-up exploratory urge among the nation's scholars; and would not require additional government organizational diagrams, formal requests for information, or new masonry and glass architecture. It might help create a common agenda of discovery.

The American government could state a national knowledge vision, not just an intelligence community vision. That statement could challenge the intellectual complacency that typically grows within a government's intelligence apparatus by pitting descriptions and predictions made by non-government individuals against government employees in open competition. It could create stockholders and accountability outside the IC regarding the knowledge on which the government bases decisions about foreign aid, foreign conflicts, threats and interventions into foreign lands. It could engage huge numbers of scholars, students, tourists and business people in collaborative knowledge acquisition efforts.


The United States government especially should develop a national system for describing the world that involves volunteers outside of and unfettered by intelligence agencies and practices. Such a revolution would help the country win its irregular wars.

Please see sections: 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 111, *Knowledge Cultures*; 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*; 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 126, *Particularization of Power*; and 48, *Grading the Social Compact*



Tai Shan is a great mountain because
it does not scorn the merest handful of dirt.

Chinese proverb



"Keynes' theory [*The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*], in my opinion, was one of those very productive hypotheses -- a very ingenious one, a very intelligent one. It just turned out to be incompatible with the facts when it was put to the test."[\[323\]](#)

Milton Friedman



Want another opinion?

Section 109, Your Staff Work Sucks

Pro tip: When briefing your review of other people's analysis of a problem, their plans to solve it, or the approach they took toward analyzing and solving, avoid giving them the impression that you are thinking the title to this section. Not easy advice to implement and, if you're the person who is supposed to give such a brief, this book will not help you solve that social skills test. On the other hand, identifying how much others' staff work indeed sucks can be easy, since it often does, and so this section offers a few extra suggestions on that score. As it turns out, military staff processes are commonly unresponsive to the kinds of struggles this book contemplates. When well-practiced, a standard like the US Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) can suffice, but it rarely excels and can be easily abused. You may find in front of you, therefore, an opportunity for improving some commander's chances for winning. Improve his or her decision-making process or that of the commander's alter-ego, the staff. Or maybe the commander is you.

The common culprits of bad staff work in irregular war are:

- Poor mission statements
- Faulty logic
- Inadequate knowledge
- Some obstinate ego with too much influence
- Time
- All of the above in a weak sauce

What to do about it: Act ahead of the problem. Create what the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (actually it's not a university, it's a dozen geezers in a small building at Fort Leavenworth, but it's good nevertheless) call *liberating structures*. *Liberating structures* is hippie-speak for something that liberates a problem-solving or decision-making process from constraints not related to the problem itself, but rather to tangential factors, like our insistence on being idiots. A member of a staff or other decision support team might see a solution to a problem, but be constrained from expressing it out of fear of reprisal or simple lack of opinion space. A relevant liberating structure in such a case might be the use of a suggestion box or a secret ballot, the secret ballot being one of the most common and archetypically American liberating structures. There are many constraining phenomena and many potential liberators. The possibility of landing on a better plan or solution to a problem, or avoiding a bad solution, could depend on your identifying the constraints and providing the liberating structures. The first step in this therapy is to recognize that a decision-making or planning weakness exists (step one -- admission). There almost surely is some little problem or you are not in my Army, so the next step is to take explicit, active measures to do something about it. At least try something that limits the potential for calamitous results (fail-safe mechanism), or add something to maybe uncover a propitious option which might otherwise have been missed. A few typical liberating structures:

- Add to the problem-solving team people who actually know something. Sound cruel? One of the most common barriers to solid decisions is the hubris of thinking we already know enough. Especially in the military we think that if we know gobs about leading men, firing weapons, and talking on radios that we are empowered to achieve whatever is necessary in some foreign place, even though it is knowledge about the foreign place that is imperative. Ah, but you knew that. What are you doing about it?
- It is not just a question of raw knowledge. Add people with completely different backgrounds and perspectives. Yes, they are strange, annoying, and maybe even disloyal because, not being like you, they might not like you. But they might see solutions that the commander or staff cannot. It may require an outsider to beat back the insidious and universal effects of groupthink. Maybe the outsider is a nerd, an artist, a Romanian, or even... a confessed philatelist.
- Go over your logic as though it were wrong. Critical thinking works. Most people cannot or do not think logically, and even Dr. Spock is illogical once he gets something stuck in his head. Try imagining the worst that could happen at decreasing intervals of time. The UFMCS calls this the 'pre-mortem' analysis. (Get it? Murphy does his pre-mortem analysis every day in every way and often moves straight to mortem.) I call it DOOM. Test the most basic logic first, like the fact that phenomena are not caused by factors that occur later in time. Simple, but it is like plugging the computer back in. No sense worrying over the Boolean logic before checking the onesies and twosies.
- Vocalize opportunity costs. Don't just analyze what resources you might assign to accomplish something. Also be sure to consider what else you might have done with the same resources.
- Buy time. Lawyers don't always delay legal process just to increase their opponents' costs. They often want to buy enough time to make better decisions and sometimes just to allow the fates to provide better opportunities. Medical doctors find this much harder to do. They are less fond of delay, sometimes having to apply a more brutally liberating structure -- triage. Delay and triage are both tied to time, however. As a leader in an irregular war, you might prefer delay to triage. Timely, confident decision-making is good, but premature decision-making in the name of decisiveness is not so good. If a decision does not yet have to be made and a quick decision does not provide a palpable advantage, give yourself or the alter-ego the extra time to learn more. Still, as expressed often in this book, the counterinsurgent should act diligently because the insurgent is vulnerable early and decreasingly vulnerable over time. Time and distance are kissing cousins. You can buy time if you can shorten your distances and increase his.
- Suspend rank. Especially at crunch time when you really really need something to work, it may be a good idea to march away from the psychological impositions of rank. The Colombian Army and Police in Medellin didn't determine their winning plan for pacifying the vicious peripheral borough of Comuna 13 until a sergeant was given space to tell the staff how it should be done. Some commanders have been known to ask the opinion of the most junior member in a meeting first, figuring his or her thinking is least likely to have been eroded by the group's preconceptions or to have suffered other impoundments of human relationships.
- Enjoy life. This can be difficult for busy, serious, applied leaders and it is a concept that can get out of hand. I'm not promoting dissipation or frivolity, but people are often more creative when they are enjoying themselves away from artificial stressors. Admittedly, with some folk it is the

opposite – epiphany follows a sharp booting of the ass, but for most of us the light goes on when the mind is at ease.

- Eat and drink, but don't smoke. We are too quick to make our planning spaces off-limits to food and drink, often because of some dinky janitorial contract or because someone goes Sergeants Major apoplectic over a full trashcan. Too bad, because people talk over food and they aren't subconsciously looking for it late in the hour if it is already in front of them. Think about it – if you go visit a civilian dignitary or host a foreigner, you think it is important enough for food. Your staff work is, too. Eat, drink, and be merry. (Don't overdo it.)

There are many other liberating structures, so maybe your most profitable one will be the meta-liberating structure: to educate and train yourself in seeking and building them. Your irregular war may require an irregular staff approach. Courses in critical thinking, alternative decision processes, and geographic enlightenment abound. Find them. It is never too late; don't be the obstinate one. Your staff work will still suck, but it will suck a little less.

Please see sections: 72, *Land Strategy*; 49, 114, *R.V. Jones; Territorial Scrutiny*; 68, *Scale*; 112, *DIME and PEMISI*; 38, *Cultural Knowledge for What?*; 32, *Land-use Planning*; and 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*.




“Man reflects before he acts, but not very much; he is still by nature intellectually impatient. No sooner does he apprehend, in whole or in part, the need of a new world, than, without further plans or estimates, he gets into a state of passionate aggressiveness and suspicion and sets about trying to change the present order. There and then, he sets about it, with anything that comes handy, violently, disastrously, making the discordances worse instead of better, and quarrelling bitterly with anyone who is not in complete accordance with his particular spasmodic conception of the change needful. He is unable to realize that when the time comes to act, that also is the time to think fast and hard. He will not think enough.”[\[324\]](#)

H. G. Wells in *World Brain*



“It is a vessel of fertilizer, and none may abide its strength.”

Fourth in the seven-step process
that transforms plan into policy



“We mock what we do not understand.”

Austin Millbarger in the movie
Spies Like Us (1985)[\[325\]](#)



Testing ignorance, begging exploration

Section 110, Knowledge Gaps

How do you know if you know enough to win, especially about a foreign place? What you don't know can be framed by the following question: Can an ignorant (not dumb, just unknowledgeable) staff person who finds him or herself planning a counterinsurgent, stability, humanitarian or insurgent operation in or to a foreign land find the requisite knowledge fast enough? If the requisite knowledge is not contained in some easily retrievable dataset familiar to that person – that is to say, their own skull, at their keyboard fingertips (public search engines count), in the head of someone in the same building, someone who can be readily called or emailed, or in a library across the street, then you can presume that the institution is ignorant. We'll get to what the requisite knowledge is later below.

It is hard to say just what the *time-to-knowledge* standard should be. It can't be so much time as to harmfully delay or misdirect the planning process. Let's say for argument's sake that a *time-to-knowledge* standard of fifteen minutes initial investment on the part of the staff officer and no more than a 48-hour wait for a key set of facts is acceptable. Obviously this supposes some urgency; we might have lots more time if we can guess well enough in advance where we might be going in the future.

This section offers a way to test relevant ignorance. It is specifically not about the kind of information sought and processed by secret intelligence agencies in relation to conventional warfare and international confrontations. In other words, this comment is not about knowledge gained by a remote sensor or by activities normally considered the purview of spies. That secret knowledge is valuable, but all of the knowledge contemplated by this section is public or nearly so. Some of that other, secret knowledge might be extremely useful. I'm just not talking about it here. We'll use a few test subjects to see if we (our institution represented in this case by some smart but ignorant researcher) know enough about a foreign place so that we won't make so many mistakes at the beginning of an operation that we can't recover from them.

The process of ignorance testing includes making a map (GIS-based, of course) that shows the world according to county-level administrative units and displays relative ignorance about those counties based on our test subjects' ability to answer a representative set of questions about them. The questions are tracking items -- questions considered *representative* of the kinds of knowledge necessary in order to succeed in operations. The list of questions is not really a list of the most needed things to know about a specific county or a comprehensive list of what knowledge to seek. *It is not a requirements list.*

Since each place and every mission is unique, there exist thousands of questions that can and should be answered about a given place. Inability of our people to timely answer the tracking questions, however, will warn us of an institutional knowledge gap. You can take the test yourself. Inability to answer the questions is the indicator that tells you your institution doesn't know enough about a particular place. It is not that the questions on the test are the things you have to know, but rather that if you're ignorant of these things, you're probably also ignorant about whatever it is you really would need to know.

You will do well to use the county (county, not country) as the level of geographic, territorial resolution for your test, but it could be a higher resolution, like the township. Almost every country in the world has some territorial unit similar in scale to the county. From a base map of a country of interest (showing its counties), pick a county for the test. Choose one that might be of future security interest, then give the name and location to your test subject. Ask him or her to answer all twenty-three of the following questions as soon as he or she can and note how long it takes to get a good answer. You might want to know the right answers in advance. That might make grading the test a little easier, but it is not necessary.

1. Where is the most visited tourist attraction inside the county?
2. What is the residents' most frequent destination outside their county?
3. What families own the most valuable real estate in the county?
4. What is the name and contact information for a person we know (and who would be willing to help us) who can fluently speak the language dominant in the county?
5. What three regular open-air public events draw the most attendance in the county?
6. On what day of the year is a thirty-year-old man most likely to visit his mother if she lives in the county (other than her birthday)?
7. Where is the nearest jail that houses more than fifty prisoners?
8. Where are the most-used morgues in the county?
9. What is the name and contact information for a person willing to help you, who has stood in the county and who personally knows three persons who live in the county?
10. What are the words to the most common three prayers said in the county?
11. What is the second most popular flag design in the county?
12. What is the second most smuggled thing that goes to, through or from the county?
13. From what two health issues would a twelve-year-old boy in the county most likely suffer?
14. What are the most accessed information media in the county?
15. What is the price of an egg in the county?
16. What is the walking distance for a person of modal income between their most frequently used kitchen and the nearest source of potable water?
17. What groups or persons are the likely butt of jokes in the county?
18. What does a man living in the northeastern quadrant of the county use to wipe himself after evacuating his bowels?
19. Where and when might a group of six housewives meet, other than at church?
20. Where would a 22-year-old unmarried male resident go to have sex?
21. What is the most common nickname for a pistol in the county?

22. To whom is a forty year-old man with a family likely to owe a financial debt or tax?

23. Exactly how many motorcycles are ridden in the county?

If you had the time and money to repeat this test over and over, pretty soon you could make a map showing all the counties of which you're effectively ignorant. More than likely you'll find out that you don't need to invest much time or money in the ignorance audit. Your institution probably can answer only a very few of the questions for very few counties anywhere. If you're an insurgent, you or your friends live there, so you not only know the answers to the tracking questions, you know the people who have organized around related grievances.

For any counties you, incredibly, seem to know well, you might zoom the test down further to the level of townships. Next you might physically go or send someone to a township or two just to review that the answers were right. (This means it would be smart for you to pick touristically sweet foreign places for the test. After all, except for a few places in the world, your institution is equally as ignorant of the nice places as it is of the not-so-nice-places. So, if there is any tourist attraction of merit, at least you'll be able to stay in a nice hotel.)

If your test subjects can answer the bulk of the twenty-three questions well and quickly, that's good. The tracking questions, however, are mostly geographic inventory questions. They don't go right at social conflicts -- to the interrelationships, grievances, agents, and objects of desire. An idea for that kind of analysis is covered in Section 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*. This section assumes that you should not put faith in an analysis of conflict done by a person or office that can't answer the most basic geographic inventory questions.

Don't worry about the test subjects or institution getting your list in advance and cheating on the test. There are tens of thousands of counties out there and you'll pick the test county. If your test subjects were to build some system that let them quickly derive answers about whatever county you throw at them, you're in great shape. Not gonna happen. The above text downplays the substantive importance of the individual questions a bit. They were selected to be representative and not specific, but, depending on the mission, answers to most of them would be operationally useful as to many foreign locales. As your ignorance map of foreign counties gets filled in, it can be correlated directly to GIS maps of counties deemed of strategic importance, or of counties that have been spotted as potential foci of human conflict.

Please see sections: 66, *GIS*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 47, *Why the County*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; 112, *DIME and PEMISI*; 38, *Cultural Knowledge for What?*; 32, *Land Use Planning*; and 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*.



"My mind is a raging torrent, flooded with rivulets of thought cascading into a waterfall of creative alternatives."

Hedley Lamar in the movie

Blazing Saddles [\[326\]](#)



The desert is so hot you can collapse, and then the buzzards circle overhead, but no one rescues you because it's real life and not the movies. [\[327\]](#)

Marjorie Weinman Sharmat

Gila Monsters Meet You at the Airport



Section 111, Knowledge Cultures

The kinds of information that people seek, the way they sort through and arrange it, and the way they present findings and opinions are all subject to big cultural and small institutional habits, rivalries and historical divergences. Limitations in knowledge cultures can get in the way of your winning, and breaking out of those cultural constraints might help you win. This topic could drag on forever, so in this section are just a few cherry-picked items you might be able to use to inspect the agility of your personal and your organization's thinking about your irregular war.

A 2010 paper titled *Fixing Intelligence* from the Center for a New American Security starts with the unfortunate sentence, "Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the US intelligence community is only marginally relevant to our overall strategy."^[328] There are reasons why this might be true, as well as a few fixable habits, that are mentioned further below.

Secret versus not secret. Because some forms of secret intelligence are so valuable and powerful, everything that can earn a secret label takes on a degree of respect, even while the document marked as secret may be worthless or doesn't need to be so marked. Along with secret-labeled documents come levels of access and exclusive geographies – rooms, buildings and bandwidth that are for 'cleared' persons only. The abbreviation OSINT stands for Open Source Intelligence and for a while was a rallying cry for making available more of the vast body of world knowledge onto which nobody had yet stuck a secrecy label. OSINT ultimately became almost synonymous with having secrecy-accredited analysts going onto the open Internet to find information. Today, decades after recognition of the Internet and GIS knowledge revolutions, the formal, unclassified knowledge function supporting the United States military remains in its infancy.

Government versus academe. When the big American intelligence organizations were born in the late 1940s, line and block diagrams (organizational charts) with thousands of government positions were created, most requiring some kind of secrecy accreditation. The result was a distancing of American scholars from government knowledge spaces, conversations, decisions, and consequently and worst of all, trust.

Organigrams versus ideas. Inside government buildings, knowledge is often constrained by organizational format – pay and supervision hierarchies, budget flows, and room designs. Maddening or hilarious compartmentalization occurs that leaves holes in the known world. For instance, some years ago it was decided that the Department of Defense would take the lead in fighting illicit drugs. It seemed logical to give the cocaine knowledge portfolio to a team focused on Colombia. The heroin problem went to some Central Asia experts, since that is where most of the world's heroin was grown. However, because none of the Central Asia experts spoke Spanish (and Colombia wasn't in 'their' part of the world) they ignored Colombian heroin poppy production, which at the time satisfied much of the US demand). Complete knowledge about the heroin trade going to the US stumbled for a couple of years because of the line and block diagram. The line and block diagram, with its compartments and hierarchical levels of authority, is useful for organizing military units. It is not so good for organizing knowledge, but because the organizational culture given to 'intelligence' was a military inheritance, the American government knowledge community got a model that has caused some thought problems.

Personal loyalty versus intellectual conviction. Imposition of military organizational design on knowledge processing has secondary effects. For instance, it is traditional military ethos that subordinates support the decisions of military leaders in the hierarchical structure – the chain of command. It is an ethic that many of us deem noble and necessary. That sense of 'getting behind the decision', can become a loyalty test expected not just for decisions, but for analyses. This can be an unfortunate ethos for a knowledge organization, especially when the best knowledge may have little correlation to administrative rank.

'Strategic' versus 'operational'. This book mentions a few higher level strategy questions, but it is mostly about movement and placement on the battlefield, identifying and getting close to an enemy so that he can be dispatched, and dispatched in such a way as to not create more enemies. What is the 'operational art' gold standard for such knowledge? It might be something like placing a sniper at a safe shooting distance from a dangerous enemy leader at the moment when that enemy is relieving himself. At the not-so-graphic world of 'strategic intelligence' the gold standard for an analyst might be to have a comment placed in a briefing folder that a senior leader might read. Blah. A divergence of knowledge glories drags a lot of mental resources away from military operational art and toward an expansive frame of subjects and satisfactions that, while often of the highest importance, are often irrelevant or even frivolous. Many points can be gained for a strategic analyst who has made a well-argued prediction regarding an upcoming foreign presidential election. Not useless effort, it is the kind of thing that absorbs hundreds of work hours even though a wait of a few days will give the definitive answer without any analysis at all. To win at irregular wars, more glory needs to be given to those who derive knowledge tied to operational equations -- to the essence of strategy -- to the classic military questions. To be fair, in the American case, providing the knowledge to kill a top leader of al Qaeda does not go unappreciated.

Post-structuralist versus others. A current fashion in academe favors a freestyle sorting of underdogs and overdogs, the former being good and the latter bad. Assignment of who or what is on the overdog or underdog sides of the knowledge virtue ledger is a constantly changing mix of coded reaffirmations. According to what appears to be mainstream academe, the words *worker*, *resistance*, *anti-globalist*, and *progressive* fall on one side, and *neoliberal*, *colonialist*, *realist*, or *positivist* fall on the other. In a current fashion of social sciences, thinking must be politically competitive if it is to be recognized as scholarly, and research is only ethical if done in service to one side of that competition, the *progressive* side. This competitive reordering of academic life is having a deleterious effect on the production of knowledge in general. Although by no means universal, the tendency in academic circles has been to reject the whole notion of objectivity in favor of competitive intent, a moral infusion that is often no more clearly expressed than as resistance to injustice.

The cultures of academe are subdivided into 'disciplines' but the disciplines and discipline clusters vary country to country. Below is a three column chart with four academic disciplines in each column.

Medicine	Mathematics	Philosophy
Law	Geography	Sociology
Engineering	History	Anthropology
Accounting	Biology	Theatre

It is unfair to use the above selection as a representative sample of the whole universe of disciplines and it is a shame to leave out what are some of the most useful – like languages, geology, physics, etc. But that doesn't matter, because the chart is only intended here to help make a single criticism, in this case directed at the US Army. The criticism is as follows: Throughout history and across all continents, armies have given special insignia, extra pay, and designated whole corps in accordance with the disciplines listed in the left-hand column. That is because they are so necessary for the efficient and effective conduct of military operations. Those disciplines are in turn obsessed with the disciplines in the middle column, because the middle column disciplines are the food groups for the meals the disciplines in the left-hand column are paid to prepare.

Each academic discipline has its own habits, methods, vocabulary and ethic. Like the various professions to which they are matched, they have their own cultures. The disciplines on the left-hand side of the chart are generally more 'empirical' than those on the right, but members of those

disciplines are often enamored of those on the far-right, knowing that all knowledge is grist to their mills. A doctor and his lawyer wife might go out to the theater, enjoy it immensely and learn something useful and enlightening. They would be better off not to suppose that going to the theatre is a substitute for continuing professional education in their disciplines. That, however, is what the United States Army may be doing in its relationship to the various disciplines in American academe. In its approach to insurgent war, Army education has been dissipating with the disciplines on the right-hand side of the chart, perhaps failing to keep up with those toward the left. They are all valuable, but some are more valuable than others for winning.

Below is an incomplete list of institutional knowledge sub-cultures, with descriptions of what may distinguish them in terms of how they approach knowledge of armed groups and armed conflict:

Military. Military intelligence is based on requirements, collection plans and templates. Intelligence people the world over are enamored of a thing called the Intelligence Cycle, which most of them think is an actual thing spewed full blown from the head of Bismarck, but that actually was invented sometime in the early 20th century as a simplified scientific method that the military might follow. It has many versions, usually depicted in the shape of a wheel turning clockwise and including planning, collecting, processing, and dissemination. It often has other ingredients and flourishes like 'feedback' and 'operational security'. The problem of operational security indeed distinguishes the military knowledge method from academic in that secrecy tends to reduce the feedback. Unlike police work, the military mind usually focuses on a 'unit' rather than an individual, is not interested in proving guilt and is usually forward-looking in time from the occurrence of events, rather than backward. The military habit does not look to explain why an event happened as much as where the next event will take place.

Police. Police seek and follow clues, collect evidence, pursue suspects and help prosecutors build cases. They mostly look backwards in time from the commission of a criminal event. That is not to say they don't try to anticipate a suspect's next moves or try to figure out where he will be, but their investigative time-frame is more about what happened than what is going to happen.

Business. Businessmen look for markets, costs, products and prices. They keep accounts and measure the success of a knowledge process in profit.

Medicine. Doctors diagnose from the presence and absence of symptoms. They seek cures. They seek clusters of medical events and try to correlate the clusters to other things, like vectors or habits. They make and keep 'records' and individual histories. Most doctors work at the scale of the individual human body, although there are some that are interested in epidemiological facts. They measure the success of the knowledge process in cures.

Law. Lawyers create theories about conditions, events, statutes, cases, motivations, and foibles. Everything is digested for the purpose of predicting what a judge or jury of some kind might do to their client. They like to write briefs and cross-examine witnesses. Their work is constrained by jurisdictions and court dates. They measure success of the knowledge process in dollars, victories, settlements, convictions, and so on. Legal professional ethic rests on privileged and protected communications with clients and on a duty to represent aggressively.

Sports Betting. Bookies like to find or create environments in which the outcomes they expect are a little more likely than the outcomes other people expect. They depend on the perception of random chance, on someone else's undeserved arrogance regarding the future, and on insider knowledge.

Espionage. Spies look for secrets, so they look in hiding places and try to endear themselves to people with special knowledge. They lie and send code.

Greek Math. All dead Greeks knew syllogisms; all Greeks eat souflaki; therefore souflaki killed logic. OK, not a valid syllogism, but there are a number of classical rules for sorting truths from non-truths, and a larger number of logical fallacies that are often used purposefully to deceive.

Academe. Scholars form testable hypotheses and worry over induction, deduction, interpolation, extrapolation, and in the transparency and replicability of data and results. For them, the universe can be understood and explained. Many, especially in the social sciences, don't bother with any of that.

Your efforts to know more about your war will be better served if you do not put too many chips in any one of these knowledge culture-baskets, or reject any out-of-hand. A multidiscipline, multi-institutional, multi-profession approach is best. At the heart of your insurgent war thinking however, put history, geography, engineering and law. Fortunately, you are competing against other humans. You don't have to be faster than the bear, just faster than some other proud dope. If your enemy contemplates the world principally from within the vocabularies of sociology, anthropology and philosophy, he is uncompetitive.

Please see sections: 68, *Scale*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; 33, *Engineers & Built Environment*; 1, *What the Pirate Said to Alexander*; and 114, *R.V. Jones*



"The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards."[\[329\]](#)

William Francis Butler
Charles George Gordon



"I don't care much for facts, am not much interested in them, you can't stand a fact up, you've got to prop it up, and when you move to one side a little and look at it from that angle, it's not thick enough to cast a shadow in that direction."[\[330\]](#)

William Faulkner



"...the public gives more weight to credentials than it should when an academic is opining outside of the area of his expertise."[\[331\]](#)

Richard Posner quoted by Alan Sokal



It matters how ideas are organized

Section 112, DIME and PMESII

It matters how knowledge is organized. When knowledge is placed in categories, there should be some purpose for doing so. Maybe we choose categories so that other people can easily find information, or in order to make comparisons of attributes. In other words, we might classify the shoes we sell as pumps, loafers, high-heels, and oxfords; and then subcategorize them according to color and size; and then keep track of the number we sell and the net income by month. We can later go back and find out what the trends and preferences are, so as to better provide what consumers want and thereby make more money. It will be rewarding for us to get our categories right or, as a result of not naming things aptly, we won't make as much money as we might have made. In other situations maybe we want to name categories to help us keep track of common roots and relationships, like a genealogy, or taxonomy of flora. We might pick our categories just because they can help reduce something complicated that we are studying. This can be especially dangerous. We can always make simplifying categories of the complex, even if the complex phenomena being studied really cannot be broken into pieces. That is, we can do things with our language that can't be done in reality. Our categories are a form of imagination. We can easily imagine things as separate that are not, to later convince ourselves that they are. (You've noticed I tend to put things in lists of 3, 7, or 12 parts. I do that because it amuses me. How authoritative does my amusement make the categories?)

There are ways to test to see if we have chosen categories well. For instance, if different shelf stockers independently place the store's shoes in the intended categories, it is a sign that the categories are effective descriptors; that the categories have an efficient relationship to the common language and to the culture of shoe styles, or at least that the employees have been well trained as to the language of the store. Likewise, if sales staff can go find what style shoes they're looking for (just as the shelf stockers had intended) it's a good sign that the shoe categories are reasonable and meeting a purpose. If a sales person can explain the general nature of a shoe model to a customer (or the customer to the sales person) without the model being in front of them and the sales person can then go retrieve something that meets the description, the whole experience verifies a copacetic categorizing.

Here are twelve non-PMESII ways to organize knowledge:

1. The alphabet. Always a favorite, translations can be troublesome.
2. Google or other google-type engines.
3. Geographically -- It's simple, understandable, comprehensive, hierarchical and categorically unique. This might be called a GIS.
4. Chronologically. This is the way some file systems are done, and is especially powerful in conjunction with number 3., above.
5. The system of knowledge established by the disciplines accepted in US universities. There are some historical and practical reasons for separating Law from Engineering, for instance.
6. According to Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How.
7. For complicated conflict situations, maybe use something like what is in Section 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*.
8. Names of persons associated with an idea, responsible for something, or capable of providing something.
9. According to type of knowledge. For instance, you might try:
 - A. Foundational knowledge (simple facts in many categories about places);
 - B. Events knowledge (things happening in near time);
 - C. Reasoned knowledge (analyses or observations of correlations, anomalies, patterns, trends, systems, complaints, demands, consequences); and,
 - D. Knowledge about knowledge (metadata?) (How to get knowledge, whether or not to use PMESII, how to impart knowledge, the difference between epistemology and heuristics, and so on).
10. According to the manner in which the knowledge is gained or to be gained, ie., remote satellite sensors, surreptitious human collectors, public domain publications, diplomatic missions, academic expeditions...
11. According to the categories in the CIA World Factbook: Geography, People and Society, Government, Economy, Energy, Communications, Transportation, Military, Transnational Issues.
12. If the desire is to organize knowledge about a society in order to determine how susceptible it might be to organized coercion, or to expose areas for potential improvement, or to gain competitive advantage generally, then I would organize the knowledge as suggested by Section 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; or, in more ominous conditions, Section 105, *Genocide Geography*.

There are others, and any or all of the above can be mixed. The line and block diagram can be a real thought killer, but it can also establish hierarchy, responsibility, accountability, or leadership. It can help trace and correlate attributes. We know, however, that Max Weber, attributed inventor of the thing, is frying in the same cubicle in hell as that fellow who invented the cloth office workspace divider.

When buzzwords or acronyms are used to organize knowledge rather than just make a teaching point, knowledge suffers, and decision-making in turn. PMESII, for instance, stands for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure. In some doctrinal literature it has had two letters added to make it PMESII-PT, the P and the T standing for Physical Environment and Time. Be careful. Memory devices can be useful, but they are sometimes sold as taxonomies and even methodologies for the study of places and phenomena, when actually they are neither of these things. It is healthy to be skeptical about any laundry-list approach to strategy. PMESII hardly passes any of the tests for good categories suggested at the top of this section, but if it helps you remember something, great. If it helps you organize a written document, fine. Poor categories pose a danger to good thinking, but if PEMISI or any other device speeds and clarifies *your* thinking about a place, don't let this book dissuade your use of it. Consider, however, that if a number of themes covered by the sections of this book and applicable to your irregular war are not easy for you to place into nor revealed using PEMISI categories, that mismatch might be a warning. If you are told to use PMESII because 'that's the way the boss wants it', check to see if that is seriously so, and then decide between obedience and loyalty. If you're the boss, be careful not to hamstring thought with inflexible semantics. I am pretty sure that friends don't let friends use PMESII. It provides this book the best available example of how not to organize knowledge for armed competition.

Moreover, PMEISI is inherently oriented toward a nation-state level of considerations, that is, it is already confined and confining to a scale in

which the world is divided into about 160-200 territorial chunks. That may or may not be the right scale for the study of a given irregular war (I doubt that it will be), but if it is, then I propose instead the CIA's World Factbook categorization, which is more logical and useable. The CIA has famously comered the market. A lot of data has been fed into the categories, and they are used by umpty-ump people around the world.

Some instructors at the US Army War College are fond of another mnemonic, 'DIME', which stands for Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. (Since it is an actual acronym and only has four letters, I tend to remember the order). The school posits DIME as a useful separation of the instruments of national power that might be applied by strategic leaders – meaning leaders with the wherewithal to influence the application of those elements at a national level. Some War College instructors claim it as a pedagogical device so that senior military officers in charge of the 'M' don't forget that there are other kinds of power that might be more useful and appropriate in a given situation. 'Who holds a hammer sees nails everywhere'. There are some variants to the mnemonic, like MIDLIFE and DIMEFIL, that add other components, but I can't remember what they are. Most military leaders are not so strapped for organizational skill or intellect that they need such a checklist, but the thinking is that it never hurts to remind. Even still, how much help to planning and leading is a buzzword like DIME really going to lend in an irregular conflict, especially a heavily urban one? It might not be a good idea to rest thought on such devices.

A city leader or planner, say a mayor, police chief, or traffic engineer, would have to look at DIME and wonder where to put waste engineering, property tax records, land-use and stewardship, or recreation. DIME moves strategy up to 'national' and 'international' importance, but leaves behind a whole realm of matters consequential to military success. DIME, as a parameter for strategic thought, offers little intuitive space for what may be critical instruments of power for winning insurgent struggles. If it is true that DIME does little for the leaders of a city, why would DIME be appropriate for a military leader, or a guerrilla leader, in a world made of cities? Part of the answer (admittedly, the cynical part) can be found in the curriculum of the US Army War College. Or rather it cannot be found. The War College (A wonderful institution, don't get me wrong) barely deals with urban. Things that don't fit well into our laundry lists tend to disappear.

Below is a paragraph taken from the *Globalsecurity.org* website.

There is a debate underway to rescind the use of ASCOPE (area, structure, capabilities, organization, people, event) as the methodology to understand the civilian considerations, or 'C' in METT-TC. Some argue that PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time), is sufficient to explain both operational variables as well as mission variables of METT-TC, or at least the civil considerations.

Rather than take a side in that argument, I suggest that the very existence of the above paragraph is evidence enough that something is wrong. There are other approaches, as suggested throughout this book. As a minimum, the classifications you use to describe a place should be appropriate to the scale of the geography, and reflect what it is you are trying to do.

Please see sections: 66, *GIS*; 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 100, *What the Foucault?*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 34, *Urban or Rural*; and 68, *Scale*.



Classification is not a matter of identifying "essences," as is widely believed. It is simply a reflection of social convenience and necessity—and different necessities are always producing different classifications.

There are few complexities about classification at the level of dogs and cats, but when it comes to classification at high levels of abstraction—for example, those describing conduct, social institutions, philosophical and moral problems—serious difficulties occur. [\[332\]](#)

S.I. Hayakawa
Language in Thought and Action



[Animal types can be divided into...] "(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) trained, (d) suckling piglets, (e) mermaids, (f) mythical, (g) dogs on the loose, (h) included in this classification, (i) that twirl around as if they were crazy, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) that just broke the vase, (n) that from a distance look like flies." [\[333\]](#)

Jorge Louis Borges
attributing to Franz Kuhn
attributing to the ancient Chinese



"The war is over. The rebels are our countrymen again." [\[334\]](#)
Ulysses S. Grant (1865)



Section 113, Unrestricted Chi Whiz

I filched the vital essence for this section from Tim Thomas' *The Dragon's Quantum Leap*, which is a primer on the growth of China's power as illuminated by discussion of the nature (as a cultural as well as strategy matter) of the Chinese application of power. Extracting two concepts from Mr. Thomas' work – one being *shi* or sometimes *shih* (pronounced like the word 'sure', and I know what you're thinking: Why the heck not spell it that way, eh? Call the Academy.), and the other being *unrestricted warfare*.

Mr. Thomas did us orientally uneducated a favor by expounding upon *shi* in an appendix that covers the wide range of meanings, interpretations and translations of this central Chinese military concept. Four verbal tones and dozens of calligraphic characters lend mischief to translations, but Mr. Thomas tightens our focus to "energy, power, momentum, and strategic advantage."^[335] Ultimately, the translation we want is *strategic advantage*. *Shi*, however, is also confusable with the word *chi* or *ch'i*, which is a ubiquitous and consummately Chinese concept regarding life force or vital energy. Interestingly, *chi* can also mean surprise or the unorthodox. Chinese military strategists seek the generation of *shi*, that is, advantage, through the proper timing and balancing of *chi* actions with the force of more orthodox, *cheng*, actions. I guess the *cheng/chi* balance is like that of the *ying/yang*, but for the warrior.

Unrestricted warfare, as translated from the Chinese, is a much newer thing than either *chi* or *shi*, or maybe not. Whereas Western English language histories might use the term 'unrestricted warfare' to denote exceeded moral or legal boundaries, as in 'unrestricted naval warfare' (we think you are smuggling war supplies so we are going to sink the Lusitania), Chinese usage has a more comprehensive character. By unrestricted warfare (also referring to it as cocktail warfare) the Chinese strategists intend a creative and unfettered mixture of any possibly contributory methods and occasions, military and non-military, that might help generate strategic advantage in time and space. Unrestricted strategy implies a willingness to combine doctrine with innovation for creating *shi*. It is an attitude that supposes some orthodoxy, *cheng*, but seeks the creative ingredient of the unorthodox, the *chi*.

氣 chi or ch'i

勢 shi or shih

Chi, an ingredient of *shih* is in the section title because *chi* can be considered as surprise, creativity, or deception, and anyway is often confused in translations with *shi* or *shih*. It made more sense to use *chi* in the title since the generation of *shi* through a strategy of unrestricted warfare presupposes the admixture in novel combinations of some measure of *chi*. And, of course, *chi* went better with *whiz* so as to intimate gee whiz and cheese whiz.

The French say of Chinese strategic philosophy that it has a *je ne se quoi*, but they don't know what it is. Whatever it is, it is not magic, so why bother featuring a section on *shi* and *chi* in a book on irregular war?: Because the Chinese tend toward multi-purposed application of diverse activity. Predisposed to creating strategic advantage by increments, and in possession of immense athletic and technical potential, they are well-positioned to counter the efforts of other nations' SOF. China will probably never see its army clutched in glorious, diesel-rich tank battle against the Fifth Cavalry, but we can reasonably predict quite a few smaller, surreptitious and deadly encounters. *Unrestricted* and *irregular* overlap; both embrace the incremental but simultaneous creation of *shi*

Please see sections: 6, *The Operational Equation*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; 141, *Thirty-six Stratagems*; 101, *Magical Realism*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; 68, *Scale*; 10, *Decisive Battle*; and 142, *Conflict Geography*.



Axe Cop: We are going to need to turn Wexter into a dragon so that he can fly us to Zombie World.

Sockarang: But he is already a giant lizard that can fly.

Axe Cop: To get to Zombie World, you need a dragon with rocket wings. Plus, dragons are awesome.

from the webcomic


Axe Cop ^[336]



When all the land is in ruin,
and Burnination has forsaken the countryside,
only one guy will remain....
My money's on TROGDOOR...TROGDOOR,
and then Trogdor comes in the NIIIIght.

from the webcomic

Homestar Runner ^[337]



If you don't get the joke, step away from the plans

Section 114, R. V. Jones

Winston Churchill asked young physicist Reginald Victor Jones to defeat German radar and to do so fast. Reggie quickly invented chaff, something we now consider commonplace, rather than something that was actually invented. Reggie understood that knowledge about aircraft locations went into the radar operator's head by way of a small green tinted screen, and that all it took to ruin the radar was to confuse the operator regarding that little image. Reggie was a genius and one of the winners of World War II. Besides defeating German radar, he convinced the otherwise disbelieving paragons of the British scientific establishment that the Germans had some secret programs ongoing that included accurate long-range rocketry. He was a central author of the deception plans protecting the invasion of Europe. He didn't write much (*The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945*), but in a series of brief, obscure lectures from 1957 to 1975, Professor Jones expressed the nature of his strategic thinking. The titles of two of those lectures bespeak the odd nature of his message: 'The theory of practical joking – its relevance to physics' and 'Irony as a phenomenon in natural science and human affairs'.

As an incorrigible prankster, Jones thought it therapeutic to trick his physicist colleagues into plunging their telephones into buckets of water (for security reasons). Jones found in jokes all the patterns by which the mind is surprised -- delightfully or tragically. His sense of strategy incorporated the idea of creating and anticipating the unexpected. Correspondingly, his advice regarding defense policy underscored respect for strategic irony, especially in the unintended consequences of defensive measures. One of his lecture examples was that of the great pyramids. The Pharos, to preserve their honor as well as their remains, built huge edifices in which to protect their corpses. The effect was to publicly identify the location of their remains and to create a visible promise of great reward to the thief. Ultimately, Egyptian planners had to resort to hiding deceased royalty in the desert.

Professor Jones taught something else. He believed that his sense of humor was linked to his ability to understand, create and anticipate deceptions. His advice was to be wary of those who did not have a sense of humor, that they might not get the big military jokes, might not understand the deceptions inherent in strategy, and so ought not to be on anyone's planning staff. Facing irregular armed conflict, they might not be able to sift through the Magical Realism or the Songs of Chu. They might, as they say, not get it.

Accessory: Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein wrote a pair of books with a relevant premise, titled: *Plato and a Platypus Walk Into a Bar* and *Aristotle and an Aardvark Go to Washington*. Maybe military strategy and philosophy run on the same mental circuits as well.

Accessory 2: Hedy Lamarr, born just a few years after Reginald, was an Austrian who became an American citizen and Hollywood star. Some considered her the most beautiful woman in the world. She also dabbled in physics, inventing a frequency jumper that makes radar harder to jam. She, too, had a sense of humor, but patently was the un-Reginald.

Please see sections: 141, *Thirty-six Stratagems*; 101, *Magical Realism*; 16, *Presence*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; 46, *Taxation and Debt*; and 122, *Ulm and Austerlitz*.



“As usual, I'm writing slowly because I know you can't read fast.”

Radar O'Reilly from the TV show
MASH (in a letter to his mother) [\[338\]](#)



Cathy: ...they were attractive as they were incendiary.

Ann: “Revolutionary.”

Cathy: If you will.

Ann: In their ideas.

Cathy: Not in their ideas, no. What were they? Finally? They were essentially a sort of chant.

Ann (reading): ‘Words not meant to misdirect are wasted’.

Cathy: Well, there you are...and their absence of meaning allowed us, or we understood them, as a celebration of the transgressive. Because they had no meaning.

David Mamet from the play
The Anarchist [\[339\]](#)



Transformation can still arrive on-time

Section 115, Academies

A transformational phenomenon was exposed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The document reported 660 special operations units (Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs, Force Recon teams, etc.). This *is* transformational, as these units, much smaller than the division or the brigade, are becoming the new standard unit of employment. The change reflects not only the experiences of the United States in recent years, but similar pressures and responses that have occurred in foreign armies. The challenge of such a transformation is to maintain the elite quality of each 'special' unit and to not rob *regular* units of their most qualified leaders and members.

There are other training and 'force generation' aspects to ongoing changes that deserve more attention than they'll get here, but in general, changes in the US military have been less than radical. There are still an air force, a navy, an autonomous marine infantry, a coast guard, and an army. Officers are still created at four academies, or by the ROTC at a number of participating civilian universities, and from the ranks via OCS. Recruiting continues to be accomplished as it has been for decades.

If, as appears, the future promises for the United States and its allies a changing panoply of irregular armed conflicts, then it makes sense to prepare a force optimally peopled, equipped and trained to meet that challenge. It also makes sense to not lose all big-war readiness if a viable threat exists for which a heavy army is needed.

Several aspects of future irregular wars impinge on the preparation of armed forces personnel. Emotive or psychological quantities, like ideological or religious affinity, hate, resentment or fear play a more prominent role; the legal environments in irregular wars are distinct from those in regular war; a broader set of enemy, friendly and neutral organizations participate effectively, this in part because civilian populations are not removed or distant from the battlefield; control over anonymity is more often an imperative. There exists, then, a palpable need for military organizations with markedly higher standards of education and training. Armed competition will require more precious human attributes, and if military service continues to be a voluntary choice, then greater effort will have to be made to make service attractive to the most capable. The pool of potential inductees can deliver a broader range of aptitudes in higher numbers than is now the case. Mental acuity will be a continuously more highly prized ingredient for basic soldiering. The math demands we draw more heavily on the population of young women.

One way to accelerate transition toward a force better suited to winning irregular war is to transform the service academies. The prescription here is for an increase in the number of students at all four national service academies, with the resulting size of the student bodies becoming approximately equal. In addition, the male-female ratio would be made equal in all of the academies. The option for doing honorable service upon graduation either as a commissioned officer or as a non-commissioned officer should be offered. The period of study should be lengthened so that language and travel experiences can be extended.


There is always room to add better weapons and machines, but great competitive advantage can be gained by making step increases in the average quality of the humans in the force. Part of the solution may include a big step toward equal gendering. That does not necessarily mean opening all specialties to women, but it does mean drawing greater numbers of women into the services as a whole. If I were King, I would redesign the experience confronted by individual citizens in military service and transform the academies accordingly.

Please see sections: 76, *Gender*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 78, *Identity*; 120, *Misleading Counterinsurgency Articles of Faith*; 11, *Protraction and Diligence*; 79, *Suicide*; 45, *Police or Military*; and 129, *Nerd Globe*.



"I think that, as life is action and passion, it is required of a man that he should share the passion and action of his time at peril of being judged not to have lived."[\[340\]](#)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.



AMAT VICTORIA CURAM

etched on one side of an M1911A1

in the movie *The Mechanic* (2011)[\[341\]](#)



Convincing you to convince yourself

Section 116, Songs of Chu

Legend has it that during the Chu Han dynasty wars, Liu Bang, leader of the Han, besieged Xiang Yu, leader of the Chu, at Gaixia. Liu Bang had his men loudly sing the local songs of the Chu people. Hearing the songs, Xiang Yu believed his people had joined the Han and that Xiang Yu's support had evaporated.

Liu Bang fed Xiang Yu's own existing doubts. It is one of the great classics of psychological operations, an old tale about the power of suggestion. The legend also ties itself to the physical results emphasized throughout this book. In the rest of the story, Xiang Yu tries to make a run for it. His escape to sanctuary fails, Liu Bang's pursuit succeeds and Xiang Yu, realizing his fate, commits suicide. When faced with a superior force, or what he thought was a superior force, Xiang Yu did not have a secure route of withdrawal to sanctuary.

Guerrillas or insurgents more than governments are constrained to the basics of the classic military operational equation and, therefore, must depend more on technology and be more obedient to the dictates of physical terrain. I think that without the landmine, the FARC would have been beaten long ago. To survive, al Qaeda had to seek the most remote area of the Islamic world and live in holes. Being the physically weaker parties, guerrillas will attempt sleight of hand and psychological ploys to misdirect their enemies. It works. It also works against them.

In this age of socialist revolutions, leftist guerrillas have made two generations of government strategists think that the military operational basics somehow didn't apply. The guerrillas themselves have rarely fallen into that misconception. The guerrilla's public right hand plays songs about religion and legitimacy while his armed left hand concentrates on the military operational imperative: where on the map to attack and still maintain a secure line of retreat. New Songs of Chu help him survive in a world of time, weight, and sudden failure. The FARC guerrilla tromped around in uniform for decades telling each other that their goal was to take power by the force of arms and they were on their way to doing just that. Meanwhile, they convinced many in the public, including many supposed military strategists, that a military victory against them was out of the question, impossible, because the conflict was essentially political, or social, or economic, or something. According to the song, political compromise was the only logical solution. When finally that siren was ignored and FARC leaders' heartbeats made the central question, all of a sudden military defeat and victory became real, not just in the public's eyes, but in the FARC's.

By the way, before he flees Gaixia, Xiang Yu tenderly kisses Yu Ji, his favorite hottie concubine, goodbye. This is an obligatory part of the story and part of what makes this such a popular legend. In China as in America, a perfectly good war story is schmaltzed up with a romantic sub-plot so your girlfriend will tolerate going to the movie with you.

Please see sections: 122, *Ulm and Austerlitz*; 103, *Negotiations*; 38, *Cultural Study for What?*; 40, *Popular Support*; 77, *Sex*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; 79, *Suicide*; and 114, *R.V. Jones*.



Young William: What are they doing?

Argyle Wallace: Saying goodbye in their own way, playing outlawed tunes on outlawed pipes.

from the movie

Braveheart (1995) [\[342\]](#)



“Crack of dawn

All is gone

Except the will to be”

from the Metalica song

For Whom the Bell Tolls [\[343\]](#)



German Army Oath Before August 1934

I swear by almighty God this sacred oath:
I will at all times loyally and honestly
serve my people and country and, as a
brave soldier, I will be ready at any time to
stake my life for this oath.

German Army Oath After August 1934

I swear by almighty God this sacred oath:
I will render unconditional obedience to
the Fuehrer of the German Reich and
people, Adolf Hitler, Supreme
Commander of the Wehrmacht, and, as a
brave soldier, I will be ready at any time to
stake my life for this oath.



Her hips don't lie

Section 117, Strategic Communication

President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia had a pretty good run as a counterinsurgent president. There is plenty of evidence to explain why. Take, for instance, some of his strategic communication during the summer of 2008. He...

- *Cave singer Bosé Colombian citizenship: 'Spaniards are welcome here'.
- *Signed a Defense Treaty with Brazil in Leticia: 'How about that, Hugo?'
- *Hugged Shakira: 'I'm a guy, she's hot, and she's 100% Colombian'.
- *Was often seen working late: 'What good Colombians do'.
- *Rode a fine horse and wore a fine hat: 'Your leader is a *Señor*'.
- *Looked bookish and concerned: 'A *Señor* is not a clown, like Chávez'.
- *Helped organize a mega-march on national day: 'We're in this together'.
- *Relieved officers for suspected rights violations: 'We're accountable'.

All in all, President Uribe's argument and argumentation were not about fooling the press or hiding sins, although he did some of that, too, and there were some things to hide. President Uribe's strategic communication, however, was solid because he knew what his audiences were ready to hear. The messages were not accidental and, imperatively, they enjoyed a background of concerted action. The year 2008 was one of military victories over the FARC, something that President Uribe had promised and, if slowly, delivered. In March, a cross-border raid (about a mile into Ecuador) killed the senior acting FARC commander and gained a treasure trove of valuable new intelligence. In July, a prized group of hostages was rescued, including three Americans. Soon it was revealed that the iconic leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda, had died. The strategic communication was not founded on argument and argumentation, but rather the argument and argumentation were effective because they were backed by successful acts and accomplishments. The fact that the communication was often flashy and entertaining, even while coming from a somewhat dour and applied man, made it fit its culture.

For some, *strategy* implies perfidy, treachery or, at very least, secrecy. Because they might be right, *strategic communication* may be an unfortunate term. To the extent it means the deft use of language, art and imagery by senior leaders in order to further worthy objectives, to explain to the polity the reasoning and need for action — that's nice. To the extent it means how to trick the public media, or how to manage the psychology of a public that the leaders dismiss as incapable of intelligent choice — that might not be so nice. The word 'spin', now often used admiringly, used to connote more of this latter, not so nice, aspect of strategic communication. A better term would be 'responsible argument and argumentation'. Many leaders fall so in love with spin that spin grows its own ethical justifications and apologies, tied somehow to belief in a mystical realpolitik blessing. Leaders grow to feel they have a special license for deceptive communicating — to spin. Deceptive communication then becomes confused as strategy itself. Strategy may require deception, to be sure, but strategy is strongest when founded on sustained action, and then only when the right audience is being deceived. Whatever deceptions Álvaro Uribe might or might not have played on his countrymen, he told them he was going to go punch the FARC in the face, and he did.

Please see sections: 101, *Magical Realism*; 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 16, *Presence*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; 125, *Human Rights*; 141, *Thirty-six Stratagems*; 114, *R.V. Jones*; and 137, *Foreign Support and Perspective*.



"I prefer an ugly truth to a pretty lie. If someone is telling me the truth that is when I will give my heart."[\[344\]](#)

Shakira Mebarak



Somewhere far overseas
There's a place called Kosovo
That's where you don't want to go
If you're Albanian at all

from the song 'Kosovo'

(lyrics by Bob Rivers (1999), sung to the tune of the Beach Boy's 'Kokomo', 1988, lip-synced by Norwegian peacekeepers in Kosovo in 2002)[\[345\]](#)



Free and fair elections are the small part of peace

Section 118, Democracy

The word democracy is not mentioned in the Constitution of the United States. Democracy was not its purpose. People like elections, however, especially if they haven't had any. Proponents use the word democracy use it far beyond elections, however, to mean 'good'. Elections are better than no elections, but they are no guarantee of good governance or a peaceful social compact, and holding them will not necessarily help you win a war. Elections, even if open, egalitarian and fairly administered, can be counterproductive. The same characters who ran everything before there were elections can hijack the new gift or, if popular legitimacy is awarded solely on the basis of an initial electoral victory, it might be the last election.

There is a big difference between a cult of the elected and regular elections. The ultimate purpose of electoral democracy should not be peaceful selection of leaders, but the peaceful change of leaders. Few historians will make the claim that the founding fathers of the United States thought democracy was a great deal. In fact, several of the founding fathers saw in democracy another form of tyranny that needed to be constrained. Electoral democracy encourages those elected to believe they have earned a right to rule, instead of having been lent a privilege of service. The elected like to believe that a popular preference, measured at an instant in time, transfers to them a mandate that lasts forever. The framers of the US Constitution sought a formula that could keep the ballot box from creating more problems than it solved.

Democracy is an overused term in discussions about successful counterinsurgency. Plenty of governments that use the term cynically (and allow little of it) are nevertheless good at counterinsurgency. Insurgent organizations that use democracy to pick their leaders are rare. The list of adjectives that describe the *typical* insurgent leader does not include modest, restrained, or democratic.

The United States pushes democracy in places where it can, but that is because Americans haven't maintained cultural memory of the less-positive aspects of democracy about which the founders of the United States warned. Likewise, Americans don't sufficiently value their political inheritance of formal property and how a just property regime, more than elections, underpins peaceful social relations.

If you are in charge of planning or leading counterinsurgency and cannot escape the word democracy, at least define democracy to mean the whole basket of institutional contraptions that limit the concentration of power and that allow for the peaceful replacement of leaders. Selection of the right leaders might have a lot to do with winning the struggle. Admirers of democratically elected Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez thought so. On the other hand, the efficacy of American support to Vietnamese leaders Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu is often noted as an element of the negative outcome there. Regardless, putting the process of selecting civilian political leaders at the center of counterinsurgent planning could be a distracting and disappointing mistake. Creating an insurgent-resistant society requires an acceptable social compact. As much as vibrant electoral politics, it takes efficient, transparent administration. Elections are interesting. A formal property system is not, but it is a more substantial achievement.

At the time this section was being written, a couple of world events occurred to put extra spin on this theme. The President of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, was visited at home by members of the Honduran military who brusquely escorted him to an airplane and then dropped him off on the tarmac in neighboring Costa Rica. The immediate widespread reaction, including from the US government, was to condemn the actions in Honduras as dangerously reminiscent of an earlier time in Latin American history that had supposedly passed. Some first impressions are hard to reverse, but in this case it shortly became apparent that all the other civilian institutions of the Honduran government were in favor of the ouster. The military, sworn to obey civilian leadership and law, had found itself between two legitimacies: their President and the rest of the government that wanted him arrested for unlawful acts. Although a dilemma, the arrest orders from the Honduran Supreme Court were from a unanimous decision, and the whole panoply of government institutions were in agreement, to include almost all the congressional members of President Zelaya's own political party. The Honduran military command agreed afterwards that although the arrest was a legal, constitutionally supportable exercise, it had not been legal for them to take President Zelaya out of the country.

Some say that whatever the ouster's constitutionality, it highlighted either the underlying undemocratic nature of the constitutional order or the confusing math of democracy itself. A broader, 'post-structural' attitude observes that institutional scaffolding of legislatures, courts, statutes, and other social accoutrements merely serve an entrenched and oppressing hierarchy of power. Their argument uses logic unlike what most of us have come to understand as the math of electoral democracy. They argue that numerical majorities from an oligarchic legislature or court are inherently insubstantial. According to their new math, President Zelaya genuinely represented the downtrodden; his original election was therefore an 'ontologically' democratic moment that should not be overturned by any subsequent majorities that are the product of an elaborate, structural neoliberal trick. At any rate, the Honduran elections, which had been previously scheduled and with candidates already chosen, went off without a hitch. A relatively liberal new president, Porfirio Lobo, took possession in late January of 2010.

One of the interesting details of the Honduras saga was part of an effort that got President Zelaya arrested to begin with. It had been a design of Zelaya's to hold a public opinion poll using ballots and counting mechanisms imported from Venezuela and apparently paid for by a non-Honduran fund. The radical international left employed numerous means to support Zelaya's bid to return to power and thereby maintain the Honduran State within their Latin American alliance. Fomenting and paying for controlled electoral formalisms while simultaneously creating an image of popular spontaneity and mass support had become a standard element of the international leftist energies.

The latest presidential elections in Honduras may be an apogee in the swing of an ideological pendulum in Latin America, which is possibly now moving back toward political liberalism and away from populism. More significant for the purposes of this book, however, is noting the power of a vision of electoral democracy that doesn't just question details of representation, but simply rejects the entire envelope of mathematical concepts on which most understandings of democracy are built. Democracy's meaning is gutted by this 'post-structural' understanding. In the case of Honduras, it appeared that many governments and international organizations sided with the new understanding, rather than the old.


Love of *democracy* has not improved our ability to govern overseas or to win irregular wars. Do what you must with the the word. To say you do not love democracy is now like saying you hate America. The post-structuralists love democracy. They love its embodiment, too, as in the embodiment of the people's will in a politically chosen leader – a Josef or Fidel. They will fawn if he can present a compelling emotive narrative of the common mytho-poetic vision and destiny. He will not only lead them, he will be them. If you are in that camp, OK, but to me we are more likely to approach paradise on earth by hewing toward construction of an inky cotidian property system that helps resolve small conflicts peaceably, especially regarding the control of land. Property can be a more effective concept than democracy if written out in detail.

Please see sections: 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 52, *Sovereignty*; 98, *Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa*; 104 *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; and 131, *Is it an Insurgency?*



“‘Democracy’ is often used as shorthand for the Western form of government. But the framers of the U.S. Constitution knew that voting is far from a sufficient guarantor of good government. Nor does it forestall dictatorship. From Azerbaijan to Benin, from Serbia to Sudan, tyrants have learned how to get themselves elected. . . . In favor of democracy, it is true that power is best divided and checked by a popular chamber. But democracy should be viewed as a means, not as an end, and voting as an official act, not as a universal right.”[\[346\]](#)

Tom Bethel
The Noblest Triumph



“Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”

James Madison, *Federalist #10*



The bludgeon game-winner

Section 119, Declaration of Counterinsurgency

The American Declaration of Independence is the seminal document of modern revolution and insurgency. Whatever other significance it has in the history of political discourse, it asserts that sometimes it is legitimate, valid, justifiable, honorable behavior to use violence to resist or even overthrow a constituted government. Also in the document, however, are careful disclaimers about when and under what conditions armed rebellion is justifiable.

What would the counterargument look like? When is it justifiable to use armed violence against a political opponent of the State? This may seem obvious enough, even trivial (it's sometimes called criminal law), but there exists a powerful empathy, greatly America's product, for the insurgent underdog. That empathy has the wonderful effect of changing the burden of proof and of confusing ethics and equities sufficiently to open space for the challenger and to presume him to be noble and the State despicable. This is a good thing -- it keeps government on its ethical toes, but it can also put a mantle of acceptability on what are often just charlatans and evildoers.

A declaration of counterinsurgency might look as follows:

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for a people to oppose political bands which have established themselves in violent opposition to the existing social compact and to the government that has been constituted to enliven that contract, a decent respect for world opinion requires that the people should declare the causes which impel them to violently repress such bands.

We still hold these truths to be self-evident, that all humans are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that so long as the government is constructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to oppose violent attempts to alter or to abolish it, and to take such actions as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments should not answer opposition with violence for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience has shown that government should suffer even strident opposition, while evils are sufferable, rather than address opposition by abolishing the forms of liberty to which the people are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations by an opposing band, pursuing invariably that which evinces a design to reduce the amicable social compact by force, it is the people's right, and the duty of government, to repress and eliminate such a band.

Such has been the patient sufferance of the people; and such is now the necessity which moves them to violently oppose _____. The history of the _____ is a history of repeated injuries and crimes, all having the object of destroying the social compact which the people have and continue to embrace, and to supplant that social compact with the establishment of a tyranny of their own selfish design. To justify and encourage opposition to this arrogance, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

Here a list of offenses committed by _____:

In every stage of these abuses the people have petitioned for redress: Our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A band of outlaws whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyranny is unfit to be seen as a legitimate counsel or vehicle of political change.

Nor have we been remiss in attentions to reconcile with the _____. We have issued innumerable warnings and offered various forms of amnesty and plea bargain. We have appealed to what we hoped would be their native justice and magnanimity, and we have appealed to them citing the ties of our common kindred to disavow violence. They have been deaf to the voice of justice and reason. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, and hold them, as we will hold those who directly support them, enemies.

Please see sections: 46, *Taxation and Debt*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 98, *Jorge Verstryng and Pio Moa*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 42, *Brigands*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; and 4, *Defining Enemy*.



“Once vigorous measures appear to be the only means left of bringing the Americans to a due submission to the mother country, the colonies will submit.”

King George III (attributed)



O' Conspiracy!
Sham'st thou to show thy dangerous brow by night,
When evils are most free?[\[347\]](#)

The Tragedy of Julius Ceasar



When doctrine throws out the baby

Section 120, Misleading COIN Articles of Faith

Below are ten rarely questioned notions from English-language literature (including official US military doctrine) on the nature of insurgency. They are not wrong, but are misleading. Most of the topics earned a separate section somewhere in this book. If you are fighting an irregular war, these articles of faith could do worse than misdirect – they could disable.

Asymmetry

The misleading article of faith: *The unique characteristic of insurgent warfare is the great differential in resources, methods and objectives between the insurgent and counterinsurgent.*

Actually, asymmetry is the difference between winning and losing in every conflict. In every armed struggle, the balance of strength is as often determined by distances and by resolve as by resource totals or technological advantage. Objectives will everywhere be related to the control of impunity, and the methods will always relate to the operational equation mentioned in Section 6.

Decisive Battle

The misleading article of faith: *Counterinsurgent leaders are wise not to seek decisive battle; as such an event is elusive if not an illusion.*

When this is internalized by leaders it can disable rational strategy. The ‘decisiveness’ of engagements often can be measured based on the outcome of ensuing pursuits. A successful pursuit, or a successful escape, after battle often gives it its decisive quality. This is as true in irregular war as in conventional or regular war. In irregular war, competent leaders take special care to achieve decisive battle, or perhaps many of them.

Legitimacy

The misleading article of faith: *Government legitimacy is the basis of success of counterinsurgency and electoral democracy is the principle font of legitimacy.*

Several sections of this book are dedicated to soften this favorite. Legitimacy is as much argument as it is condition. Having even a lot of it will not assure success in irregular conflict, nor will having little legitimacy preclude success. If by legitimacy we mean something like rectitude or honorable behavior, then having it can make our own morale more durable. To the extent it means broad popularity, however, it may create an unstable platform, an ephemeral substitute for solid objectives.

Natural Protraction

The misleading article of faith: *An insurgent war is by its nature a protracted affair.*

It is not. Rather, the insurgent protracts it in order to survive. This misleading article of faith has been one of the most damaging to US and allied decision-making in recent years.

Nonlinearity

The misleading article of faith: *Insurgent or irregular war tends to be nonlinear.*

This unfortunate misinterpretation of classic strategy is brother to ‘asymmetry’. Irregular warfare is highly linear.

Political over Military Resolution

The misleading article of faith: *The answer to insurgency must be more political than military.*

This assertion can be shorthand for a lot of reasonable things, but in general it is a false and disarming dichotomy. If you have a foe who is granted impunity against your will, you will probably have to apply coercive force to rectify the situation. If military or police power are extensions of the political (are politics by other means), how can the application of the latter not be an application of the former?

Popular Support

The misleading article of faith: *The center of gravity of insurgency and counterinsurgency is the greater population.*

True and totally false. It too often begs the questions how much is enough and what to do with it once you have it.

Socioeconomic Causation

The misleading article of faith: *The causes of or reasons for insurgency are to be found in inequitable socioeconomic conditions.*

Maybe, but it does not follow that general socioeconomic improvement will help you win.

Spontaneity

The misleading article of faith: *Armed resistance can spring to life without hierarchical leadership or centralized design.*

Semantically it seems as though ‘insurgency’ necessarily contains some amount of spontaneity. Historical reflection, however, insists leadership indispensable for the success of any organized armed enterprise, therefore relegating the notion of spontaneous uprising as mere romanticism.

Classic principles of military strategy are inapplicable

The misleading article of faith: *The vocabulary and lessons of the 19th century (and earlier) masters don't apply, are not obeyed by the insurgent and cannot guide successful counterinsurgency efforts.*

They do apply; the successful insurgent obeys them diligently, and to ignore or deny them is dangerous.

Maybe worse than the fact the above ideas misdirect: they displace other ideas that are more likely to accelerate effective preparation and execution of competitive strategies in armed social conflicts. Once again, the disclaimer: One of the favorite tricks of argumentation is to present a targeted proposition in its exaggerated form so it can be more easily attacked. I pose the above ‘articles of faith’ in unvarnished and vulnerable form. In fact, all of them are to be respected, but just not too much.

Please see sections: 132, *Turducken and Hybrid*; 14, *Legitimacy*; 5, *Vocabulary of Classic Strategy*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; 59, *Spontaneity*; 39, *Socioeconomic Causation*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; and 40, *Popular Support*.



“Here in America we’re descended in blood and in spirit from revolutionists and rebels -- men and women who dare to dissent from accepted doctrine.”[\[348\]](#)

Dwight Eisenhower



Raj: You are so arrogant. If you were a superhero, you would be Captain Arrogant. And you know what your superpower would be? Arrogance!

Sheldon: You're wrong again. If my superpower were arrogance, my name would be Dr. Arroganto.
from the TV show

The Big Bang Theory [\[349\]](#)



Honor is not private property

Section 121, Dignity and Honor

Do not leave the subject of human dignity at the level of a common sense ingredient in plans and programs, or as a checklist item in the review of the plans, or as a question of tactical cultural courtesies. Instead, make plans that specifically address and incorporate the broader issues of human dignity and then assure that said plans reconcile with other plans. Study degradations of and threats to the dignity of human identities as they are linked to the places you think you want to stabilize, destabilize, subdue, conquer, liberate, own or protect.

We all have a pretty good idea what the words dignity and honor mean, at least within the context of our own lives, our own institutions and our own society. Like real thirst, however, many of us have not experienced profound lack of dignity or lack of hope. Our empathy can fail us.

We know that assaults against dignity induce stress, whether the assault is a slow, grinding result of established social relationships or a more immediate economic or territorial trespass. In any case these can be translated into grievances and, through agency and leadership, into action.

You can highlight grievances, point out assaults on human dignity that have been embedded and hidden in the existing social structure as you find it. (This is sometimes called deconstruction.) You can even increase the sense of insult or strategize to exacerbate the cause of the grievance in order to bring it to a point of intolerability. This is sometimes referred to as the 'Alinsky' method of social struggle. Retribution and revindication, while terms of justice, underpin policies based on negative emotions that can beget further injustices and more ill-will. A better plan will be to engage in transparent efforts to positively grow dignity, and to be seen doing so. In general, older people are not so impatient as to expect indignities to be undone or debts paid with a quick stroke, even while younger people are not so docile that they are willing to postpone honor for a future generation. Because they constitute the vast majority of the fighters, the dignity of young men may be of greatest urgency. Their dignity may be tied to that of their parents, siblings, friends and romances. You may, however, not always want or be able to preserve or respect the dignity of young men. For instance, in some societies the dignity of potentially violent young men may be tied to a status quo of submissive indignity for women. It is easy to state the rule, 'respect everyone', but inherent dilemmas abound.

This book is greatly about lines of supply, lines of retreat; about physical position and movement, finding and closing with an enemy in order to neutralize and dominate him. It is unapologetically about those things, but they need a bigger reason. Over the long haul they cannot defy basic truths and one of the basic truths of irregular conflict is the accounting of dignity. On whatever side you find yourself, there one day will be an accounting of how you, your subordinates, your leaders, and your ideas related to human dignity and the structure of life.

It is not that honor and dignity play no role in regular warfare. They do. In irregular conflict, however, the ultimate objective is often an elusive condition of the spirit. Yours may be an existentialist's war. If you cannot express the relationship of what you are doing to the meaning of life, you will want to review your goals to see if that connection is missing. If you cannot say how your goals of closing with and destroying the enemy fit the sustainable balance of dignities (as related to the human identities in the places where you fight) you might want to rethink things. In other words, if you are the leader and you cannot tell your followers why what they are doing is a fine thing, you might not be the leader. That is not to say, however, that at some scale the honor and dignity of a group of people will not have to be sacrificed, abandoned, postponed, relegated, or even abused and diminished for the safety and dignity of some other identity. Maybe that is the case and maybe it is a truth you do *not* make transparent.

The 'hearts and minds' approach to insurgency can be too slow at getting to the nub of things. That nub (something probably related to culminating points) in a given tactical situation might be nothing more than thirst for water and the opportunity to make that dangerous discomfort go away. In urban environments the nub is not usually water, but is more likely camouflage, that is, anonymity. An environment that hides the person can also hide the details of his motivation and, while hidden whereabouts, or geographic anonymity, is touted everywhere in this book as a first problem to solve, that solution alone (finding people) is insufficient. What to do with the knowledge about identity and whereabouts remains. If you act quickly, perhaps you can kill your enemy and go home before having to deal much with the question of his dignity. If your answer is not death or imprisonment, then it is probably tied to dignity. A 'hearts and minds' campaign directed squarely and competently at questions of dignity may be effective, but perhaps only with years of application. Paradoxically, with every ineffectual lingering moment, failure to understand your enemies' dignity will burden your capacity to change the balance of anonymity to your favor, e.g., find him.


Even if you only help make it possible for people to evacuate their bowels in a decent way, they will figure out the positive linkage between your behavior and the improvement of their dignity. Humans can be grateful. Still, helping people is not always the way to honor or respect them. Also, being respectful of all people does not mean to suspend judgment, accept all cultures or communions as equal, or pardon trespasses. Respect is a starting place.

Please see sections: 79, *Suicide*; 94, *Poop*; 76, *Gender*; 95, *Childhood*; 124, *Slavery and Underclass*; 115, *Academies*; 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; and 144, *What the Pirate Said to Alexander*.



"Whereas the east coast monuments such as the Lincoln Memorial and the Statue of Liberty speak specifically to ideals, the Protestant Memorial chapel at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas--overlooking the Missouri River at the edge of the Great Plains, with the rails of the Union Pacific visible in the distance--invokes blood and soil."[\[350\]](#)

Robert D. Kaplan



"Beware how you take away hope from any human being."[\[351\]](#)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.



Suha: One day things will be better.

Taxidriver: Sounds like you're not from here.

from the movie

Paradise Now (1995)[\[352\]](#)

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

Napoleon's masterpiece

Section 122, Ulm and Austerlitz

Napoleon's Ulm and Austerlitz campaign of 1805 is an icon of classic military history and strategy, and the centerpiece of Napoleon's résumé — this in spite of being Napoleon's plan B. Plan A was to invade England. In July, Napoleon was at Boulogne overseeing preparations for the invasion when information came to him that his navy would not be able to gain the necessary control of the English Channel.^[353] The timeline:

- * July 23-24, 1805 -- Calder stymies Villeneuve at Cape Finisterre
- * August 15 -- Villeneuve sails for Cadiz against Napoleon's orders
- * September 23 -- Napoleon declares war on Austria; marches on Ulm
- * October 16-19 -- Battle of Ulm
- * October 21 -- Naval Battle of Trafalgar (little effect on land actions)
- * December 2 -- Battle of Austerlitz
- * December 26 -- Treaty of Pressburg

Napoleon soon decided to use his huge, well-drilled force by turning it westward, and in late August marched it to the Rhine to meet the armies of Austria and Russia before they could join together against the French. Austrian General Karl Mack von Leiberich had prematurely begun operations instead of waiting for the Russian army to join him from the east. The first week of October, Mack learned of the French vanguard's presence on the Danube. News of Napoleon's movements came quickly to Mack, but the reports were as much the product of Napoleon's deceptions and feints as of trustworthy observations. Mack attempted a series of maneuvers to escape from being encircled, but they were ineffective. By the 16th of October, Napoleon had managed to encircle Ulm and most of Mack's forces. Some skirmishes occurred for a few more days as Mack sought to break out across the Rhine, but these also were too little, too late. While some parts of his force remained outside the encirclement, Mack, without a secure line of supply or retreat, surrendered an entire army, perhaps 30,000 men. Now Napoleon, with a much better prospective correlation of force, would seek battle with the oncoming Russian-led army.

The consummate battle of Austerlitz was joined December 2nd on ground west of the town in what is now the Czech Republic. French organizational excellence and logistic preparations were matched to Napoleon's tactical genius. French soldiers showed their discipline and revolutionary élan. The opposing army was soundly defeated and the alliance against Napoleon finished. At the Treaty of Pressburg, the Austrians retired from the war and Napoleon's position on the continent became immensely more secure than it had been six months earlier. For the Russians, the defeat at Austerlitz was grave, but it was not complete; there was a Russian retreat. Russian military leaders, including generals Mikhail Kutuzov and Pyotr Bagration, did not let the French encircle their forces as had General Mack. Positions on the ground at the time of the treaty allowed the Russian army to return home relatively intact.

The defeated Russians would meet Napoleon's armies several times more. Seven years after Austerlitz, the battle of Borodino in early September, 1812 (often described as indecisive) set the stage for Russian victory over the French Grande Armée. At Borodino, Napoleon failed to pursue the beaten Russian army. Bagration was mortally wounded, but Kutuzov would evacuate Moscow, retreat and refit. By late October, the Grande Armée was itself in retreat and would be harassed to death by Kutuzov and the Russian winter. Of the half million French soldiers who marched into Russia, fewer than a hundred thousand returned to France.

Not only do these old battles expose classic lessons, they exposed those lessons to at least one leader who would later be credited with the invention of revolutionary military strategy. Probably using these same battles as examples, the Russians taught Mao Zedong about the balance of offensive and defensive movement, lengthened and shortened supply lines, and retreat into a supportive population. They taught him the effect of distance on correlations of force and the difference between aggressive pursuit and patient harassment. They may even have taught the wisdom of not invading an island without first securing the sea.

There is another side to the maneuver coin. Some peoples, even warrior peoples, have been culturally indisposed to maneuver, at least to the maneuver of retreat or withdrawal that this book says is central to military operational math.

Free though they are, they are not entirely free -- for the law is their master, whom they fear far more than your men fear you. Whatever their law commands, that they do; and it commands them always the same; they are not allowed to flee in battle from any foe, however great the numbers, but rather they are to stay in their ranks and there conquer or perish.^[354]

The above description of a Spartan cultural grip on military options comes from Herodotus. Later Spanish experience gave us the word guerrilla; Iberic culture was no impediment to hit-and-run tactics. Yet, an ancient Spanish 'spirit of Numancia' demands unbending resolve in the defense of fixed positions, denying Spanish defenders the option of retreat. I mention it not because there are many cultures today that impose a similar rigidity on operational options in warfare. There aren't, yet all cultures lend predispositions that play a part in delimiting the range of possibilities for how we approach operational problems. In the American military, it seems we somehow convinced ourselves that position and maneuver are insignificant features of irregular war. That is a mistake. Irregular warfare is subject to most of the rules exposed by the Napoleonic wars or those in southern Africa. If you convince your enemy that he cannot withdraw to base nor defeat you in battle, he might surrender. If he retreats and you have the capacity to pursue but do not, he may regain strength. If he refuses to accept or misses the relationship among power, distance, and movement, you hold an elemental advantage.

Please see sections: 113, *Unrestricted Chi Whiz*; 27, *'Nonviolent' Actions*; 28, *Takeovers and Sieges*; 117, *Strategic Communication*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 143, *Seven Strategy Strains*; 65, *Smuggling*; and 10, *Decisive Battle*.



"This much is certain; that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will. Whereas these, that be strongest by land, are many times nevertheless in great straits."^[355]

Sir Francis Bacon,

'On the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates' (1597)




“The tactics of uncoordinated charges turned out to be suicidal. When such assaults failed, there were never ordered calls for retreat, much less a fighting withdrawal or organized covering sortoes. Rather, entire *impi*s, as tribal Germans on the Roman frontier, collapsed and ran headlong from the enemy. Thousands in the Zulu wars were ridden down by British horsemen who lanced, shot, and hacked at will once the *Impi*’s charge was broken and panic set in.”[\[356\]](#)

Victor Davis Hanson



1805— Europe circa 1805 —1805



The above map, from T. Miller Maguire, shows Napoleon’s movement from his erstwhile invasion of England to the battlefields of Ulm and Austerlitz.[\[357\]](#) The bottom map, cropped from an original from the United States Military Academy, shows the spatial relationship of Ulm to Austerlitz, north of Vienna.[\[358\]](#)

The advantage of optional wars

Section 123, Sea and Aerospace Power

Sir Francis Bacon understood the relationship of Britain's small wars to sea power. The Royal Navy made those land wars optional for the British. It made land war on the British Isles an immensely costly proposition for a would-be invader; it provided a heavy lift line of supply to distant British armies; and it secured a route of withdrawal for those armies in case things went sour. It is never lost on a strategically-minded Brit that William had to launch a lot of boats in 1066, or that at Trafalgar in 1805 Admiral Lord Nelson denied Napoleon any opportunity to do the same. On the back of that understanding the British had a pretty good run in terms of strategy and empire, dividends still paying.

The bad news that arrived in late July, 1805 at Boulogne (where Napoleon was preparing to invade England) was about the sea battle of Cape Finisterre. The battle of Cape Finisterre is not one of military history's milestone events, but maybe it should be. Many of history's great battles were preceded by some nearly forgotten one, but which set the stage. The battle of the Coral Sea preceded the battle of Midway, Pantano de Vargas preceded Boyacá Bridge, and so on. The Battle of Trafalgar, won by Admiral Lord Nelson to establish British supremacy at sea, was preceded by the battle of Cape Finisterre.

Actually, at least two pieces of knowledge fed Napoleon's decision to abandon his plans to take England. One was the sorry performance of his landing craft, many of which floundered during an invasion rehearsal, in turn swamping some of the Emperor's confidence. More significantly, success depended on his fleet being able to control the waters of the English Channel for a period of time sufficient for the French army to cross. Napoleon's plan was daring -- or tenuous -- French admiral Pierre Charles Villeneuve was to break out of the port of Toulon (at the time being blockaded by Admiral Horatio Nelson) and sail his fleet to the West Indies where he would meet another French fleet under Admiral Honoré Ganteaume.

Ganteaume was to break out of the British blockade of Brest. By sailing to the Caribbean, ostensibly to attack British commerce, the French would pull a significant part of the British fleet in chase. Both French fleets would return quickly and overpower the remaining British ships in the English Channel, thus creating a window of time for Napoleon's army to displace before the main elements of the British fleet could get back from the Caribbean. Once Napoleon had invaded Britain, he would keep the British fleet from returning to port.

Admiral Nelson did in fact chase -- that part of Napoleon's plan worked. Ganteaume, however, had not been able to break out of Brest, and so did not meet Villeneuve at Martinique as planned. Although Villeneuve got back to European waters a month ahead of Nelson, he was met off Cape Finisterre by a British fleet commanded by Admiral Robert Calder, who had been blockading the ports of Rochefort and Ferrol. The ensuing battle was indecisive, or so it seemed, and afterwards Villeneuve put into port at Ferrol. Then, although ordered by Napoleon to go north to lift the blockade at Brest and proceed on to Boulogne (the invasion plan still alive, since Nelson's fleet was still distant), Villeneuve decided instead to retire to Cádiz to the south. When Napoleon heard the news of the battle of Cape Finisterre and Villeneuve's irresolute decision, the invasion plan died.

In effect, it was Calder's action that convinced Napoleon he could not carry out a cross channel invasion (rather than Nelson's victory at Trafalgar, which did not occur until October, two days after Mack's surrender at Ulm). Neither the French nor the British commander pursued his foe after the battle and so, in that sense, Cape Finisterre appeared indecisive. Each had his reasons, but each was soon condemned for failure to push to the limit of his respective culminating point. Calder was reprimanded and never commanded at sea again. Napoleon had Villeneuve murdered. Calder's reasons were better than Villeneuve's, and it seems from this historical distance that Admiral Lord Nelson's already immense public popularity may have been the main enemy of Calder's reputation. In retrospect, it may be that Calder's decisions saved Britain from invasion, not Lord Nelson's.

Aside from a possible Spanish-language insurgent movement based on some form of Mexican retro-nationalism, almost all of US participation in irregular wars will continue to be allowed by United States sea and air power. United States' warring is optional, and it is optional because sea and air power give the United States global-length lines of communication -- secure lines of supply and withdrawal. There is no American insurgent or counterinsurgent strategy anywhere outside of North America without the US Navy and the US Air Force.

It may seem that almost all the other sections of this book relate to the labors of men and women in government armies or in land-based insurgencies and gangs, and not so much about sailors, pirates, or pilots. That is the case. The submarine captain will find this book is less about him. Nevertheless, he and his submarine allow continued US presence on foreign soil. A single submarine can help win an irregular war. In a given situation it can change the math of whose lines of supply and retreat are protected and whose are vulnerable.

The 'global commons' is a territorial concept that has to be constantly enforced. In part, that's because the operational equation holds true at all scales and, with a common sea the lines of communications to distant sources of power are easier to keep open. Like the British, the American army officer can presume his global lines of retreat and supply are secure -- a security that exists because of the US Navy, Air Force and their allies. Xerxes would be a good witness.

Dynamic and creative use of airspace can provide an almost prohibitive advantage in war, an advantage that in insurgent conflicts goes more often to the counterinsurgent than it does to the insurgent. The same now applies to the upper atmosphere. In the last few decades we have witnessed two knowledge revolutions. One is the Internet and the other GIS. Both of these revolutions depend for their continued existence on the US Air Force. American ground forces still haven't figured out the real consequences of these revolutions to land power and, like many things in armed conflict, it is cheaper to break things than to build them. But the US Air Force is going to be able to protect the orbiting equipment of the knowledge revolution long enough.

Governments and insurgents alike understand the lessons of Sir Francis Bacon and Sir Francis Drake perfectly. It is a geostrategic luxury to be able to go abroad to challenge other peoples' holes in ground, roadblocks, and other phenomena gracing sections of this book. Today, the aircraft carrier is a practical fact but for which many violent groups around the world would have little to fear. To many, targeting the USS Cole, though not a carrier, made all the sense in the world.

Air, space and sea power are not more tied to technological change and to machines than is land power, however. They are all woven together. Now, a century from the invention of fighter pilots, their machines are too good for them. The machines can turn quicker and acquire targets faster without a pilot. The cost-points for putting something dangerous in the air have gone down and the game will soon become cheap enough that poorer peoples can play. Governments with smaller budgets and even insurgent forces are sending up dangerous machines and sending the issue of local air superiority back into doubt. A few Latin drug lords have shown us something parallel if not quite as ominous in the water, launching flotillas of cheap semi-submersibles capable of independent navigation on the high seas.

Land power, for any country planning to conduct military operations in lands other than its own, is almost entirely dependent on sea and air power. This, historically, has been as true for insurgent or irregular war as it has for any other type of armed contest.

Please see sections: 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 111, *Knowledge Cultures*; 120, *Misleading Counterinsurgency Articles of Faith*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 136, *Weapons*; 76, *Gender*; and 6, *The Operational Equation*.



“I do not say the Frenchmen will not come;
I only say they will not come by sea.” [\[359\]](#)

John St. Vincent,
First Lord of the Admiralty (1803)



Newsreel announcer: Accepting responsibility for Klendathu, Sky Marshal Dienes resigns. His successor, Sky Marshal Tehat Maru, outlines her new strategy.

Sky Marshal Tehat Meru: To fight the bug, we must understand the bug. We can ill afford another Klendathu.

Newsreel announcer: Would you like to know more?

from the movie
Starship Troopers (1997) [\[360\]](#)



May I vote myself into slavery?

Section 124, Slavery and Underclass

Slavery. It is bad press for you to be in favor of slavery, to allow slavery, or get anywhere close to slavery. Americans especially are touchy about the subject. If you fancy yourself anti-American and, especially if your organization runs a risk of inviting the Americans to come visit you, armed, don't expose yourself as slaveholder, slave trader, slaver, or even as a slave. Slavery is the opposite of liberty, but it is difficult to make a useful statement as to where either condition begins or ends. This book is about winning irregular conflict, so I must note up-front that holding slaves can help you win. Many humans accept being slaves if fed, clothed, entertained, and keep more-or-less healthy and physically safe. They may even give you their loyalty and fight for you.

On the other end of the spectrum, however, lives a stubborn minority for whom no amount of care is sufficient to compensate enslavement. They would rather be sick, poor, and ignorant than dominated by you. They can be problematic, too, especially if they can find a leader. For them, a central question arises over the need to recruit, organize, and proselytize: Does a people have a right to choose slavery for itself or not? It is the one question that forces the theme of slavery to be included as a section in this book. Can a people freely and willingly vote itself into a condition of slavery, or must that particular free act be opposed? It is one of the main questions of the age. Unfortunately for practical opposition, the choice toward slavery is rarely made in one big leap, but rather in a series of comfortable increments. This leads to a closely related question: Can a majority in a democratic polity vote away the rights of a minority, slice by slice? Does the fact that such slicing results from peaceful, predictable, open, democratic elections make the slicing toward slavery and away from liberty legitimate?

Like *legitimacy*, *democracy*, *rule-of-law*, and *sovereignty*, the term *slavery* does not have an official, commanding definition, nor is there a clear boundary between when it exists and when it does not. There are, nevertheless, some conditions about which there is little argument. If you have enough money, but cannot leave a place, then you are probably a slave or a prisoner. You might be a debtor. Debt servitude gets pretty close to slavery. If you can be corporally punished for not paying a debt, or for something you say, then you might be a slave. If you are good to your children, but they can be taken from you anyway, you're probably slave. If you do not have the right to *not* speak, you're probably a slave. Study your social compact. If you are more part of what can be owned than part of who can do the owning, you might be a slave. If you can decide at whim the revealing outlines of other persons' personal identity, you are tending toward being those persons' owner or at least toward being perceived as such.

In the past, *Webster's* defined *enthrall* as '1. To make a slave of; enslave; hence, 2. To put or hold under strong influence; captivate; enchant; fascinate.' The words 'Now rare' appear before the first meaning in more recent *Webster's*, and most new American English language dictionaries start with the second denotation -- that of enchantment. To me, more of the first meaning should be returned to the word. Enthrall is what charismatic political leaders do; enthrallment is what charisma allows. Attractive in small doses, its excess is a near constant in today's conflicts. To enthrall rather than to convince distinguishes the intentions of fascists, Bolsheviks, Rasputins, or populists in general. Post-structuralists are captivated by populists. Theirs is a voluntary slavery which they often commend to or even prescribe for others. The question of slavery, and whether or not a people can choose slavery, may be at the heart of your insurgent war.

Underclass. Underclass is not used here in the way Karl Marx used *lumpenproletariat* -- a refuse class, but rather as a term for any collective identity that suffers an inferior social status compared to the societal norm or even compared to some other minority collective identity. It is a dangerous condition and, while its mere existence might not cause an irregular armed conflict, it is safe to assert that it can contribute.

Perceived relative deprivation has for some time been observed as a causal condition for criminal behavior and posited as a motivator of rebellion. Professor Ted Gurr (*Why Men Rebel*) can be credited with the observation, but so can Karl Marx and maybe some long-dead Greeks. (The observation can be inferentially tied to egalitarianism, e.g., if everyone is in about the same material condition there will be less discontent and less conflict.) The opposite view is that plenty of us are actually not content unless we have more than others.

A category of people sharing some cohesive identity and perceiving a shared grievance can be a recruiting, financial or leadership source-bed for insurgency. It can facilitate the identification or creation of routes and places of anonymity and refuge. If there is an underclass, a perception of grievance can be created even if one does not already exist.

American national self-assessment draws in part on a current flowing from the pre-constitutional existence of a Black underclass. The evolutionary erasure of that status continues to encourage and dismay, but is nevertheless part of what paints collective attitudes about the fairness and stability of the US social compact. Meanwhile, however, the United States has allowed the growth of a new underclass, mostly of Mexican origin, many of whom are illegally present in US territory. This condition has not been adequately addressed in terms of its potential as a cause, kindling, or enabler of irregular conflict in North America.

Whatever the scale of the territory, it is a good idea to check for the existence of an underclass. This said, you will do better to steer clear of 'class warfare' or 'class struggle' as an approach to conflict analysis, except maybe for propaganda purposes if you are so inclined ideologically. Plaintiff's lawyers often invent a class, the word just a synonym for a human collective or category that can be reasonably said to share an actionable grievance. So in a way, all of your analyses will be class analyses if they have anything to do with conflict and competition. One of the weaknesses of marxist class analyses, however, has always been the contrived and amorphous nature of the classes chosen. If enough people are convinced they're in the 'proletariat' or that they're 'workers' or an underclass and that some other people are in an abusive 'bourgeoisie' or 'elite', or even 'citizen' class, then maybe some of the vocabulary from that construct can still have some meaning.

Please see sections: 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 26, *How Violent Groups Form*; 79, *Suicide*; 105, *Genocide Geography*; 72, *Land Strategy*; 50, *US Persons*; 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; and 118, *Democracy*.



"I have come here to chew bubble gum and kick ass...and I'm all out of bubblegum"

Nada in the movie

They Live (1988) [\[361\]](#)



"Perhaps the fact that we have seen millions voting themselves into complete dependence on a tyrant has made our generation understand that to choose one's government is not necessarily to secure freedom."[\[362\]](#)

Friedrich Hayek



Section 125, Human Rights

When dealing with human rights issues, you stand to gain competitive advantage by being as geographically and temporally specific as possible regarding both violations and legal processes.

Basic human rights. In the midst of an active civil war, you will want to set, announce, and enforce some minimums of behavior for the protection of innocents. Beyond being the right thing to do, it will help you highlight the relative illegitimacy of your enemy. Here is a sample rubric for human rights behavior – yours, that of your allies, and that of your enemies:

Children under 15 years of age are a protected category. Involving children in armed conflict is proscribed behavior, a violation of human rights and a crime to be prosecuted. ‘Involving’ means using children in any capacity, including as shields, spies, hostages, messengers, orderlies, or collateral.

The use of landmines, booby traps, and other explosive devices that cannot discriminate as to their target (that is to say, a child might unwittingly detonate and be injured by them) is inherently criminal and a violation of human rights.

The identities of any persons who are detained and deprived of their liberty will be precisely identified, along with the reason for their detention. Respect *habeas corpus*.

All human deaths will be investigated. All human remains will be precisely identified and the fact of a person’s death publicized along with the location of the person’s known remains. Respect *habeas corpus*.

Obedience to superior orders is not a credible defense for willfully killing another person. Any organization whose member is directly responsible for a human killing must publicly express that organization’s grant of immunity to the killer or investigate the killing as a homicide.

Killers are not released from culpability and liability for crimes solely because their higher authorities express a grant of immunity as to their actions. The expression of immunity only establishes by admission the responsibility of the killers’ organization as a potentially culpable and liable participant in a killing. That is to say, what the organization granted might not have been immunity, but rather impunity.

You can always expand the compass of the term ‘human rights’ and raise the standards of expected behavior. You might determine that 17 years is a better standard for the protection of children, address the subject of torture, or even set the tormenting of dogs as an offense.

The above standard leaves open the possibility that a State or an insurgent might protect its agents against prosecution, claiming sovereign prerogative (sovereign immunity) -- with the added flourish that a sovereign need make no legal or moral justification since, under a theory of *suma potestas*, there is no higher authority to which the sovereign State must answer. If an insurgent or an established State claims such sovereign independence from higher jurisdiction, but does not explain its behavior for killing (or other trespass), it nevertheless exposes itself to moral judgment. At some point in an armed conflict, a competing entity will not only say it has a monopoly over the granting of impunity, but also a monopoly on imposing punishment, as well as a monopoly on allowing forensic investigations. Such a power might say, ‘If you want to punish people in this territory for some alleged violation of human rights, you will have to force your way past us’.

Some people will argue that a government commits a human rights violation if it fails to stop a human rights violation directly committed by someone else, even its insurgent foe. This has been experienced several times by the government of Colombia. Such an accusation of secondary responsibility asserts that protection of the citizenry is an essential purpose and responsibility of a State. ‘Failure to protect’ has become a useful, parallel theory of State violation of human rights. Government omissions, inaction or impotence invite human rights charges against the government, making it easier for an insurgent organization to paint the State as a failure. This twist on human rights violation also encourages insurgents to provoke violence.

Expansive Human Rights. People invoke the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights for many purposes. It is a cornucopia of desires, used both innocently and cynically. Rarely is it used in a manner that does not selectively judge the ethical performance of armed competitors and their objectives. The Declaration is of little help in determining where on the ground affected persons might enjoy a full range of rights without stepping on rights claimed by others. The Declaration of Human Rights is not a social compact; a social compact is not a list of desirables. A social compact is an agreement about how to peacefully address the distribution of rights and duties. If there is no social compact, then all human rights are subject to forfeiture. Social compacts are strongest where the evidence of rights and duties is accurate, comprehensive and transparent; where there are mechanisms to apply the evidence (courts, markets and democratic processes), and the basic rules regarding who can own what (how and to whom rights and duties are distributed) are consonant with the expectations of the population as a whole. Although basic human rights are increasingly recognized on a global scale, there is no global social compact. Social compacts seem to require geographic delimitation – boundaries.

At some point, human rights, property rights and civil rights amount to the same thing. Perhaps the most basic right to property within English-language tradition is a right to safe use and enjoyment of a place. Humans have a right to exist safely *someplace*. That right is proscribed by the logic of physical separation. We can’t all have the same right to peaceful use of the *same* exact place at the same time. Conversely, most of us cannot abide by the idea that there exist humans who have no right to peaceful safety *anywhere*. Mention of this obvious spatial logic leads to another – that land stays put, but people can move. New theories of ‘spatial justice’ are at work confounding traditional logic by comparing human material conditions from place to place and then calling for redistributions of wealth to the *places* of material inferiority. These ‘spatial justice’ notions depend in part on a curious invention in human rights theory: that not only do people everywhere have basic rights, their claims to a whole basket of rights should be answered without prejudice to their right to stay put (in terms of residence or employment, for instance). In other words, human rights are rights *in situ* and, furthermore, according to many proponents of this line of geographic human rights thinking, when people move, their claim of rights is still not subject to a duty to move.

Such a viewpoint obviously helps the immediate arguments of groups such as organized squatters. An opposing view stresses human movement and separation as options for conflict resolution and material improvement. In other words, this latter view, while it may or may not consider economic rights as basic human rights, does not attempt to suggest that a poor environment (a poor place) necessarily needs to be made better – the alternative being to empower individuals to have a wider range of location choices that they can make for themselves. Sometimes the best of poor alternatives might be forced relocation.


We cannot effectively respect human rights if we express them in purely legalistic or moralistic terms. They have to be geographical, pragmatic terms. Jefferson’s vision of a more equitable world required theory, place, and practicality. He matched the right to life with a proof of life (*habeas corpus*), for instance. ‘Property’, meanwhile, is not just a thing or a place; it is a human relationship that addresses the division of rights and duties within and about territorially delimited space. Property is where law, economics and geography converge. The practical ethic of a human rights program first has to be about the human right to peaceful existence, but this, as a practical matter... *in defined space and time*. I recommend measuring human rights performance in terms of property.

Please see sections: 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 107, *Guerre d'Algérie*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 71, *Jerusalem*; 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; and 7, *Sanctuary*.



“In every civilized society property rights must be carefully safeguarded; ordinarily and in the great majority of cases, human rights and property rights are fundamentally and in the long run, identical; but when it clearly appears that there is a real conflict between them, human rights must have the upper hand; for property belongs to man and not man to property.”[\[363\]](#)

Theodore Roosevelt



Rooster Cogburn: I mean to kill you in one minute, Ned; or see you hanged in Fort Smith at Judge Parker's convenience. Which will you have?

'Lucky' Ned Pepper: I call that bold talk for a one-eyed fat man.

Rooster Cogburn: Fill your hand, you son-of-a-bitch.

from the movie,

True Grit, 2010[\[364\]](#)



A cat as good as the king's

Section 126, Particularization of Power

The number of individuals and groups that can exert their will at global distances continues to increase. I call it the particularization of power, as distinguished from the diffusion of property. Both phenomena are tied to globalization. The diffusion of property is the constant division and redistribution of rights and duties that are recognized within human collectives and tend toward increasing formality. The two terms, 'particularization of power' and 'diffusion of property' can be helpful to you in sorting out the nature of and possibilities in irregular war.

Today, many individuals can implement their own foreign policy, visiting countries pretty much as they choose, writing Congress, sending money to causes, blogging, suing or defending in international courts, or even working for a foreign government. An individual can do all kinds of influential things, often with little regard for the opinions or preferences of government. If he or she can represent a powerful group identity or has attained great material wealth, he or she can exert influence at global distances. If the individual is nuts and homicidal, he or she can randomly ruin someone's afternoon.

There is a finite amount of attention that can be given by top government leaders to any issue and when that attention span is occupied, remaining matters of State fall to second then third string bureaucrats. As the rank of the functionary drops, other parts of a government and influences outside of it, stand to gain a little space. For instance, there is no hope of a unified voice or a *summa potestas* in American foreign dealings; there is more and more of a marketplace for American foreign policy in which the federal government is only a major player. The particularization of foreign policy power is not just related to global redistribution of wealth or new communication technologies, but to ambivalence, involuntary abnegation of power, and the practical limitations of leaders' attention.

Banks, because they process the convertible wealth of other identities (clients, shareholders, creditors, debtors), are some of the most powerful and least understood non-governmental and semi-governmental entities. Through them, agile leaders can translate the cohesiveness of one kind of group into support for the project of another. Banking helps convert money – hiding the connection between manifestations of debt and credit (cash, commercial paper, electronic inputs) and the manner of their acquisition or accretion. Banking allows what is perhaps the ultimate diffusion of property and, in a way, is a paradox of the power of the capitalist system: its life blood, money, can be so easily converted into projects that sicken the system itself. In effect, insurgents can wield unblessed power, translate it into representational forms of debt and credit, convert those representations into fungible money and then use the newly legitimated wealth to attack. That is really what money laundering is – changing illegitimate power into legitimate power.

The particularization of power can be anticipated and managed to a degree. When it becomes property, it is a bit easier to see, but perhaps harder to control. In irregular war, someone will try to transform power not recognized as legitimate into property. As soon as illegitimate power is turned into legitimate property, laundering is complete and anonymity is no longer needed for its exercise. It is easier in the legitimated system to follow property, but harder for that system to confiscate or deny its use. It is not a black and white world, but in your case you are probably either all about laundering your power into legitimate wealth or you are all about trying to keep your enemy from doing the same.

The particularization of power will continue. If you are of a mind to, you can slow it using laws limiting access to places, equipment and privacy. Limiting the conversion of unrecognized or illegitimate power into property, on the other hand, requires more careful study of market mechanisms that depend on the fluid conversion of assets.

Please see sections: 110, *Knowledge Gaps*; 139, *Strategy of Aggregate Tactics*; 62, *Bank Robbery*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 42, *Brigands*; 130, *Globalization*; 138, *Raids*; and 108, *Common Knowledge*.



"I give away something up to \$500 million a year throughout the world promoting Open Society. My foundations support people in the country who care about an open society. It's their work that I'm supporting. So it's not me doing it."[\[365\]](#)

[George Soros](#)



"...the problem in this world is to avoid a concentration of power, to have a dispersal of power, that unless we maintain a dispersal of power we will not be able to maintain a free society."[\[366\]](#)

Milton Friedman



Section 127, Between Liberty and Lawrence

The first railroad bridge over the Missouri river at Kansas' eastern border, a quarter-mile steel trestle on stone pylons, opened at Kansas City in 1869 (144 years ago). That piece of architecture was needed to move direct rail traffic between Texas and Chicago, to help put T-bone steaks between eastern teeth, but more than steak was at stake. Until the rails changed the prevailing pattern of commerce and travel from north-south to east-west, Leavenworth, along with St. Joseph, had been significant nodes. Locals claim that if the bridge laid across the river upstream at Leavenworth a decade later had been better constructed, Leavenworth might have regained its place as the region's dominant urb. The big planners and investors -- the visionaries who were to manifest Manifest Destiny and schedule its destinations -- struggled with the slavery question and the Indian question. To move the railroad through meant opening the land west of Missouri while 'opening' meant formalizing ownership.

The story being far above my poor power to add or detract, I lifted lines wholesale from Lincoln's second inaugural address, and relevant facts from Wikipedia and the following books:

Nicole Etcheson's *Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era*.
Loren Litterer's "*Bleeding Kansas*": *The Border War in Douglas and Adjacent Counties*.
Tony Mullkis' *Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army Operations in Bleeding Kansas*.
Alice Nichols' *Bleeding Kansas*.
Thomas Crump's *Abraham Lincoln's World*.

This is about railroads, borders, towns, and property rights, about the history of the distribution of power, about ideology. If you google 'center of the ideological universe', the interwebs will give you the location of the first bridge over the Missouri river into Kansas. Or it won't, but it might just as well. The following selective time line and the map on page 509 will help with the read and maybe get you to agree.

- * September 18, 1850 -- The Fugitive Slaves Act passed as part of the "Missouri Compromise." A legislative contraption, it disallowed slavery north of the 36°30' parallel.
- * May 30, 1854 -- President Franklin Pierce signed into law the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The law broke the Missouri Compromise in that it allowed for 'popular sovereignty', meaning local settlers would vote to decide if whites could own slaves in Kansas and Nebraska.
- * August 1, 1854 -- The town of Lawrence, Kansas was established by Free-State settlers.
- * November 29, 1854 -- Kansans elected their first congressional representative (pro-slavery). Of approximately 1,500 registered voters, nearly 6,000 votes are cast!
- * September 1, 1855 -- Territorial governor Wilson Shannon (pro-slavery) arrives.
- * April 21, 1856 -- The first railroad bridge over the Mississippi River connects Rock Island and Davenport. The crossing fueled confrontation between riverboat men and railroaders.
- * May 22, 1856 -- South Carolina Democrat Preston Brooks attacked Massachusetts Republican Charles Sumner in the Senate chambers, beating him senseless.
- * May 24, 1856 -- Abolitionist John Brown lead a murderous rampage against pro-slavery settlers at Pottawatomie Creek, killing five.
- * July 4, 1856 -- Using two hundred federal troops, Fort Leavenworth commander Colonel Edwin Sumner broke up a meeting of the unofficial "Free-State Legislature" in Topeka.
- * March 6, 1857 -- The US Supreme Court hands down a decision in *Dredd Scott v. Sandford*. The court opined that blacks of African descent were property and not citizens, were not protected by the Constitution, had no right to sue, and no right to freedom.
- * May 19, 1858 -- Thirty men led by pro-slaver Charles Hamilton murdered eleven unarmed free-staters near the Missouri border in what became known as the Marais des Cygnes or Marais de Cygne massacre.
- * October 4, 1859 -- The Wyandotte (anti-slavery) constitution is approved by Kansas voters.
- * December 2, 1859 -- John Brown hanged in Virginia.
- * January 29, 1861 -- US President James Buchanan signs the Kansas Statehood Bill, making Kansas a state of the United States.
- * April 12, 1861 -- Confederate forces fire on Fort Sumter, initiating hostilities in the Civil War.

Note that in the middle of our timeline is another railroad crossing -- over the Mississippi. Lieutenant Robert E. Lee had chosen the site of the Rock Island Bridge during the national topographical survey back in 1837. When the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad and the River Bridge Company put that bridge over the Mississippi, the river boat captains were not happy about it. Shortly after the bridge opened, a steamboat ran under then into it, blew up and burned down the bridge. Then the riverboat men went a step too far, suing the bridge and railroad companies for the loss of their boat. The railroad men hired the best lawyer they could find, Abraham Lincoln, who, while pointing out tactically the questionable facts surrounding the fire, expressed the strategic meaning of the case. He told the jury that the future nation was to be bound east-to-west, and the jury agreed. That an east-west vision might accelerate the tear of south from north is a geographic curiosity, but one that cannot be itself separated from the issues of land ownership and people ownership.

One of the great dramas of human history was rehearsed in eastern Kansas in the late 1850s. All thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war, and many believed that the wealth piled by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil would be dissipated, and every drop of blood drawn with the lash paid by another drawn with the sword, as had been said three thousand years earlier, so it was still that the judgments of the Lord were true and righteous altogether. Religion, or at least denomination, was not at issue. Both sides read the same Bible and prayed to the same God; and each invoked His aid against the other.

The towns of Leavenworth, Topeka, Lawrence, Ft. Scott, Wyandotte, Lecompton, Potawatomi, Shawnee and dozens of still smaller places nearby tested the dilemmas of democratic math and of being freely able to choose against being freely able to choose. Something was exposed about the amount of faith to be invested in elections, the geographic scales of democracy, and the power of voting with the feet. Also brought home was the question of whether revolutionary change, even the most just, required violence -- if viciousness could be not only justifiable but righteous. The immediate roles and interaction of militias and of federal soldiers, and the meaning of oaths in the face of flawed fundamental laws,

were tested as well. NGOs formed. The New England Immigrant Aid Company was one of the first to insert itself as a partisan in an armed conflict. It smuggled Sharps carbines to Lawrence Free-Staters in boxes marked as Bibles. Heavy Bibles.

In all, between 1855 and 1860, Kansans voted on four constitutional drafts -- two pro-slavery and two anti-slavery. Each was subject to rejection or ratification in Washington. Fewer than fifty persons were murdered in the timeframe of the state constitutional contest, but most of those murders were absolute political statements, which were taken as such locally, nationally, and internationally. The two scales of democracy and constitutionalism barely coincided to finally abolish slavery in Kansas.

The close-in-time details of the violence involve land claims, claim jumping, inconsistent surveying of property lines and reservation boundaries, and the variously effective serving of variously legitimate arrest warrants. At one turn of the indignations and reprisals, on the night of April 23, 1856, a sniper shot Samuel Jones (who had been postmaster in Westport, Missouri until appointed as Douglas County Sheriff by the pro-slavery legislature) in the back, in his tent, after he had made some arrests unpopular in Lawrence. He recovered to lead a vengeful May 11th raid on Lawrence to chasten and weaken a growing Free-State organization. The raiders burned down the Free-State Hotel, a couple of homes, destroyed printing presses, and looted widely. Two of the raiders died, but by mishap.

The proxy war in Kansas Territory was a prelude to an uglier plane of border violence perpetrated by Jayhawkers, Redlegs, Ruffians, Bushwhackers, and by less-memorable militias and vigilantes. In August, 1863, William Clarke Quantrill led a raid on Lawrence, this time razing a quarter of the town and killing perhaps two hundred men. Pre-war 'Bleeding Kansas' had been a relative pin prick, but it was the beginning of the end of a powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war.

Please see sections: 48, *Grading the Social Compact*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 29, *Heavy Machines*; 73, *Property and the Social Compact*; 16, *Presence*; 68, *Scale*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; and 138, *Raids*.



Laura Lee: Kansas was all golden and smelled like sunshine.

Josey Wales: Yeah, well, I always heard there were three kinds of suns in Kansas, sunshine, sunflowers, and sons-of-bitches.
from the movie
The Outlaw Josey Wales (1976)[[367](#)]




James Ewell Brown 'Jeb' Stuart: What do you do on Saturday night for fun here?

Kit Carson Holliday: Well, as I remember, half of Leavenworth takes a bath and the other half gets drunk. And since there are only two bathtubs in town, things get kind of exciting around midnight.
from the movie
Santa Fe Trail (1940)[[368](#)]



— Kansas-Missouri Border circa 1858 —



The dotted lines reflect major trunks of the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails

If there's a global system, there's a global rebel

Section 128, Global Insurgency and Global Trespass

A global insurgency has been afoot for some time – two or three thousand years maybe. Somehow, in the confusion of contemporary arguments and translations, people have begun to identify radical Islamists, deep ecologists, neo-marxists, and other curious bedfellows with global insurgency. That's too bad, because George W. Bush's mention of an 'empire of liberty' was more in line with the heritage of global insurgency. That liberty-based millennial current of insurgent energy and inspiration has been changing the balance of power (between the individual and large collectives) toward the individual. By power I mean the capacity to determine one's fate, compose one's vision of the meaning of life, establish relationships, create voluntary associations, and improve one's material lot).

The millennial insurgency has clear revolutionary milestones, but has hardly been continual or consistent in its progress or expression. Now and then it has challenged a State, church or some other organized enterprise, and even destroyed some. It is not inherently against States, churches or other associations, but rather presumes that they tend toward tyranny and therefore occasionally need to be checked. It is an insurgency because it is about growing and preserving the relative power that individuals have within whatever structure of governance, associational preferences, and entrenched advantages they find themselves. It has old symbols and code words, like *liberty* and *free will*, and its strongest roots have geographic paths that seem to make it more 'Western' or 'Judeo-Christian'. While these latter identifiers may be dependent as much as independent characteristics, Americans are among the most easily engaged in advancing the millennial insurgency today. Partly because America's physical and cultural reach is global, the insurgency is global.

There exists another global current that does not have as deep a set of roots. It also challenges the power of States (some, anyway) and other associational structures, and for this reason can be ascribed the adjective 'insurgent'. It does not challenge the idea of dominant State power *per se*, however. In fact, it prefers socialism and other designs for centralized decision-making. It is exactly not insurgent in that it seeks to rebalance power toward the State, arguing that human progress will be extended to otherwise abandoned and downtrodden humans if the State has more power relative to the individual. It does not presume that centralized States are inherently likely to abuse power.

This second 'insurgent' current manifests itself through a variety of organizational types, most of which depend on and venerate some form of exclusive agency, like a vanguard or a clergy. Although its adherents may describe it using the word 'resistance', it is often anathema to those who would defy and resist the creation of tyrannies, since it explicitly yearns and works toward the concentration of power in small elites. As a global resistance movement, it has taken on a basket of identifiers for what it resists. Accordingly, it describes itself as 'anti-' many things, including neoliberalism, capitalism, and colonialism. The most specific adjective for what the movement resists, and with greatest consistency, is *American*, as in *anti-American*. The movement has a number of intellectual call signs, among them post-structuralism. If a person self-identifies as a convinced post-structuralist, it probably means he or she has bought in to active anti-Americanism.

The government of the United States does not always proceed in support of the millennial insurgency described in the first paragraph above, or does it always oppose the *resistance* movement described in the second and third paragraphs. It is often the opposite. Equally, what Americans do in the world outside the auspices or control of the US Government is inconsonant with the immediacies of government policy. America as a nation may promote the millennial insurgency when its government does not, or vice versa.

While there may be 'clashes of cultures' in the world, that concept is not the best foundation for setting the scorecard in the irregular war in which you are likely to participate. It will work better for you to envision the pair of currents noted above. One is a fitful, inconsistent but genuine global insurgency with millennial roots which seeks to distribute and balance power. The other is a reactionary amalgam that, when successful, generally creates some new tyranny. When Martin Luther tacked his ninety-five theses onto the door of the Church Castle at Wittenberg in 1517, he set one of the milestones of the millennial insurgency. He told the exclusive agents called the Roman clergy that he wasn't buying it any more. He would deal with God directly and do so in his own language to boot.

In addition to the two sides of global insurgency, there are two sides to global trespass, *trespass* meaning the violation of others' rights, especially the rights we would suppose people to have in the peaceful enjoyment of their own land. One of these forms of trespass has a tinge of legality. It is the overreaching and abuse of comparative advantage by those with *de jure* power, either financially or politically. It is what the multinational corporations often do and what dominant governments often do. In other words, having stated admiration for the millennial insurgency whose torch is most engagingly carried by America, it is necessary to insert the disclaimer that everything the second resistance movement (the anti-insurgency) does and says is not wrong. It feeds on an existing reality of trespass and injustice of which our institutions are often guilty.

Another form of global resistance, if not insurgency, has grown with globalization. It is transnational criminal enterprise or global trespass. It is hard to claim that organized crime is more or less dangerous to civilization (or to the millennial insurgency of liberty) than is the post-structural movement, partly because the two seem to have melded and intertwined to a degree that such a distinction between them might now be meaningless. Nevertheless, the trespasses can be mapped in space and time and culpability assigned to actually men.

Please see sections: 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 60, *War Nouveau*; 98, *Jorge Verstryngne and Pio Moa*; 135, *Borders and Anarchism*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; 65, *Smuggling*; 52, *Sovereignty*; and 137, *Foreign Support and Perspective*.



"Most paranoid delusions are intricate...but this is brilliant."

Dr. Silberman, in the movie
The Terminator (1984)[369]



"Do not be narrow-minded, but think in large terms of great spaces, in continents and oceans, and thereby direct your course with that of our Fuhrer." [370]

Karl Haushofer



"One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for ever."

Ecclesiastes 1:4 (King James)



Nerds can be bad, too

Section 129, Nerd Globe

These days, losing dominance in higher math for almost any amount of time and in any sector of activity can present a grave vulnerability. The one-in-a-million math mind has become a critical strategic natural resource, at least in terms of national defense or global security. The kinds of things an aggressive one-in-a-million-mind nerd can do on his evil little keyboard can fit into five categories as follows:

1. Overload others' computers so that they don't work. He takes exception to some website, finding it offensive because it insults his nationality, favors someone who does, seems morally dangerous, is a financial competitor, or who knows why. One of his options is to arrange a denial of service attack in which he overloads the supposedly offending server with so much computer traffic that it chokes on trespassing mips and bips.
2. Sabotage computer systems with viruses, worms, trojans and the like. This is especially annoying when the computers being attacked control things like air-traffic or power stations.
3. Steal valuables...like money and personal identifications, which are then used to further their criminal enterprise, like stealing more money.
4. Spread propaganda, both commercial and political, to appear all over the place when the rest of us don't want to bother with it.
5. Rig elections. Many electoral territories use electronic voting machines, electronic vote counters, or both.

These five can overlap, their effectiveness depending on superior computer skills and ultimately on superior math skills. The techniques, mental competencies, and formal education needed to commit digital misdemeanors are the same as for digital felonies and digital warfare, so possessors of these qualities bear watching. As with other crimes, the greater problems arise when bad nerds are organized by leaders with nefarious *mens rea*. What we should not overlook, however, is that the realm of organized math trespass is subject to the same principles of strategy that the mundane, muddy-booted warrior is obligated to observe. [\[371\]](#)

The classic principles of military strategy and its operational equation are ignored at peril, whether you are Erwin Rommel or Booger Dawson. The trespasser nerd lives in physical space and his weapons are physical, not virtual. He needs a box, keyboard, server, router, cable, or satellite. He and his equipment are located somewhere. Distance is as relevant a concept for his actions (and for defense against his actions) as it would be in any other armed competitive activity. The thing to remember from Geography (the academic discipline) is that cost-distance is more pertinent than Euclidean distance. The cost-distances for a trespass nerd, although he may not realize it, are determined by language, legal protection, and emotive or affective welcome. The Chinese hacker does not have to pay much attention to operational security as long as his trespasses are against properties outside those of the Chinese and especially the Chinese government's domain of national interest, language, and territory. He is not likely to be extradited if he causes a denial of service attack against a website in Australia because he thinks the owners of the website are somehow supporting Uighur separatism.

The competent, funded, malicious nerd will raise his game of competitive strategy from latent stages of guerrilla organizing, to attacking vulnerable targets of opportunity (rarely venturing from his physical sanctuary) to risking extended and external lines of communication in order to establish weapons sites and opportunities for attack outside his sanctuary, into the enemy's geographic depth, attacking enemy lines of communication and even perhaps the enemy sanctuaries. The nerd can do this by overtaking enemy computers with botnet attacks and by planting timed commands in various parts of the enemy physical infrastructure for use at a future date. Concomitantly, the strategizing nerd can seek to recruit and incorporate other nerds who can position themselves physically at distant places in order to provide the maintenance and warning necessary without endangering themselves. Know that the supposedly 'virtual' world of computers and math is one of human intention, housed in human bodies, and manifested using physical gear. The distances/weights and timing of the competition is a little different, but it is almost entirely physical, not metaphysical.

Any combination of unfriendly entities -- lone terrorist, brigand, felon, government, or simple pleasure seeker -- can seduce, fund, bully, or otherwise inspire a team of mathematicians to attack files, systems, accounts, and codes. The best mathematicians in the world don't seem to be much brighter than the average Red Wings fan when it comes to identifying the good guys and bad guys in the global insurgency. Loss of math superiority can lay a society bare to every terrible manifestation of resentment, disdain, envy, recklessness and other post-structural unworthiness. A large-scale math invasion could irreparably change a country's fortunes.

In other words, some governments will continue building criminal and civil law to make hacking and other Internet trespasses more difficult. Other governments will protect trespass-nerds. Some countries will increase diplomatic pressure on governments and NGOs to adhere to, promote and enforce legal restraints on Internet trespass. Shrinking the geography of cybercrime -- easing access to the physical implements of potential cyber trespass through international agreements -- might make the overall military task more manageable.

Governments, along with nongovernmental partners and allies will have to organize math minds not just for the purposes of passive defense, but for offensive mathematical counterattack against trespassers. Governments will also prepare military resources for the occasional need to visit physical destruction upon some wad of nerds. The United States and many other countries have the wherewithal to ensure that the best math minds in the world have the opportunity and desire to choose. We could take active measures to identify the best science and math minds in the world at an early age, and to assure that our own math education does not lag behind. The first defense against incivil nerdity is to be an attractive place for beautiful math minds to live. Meanwhile, bad nerds on pathways detrimental to the safety of a nation must be confronted.

The State has three offensive capacities with which to mount winning strategies against nerds who digitally trespass against it and society. One is mathematical, another is legal/diplomatic, and the third is physical. It will not be enough to build math firewalls and observe safe Internet. There has to be an offensive capability so that the appropriate combinations of offense and defense give the State a reasonable chance against brilliant cyber guerrillas and criminals. Government's obligation in the social compact (at least the American) is to provide for the common defense. When it does not, the omission engenders self-help and vigilantism. Nerd feuds could get ugly.

Special Operating Forces (SOF) will be called upon more and more often to attack cells of math nerds or even individual math geniuses. Booger (who prefers to be called an 'IT professional') might just have to go down. Taking him out competently will require observance of the military operational principles which, in turn, will require careful study of the physical and human geographies in which counter-nerd operational art will play out. Although cyber war happens in a physical world, the cost-distances are admittedly distinct. As a result, abstract concepts like spontaneity, collective identity, and democracy can be warped to create practical power advantages. Voting in political elections, for instance, can be achieved in all sorts of new and convincing ways, cheapening and confusing the whole idea of elections. Unscrupulous nerd-handlers can finesse the rules of legitimacy, create new scams, and change outcomes. For every financial scam we suffer as a globalizing society there may be an electoral scam that is harder to detect. Do we trust the power of higher math in the hands of the State?

A related problem has been developing for several millennia, is accelerating, and could metastasize. It can be called the presumption to godliness.

We are sneaking up on the biological secrets of life -- cloning, inventing species, promiscuously designing or redesigning this and that organism. Someone is bound to get scared and angry -- not just at the hacker nerd, but at whomever is perceived to be the mad scientist. The torch-bearing mob at Dr. Frankenstein's door may go global.


Please see sections: 16, *Presence*; 86, *Shifting Covert-geographies*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 19, *Mercatus*; 30, *Control Technology*; 108, *Common Knowledge*; 2, *Anonymity*; and 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*.



“You know...
like nunchuku skills, bow hunting skills, computer hacking skills...
Girls only want boyfriends who have great skills.”

Napoleon in the movie

Napoleon Dynamite (2004)[\[372\]](#)



Rat: How many languages do you speak?

Dr. Zimsky: Five, actually.

Rat: I speak one: One, zero, one, zero, zero. With that I could steal your money, your secrets, your sexual fantasies, your whole life; in any country, any time, any place I want. We multitask like you breathe. I couldn't think as slow as you if I tried.

from the movie

The Core (2003)[\[373\]](#)



To the chagrin of reactionaries

Section 130, Globalization

The first of two quotations below is from *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels* (1848) and the other from *T. Miller Maguire* (1910). The first makes us pause and wonder why being publicly opposed to globalization is a broach of current leftist political fashion. The later comment is more obscure, but together they confirm that globalization is not new to our generations. Maybe not even the pace of globalization is greater now than in some periods during the past. After all, the greatest change in moving weight may have come during the period of rapid railroad network expansions and then again during the spread of airline service. It may be that, in terms of moving heavy items to some places, we aren't much better globalized today than we were half a century ago. It is possible that in some ways the world is not as 'small' now as it was in the first half of the 20th century, given that today there are fewer active miles of railroad in many areas.

There is no escaping the breathtaking differences in communication brought by the Internet, cell phones, and GIS, but armed struggle takes weight and, while informatics have indirectly changed the potential for optimal geographic leverage of weight (we should be able to decide more rapidly and precisely where to deliver things that have mass, whether tanks, explosives, food, or arrest warrants), information alone can be unconvincing in armed struggles. We, the intransigent, need to be shown something with a little heft or we will continue to defy your insults.

From *The Communist Manifesto* (1848):

The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property.

Considering that Marx and Engle's observations are over a century and a half old, it's pretty insightful stuff. Note the positive aspects the original communists admitted regarding the contribution of the bourgeoisie and the value of globalization. There are some deep ecologists and others today who just don't like globalization, technological progress, or even humankind. They present quite a mental and philosophical challenge. But they are a detail in the panorama of global insurgency. Most of the rest of the participants in the self-styled anti-American version of global insurgency aren't really focused on or enraged about the processes of globalization as such. For some of them, globalization is a tagline for a select number of processes they feel work to the benefit of a small minority of humans and to the detriment of the vast majority. Identifying one's self as anti-globalization doesn't necessarily mark opposition to globalization processes per se, but is rather just a password or entrance badge to communicate solidarity with people who oppose what they think are dominating identities. (Ironically, Marx would probably have called opponents of globalization reactionaries.)

Marx did not understand property as a social compact or as a conflict resolution mechanism. He did not foresee that the bourgeoisie, if there even is such a collective identity, would actually increase and spread property, or that vastly greater numbers of people would become and consider themselves owners of property. He did not comprehend the modern corporation or study America. Today's marxism, however, is only a little bit about Marx. Still, Marx saw injustice, didn't like it, started to think about it, and called for action against it. Some of his original classifications of people were too crude and his vision overly stuck to his time and place. People progressively distorted his ideas and with the auspices of an evil empire, a whole lot of people started adding to and evolving marxism and marxism-leninism. When the empire died and it looked like we might say goodbye to marxism, a new group of thinkers dug it up so that now it roams the earth like a zombie -- with many of the same appetites. Today's anti-globalization movement is not all marxist, but its inspirations and leadership overlaps what marxism has become, even while it is barely recognizable as early marxism. And from *The Gates of Our Empire* (1910):

Manifestly the Pacific coast (of North America) is now absorbing the attention of the wisest as well as the ablest of mankind, and what applies to San Francisco in the event of any international dispute would also apply to Vancouver and Prince Rupert, which are a few days journey nearer to Asia than is California. Railways and steamships have almost annihilated distance. Napoleon's men had to walk or ride from France or Spain to Moscow. To-day it takes less time to reach Washington from the most distant nations than it took senators from their respective States seventy years ago, and less time to reach Vancouver than it used to take to get to Galway, and for Dr. Johnson to get to Scotland was a more troublesome task than for a Canadian contingent to get to Africa. [\[374\]](#)

Maguire was a friend of C.E. Callwell, whose *Small Wars, Principles and Practice* was an early 20th century bestseller among British military thinkers. Callwell pointed out that the small wars of which he wrote were those fought by regular against non-regular forces, and that the regular forces were almost always dependent on long lines of supply to base. [\[375\]](#) It was clear to these Britons that the irregular wars in which they took interest were only interesting because of the strategies made available to a country able to create and exploit the processes of globalization. Maguire was broadly read and was aware of communist ideas, but did not give them significance as a military matter.

Karl Marx and his friends focused on economic effects of globalization, and especially on land arrogations and their revolutionary consequences, but those consequences and the influence of their revolutionary thinking simmered slowly. Fifty years after the publication of the manifesto, Maguire and his buddies were teaching the practical effect of globalization on imperial military strategy, not oblivious to communist theory, but utterly unmoved by it.

Probably the best-known of the globalization measurements today is the 'Globalization Index' produced by A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy, which can be downloaded at [atkearney.com](#). It is a country-by-country ranking using four categories of globalization: political engagement, technological connectivity, personal contact, and economic integration. Although the most globalized technologically, the United States is 71st (out of 72 countries rated) in economic integration. This presents a strange relationship to the anti-Americanism of the neo-marxists or post-structuralists.

Their argument encompasses more than just economics, to be sure, indicting the entire structure of Western culture.

We can suppose all four of the globalization index categories are fair game for their critical analyses, but economic imperialism is to the anti-capitalists the most consequential sin. Nevertheless, the United States is nowhere near the most involved internationally in terms of economic interdependence and integration. Also, one of the assertions of the Globalization Index is ‘there is no turning back the clock on globalization’. This, to the post-structuralist, is an irritating part of what they see as a false truth foisted on the world by a capitalist, neoliberal, positivist, sexist, neocolonialist monster. In spite of their invective, however, the countries that are apparently benefiting the most, or which have best exploited the processes of globalization, are often small and not ‘Western’. It seems, barring Armageddon, that the creators of the Globalization Index and Karl Marx are right – globalization is going to proceed.

Arguments about economics might best be placed to the side when considering globalization. Instead of considering any of the four categories proposed by the Globalization Index or which countries land in the index’s ‘winners circle’, go back to what Maguire and Callwell noted about which countries were prepared to move and maintain military mass at distance. This is what really motivates the anti-Americanism of the post-structuralists. In spite of having inherited from marxist tradition an economics-based conversation, the part of globalization that really galls anti-Americans is the fact that the world is smaller, overall, for the United States military than for any other armed force. The United States and only a few other countries can initiate and sustain military deployments in others’ lands. Some would argue, meanwhile, that this US capability to wage war at distance is a fundamental column of the structure that allows the rest of globalization to proceed to the benefit of many lands.


So what? Globalization is, in balance, a positive process. Countries are far more likely to succeed materially if they can globalize. Development plans built on aversion to or denial of globalization (or of market forces) will fail or become tyrannical, and this will be so regardless of interest or indifference shown by the United States. In particular cases of American military involvement, it is a capability to maintain long lines of communication to base that, for better or worse, allows American intervention. Globalization will proceed to the benefit of the world so long as a few countries, and especially the United States, maintain their capacity to fight around the globe.

Please see sections: 123, *Sea and Aerospace Power*; 97, *Oviedo*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; 6, *The Operational Equation*; 95, *Childhood*; 99, *Postmodern and Post-structural*; and 100, *What the Foucault?*



“My dear Nikolas, perhaps you don’t realize that it’s tea that has made the British Empire and Dr. Watson what they are today.”

[Sherlock Holmes](#) in the movie
Pursuit to Algiers (1945)[[376](#)]



“You come here with your laptop computers, your malaria medicine and your little bottles of hand sanitizer and think you can change the outcome, huh?”

Danny Archer in the movie
Blood Diamond (2006)[[377](#)]



“...globalization, at bottom, is merely the extension across national boundaries of the very same economic processes that inspire you to trade with the supermarket down the street...”[[378](#)]

Donald J. Boudreaux
Globalization



Do you think they may convey immunity?

Section 131, Is It an Insurgency?

Here is a kind of litmus test to help define your irregular war: Do you think the enemy leader has a right under international law to convey immunity to his armed subordinates for killing your armed subordinates? If you say 'yes', you're placing yourself, arguably at least, in a traditional State-on-State contest. If you say, "No, the enemy leader is granting impunity to his people in defiance of our authority," then your enemy might still not be an insurgent, but you will want to discern if he is purely criminal or is more politically motivated. That determination is trickier.

You'll hear it said that 'insurgency' relates to a goal while 'guerrilla' relates to a method. Sometimes the point is made to argue that more must be done within a battlespace than just combat. 'Guerrilla' connotes combat. 'Insurgency' seems to invite countering efforts like psychological land information operations and civil affairs -- to gain popular support. Try not to get caught by the distinction, as accurate as it may be. 'Guerrilla' is old Spanish for small war. Many English etymologies reach it back to the Peninsular Wars of the late 18th century, but the term goes back farther in the Spanish and, yes, there can be guerrilla tactics, guerrilla strategies and guerrilla all kinds of things within a non-insurgent war.

If you get to maneuver a tank brigade against another tank brigade, everything in your battlespace is subject to being blown to smithereens. When you're done, you (hopefully) will go back to the motor park to dust off. You probably don't care if the tiff is called a UN Chapter 6 peace mission, an insurgency, a police action, a punitive expedition, World War III, or whatever. This book imagines conflicts that don't hold out much chance for that big tank battle to occur. Here we imagine separatists, insurgents, brigands, warlords, resistance fighters, crime bosses, and so on. If any of them *were* to have a tank brigade, the contest would start to be a different creature than what concerns us here. The more useful determination does not revolve around a conflict's being or not being an insurgency, but around the granting of impunity and how much a group has to depend on anonymity to keep defying a State.

For years, many Western analysts preferred to view what they called insurgencies through the lens of a marxist-leninist movement with a unifying ideology, a well-defined cellular structure and a hierarchical leadership. Many such insurgencies had their inspiration and funding from Moscow, Beijing, or Cuba as part of the East-West, Cold War competition. We in the United States tended to discount and ignore other armed political challenges to States. The wide gamut of motivational and organizational formulae is now more evident, some 'insurgencies' fueled by hate, revenge and stridency; others by gangsterism; and others by the hybrid energies of ideology and profit. A common denominator is their capability to grant impunity to their people within physical space. They vary to the extent they need to maintain anonymity in order to do so. If they need no anonymity and can still grant impunity, perhaps they are, to that extent, another State. If some foreign government accepts that an armed group has a right to protect its members from punishment, that group is getting closer to being a State, and if the government being challenged by that group also accepts that the armed group has the right to protect its operatives from punishment, then the group is looking even more like a separate State.

Typifying, categorizing, defining types of armed defiance can be comforting, however, and maybe useful, so here is a comfort list:

Insurgency – Insurgents say the government is illegitimate or otherwise unsatisfactory and justify their use of violence to secure a better state. They challenge the government's claim on exclusive power to grant impunity and attempt to protect the people in their organization from being punished by the challenged government. The word autochthonous is useful here. We presume an insurgency to be autochthonous (local, indigenous, home grown, aboriginal, native), but it might be autochthonous only in part.

Revolution – Revolutionaries say that the symbols, vocabulary, bureaucracy, institutions, power relationships, legends -- the whole structure of the society -- is built to keep down a particular identity, maybe the proletariat, a race, women, or an amalgam of disaffected groups. If they are right, you might want to make some changes, negotiate, give up or go over to their side. On the other hand, they may be bent on wresting power by force and killing you in the process. If it's an armed revolution, insurgency is a 'lesser included'. Revolutionaries aren't necessarily 'leftist' or 'statist.'

Occupation and Stability Operations – All ground operations are occupation and stability operations. Otherwise, what are they -- 'call-in-by phone-and-course-about-the-chaos' operations? It's just a matter of how long you need to stay and what you want to accomplish.

Separatism – Separatists don't plan on throwing the government out of office, just throwing it out of a place that they claim belongs to them and not to the government or to whomever the government claims to represent. It might or might not be revolutionary, but that doesn't make much difference. There is something about the current ownership they obviously don't like, and that part maybe makes them insurgents. If the separatists are successful, the old government will no longer be able to punish their people or grant impunity to the government's people inside the new territory.

Organized Crime – Criminals like the government fine if its people will take the bribe. If the government won't take their bribe, the 'don' is still betting the government can't convict his wise guys and that it definitely can't convict the don. Criminals often feel the same way toward revolutionaries as they do toward governments. However, crime would be sweeter if they could take over a government for themselves, so the concepts might overlap (along with some smuggling routes), and it still doesn't matter.

Armed resistance movement – They don't want a stranger there, the place probably wasn't the stranger's to begin with, and the stranger might not want it either when it comes right down to it.

Guerrilla war – Smart guerrillas aren't going to confront a stronger force unless they think their line of retreat is secure. They might not have much air power to speak of. They take care to protect their anonymity. They probably dig holes in the ground. They might or might not wear uniforms (their own or someone else's). They might be insurgents, separatists, revolutionaries, or not.

Irregular War – This is a container for the terms above. We can distinguish it from 'regular' war because of five inter-related conditions:

1. There are more civilians in the area of concern who we cannot or don't wish to just remove -- we deal with them in place;
2. The contending forces have to manage the question of anonymity -- who knows who is for whom within the population;
3. The phenomenon of incorporeal presence is more consequential -- emotive or psychological quantities in the population, like ideological or religious affinity, hate, resentment or fear;
4. There exist greater numbers of layers of legalities and legal niceties with which we are obliged to reconcile our actions -- we may face the impositions of not just the laws of war and military operational law, but of contract law, migration law, foreign criminal law, international commercial law, etcetera. Enjoy the reading.
5. The contenders may or may not belong to, associate with or be sponsored by an existing country of the international system.

The five main ingredients that make a war irregular -- more physical human presence, more non-physical human presence, increased legalism,

greater anonymity, and non-state fighters and other participants. We could say that overall there is a fuller interreaction between the human and the physical geographies. When exactly is it an irregular and not a regular war? Can't say. If you're at 42nd and Broadway you know it's urban. In a slit trench in Amachel, Guatemala you know it's rural. Regular and irregular are that kind of categories – comfy only at the extremes.


Whatever folks are calling you, your enemy or the contest, pretty soon, if you control the anonymity, your opponent will have to seek physical sanctuary. If he doesn't need anonymity or sanctuary, that is, if he can just get in your face and you can't do anything to stop him from granting impunity to his people, you're probably losing. The various definitions are not useless, but don't let fine distinctions about identity, method and purpose steer you away from analysis of a group's capability to grant impunity to its members.

Please see sections: 45, *Police or Military*; 16, *Presence*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; 42, *Brigands*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; and 65, *Smuggling*.



“You learned the dry-mouthed, fear-purged purging ecstasy of battle and you fought that summer and that fall for all the poor in the world against all tyranny, for all the things you believed in and for the new world you had been educated into.”[\[379\]](#)

Ernest Hemingway,
For Whom the Bell Tolls



“Hey, you're talking to my guy all wrong. It's the wrong tone.”

Clem in the movie
Joe Dirt (2001)[\[380\]](#)



One thing stuffed inside another, or something else

Section 132, Turducken and Hybrid

Turducken is a Cajun or faux-Cajun dish prepared by roasting or deep frying a turkey stuffed with a duck stuffed with a chicken and maybe stuffed with spices or sausage. The whole thing might even be covered with bacon. The juices and flavors get all mixed together....mmmm. Not a vegetarian dish. Go on up to Yellowknife or Whitehorse and try the Moosbearbou. If you don't care for the carnivore analogy, you could use the cherpump, "A Cherry Pie, an Apple Pie and a Pumpkin Pie, Each Cooked inside a Separate Cake, and Then All Cooked Together inside Another Cake." Food critics say it represents all that remains good and right in this fallen world [381] So there it is.

'Turducken' might help describe disparate events of some armed conflicts. Military history is replete with examples wherein major contenders engaged in what looks like more than one kind of warfare simultaneously. Lawrence of Arabia was doing something irregular in the midst of World War I. General Giap fielded regular armies against French and later United States forces, but also mounted a broad guerrilla campaign. During the American Revolutionary War, General Nathaneal Greene's regular forces coordinated successfully with the militia units and guerrilla methods of the 'Swamp Fox', Francis Marion. The Napoleonic Wars, classic by default, included the Peninsular Campaigns, which birthed the term guerrilla. These and many others could be termed *turducken* wars. Turducken might be an apt term if a front were established along which two contending regular armies were pitted in maneuver combat, behind which a guerrilla war raged and inside of which international organized crime prospered.

The term hybrid has come into recent fashion as a descriptor of irregular-type wars. (A *hybrid* is generally considered a product of two things that carries some of the characteristics of each of its parents. (A mule is the hybrid offspring of a male donkey and a female horse, for instance.) The use of 'hybrid' as a descriptor of some future warfare could falsely imply contiguity in time and space. Much of what is honored as guerrilla strategy involves the idea of stages or phases. A revolutionary effort, for instance, evolves, according to the literary protocol, from latency through guerrilla operations to a war of movement. This pattern, wherein Mao moves purposefully from organizing secret cells toward the vast campaign of Huai Hai, is poorly contained by the term hybrid. Likewise, if a nation were waging a pitched tank battle on a foreign battlefield, but also contending with an effective and virulent enemy 'fifth column' at home, is that warfare hybrid? Did the activities of the French Resistance make the German's war challenge a hybrid one? If the Iranians build nuclear weaponry, but fund and guide Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, is that hybrid?

Hybrid is probably not the best word to use for describing future wars, but if it is or isn't, so what? Part of the upshot is found in how governments organize to meet variable threats to the State. As expressed in other sections, clear distinction can be made between what is police and what is military, at least from a traditional United States perspective. From that point of view, what distinguishes police from military involves differential authorities, obligations, and immunities. Those legalistic attributes express themselves visibly in types of weapons, colors of uniforms, organizational design, information culture and operational practices. In some countries, police-military hybrids exist. Some of these have long traditions, such as the *carabinieri* of several countries. In the United States, such hybridizing runs into a marsh of issues about the role of federal troops, the National Guard, Posse Comitatus, and the like. A conflict probably isn't a hybrid, but an armed force can be.

Asymmetry is another term in fashion for describing insurgent-type wars, and that word spawned its own foreign usage. If opponents in a war, battle, lesser armed confrontation, or even a sport, were perfectly symmetrical as to their competitive resources and recourses, the contest would never end, except maybe by dumb luck or divine intervention. We win by unbalancing symmetry. An insurgent is almost always, at least at the beginning of a contest, obliged to seek stratagem. Patience, deception, surprise and escape are bywords for overcoming what appears on the surface to be overall government advantage of size and weight. Advantage is what a competitor seeks, however, and the word advantage contains within it the notion of asymmetry. Not to say the word asymmetry is meaningless. Military forces can be of equal overall strength, balancing-out on some theoretical power teeter-totter, but still have different internal shapes and numbers of elements. Observation of that internal asymmetry has caused us to worry about how our differently-shaped, often smaller opponents are able to achieve superior results at given points and times. I believe we should attribute less of the answer to psychology and theatre, and more to distance and speed.

Not *asymmetry*, but rather *anonymity* and *distance to sanctuary* will be the challenging phenomena or characteristics in irregular war that you will have to confront. The two terms are related in that much of the competitive advantage sought by an insurgent or criminal adversary of the State is achieved through secrecy. The word 'asymmetry' begs a question: If our foe is not shaped like us, so what? Gaining and maintaining advantage in anonymity is a major part of the answer.

There is an area, however, where the word asymmetry has greater utility. *Moral asymmetry* is a worrisome phenomenon that lends competitive advantage to the side less constrained by moral standards of behavior. Tactical moral asymmetry has long been encouraged by revolutionary theory holding that the moral constructs of the enemy can and should be rejected -- that they need not be observed by the morally justified revolutionary. If you are truly a rebel and not just a crook, you don't just disobey the law, you disdain both the law and the invalid moral structure from which that law sprang. Similarly, the righteous zealot easily justifies his nonobservance of his enemies' moral standards. It is partly because of the danger of moral asymmetry that this book delves into 'magical realism', 'post-structuralism', and anarchy -- artistic and philosophical currents that support moral asymmetry. Maybe we are seeing a similar quantity in Chinese *unrestricted* warfare, as well as in a renewed romanticizing of gangsters and gangsterism.

Here is a brief description of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War provided by Karen Kaya, a leading researcher on the Levant. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah units ambushed an Israeli patrol on the Israeli side of the Lebanon-Israel border, killing three Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two others. Thus began a month-long war in which Hezbollah used a strategy that was neither wholly conventional, nor purely irregular. Hezbollah disposed its forces as an 'irregular' force might, yet emphasized holding and defending ground. In the brief contest, Hezbollah inflicted more Israeli casualties per Moslem fighter than in any of Israel's previous wars. Hezbollah had been purchasing real estate, distributing weapons, and secretly digging extensive underground communications and other military facilities. Some heralded this as the model for 21st century wars. Hezbollah had been born out of the civil war in Lebanon in 1982. After Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 2000, and with the help of Syria and Iran, Hezbollah initiated actions to govern Southern Lebanon. These included establishing a political party, developing a militia/military and providing social programs to the population. Weakness of the central Lebanese government also provided open territory in which the Iranian Quds Force could conduct rigorous paramilitary training in both weapons and tactics, and freely rearm Hezbollah. As such, Hezbollah became considered the de-facto government authority in Southern Lebanon. By 2010, Hezbollah had evolved well beyond the shadowy terrorist organization it had been a decade earlier. By the time of the selection process for Prime Minister in early 2011, Hezbollah revealed itself as having considerable influence within the regular electoral democratic processes in the country.

Does it matter if the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War is called hybrid, asymmetric, or irregular? I see it involved a land strategy, tunneling, militias, social programs, electoral intrigue, kidnapping and other actions mentioned throughout this book. I am not promoting the fanciful culinary word *turducken* (noting, nevertheless, regular use by the Chinese of the word *cocktail* in place of *unrestricted*); but I do hope that some recent semantic enthusiasms, including *hybrid* and *asymmetric* will be short-lived, because they highlight secondary rather than primary characteristics of the challenge. They invite the question, 'So what?'

Please see sections: 131, *Is It an Insurgency?*; 113, *Unrestricted Chi Whiz*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 56, *Militias and Gun Control*; 2, *Anonymity*; 45, *Police or Military*; 101, *Magical Realism*; and 112, *DIME & PMESII*.



“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.”[\[382\]](#)

F. Scott Fitzgerald



“Oh Paddy dear, and did you hear the awful things they say?
Princess Margret and Lord Snowden, they have joined the IRA
They are drilling in the mountains to the sounds of fife and drum
Young Tony's taking snapshots while young Maggie fires the gun!”

from the song *The Reluctant Patriot*



Murderers if no immunity; Convicts if no impunity

Section 133, Snipers and Assassins

Sniping has long been a controversial issue in warfare. Sniping combines a sense of elite status, both technologically and athletically, with stealth. It also gives an impression of one-sidedness, of ambush or surprise. It is so effective and disconcerting that the officers of professional armies have, on occasion, distanced themselves from sniping as a dishonorable activity and at other times embraced it. Meanwhile, sniping, sharpshooting and regular marksmanship keep closing the gaps among them.

Landmines and snipers are revealing features of irregular war. We refer to the sniper rather than the rifle, while we refer to the landmine rather than the 'emplacer'. Sniping is a more personal act and is more personally risky since, unless done perfectly, it can reveal the whereabouts of the perpetrator and does so within the effective range of an opposing rifle. Snipers have been part of the combat landscape for some time. They are costly because the expert sniper is a physical rarity, must be vetted psychologically, and must be exhaustively trained. The sniper participates intimately in the distance-time-weight linearity of warfare. Most of his activity is movement to the place where he can take a shot, and his art consists of being able to take that shot against a superior unit and be able to escape. The sniper, even as an individual weapon system, must understand and obey the constraints of the operational equation expressed by Maguire. Judging distance is one of the sniper's staple skills.

Explosions are almost exactly not sniping. Their use does not require that the eyes of an emotionally responsive human watch the detonation and effect. The user of explosives can treat the mathematic of operational art differently (being able to begin part of his escape before the detonation), and the moral weight of using explosives is distinct as well. The same professional officer who might eschew the use of snipers due to moral sensibilities might have to reject the landmine outright. In fact, many armies have all but rejected the use of landmines, but still employ snipers.

Because it is such an integral part of a sniper's art that he blend into his surrounding environment, the concepts *sniper* and *spy* begin to converge, at least in urban settings. When snipers are used by an insurgent force, the government might successfully label them simple assassins or murderers.

It is an advantage in irregular war to enjoy superiority in effective, disciplined shooters. That advantage will grow stronger as armed drones become cheap if not ubiquitous. Leaders in an irregular war should make the status and employment of snipers an issue of direct attention. At some point, influenced by law and diplomacy, a sniper becomes an assassin -- immunity becomes impunity. My advice is that you not become a shooter yourself if you cannot count on your boss to protect you from everyone else's punishments.

Please see sections: 6, *The Operational Equation*; 35, *Comuna 13*; 82, *Conflict Thresholds*; 1, *Impunity*; 115, *Academies*; 123, *Sea and Aerospace Power*; 136, *Weapons*; and 24, *Ruthlessness and Resolve*.



Vasilli: In the forest, the wolf lives for three years and the donkey for nine.

Tania: That must be a proverb from the Urals, it makes no sense to me.

Vasilli: The donkey lives longer because he's more useful.

Tania: There aren't any donkeys in the forest, you made it up.

from the movie

Enemy at the Gates (2001)[[383](#)]



Ludwig: Tell me, Mr. Papshmir, in all the world, who is the most effective assassin?

Papshmir: Well, I would think anyone who manages to conceal his identity as an assassin.

Ludwig: Yes, but there is even a more ideal assassin - one who doesn't *know* he's an assassin.

from the movie

*The Naked Gun: From the Files
of Police Squad!* (1988)[[384](#)]



No God, no master

Section 134, Luigi Galleani

Luigi Galleani was born in Italy around 1861, became an anarchist in his teens and moved to the United States in 1901 still practicing and preaching anarchy. He did not come to America to seek a better life or to pursue the American dream. He was a violent communist radical who came to the United States because he could. Other places could repress the vocal anarchist too easily or had already kicked him out. A lead character in the history of American terrorism, he is an apt biographical focal point for the purposes of this book. Luigi learned the physical operational imperatives of rebellion and how ideology could both support and offend those imperatives. Always in trouble with the law or a fugitive (he had to escape from an Italian prison in order to emigrate), he was never convicted of a serious crime in the United States. The feds exported him back to Italy in the wake of the 1919 'Red Scare' bombing spree for having promoted the violent overthrow of the United States government.

Luigi was educated, articulate and charismatic. He published a widely circulated booklet on how to make bombs, and a newsletter encouraging 'propaganda by the deed'. One of his mistakes was to let the feds get the mailing addresses of his newsletter recipients during a raid, opening up a number of avenues of investigation and thereby compromising quite a few of his followers. He also made some technical mistakes that blew up a couple of his bomb-makers. Luigi was smart enough not to do the bombing himself.

Two of Luigi's anarchist soldiers, also immigrants, were Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Nicola and Bartolomeo were arrested for murder in 1920 and executed in 1927. Various aspects of their drama are relevant today, bearing as they do on the continuing emotional, philosophical, and political controversy about the relationship of America to the meaning of life. Luigi, too, had been arrested and tried for incitement to riot, but that jury found the prosecution's case inadequate, acquitted him, and the case never became part of popular lore.

For some people, the story of Sacco and Vanzetti is about American hypocrisy... an emblem of the injustices heaped on immigrants as an outgrowth of systemic racism... an epic but woefully common tale of American exceptionalism gone unfulfilled. Galleani's name graces the title to this section, rather than 'Sacco and Vanzetti', in order to underline operational matters like keeping secrets, impunity, the line of retreat, and the central importance of the guy with the *mens rea*. I also wanted to place the Sacco and Vanzetti saga in a context of identity, sovereignty, and legitimacy. Nicola and Bartolomeo were members of Luigi's violent organization, an organization that funded itself through robbery, used explosives to terrorize and project its presence, and sustained itself within an ethnic geography.

Unlike 'normal' bank robbery or murder defendants, Sacco and Vanzetti received high caliber, expensive, and extensive defense counsel. Their status as anarchists and leftist radicals attracted support and solidarity not only in emotional or ideological terms, but in funding and publicity. The support was from a movement within which the lives of Nicola and Bartolomeo were perhaps valued little more than the victims of their bombings. They may not have committed the murders for which they were arrested and tried. The jury may have found them guilty for crimes they did commit, but for which they were not arrested and tried. Their lawyer, a famed socialist defense attorney, built their defense around their being anarchists – that they were unable to get a fair trial because of public prejudice against their political views. The defense also adverted a parallel theme of generalized injustice inherent in the capitalist system. That utilization helped vault the case onto the world's imagination. Making the case about political blindness and social justice (rather than about a crime) worked, but it might have cost Nicola and Bartolomeo their lives. The probable intellectual author, the *mens rea* guy, died in Italy in 1931 of diabetes or some related complication.

A couple of decades later, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg couriered secrets from Los Alamos Laboratories to the Soviets, accelerating Russian development of their atom bomb. Sacco and Vanzetti had been tried in the shadow of, but not under the authority of the 1917 Espionage Act, but the Rosenbergs were the first to be executed as spies. Their indictment and trial was for decades a controversial *cause célèbre* whose ledger of ideological positions and proponents read much like those of the Sacco and Vanzetti case. Many commentators the world over would reference the Rosenbergs' fate as an example of a failed social system that had responded to unfounded fear and to ethnic prejudice. For decades, the Rosenbergs' innocence was proclaimed and their execution denounced by left-leaning intellectuals. Ideology aside, it is now beyond reasonable doubt that the Rosenbergs committed the acts for which they were convicted, although public clarification would not come for a half-century after the events – after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This clarification came with the exposure of the 'Venona files'.

The 'Venona files' is the informal name given to a body of declassified or otherwise uncovered Cold War intelligence files from both the United States and the former Soviet Union. (Several good book titles cover their contents and revelations.) In short, the Venona files not only proved that the Rosenbergs were guilty as charged, the files radically changed the historical record regarding the second 'Red Scare' of the 1950s. The Venona files are nevertheless ineffable in many history and social science departments on campuses today. Few bumps in historiography are so discomfiting to the ideological left. The Venona files say, indirectly, that using the word 'McCarthyism' to mean 'political witch hunt' is merely a semantic souvenir of a politicized misread of the actual events.

Senator Joe McCarthy, who became obsessed by what he saw as secret Communist infiltration into American public life, was a delusional paranoid, and many of his accusations were demagogic and unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, his paranoia fed off a basis of facts. The Communist penetration may have been almost as bad as he imagined. There *had* been an extensive secret Soviet Communist penetration into American public life. Having this fact intoned today, much less read aloud, is anathema to the post-structuralist worldview currently fashionable in US academe. That worldview would have the Rosenbergs (as with Sacco and Vanzetti) remain iconic victims of an unjust society, rather than what they were in *deed*: small criminal perpetrators.

Rebels and revolutionaries can be founders of nations, but they have to win. Often pawns of a more cunning and ruthless leader, their personal retreat to sanctuary might not be as well secured as that of their masters. Fortunately or not, honor for the rebel soldier, or at least pity for him as a victim, can be preserved for years, even in the face of the best evidence.

Please see sections: 22, *Badassoftheweek.com*; 8, *Linearity and the Line of Retreat*; 17, *Keeping Secrets*; 101, *Magical Realism*; 50, *U.S. Persons*; 131, *Is It an Insurgency*; 72, *Land Strategy*; and 23, *Mens Rea*.



Q. Why do anarchists drink herbal tea?

A. Because proper tea is theft.

from The Daily Cocktail,

Anarchist Lightbulb Jokes [385]



“Anarchists, Unite!”



Section 135, Borders and Anarchism

If we could map that space in the ideological firmament where anarchism and libertarianism roam about, the resulting image would be finely parsed, irregular, with overlapping territories of thought. A Venn diagram of anarchism, libertarianism, and individualism must show a tight overlap, with violence but a sliver of the whole. But because there are and have been violent ‘propagandists of the deed’ who loudly call themselves anarchists; and because these kinds of anarchists are staple characters in irregular wars, we are compelled to address *anarchy’s* unshakable connotation of violence. Due to my laziness in the face of convention, I throw violent anarchism in with its more peaceful shades. Most folk who call themselves libertarians, at least, are peaceable. The hard-core anarchist could have little regard for *regular* war, since he would have little regard for government. He would likewise have little regard for mapped boundaries in general. The libertarian (accepting that there are a hundred flavors, few of whom want a label) might like boundaries and still not care much for either regular or irregular war.

This year, at least one Kansas school district reconsidered the eternal question pitting at-large against by-territory representation to a school board. The president of the board felt that some of the communities’ representatives were obstructionist, and that, those being communities with a small percentage of the school-age children, should not have the power to block what she felt the majority of the citizens in the district wanted. Indeed, the territorial delineation of constituencies can seem artificial (gerrymandered) -- drawn by those who in some inconsequential moment hold the power to map out the represented geographical subdivisions. The spacing of representation becomes the enemy of pure democracy, allowing voters in some spaces to wield what looks to be a more influential vote than the one exercised by voters from other spaces. Gerrymandering becomes the rejection of ‘one-man/one-vote’. Place identity and place-representation become anathema to pure democracy. It is historically poetic that it be a Kansas school board, since Kansas was born of the same phenomenon at a different scale. Pre-Civil War southern states wanted to assure that whenever any new free state came into the union, so would a slave state, thereby maintaining a balance of representation in the Senate. Balance in the Senate meant that no legislative bill outlawing slavery throughout the United States would pass out of Congress. The population in the North was growing more quickly than in the South, and everyone could count. The obvious demographic trend made slave-state fears quite reasonable. Without the brake of geographic representation, slavery eventually would be voted out.

I mention this American representation-by-space example because all federalism versus anti-federalism ideological battle is geography-centric, with place identity and locale prominent in the formulation of arguments. Other ideological currents can be proselytized without so much as a mention of where-the-heck anyone is from. (Workers of the World, Unite!) Our 18th century founding fathers, for whom a vast expanse of coveted new territory became an immediate practical concern, could hardly have contemplated a scheme for distributing power that did not involve location, space, and distance. In an age before electronics, even their begrudged concessions to electoral democracy formed around the amount of time it might take a representative legislator to travel. The founders wanted to translate abstract notions of civil and human rights into practical applications and (as with *habeas corpus*) those practical solutions included territorial specificity.

If we wish to carry things to their extreme (of course we do) we see that perfect geographic specificity could bring us right back to perfect individualism. If we could specify our personal location, our own square foot, as the basic unit of political geography, we could have a perfect democracy in which place and personal identity were one-in-the-same. It seems as though we could almost do that today with our cell phones. Our place identity would be exactly the place occupied by just our own body at a moment in time. Which brings us back to anarchy. Anarchy tends toward the perfection of individualism and so, for an instant at least, anarchism likes perfect democracy because it likes individual identity and individual power. Anarchism has a hard time finding the *we* in *team*, however. Anarchism would rather not represent or be represented by location. Naturally, it even less likes anyone telling others what to do, so while it might tactically prefer an at-large vote, it would prefer no vote at all, because voting for anything almost always means giving up power.

Anarchism does play well in the federalism/antifederalism sandbox because anarchism does not want to link itself with all those inside any territory, or to pit one territory against another, or to draw territories on maps. As an historical tendency, anarchists are tolerant of being included in a non-territorial collective identity when that identity is ample, like ‘workers’, but then the anarchists torque when some nucleus of some vanguard claims to be their agent and nanny. Anarchism runs afoul of bolshevism, given that the bolshies so enjoy being in charge.

Anarchism, or the intellectual fascination for perfecting power in the individual, poorly considers geographic movement of that power. Anytime a perfectly empowered individual were to move, he would almost necessarily take his power into the space of another, inciting thereby a territorial challenge. Anarchy is tantamount to cronic trespass. Pure democracy (perfect individual representation) could devolve to anarchy if individuals were allowed to just roam about exercising all that represented power.

Recognize the scale and balance of geographic vs non-geographic power in your irregular war. You may be able to ameliorate or change one set of identities or the other -- changing the territorial boundaries of place representation, membership or definition of the collectives, or the details of power available through representation. You won’t be able to do this if you don’t see the phenomenon. Religion, family, language -- there are numerous non-geographical identities that are partially geographical. In every case try to know the difference and to nest or overlap place vs non-place identity where appropriate.

Please see sections: 49, *Territorial Scrutiny*; 126, *Particularization of Power*; 143, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*; 53, *Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis*; 104, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*; 118, *Democracy*; 81, *What a Clergy Wants*; and 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*.



Event: An anarchist throws a bomb into a Paris kitchen.

Outcome: Linoleum Blownaparte.



“...I admire all nations and hate all governments, and nowhere is my natural anarchism more aroused than at national borders.... I have never smuggled anything in my life. Why, then, do I feel an uneasy sense of guilt on approaching a customs barrier?”[\[386\]](#)

John Steinbeck,
Travels with Charley: in Search of America



Section 136, Weapons

This book is about armed conflict. We do have violent, organized competition without weapons, but it's called rugby. We can every once in a while stage a big punch up, monkey-style, but over time humans have continually improved their weapons, and this improvement occasionally changes the balance of who is likely to dominate and who is likely to submit.

The cannon is a major historical accomplishment. Its composing innovations accreted over a long time, so maybe it was never revolutionary, but it was at least transformational. It is hard to make an arrest with cannon, though, and the people who use cannon don't usually watch their effect in real time. You can extort with cannon, however. The use of artillery can mark a usable threshold between what is 'police' and what is 'military'. In military combat we know that artillery is fearfully effective against infantrymen (soldiers who can't fly and have no armor worth bragging about). Some soldiers think they are called infantrymen because 'cannon fodder' is insensitive. A common mistake in irregular conflicts is for infantrymen to think there won't be artillery or that enemy planes won't see them.

In terms of accountability and impunity the most un-artillery firearm is the pistol. A person has to be pretty close to the target to use a pistol, so the emotional investment and the quantity of resolve needed to use a pistol is much different than for a cannon or an aerial drone. However, another weapon that seems dissimilar to artillery, the landmine (or, more broadly, the explosive device or artifact), is closer to artillery on the plane of accountability. No one tries to make an arrest with a landmine. Explosives are often used for pure intimidation or for making logistics more expensive and causing an overall increase in the costs of an enemy's operations due to force- and population-protection concerns. However, landmines can also be the backbone weapon for a military operational plan that adheres to a vision of aggregated tactics as described in Section 139. The landmine can be used to change the relative risk distances of pursuers and pursued, especially in terrain that offers a number of constrictions to movement. If any single weapon or thing has contributed to the longevity of the Colombian FARC, for instance, it would be the cottage industry landmine. If you, as an insurgent, can make it seem morally unjustifiable for the government to use artillery, but still morally justifiable for you to use landmines, you gain some operational advantage.

Lately, inventors have been accelerating efforts to develop nonlethal but incapacitating weapons. Water cannons work, but one has to carry a lot of water. Among the best of the new breed is a sound gun from American Technology Corporation that has seen extensive service in Iraq. Although it is a bit heavy and clumsy, it can make people unbearably uncomfortable and yet do them little permanent harm (relatively speaking). Like any weapon, people will find ways to neutralize or minimize it, but the sound gun is the kind of thing that can change the balance of advantages in situations such as a roadblock, building takeover, or port occupation. One of the key advantages that government can have in irregular war map algebra is the capacity to invent expensive new weapons. Nonlethal choices can change contested geographies, and change the utility of using certain classes of participants (like small dissent groups populating street barriers). The sound gun or one of its relatives might turn out to be as transformational as the armed aerial vehicle. The nonlethal weapons *can* help make arrests.

Having stated the advantages of new non-lethal weapons, new lethal weapons, like the XM25 airburst shoot-to-behind walls firearm, will likely be seen to have delivered an appreciable combat advantage during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most transformational weapon to come out of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, is the armed aerial drone (in some documents called the *weaponized UAV*). The drones are typically equipped with television cameras and electronic sights. Finally, the killer is watching the kill at a cold distance. The difference is enormous, even if, like many changes, including the indifference, it has not yet been fully felt. The armed drone is a big new number in the irregular war map algebra. Think about the basic strategy move in Section 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints* and how drones could change the game math. Just following the enemy is a good deal, but being able to bring fire on him is a whole different thing. The drone brings airpower to smaller, messier conflicts. The thing is, the drone is soon going to cause a sea change in what it takes to secure aerial dominance. Lots of countries can make effective little drones and make them a lot cheaper than the ones the US is in love with these days, like the Predator.

Meanwhile, folk who would never think of throwing on a ruck (so they can sweat their whatevers off walking sixty miles to kill someone) will nevertheless bring death after they set their coffee mugs over to the side of the monitor so they can take some time-in to shoot someone in the face from two thousand miles away. You can't help but wonder if the guy with the ruck gets the same color medal. No ghillie suits, no crawling into a hide, just a couple of spreadsheet entries.

The real problem isn't the medal, (although the cheapening of valor is no weightless matter), it's the impunity -- who grants it and who gets it. The boss is in the room, the machines will tell the forensic investigator who is making the kill decisions, and there is no reason not to keep records, except, of course, to provide impunity. If the enter key pusher is not identified, the hierarchy still will be, so leadership will perhaps be increasingly held accountable when a drone kills non-soldier-looking types.

The Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum website stated:

The US military began experimenting with unmanned aircraft as early as World War I. By World War II, unmanned craft could be controlled by radio signals, usually from another aircraft. Vehicles that could return from a mission and be recovered appeared in the late 1950s [\[387\]](#)

The US Air Force could have had effective operational drones flying decades ago, but doing so would have meant a radical change in the organizational culture of the Air Force. The alpha male Air Force officer, the guy who goes on to be a general, had, for the most part, to have been a fighter or bomber pilot. Seeing a technology that suggested a new and less athletic pathway to those prime jobs presented an unwelcome challenge. For decades it was virtual Air Force treason to mention the damn things, much less fund programs to develop them. Now the argument is long buried. Solid circuits don't worry about and aren't limited by the pressure of sharp turns or by fatigue. What we don't yet know is if the preferred path to generalship will someday run through the *remote fliers'* toggle-of-death. We can rest assured that cognitive dissonance will cause air forces everywhere to make awkward decisions as they try to maintain their institutional niches.

Section 6 applies the late nineteenth century observations of a lawyer and historian named Maguire. That era and Maguire's math are relevant partly because his synthesis about military strategy was made just before the advent of the airplane and the changes the airplane wrought in military thinking and practice. The Wright Brothers seemed to make many of the old rules of operational strategy go away and, in fact, the airplane did change the calculus. Lines of communication could be threatened from new angles as well as new speeds. Moreover, in situations where it was hard to achieve victory by applying the classic methods (to overcome his lines of supply and retreat or defeat him in open battle) the airplane made it easier to apply the main strategic alternative, extortion. If you didn't have the patience or wherewithal to beat your enemy by position and maneuver, you could perhaps place what was most valuable to him in mortal danger.

The armed drone may force a similar if not as grand an adjustment in military operational math. In irregular war, airpower has perhaps had its greatest effect through changing relative risk distances (especially the helicopter), mostly moving government troops well beyond what would have been the limits of their prudent distances. The drone does something similar, enlarging the geographies of possible points of contact without the same risk to the attacker, and at a much lower price. The math of risk distances, correlations of force and the geometry of lines of retreat is again being adjusted.

Furthermore, with drones the changes wrought to operational math do not so uniquely benefit government forces as they do with the helicopter.


Considering the new arrays of technology, we can safely assume that in some conflictive places the use of armed drones will carry special juridical and political consequences. Engagement with an armed drone inside many countries will test the limits of impunity that might be granted to its operators. Hole diggers, TV cameras and international lawyers will be salient features in future irregular wars, but the armed drone is most special. Meanwhile, the violent anarchist, unpersnikety regarding victim classes, need not look to the new technologies. His economies can be satisfied by weapons at hand, like fire and water.

Please see sections: 54, *Extortion*; 82, *Conflict Thresholds*; 123, *Sea and Aerospace Power*; 125, *Human Rights*; 133, *Snipers and Assassins*; 139, *Strategy of Aggregate Tactics*; 27, *'Nonviolent' Action*; and 127, *Between Liberty and Lawrence*.



“The only person who could miss with this gun
is the sucker with the bread to buy it.”

Peter in the movie
Dawn of the Dead (1978)[[388](#)]



“Now if there's one thing you can be sure of, it's that nothing is more powerful than a young boy's wish. Except an Apache helicopter. An Apache helicopter has machine guns *and* missiles. It is an unbelievably impressive complement of weaponry, an absolute death machine.”

Narrator in the movie
Ted (2012)[[389](#)]



Insurgencies are international conflicts

Section 137, Foreign Support and Foreign Perspective

Foreign Support:

An insurgent or separatist is more likely to win with foreign support than without it. We can go a step farther, however and say that there are no wholly internal conflicts. Ok, there are probably a few, but the proposition is strong enough to switch the burden of proof onto those who would argue that anti-State armed groups (or at least those that last any appreciable amount of time) ever succeed without foreign support. So are these, then, not international wars?

Even if a foreign government does not support an insurgency directly or openly, it can lend a blind eye to movement into and through its territory, allow the issuance of false passports, vote in favor of international recognition, block international police investigations, etc. This accessorial behavior is probably the most common form of effective support and it relates directly to one of the principle themes of this book – the significance of lines of communication, especially the line of escape to sanctuary. Because the line of retreat to sanctuary is a central geographic feature of military strategy, any time those lines pass into or through a foreign country, and that country abets or remains indifferent, it is effectively an accessory and participant in the war. It behooves insurgents to diminish the importance of lines of communication in their public arguments and propaganda, so as to deflect attention from them. Instead, they highlight the importance of psychological, political and socioeconomic factors. The insurgent rarely wants to have light shined on the classic military dimension of the war: his lines of communication.

Foreign countries also often facilitate insurgent finances and fiscal anonymity. Moving, storing and converting money is essential to the longevity and success of insurgent and criminal leaders. In the case of the FARC, some countries have found it in their best interests to appreciate the FARC as a legitimate social movement in order to perpetuate a lucrative banking service, giving the FARC asset liquidity and forensic security for many years. If foreign banks had revealed FARC finances years ago, the damage such transparency would have done to FARC logistical strength might have been far greater than the damage done by killing coca plants.

In May 2008, the government of Colombia attacked a FARC camp across the Colombian border a couple of miles into Ecuadoran territory. Aerial bombs not only killed Louis Devia (Raúl Reyes), a principal leader of the FARC, they also opened a can of geopolitical worms. It appeared convenient to the government of Ecuador, spurred on by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez to call the incident an international invasion of Ecuador by Colombia. Ecuador had either been allowing or hosting the presence of FARC camps on its territory for some time. Maybe an aggressive diplomatic offensive seemed to the Ecuadoran government the best defense against accusation of being a surreptitious ally of the FARC and, therefore, complicit in illicit drug trade and terrorism. The opportunistic approach of the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan regimes to the armed struggle inside Colombia is typical, but foreign support comes in more forms than just direct surreptitious government aid to insurgents. A short list of types of foreign support to supposedly internal conflicts might look as follows:

1. from a foreign government to a government suffering some challenge from an insurgent, separatist, etc., movement;
2. from IOs to a government or to anti-government forces;
3. from NGOs to a government or to anti-government forces or to movement elements;
4. from foreign individual volunteers, whose presence is facilitated/encouraged by a foreign government, IO or NGO;
5. independent voluntary participation by foreign individuals in government forces or in anti-government forces;
6. assistance, usually financial, from international corporations to government or anti-government forces or movement elements.
7. from international or transnational criminal organizations to government or anti-government forces.

Because the consequences of exposing and declaring an international conflict seem both unpredictable and vast, governments prefer to maintain diplomatic fictions regarding the international character of armed conflicts that are supposed to be 'not of an international character'. What you don't want to do is fool yourself regarding the geographies of the lines of retreat, supply, finance, recruiting and diplomacy. This book is especially about operational art and, as such, it focuses on the geography of the lines of communication, and especially lines of retreat to sanctuary. If the Mexican government gives refuge to Guatemalan insurgents or just gives a blind eye to insurgent presence in Mexican territory, it is very unlikely that the Guatemalan government can muster enough power to conclude the war entirely on its own terms. If the Indian government denies sanctuary to the Tamil Tigers, but instead helps the Sri Lankan government prevent their escape, then the Sri Lankan government has a chance to win big militarily.

Foreign Perspectives:

Most relevant foreign perspectives are manifested in foreign languages. It is unreasonable to suggest that foreign viewpoints, analyses, perspectives, and decision paths can be discovered in one's own planning and decision-making language. Americans especially are notorious for incapacity in foreign languages, and weakness in foreign languages makes gathering and absorbing foreign perspectives difficult. You are not likely to dominate in an irregular armed conflict inside a foreign land (whoever the supposed enemy or partners) if the languages of that nation are not mastered by a sufficient number of key people in your force.

It can be an indicator of a knowledge weakness if your default source for gaining knowledge of foreign perspectives is the formal country-to-country diplomatic channels. In a world of varied, massive, instantaneous and open information flows, various actors and interests can manipulate the formal diplomatic messaging. Anyway, diplomats are in charge of diplomatic fiction. Many strategists believe strategy and deception are synonymous and that strategy and stratagem cannot be far apart. As a starting rubric, it is best to consider all irregular wars international and that all diplomats will believe they have something to hide and something to gain by lying at some point. In addition, if you are limited to the use of local interpreters, you will face the problem of the interpreters' tendency to filter and adjust communications in accordance with the interpreter's own agenda, perspectives, goals, fears, and foibles.

Matt Stein offers this paragraph about neighborhoods and local cultural diplomatic norms. In early 2010, a dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan caused rail traffic to be delayed between the two countries. The dispute was over the building by the Tajiks of the Roghun Dam on the Vakhsh River in central Tajikistan. The dam would interrupt water flow to Uzbek agriculture downstream. In southern Uzbekistan, the Uzbeks held up a few thousand rail cars destined for Tajikistan, 300 of which were non-lethal cargo bound for forces in Afghanistan on NATO's Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Eventually, the train cars were allowed through. NATO had established the NDN because of delays and losses of supplies coming via Pakistan. The NDN handled an estimated 40 percent of non-lethal supplies for forces in Afghanistan. The Uzbek government, as in the region typically, tends to shut down its country's borders as a first security reaction. Later in 2010, violence broke out in Kyrgyzstan, to Uzbekistan's east, lasting almost a week before Kyrgyz police and security forces restored order. Uzbekistan first allowed 75,000 refugees to enter but closed and reinforced its border to stop the violence. The transnational movement of supplies seemed permanently vulnerable to instinctive government policy reactions.

Among the surest investments you can make in advance of anticipated irregular armed challenges is to increase capacity in relevant foreign languages. There are few irrelevant foreign languages. The anthropologists' attitude is valuable in this. They tend to think small. It isn't enough for them to know that in Guatemala they speak Spanish. They recognize that in Purulhá, Guatemala, Spanish may be the second language. If you are planning to meddle in the problems of a foreign place and you aren't sure you even know the locale's principal language, you're traipsing close to the edge of cross-

cultural disaster. Start out a campaign profoundly ignorant of cultural basics and you will concede the weight of those key factors to your enemy. Foreign support is always at risk of foreign misunderstanding. Another investment to make in anticipation of some internal conflict is to study the neighboring countries. It will be the rarest of irregular wars, or at least the rarest of irregular wars that anybody in Kansas will worry about, that involves only one country and not its whole neighborhood.

Please see sections: 13, *Puthukkudiyirippu*; 61, *The Geography of Dope*; 113, *Unrestricted Chi Whiz*; 19, *Mercatus*; 68, *Scale*; 52, *Sovereignty*; 107, *Condottieri*; and 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*.



“I learned that Japan was a weird foreign country that was for some reason under almost constant attack by giant mutated creatures. Godzilla was the most famous one, of course, but there were also hyperthyroid pterodactyls, spiders, etc., all of which regularly barged into Tokyo and committed acts of mass destruction.”[\[390\]](#)

Dave Barry



“[Hugo Chávez] is one of the most important forces we have had on this planet...”[\[391\]](#)

Sean Penn



Get in and get out

Section 138, Raids

In August 1976, the Rhodesian Selous Scouts raided a large guerrilla training camp in Mozambique that belonged to the ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army) insurgents, who were trying to replace the government of Rhodesia. The Scouts entered the ZANLA camp dressed and equipped as ZANLA fighters at a time when the garrison was celebrating and many of the ZANLA troops were in parade formation. The raiders killed more than 1000 ZANLA fighters and wounded many more. The Scouts were then able to return to their base having only suffered four wounded, making it the most successful attack of the Rhodesian insurgent war and one of the most daring and impressive raids in military history. Although the Scouts entered enemy sanctuary and greatly damaged ZANLA morale and strength, the raid was decisive of nothing. The Rhodesian military was far too small for the territory it had to control; it had almost no operational or strategic concept; and the ultimate goal for which it fought (minority apartheid rule) was unsustainable. In 1980, Rhodesia ceased to exist. A ZANLA leader, Robert Mugabe, is today the country's dictator.

During the American Civil War, Union General Ormsby Mitchel and Union spy James J. Andrews devised a plan to infiltrate a group of volunteer soldiers into Georgia for the purpose of stealing a locomotive in Atlanta and driving it northwest toward Chattanooga, destroying track and bridges behind it. General Mitchel was planning to move on Huntsville, Alabama then go east to take Chattanooga. His plan depended on blocking the Confederates from quickly moving a superior force up from Atlanta. The raiders, dressed in civilian clothes and led by Mr. Andrews, took the train and proceeded north, followed by an amazingly resolute and resourceful Georgian train conductor. The raid ultimately failed and the Confederates hung Andrews in Atlanta as a spy, but a number of the volunteers survived and for their daring were the first to be awarded a new medal, the Medal of Honor.

In late 2007 or early 2008, Luis Devia, a senior member of the FARC Secretariat and, at the time, commander of military and logistics operations in southern Colombia, established a major FARC headquarters about 1,800 meters inside Ecuadoran territory south of the Putumayo River and east of the artificial international boundary traced along the 76 degree 20 minutes West longitude. From the FARC headquarters it was a short march south to roads leading to Nueva Loja (which was the hub of FARC rear area operations inside Ecuador) or to the San Miguel River that traces the Colombian-Ecuadoran border to the west. By late February, 2008 the Colombian government had unified enough information from technical and human sources to pinpoint Devia's installation. Aside from killing Devia, the raid netted a treasure trove of intelligence information found in digital files at the camp. About twenty other guerrillas and one soldier, Carlos Hernández León, also died during the operation. According to some reports, Devia probably died bleeding out after he stepped on a FARC landmine as he ran from the air bombardment. The raid into Ecuadoran territory caused a bit of an international row given that the Ecuadoran president was an ally of Venezuelan Hugo Chávez and presumptively of the FARC, but the military advantage gained by the Colombian government as a result of Operation Fénix was immense. Capture of the FARC rosters led to numerous indictments and arrests, induced defections and put many of the FARC fronts in southern Colombia on their heels.

In February 1942, a joint British army and navy force mounted a raid to recover electrical components from a German radar station on the French coast at Bruneval. About 120 parachutists from the Scottish Black Watch, Cameron Highlanders, King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the Seaforth's regiments jumped into France a few miles from the German radar site. Amid some confusion and against energetic but tardy resistance, the raiders absconded with the radar equipment, were picked up by the Royal Navy and made it back to England. Two British soldiers died in the operation, but the British gained considerable useful knowledge through technical exploitation of the apparatus. An officer named John Dutton Frost, then a major, led the raid. He would go on to lead other raids, successful and unsuccessful, most famously taking the 'bridge too far' at Arnhem. There, although the allies could not hold the bridge, Colonel Frost led one of the most gallant and stubborn stands in the gallant and stubborn vein of British military history. Out of bullets, surrounded, captured and imprisoned by the Germans, he survived and was freed when the US Army arrived. Leading many raids and earning many medals, Colonel Frost's march of achievements was sparked when R.V. Jones' team of eggheads noticed something they thought to be rare and dangerous on some overhead photographs of the coast of France.

In 1978, the 31st of December fell on a Sunday. Good time for a robbery. That day, having completed an 80-foot tunnel under an adjoining street, operatives of the guerrilla group M-19 broke into the arms rooms of a military depot in northern Bogotá known as *Cantón Norte*. The group had been planning the action since before their kidnapping of Sears executive Donald Cooper, for which they garnered a substantial ransom. They applied the money to the purchase of a legitimate business and, with the profits and liquidity from that, they helped an accomplice buy a house across the street from the armory. While the accomplice lived there with his family, leading a seemingly normal family life, a platoon of guerrillas began digging -- and dug for almost three months -- sneaking all the dirt out at night in plastic bags. It was as though they were trying to escape from a POW camp, but no. On the 30th they were ready to break in under the floor of the arms room, and on New Year's Eve took out the first few rifles. On New Year's Day they removed 5,700, the army not becoming aware until the next day, January 2nd. If the M-19 can be criticized for any particular shortcoming in their planning, it is for having failed to plan adequately for success. They did not do sufficient planning for getting away with the rifles, didn't plan an escape with so much weight. The government recovered almost all of the rifles within weeks, but even though the guerrillas didn't get to distribute the weapons to their troops, the propagandistic value was huge. The raid sealed the M-19's reputation as a creative, daring foe and made the Colombian army look inept.

A lot of famous events carry the name 'raid'. The rescue at Entebbe, the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, the Son Tay Raid to free POWs in Vietnam, Sir Walter Scott's raid on Carlisle Castle in 1596 to free Kinnmont Willy Armstrong, the 2008 Colombian *Jaque* raid to free FARC hostages, the 2011 raid on Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden, and so on. The five raids summarized above (against the ZANLA, the Confederacy, the FARC, Fortress Europa, and a Bogotá armory) have almost no common denominator aside from daring and tightly defined missions. Their mission definitions were tightened by the absence of any intention to take and hold ground. Something was to be achieved, after which the force would return home.

Raids rarely unfold just as planned, and many are costly failures. The raid ordered by President Jimmy Carter to rescue American hostages held in Tehran in 1979 is popularly known as *Desert One*, after the location of the disastrous plane crash that ended the mission. In 1993, President Bill Clinton's order to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid led to what we remember as the Battle of Mogadishu, or *Blackhawk Down*. To call such operations high risk is understatement, not hyperbole, and the events are often more dramatic than a fiction writer could hope to devise. The best planners of the best raids are acutely aware of T. Miller Maguire's equation. They worry over the withdrawal. In this light, the First Gulf War was a raid, not an invasion. The US government had no desire or intention to take the capital of Iraq, or to stay and occupy anything. The point was made and goodbye. There was an exit strategy.

Please see sections: 10, *Decisive Battle*; 140, *Risk Distance and the Pursuit*; 5, *Vocabulary of Classic Strategy*; 114, *R.V. Jones*; 28, *Takeovers and Sieges*; 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; and 115, *Academies*.




William Campbell: What do we tell the Johnny Rebs when they ask who we are and where we're from?

James J. Andrews: Tell them you're Kentuckians escaping the rule of the Yankees to join a Southern regiment. If they press you closely, tell 'em you hail from Fleming County, Kentucky. I'm from Flemingsburg myself. No man from that county has ever joined the Southern army... As for you, Mr. Buffum, it might be wiser if you didn't speak at all. I never met a Kentuckian so plainly from Massachusetts.

from the movie,

The Great Locomotive Chase (1956)[\[392\]](#)



“Get to the Choppah!”

Dutch in the movie

Predator (1987)[\[393\]](#)



“Okay. So we take ze money you haf on you, und ve calls it eefen.”

A Nihilist in the movie,

The Big Lebowski (1998)[\[394\]](#)



A thousand knives for a thousand cuts

Section 139, Strategy of Aggregate Tactics

There exists a peculiar and influential protocol in today's military strategy teaching. It is a hierarchical concept about 'levels' of war formed of the terms 'Tactical', 'Operational', and 'Strategic'. Generally speaking, and with too many exceptions and arguments to bother with here, 'tactical' refers to the battle or physical engagement of enemies; 'operational' (often 'operational art') refers to movement to battle and position, and strategic refers to decisions about who the enemy is, how the whole force will be generated, and about the distribution of resources among elements of the force. The three terms also generally represent a scale of decision consequences. That is to say, according to convention, a solid strategy can survive an operational error, sound operational art can survive some failed tactics -- but the reverse is rarely true -- the best tactics rarely survive poor operational decisions nor the best operational plans survive invalid strategy.

Although the conventional logic of hierarchical consequence can be stated in sentence form, the three supposed levels of activity and decision are actually intimately interrelated. There is no magic in the terminology and, while the usual sequence of importance goes tactical-operational-strategic, even this is not always so. Some writers hold that when a general cannot succeed at tactics he is forced to resort to strategy, *strategy* meaning *stratagem* or *deception*. In short, don't worry over the word soup made by this troika; the terms gain their meaning in context. Besides, writers will at times combine or hyphenate (like 'operational strategy') or throw in adjectival wrenches like 'grand' strategy or another level, like 'policy'. These usages don't translate well across historical periods or to other languages, and often have more to do with who is in charge of whom and less with what to do where. Some American doctrinites will insist upon a linguistic discipline holding tactics to be everything done below the corps. Webster's 10th Collegiate does not have the same definition of *strategy* as Webster's 1st Collegiate, and yet they are both valid.

Success in organized armed struggles can depend on decisions that improve the likelihood of success of many subordinates and supporters during their contacts with the opposition. The decision to use a rifle with a 5.56mm bore rather than one of 7.62mm was clearly a 'strategic' decision, even though the rifle is an essentially tactical apparatus, and no specific campaign or single decisive battle was envisioned when the decision was taken to choose one caliber over another. The decision determined manufacturing processes, the selection of manufacturers, the nature of training and training literature, and even affected gendering (since the M16 was manageable by a greater percentage of women than were the larger caliber rifles). Given the nature of irregular wars, senior leaders might never make a decision related to a single strategic event, but still make strategic decisions.

Allowing 'small battles' to mean 'insignificant battles' is part of why some military theorists reject classic principles as they might apply to irregular conflict. Even an insurgent will categorize his small attacks as harassments intended only as deceptions, expressions of presence and defiance, or to attrite or disperse a government force. Such small battles however, are rarely ancillary to or anticipatory of the war effort -- they *are* the war effort. One successful form of master strategy is to recognize the aggregate importance of all the little battles and so seek to make the result of as many as possible decisively favorable. Certainly national leaders will take some diplomatic and informational decisions that influence large identities, like nations or whole populations. Such decisions are clearly 'strategic'. Senior leaders will take other decisions regarding specific, critical contacts with the enemy or about campaigns involving series of combat actions. Those decisions, too, are strategic in level, scope or import. In an internal war, however, most decisions worthy of the adjective 'strategic' anticipate, comprehend, and affect the summed results of many little, even micro, battles which in the aggregate constitute a major outcome.

Colombian FARC leaders recognized decades ago that the land mine was a great leveler of military equations. Each time a landmine shortened a soldier's leg, it shortened the risk distances of all government units trying to pursue FARC guerrilla elements in the aftermath of contact. The most effective mine designs, delivery of components, training in their manufacture and placement, and arming became matters for strategic discussion. Although the United States despised them as 'improvised' explosive devices (IED), they are the weapons that have most allowed the survival of a guerrilla force. They fit the guerrillas' understanding of operational art and, viewing military strategy as an aggregate of small contacts, the FARC leadership made strategic decisions, hardly improvisational, about explosive devices that would be locally fabricated. As homemade as the individual artifacts may be, nothing could have been less improvisational than FARC use of the landmine as a technology for operational art and strategy.

The Colombian military has made many decisions in recent years that address priorities of effort at the national level. For instance, it decided that one of the first efforts after the end of the truce in 2002 had to be the lifting the FARC's encirclement of Bogotá, which the FARC had achieved in order to mount a progressive siege of that city. Where to concentrate forces nationally, where to take risk with economy of force measures, when to take advantage of rare intelligence that involved international risk (such as the later strike into Ecuadoran territory to kill FARC leader Louis Devia), and when to commit precious mobility assets -- these were not 'strategy of tactics in the aggregate' decisions. Nevertheless, many other strategic decisions related to equipment, training, disposition of units, allocations of air transport, or creation of fortified outposts. The Colombian senior leaders made sweeping changes with the understanding that there would be few large battles, but that if subordinate units could win the majority of little battles decisively, the aggregate effect would be more than simple attrition. They sought that, on every occasion practicable, subordinate army units could pursue FARC units successfully when the latter attempted escapes to sanctuary.

Please see sections: 10, *Decisive Battle*; 7, *Sanctuary*; 5, *Vocabulary of Classic Strategy*; 51, *Get Willy*; 63, *Roadblocks and Checkpoints*; 102, *Negotiations*; 129, *Nerd Globe*; and 115, *Academies*.



"From Fort Reno to Fort Apache - from Sheridan to Startle - they were all the same: men in dirty-shirt blue and only a cold page in the history books to mark their passing. But wherever they rode -- and whatever they fought for -- that place became the United States."

Narrator in the movie

She Wore A Yellow Ribbon (1949)[395]



"Success depended 50% on the air part, so much so that the troops, without helicopters, did nothing." [396]

Jineth Bedoya Lima



Section 140, Risk Distance and the Pursuit

Risk distance (or perhaps ‘prudent risk distance’) is the distance to the culminating point, remembering that the *culminating point* is that theoretical point in time and space beyond which it would be imprudent to proceed (with, say, an initiative, including an offensive, attack or pursuit). The term ‘culminating point’ dates back at least to Carl von Clausewitz, the Napoleonic era, and classic strategy. Of all the concepts of classic strategy that have been dismissed in modern writings about insurgency, this may be the one whose absence is most detrimental.

The operational equation counsels aggressive pursuit (because an inferior force that cannot escape runs the risk of ruin). However, if the pursuing force presses beyond its risk distance, the pursued force may turn and counterattack, effect an ambush, or maneuver to cut off the erstwhile pursuer from the pursuer’s own line of retreat. Hence, positional, movement warfare revolves in part around the leaders’ analyses and intuitions regarding relative strength and risk distances.

As a matter of military critique, generals are often discredited who fail to press an opportunity to finish off a weaker force. Some will argue that Meade should have pursued Lee after Gettysburg, for instance. These critiques are always speculative observations of a victory that might have been greater. ‘Monday morning quarterbacking.’ On the other hand, it is pretty clear that a commander did in fact pass that point of too much risk if he was defeated by a counterattack.

The risk distance for a squad in the pursuit depends in part on the amount of water it carries or if it can be easily resupplied with water. Because the human body so needs H₂O, a squad’s leader would at some point be taking too much risk if he were to make his squad continue to move forward beyond the squad’s water supply. In a severely dehydrated state, his soldiers might be subject to heatstroke or to an effective counterattack from a well-watered enemy. If an enemy were to turn and defeat the squad due to its dehydration, we could reasonably say that the defeated leader had taken the squad beyond its risk distance.

The distance to the squad’s culminating point also depends on many other variables. Ammunition and food are other common limiters. Military expressions like ‘water discipline’, ‘fire discipline’ and ‘rationing’ attest. The quality of weaponry, training, morale, and leadership are also contributors to the amount of time and distance before the squad might reach its culminating point. Transportation options also influence the culminating point. The helicopter, for instance, can change the time-distance equation like few other machines.

As previously noted, in many situations landmines can drastically shorten the distances to culminating points. If a member of a squad in pursuit steps on a mine during pursuit of an enemy unit up a mountain trail, not only will the squad be immediately weakened, the leader of that squad along with the leaders of future patrols will feel they must take more precautions and perhaps move more slowly. The squads’ antipipated distance to points in time and space beyond which it seems too risky to precede is reduced just by the threat of the landmine.

Finally (and these are no small points), static or initial locations on the ground affect everyone’s risk distances, and getting somewhere is not the same as getting back. Aircraft and bad planning can take a unit well beyond its culminating point. The French garrison at Dien Bien Phu is an example of a huge violation of the classic principles. The French did not assure that, were they to confront an enemy force with greater strength, their route to sanctuary would be secure. In a sense, they placed themselves beyond their culminating point *ab-initio*. This happened partly because they measured comparative strength poorly, not correctly calculating the effect of distances. Author Jake Tapper describes a similar, smaller, more recent, but perhaps too typical event in *The Outpost*, about a fateful attack on Camp Keating in Afghanistan.

You may ask how risk distance applies to environments in which the location of the enemy is unknown. An insurgent *modus operandi* may be to meld into the population in civilian clothes and disappear on the metro after an action. In such an urban battlefield, insurgents fear a system that checks individual identity when persons enter the train station, or a neighborhood full of people willing and able to report the presence of strangers. Rebel lines of retreat are made insecure to the extent they cannot retain anonymity. Systems that make us all identify ourselves (such as counterfeit-resistant ID cards, a conscription registry requirement, motorbike registration, professional licensing and so on) makes insurgent lines of retreat less secure. Every action the rebel takes is more likely to push him beyond his culminating point. That is, beyond the point in time and space where it is too risky to prudently proceed – to continue beyond his risk-distance. If a government does *not* establish systems that endanger rebel anonymity, the insurgent will likely remain at large, rarely having to risk beyond his culminating point. If a government has any resources at all, however, the insurgent best not talk on the phone or use a credit card.

Why all this about a theoretical point? Because you can design a strategy in such a way that the aggregate of your subunits’ risk distances is advantageous to them, their risk distances extended and the enemy’s shortened. You can also compare the contributions of various seemingly disparate inputs. For instance, you can determine if the purchase of another helicopter is likely to increase the distances to your units’ culminating points to an incrementally greater degree than would improving the training of your unit leaders or building a wall somewhere.

Thinking in terms of risk distances can also help determine rough measures of relative unit effectiveness, the reasonableness of an operational strategy, or the relative advantage of positions. It can aid in understanding why certain places are better for building forts and walls.

Please see sections: 6, *The Operational Equation*; 8, *Linearity and the The Line of Retreat*; 67, *Points, Lines, Spaces*; 11, *Decisive Battle*; 28, *Takeovers and Sieges*; 16, *Presence*; 64, *Measuring Distance and Comparing Power*; and 108, *Your Staff Work Sucks*.



“Next to victory, the act of pursuit is the most important in war.”[\[397\]](#)

Carl von Clausewitz,
Principles of War (1812)



“To Make a Long Story Short:

‘They got away’”[\[398\]](#)

The Adventures of Captain Underpants



Designed to trick, not bludgeon

Section 141, Thirty-six Stratagems

We won't go over all thirty-six. I'm pretty sure some Chinese general (let's say Sun Zhu since everyone else does) told his doctrine guy he wanted thirty-six stratagems. The guy probably came back and said something like, 'Well, Sir, we can only really come up with twenty-eight distinct stratagems, is that OK?' and the general got himself a new doctrine guy. So there are thirty-six stratagems in Wang Xuanming's *Secret Art of War: Thirty-six Stratagems*. He has another book titled *100 Strategies of War* and so, you see, there might be sixty-four of something you can call strategy that are beyond stratagem.

To unwrap the mystery that is Chinese strategic thinking, I depend on Tim Thomas (*The Dragon's Quantum Leap* and other dragon books) and Scott Henderson (*Dark Visitor*) whom I have mentioned elsewhere.

Stratagems of the Chinese government should be less of a concern for you (or at least a narrower category of concern) than the strategies of Chinese; and strategies of Chinese less significant than Chinese strategic thinking. Regardless, Chinese stratagems are the heart of Chinese strategic thought, so much so that strategy without stratagem is hard to conceptualize and is rarely applicable to irregular war. Make noise in the East and attack in the West is perhaps the most basic, but a more encompassing angle is perhaps to say that the idea is to get your opponent to want to do what you want him to do.

The Chinese strategic method is to conceive of a specific action in time and space (the objective dimension), but to influence the opponent's mind (the subjectivity dimension) as the latter might affect the objective world. This is what R. V. Jones talks about in the form of practical jokes – of playing to what people want to think or are programmed to think, but with a purpose: to cause action or inaction at a moment in time and place. It is also at the heart of T. Miller Maguire's prompts regarding operational strategy. He is all about the physical security of the physical line of retreat, for instance, but what he alludes to as the essence of strategy revolves around the mindset of the leaders – their perception of the environment, chances of success and level of resolve – and how to affect those mindsets. Military strategy or operational art do not just happen. The strategy and the decision-making of the strategist are one. So there is no special Eastern magic in Chinese strategic thinking, either traditionally or currently, although it may be that Western strategic thinkers have lost their sense of the essence by denying applicability of the classic operational equation to irregular war.

If you cannot find the enemy or his lines of communication, how can you deceive him as to the proper time and place for his actions or yours? How can you deceive him as to your relative strengths, the security of lines of communication, or levels of resolve? It is not impossible, actually, since you might confuse him into inaction or error regardless of his position, condition, or your own knowledge of them. This is probably an unrealistic hope, since even communicating to him is subject to understanding of the geography.

A few favorites from *The Art of War: Thirty-six Stratagems*:


Stratagem 28: "Remove the ladder after the ascent. Expose your weak points deliberately to entice the enemy to penetrate into your line, then ensnare him in a death trap by cutting off his rearguard support..."

Stratagem 22: "Bolt the door to catch a thief. When dealing with a small and weak enemy, surround and destroy him. If you let him retreat, you will be at a disadvantage pursuing him."

Stratagem 18: "To catch rebels, nab their leader first. Destroy the enemy crack forces and capture their chief, and the enemy will collapse..."

All 36 are pretty good, and so are the rest of the hundred. No, they don't all have to do with the line of retreat.

Please see sections: 114, *R.V. Jones*; 89, *The Dot Game and Go*; 68, *Scale*; 101, *Magical Realism*; 131, *Sea and Aerospace Power*; 117, *Strategic Communication*; 2, *Anonymity*; and 115, *Academies*.



"The central task and the highest form of revolution is to seize political power by armed force, to settle problems by force."[\[399\]](#)

Mao Tse-tung in
Problems of Strategy... (1936)



"America is all about speed -- hot, nasty, badass speed.
Eleanor Roosevelt"[\[400\]](#)



Section 142, Conflict Geography

Military Geography is well-established as an academic sub-discipline. Military geographers have their own specialty group in the Association of American Geographers, for instance. Military geography, in its current habits, puts great emphasis on how the physical environment affects military operations, conventional mostly. It focuses on trafficability, cover, and concealment. It does not propose its own theories regarding the interaction between people and their environment in the context of irregular war. Because irregular war is marked by legal constraints and by the varied development of sanctuary and presence on the part of irregular forces, a new Geography for irregular armed conflict should take a different azimuth. Without overlooking the traditional who, what, where, why, when, and how of other disciplines, a Conflict Geography for irregular war would address at a theoretical level how spatial relationships affect competitive prospects. While Conflict Geography might presume to help avoid or resolve conflict, it could be ethically comfortable seeking victory and dominion. Here I propose methods and principles of Conflict Geography, in no particular order:

Scale. Selection of appropriate scales for time, space, and weight is more than a useful exercise, especially for expressing ideas about distance and location across academic and professional disciplines and across means of communication other than maps. Scale helps conform thought, exclude distractions and emphasize the relevant. It can also restrict creativity and hide what is actually most significant, remain flexible to the constant dynamics of scale and to the possibilities of limitless or not-scaled concepts.

Visualizing. Maps, photography, models, verbal and written description, poetry, plastic art, and performances all help describe the nature and importance of places. Today, GIS provides the most effective and useful inventorying and epistemological framework to combine subjective descriptions with technical specificity as to absolute and relative location, time and weight. Some kinds of data can only be drawn appropriately in point form, depending on the scale. Many geographically relevant concepts, including cultural affinity, fear, aspiration, economic trends, and the like may be better expressed in ways other than the map, or in conjunction with maps.

Territory. Territorial boundaries (as drawn on maps and sometimes on the ground) represent agreements, desires, impositions, natural phenomena, theoretical phenomena, descriptive categories or perhaps technical limits. They come in all sizes shapes and scales, representing things like cell phone tower ranges, school catchment areas, sales territories, water easements and historical trends. When these territorial lines overlap, however, the overlap almost always betrays a conflict or a potential conflict. Discovery of the two dimensioned overlap of territories is a worthwhile analytical technique, just as the thoughtful imbrication and tessellation of territories is a useful social planning technique.

Networks and flows. While territories can be visualized as areas, networks are easier to depict as connected lines. Usually they can be drawn in conjunction with the territories. Networks can also be called flows, which generally exist as territories themselves (like bandwidth, an airline route, or a gas line easement).

Smuggling Significantly, the geographic characteristics and extents of contraband territories and flows are distinct from licit territories and flows. These smuggling geographies almost always overlap with the lines of communication of irregular warfare military organizations.

Identity. Many human identities can be depicted in two dimensions as well. Sometimes territorial ranges and identities match, and sometimes they don't. A mismatch indicates a potential conflict. For instance, you could probably make a two-dimensional boundary around where inhabitants who identify themselves as Kurds predominate, but where the tax and other boundaries suggested in Section 52, *Sovereignty*, will not match your 'Most of us call ourselves Kurds' boundary.

GIS. Conflict Geography aspires to precision, completeness, and replicability in recording time and location of relevant conditions and events.

Power and distance. Power diminishes with distance, like the light from a light bulb. The geography of competing power and influences in a given locale is rarely so complex that the major elements cannot be both identified and their relative power understood, but distance must be considered as a backbone variable. Euclidean distance is the standard baseline, but the determining distances in Conflict Geography are friction or cost-distances. More than time, fuel, or money, the measurement and analysis of distances should include factors such as fear and extortion, legal constraint, anonymity, public will, and especially impunity.

Risk distance. The distance to the culminating point (or point of too much risk), risk distance can be calculated as an inverse form of friction or cost-distance that includes the threat of bodily harm or death.

Place identity versus pure democracy. Conflict Geography exposes the friction between representation according to place, and representation according to non-geographic categories. An almost ubiquitous phenomenon in irregular war, it can be exposed and visualized in detail.

Sanctuary. Sanctuaries – whether furtive, physical, or governmental – can be mapped. In the context of irregular war, Sanctuary is the geographic manifestation of impunity. It is where people get away with what they are getting away with. A centerpiece of Conflict Geography is the effort to map sanctuary.

Presence. As developed in this text, 'presence activities' in irregular war are designed to create non-physical presence, either as residue or anticipation. The effort to create non-corporeal presence generally includes some amount of actual physical presence. Even the non-corporeal part of the phenomenon can, nevertheless, be depicted geographically on visual maps. Along with sanctuary, Conflict Geography attempts to map presence.

Impunity. Impunity is not an amorphous, abstract quantity. Impunity has a geographic extent. Conflict Geography for irregular conflict must orient itself to identifying those places on the ground that are out of reach for a would-be sanctioning authority.

The Underground. Conflict Geography must thoroughly recognize and appreciate territories and flows in the underground plane of physical conflict. (Here I am not referring to 'clandestine' activities, secretive though they might be, but rather to all human activity effected under the surface of the ground.)

Law. Irregular warfare unfolds in the context of dynamic legal and economic relationships. Armed competitors are nevertheless still subject to the classic principles of warfare, albeit with adjustments due to a wider gamut of scales as to numbers, weight, time, and space. The operational math is always subject to the kinds of friction distance mentioned elsewhere.

Property. The propensity of a place to be the venue of irregular armed conflict can be estimated by careful consideration of the social compact, and the social compact can be best understood in terms of property relationships, especially as regards land and the systems of land ownership. Successful strategies for long-term peace will be land-based strategies that are built on an understanding of the relative worth of real estate and the relation of places and their worth to human identity. Property (as ideological theory) is where economics, law, and geography converge. Conflict Geography exploits property analysis to understand the distribution of power, and the likelihood of conflict resolution.

Linearity. Assuming the linearity of movement in armed conflict, Conflict Geography highlights lines of communication. Within the classic rules of movement and position, a central geographic feature is the line of retreat, especially that which leads from some sort of target or contact to a

sanctuary.

Roadblocks and checkpoints. Recognizing roadblocks and checkpoints as common features of irregular war, Conflict Geography supposes the use of ‘map algebra’ to anticipate and plan advantage.

Crowdsourcing. Conflict Geography leans heavily on open source, broadly participatory data collection and opinion.

Technological change. Innovations constantly change the variables of friction distances and, therefore, the power that is lost, gained, or can be exerted in a given place.

Extreme natural events. Earthquakes, volcanoes, epidemics, hurricanes and similar phenomena can have major predictable and unpredictable influence on the environments in which irregular wars unfold and are, therefore, a staple consideration of Conflict Geography.

Anonymity. Among those preoccupations from broader human geography, those conditions providing anonymity (of person, wealth, and relationships) are paramount. For longer-term strategies, the system of land ownership and, consequently, the transparency of that system, is the preoccupation.

Vulnerability. Conflict Geography is sensitive regarding the existence of human collectives that are at-risk to harm or destruction, whether from natural or human causes, or a combination of the two. This sensitivity is a bi-product of awareness regarding relative power, especially as it is exposed in property systems.

Conflict Geography, like its mother discipline, has to remain hyphenatable. It can’t draw just on Geography, but on medical-Geography, historical-Geography, business-Geography, etc. It has to strive (against the disdain of post-structuralists) to be as objective, as empirical, as possible in its measurement of the world and the battlespace. This is not to say it should not draw on art and spirit – or that it cannot or should not take sides in a fight. Conflict Geography is Winning 101.

Please see sections: 72, *Land Strategy*; 80, *Why You Should Like Geography*; 75, *The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism*; 86, *Shifting Covet-geographies*; 125, *Human Rights*; 66, *GIS*; 7, *Sanctuary*; and 135, *Borders and Anarchism*.




“Territory is not the cause of war. It is the cause of war only in the sense that it takes two to make an argument. What territory promises is the high probability that if intrusion takes place, war will follow.”[\[401\]](#)

Robert Ardrey,
Territorial Imperative



“Wouldn’t you like to get away?
Sometimes you want to go
Where everybody knows your name
And they’re always glad you came.”

Gary Portnoy and Judy Hart Angelo
themesong from the TV Show *Cheers*



“If you are not prepared to use force to defend civilization, then be prepared to accept barbarism.”...
“If the battle for civilization comes down to the wimps versus the barbarians, the barbarians are going to win.”

Thomas Sowell (attributed)



Strains on strategy or strains of strategy?

Section 143, Seven Strategy Strains

There are seven categories, currents, methods, options for dealing with your foe. They are:

1. **Operational Art.** Positioning and movement of coercive force that seeks the optimal time and place for contact. Cognizant of the practical interrelationship of relative power, distances, technology and resolve, the classic strategist tries to adjust variables of the operational equation to his advantage and to perplex his enemies regarding their options, thus driving them to err.
2. **Extortion.** You despair of dominating map algebra and its lines of communication or you disdain the risks of operational art. You instead hold at risk something of value to your opponent and convince him that you are willing to destroy it. You offer to protect or relieve him from that fate if he bends to your will. This course works best if you still pay some respect to the operational art of position and movement, however. Sometimes the word attrition fits in here. Attrition can support extortion.
3. **Deception.** You deceive your foe into giving up, giving you what you want, or falling into one of the first two options above. Most of the thirty-six stratagems attributed to Chinese strategic culture involve deception. Some strategists feel that the word strategy refers to this option almost exclusively or at least that it is indispensable for the optimal functioning of the other options. Some would say if you don't have the power to win battles head-on, that you are relegated to strategy, and they usually mean this kind of strategy.
4. **Negotiation.** You weigh costs and benefits and figure you can offer something to your foe in exchange for something he has or a change in his behavior. It might be that the exchange will benefit both you and your opponent. It is not necessarily a zero-sum world. Trade can be great, create wealth, solve problems. Perhaps he seeks changes in the society or power structure that you are willing to make. More than likely, however, if you are dealing with a foe as characterized in *Section 4, Defining Enemy*, there is not enough time, and you will have to combine this option with one of the first three above.
5. **Argument.** You appeal to reason. You don't have anything to trade and you either can't or don't intend to deceive. You just have some moral or practical arguments that you feel you can effectively make to dissuade or change the behavior of your foe. This is a great option if he does not fit the definition of enemy around which the rest of this book worries.
6. **Annihilation.** You don't plan to outmaneuver your foe physically, or threaten, deceive, negotiate or argue with him. You don't have to. You have the power and willpower to simply eliminate him from the face of the earth.
7. **Do nothing.** Under this choice we find delay and surrender. Surrender is always an option. Leave this miserable vale of tears. Delay might work; good things come to those who wait, but, again, our definition of enemy doesn't afford much time.

If you don't wish to surrender, you can't wait, arguments won't work fast enough, you don't have the power or willpower to annihilate your foe, and you don't have anything you are willing to negotiate away, then you're pretty much stuck with the first three strategy options. Combine them as best you can.

Please see sections: 6, *The Operational Equation*; 102, *Negotiations*; 141, *Thirty-six Stratagems*; 116, *Songs of Chu*; 65, *Smuggling*; 20, *Rule-of-Law*; 120, *Misleading COIN Articles of Faith*; and 10, *Decisive Battle*.



“To create a formula or a general rule...that would be appropriate in all situations is absurd. One must be able to think on one's feet to be able to make sense of each separate case.”[\[402\]](#)

The Most Humane Human



“We must study this.”

Myamoto Musashi (attributed)



He didn't ask AI if he wanted fries with that

Section 144, What the Pirate Said to Alexander

St. Augustine of Hippo was a cleric and philosopher who lived centuries later than Alexander, but whose keen observations about the nature of sovereignty and power still influence us today. St. Augustine addresses moral weight in the context of State power. His assertions about the subject revolve around the word *impunity*. Impunity means exemption or protection from punishment.

Alexander the Great got great the old-fashioned way, but that's not what matters here. We turn instead to his need to deal with some less powerful contenders, a pirate in this case. St. Augustine tells us the story with the pirate as protagonist. Here is the passage:

In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized brigandage? For, what are the bands of brigands but petty kingdoms? They also are groups of men, under the rule of a leader, bound together by a common agreement, dividing their booty according to a settled principle. If this band of criminals, by recruiting more criminals, acquires enough power to occupy regions, to capture cities, and to subdue whole populations, then it can with fuller right assume the title of kingdom, which in the public estimation is conferred upon it, not by the renunciation of greed, but by the increase of impunity. The answer which a captured pirate gave to Alexander the Great was perfectly accurate and correct. When that king asked the man what he meant by infesting the sea, he boldly replied: 'What you mean by warring on the whole world. I do my fighting on a tiny ship, and they call me a pirate; you do yours with a large fleet, and they call you a Commander'.[\[403\]](#)

St. Augustine, 5th-century Cleric

Man is a territorial creature who, when he gains power, doesn't like anyone else granting impunity in his space. Our captured pirate, unbowed, points out that there is little difference between himself and Alexander, save that Alexander is honored for the scale of his arrogation.

This book starts with St. Augustine's pirate story because, as the title says, the book is about *winning*, and the notion of winning needs practical form. Here, that form is offered by the assertion that government wins when it is the only entity within its territory able to grant impunity. Sometimes a pirate, insurgent, separatist, warlord, or mafioso (or a foreign country) can successfully grant impunity in defiance of a State -- and that is the challenge addressed by this book. If an entity other than the State can grant impunity to people who defy the State's rules, the State fails to that extent. If no entity can defy the State's monopoly on granting impunity, the State is securely sovereign. Sometimes a leader can successfully defy a State and grant impunity to his people because he arms and organizes well.

Please see sections: 1, *Impunity*; 23, *Mens Rea*; 43, *Sam Spade's Whereabouts*; 90, *Prisons & Prisoners*; 96, *Combatant Status*; 121, *Dignity and Honor*; 128, *Global Insurgency and Global Trespass*; and 84, *Cultures of Violence*.

St. Augustine spoke through the voice of the pirate, but this book's protagonist was not a pirate, an Alexander, or even a St. Augustine. *You* are this book's protagonist.



Fredric: You make it a point of never attacking a weaker party than yourselves, and when you attack a stronger one you invariably get thrashed.

Pirate King: There's some truth in that.

from the movie


The Pirates of Penzance (1983)[\[404\]](#)



Q: What do Kermit The Frog and Alexander The Great have in common?

A: Their middle names.

Miss Piggy (attributed)



"Pain heals. Chicks dig scars. Glory...lasts forever."

Shane Falco in the movie

The Replacements (2000)[\[405\]](#)



RESTATEMENT

There are several conditions and principles likely to reign across all types of irregular armed conflict. A good plan for winning one of those conflicts will address the following seven fundamentals:

- Pick the right place to fight and the right enemy. It is hard to recover from fighting at the wrong place and time against the wrong people. Your enemy has a name and an organization; he is not an amorphous abstraction or a spontaneous reaction. Your enemy is not an idea or a network, he is a man and he is located somewhere. Learn geography.

- Control anonymity. Take it away from your enemy and secure it for yourself. Apply technical and institutional innovations. A regime of accurate, comprehensive and transparent public records tops the list for the counterinsurgent. It is hard to maintain impunity without anonymity.

- Work to cross, close, and restrict your enemy's escape to sanctuary. The physical line of retreat to sanctuary should be the central geographic concept of your military operational planning. A successful attack on a sanctuary means it wasn't. To win battles decisively, win the pursuits.

- Create property. Property is the social compact, the contract of contracts that serves to resolve conflicts before they become violent. Property is where economics, law and geography meet. Know who all owns what all.

- Respect everyone. This is not abstract concept or luxury. If you do not attend to dignity and honor, your enemy will. The line of your enemy's withdrawal is covered by people, as is yours. Set a baseline of honorable behavior, announce and enforce it. Start with the treatment of children.

- Make something. Bridges, walls, tunnels, and pipelines do not go out of fashion. Humans like them and they help if put in the right places. Either make something that favors your military operational art, or make something useful to the public. Choose or invent the right machines, including weapons, and things that change the built environment.

- Seek advisors who have a sense of humor, not because they are funny, but because the mental circuits of humor are often those of strategy, and of a positive outlook. Neither believe all your own propaganda nor discard all your enemy's, but when he most insists there is no military solution to your conflict, look harder for it. Wars do not prolong themselves any more than they win themselves. Act diligently.



I should therefore prefer to restrict my guidelines to the following:

- Don't believe that military interventions, no matter how morally justified, can succeed without clear military goals
- Don't fall into the trap of imagining that the West can remake societies
- Don't take public opinion for granted -- but don't either underrate the degree to which good people will endure sacrifices for a worthwhile cause
- Don't allow tyrants and aggressors to get away with it
- And when you fight -- fight to win.

Margaret Thatcher [\[406\]](#)



SYNTHESIS

A prudent general, even if he leads no more than an insurgent squad, protects his lines of communication, and makes sure that as he dares to confront a dangerous foe, he keeps his options for retreat alive. He knows that victory is often achieved only by successful pursuit after battle.

It is never enough to just win battles. Profitable victory means neutralizing your enemies while not creating too many more of them. Profitable victory is a hard feat to pull off, one which can entail administration, engineering, education and indoctrination – efforts for which military units are only partially and poorly suited. Battle, nevertheless, remains the quintessential and imperative military event.

In irregular wars, cultural knowledge cannot be dismissed as a luxury, or relegated to being a secondary concern. Military strategy involves stratagems and deceptions, and when civilian things are mixed indistinguishably with military things, clever warriors develop their stratagems and deceptions through literature, arts, entertainments, legalities, and all manner of cultural habits and expectations. A warrior ignorant of the culture will be unable to anticipate, recognize and defend against elegant stratagems. He will not be able to mount effective deceptions of his own; not be able to implement anything but the most transparent plans, not be able to seize the initiative. Some people, although they will admit the importance of cultural acuity, are offended by jokes, especially if they play on sensitive elements of human existence like excrement, death, parentage, or sex. Jokes, however, are created in the same way as military and political deceptions. To shy away from jokes is like shrinking from the subject of deception. If you let your enemy dominate the subtleties of cultural expression, he is likely to get to you before you get to him – and he'll laugh at you. In irregular wars, communications are enmeshed in the cultural gearing. If you are ignorant of the culture, chances are better that you won't get the jokes. How are you, then, for being deceived?

Just as dismissal of cultural knowledge can cause failure in military operations, so too can distancing ideology from military planning. Ideologies are sets of ideas and theories about the distribution of power and, since military planning is about the application of coercive force, to distance ideology from military plans is to uncouple our objectives from our methods and means. Post-structuralism is the name I assign to a globally radicated ideological music that includes within it the refrain that American power, waning and unfocused, is the bulwark of an evil system which noble insurgents should resist. Post-structuralists enjoy this music a lot, and push with it bits of contrived reality to help perplex the reasoning mind. They often go a step farther to insist that real reality doesn't even exist, and so isn't worth looking for. America will do well not to overvalue the post-structural orchestra. Its concert is rooted in discredited forms of marxism, and its conductors are selfish and violent.

Activities like building walls and sewers or doing a thorough inventory of everything and everyone in a place may not seem to have much connection to vagaries like post-structuralism. Nevertheless, questions about the control and use of spaces -- who will be trusted to decide their use; who will be able to determine the division of rights and duties on specific pieces of dirt -- are responsive to an ongoing intellectual struggle about the correct nature of ownership and leadership, and even about reality itself. This book points admiringly at the great conflict resolution innovations of Western civilization, like the writ of *habeas corpus*, the statute of frauds, or liberal property ownership. But historical admiration is not enough. They are worthy of application.

When dealing with insurgency, there is no way to separate issues of rectitude and legality from military operational movement and position, or to separate social responsibility from approaches to knowledge. They are all balled up. The categories of our thinking, like geography, operational art, economics, strategy, law, culture, tactics, postmodernism, or empiricism are all helpful and necessary. As boxes, however, they keep us from freely mixing ideas as we should, and they compete in ways that deny the contribution of other categories. There is no way to keep that from happening, but there are a few things that can speed our thinking in dangerous human competitions. One of the most profitable is to respect time, distance, and weight. Whatever the metaphysicists may find to challenge our assumptions about time and space, for our practical and violent competitive purposes, time flows in one direction, location is fixed, and it takes mass to convince the recalcitrant.

Great advantage goes to the competitor who takes careful inventories and makes precise and comprehensive maps. In the last few decades, two knowledge revolutions have occurred – one is the Internet and the other is GIS. Victory is more likely for those who master both. Successful strategic thinking must reconcile empiricism with solipsism, but you are much more likely to win your war if you build your efforts on a foundation of dogged empiricism, and GIS is the codeword for that devotion. GIS-based empiricism will help you close with and destroy your enemy. The 'close with' part is aided immensely by the control of anonymity. The insurgent especially depends for survival on geographic anonymity of his agents, sanctuaries and wealth. (And, by the way, if your enemy's sanctuary is in a foreign land from which you can't extract or extradite him, then you might not want to fool yourself into thinking yours is a merely insurgent war.)

If your enemy enjoys a sanctuary, and you don't know where it is or how he gets there, you're in trouble. Many of the other complexities boil down to that one ignorance. Sanctuary is the physical geography of impunity. In the final calculations of winners and losers -- in the measurements of success or failure -- there will be a truth that overcomes all perception management and spin: The side that attains or retains control over the ability to grant impunity is the winner. It is ultimately not hard to tell if a government is or is not in control of the granting of impunity within its territory.

The above paragraphs might make it seem as though human conflict is complicated. Maybe it is, but there is no need to let all the trees hide the forest, either. No need to over-think the thing. If you have an enemy, find him, close with him, and neutralize him. If not, build something, train, or go play golf.[\[407\]](#)



“In the immortal words of Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Au revoir, Gopher.'”[\[408\]](#)



APPENDIX: MISCELLANEOUS LISTS

LIST A – for Section 48, *Grading the Social Compact*

1. Quality of the evidence delineating rights, duties and owner identities is determined by three characteristics:

A. **Accuracy** (or precision. How accurate technically are the geographic or physical descriptions, and how accurate legally are they in terms of owners and rights, and perhaps how accurate in terms of market value);

B. **Comprehensiveness** (what is the coverage of the system both geographically and in terms of the percentage of owners and the possible rights involved);

C. **Transparency** (the visibility and availability of the data and its resistance to corruption and fraud).

A. Accuracy

1. Extent to which ownership registry and cadastral descriptions are unified;
2. Existence of a statute of frauds and related statutory requirements;
3. Availability and use of title insurance;
4. Accuracy of surveying technologies;
5. Monument quality and density;
6. Age of records;
7. Capacity of cadastral and registry bureaucracy;
8. Appraisal cost and availability;
9. Relationship of tax assessments to market value appraisals if applicable.

B. Comprehensiveness

1. Percentage of the geographic surface represented in cadastral maps;
2. Percentage of owners whose properties are represented in cadastral maps;
3. Difficulty of registration;
4. Percentage of properties with tax appraisals;
5. Percentage of properties with market appraisals.

C. Transparency

1. Access to cadastral information;
2. Access to land-use data online;
3. If paper records available for public inspection;
4. Where records are kept;
5. Are registries and cadastral records digitized;
6. Are cadastral maps digitized and vectorized;
7. If government development projects are advertised online and GISed;
8. What records cost.

2. Capacity of owners (or claimants) and the government to act on conclusions logically drawn from the evidence (sometimes '*ease of alienability*' or '*security from trespass*' depending on the mix of owner rights and government duties involved). It also can be reduced to three parts:

A. **Marketability**;

B. **Protection from trespass**, and;

C. **Protection of the social compact generally**.

(A) Marketability

1. Ratio of properties bought and sold to total properties in a given time;
2. Existence of a professional real estate industry and its measures of professionalism;
3. Regulatory limitations on sale commissions, and their effect;
4. Real estate price controls and what is the effect;
5. Where zoning laws exist;
6. If deed restrictions and other controls on alienation are used, where and for what;
7. Existence of an electronic market property listing service;
8. What collateral is accepted for loans and what are standard rates across types of real estate.

(B) Protection from trespass

1. How long it takes to file a quiet-title claim;
2. If there is a grievance mechanism against real estate professionals;
3. How much it costs to conduct a quiet-title action;
4. If there are established rules for ownership through adverse possession.

(C) Protection of the social compact generally

1. How often the statute of frauds is applied;
 2. If agency contracts are used;
 3. If sales contracts are used;
 4. Whether or not the police use formal records to resolve property disputes;
 5. Professional standards of real property sales or appraisal force;
 6. Professional standards for appraisals;
 7. Prenuptial requirements (is there a statutory requirement, what are the choices, what is the intention, how do they limit alienability).
3. Basic rules delimiting the compact participation (at times called *liberality*). The three general determinants of liberality are:
- A. **Inclusiveness** (who can effectively be owners);
 - B. **Divisibility** (how thoroughly the various rights associated with things can be divided);
 - C. **Alienation** – what rights owners have to dispose of property.
- A. Inclusiveness**
1. If women can own property;
 2. If foreigners can own property and to what extent, where, etc.;
 3. If religious or ethnic identities are excluded.
- B. Divisibility**
1. If subsurface rights can be bought and sold;
 2. If innovations such as time shares, condominiums, joint, common, partnership, incorporation, etc. are used and is there data on geographic distribution and percentage of types;
 3. If any studies relate ownership and tenancy forms to violence, migration or illicit narcotics production or trafficking.
- C. Alienation**
1. If real property can be freely bequeathed by testators;
 2. Who can give away real property and to whom;
 3. How intestate estate property is disposed by statute or custom;
 4. If life estates are used;
 5. Standard tenancy patterns (leases, sharecrop arrangements, *ejidos*, communes, family corporations);
 6. If land is otherwise fully alienatable (mortgaged, sold, rented, lent).

LIST B – for Section 69, *Measuring Effects of Actions against Enemies*

(1) Conclusive indices of success:

1. Are elements of an organization able to commit crimes and not get caught; get caught, but not be prosecuted; or be prosecuted, but escape from jail? *If insurgent or criminal leaders are effectively protecting their agents from punishment by the State, the State and probably the society are failing. If you are a counterinsurgent leader, you are failing.*
2. In what territorial space are you confident that your side has monopoly over the granting of impunity? This geography may be growing, shrinking or changing. If such can be mapped, that map can provide the relative measure of success or failure over time.
(These first two measurements are conclusive if extended to their practicable maximum. If there is no geographic extent wherein your enemy can escape your sanctions, for instance, you are totally, unequivocally triumphant. You might consider the next measurement conclusive if you can correctly and precisely identify your enemy.)
3. How many of the enemy leaders have been neutralized by surrender, capture, death, coercion, buy-out, or deception? *Either they have been neutralized or they have not. If, by the way, an insurgent or criminal leader can be timely turned or purchased, and he ceases to provide impunity to his followers, then the logic here is that he or she is thus neutralized.*

(2) Indices of success conditioning:

1. How many of the identified enemy leaders have been located? *Of course, how many is not as good as how many out of the total and how important is each.*
2. How many enemy leaders have been identified? *If they have been identified, then some of their security is breached. If enemy leaders have not been identified, locating them is all the more difficult, as is counting them.*
3. How many wounded insurgents are returned to action by the enemy? *If captured guerrillas have been previously wounded and successfully returned to combat functions, for instance, it is a clear sign that an enemy LOC-to-sanctuary was viable. We can suppose that it remains equally viable for the leaders.*

4. How far from combat actions are enemy hospitals? *Distance from the point of injury to medical care is a clear indicator of ability to maintain the LOC-to-sanctuary.*
5. Do insurgents receive training outside their areas of operation? *Similarly, the more it appears that training is conducted remotely, the more evident a healthy LOC-to-sanctuary.*
6. Is there evidence of general support maintenance of enemy equipment? *Some maintenance activities are unlikely to be conducted close to the point of operations. Evidence that such maintenance is occurring is again evidence of a healthy LOC-to-sanctuary.*
7. Are insurgents recruited from areas distant from their areas of operation? *This may not be a strong indicator of LOC-to-sanctuary health, but sufficiently varied data can indicate recruit source preferences and changes in likely sanctuaries over time.*
8. Can insurgent leadership travel abroad legally? *If insurgent leaders are showing up in foreign capitals, it is clearly a sign of LOC-to-sanctuary health.*
9. How well are the insurgent junior leaders and foot-soldiers trained? *This may or may not be a sign that the leaders' LOC-to-sanctuary is healthy or their ability to muster resources intact. The insurgent leaders may be choosing not to expend or risk resources.*
10. How new are insurgent weaponry and other equipment? *This may or may not be a sign that the leaders' LOC-to-sanctuary is healthy or the ability to muster resources intact. The insurgent leaders may be choosing not to expend or risk resources.*
11. What is the pattern and pace of visits by leaders to subordinate leaders? *This may or may not be a sign that the leaders' LOC-to-sanctuary is healthy or the ability to muster resources intact. The insurgent leaders may be choosing not to expend or risk resources.*
12. What is the number and rate of valid, un-coerced informant reports? *This may be one of the most revealing indicators of LOC-to-sanctuary health because it implies a breakdown of security for the LOC. This, however, is one of the types of indicators that must be closely held, and it may only measure an input.*
13. How many insurgent supply caches have been found? How large are they?
14. How many persons are killed in individual insurgent attacks?
15. What are the locations and numbers of insurgent landmines and other explosives?
16. What category of targets is being chosen by the insurgent?
17. What is the location of the targets chosen by the insurgent?
18. What are the relative sizes of forces engaged in combat actions?
19. What is the condition of captured insurgent weapons and rations?
20. What are the ages of captured enemy soldiers?
21. What is the ability of the insurgent enemy to recover wounded?
22. What is the relation of friendly casualties to insurgent casualties in firefights?
23. What is the extension of illicit crops?
24. What do extortion and other crime statistics indicate?
25. What is happening to the number of un-coerced informant reports?

(To these 13 might be added some advantages that may be given to one force or taken away from the opposing force. For instance, if a counterinsurgent force has been given better rifles, more training, or more mobility, these things might be assumed to give a relative counterinsurgent advantage, all else remaining the same. They should not be given too much weight, since all else does not remain the same. They are useful inputs, means toward the goal, but not the goal itself. Supposed, or potential advantages for creating advantage in risk distances and correlations of force might be misapplied, countered by other losses, or overmatched by enemy adjustments. A counterinsurgent force might obtain more helicopters, for instance, but that change is *not* a measure of greater counterinsurgent success.)

(3) Indices of encounter success:

1. How many enemy soldiers were captured alive or surrendered in an action?
2. How many enemy soldiers were killed in an action?
3. How much materiel was decommissioned in an action?
4. How much insurgent capital inventory was destroyed or taken in an action?
5. Did the local, national and international media pick up the story of an action?
6. How do the above compare with friendly losses and capital expenditure in comparison with other encounters?
7. Was contact with the enemy followed with a pursuit of the inferior force by the superior force?
8. If pursuit followed a contact, was the inferior force overtaken?

(The last two questions, about pursuit, are especially significant in the aggregate. If pursuits are never successful, it almost becomes a conclusive measure of insurgent success and counterinsurgent failure.)

An insurgent leader might measure his enterprise as follows:

1. Is my bank account increasing or decreasing? *If it's beating inflation, I'm OK.*
2. Has the government identified any of my lines of communication? *(Has it found a bank account, broken one of my codes, stopped a shipment of weapons, intercepted the visit of a subordinate commander, or prevented out-of-area training?) If it has, it may find more, my sanctuary is tenuous, and I might have to run.*
3. Is my family safe? *If not, and I care, I'm in trouble.*
4. Can I travel to country X? *If not, my sanctuary options decrease, and my safe lines of retreat are fewer.*
5. Can I meet with subordinates easily? *If not, my power to effect things on the ground is limited.*
6. Are my people being killed or captured? If they are captured, can I get them back? If I can fulfill my grant of impunity to my people, I'm doing well. *If the State can enforce its monopoly on granting impunity, my end is nearing.*
7. After contact with government forces, are my subordinate units successful in escaping?

(An insurgent leader's ultimate questions are. "Am I still able to garner resources without being trapped by my counterinsurgent foe?" and, "Can I still protect my followers from punishment by the government?" If the answers are yes, the insurgency is in good shape. We might ask if the government's ability to recruit soldiers wouldn't be a significant metric by which the insurgent could measure the progress of the insurgency. Ease of government recruitment could not be taken as a good sign for the insurgent, but it would hardly be conclusive of anything.)

LIST C – for Section 70, *Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure*

Measuring human security:

1. Real estate prices
2. Migration rates
3. Vehicle-miles traveled on selected roads without incident (incidents per vehicle mile)
4. Tourist destination bookings and visits
5. Civilian landmine injuries and locations
6. Tip-offs to government regarding criminality
7. Kidnappings reported
8. Number of resolved real property civil court case
9. Transparency of public records
10. Levels of smuggling activity
11. Number of peacefully achieved arrests by warrant for felonies
12. Bond rates

Measuring prosperity:

1. Real estate prices
2. Tax collections to tax rates
3. Percent of formally owned land
4. Bond and insurance rates
5. Vacation patterns

Measuring freedom:

1. Real estate prices
2. Ballot access
3. National tourist origin-destination
4. Immigration rates
5. Registered NGOs
6. Cell phone dispersion and use rates
7. Internet logon rates

Measuring public will to support the social compact and defeat insurgents:

1. Informant tip-offs
2. Voter turn-outs and votes
3. Emigration and immigration

4. Volunteer participation in public forces by youth members of the elite

LIST D – for Section 85, *Geography of Genocide*

Public knowledge about genocides can be placed into seven categories, each connected to the national and global attention paid to the phenomenon, as follows:

1. Longer-term (years) warnings regarding the likelihood of or heightened vulnerability of a people to genocide.
2. Creation of inventories of potential target collectives (the creation of which might itself deter mass killings).
3. Forensic geography conducted before events that can support prosecutions after the fact. This category serves both as a deterrent and as a support to justice.
4. Midterm (weeks and months) warnings that can mobilize attention and pressure against potential perpetrators and in favor of potential victims.
5. Occurrence reporting and recording to inform the world community of ongoing genocidal events.
6. Prosecutorial discovery and post-crime forensic mapping.
7. Recovery mapping.

Below is the start of a little taxonomy of indices of vulnerability or murderous intent we can place under the seven categories above:

1. Longer-term warnings

- a.) clearly identifiable collective identities, especially linguistic, national, ethnic, religious, and racial;
- b.) high contrast and proximity of collective identities;
- c.) inability of a collective identity or members of a collective identity to defend itself/themselves.
 - 1.) Improbability of physical escape from the actions of a likely perpetrating entity due to:
 - A. physical isolation,
 - B. lack of material wherewithal,
 - C. existence of legal prohibitions on personal movement,
 - D. lack of welcoming destinations;
 - 2.) Lack of representation in executive, administrative, legislative and judicial forums;
 - 3.) Lack of reporting and warning capacity due to:
 - A. lack of journalist presence,
 - B. lack of academic presence,
 - C. lack of technical communications means,
 - D. existence of legal restrictions imposed on A-C,
 - E. existence of legal restrictions imposed on communications;
 - 4.) Existence of collective cultural disrespect evidenced as follows:
 - A. explicit insult in educational materials,
 - B. explicit insult in governmental documents other than above;
 - 5.) Lack of effective weaponry due to the following:
 - A. Laws monopolizing or restricting the ownership of weapons,
 - B. Lack of sufficient wealth for armament,
 - C. Existence of cultural norms deterring the ownership and use of suitable weaponry;
 - D. High differentials in tax burdens;
 - E. General inability to migrate due to the following:
 - 1.) enforced legal restrictions on migration,
 - 2.) physical barriers to migration,
 - 3.) enforced legal restrictions on immigration to best destinations;
 - F. Proximity of high value physical geography, including the following
 - 1.) source locations of commercial exportable things,
 - 2.) best routes of movement of commercial exportable things including contraband routes,
 - 3.) chokepoints and nodes in above routes,
 - 4.) properties or terrain with high market value for any other reason.

2. Inventories of potential victim populations

- a.) representative (tracking) individuals in victim-likely populations;
- b.) property rights pertaining to victim-likely collective identities and/or pertaining to tracking individuals in those collective identities;
- c.) property rights pertaining to perpetrator-possible identities, both individual and collective;
- d.) cultural signatures of victim-likely collectives.

3. Pre-event forensic Geography

- a.) geographic forensics baseline preparations;
- b.) human-caused physical destruction and obstruction;
- c.) mapping of wealth of hate-agents and leaders of perpetrator identities.

4. Mid-term (weeks and months) warning

- a.) presence of effective hate agents;
- b.) permissive rules of hate speech;
- c.) collective sense of loss, especially national, in a potential perpetrator identity;

d.) collective sense of impending or threatened loss, especially national, in a potential perpetrator identity.

5. Occurrence reporting and recording

- a.) mapping communications potential from within a risk geography;
- b.) inventory and mapping of reporting networks;
- c.) fear mapping;

6. Prosecutorial discovery and post-crime forensic mapping

- a.) geographic forensics;
- b.) mapping areas of evidence destruction and obstruction;
- c.) mapping of wealth of hate-agents and other leaders of potential perpetrator collective identities;

7. Recovery mapping

- a.) damage mapping of dwelling places;
- b.) defensible terrain mapping;
- c.) logistics mapping for temporary sustainment;
- d.) line of communications damage mapping;
- e.) NGO or government support systems mapping;
- f.) remnant victim-group mapping;
- g.) donor and potential donor inventory and mapping;
- h.) cultural symbols damage assessment and mapping.

Occurrence reporting (#5) is often the purview and expertise of journalists, or of government personnel dealing with classified means, so it is only touched on here. As for recovery mapping (#7), that is a question of logistics, humanitarian aid and reconstruction, a function for which there already exist massive datasets, preparations, bureaucracies and even industries. That said, changes in aspects discussed in the other categories may well shape and add to the effectiveness of these functions.

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Cervantes' friend [\[409\]](#)



INDEX

dullah Hassan, Mohammed, 239, 242
 dsalom, *Absalom!*, 411
 demies, *Section 115* (469-470)
 dams, Scott, 109
 dowa, 34
 dghanistan, 197, 250, 267, 281, 454, 538, 543, 553
 dplane II: *The Sequel*, 68
 dgeria, 434-443
 dN, The Army of National Liberation, xxiii, 440
 dQaeda, 21, 456, 471
 dnnesty, *Section 103* (415-418)
 darchist *Lightbulb Jokes* (web comedy), 533
 darchy, ix, 55, 179, 246, 527, 531-536
 dngelo, Judy Hart, 561
 dimal House, 98
 donymity, *Section 2* (4-5)
 donymity, v, x, xi, def., xxiii, 2; 3-5, 8-10, 18, 22-25, 32, 41, 42, 53, 57, 60, 64-68, 79-82, 87, 90, 98, 99, 104, 113, 124, 130, 134, 135, 141-148, 176, 179, 187, 201-203, 213-218, 222, 223, 236, 237, 260, 283, 323, 326, 327, 343-347, 370, 377, 423, 431, 435, 440, 444, 485, 486, 495, 503, 515, 522-528, 541, 553-560, 567, 571
 dthropology, 300, 334, 376, 456, 544
 doocalypse Now, 441
 ddrey, Robert, 340, 427, 561, 585
 dicapa, Ricardo, 145, 379, 585
 dstrong, Louis, 407
 dson, 540
 dt Nouveau, 242, 243, 245, 400
 dkari, xxiii, 348-351
 dsturias, Ricardo, 90
 dsturias, Spain, 386-394
 dymmetry, 49,120, 395-398, 481, 482, 526, 527
 dlas *Shrugged* (book), 403
 dteridge, Hilliard, 34, 43, 197, 243, 585
 dUC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, xxiii, , 143, 416, 429-431, 502
 dsterlitz, battle of, 487-490
 dstin Powers: *International Man of Mystery*, 222
 dstin Powers in *Goldmember*, 194
 dthe Cop (web-animated comedy), 466
 drau, Manuel, 91
 dthe Acid Trip, 398
 dthassoftheweek, *Section 22* (93-95)
 dgration, Pyotr, 488
 dldwin, William, 208
 dink Robbery, *Section 62* (255-257)
 drry, Dave, 544
 dse areas, xxxiii, 19, 21, 27, 116, 129, 196, 207, 352, 366, 489, 518, 520, 545, and see *sanctuaries*
 dstiat, Frédéric, 55, 214
 dttle, importance of, 19-21, 35-39, 268, 344, 355, 378, 481, 550, 551, 567
 dthe Paw, surrender of Chief Joseph, 31-33
 dthe Geste, 378
 dthe *avis and Butthead* (TV show), 325
 dthe Lima, Jineth, 551
 dthe rra, Yogi, 321
 dthe l, Tom, 308, 478, 586
 dthe Brother, 3-10, 26, 67, 176-178, 202, 178
 dthe s, Brian, 132
 dthe metrics, 6-8, 121, 202; see also, *Big Brother*
 dthe *ack Hawk Down*, 43
 dthe *azing Saddles*, 355, 453

Good Diamond, 520
 ow, 365
 er, Boer War, 18, 239-247, 350, 352, 588, 593, 596
 olivia, 4, 36, 40, 58-61, 217, 341, 357-358, 403, 587
 onaparte, Napoleon, 14, 18, 111, 113, 283, 332, 427, 487-490, 492, 518, 525, 552
 order and Anarchism, *Section 135* (534-537)
 rders, 13, 127-129, 166, 195-199, 200, 211, 214, 313-315, 426, 440; see also territoriality and see property
 rges, Jorge Louis, 408, 464
 udreaux, Donald J., 520
aveheart, 472
 ierly, J.L., 214, 427, 586
 igands, *Section 42* (170-173)
 ick, Pearl S., 318
 ngineers & Built Environment, *Section 33* (130-132)
 lldozers, 70, 119-120, 125, 194
 rke, Edmund, 352
 tkus, Dick, 150
 tler, William Francis, 459
 ballero, Largo, xxv, 387-392
 dastre, xxiii, 6, 107, 190, 311, 586
ddy Shack, 60, 571
 ilder, Admiral Robert, 487, 492
 illejas y Callejas, Manuel Antonio, 83-90, see also *Section 22, Badassoftheweek.com*
ill of the Wild (book), 361
 illwell, C.E., 518, 519
 nnon, James P., 55
 ipe Finisterre, battle of, 487-494
 ipone, Al, 414
 irlin, George, 342
 apults, 222
 ves, 130; see *Section 31* (124-125); see also, tunnels.
 ̄DA, Confederation of the Autonomous Right [Parties] (Confederación de Derechas Autonomas), 388-390
 nter of gravity, 15, 88, 159, 160, 162, 208, 231, 482
 ávez Hugo, 62, 102, 161, 212, 230, 385, 396, 402, 403, 473, 542, 544, 546
 e Guevara, 4, 40, 524
 eers (TV show), 561
 esterton, G.K., 267, 393, 427
 iang Kai-Shek, May-Ling, 39
 ief Joseph, see section 9, (31-34)
 ildhood, *Section 95* (381-383)
 ildren, 84, 136, 141, 142, 151, 152, 246, 249, 280, 285, 320, 323, 324, 339, 365, 381-383, 396, 430, 495, 498, 499, 567
 inatown, 358
 urchill, Winston, 45, 251, 467, 596
 ass, class struggle, 58, 235, 496, 497, 535
 assic Strategy and Irregular Warfare, *Section 5* (14-18)
 ausewitz, Carl von, 14, 39, 111, 177, 363, 552, 554
 emens, Samuel, 78, 235, 236
 rgy, I, 101, 131, 186-187, 198, 238, 324, 336-338, 392, 510
 llins, Phil, 224
 olombia, 41, 65, 69, 75, 93, 124, 126, 130, 133, 134, 137-146, 152, 155, 156, 159, 170, 171, 189, 190, 200, 204-209, 212, 223, 228-233, 239, 243, 250-253, 261, 266, 276, 280-283, 286, 320, 345, 346, 356, 357, 360, 371-373, 376, 379, 415-417, 428-433, 455, 473, 474, 499, 542, 545, 546.
 mbatant Status, *Section 96* (384-385)
 mmitment of the Reserves, *Section 12* (44-46)
 mmodore George Dewey, 240-242
 mmon Knowledge, *Section 108* (443-445)
 muna 13, *Section 35* (137-146)
nan the Barbarian, 398
 ndottieri, *Section 58* (233-234)
 nflict Geography, *Section 142* (557-561)

inflict Thresholds, *Section 82* (339-342)
 Inrad, Joseph, 361, 587
 Intransigent, 205, 207, 249, 270, 281, 558, 582; and see *smuggling*
 Intransigent, see *Section 58*, Condottieri (233-234)
 Introductory Technology, *Section 30* (121-123)
 Invocation, 59, 113, 237
 Inverse relation of force, 15-18, 114, 162, 221, 258, 267, 283, 487
 Involuntary, x, 2, 5, 7, 26, 52, 79-81, 143, 170, 193, 221, 249, 260, 284, 288, 303, 310, 316, 573
 Involuntary, 8-10, 62, 63, 126, 129, 172, 174, 189-191, 206-209, 213, 274-280, 306, 324, 379, 423, 429-431, 450-453, 507, 548
 Involuntary point, 14, 15, 23, 41, 45, 114, 206, 207, 231, 260-264, 282, 334, 343, 360, 366, 370, 441, 485, 492, 537, 540, 550, 554, 559, 578, (see also, *risk distance*)
 Intellectual Study for What?, *Section 38* (153-154)
 Intellectuals of Violence, *Section 84* (345-347)
 Injuria, Hamid, 411
 I'm It Feels Good To Be a Gangsta (song), 173
 Injustice, Mike, 131, 379, 587
 Injustice of the Dead, 540
 Injustice Westy *Section 41* (163-169)
 Rochefoucauld, Francois, 64
 Saint Exupéry, Antoine, 21
 Injustice, v, 20, 23, 153, 154, 273, 363, 392, 466-468, 471-474, 487, 526, 543, 549, 550, 562, 569, 576
 Injustice Battle, *Section 10* (35-39)
 Injustice Enemy, *Section 4* (11-13)
 Injustice of Counterinsurgency, *Section 119* (479-480)
 Injustice, *Section 118* (475-478)
 Injustice, Luis, 67, 261, 542, 551 (Raúl Reyes was his non de guerre)
 Injustice, demilitarized zone, 137, 138
 Injustice 12, 182, 183, 396
 Injustice Hill, battle of, 240, 243
 Injustice Bien Phu, 116, 435, 440, 441, 553, 588
 Injustice, 109
 Injustice and Honor, *Section 121* (484-486)
 Injustice and PMECII, *Section 112* (460-464)
 Injustice and Disasters, *Section 93* (375-378)
 Injustice, v, xi, 14, 17, 18, 23-27, 54, 63, 64, 87, 126, 130-134, 142, 151, 175, 196, 197, 205, 207, 223, 231, 232, 246, 258-267, 272, 276-282, 319, 322, 331-335, 343, 344, 351-363, 366, 379, 384, 390, 398, 430, 435, 440, 448, 452, 455, 464, 481, 488-492, 502, 513-520, 527, 529, 535, 538, 540, 552-554, 558-561, 569, 570, 576 (the word *distance* appears 269 times in this book)
 Injustice and Mules, *Section 57* (231-232)
 Injustice, John, 398, 403
 Injustice, Frederick, 315
 Injustice, Arthur Conan, 18, 136, 246, 520
 Injustice, 119, 124, 182, 228, 319, 340, 530, 537-540
 Injustice: *Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, 125
 Injustice, Alfred, 158
 Injustice and Dumber, 280
 Injustice, 125
 Injustice, Bob, 383
 Injustice of force, 15, 44, 363, 551
 Injustice Rider, 136
 Injustice (book), 330, 511
 Injustice, Thomas, 240, 241
 Injustice, 80-82, 98, 107, 122, 132, 142, 151-154, 288, 364, 417, 425, 449, 457, 514, 524, 531, 582
 Injustice, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, Guatemala, xxiv, 84-90
 Injustice, Dwight, 82, 298, 483
 Injustice, xxiv, 575
 Injustice Pass, Sri Lanka, 48, 51
 Injustice, xxiv, 67, 99, 228, 266, 412, 430, see *Colombia*
 Injustice, Ralph Waldo, 120

temy at the Gates, 530
 ineers, engineering, v, xi, 49, 69, 119-146, 356-358, 364-370, 379-380, 399, 440
 ighineers & Built Environment, *Section 33* (130-132)
 ertainment, 7, 63, 122, 133, 147, 149, 317, 569
 thrallment, xxvi, 101, 206, 235, 337, 496
 velopment, 15
 cape Geography, *Section 88* (359-361)
erything Goes: On Land (book), 132
 clusive agency, 49, 56-60, 187, 336-338, 510
 istential, 23, 63, 76, 105, 145, 330-332, 345, 379, 396, 403, 405, 408, 485
 plosives, 1, 19, 23, 29, 50, 76, 78, 83, 119, 125, 131, 144, 157, 171, 185, 206, 221, 300, 319, 381, 384, 406, 420, 431, 498, 536, 542
 tortion, 20, 67, 73, 114, 118, 126, 157, 186-187, 190, 198, 220-224, 229, 252, 258, 310, 316, 318, 322, 354, 364, 374, 539, 559, 562, 578
 ctortion, *Section 54* (220-222)
 traterritorial Jurisdiction, *Section 104* (419-421)
 lstaff, 74
 iled state(s), 1-2, 54, 155-157, 185, 192, 223, 227, 229, 289, 291-292, 344, 415
 mily, 11, 12, 65, 187, 195, 200-201, 223-224, 269, 322, 327, 347, 372, 413, 452, 536, 547, 575, 579,
 ARC, xxiv, 8-11, 42, 65, 67, 74, 105, 124, 133-138, 158-161, 170-171, 189-190, 204-209, 212, 223, 231-233, 236, 250-251, 266, 276, 280, 283, 320, 341, 357,
 360, 365, 367, 371-373, 385, 412, 417-418, 429-433, 471-474, 537, 542, 545-547, 550-551, see Colombia
 scism, 59, 105, 384, 387-392, 405, 496
 ulkner, William, 191, 411, 459
 hrenbach, T.R., 292
 lix, Bate, 21
ght Club, 27
 tzgerald, F. Scott, 528
 .N, xxiv, 434-442
 nseka, Sarath, 48, 93
 otball, (American football, the good stuff) xi, 147-150
rice 10 from Navarone, 385
rever Young (song), 383
r Whom the Bell Tolls (poem, book, movie, song), 393, 398, 472, 524
 reign Support and Foreign Perspective, *Section 137* (541-544)
 rts and Walls, *Section 91*(366-370)
 ance, xxiv, 21, 99, 116, 239, 243, 342, 402, 404-407, 434-442, 488-494, 525, 546, 553
 anklin, Benjamin, 104
 ench-Algerian War, 434-442
 edman, Milton, 158, 445, 503
 ost, Robert, 370
 unze, Mikhail, 30
 ilula, David, 97, 434-440, 589
 nteaume, Honoré, 491, 492
 nder, *Section 76* (319-321)
 ernal Leonard Wood, 244
 nocide Geography, *Section 105* (422-427)
 ography (the academic discipline), v, ix, xi, 262, 333-335, 422-427, 456, 557-561
 orge, King of England, 65, 276, 480
 to Boys, 173
t Smart, 257
 t Willy, *Section 51* (204-209)
la Monsters Meet You at the Airport (book), 453
 S, xi, xxiv, 10, 60, 119, 121, 128, 142, 178, 189, 198-199, 271-274, 291, 334, 347, 374, 450, 453, 454, 461, 493, 516, 557-558, 570-571
 S, *Section 66* (271-274)
 obal Insurgency and Global Trespass, *Section 128* (509-511)
 obalization, *Section 130* (516-520)
 obalization, 11, 213, 236, 239-247, 264, 279, 295, 323, 395, 403, 419, 502-503, 509-520
 oldman, Emma, 82
 lf, 60, 153, 571
arles George Gordon (book), 459

adding the Social Compact, *Section 48* (192-194)
 ant, Ulysses S., 3, 281, 464
 au, Les, 132
 aves Registration, *Section 92* (371-374)
 ayson, Private William, 239, 240
 eene, General Nathaniel, 21, 525
oundhog Day, 403
 atemala, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, 83-92, 99, 155, 172, 227, 320, 375-376, 542-544
 erre d'Algérie, *Section 107* (434-442)
 errilla war, the word guerrilla appears more than 260 times; working definitions can be found on pages xxiv and 25
 evara, Ernesto, 4, 40, 524
 ntram, Herb, 195, 589
ys and Dolls, 363
beas corpus, 5, 129, 207, 302, 373, 374, 498, 501, 535, 570
 asselhof, David, 432
 istings, Battle of, 6
 ushofer, Karl, 511
 yakawa, S.I., 464, 589
art of Darkness (book), 361
 avy Machines, *Section 29* (119-120)
 licopter, 45, 87, 360, 367, 434, 435, 440, 540, 551, 553, 554, 578, 594
 mingway, Ernest, 393, 524
 n-mut-too-yah-lat-kekht, 33
 tler, Adolf, 97, 109, 332, 389, 425, 472
 hfeldian Grievance Analysis, *Section 53* (215-219)
 oles in the Ground, *Section 31* (124-125)
 olmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., xii, 13, 162, 219, 321, 470, 593,
 olmes, Oliver Wendell, Sr., 338, 486
 olmes, Sherlock, 136, 520
omestar Runner (animated web comic), 234, 466
 nduras, 171, 212, 397, 476, 477
 pe and hopelessness, 10, 62, 64, 76, 118, 135, 298, 330-332, 338, 484, 486
 ow Violent Groups Form, *Section 26* (105-109)
 man Rights, *Section 125* (498-501)
 mboldt, Alexander von, 335
 me, David, 407
 brid war, ix, 223, 400-402, 525-528
 nnaccone, Larry, 75, 76
 entity, *Section 78* (326-329)
 D, Improvised Explosive Device, see explosives
 brication, xxv, 127-128, 227, 558
 munity, x, xxv, 1-3, 25, 27, 182, 184, 218, 226-227, 339, 341, 421, 426, 498-499, 521, 529-530
 punity, *Section 1* (1-3)
 punity, (The word impunity is used 297 times in this book, that is, in almost every section.) To understand how it is used in this book see v, x, xi, xii, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, 1-3, 22-27, 564
glorious Bastards, 100, 365
 itiative, 25, 30, 37, 43, 84, 89, 131, 138, 182, 204, 258, 268, 289, 297, 417, 431, 552, 569
 ITERPOL, International Criminal Police Organization, xxv, 202
 ventories, v, 6-10, 81, 108, 178, 204, 261, 326-327, 333-334, 337, 364, 408, 425, 440, 453, 462, 557, 570, 581-583 ; see also *Section 3, The Domesday Book*
 B, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 271
 KF, Indian Peacekeeping Force, 49
 iq, 45, 177, 211, 281, 286, 340, 362, 435, 538, 548
 It an Insurgency?, *Section 131* (521-524)
ve Got a Name (song), 329
 imché, *Section 21* (83-92)
 mes, Henry, 203, 380, 407
 mes, William, 169, 199, 219, 380
 rusalem, *Section 71* (293-298)

e Dirt, 78, 152, 315
egan's Run, 27
 hnson, Lyndon, 68
 mini, 14, 112, 113, 342, 589
 nes, R.V., 417, 467-468
 rge Verstrynge and Pio Moa, *Section 98* (395-398)
 rplan, David, 195, 589
 rplan, Robert, 486, 590
 nsas, ii, xxvi, 114, 128, 314, 379, 486, 504-508, 534, 544
 ss, Leon, 325
 eeping Secret, *Section 17* (65-68)
 lly, Ned, 185
 rnkraft 400, 398
 rrr, Elizabeth Margaret, 191
artoum, 118
 dnapping, 29, 91, 142, 198, 220-224, 236, 252, 255, 322, 325, 339, 364, 373-374, 414-415, 527, 528, 547, 580
 dnapping, *Section 55* (223-224)
lldozer, 194
 nmont Willy, 8, 547
 owledge Cultures, *Section 111* (454-459)
 owledge Gaps, *Section 110* (450-453)
 owles, Anne Kelly, 274
sovo (song), 474
 hn, Franz, 464
 utuzov, General Mikhail, 488
 marr, Hedy, 325, 468
 Amour, Louis, 208, 305, 591
nguage in Thought and Action (book), 464, 589
 rd (this is used as a whole word more than 300 times)
 nd Strategy, *Section 72* (300-305)
 dmines, see explosives
 nd-use Planning, *Section 32* (126-129)
 wrence, Kansas, 114, 504-508; T.E., 348-349; Taylor, 383
ap of Faith, 378
 avenworth, ii, xxiv, 38, 128, 446, 486, 504-507
 d Zeppelin, 203
 gitimacy, *Section 14* (52-55)
 nin, Vladimir I., 58, 112, 236-237, 563
Marais du Cygne (poem), 432
 wis, C. S., 72
 erating structures, 446-449
cense to Kill, 3
 ence to kill gophers, 60
 ncoln, Abraham, 92, 342, 486, 504-507
 nearity and the Line of Retreat, *Section 8* (28-30)
 es of communication, see LOC
 ie of retreat, xi, 20, 28-30, 35, 42, 60, 94, 116, 221, 331, 351, 366, 411, 471, 523-524, 531, 541, 552, 555-560, 567
 nkletter, Andro, 312
 oleum, 536
 OC(s), line(s) of communication, xi, 16, 19, 28-30, 44, 49, 87, 124, 134, 143, 157, 171, 172, 179, 183, 190, 223, 242, 251, 253, 276, 278, 301, 343, 349, 351, 366-367, 383, 390, 423, 440, 492, 493, 513, 520, 539, 541-542, 556, 558, 560, 562, 569, 579, 583
 well, James, 214
 TE, xxv, 46-51, 376, 543
 igi Galleani, *Section 134* (531-533)
 tther, Martin, 187, 232, 338, 510
 -19, xxv, 117-118, 376, 547
 achiaivelli, Niccolò, 111, 116, 233-234, 342, 591
 agical Realism, *Section 101* (408-411)
 aguire, T. Miller, 19-21, 98, 227, 241, 242, 264, 366, 456, 490, 516-519, 529, 539, 548, 553, 555
 ahan, Alfred T., 246

ajuba Hill, battle of, 241
 amet, David, 468
 alatesta, Errico, 95
 alkin, Michelle, 265
 ao Tse Tung, Zedong, 24, 37, 38, 43, 94, 95, 105, 161, 162, 321, 395, 396, 397, 401, 437, 488, 525, 556
 arkets, 7, 73-78, 82, 103, 126, 158-159, 233, 240, 249-256, 270, 279, 295-297, 303-310, 316-317, 322, 324, 346, 354, 357, 362, 366, 458, 467, 500-503, 516, 520
 arines, U.S., 76, 292, 366
 artinson, Charles, ii
ASH, (TV show), 468
 ass, concentration of military force, 14-18, 43, 111-115, 162, 267, 280, 516, 519, 570; political movement, 111, 236, 237, 477; murder, killing or destruction, 281, 375, 422-433, 544, 581
 arx, Groucho, 411
 arxism, xi, 76, 77, 89, 105, 208, 289, 386, 395, 399, 401, 404, 567, 517-519, see fascism
 arx, Groucho, 411
 arx, Karl, Marxism-Leninism, Marxists, xi, 76, 77, 89, 105, 208, 279, 289, 386, 395, 399-411, 437, 496-497, 509, 516-519, 522, 570
 assacres, *Section 106* (428-433)
au Mau Man-Hunt (book), 208
 axfield Parrish, 243
 easurement (of power, legitimacy, success), 13, 20, 26, 31, 33, 52, 63, 73, 78, 88, 94, 104, 111, 126, 138, 148-149, 158, 174, 186-187, 192-194, 197, 217-218, 223, 256-257, 258, 262-267, 274, 279-292, 301, 312, 316-318, 333-334, 336, 344, 370, 388, 408, 424, 458, 475, 481, 519, 527, 553, 554, 559, 561, 571
asuring America (book), 312
 easuring Effects of Actions on Enemies, *Section 69* (281-287)
 easuring Effects of Actions on Structure, *Section 70* (288-292)
 easuring Distance and Comparing Power, *Section 64* (262-267)
 ebarak, Shakira, 473, 474
 eir, Golda, 98, 298, 355
 encius, xxvi, 72, 381, 383
ending Wall (poem), 370
en in Black, 5
 ens Rea, *Section 23* (96-98)
ens rea, xxv, 32, 50, 96-98, 102, 207, 208, 237, 238, 249, 254, 282, 285, 331, 332, 343, 389, 392, 411, 426, 512, 532
 ercatus, *Section 19* (73-78)
 ercenaries, 233-234
 etrics (see measurement)
 exico, 87, 90, 92, 172, 190, 200, 223, 248, 254, 280
 ilitias and Gun Control, *Section 56* (225-230)
 ises, Ludwig von, 363
 isleading COIN Arts of Faith, *Section 120* (481-483)
onty Python and the Holy Grail, 55
 otorcycle, 8, 153, 179, 260, 307, 452
 ountains, 87, 99, 172, 205, 355, 359-361, 389-390, 433, 445, 528, 553
 usashi, Myamoto, 563
 ussolini, Benito, 344, 389
iked Gun: From the Files of Police Squad!, 530
 imath, Joe, 150
 ipoleon Bonaparte, 14, 18, 111, 113, 283, 332, 427, 487-490, 492, 518, 525, 552
ipoleon Dynamite, 515
id Kelley, 222
 :gotiations, *Section 102* (412-414)
 :lson, Admiral Horatio, Lord, 487, 491-492
 ogeography, 272, 444-445
 :rd Globe, *Section 129* (512-515)
 sting, 126, 536
 tworks, 59, 90, 94, 120, 133, 197, 205, 346, 367, 516, 543, 558, 567, 583
 :z Percé, 31-35
 OOs, IOs, and Unions, *Section 15* (56-61)
 kola Tesla, 240, 241
neteen Eighty-Four, 10

n-lethal weapons, 70, 342, 538, 543
 on-Violent' Action, *Section 27* (110-115)
 orris, Chuck, 95
 orwegians, 474, 634
 outhwest Ordinance, 129
 nchuku skills, 515
 ths, 472, 506
 Ballance, Edgar, 434,440,441, 593
 jective (as a concept of strategy), x-xii, 15-18, 25, 27, 43, 48, 52, 89, 92, 105, 122, 138, 153, 182, 216, 218, 262, 280, 296-298, 302, 334, 343, 359, 434, 436, 439, 465-466, 474, 481, 482, 500, 569
 fensive (initiative), 14, 30, 84, 87, 88-90, 92, 138, 148, 175, 183, 252,343, 366-370, 488, 514, 552
fice Space, 68
 sen, Merlin, 150
ri the Waterfront, 5
 oportunity cost, 263, 444
gazo, 162
 RPA, xxv, 83-92
riedo, *Section 97* (386-394)
 lonegro, battle of, 239, 243, 244
ipillon, 365
 rker, Theodore, 152
 rticularization of Power, *Section 126* (502-503)
 ul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck *Section 85* (348-353)
 ulus, Friedrich von, 28
 yeras, Mario, 84, 90
 nn, Sean, 544
 ralonso, battle of, 239, 241, 243
 ilippines and Philippine Insurrection, 99, 239-245, 265, 281
 ggy, Miss, 565
 lkey, Dav, 554
 nochet, Augusto, 421
pes, Richard, 308
rates of Penzance, 565
rhana 3DD, 432
 ace identity, 65, 149, 313, 314-315, 328, 334, 410, 534-535, 559
 att Amendment, 240, 245
 ints, Lines, Spaces, *Section 67* (275-276)
 lice or Military, *Section 45* (180-185)
 litical/Military/Administrative, *Section 44* (177-179)
 op, *Section 94* (379-380)
 pol Vuh, 91
 pular Support, *Section 40* (159-162)
 rtnoy, Gary, 561
 sner, Richard, 459, 594
 ostmodern and Post-structural, *Section 99* (399-403)
 ostmodernism, ix, 105, 198, 395-410, 570
 ost-structuralism, v, xiii, xxv, 58, 77, 96, 236, 335, 386, 395-411, 456, 477, 478, 510-511, 527, 561, 569-570; see also *Section 99, Postmodern and Post-structural*.
 welson, John, 103, 302, 308, 594
 abhakaran, Velupillai, 46-48
edator, 548
 esence, *Section 16* (62-64)
 imo de Rivera, José, 393
 ions and prisoners, 2, 123, 183, 207, 224, 270, 284, 285, 364-365, 373, 384, 391-392, 413, 423, 451, 486, 495, 531
 ions and Prisoners, *Section 90* (364-365)
blems of Strategy (book), 556
 operty, there are 276 instances of the use of the word *property*. Some of them are listed here: definition, 79; v, xi, 192-194, 293-318
 operty and the Social Compact, *Section 73* (306-312)
 otraction and Diligence, *Section 11* (40-43)

SOE, Socialist Workers' Party of Spain, xxvi, 387-393
 blic records, 4-10, 91, 174-174, 183, 193-194, 202, 218, 317, 567, 580
 rgatory, 186-188
 rsuit, 14-15, 18, 30, 35-39, 43, 45, 62, 114, 207, 282, 283, 320, 343, 359, 360, 367, 369, 440, 471, 481, 488, 552-554, 567, 569, 578
rsuit to Algiers, 520
[thukkudiyirippu](#), *Section 13* (46-51)
 ids, *Section 138* (545-548)
 japaksa, Mehinda, xxvi, 48-50, 93
 mis, Harold, 60, 98, 318, 403
 úl Reyes 67, 261, 542, 551 (Luis Devia was his given name)
 agan, Ronald, 104, 158, 172, 173, 201, 292, 453
 ar areas, see *base areas* and *sanctuaries*
d Dawn, 10
d vs Blue: Why Are We Here? (online animation comedy), 352
 fugees and Displaced Persons, *Section 74* (313-315)
 stitution, 102, 219, 285, 315, 347, 372, 415-418
 vel, Jean François, 238
 volutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, see FARC
 ce, Susan, 238
 sk Distance and the Pursuit, *Section 140* (552-554)
 k distance, 14, 15, 23, 30, 41, 45, 114, 260-265, 343, 356, 360, 361, 366, 370, 430, 492, 537, 540, 550, 552-554, 559, 578 (see also, *culminating point*)
 rers and riverine operations, 359-361
 vers, Bob, 474
 ach, Mary, 270
 adblocks and Checkpoints, *Section 63* (258-261)
ad to Morocco, 441
 bert Ardrey, 340, 427, 561, 585
 gers, Will, 414
 mmel, Erwin, 115, 512
 osevelt, Theodore, xii, 50, 179, 245, 246, 501
 osevelt, Eleanor, 556
 OTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps, 469
 ile-of-law, *Section 20* (79-82)
 ithlessness and Resolve, *Section 24* (99-100)
 V. Jones, *Section 114* (467-468)
 m Spade's Whereabouts, *Section 43* (174-176)
 nctuary, *Section 7* (22-27)
 nctuary, there are 191 instances of the use of the word *sanctuary*. Some of them are listed here: x, xxvi, 22-27, 31, 36, 62, 111, 207, 300, 343, 541
nta Fe Trail, 230
 rtre, Jean-Paul, 315, 571
 ale, *Section 68* (277-280)
 ale, there are 158 instances of the use of the word *scale*. Some of them are listed here: 8, 45, 277-280
arface, 100
 hool Lunches, *Section 37* (151-152)
 a and Aerospace Power, *Section 123* (491-494)
 ndak, Maurice, 109
 ven Strategy Strains, *Section 143* (562-563)
 x, *Section 77* (322-325)
 akira, 473, 474
 armat, Marjorie Weinman, 453
ie Wore A Yellow Ribbon, 551
 eridan, Phillip, 43
 ifting Covet-geographies, *Section 86* (354-355)
 nreich, Rick, 287
 .A, see Sri Lanka
 ivery and Underclass, *Section 124* (495-497)
 ivery, xxiv, 80, 100, 137, 152, 170, 213, 301, 304, 315, 322-324, 381, 430, 486, 495-497, 504-507, 534-536
 ugging, *Section 65* (268-270)
 ugging, 69, 87, 134, 171-173, 189, 196, 209, 213, 220, 250, 260, 264, 268-270, 281, 323, 424, 452, 465, 506, 523, 536, 558, 580

ipers and Assassins, *Section 133* (529-530)
 ipers, 119, 144, 181-184, 232, 360, 455, 507, 529-530
 cioeconomic Causation, *Section 39* (155-158)
 cial compact (there are 137 instances of the term social compact. A selection is listed here), 7, 67, 69, 104, 128, 149-150, 198, 216, 278, 302, 303, 324, 344, 346, 435, 475, 496, 500, 514, 560, 567, 573-575
 cialists, xxvi, 86, 129, 304, 386-392, 406, 428, 471, 532
 kal, Alan, 459
 ngs of Chu, *Section 116* (471-472)
 vereignty, *Section 52* (210-214)
 well, Thomas, 383, 561
 ackler, Carl, 60, 571
 anish Civil War, 112; *Section 97*, Oviedo (386-394); 613
 artacus, 93
 ecial operations units, 163, 166-168, 207, 233, 267, 275, 276, 320, 361, 439, 469, 514
 eed, v, 4, 43, 45, 85, 135, 162, 171, 231, 269, 279, 319, 367, 527, 539, 556
ies Like Us, 315, 449
 ion Kop, battle of, 239, 242
 ontaneity, *Section 59* (235-238)
uth Park, 115
 i Lanka, Army, SLA, 46-50; president of, xxvi, 93-94, 170, 376, 543; *Section 13*, [Puthukkudiyirippu](#) (46-51)
 . Augustine of Hippo, 564-565, 585
arship Troopers, 154, 494
 ewart, Rod, 383
 ategic Communication, *Section 117* (473-474)
 ategy of Aggregate Tactics, *Section 139* (549-551)
 atagem, 33, 543, 549, 555-556
 ategery, 462
 ategy, *strategy* or *strategic* are used over 520 times, so...whew, good luck
 icide, 19, 50, 76, 232, 281, 330-332, 396, 404, 471
 icide, *Section 79* (330-332)
 n Tzu, 43, 342, 556
 per Troopers, 254
 rge, 45
ken, 224
 ikeovers and Sieges, *Section 28* (116-118)
 mil Tigers, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE, xxv, 46-51, 376, 543
 pper, Jake, 118, 553, 595
 ixation and Debt, *Section 46* (186-188)
 xes, xxiii, 1, 12, 23, 25, 27, 49, 53, 57, 60, 75, 101, 123, 127, 145, 153, 170, 178, 186-188, 190, 193, 198, 202, 210, 212, 213, 216, 250, 258-261, 268, 272, 278, 303, 317, 337-338, 346, 354, 357, 380, 424, 430, 435, 441, 452, 463, 558, 573, 580-582
 ylor, Maxwell, 21
d, 540
rritorial Imperative (book), 340, 427, 561, 585
rritorial Scrutiny, *Section 49* (195-199)
 rritoriality, (there are at least 280 instances of the use of the word 'territory' or one of its derivatives -- so just take a stab)
 ssellation, xvi, 127-128, 227, 558
 atcher, Margaret, 568
ie Adventure of the Copper Beaches (book), 136
ie Adventures of Captain Underpants, 554
ie Anarchist (theatre production), 468
ie Big Lebowski, 548
ie Blues Brothers, 344
ie Bonfire of the Vanities (book), 421
ie Core, 515
ie Denver Broncos, *Section 36* (147-150)
ie Departed, 335
ie Dirty Dozen, 329
ie Domesday Book, *Section 3* (6-10)
ie Dot Game and Go, *Section 89* (362-363)
ie Dukes of Hazzard, 191

e *Family Guy* (TV show), 347
 eft, 1, 20, 29, 53, 97, 101, 162, 171, 173, 186, 220, 233, 250, 255-258, 311, 326, 418, 512, 515, 532, 533, 545, 547
 e Geography of Dope, *Section 61* (248-254)
 e *Godfather*, 63, 172-173, 187,
 e *Good Earth* (book), 318
 e *Great Locomotive Chase*, 548
 e *Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, 120
 e *Last American Hero*, 270
 e *Law of Nations* (book), 214
 e *Maltese Falcon*, 176
 e *Manchurian Candidate*, 123
 e *Matrix*, 123
 e *Mechanic*, 470
 e Operational Equation, *Section 6* (19-21)
 e *Outlaw Josey Wales*, 34, 418, 507
 e *Outpost* (book), 118
 e *Pirates of Penzance*, 565
 e *Powerpuff Girls* (TV show), 95
 e Price of Real Estate, and Tourism, *Section 75* (316-318)
 e *Proud Tower* (book), 418
 e *Reluctant Patriot* (song), 528
 e *Replacements*, 565
 e *Right Line of Centic* (book), 158, 588
 e Rock (nom de rastle of Dwayne Johnson), 409, 410
 e Royal Proclamation of 1763, 276
 e *Sandlot*, 232
 e *Searchers*, 224
 e *Terminator*, 511
 e *Town*, 257
 e *Walking Dead* (TV show), 347
 e *Walking Drum* (book), 208
 e *Warriors*, 199
 e *Waterboy*, 383
 e *Wizard of Oz*, 232, 254
 irty-six Stratagems, *Section 141* (555-556)
 omas, Tim, 111, 465, 555, 595
 ucydides, 18, 194, 459
 urism, 7, 88, 290, 316-318, 377, 444-445, 451, 580
 ynbee, Arnold, 287
 afalgar, 487, 491-492,
 ns-modal places, 261
 nsparency, 2, 5, 7, 8, 22, 26, 54, 193-194, 233, 274, 285, 310, 326-327, 443-444, 541, 560, 573, 580, 599
 nsportation, xxiv, 119, 128, 142, 193, 205, 226-227, 231, 249, 252-253, 260-263, 295, 333, 346, 354-355, 359, 360, 368, 376, 423, 461, 551, 553
 mors, 125
 inquier, Roger, 99, 434, 437-439, 595
 ogdor, 466
 otsky, Leon, 60, 238
 chman, Barbara, 419
 nnels, see *underground*
 rducken and Hybrid, *Section 132* (525-528)
 vain, Mark, 78, 235, 236
IX 1138, 344
 S. Persons, *Section 50* (200-203)
 AV, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, see drones
 m and Austerlitz, *Section 122* (487-490)
'Zana's Raid, 234
 erground (below the surface of the earth), 28, 87, 119, 124-125, 130, 141, 368, 528, 547, 567
 restricted Chi Whiz, *Section 113* (465-466)
 restricted warfare, 110-114, 246, 255, 395, 428, 465-466, 527-528, 562
 ough in *Smoke*, 203, 232

orton, Kate, 64
 Urban or Rural, *Section 34* (133-136)
 Urban warfare,
 Uribe Vélez, Álvaro, 10, 138, 139, 159, 161, 412, 413, 473-474, 476
 URNG, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, xxvi, 89, 90
Urtation, 318, 610
 Van Fleet, James A., 185
 Vanelleneuve, Pierre-Charles, 487, 492
Vision Quest, 411
 Van der Nouveau, *Section 60* (239-247)
 Warriors, 25, 29, 31-35, 91, 199, 351, 418, 465, 488, 512, 569
 Washington George, 93, 95, 115
 Water Wars, *Section 87* (356-358)
 Weapons, *Section 136* (537-540)
 Weapons, ix, 10, 17, 18, 23, 25, 34, 36, 50, 63, 81, 84, 87, 117, 119-120, 130, 137, 144, 157, 168, 170-172, 176, 181-182, 184, 206, 221, 225-230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, 246, 259, 264, 267, 281, 298, 302, 316, 318, 319, 327, 331, 332, 342, 350, 364, 375, 381, 389-392, 396, 414, 417, 419, 426, 431, 443, 447, 470, 498, 504, 506, 512, 513, 526, 527, 528-530, 537-540, 547, 550, 553, 567, 577, 578, 579, 582
 Wells, H. G., 449
 West, Diana, 45
 Westmoreland, William, 163-169
West Side Story, 145
 What a Clergy Wants, *Section 81* (336-338)
 What the Foucault?, *Section 100* (404-407)
 What the Pirate Said to Alexander, *Section 144* (564-565)
 Whereabouts, x, 4, 53, 104, 147, 153, 161, 196, 274, 302, 320, 323, 325, 373, 485-486, 523, 554
Where the Wild Things Are, 109
 White Bird, *Section 9* (31-34)
White Lightning, 261
 Whittier, John Greenleaf, 432
 Whole of Government, *Section 18* (69-72)
 Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?, *Section 83* (343-344)
 Why Humans Don't Fight, *Section 25* (101-104)
 Why the County, *Section 47* (189-191)
 Why You Should Like Geography, *Section 80* (333-335)
 Wiesner, Eliezer, 418
 Wolfe, Tom, 421
 WWF, World-Wide Wrestling Federation, xxv, 409
 Worborough, William, 163-169
 Wuknapatawpha, 191
 Your Staff Work Sucks, *Section 109*, (446-449)
Yumbieland, 570, 619
 Yumbies 77, 347, 398, 399, 404, 466, 518
Yumbie Nation (song), 398
 Yolander, 280, 358

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 "Strategize impunity."  
 Anonymous  
 ~~~~~


EPILOGUE

After distribution of what was supposed to be the final draft in January 2014, Tim Thomas, in addition to pointing out that some sentences and phrases no verb, raised a question -- How was it that the term *Al Qaeda* is found almost nowhere in the book? Had I not been on this planet for the last ten years? "What of it?" I explained. But I will try harder here. The precursor, *Winning Insurgent War*, began as a short essay on the continued applicability of classic strategic principles to insurgent war. At the time, in 2001, some irritating fashions were gaining influence. Insurgencies were being described as non-linear, protracted, ambiguous, amorphous, the by-product of underlying socio-economic injustices; and especially...they were uber-complex. In such volatile uncertainty, *winning* was demoted as an unattainable fixation of traditional military planning. Sociology offered a more sophisticated design process that would seek balance and favorable outcomes. The guidance smelled all of woe and guilt. On the back of such, the classic principles were tossed out of doctrinal literature on how to deal with organized murderers.

During the decade of not winning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many of us at the Foreign Military Studies Office hewed to the office mandate of looking at places and things that the rest of the Army could not. We concentrated on threats and experiences that were not from Iraq and Afghanistan. Those two places were building experts by the dozens of dozens, and so to enter the doctrinal debate with force (especially to challenge favored ideas), it seemed the better play to present lessons from other places and times. The many men and women who were coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan could then compare their newly-gained observations against something else. After all, we saw the mission of the office not just to observe and report on other places and phenomena, but to state the consequence -- to express the so-what. The effort, then, should not be to scoff at doctrinal fashion, but to pose those valid observations and explanations that would fuel a weightier, more substantial input to doctrine.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required of their prosecutors the use of a tailored and shape-changing suite of jargon, whereas we at FMSO remained free to use English. Deployed men and women also found themselves required to display fealty to operational ideas that may have been tied more surely to individual leaders and their cliques than they were to historical precedent or critical thinking. As the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 was being developed, terms like prison, child, extraterritorial, property, land, tunnels, sanctuary, or lines of communication were all but missing. Those terms and many others, meanwhile, seemed essential in light of global observations brought back to our office. Within this context, the term *Al Qaeda* gave way in the text of *Winning Insurgent War* to the names of other ill-doers like the FARC and the Tamil Tigers. Anyway, many of us feel that counterinsurgency must be addressed in one breath with insurgency -- that one cannot be understood without the other. Additionally, the United States will not always be on the counterinsurgent side of the ledger. We are by deeper tradition rebellious.

In light of all the above, rather than return to this book's sections to sprinkle in the term *Al Qaeda* (where along with it I would inevitably leave more typos and syntactic gaffes), I urge the reader to find *Al Qaeda* almost throughout. The section 'What a Clergy Wants' was not inspired by religious warfare in Colombia, of which there is little. Mention of franchises in 'How Violent Groups Form' was made with *Al Qaeda* in mind. American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan inspired the many references to drones. Moslem extremists were in the back of the mind when drafting sections on 'Sanctuary', 'Smuggling', 'Distance and the Measurement of Power', 'Suicide' and many others.

This book insists that geography is worth learning and re-learning. Latin America is closer than the Middle East or West Asia. While *Al Qaeda* and its similars are threats neither to be dismissed as distant nor despised as ineffectual, they are not the only threat. They might not have the most influence on our daily lives. If *Al Qaeda* can express itself at great distances, so can others, and the length of those distances still counts heavily in the exertion of power. Things and people (bad and good) who are physically closer to us will have more influence and power on and over us. Mexico is a bit closer than Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Cuba is closer. Colombia and Venezuela are closer. Britain and Spain and Japan and Korea are all closer. It seems that a failed *Al Qaeda* attack or the video of an ISIS decapitation will continue to get greater media reaction than would multiple decapitations perpetrated by a Mexican drug gang. Maybe that makes sense given the apparent randomness of terror attacks perpetrated by elements of radical Islam. Still, the insidious presence of criminal organizations is widely felt. Kansas City is no border town, but it suffers violent transnational crime.

For a while, it looked as though Norway might win the 2014 Olympic Games. Norway has a population of five million. I hope those folk don't turn to the dark side. With global warming proceeding as it isn't, they could ski over the top and get us just like that.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Table of Contents

2. Identify the worst places. Locate the congruence of conditions that favor the germination of violent resistance groups as described in the above paragraphs, highlighting the qualitative as well as quantitative characteristics of those places.	70
8. Gather knowledge about all groups and institutions, not only of resistance franchise packages and agents, but of the groups and institutions they oppose.	70
“I prefer an ugly truth to a pretty lie. If someone is telling me the truth that is when I will give my heart.” Quotelicious.com. ‘Shakira Quotes’.	247
Joes, Anthony James. Urban Guerrilla Warfare. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007.	308
Record, Jeffrey. Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009.	310