

Foreign Military Studies Office

OE WATCH

FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT



Special Essay: China's New Defense White Paper The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces: **Have We Really Learned Anything?**

Vol. 3 Issue #7 July 2013
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Contracted Logistics: A Russian Perspective on Military Outsourcing

OE Watch Commentary: *The Russian Federation has been engaged in large-scale military reforms, often called the “New Look” reforms, since 2008. Issues of military transformation such as the adoption of the brigade system, reducing the number of military districts, officer reductions, and altering the C2 structure of the Russian Armed Forces have typically been the topics that have dominated public interest.*

One issue that has received relatively little attention is that of logistics reform. In general, the Russian Federation has scrapped its Soviet-era logistic system in favor of a more “streamlined” Western system. This transition has been difficult. There has been much debate if these “New Look” reforms have really been helpful. There is a view that not only have these reforms not been helpful, but that they also have disrupted the old methods of insuring accountability. Some commanders have complained that now no one is accountable for problems in the new system.

*As the accompanying article discusses, one of the most controversial aspects of logistic reforms is the replacement of soldiers who performed logistical and maintenance functions with civilians who have been hired by third-party contractors. Again, this has been another reform that has been rife with problems; initially enacted as a cost-saving measure, pundits are now speculating that this reform is only degrading the combat effectiveness of the Russian Armed Forces. **End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles)***

Source: Vladimir Shcherbakov, “Misconceived Logistics: Provisioning of the Armed Forces needs priority attention,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Military Edition* (online), 24 May 2013, <http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2013-05-24/1_nedorazumenie.html>, accessed 20 June 2013.

Misconceived Logistics: Provisioning of the Armed Forces needs priority attention

...The policy of “blindly” copying western standards and approaches to creating such logistics systems without vetting whether they comport with Russian realities and the posture of the RF Armed Forces proved disastrous. Effectively, the RF Armed Forces adapted not even a copy but an imitation of western logistics, the old system was almost completely torn down, and the many decades of know-how paid for not only out of public funds but also with military sweat and blood was relegated “to the scrap heap of history.”...

...At a State Duma round table held on November 14, 2012, Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev, commander of the 58th army from 2004 to 2006, pointed out: “A commander must have both logistical and technical support agencies and requisite units, forces and detachments. The army currently has no real logistics forces at all such as there used to be. There is no echeloning of ammunition and other materiel. It all needs to be reinstated.”...

...For example, in a federal newspaper interview, a representative of the Southern Military District command noted that among district forces the logistics battalions and brigades were on average 80% staffed, and not more than 5% of the personnel have knowledge of or experience in armored vehicle repair. And only about 1% of the personnel can perform a relatively complex repair of electrics, command, control and communication systems, stabilizers, and so on. “The rest have only been trained to wave a sledgehammer around, and even that poorly. The picture is not likely to be very different in other districts,” the interviewee said....

...And while about 80% of required arms and materiel repair work was reliably performed in Soviet times, today, the expert claims, outsourcing of the primary functions has left the maintenance and repair units poorly functional. They are able to perform no more than 10% of scheduled work at the tactical level, and even then only basic maintenance, if there are enough spare parts....

...Russian experts now acknowledge that it was a major mistake to transfer to outside contractors the supply of materiel to the troops and to set up centralized supply of spare parts, units, assemblies and materials for maintenance and repair of arms and materiel in the forces. This runs completely contrary to today’s military trends and does not conform to the scheme existing in the armies of the leading foreign countries whose experience was constantly being cited by those who introduced such innovations....

...“Equipment that has been overhauled or undergone intermediate maintenance and is under warranty often breaks down during the first months of operation,” said Army General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. According to him, the results of the exercises showed that only 66% of airplanes and helicopters are in working order, and many Msta-S SPGs and BMD-2s could not leave the depot due to wear-and-tear and breakdowns....



Repair outsourcing was acceptable at military units’ permanent bases. Problems arose when the units were deployed on missions hundreds of kilometers away. Photo – Oleg Vladykin
http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2013-05-24/1_nedorazumenie.html?print=Y

(continued)

Continued: Contracted Logistics: A Russian Perspective on Military Outsourcing

This last point is especially important because, as a source familiar with the current situation in this area told the author, the reform has meant that at no level of the army is there a clear line of responsibility between the military agencies for maintaining combat readiness by having available arms and materiel in good working order. The military agencies that used to be directly responsible for organizing the operation and repair of arms and materiel no longer have subordinate forces and assets, have no ability to take operational decisions, and only introduce into combined administrative and planning logistics documents proposals for their own specific procurement needs....

...As a result, information reaches the troops late and is incomplete, and a large circle of people have access to the information, which presents a security risk. Vasily Vorobyev, a retired lieutenant general and doctor of economic sciences who headed the RF Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Budget and Finance from 1991 to 1995, wrote in one of his articles: "The US military leadership is not trying (as we have done) to have the private sector replace civilian employees in the military because the experience and qualifications of those employees are higher overall than those of the employees of potential contractors." Ultimately, he believes, the result of the massive move to civilian outsourcing has been that the RF Armed Forces "are losing self-sufficiency during wars, emergencies and disasters."...

...This would seem to require the RF Defense Ministry to, firstly, decide whether to improve the logistics system as a unified structure under a unified command going forward, or set up, as used to be the case, separate specialized military agencies that can resolve technical, logistical and other provisioning issues on the spot; and secondly, review as soon as possible the functional purpose of the specialized military agencies to eliminate duplication of functions and restore procurement functions to them, which will make it possible to establish ultimate responsibility of the commanders (leaders) for work performance under their supervision....

...Georgy Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, said that without adequate logistics, any brilliantly designed operation will just be pretty arrows on paper. And if the Defense Ministry leadership plans to defeat the enemy, it must immediately focus on logistics. Otherwise it may have to be improved under falling missiles and bombs.



Mobile workshops, complete with state-of-the-art equipment, have been coming to the maintenance units that are once again being set up in the armed forces. Author's Photo http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2013-05-24/1_nedorazumenie.html?print=Y

Major Combat Service Support Units
of the Russian Federation Ground Forces




Click on the image to see a higher resolution version of this organizational map. A more detailed version of this map is available on page 7.

(continued)

Continued: Contracted Logistics: A Russian Perspective on Military Outsourcing

Click on the image to see a higher resolution version of this organizational chart.




Presentation by former Chief of the General Staff Army-General Nikolai Makarov, Moscow, 17 November 2011. (Click on the image to see a higher resolution version of this organizational chart.)

(continued)

Continued: Contracted Logistics: A Russian Perspective on Military Outsourcing

Click on the image to see a higher resolution version of this organizational chart.



Presentation by former Chief of the General Staff Army-General Nikolai Makarov, Moscow, 17 November 2011. (Click on the image to see a higher resolution version of this organizational chart.)

(continued)

Continued: Contracted Logistics: A Russian Perspective on Military Outsourcing

Major Combat Service Support Units
of the Russian Federation Ground Forces



Western Joint Strategic Command		Southern Joint Strategic Command		Central Joint Strategic Command		Eastern Joint Strategic Command			
6th Army (St. Petersburg)	20th Army (Nizhny Novgorod)	49th Army (Stavropol)	58th Army (Vladikavkaz)	2nd Army (Samara)	41st Army (Novosibirsk)	29th Army (Chita)	35th Army (Belogorsk)	36th Army (Borzya)	5th Army (Ussuriysk)
51 БрМТО (St. Petersburg)	БрМТО 69 (Mulino)	99 БрМТО (Maykop)	78 БрМТО (Prokhladny)	105 БрМТО (Roshinsky)	101 БрМТО (Novoaltaysk)	104 БрМТО (Chita)	103 БрМТО (Belogorsk)	102 БрМТО (Gusinoozyorsk)	101 БрМТО (Ussuriysk)
216 БХПБТ (Petrozavodsk)	99 БХПБТ (Tver)		230 БХПБТ (Dachnoye)	262 БХПБТ (Boguchar)	104 БРПХБТ (Aleysk)	227 БРПХБТ (Divisonaya)	240 БХПБТ (Belogorsk)	225 БРПХБТ (Yasnaya)	237 БХПБТ (Bikin)
	103 БРПХБТ (Shilovo)				187 БРПХБТ (Nizhneudinsk)		261 БХПБТ (Makovaya Pad)		245 БХПБТ (Lesozavodsk)
							243 БХПБТ (Khabarovsk)		247 БХПБТ (Sibirtsevo)

This graphic depicts known major Combat Service Support units of the Russian Federation Ground Forces, and their suspected organizational structure. These units are Joint Strategic Command level assets, but are each attached to one of ten Combined Arms Armies. The “Armaments Storage and Maintenance Depots” and “Military Supply Depots” are brigade sized assets and are presumably tasked to provide depot level logistical support and maintenance services to the maneuver brigades. The “Material-Technical Support Brigade” is a new structure in the Russian Ground Forces that brings units from the Soviet era “Rear Services” and “Armaments Branch” under one command. Each Combined Arms Army has a supporting “Material-Technical Support Brigade” and it appears that the size, composition and capabilities of the brigades are far from uniform, having a variety of units, ranging from motor transport and supply to pipeline construction and route security.



Russia's Strategic Mobility

Supporting 'Hard Power' to 2020?

By Roger N. McDermott

http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3587.pdf

Roger N. McDermott's *Russia's Strategic Mobility: Supporting 'Hard Power' to 2020?* examines the rapidly changing Russian military's strategic capabilities for logistics, combat service support, and force projection. McDermott's work for The Russia Studies Programme of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) sheds light on the unglamorous, but vitally important logistic backbone upon which the Russian military relies. Roger N. McDermott is a Senior International Fellow for the Foreign Military Studies Office.



APRIL 2013

How Turkish Protests Influence Russian Demonstrations— on 12 June and Beyond

12 June 2013

OE Watch Commentary: On 12 June 2013 approximately 10,000 to 15,000 Russians (depending on reports) marched peacefully throughout Moscow, demanding a “Russia Without Putin,” and release of political prisoners arrested on 6 May 2012 who protested against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inauguration that month, and who are now facing up to ten years in prison. The 12 June 2013 protest was held shortly after mass demonstrations in Turkey. On the eve of 12 June some Russian press reports, such as the accompanying excerpts, expressed support and admiration either for Turkish citizens who are protesting against Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s authoritarian rule, or Turkey itself in comparison with Russia. They also express disappointment with complacent, by comparison, Russian citizens.

In the first excerpt, Deputy Chief Editor of online Sobesednik.ru (Interlocutor) and recipient of the Anna Politkovskaya prize for journalism Anton Zaritsky notes that as “the world is ablaze,” Russia is the only country that remains quiet. Zaritsky asks rhetorically whether or not this is a good thing. “Many Russian commentators,” he writes, “...note that even in Turkey civil society is more mature, and people are better organized than in Russia.” He also makes several comparisons between third world countries and Russia, noting that Russians are complacent compared to Pakistanis and Venezuelans, who, he observes, had managed to hold their governments more accountable than the Russians. “It is difficult to perceive Russia today in any way other than as the proverbial ‘Upper Volta with missiles,’ ” he adds.

In the second excerpt, Russian parliamentarian Ilya Ponamarev, a member of the opposition Just Party, says the protests in Turkey should serve as a warning to the Russian government, because in a society frustrated with its government anything can spark a protest. After all, he says, environmental concerns were only a pretext in Turkey for protest. Prime Minister’s Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarianism is the real reason. Ponamarev also urges more Russian citizens to come out on 12 June to maintain pressure on the Russian government.

In the last excerpt, from the more centrist Vedomosti’s (News), Pavel Kisilev opines that Turkey and Russia had both embarked on the same reforms roughly at the same time—in the first half of 1800s, but achieved different results, hinting that Turkey has been more successful. “Turkey has healed its post-imperial complexes, built a secular state with a developing economy, working political institutions. As the mass protests of recent weeks show, the society is ready to defend these civil and



Source: Anton Zaritsky, “ Как протесты в Турции унижают Россию / Мир полыхает: греки бастуют, турки бузят, Швеция стоит на ушах. Только в России тишь да гладь и божья благодать. Хорошо ли это — и надолго ли это? “ (The World is Ablaze: the Greeks are striking, the Turks are rioting, Sweden has turned Upside Down on Its Head. Only in Russia it’s Peaceful and Quiet. Is this good - and How Long Will It Last? Sobesednik.ru (Interlocutor), 5 June 2013 <http://www.sobesednik.ru/politics/20130605-kak-protesty-v-turtsii-unizhayut-rossiyu>

How Turkish Protests Humiliate Russia. The World is Ablaze: the Greeks are Protesting, the Turks are rioting, Sweden has Turned Upside Down on Its Head. Only in Russia it’s Peaceful and Quiet. Is This Good - and How Long Will It Last?

Many Russian commentators strive compared the events in Turkey, with three-year- old situation surrounding the Khimki forest - and note that even in Turkey civil society is more mature, and people are better organized than in Russia. Residents of Istanbul and Ankara have taken to heart the fact that the police dispersed a peaceful camp of protectors, spraying tear gas and lighting on fire at night tents with people in them - so close that they decided to answer, as Vladimir Putin would have said, “symmetrically,” erecting barricades and setting fire to offices of the ruling Islamist party. . .

The Turks, we repeat, have shown that they can stand up for themselves, and for sure will cope without us. To us the most interesting thing is that Russia really fell out of the global political context. From the outside it is difficult to perceive Russia today in any way other than as the proverbial “Upper Volta with missiles,” a source of important resources, ruled by unpredictable people, however, always ready to compromise “on the concepts.”

Some Russians even in this position find reasons to be proud. . . Those, however, who are trying to comprehend what is happening at least somewhat find it all the more difficult to ignore the fact that those whom is it accepted to consider s “third world” more and more rapidly outrun us in the movement to a real rule by the people.

Take Pakistan: despite dozens of terrorist acts perpetrated by Islamists, citizens have come to the polls and elected a secular parliament, so different that most intransigent opponents will be forced to come to the table and learn to cooperate, working together for the benefit of the voters.

Take, finally, Venezuela, in a political situation in which, after the death of Hugo Chavez. . . After many thousands of opposition protests that took the lives of several people. . . President Nicolas Maduro was forced to make concessions to

(continued)

Continued: How Turkish Protests Influence Russian Demonstrations— on 12 June and Beyond

secular values,” writes Kisilev.

Although Turkey made great strides in early 2000s in terms of growth and regional leadership, its political path has been less progressive. Indeed, more journalists remain imprisoned in Turkey than in Russia, according to Reporters Without Borders. But for some Russians, as these excerpts suggest, the relevance is that Turkish citizens, unlike Russia’s, are standing up for themselves and demanding greater accountability from their government. End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)

1. Gabriela Baczynska and Alexei Anishchuk, “ Russian protesters march as Putin seeks firmer political footing,” Reuters, June 12, 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/12/us-russia-protest-putin-idUSBRE95B0LG20130612>. Lynn Berry, “ Anti-Putin Protests: Thousands March Against Russian President In Moscow,” June 12, 2013, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/anti-putin-protests-russian-president-moscow_n_3427180.html
2. Lynn Berry, “ Anti-Putin Protests: Thousands March Against Russian President In Moscow,” June 12, 2013, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/anti-putin-protests-russian-president-moscow_n_3427180.html
3. Anna Politkovskaya was a Russian journalist and human rights advocate who reported on Russian government’s human rights abuses in Chechnya and was subsequently murdered in October 2006.

nearly half of the citizens of Venezuela who did not support him...

But Russia, where the election of the mayor of the country’s capital suddenly appear on the political horizon only when the authorities decide that the time has come for them, and where until this moment no one is emphatically touched by that, that huge city with a population of two Finlands is operated in manual mode. As they say, feel the difference.

Source: “Илья Пономарёв: Бунт в Турции – это важный урок для России Поводом для массовых волнений может стать что угодно (Ilya Ponomarev: Riot in Turkey - is an important lesson for Russia. The reason for the mass unrest could be anything) (New Region2), 5 June 2013 <http://www.nr2.ru/moskow/443221.html>

Ilya Ponomarev: Riot in Turkey is an important lesson for Russia. Reason for the mass unrest could be anything

The thousands-large anti-government rallies and revolutionary sentiments in Turkey should be a lesson for the Russian government. Turkey has shown that a cause for protests can be anything. Also the people of Russia should come out en masse on June 12 to the “March against executioners”, since this is an additional reason to make a psychological impact on the country’s leadership and demonstrate that the protest movement is gaining momentum. In an interview for a joint media project video agenda VIPcomments RIA “New Region” said State Duma deputy of the Just Russia party Ilya Ponomarev.

He stressed that Turkey and Russia have common characteristics. “Turkey, as well as Russia – is a divided nation. About half of the population of Turkey holds a nationalist, Islamic position and supports, therefore, the current government. And about half holds the positions of so-called Kemal Ataturk, the secular authority - support the army and oppose an Islamic revolution towards some traditional values, as does Prime Minister Erdogan, “ said Ponomarev.

According to him, Turkey did not have environmental protests as such; it was simply an excuse for mass unrest. “It’s just such a mobilizing factor that - a very important lesson for Russia, which is actually the reason for the mass action could be anything....

In addition, he expressed assurance in the need to strengthen the protest movement in Russia. “I believe that this march [on June 12-AB clarification] is a very important psychological moment... Of course, the government will not fall from our coming out to this march, but we cannot reduce our presence, our pressure, but instead increase it,” said Ponomarev.

Source: Pavel Kisilev, “От редакции: Россия и Турция, соседи-соперники. Россия и Турция начали реформы почти одновременно, но их результаты существенно отличаются (Editorial: Russia and Turkey, Neighbors-Competitors. Russia and Turkey Initiated Reforms at the Same Time but the Results Differ Substantially) Vedomosti (News), June 10, 2013, http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/12937301/vnutrennyaya_turciya

Editorial: Russia and Turkey, Neighbors-Competitors. Russia and Turkey Initiated Reforms at the Same Time but the Results Differ Substantially

Turkey has healed its post-imperial complexes, built a secular state with a developing economy, working political institutions. As the mass protests of recent weeks show, the society is ready to defend these civil and secular values, although the confrontation is unlikely to be a long one. The middle class has a lot to lose. A more important indicator of certain success in the development of Turkey’s legal society is the fact that the country at some point came close to EU membership.

OE Watch Commentary: *The Russia-Iran partnership is complex. Indeed, on the surface it may appear baffling that countries that have a history of rivalry in much of the 19th and 20th centuries are now cooperating. Yet both sides have many common interests. One aspect of this relationship which the Western press rarely emphasizes is Iran's influence in Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Caucasus. The following excerpts from Russian experts reveal the importance of this issue (among others) in Moscow-Tehran cooperation.*

On 3 June 2013 CentrAsia.ru reprinted an opinion by Middle East expert Sergey Pivin. The article originally appeared in Novoye Vostochnoye Obozreniye (New Eastern Outlook.) Pivin calls for closer Russia-Iran ties. Arguing that the Kremlin has hurt Russia in recent years by supporting too much the international sanctions against Iran to curtail its "unproven" nuclear ambitions, Pivin believes the support Moscow has given the West on the sanctions hurt Russia's image and worsened its relations with Iran. Furthermore, he believes the sanctions hurt Russia's small-to-medium-sized enterprises. He mentions the convergence in recent years between Moscow's and Tehran's position on supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and combating "international terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime."

He then notes the importance of Tehran's role in Russia's "underbelly," including Central Asia. "We should not underestimate the scale, power and geopolitical position of Iran in the region," he writes, adding that good relations between the two countries could foster increased cooperation, rather than competition in the region.

Though Pivin devotes much attention in his article to the business side of the relationship, the tone of his article seems to suggest that Iranian influence in Central Asia is not to be discounted. While he notes a decline in the nearly \$4 billion Russo-Iranian trade in 2012, this trade is minor in value compared to, for example, \$44 billion in trade between Russia and Belarus, or \$88 billion with China in 2012.

On 5 June 2013 Russian Deutsche Welle analyzed the Russia-Iran partnership. Here too Iran's regional role stands out. "Russia's main interest lies in the fact that the region remains calm," writes Mikhail Bushuyev of Deutsche Welle. Bushuyev quotes Russia expert Fyodor Lukyanov, well known in the West. Lukyanov says that stability in the Caspian region, South Caucasus, and Central Asia to large extent depends on Iran.



Russia expert Fyodor Lukyanov, via <http://www.stanford.edu>

Source: Sergey Pivin, "С.Пивин: Россия – Иран. Важность дружественного взаимодействия" (S. Pivin: Russia and Iran: the Importance of Friendly Interaction), CentrAsia.ru, 3 June 2013 <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1370230860>

Russia and Iran: the Importance of Friendly Interaction

Due to a number of factors, both objective and subjective, multidirectional Russian-Iranian relations in recent years began to flag. What is the cause of this phenomenon?

In recent years, it turned out that we got so carried away with the international sanctions against the unproven "Iran's nuclear ambitions," we not only reduced a significant military-technical cooperation with Iran, but also inflicted material and reputational damage to ourselves. At the end of the previous decade, trade between Russia and Iran amounted to 3.7 billion dollars, of which 80 percent was exported to Russia, which mostly benefited small and medium-sized businesses. By the end of 2012 this trade was down by over 40 percent, to just \$ 2.3 billion. Russian exports to Iran declined by nearly \$1 billion (2.96 billion dollars in 2008 and 1.9 billion in 2012). The result - dozens of bankrupt Russian medium-sized companies, where worked hundreds, if not thousands of Russian citizens. The budget of the Russian Federation under-received funds because of this.

Some international and Russian observers access these actions as yet another concession to Russia to the West. It turns out that we sometimes let out partners down for the benefit of the West's favor? But why gain it paying a price, and to their own detriment?

I recall the events of the late 1980s, when an incident took place in Russian-American talks about the interaction of the USSR with India on the sale of the last cryogenic engines, manufactured at a factory in Moscow... [with regard to Iran we] once again "step on the same rake," without reaching any conclusions for ourselves...

Returning to the Russian-Iranian relations, it may be noted that in the last year

(continued)

Continued: Moscow and Tehran's Complex Partnership

However, the situation is more complex. Moscow, Lukyanov observes, also benefited from international sanctions, giving Russia's oil and gas market an advantage in the international market. At the same time, he says, sanctions did preclude greater Kremlin-Tehran economic cooperation, preventing certain large oil and gas companies from entering the Iranian market.

Indeed, Moscow and Tehran share concerns about Afghanistan post-2014. Russia and Iran have a shared antipathy of the Taliban, which historically is anti-Shia and anti-Russian. Russia and Iran are also directly impacted by narco-trafficking coming out of Afghanistan. Moreover, as Pivin observed, Tehran and Moscow support Bashar al-Assad in Syria and do have business interests there. Though it is not mentioned in the articles, Moscow and Tehran also share an anti-Western ideology, and Moscow perceives Iran's nuclear program as less threatening than does the West. While Pivin laments that Moscow-Tehran ties have flagged in recent years, according to Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi, Iran's ambassador to Russia, "there is almost no other state such as Russia, which has so many common interests and common views with Iran." Iranian sources such as the hardline daily Resalat note the hope Tehran places in Russian Vladimir Putin's recent return to the presidency and ability to resist the West. Nikolai Bobkin, chief editor of Russian magazine Delovoi Iran (Business Iran) describes the "unusual for official circles candor" with which Iranian diplomats talk about Russia as its closest ally and argues that Moscow and Tehran have grown closer because of the Syrian crisis.

Iran's influence in the region is an important piece that deserves more attention. **End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)**

1. Radio Iran Russian Service, "Интервью корреспондента русской службы ГИРИ с послом Ирана в Москве сейед Махмуд-Резой Саджади," October 17, 2012 [Sorry that the link is so long. I don't know why it comes out like this and can't find a shorter link....]
<http://russian.irib.ir/analitika/interview/item/157078>
2. Nikolai Bobkin, "Сирийский конфликт: Иран – союзник России (Syrian conflict: Iran—Russia's Ally)," Mir-politika.ru, 4 January 2013. <http://mir-politika.ru/2971-siriiskiy-konflikt-iran-soyuznik-rossii.html>

(2012-2013) there is some convergence of views between the two countries on the fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. There is an apparent understanding in Moscow and Tehran about the need to support the current administration of Syria led by B. Assad....

At a press conference in April in Moscow, Iran's ambassador to Russia Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi...invited Russian investors to invest their funds in various projects that would benefit both Iran and Russia.

According to the ambassador, Iran possesses reliable legislation for the protection of investments and businesses are feeling it. Despite the "crippling sanctions," Iran continues to live and develop. Over the past years, a lot of factories and other businesses were built [in Iran] with the money of foreign investors and their products were successfully exported abroad...

From our perspective, we can say that this country [Iran] is one of the ten countries that launch satellites, and biotechnology is also developed there. The large in scope is also the field of energy, which Russia could also enter more actively.

We should not underestimate the scale, power and geopolitical position of Iran in the region. Our historical and traditional partner and ally could play a bridging role in the strengthening of Russian positions in Central and SouthWest Asia, despite the fact that Iran itself has its own strategic goals in this southern "underbelly" of Russia. We could, rather than compete in these regions for influence, interact quite successfully in the interests of all parties involved.



Iran's ambassador to Russia Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi, via <http://en.rian.ru>

Source: Mikhail Bushuyev, "Что сближает Россию и Иран" (What Brings Together Russia and Iran), Deutsche Welle in Russian, 5 June 2013 <http://www.dw.de/>

What Brings Together Russia and Iran

Russia, by selling nuclear technology and weapons to Iran, is its important partner. About what still unites Moscow and Tehran, German and Russian experts told DW ...

Russia's main interest lies in the fact that the region remains calm. "Iran - a country from which to a large extent depends on the stability in the Caspian region, the South Caucasus and even in Central Asia", -said Russian expert [Fyodor] Lukyanov.

(continued)

Continued: Moscow and Tehran's Complex Partnership


Despite the differences in their approaches to solving the problem section of the Caspian Sea, both countries intend to maintain the status quo. Just like Russia, Iran worries the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces in 2014. "The possibility of strengthening of extremist groups in the region, particularly in Afghanistan, is now a bigger threat than the Iranian nuclear program," – says [Walter] Posh....

Moscow, on the one hand, benefits from the tension between Iran and Western countries. After all, one of the competitors in the Russian oil and gas market is isolated and is not involved in the fight for the European market attractive. However, all is not so simple, Fyodor Lukyanov added: "The gas market is changing rapidly. Now a threat to the Russian gas sector is not Iranian, and shale gas and LPG..."

However, the same sanctions on Iran rather strongly constrain also the economic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. Thus, the Russian oil company Lukoil has been forced to curtail its business in Iran. U.S. sanctions against companies doing business in Iran put the Russians before a choice - either work in the United States or continue their business in Iran. Lukoil chose the former.

Probably also because of the threat of sanctions by the United States did not enter the Iranian market and a subsidiary of Gazprom ---Gazprom Oil. The Russians were planning to develop Azar oil field in Iran's south-western province of Ilam.

Affected by the UN sanctions are suppliers of Russian weapons. In 2010, Russia did not fulfill its contract to supply anti-aircraft missile systems S-300. According to the Russian side, the losses from non-performance amounted to hundreds of millions of euros.



Tim Thomas's *Recasting the Red Star* describes Russia's culture of military thought through its modernization effort. Adding to his robust library of work on the subject, Tim Thomas illuminates Russia's Defense Ministry reform efforts, the Russian national security strategy take on the operational environment, and a relevant review of the Russian military doctrine.

Chechens Fighting with Syrian Opposition?

6 April 2013

OE Watch Commentary: *About two dozen fighters from the North Caucasus were reportedly killed in February during a battle in Aleppo while fighting for the Syrian opposition. The alleged report may be evidence of a marked increase in the number North Caucasus rebels who have joined in the struggle against Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. This allegation was purportedly confirmed by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, who, during an official visit in February to Moscow for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, suggested that these fighters are from Chechnya. According to inside opposition sources, the insurgents from the North Caucasus represent the second largest foreign group supporting the Syrian opposition, second only to Libya, although official numbers are difficult to confirm. In the accompanying article, Muallem claims that the mercenaries were recruited by the radical Islamist group, Dhabat al-Nusra, a Syrian rebel force created in January 2012 with ties to al-Qaeda and past participation in terrorist attacks. The group draws support from fighters from a diverse range of states and regions, including the North Caucasus, Libya, and Jordan.*

President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov denies official Chechen participation in the Syrian conflict. In the second excerpt, Kadyrov states that the Chechens fighting for Syria's opposition are not endorsed by Chechnya or its people. These ethnic Chechens were recruited in Turkey by the leader of the "Shari'a of Ichkaria," who, Kadyrov claims, is trying to tarnish Chechnya's image abroad. The Chechen fighters support the opposition because of the potential financial gain, not ideological motivation, according to Kadyrov. It is important to note also that not all of these ethnic Chechens are necessarily from the North Caucasus. Syria has a Chechen population of around 6000, which raises the possibility that a portion of these ethnically Chechen fighters are actually Syrian residents.

In the event that the Assad regime falls, support for the new regime by anti-Russian and anti-Putin Chechens further increases the risk that Russian-Syrian relations would turn sour, in part because of Putin's lack of support for the opposition and firm stance that Russia and other outside states have no business interfering with Syria's internal affairs, especially when the opposition's strategy for transition is so unclear. The support from anti-Russian and anti-Putin Chechens could complicate the relationship even more, as the new regime would likely take on an anti-Russian bias. Aside from the push for an anti-Russian orientation, the presence of Chechen fighters also boosts the possibility of a radical Islamist government replacing the Assad regime because of the



Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, via <http://english.al-akhbar.com>

Source: Victor, Vasilev. "Чеченские боевики в Сирии: сначала война с Асадом, а затем? (Chechen fighters in Syria: first the war with Assad, then what?)" *Голос Америки*. 7 March 2013. <http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/syria-chechen-fighters-comments/1616816.html>

Article #1:

"Almost two dozen jihadists from the North Caucasus were killed in February in Aleppo, said cited sources posted by the Syrian opposition camp...Chechen fighters make up the second largest foreign force battling against the Assad regime..."

...Earlier, the Head of the Foreign Ministry of Syria Walid Muallem paid an official visit to Russia, and said that on the side of the Syrian opposition were fighters from Chechnya. According to him, the radical Islamist group 'Dhabat en-Nusra' ('Front of the support for the Syrian people') recruited mercenaries.

Dhabhat en-Nursa was created in January, 2012. It took responsibility for a series of brutal terrorist attacks, which resulted in the USA naming it a terrorist organization...

...Alexander Shumilin claims that there are two possible outcomes.

'On the one hand, the drain of anti-Russian, anti-Putin activists weakens the opposition in Russia to Putin's regime. On the other hand, this amplifies opposition in Syria and gives it a greater anti-Russian bias.' – he said."

(continued)

Continued: Chechens Fighting with Syrian Opposition?

former's affiliation with the Islamist al-Nusra front. As a longtime ally and economic partner to Syria, Russia already stands to lose an important ally, customer, and naval port in the Middle East if Assad is cast out; but with anti-Russian Chechen support for the opposition, Putin will face an additional challenge in realigning his foreign policy strategy in the post-Assad Syria.

*The trend of ethnic Chechens fighting for the opposition also affects the North Caucasus insurgency movement. The influx of Chechen fighters in Syria means that, in the short term, physical support for the insurgency efforts will be drained. In the long term, however, support for the opposition could result in an ally for the North Caucasus cause if Assad's regime is on the losing side of the Syrian conflict. **End OE Watch Commentary (Kangas)***



Ramzan Akhmadovich Kadyrov is the Head of the Chechen Republic and a former Chechen rebel., via <http://en.rian.ru>

Source: “Кадыров “чеченские боевики” в Сирии не представляют ни наш народ, ни нашу религию (Kadyrov: Chechen fighters in Syria do not represent our people or our religion).” Magas.ru. 6 April 2013. <http://magas.ru/content/kadyrov-chechenskie-boeviki-sirii-predstavlyayut-nash-narod-nashu-religiyu>

Article #2:

“The President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov disproved today the information about “Chechen fighters” fighting in Syria on the side of the armed opposition. “That you would listen to that- is nonsense,” said Kadyrov while in Abu-Dhabi.

The leader of Chechnya was referring to the rebels, who, allegedly, were recruited in Turkey by the formal head of the “Shari’a Court of Ichkaria.” According to Kadyrov, this man is trying to tarnish the image of Chechnya in the eyes of the world.

‘They don’t represent our people or our religion,’ said Kadyrov in the RIA News. The Chechen leader explained that these people are not fighting for ideology, but for money and for the opportunity to loot the war-torn Syria. Kadyrov promised that if they eventually encroached into Russia, he would deal with them personally.”

OE Watch Commentary: Markings on military vehicles and equipment represent an interesting tradeoff between the legal obligation to identify a nation's machines (especially vis-à-vis neutral states) in conflict and impeding the function of camouflage, as the accompanying article points out. The International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative's *International Humanitarian Law in Air and Missile Warfare manual* (www.ihlresearch.org/amw/manual) defines military aircraft as "(i) operated by the armed forces of a State; (ii) bearing the military markings of that State; (iii) commanded by a member of the armed forces; and (iv) controlled, manned or preprogrammed by a crew subject to regular armed forces discipline." Therefore, clearly identifying a state's military aircraft with a recognized symbol makes a statement about the machine's legitimacy in a conflict.

The article highlights that the world recognizes the red star symbol and that this was a big consideration in the Russian Ministry of Defense's recent decision regarding marking its military aircraft. As a nation attempting to define itself and its interests in the wake of the Cold War, this choice is revealing. The article mentions previous arguments for Russia's tri-color flag (inspired by Peter the Great and a symbol of Russia's aspirations to be a great European sea power) and the roundel of the Russian Empire (a white disc surrounded by successive thin blue and red rings, last used in 1917, and arguably not a proud moment in Russia's military history). Many Russians today view the Soviet Era as a Golden Age of progress (i.e., WWII, the Bomb, Sputnik, Gagarin, etc.), so this decision may have deeper implications than simple recognition by outsiders.

At the same time, plans to return to regional camouflage patterns speak to the sheer size of the Russian land mass and its topographical variation. Movement away from a universal gray paint scheme may imply that Russia plans to build more military aircraft to effectively secure airspace in each of its diverse regions and nine time zones. **End OE Watch Commentary (McIntosh)**



Source: Lenta.ru/news/2013/01/25/redstars/

Soviet Markings Return to the Russian Air Force

Russia's Air Force Command, in agreement with the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, is changing the identification markings on its military aircraft. The newspaper "Izvestiya," citing a source in the military department, writes that instead of red stars with piping in the colors of the Russian flag (white, blue, and red) a simple red star will be used, similar to those formerly painted on Soviet aircraft. There is a single difference—the stars will be smaller.

Russia's Air Force Command assesses that the bright stars with tricolor piping break up the camouflage of its aircraft in flight. The basic idea of switching out identification markings is derived from the perception that they strongly contrast with the camouflage paint schemes of airplanes and helicopters. Such paint patterns are meant to erode the contours of aircraft, making them imperceptible at long distances and harder to identify by type at short distances.

In accordance with Shoigu's decision, Russian military airplanes and helicopters will carry the one-tone red star without piping and the star's size will be decreased by half. Such a variation in markings for Russian Air Force aircraft will not appear definitive, as the red star, even without the piping, contrasts with current camouflage schemes. In the long-term, Russian aircraft are planned to carry outlined identification markings in the shape of a star, a concept already worked out and undergoing trials.

The Russian Air Force is currently flying the proposed outlined identification markings only on the T-50 fighter (also known as the Prospective Front Aviation Aircraft System or PAK FA), and the markings are carried on all four existing prototypes. The Russian Ministry of Defense's Scientific-Investigation Institute is currently defining the optimal thickness and size of the new identification markings. Outlining the star with a dotted-line pattern is also a possibility.

Identification markings in the form of a one-tone red star without piping were used on Soviet Air Force aircraft from 1918 to 1943, and then were switched out for red stars with white piping and a thin red outline. They were maintained in this form until March of 2010, when then-serving Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdiukov decided they would be exchanged for stars with tri-color piping and a thin red outline.

After the fall of the USSR, certain Russian military and political leaders called for replacing the red star as an identification marking, with some proposing the use of Russia's state flag or even the aircraft markings of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, in the first half of the '90s, the decision was taken to keep the red star on airplanes and helicopters because it is a well-known recognition symbol throughout the world.

In the meantime, replacing recognition markings is not the only change expected for Russian Air Force aircraft. At the end of December 2012 Shoigu decided to abandon the common gray-shade camouflage pattern. In the coming year, aircraft repaired, modernized, or fresh from the factories will be painted in colors characterizing the region in which they are based.

OE Watch Commentary: *Much of the Cold War transpired under a threat that Soviet tanks—low-profile, rounded turrets, big main guns, external fuel barrels on the stern—would surge across Central Europe and drive NATO forces into the English Channel. This is certainly how the USSR had turned the Wehrmacht around at Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad and ended up raising the red flag over the Reichstag. Fast, mobile armored forces traveling under the cover of heavy artillery and close air support to lead mechanized and motorized waves of infantry westward was for half a century an enduring characteristic of Russian military doctrine and every bit as worrisome to Western defense analysts as developments in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. During the Cold War the professionals who wrote U.S. Army doctrine (i.e., Active Defense, AirLand Battle) certainly paid attention to this nightmare scenario.*

It is, therefore, noteworthy that a Russian defense establishment that has for so long depended on overwhelming armored forces is now considering dropping its inventory to 2000 tanks. This development is likely oriented more toward economics than national security. As the excerpted article points out, there is a market for the outdated but highly-proliferated technology represented by Soviet main battle tanks of the 1950s and 1960s. There are still plenty of buyers interested in the aging but user-friendly stockpile of military hardware. As Russia reduces its reliance on armored forces to secure its borders and interests, it will be intriguing to see what is employed instead. End OE Watch Commentary (McIntosh)

Source: Vasily Sychev, “A Full Cut: Russia Rids Itself of All Its T-62 Tanks,” Lenta.ru/articles/2013/01/03/t62/.

Russia Rids Itself of All Its T-62 Tanks

Russia’s armed forces in 2013 will remove the aging T-62 medium tank from their inventories, and a salvaging process will begin after the New Year holidays. The corresponding decision was reached by the Main Auto-Armored Vehicle Department of Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Decommissioning this equipment will enable fulfillment of the state budget—after the tanks are dismantled repair parts will be dispatched to warehouses for maintenance and subsequent export. Some countries have already expressed interest in purchasing them.

The History and Construction of the T-62

The T-62 Medium Tank was developed at the end of the 1950s on the basis of the T-55, incorporating the classic layout in which the motor-transmission compartment was situated aft, the driver up front, and the combat crew compartment in the middle. The assigned crew was four—a driver-mechanic, a commander, a gunner, and a loader....

...The T-62’s serial production was launched in 1961 and continued until the mid-70s, turning out nearly 20,000 tanks to arm not only the USSR’s land forces, but those of 27 other countries including Algeria, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mongolia, and Tanzania....

...The Russian Federation has at its disposal a total of nearly 900 T-62 tanks, from which 150 (according to figures at the end of 2011) are in military service. All have been handed over to the “Spetsremont” group, for transition to the holding company “Oboronservis” for salvage. After dismantling the tanks for basic parts, including the engines, transmission boxes, and torsion bars, parts will be transferred to warehouses for storage and subsequent export sale. As the newspaper “Izvestiya” reports, some countries, the names of which are still unreleased, already are interested in buying these repair parts as the T-62 is currently operating in 17 countries....

...The decision to remove the T-62 from Russia’s armed forces, made by the Main Auto-Armored Vehicle Department of the Ministry of Defense, was prepared some years ago and, in essence, was not unexpected. The tank’s decommissioning corresponds with an order



Continued: Reducing Tank Inventory

signed in 2011 by Anatoly Serdyukov (when he served as Minister of Defense), which directs the armed forces to remove from its inventories non-specialized types of military equipment and to transition to a single basic caliber for tank weaponry.

Russian military forces should retain only modernized T-72s (currently 9600 of these are on the books), T-80s (4400 tanks), and the T-90 (approximately 800) There is no answer to demands for standardizing aging T-55, T-62, and T-64 inventories, which likely will be dispatched to scrapyards....

...The Russian armed forces currently hold an inventory of 20,000 tanks, but the nation's requirement for armored equipment is significantly lower. In 2010 the military department announced its plan to curtail the tank inventory by 10,000 vehicles. In 2009 it generally wanted to leave 2000 active, and to dispatch the remaining 18,000 machines to salvage and to warehouses—in effect, 10,000 remaining tanks could turn out to be an inflated number.

It's possible that, in the end, all will play out according to the 2009 plan. Two- to three-thousand modern tanks should be sufficient, considering that the modern world is generally moving toward more distant means to conduct wars. Massive bombing campaigns, long-range artillery shots, and rocket strikes could fully replace thousands of tanks.

Biographical Sketch: Dmitry Rogozin and Russian Nationalism

By Ray Finch

Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has struggled with developing a new national idea. The political and economic trauma of the 1990s discredited the idea of liberal democracy, and for the past decade Russian nationalism has become more prominent. While there are a number of Russian leaders who have been lifted up on this wave of nationalism (to include the current president, Vladimir Putin), few have been as successful in riding this surge as Russia's new Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the country's military-industrial complex, Dmitry Rogozin. This paper will briefly review Rogozin's biography, and in particular, the implications of his increasing political power for Russia and the United States.



<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Rogozin.pdf>

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OE Watch Commentary: *Despite efforts to attract greater numbers of contract servicemen, Russia's military manpower shortages continue to grow more acute. According to Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources, the Russian military are currently has 186,000 contract soldiers. Plans to increase this number to at least 425,000 by 2017 will likely prove quite difficult. The excerpt from the accompanying article, which appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda in May, describes some of the challenges facing Russian military recruiters.*

In order to attract young Russians to serve, the Russian MoD has set up a number of recruiting centers around the country. These centers are distinct from the organizational structure still used to process Russian draftees, and effective coordination between these two inductee systems has yet to be established. By law, every Russian male is obligated to serve one year in the military as a conscript, and only after completion of at least six months of conscript duty is he eligible for contract service. Given this critical link between the conscript and contract system, coordination ought to be a simple process. As the excerpt describes, however, being subordinate to different departments within the MoD, the two systems often work at cross purposes.

Many of the problems facing Russian military recruiters are rather prosaic. They complain of a lack of transportation assets, PR materials, lack of funding for required contract medical tests, and high advertising costs. Other problems are more systemic

Translation: "Let's serve Russia together!" Military contract service-your ticket to the future. Contact your military recruiter. Source: www.mil.ru

Source: Aleksandr Khrolenko, Olga Vorobyeva, Oleg Pochinyuk, Vladislav Pavlyutkin and Anna Potekhina: "Selection of Contract Soldiers is a Question of Quality," Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 28 May 2013.

Military Recruiters Assess Process for Selection of Contract Servicemen

In accordance with the 7 May 2012 decree of the President of Russia "On Further Improvements to Military Service in the Russian Federation" the task has been established to annually increase the numbers of contract servicemen by no less than 50,000 people over the course of five years. "The planned increase in the numbers of contract servicemen is a large-scale task requiring significant efforts of leadership at all levels," noted Minister of Defense General of the Army Sergey Shoygu at the April meeting of the leadership staff of the Armed Forces at the Situations Center.

In order for this to be actually accomplished in 2012 a new system of selecting candidates for contract military service has been created, and quantitative goals and priorities for staffing military positions have been defined. A management hierarchy has been established: the Main Personnel Administration of the Ministry of Defense of Russia; departments for work with contract servicemen under the personnel administrations of the military districts; and, selection points for contract military service. Such points have been created and are functioning in the entities of the Russian Federation. In order to find out how the new system for selecting contractors is currently working, Krasnaya Zvezda met with leaders of the selection points for contract servicemen in Murmansk, Voronezh, Kaliningrad, Saint Petersburg and Moscow.

The chief of the selection point for contract servicemen for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Savchenko:

"In general terms the selection point was created for the purpose of selection, not collection. Therefore during the selection of contract service candidates for military units there is naturally competition. The percent of the candidates who

(continued)

Continued: Prospects for Military Recruitment

and may prove harder to rectify. Contract soldiers often leave the military when they do not receive the promised salary or when the living/work conditions do not correspond to their contract stipulations.

Yet all is not gloom. The article describes some of the incentives provided to contract soldiers (particularly housing programs) used to attract qualified personnel into the military. While local advertising for contract service still needs work, the MoD continues to produce informative and motivational materials at the national level. (For a recent example, see: <http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/multi.htm>.) That such a frank discussion would appear in Krasnaya Zvezda is also significant. As the Russian military's primary newspaper, it reflects the priorities and concerns of the MoD. In the past there was a general reluctance among some within Russia's senior ranks to actually create a professional military staffed by contract (or volunteer) soldiers. This article suggests such sentiments are changing.
End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)

are rejected is linked to the candidate's ineligible age (older than 35), his condition of health and his non-specialized education. Frequently officers come to us, although we recruit soldiers and sergeants.

...But we do not have candidates waiting in lines. We are working on this issue now. The conditions and the qualities of selection are gradually getting better and are being constantly improved, and I would like to reach the point when every one of our candidates can find service, based on his capabilities and the requirements of the military units. As of today about 750 people have come to us in 2013, and last year it was about 400. Each one was given a recommendation for a specific job in military units based in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. But today, unfortunately, the candidates are not received in all of the units as they should be. The wrong telephone numbers are given, and sometimes the candidates are not able to telephone the unit commanders. Many are simply turned away at the check-points [KPP]. And those who nonetheless manage to talk to the command staff or get to the units, are confronted with the fact that the conditions that we described to the candidate at the selection point do not correspond to the actual state of affairs: normal housing conditions do not exist, or the salary or the daily work schedule does not correspond to that which was promised. As a result the candidate is disillusioned and starts to complain. Therefore, today I am not satisfied with the level of cooperation with the military units. But I have the hope that in time these issues will be resolved. Anyway, within the units specific officials have been appointed who are responsible for contract servicemen staffing.

...It is true that special cases occur when, for example, a serviceman arrives at a unit, and everything suits him and all of the conditions suit him. But in time he "flees" from the unit. He says that he didn't like the fact that the ship on which he

started to serve was moored at the dock, and did not go to sea. In this case, as they say, no comment is needed. But in the main, the selected candidates are refusing to sign the contract, because the advertised salaries do not correspond to actual salaries....

...Although we can improve the interactions with the commanders of the units over time, we cannot provide for the material and technical needs of the selection point itself on our own. For example, we need resources for advertising activities. We won't get anywhere without it. For the year we have a quota of 1,308 people. Thus far we have sent 280 to the troops. The plan for May is 140 men, and we have selected only 30. We aren't coping. We are trying to advertise contract service through the mass media, but they demand money from us. Even the local and the regional newspapers. A word costs 30 rubles on television. A 15-second video clip costs 800 rubles. An announcement on the commuter train for a month costs 44,000 rubles. If we place an advertisement on all of the commuter train lines, this would cost 2 million rubles a month. One can imagine how much an official advertisement would cost in the metro. And where are we to get this money?...

...The chief of the selection point for contract service for Kaliningrad Oblast, Captain Second Rank Dmitriy Sushkov:

...Moreover, based on our staffing authorization, this is a mobile point. But only on paper. Overall, we do not have a single vehicle! It has to be said that the presence of a well equipped, highly mobile point would greatly help in our work, and it would allow it to be brought directly to municipal organizations. If there were the means, there would also be new forms of operation. Specifically, we have assessed where appropriate banners could be placed in populated areas of Kaliningrad and other cities and how much this would cost. These are far from being astronomical figures. We should test at least one pilot version!

The market has also already penetrated into state establishments. It is mandatory that each of our candidates undergo an analysis at the oblast narcotics dispensary. And although previously 1,300 rubles was required for this analysis, which confirms the absence of narcotic substances in the organism, the cost for no apparent reason has gone up by a thousand rubles. I have already been repeatedly called by people saying that they do not have the money! The question is: can this situation be considered normal! Of course, not! A young person wants to serve the Homeland, and one difficulty after another is created for him....

...Our military commissariats are subordinate to the GOMU [Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate], and the selection points are subordinate to the GUK [Main Directorate for Personnel]. Doesn't this different subordination offer a basis for some kind of fine tuning? During the [seasonal] draft campaigns, for example, all of the efforts of the military medical commissions are devoted to their support, while work with the contractor candidates remains difficult.

The chief of the selection point for contract service for Voronezh Oblast, Major Ruslan Bayramgulov:

...The state's plan for recruiting youth today uses substantial social guarantees: attractive financial support, and the military [housing] mortgage [program]. After three years of service by the contractor, he earns the right to use the mortgage program and acquire a nice apartment based on his personal selection in any city of the country. And in contrast to the civilian mortgage programs, the state makes 100 percent monthly credit payments for the apartment during the contractor's entire period of service. Thus, after 20 (and more) years of service in the Armed Forces the contractor receives housing that he owns practically free of cost....

OE Watch Commentary: *Some social scientists have posited the notion that violent, interstate conflict will decrease in the 21st century. They point out that in sheer numbers, incidents of traditional state vs. state conflict have declined since the end of the Cold War, and that despite the latest headlines, our planet has become more peaceful. Such an argument would be flatly rejected by General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev, Russia's greatest (and certainly oldest) living military theorist.*

A decorated veteran of the Great Patriotic War (WW II), General Gareyev has, for the past half-century, been on the frontlines in developing and explaining military theory for the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces. While certainly influenced by his combat experiences in WW II, his writings and theory continue to encompass the ever-changing variables of armed conflict. In the brief excerpt (from a longer article in Russia's top military weapons publication), General Gareyev argues that while the tools of conflict continue to evolve, the world is as dangerous as ever, and Russia must not let down its defensive guard.

General Gareyev points out that war today often commences without any sort of official declaration, and that while traditional armaments (tanks, planes, bullets) may not be used at the outset, the damage caused by cyber, information or economic weapons can be equally destructive. Given the modern state's ability to "invade" another country without physically crossing geographic boundaries, General Gareyev suggests that the UN should adopt resolutions "on the inadmissibility of such cyber and other information actions..."

*Finally, General Gareyev argues that Russians must not be lulled into the naïve belief that global peace has become the new norm. The enemy remains at the gate and the Russian state must use its full arsenal to uncover these threats and raise the country's defense consciousness. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)***



Russian General Makhmut Gareyev

Source: General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev, president of Academy of Military Sciences, Предчувствовать изменения в характере войны [Anticipate Changes in the Nature of War] VPK Voenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer, 5 June 2013.

General of Army Gareyev on Changes in War, Warfare

Today Russia is accomplishing defense missions under extremely difficult conditions. On the one hand the forces opposing us in the international arena have strengthened unprecedentedly, especially in the economic, technological, and military sense. On the other hand, the threats to national security, which take on both military as well as nonmilitary forms, have become more complex and diverse. What must be done to ensure the country's reliable protection?

It is said more and more often in recent years that Russia has no external threats of any kind and Russia alone threatens itself. But these are the usual ruses of NPO's [nongovernment organizations], which make their living on this. One need not be especially cunning and over-intellectualize on this issue. If the state has national interests and intends to protect them, these needs inevitably clash with the interests of other countries, and differences and conflicts can arise. Should national interests not be defended or at times even surrendered, the grounds for threats naturally also disappear. But unfortunately, various threats to our security grow more and more. At the same time the very concepts of threats, of the essence of war, and of national defense are being devaluated in public awareness and the need for military strength and defense of the Homeland are being placed in doubt entirely or are being moved to the background. All this complicates the accomplishment of defense missions....



...Considering newly arisen global processes and objective factors, it is necessary to look into what war represents at the modern stage. Beginning with the times of Clausewitz it

(continued)

Continued: War's Unchanging Nature

was customary to believe that this is a complex sociopolitical phenomenon, one of the forms of international or intrastate opposition involving a continuation of politics by violent means. That understanding of war also found expression in current encyclopedias and dictionaries: opposition without weapons in any sphere is warfare, and with use of weapons and violent means it is war.

But in recent years, in connection with the growing proportion in international opposition of political-diplomatic, economic, information, cyber, and psychological means and methods of accomplishing political goals, the question is raised about a cardinal change in the concept of war itself and in the entire system of knowledge connected with its cognition. And in a number of cases this question is examined as if these nonmilitary forms of opposition had arisen only in our days and nothing was known of them earlier. But international opposition has occurred in all times with use of various forces and assets, and an integral part of them consisted of intelligence and counterintelligence, deception of the enemy and stratagem, dissemination of disinformation, and other most crafty and refined means and methods of warfare from the arsenal of the "strategy of indirect actions." In the majority of Byzantium's wars for an entire millennium, it used the Army mainly as a means of showing force and of military pressure, and victories were won chiefly by bribery, deception, diplomatic maneuvers, and disinformation. Back before our era, Sun Tsu said that a good field general wins without fighting. Of course, the use of nonmilitary means has expanded considerably today....

...The Federal Law "On Defense" (Article 18), adopted in 2012, states: "Wartime begins from the moment of declaration of a state of war or actual beginning of military operations, and expires from the moment of an announcement of the cessation of military operations..." Indeed, in connection with an exacerbation of international opposition using nonmilitary means, the borderline between war and peace has become more vague and less defined. Therefore in time a corresponding clarification of existing official documents regulating a state of war possibly will be required, although even with existing concepts it is not hard to discern the borderline between military and nonmilitary means.

...Possibly Clausewitz's comment that war is a collision of substantial interests retains its importance here, and in our time the nuclear factor is a deterrent in this respect. Thus, even the actual beginning of military operations does not always signify the beginning of war....

There also are substantial differences in the use of military and nonmilitary means of warfare. The same economic or information warfare is conducted by completely different methods in peacetime and wartime. Under peacetime conditions these are various economic and information actions, while under wartime conditions economic facilities and information centers are destroyed by missile and bomb strikes.

Even today we are seeing what kind of intensive information warfare and show of force are taking place around Korea, but no one is saying that war already has begun. Everyone is saying that it may begin. Just how is it possible to judge such complex phenomena in isolation from all these historical and modern realities?!

Just what happened? What changed? The fact is that some so-called nonmilitary forms and means of warfare saw unprecedented technological development and acquired a very dangerous, practically violent character. For example, purposeful cyber attacks, which can be made both by state special services as well as by private parties, are capable of causing serious complications in the energy, banking, and financial system of opposing countries. And all this is done covertly and it is not always possible to determine from where cyber attacks have been made, so it will be unclear against whom to declare war.

All in all, if all these actions are to be considered a declaration of war, then a situation of continuous war of everyone against everyone may arise. And Russia or some other country is incapable of unilaterally introducing a new concept of war. Such problems must be resolved on an international scale. But of course, the danger of all these actions also cannot be underestimated.

Based on this, it appears advisable above all to have the United Nations adopt resolutions on the inadmissibility of such cyber and other information actions, as has been done with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons....

...Under all circumstances the need arises to update missions of all state agencies, expand their functions for opposing new threats, and create additional state structures which would engage in coordinating the work of all state and public organizations to oppose actions being carried out against our country by political-diplomatic, economic, psychological, information, and cyber means.

The task arises in turn for science and the defense industry to create not only the newest means of armed warfare, but also corresponding modern technologies for waging information, cyber, psychological, and other nonmilitary kinds of warfare, where we now are lagging most.

It is necessary to rely on the entire system of knowledge about modern war in order to successfully oppose the entire aggregate of modern military and nonmilitary threats in the scientific sense....



Makmut Gareev, Jacob Kipp (former Director, FMSO) and Vladimir Slipchenko discussing Future War. Source via Future War, Makmut Gareev and Valdimir Slipchenko

OE Watch Commentary: *The strengthening of military and technical collaboration between Ukraine and China moved up the political agenda in Ukraine after the election of Victor Yanukovich as president in 2010. This relationship continues to grow. As the excerpt from the first article points out, Ukraine and China expect their bilateral trade to reach 20 billion dollars in the near future. According to Ukrainian officials, the two countries have already signed 200 contracts in the military-technical area since 1992, and Ukraine now considers China as one of its key partners in this area. Other areas of collaboration include joint military training exercises, visits to Ukrainian peacekeeping centers, military aviation cooperation, and the coordination of anti-piracy and antiterrorism activities.*

China has a long-standing interest in acquiring military equipment and technologies designed in the former Soviet Union for the purposes of increasing its own military capacity. As indicated in the second excerpt, China has recently purchased two military Zubr-class landing aircraft from Ukraine, capable of carrying 500 soldiers, and significant armored assets. This deal benefits both countries: China acquires a strategically important piece of military equipment, and Ukraine, which is suffering from a weak economy, gives a boost to its military industry. Ukraine is expecting to benefit from its collaboration with China in many nonmilitary areas as well. For instance, using Chinese technologies for the gasification of coal is likely to make Ukraine's energy use more efficient, which will reduce imports of Russian gas.

However, Ukrainian cooperation with China comes with a price. Some Ukrainian experts point out the possible negative consequences of Ukraine-China military collaboration. Cooperation with China may diminish Ukraine's strategic partnerships with Russia and Europe. There are concerns that China will reverse engineer

Source: Alona Liashenko, "Ukraine-China Economic, Military Ties Have Great Potential," Xinhua, 29 May 2013.

Ukraine-China Economic, Military Ties Have Great Potential

Ukraine and China have seen their bilateral relations and cooperation continuously strengthened and enhanced in recent years, especially in the economic and military areas.

Trade relations between Ukraine and China have developed smoothly and entered a new era in the past three years, according to Chinese Ambassador to Ukraine Zhang Xiyun.

The two-way trade reached 9.8 billion U.S. dollars last year, a 40-fold increase since the two nations established diplomatic ties in 1992.

Ukraine is now China's second-largest trade partner in the Commonwealth of Independent States, while China is Ukraine's biggest in Asia.

The two countries aim to see bilateral trade reach 20 billion dollars in the near future, and to that end they have recently agreed at the working level on a program of deepening their strategic partnership during 2013-2017.

According to the document, the military-technical sector, energy, agriculture, road construction and modernization of sea ports are the major cooperation areas to be enriched and developed.

The program also envisages easier entry for Chinese tourists to Ukraine and enhanced communication between the two peoples.

Ukraine intends to attract more visitors from China, including international students and tourists, while China is becoming an increasingly popular tourism destination for the Ukrainians due to its attractive tourism resources, hospitable people and reasonable prices.

According to the Ukrainian State Statistics Service, more than 37,000 Ukrainians visited China in the past two years, up 31 percent from the 2009-2010 period.



Continued: Ukraine-China Military Collaboration

this equipment, and thus reduce the competitive value of Ukraine's own military equipment and technologies on the global market. Finally, as other countries have learned, the entrance of Chinese energy, machine-building and other technologies into the Ukrainian market may create too much competition and produce severe hardship for Ukrainian domestic companies. End OE Watch Commentary (Moldavanova)

During a recent visit here of Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang, the two sides agreed to further enhance bilateral ties and cooperation in various fields.

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich highly appreciated Xu's visit, hoping it would inject new impetus into the development of the bilateral ties.

Yanukovich said his country has taken a strategic and long-term view on developing relations and cooperation with Beijing in various fields, including the military one.

Ukrainian officials said the two nations have signed 200 contracts in the military-technical area since 1992, which contributed to the building of trust at a high level.

Ukraine regards China as one of its main partners in the fields of military and military-technical cooperation, and is willing to strengthen their ties in these promising areas.

The milestones of military cooperation between the two countries are joint training exercises with the Chinese Navy, visits by Chinese military officials to Ukrainian centers of international peacekeeping activities, cooperation in the field of military aviation, and joint efforts to combat piracy and terrorism.

Source: "Zubr-Class Landing Craft Increase Chinese Amphibious Capability," Want China Times, 10 June 2013.

Zubr-Class Landing Craft Increase Chinese Amphibious Capability

After purchasing Zubr-class air-cushioned landing crafts from Ukraine, the amphibious capability of the People's Liberation Army has increased gradually according to the People's Daily operated by the Communist Party of China.

Designed by the Almaz Shipbuilding of the former Soviet Union, a single Zubr-class landing craft is able to carry 500 soldiers, three T-80 main battle tank, 10 BMP-2 or BTR-70 armored personnel carriers and eight amphibious tanks. Two Zubr-class landing crafts were provided to China directly by Ukraine according to a contract signed in 2009. In addition, China is allowed to construct two landing crafts with the help of the Ukrainian advisors.

Du Wenlong, a Chinese military analyst stated that the Zubr-class landing craft will maximize its potential especially when escorted by the Type 056 missile frigate during the amphibious operations. The Type 056 frigate designed for coast defense alone is not enough for the People's Liberation Army Navy to control an island occupied by the enemy such as Diaoyutai (Diaoyu or Senkaku) or Taiwan according to Du. After the arrival of the Zubr-class landing crafts, China finally has the ability to deploy its soldiers to those islands in mass number.

When asked whether the Zubr-class landing crafts will be given Chinese names after they entered the service of the People's Liberation Army Navy, Du Wenlong answered that it is unlikely to happen. "Because Zubr is a term which symbolize big, strong and fast already," stressed Du, "I think what we have to do is simply keep this name."

Protests Directed at Erdoğan's Authoritarian Style

June 2013

OE Watch Commentary: *As the accompanying excerpts illustrate, the widespread protests in Turkey are an outburst of anger towards Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian style of governance and intrusion into individual liberties. The passages reveal the important distinction that the protests are directed at him directly, more so than his party or the government itself.*

While some have been quick to call them a "Turkish Spring," the protests differ from the Arab Spring in at least two important ways: first, in contrast to the Arab Spring protests, which were against unelected dictators, the Turkish protests are against an elected leader. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in contrast to the Arab Spring protests where people were calling for rights they did not have, the Turkish protestors are demonstrating against an encroachment on rights that they already do have.

Briefly, the incident was sparked in late May following a police raid on a peaceful sit-in by about 500 environmentalists against the planned demolition of a park in central Istanbul to build a shopping mall. The police used pepper spray, tear gas, and water cannons to break up the demonstrators. This appeared to be the straw that broke the camel's back: tens of thousands of protesters all over Turkey joined in peaceful demonstrations, which, as the accompanying excerpts indicate, were directed at the Prime Minister's attitude, rhetoric and policies, which many Turks feel are becoming more authoritarian and less secular, and leading to a loss of political and civil liberties. In fact, as mentioned in one of the excerpts, 92.4 percent of the protesters cite this as their main frustration.

In particular, the first excerpt points out that many are angered by intrusion into individual lifestyles, such as Erdoğan's recent decision to introduce legislation to restrict the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages; his comments calling on women to have at least three children, and his comments criticizing TV shows

"...That is really the core of the problem: Erdoğan's intimidating style... The way he understands democracy ("I win the ballots, I call the shots") and the way he degrades his opponents has been breeding a widespread tension in the country, which exploded in a way that he could not ever foresee."



A demonstrator in Istanbul, Source via: ctvnews.ca

Source: Mine G. Kırıkkanat, "Ulusun Başbakan'a Seslenişidir (It is the Nation Calling out to the Prime Minister)," Cumhuriyet, 2 June 2013, <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=420382>

"Prime Minister Erdoğan did not understand that people in this country (even those who voted for his party), where he rules with such an authoritarian style, were sick of his stubbornness; and that they were saying 'enough' to the increasing way he silenced them and interfered in every aspect of their lives from what they ate and drank, to how many kids they should have, to what they should think."

Source: "Başbakan: Bu Tayyip Erdoğan değişmez (The Prime Minister: This Tayyip Erdoğan won't change)," Hurriyet.com.tr, 12 June 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23479966.asp>

"They say this Prime Minister is causing tension, that the prime minister is too tough.

Were we supposed to get down on our knees in front of them and beg them to bring down the thugs [from the Atatürk Cultural Center]? If you call this tough, then excuse me, this Tayyip Erdoğan won't change."

(continued)

Continued: Protests Directed at Erdoğan's Authoritarian Style

and kissing in public, just to name a few.

The second excerpt is an example of Erdoğan's tone, and the third and fourth point out anger at this tone and rhetoric, which is perceived as insulting and marginalizing those who do not think like him. They also demonstrate frustration with his style of governance and understanding of democracy, which they claim is more like majority rule rather than a pluralistic rule.

Erdoğan blamed the protests on outside powers, terror organizations, "radical elements," and "street thugs," and resorted to conspiracy theories to explain the protests, further reinforcing the belief that he is out of touch with the people. As he showed no sign of softening his tone, the protesters showed no sign of stopping. As of late June, Amnesty International reported at least four deaths and 7600 injuries as a result of the crackdown on protesters.

*Having been prime minister since March 2003, Erdoğan is the longest-serving prime minister in the history of Turkey. Moreover, he is planning to run for President in 2014. (Also see 'Assessing a Decade of AKP Rule' in the December 2012 issue of OE Watch.) **End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)***

Source: Hasan Cemal, "Türkiye hızla tehlikeli sulara doğru seyrediyor! Ve Sayın Başbakan, mesele sizden başkası değil! (Turkey is moving rapidly into dangerous waters! And Mr. Prime Minister, the problem is none other than you!)," T24.com.tr [an independent Internet newspaper], 17 June 2013, <http://t24.com.tr/yazi/turkiye-hizla-tehlikeli-sulara-dogru-seyrediyor-ve-sayin-basbakan-mesele-sizden-baskasi-degil/6906>

"Mr. Prime Minister, with your language and rhetoric, you are polarizing Turkey more and more each day; you are dividing and pushing people apart. Your speech at the meeting in Istanbul yesterday, just as in Ankara, was... full of threats and degrading comments... With such provocative attitude, you are deepening the crisis. Your conceited attitude as if you have a monopoly on what is right is not helping Turkey; you are hurting peace and democracy. Yes Mr. Prime Minister, the problem is none other than you, you are at the center of the problem... You are the one who turned Gezi Park into a problem; and then the problem into a crisis."

Source: Mustafa Akyol, "It is all about Erdoğan", Hurriyet Daily News, 5 June 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/it-is-all-about-erdogan.aspx?pageID=449&nID=48214&NewsCategoryId=411>

"...That is really the core of the problem: Erdoğan's intimidating style... The way he understands democracy ("I win the ballots, I call the shots") and the way he degrades his opponents has been breeding a widespread tension in the country, which exploded in a way that he could not ever foresee."

Source: Kadri Gürsel, "90 Kuşağı'na merhaba deyin (Say hello to the '90 Generation)," Milliyet.com.tr, 6 June 2013, <http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/-90-kusagi-na-merhaba-deyin/dunya/ydetay/1719131/default.htm>

"According to the results of the poll [conducted by two academics from Istanbul Bilgi University], the first reason for the protesters' frustration is the Prime Minister's authoritarian attitude (92.4%). This is followed by police force (91.3%); the violation of democratic rights (91.1%), and by the silence of the Turkish media (84.2%)..."



Turkey's Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization

By Karen Kaya

Turkey views its presence in Afghanistan not only as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, but also as a "brotherhood duty" to help the Afghan people restore peace. Turkey's views towards Afghanistan are also based on its own strategic interests: as long as Afghanistan is unstable, the whole region will be unstable, posing a security threat to Turkey. When Afghanistan becomes a secure and stable country, this will introduce wider stability in the region, bringing new economic benefits for the region in general and for Turkey in particular.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130831_art007.pdf




OE Watch Commentary: The accompanying excerpts are important reports from the Turkish press: seven suspected individuals from the al-Qaeda-linked Al Nusra Front were captured in antiterrorist operations in Adana, Turkey, and two kilos (4,5 pounds) of sarin gas were found in their apartments. According to the accompanying reports, they were planning attacks on the Incirlik Base in Adana and in Gaziantep, a city near Turkey's border with Syria. These reports went relatively unnoticed due to the start of massive demonstrations.

The antiterrorism operations were prompted after terrorist attacks on 11 May, during which twin car bomb explosions killed over 50 and injured hundreds of Turkish citizens in Reyhanlı, a city near the Syrian border where many Syrians have sought refuge. The Reyhanlı attack was the largest terrorist attack in Turkey since the 2003 al-Qaeda attacks in Istanbul. (Please also see 'Terror Attacks and Turkey's Syria Policy' in the May 2013 issue of OE Watch.)

While al-Qaeda has targeted Turkey many times in the past, the emergence of Al Nusra Front elements and sarin gas is a relatively new phenomenon, which appears to be a result of the spillover effects of the Syrian war into Turkey. As one of the accompanying excerpts points out, the Turkish public is increasingly frustrated about this situation-- one of the many reasons for the widespread demonstrations in Turkey.

If it is true that the members were planning an attack against the Incirlik Base in Adana, this would not be the first time. Al-Qaeda has plotted attacks against many American targets in the past, including the Incirlik Base in Adana in 2003; a foiled attack on the NATO summit in Istanbul in May 2004, which was to be attended by then-President George W. Bush; and an attack on the US Consulate in Istanbul in July 2008, which killed three policemen. In July 2011 an attack on the US Embassy in Ankara was thwarted just before then-Secretary of State Clinton's visit. As recently as April 2013 Turkish police found evidence of a new al-Qaeda plot to bomb the US Embassy in Ankara.¹ **End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)**

1. "U.S. Embassy in Turkey said to be targeted," *New York Times*, 11 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/world/europe/turkish-police-say-us-embassy-was-target-of-bomb-plot.html?_r=0; "El Kaide'nin Türkiye'deki ölüm listesine ulaşıldı (Al Qaida's Turkey death list acquired)," *Cnnturk.com.tr*, 11 April 2013, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/04/11/el.kaidenin.turkiyedeki.olum.listesine.ulasildi/703863.0/index.html>



Sarin gas is considered a weapon of mass destruction by the United Nations. ,
Source via: The voice of Russia <http://english.ruvr.ru/>

Source: "İki ilimizi adeta cehenneme çevireceklerdi! (They were going to turn two of our cities into hell!)," *Sabah.com.tr*, 31 May 2013, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/05/31/iki-ilimizi-adeta-cehenneme-cevireceklerdi>

"The Adana Police Department, which started an operation against al-Qaeda and its affiliate the Al Nusra Front, revealed that the captured al-Qaeda members were planning bloody attacks... It has been identified that their targets were Gaziantep [a city near Turkey's border with Syria] and the Incirlik Base in Adana."

Source: "12 adreste 2 kilo sarin gazı çıktı (2 kilos [4,5 lb] of sarin gas found in 12 addresses)," *Milliyet.com.tr*, 31 May 2013, <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/12-adreste-2-kilo-sarin-gazi-cikti/gundem/detay/1716459/default.htm>

"It has been determined that the al-Qaeda organization and its affiliate Al Nusra Front, who were being monitored by the Department of Intelligence and Anti-Terror, were preparing for an attack. 12 people, who were believed to be members of these organizations and who were living in Adana and Mersin, have been detained. In searches of their addresses, many pieces of information, documents and digital equipment have been seized... In addition, 2 kilograms of sarin gas [~4,5 lb] have been seized from their addresses." [Five of the detained were later released].

Source: Kemal Kirişçi, "How Erdoğan Fell from Grace", *The National Interest*, 4 June 2013, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-erdogan-fell-grace-8549>

"... these demonstrations also need to be seen in light of the growing concern about the way the government is handling the Syrian crisis, and subsequent fears that the crisis is beginning to spill into Turkey."

Another Trial Ahead for the Turkish Military

June 2013

“...there are estimated to be around 450 active and retired officers, including three former army commanders as well as active senior generals and admirals, who are being tried on charges of either staging coups, toppling former governments or making plans to unseat the current government.”

OE Watch Commentary: The accompanying excerpted articles point to another trial ahead for the Turkish military. This particular case will deal with the military's actions in 1997, which resulted in the resignation of the government at the time, led by Turkey's first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan. Because it was not a direct coup, it has been called a “soft-coup.” (It is also known as the “28 February process,” because the process started after the 28 February 1997 National Security Council meeting organized by the military.)

The accompanying excerpts point out that on 6 June a criminal court in Ankara approved an indictment filed by the Turkish prosecutor's office, under which 102 retired military officers, including former senior commanders, and a civilian will be tried over charges of staging this “soft-coup.” All of the suspects face aggravated life imprisonment on charges of overthrowing a coalition government and preventing it from performing its duties.

The military has historically been a powerful institution and the unquestioned guardian of the secular republic since its founding. Starting in 1960 the military conducted coups d'état almost every decade, removing administrations that it deemed a threat to the secular nature of Turkey or deviated from its constitution. The 1997 soft-coup in question came after the coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980. In addition, in 2007 the military threatened action in an on-line statement (referred to as an “e-coup”).

Following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power with a clear majority, the AKP significantly reduced the military's powers. Many officers are facing charges of either staging coups and/or toppling or attempting to topple governments. As one of the accompanying excerpts points out, there are currently estimated to be around 450 active and retired officers, including three former army commanders, as well as senior generals and admirals, who are being tried on such charges. (Please also see ‘Understanding Turkey's Historic Coup Trial’ in the October 2012 issue of OE Watch.) **End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)**



The prime suspect in the case, former Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Ismail Hakkı Karadayı (right); and the late Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. , Source via Demokrathaber.net

Source: “28 Subat iddianamesi mahkemece kabul edildi (The 28 February indictment approved by the court),” Milliyet.com.tr, 7 June 2013, <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/28-subat-iddianamesi-mahkemece/gundem/detay/1719669/default.htm>

“The 13th Criminal Court in Ankara has approved the 309 page indictment regarding the 28 February investigation, which was prepared after a 2,5 year period of investigations... The then-Chief of the General Staff Ismail Hakkı Karadayı will be tried as the primary suspect and then-Deputy Chief of the General Staff will be tried as the second suspect. The indictment's main victim is then-Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Çiller...”

103 suspects will face trial after the court has prepared its trial case, on a date to be determined... The 103 suspects are being charged with “attempting to change part of the Turkish Constitution or to depose of it and attempting to eliminate the Turkish Grand National Assembly [Parliament] or prevent it from doing its job.”

Source: Lale Kemal, “Turkish Military Faces Morale Crisis,” Al-Monitor.com, 9 June 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/turkey-military-moral-problems.html>

“All of the suspects, 76 of whom are [already] in jail, face aggravated life imprisonment on charges of overthrowing an Islam-sensitive coalition government and preventing it from performing its duties. Former army chief Ismail Hakkı Karadayı is named as the prime suspect in the group. Together with the other February 28 coup suspects, there are estimated to be around 450 active and retired officers, including three former army commanders as well as active senior generals and admirals, who are being tried on charges of either staging coups, toppling former governments or making plans to unseat the current government.”

Iran Can “Crush American Warships Like Cans”

27 May 2013

“The parallels between Naqdi’s arguments and those of radical 1970’s-era Muslim Brotherhood clerics are striking.”

OE Watch Commentary: *As the Iranian Navy expands its reach and adds new capabilities, Iranian officials continue to declare that its main foe is the U.S. Navy. In the latest example—excerpted here—Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, commander of the paramilitary Basij (volunteer) forces, includes the threats against the U.S. Navy in a broad diatribe delivered to Basij forces in the Iranian shrine city of Qom.*

Naqdi’s mindset is interesting: he began his speech by accusing the United States of launching a full-scale cultural war against the Islamic Republic, citing the U.S.-based Persian language satellite channels, the Baha’i faith, and the alleged U.S. promotion of vulgarity among Iranian youth. He also blamed Iran’s substantial drug problem and alcoholism on a deliberate plot by the United States to corrupt Iran morally. He concluded his speech by warning against the temptation of some Iranian politicians or diplomats to negotiate with the United States, reminding them that the United States simply wants to return Iran to the subjugation it experienced during the Shah’s rule.

*While some might dismiss Naqdi’s speech as merely conforming to the excesses of the Islamic Republic’s normal rhetoric, especially in towns like Qom that are renowned for loyalty to the revolutionary principles, the parallels between Naqdi’s arguments and those of radical 1970s-era Muslim Brotherhood clerics are striking. Abdullah Azzam, for example, best known as Al Qaeda founder Usama Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, taught in Saudi Arabia that Western culture was a deliberate plot to separate Muslim youth from God and that, therefore, it was permissible both to respond violently and consider that response to be defensive in nature. While Naqdi likely exaggerates the current Iranian capability against the U.S. Navy, his focus on the U.S. presence suggests Iranian hostility toward the United States and its presence in the Persian Gulf has not diminished. **End OE Watch Commentary (Rubin)***



Commander of Iran Basij Force Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, via <http://previous.presstv.ir/photo/20130613/shamsara20130613162211373.jpg>

Source: Sazesh ba Amrika Eqtsad-e Iran ra Monahedem Mikonad, ” (“Compromise with America Will Destroy Economy of Iran”),” Fars News Agency, 27 May 2013. <http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920306001445>

Compromise with America Will Destroy Economy of Iran

...[Commander of Iran’s Basij Force Brigadier General Mohammad Reza] Naqdi stated that “Today, Iran has missiles that can crush American warships like a can and can send them into the depths of the water,” Naqdi stated, adding, “The defense forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as acknowledged by both enemies and friends, are the best defensive power in the region and one of the best forces in the world. Israel fought with the pupils of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon, and with misery retreated; and with the students of the pupils in the 22-day [Gaza] war [in 2008] and, after an eight-day battle, they did not succeed....”

“...the power struggle within the rebel military institutions of Daraa Province has escalated and is likely to continue doing so...”

OE Watch Commentary: In late March 2013 a Syrian Parliamentarian warned that insurgents had seized control of key parts of Daraa Province and were threatening to overrun the provincial capital. More precisely, rebels had gained control of the Daraa International Highway (linking Damascus and Amman, Jordan) at the key junction of Khirbat Ghazalah, halting traffic along the highway and laying siege to Syrian troops south of there. Repeated regime attempts to retake the strategic town failed until early May, when the local rebel military council ordered the ammunition-starved rebel forces to withdraw from their positions, allowing regime troops to quickly recapture Khirbat Ghazalah.

In the aftermath of the retreat, the ire of some rebel battalions (and of several local activists) was turned to Ahmed al-Naama, head of Daraa's military council. As the first accompanying article notes, many held al-Naama personally responsible for the loss of Khirbat Ghazalah, accusing him of prioritizing personal gain and foreign interests over those of the local population. This was not the first time such charges had been leveled against him. Two of the strongest rebel brigades in Daraa used events in Khirbat Ghazalah to justify – whether genuinely or not – their withdrawal from the al-Naama-led military council (The “Fallujah Hawran Brigade,” led by Yasser al-Abboud, and the “Yarmouk Brigade,” led by Bashar al-Zoabi). Such signs of dissension are music to the Syrian regime's ears. The second accompanying article excerpts a recent interview with Bashar al-Zoabi addressing these issues.

As with much else in Syria, the particulars of the situation remain murky. What is clear, however, is that the power struggle within the rebel military institutions of Daraa Province has escalated and is likely to continue doing so; the potential for the fledgling institution to be subsumed by the increasingly powerful personalities vying for its control is real. Lt. Col. Yasser al-Abboud and Col. Ahmed al-Naama, both of whom defected from the Syrian Army in the first half of 2012., have emerged as arguably the strongest figures within the local structures of the rebel army. Although still united by a common enemy, these aspiring strongmen may choose to pursue or reject alliances with both foreign powers and independent Islamist brigades, creating potential fissures that the remnants of the regime will be happy to exploit as the Syrian conflict enters a new phase. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)**

Source:

أسباب السقوط المفاجئ لـ“خربة غزالة” بيد النظام السوري

“Reasons for the Surprise Fall of Khirbat Ghazala in the Hands of the Syrian Regime” (NOW [Lebanon]), Source: <https://now.mmedia.me/lb/ar/newspecialar/>

Article #1:

Ahmed al-Naama, head of the military council in Daraa, said that ammunition was not provided to the rebels for several reasons, including the fact that it was unavailable. Some battalion leaders and other rebels refute this, saying that the leadership had enough ammunition. As proof they mention how two days after the withdrawal from Khirbat Ghazalah the military council prepared for the “Unifying Hauran” battle by striking the 52nd Brigade in the town of al-Harak...

Many local journalists have raised questions on who benefitted from the international highway falling back into Syrian government hands. Some point to the Jordanian government, which suffered economically after rebels took over the highway. Others link it to international politics...

Source:

حوار حصري مع قائد لواء اليرموك بسوريا بشار الزعبي

“Exclusive Interview with the Leader of the Yarmouk Brigade Bashar al-Zoabi” (Blad News), Source: <http://bladnews.com/news7619.html>

Article #2:

Q: Do you follow the Daraa Military Council?

A: No, we follow the Joint Chiefs of Staff – Southern Front and do not follow the military council under its current leadership, which has proven its ineptitude recently. We tried to change and withdraw some of the signatories at the last moment following personal communications with them, however they prevented the changes from being implemented. We wish to confirm that we will support any internally elected military council which is agreed upon by our brothers in Hawran.

Q: What happened in Khirbat Ghazalah and why did it fall?

A: Everyone knows about the fighters' steadfastness for over 60 days. It was attrition, in terms of ammunition. We in the Yarmouk Brigade lost more than 12 fighters and tens were injured in our involvement in Khirbat Ghazalah. The mass withdrawal was due to a lack of ammunition, which had been requested from the military council in order to continue cutting off the international highway. When the colonel arrived, ammunition was distributed according to loyalty rather than capability. We were not able to hold for even 72 hours, and Khirbat fell.

Q: Do you have disagreements with the military council and with battalions on the ground?


A: With the military council yes, everyone knows there are disagreements about how they operate. With the battalions there is no disagreement, thank God.

“Nasrallah once again took to the podium, asserting that with respect to Hizbullah, the post-Qusayr stage is no different than the pre-Qusayr stage.”

OE Watch Commentary: On 25 May Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a lengthy speech in which, among other topics, he announced that his party's militia was openly fighting alongside the Syrian Army in the town of Qusayr. On 14 June, following the Syrian regime's recapture of Qusayr, Nasrallah once again took to the podium, asserting that, with respect to Hizbullah, the post-Qusayr stage is no different than the pre-Qusayr stage. Not everyone agrees.

The first accompanying article, authored by the deputy editor of the daily al-Hayat, sees Qusayr as a fundamental turning point in the history of Hizbullah, one in which the Arab public (read: Sunni) will turn against the party in irreversible ways. Hizbullah's ability to shape the narrative – as a potter molds a jar, to use the author's metaphor – has been exhausted after its intervention in Qusayr. This, it bears noting, is neither the first nor likely the last time that Gulf media have predicted Hizbullah's demise. Yet while the view from the Gulf may have changed little after Qusayr, Hizbullah's Syrian intervention does appear to have elicited negative reactions among many who, while not openly supportive, have historically been broadly sympathetic toward Hizbullah's actions and positions. The second article, authored by the Amman bureau chief of the daily al-Quds al-Arabi, is a case in point. As the author notes, the timing of Hizbullah's intervention, as well as the openness with which it was announced, are significant tactical mistakes, the likes of which the party rarely makes.

For Nasrallah, Hizbullah's forceful and open intervention in Syria is driven by the logic of resistance, a morally just cause that will ultimately be vindicated by the Arab public. If its public standing in the region temporarily suffered as a consequence, so be it. The third accompanying article, written by the editor-in-chief of Lebanon's daily al-Akhbar, believes that Hizbullah retains its advantage to shape the narrative and mobilize its followers. Indeed, the ability to mobilize and control one's supporters for a sustained period of time will likely become the key to survival in the reconfiguring Levant. Thus far, Qusayr does not appear to have significantly dented Hizbullah's ability to do so. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)**



Sayid Hassan Nasrallah, via <http://www.totalfascism.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Hassan-Nasrallah3605220261.jpg>

Source:

”اقتراق“ حسن نصرالله!

““Hassan Nasrallah Burns!” (al-Hayat), Source: <http://alhayat.com/OpinionsDetails/520092>

Article #1:

3 June 2013

Sayid Hassan Nasrallah made a major mistake in becoming involved in the fighting in Syria. Try as he might he will be unable to correct it. It will reflect on his party and its followers soon, with some now calling it the “Party of Satan” and hatred toward it on the rise in the Arab Street...

The jar has fallen and broken many times in the past years, but it has been remolded, allowing others to drink from it. Yet following Hizbullah's flagrant intervention and the killing of Syrians... The jar has been broken thousands of times, Mr. Nasrallah, and you cannot be shrewd as you always have been before, the clay can no longer be remolded nor can the water from the jar be divided. Only those without dignity, searching for “clean” Iranian money, can coexist with you and your party in the region.

(continued)

Continued: The Post-Qusayr Stage

Source:

خطاب (لن تسبى زينب مرتين) وأخطاء حزب الله

“Hizbullah’s Speech (Zaynab will not be captured twice) and its Mistakes” (al-Quds al-Arabi),
Source: <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=54758>

Article #1:

16 June 2013

Iran, according to my limited understanding, fought with Hizbullah alongside the Syrian regime, but hid or at least did not announce the presence of thousands of Revolutionary Guards on the ground... Why did Hizbullah openly accept the job? I do not know.

Everyone knows that Tehran stands fully with Bashar’s regime but when it comes to military and fighting assistance it shies away from open declarations, unlike Hizbullah, whose commanders entered the war on television screens, overtly and with a stubborn urgency despite the fact that the crisis is largely domestic...

Simply put and as an Arab citizen who loves Hizbullah and believed in it in the past, I feel that it has made a mistake and failed specifically regarding the announcement of its participation...

Source:

“Hezbollah and the New Levant” (al-Akhbar English [Lebanon])

Source: <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/hezbollah-and-new-levant>

Article #3:

10 June 2013

What is most important in those experiences is Hezbollah’s ability to produce the appropriate political discourse for each stage. Therefore it can introduce mechanisms allowing it to continue mobilizing a new generation for its forces. After a quarter of a century of military experience, its fighters are still in their early twenties...

Today, Hezbollah is abhorred by a not-so-small number of Arabs and Muslims. Yet it does not worry about its popular legitimacy. It never linked its struggles or position with obtaining prior approval from those who everyone knows are not fit to hire a government employee, let alone make a strategic choice...



Changing Trends in Israel – Turkey Security and Military Relations: Their Perspectives

By Karen Kaya

This article analyzes the changing trends in the military and security relations between Turkey and Israel. It identifies factors of the operational environment that influence bilateral relations and includes a thorough discussion of each of the factors from a Turkish and Israeli perspective. It argues that relations are a product of the structural changes in the two countries’ operational environments.

<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/universities.html>

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Forget Earlier Rebuke: Western Alliances with Chad's President to Fight Terrorism in Mali

13 June 2013

“Chad was a big winner from this year’s French-led intervention in Mali. But a failed coup attempt at the start of May shows that Western powers may be getting into bed with a regime which is not entirely stable...”

OE Watch Commentary: Sometimes overlooked in the Western media is that the French intervention earlier this year in northern Mali received assistance from several African militaries, with troops from Chad apparently being particularly helpful. As the accompanying article states, “The swift victory over militant Islamist groups demonstrated the strength of the Chadian military, pushing the country up world power indexes. And with Western powers looking for allies in the Sahel, Chad has emerged as an unlikely but possibly indispensable ally.” Unfortunately though for those who look to Chad to play even bigger roles in African security in the future, the present regime has a history of corruption and political repression.

Idriss Déby seized power in 1990 and has been president of Chad ever since, though not without several attempts to force him out, the most recent in early May of this year. Not long ago he was one of the people French President Hollande was trying to distance his country from by ending “La Françafrique, a neo-colonial arrangement between French state and business interests and rulers of former colonies.” In other words, France did not want to continue having strong relations with long-term rulers and others it deemed as being less than savory characters. However, with the crisis in Mali, France went looking for allies, and in embracing Chadian assistance France appears to have silently dropped its opposition to La Françafrique, at least with respect to President Déby. This was by no means a one way relationship. Déby used the “opportunity to solidify the French relationship.”

In overlooking Déby’s history of corruption and political repression, during the Mali campaign France gained



Idriss Déby, President of Chad, via http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Idriss_Deby_Itno_IMG_3724.jpg

Source: “Chad: Power Abroad, Trouble at Home,” ThinkAfricaPress, 13 June 2013, <http://thinkafricapress.com/chad/power-abroad-trouble-home>

...Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi invested significant political capital in the Sahara and the Sahel. His downfall left a power vacuum across the region, one which it appears President Déby of Chad has been keen to fill...

...It has traditionally been Algeria, not Chad, that has played the role of mediator in northern Mali...

...French troops had little to do with those sent by ECOWAS member states and limited their fighting alongside the Malian army. But as James Hackett, an analyst from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, intimated they trusted the Chadians and the Chadians alone due to their “knowledge of the terrain”...

...This new-found friendship signaled an about turn in relations between Chad and its former colonial power...

...Many followers of Central African politics have seen Chad as the winner of the rebel victory in CAR. One newspaper, La Nouvelle Centrafrique, went so far as to proclaim that “Déby was recolonizing the Central African Republic”. Although this claim may be exaggerated, Chadian forces do maintain a presence within the CAR...

(continued)

Continued: Forget Earlier Rebuke: Western Alliances with Chad's President to Fight Terrorism in Mali

an African military ally they trusted, according to the accompanying article more so than they trusted other African militaries for assistance, because the Chadians had "knowledge of the terrain." Chad's participation in the fighting in northern Mali, however, came with a steep price: more than 30 Chadian soldiers were killed, the most of any of the foreign countries.

Though the initial campaign in Mali is over, Déby continues being noticed by Western nations concerned with fighting terrorism as his country helps fill the security vacuum created in the central Sahara when Libya's Gaddafi was removed from power. Regarding this situation, Alex De Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Programme thinks that "the combination of oil, military capability, and good relations with France have turned Chad into a regional force to be reckoned with."

*Unfortunately part of that military capability is based on child soldiers, earning Chad a place on the U.N. "list of shame" for child recruitment.¹ However, despite Chad's inclusion on that register, the U.N. still plans to include Chad in its peacekeeping force for Mali. Thus, in fighting terrorism in Mali, both France and the U.N. have turned to a capable though tarnished ally. **End OE Watch Commentary (Feldman)***

1. Alexandra Olson, "Group: Exclude Chad Troops from UN Force in Mali," Associated Press, 19 June 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/group-exclude-chad-troops-force-mali-19439617#.UcR-6Y3D9v4>

...Déby's decisive action in Mali does not simply fall into the category of foreign policy - it was also an effective way to exude authority domestically. Roland Marchal, Head of Studies and International Research at Science Po University in Paris, explained to Think Africa Press that now "Déby will be able to brand any armed rebellion against his rule as Islamist based", and ensure international support...

... And Déby has reportedly responded to last month's foiled coup plot by cracking down on dissenting voices - arresting scores of parliamentarians, officers and journalists...

...After 23 years of Déby's authoritarian rule, which has seen the country drop down various freedom rankings, there seem to be few viable alternatives. Celeste Hicks, a journalist and Sahel analyst, explains that "the opposition is very weak" and "it has failed to produce any candidate who can challenge him". Few hold out much hope for change through the ballot box in 2016, with a divided opposition that, according to Marchal, "can be bought off with money". Indeed, Marchal told Think Africa Press, "that the greatest threat to Déby's regime comes from inside his own ethnic group, the Zaghawa. He is more likely to be gunned down by one of his bodyguards"...


...Development funds are urgently needed. Chad's oil reserves and a World Bank-funded pipeline had been an initial source of optimism. These revenues were "meant to be used for developmental purposes, but it was stolen by the Chadian Government for weapons", Plaut explained. Déby appears to be prioritizing guns over grain...

Africa's Brain Drain: Its Impacts on Security and Stability

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert Feldman, U.S. Army Reserve.

Africa is bleeding. Much of its lifeblood, composed of well-educated individuals who could help tackle its toughest problems, is flowing away. This hemorrhaging of engineers, doctors, teachers, nurses, businesspersons, scientists, and others with extensive training constitutes Africa's brain drain. This brief study examines the impact of this loss in the social, economic, political and security spheres.

<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Africa's-Brain-Drain.pdf>



South African “NObama” Campaign to Protest U.S. Military and Foreign Policy 20 June 2013

“South African civil society’s primary points of contention relate to the U.S. government’s “militarization of international relations,” the U.S. position on Israel, as well as its veto behavior in the United Nations Security Council.”

OE Watch Commentary: *Members of South Africa’s civil society--in the form of a variety of political groups--are using President Obama’s Africom visit as a platform to express their critical perspectives on the United States’ military and foreign policies. Given that South Africa boasts one of the continent’s most vibrant civil society landscapes, the planned protests are perhaps not surprising.*

As the accompanying article details, three of South African civil society’s primary points of contention relate to the U.S. government’s “militarization of international relations” (particularly the presence of AFRICOM), the United States’ stance on Israel, and its veto behavior in the United Nations Security Council. It should be noted, moreover, that the statement relayed below is an abridged version of the group’s perspectives on the United States’ military and foreign policy; the original document also includes language critical towards Washington’s relationship with Cuba and its approach to environmental protection.

*These anti-U.S. viewpoints of South African civil society thus noted, it bears stating that those groups and individuals involved in the upcoming protest are known to be intellectual radicals, who pride themselves on their neo-Marxist interpretations of both international and domestic politics. The takeaway point for the reader, then, is that, although a recognition of the following perspectives is imperative for understanding South African and Sub-Saharan African interpretations of the U.S., these outlooks should not be interpreted as necessarily representative of these populations at large. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)***

Source: “NObama Campaign Protests Obama Visit in South Africa,” African Security Central. 20 June 2013: <http://africansecuritycentral.com/2013/06/20/nobama-campaign-protests-obama-visit-in-south-africa/>

NObama Campaign Protests Obama Visit in South Africa

We as South Africans in the form of the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Young Communist League of South Africa (YCL), the South African Students Congress (SASCO), the Muslim Students Association (MSA), the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Friend of Cuba Society (FOCUS), Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel in South Africa (BDS South African), and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), declare our utmost rejection of visit of the United States of America President, Barack Obama to our country. Our rejection is based the USA’s arrogant, selfish and oppressive foreign policies, treatment of workers and international trade relations that are rooted in war mongering, neo-liberal super-exploitation, colonial racism and the disregard and destruction of the environment, thus making the realization of a just and peaceful world impossible.

The coming of President Barak Obama to South Africa is the first ever since he was elected head of state. The USA under his leadership has escalated its assault on human rights, militarization of international relations and continuing galloping of world resources at the absolute expense of the environment and oppressed peoples of the world.

The following issues will be highlighted in upcoming protests of President Barack Obama:

1. The championing and maintenance, by the USA, in the militarization of international relations and co-operation. It is a well-known fact that the USA approaches conflicts in the world through inciting, encouraging as well and championing war, primarily driven by its business interests often masqueraded in the language of defense of human rights. The militarization of international relations is in the main exemplified by institutions like Africom, NATO, and the continuing double standards around nuclear disarmament that the USA preaches when it comes to countries in the South, whilst continuing to collaborate with on nuclear weapons with Israel.

2. The USA’s active support and defense of colonial and oppressive regimes. This is the one aspect of USA foreign policy that most exposes its hypocritical character where regimes that support its interest are never opposed; instead they are not only supported but maintained through amongst other things, the USA war machinery. Chief amongst these is Israel, which continues to serve as the USA’s frontline state in the Middle East whilst suppressing and maintaining its racist apartheid policies on Palestinian people. Another example is the USA’s support to Morocco, that is oppressing and colonially occupying Western Sahara, and increasingly the support of oppressive regimes like the one in Colombia.

3. In addition, the USA has for years been single-handedly blocking any progress and is totally divorced and isolated from the consensus of the international community. In fact, the USA is the most frequent user of the UN veto: it has used its veto power over 40 times to defend Apartheid Israel. As South Africans, we painfully recall how the US used its veto power to defend Apartheid South Africa, particularly from UN resolutions imposing economic and military sanctions. The USA, under Reagan and others, supported Apartheid South Africa and was on the wrong side of history. Why does the USA not learn from its history, and be on the right side of history this time?

“Although threats and even occasional violence between Frelimo and Renamo are not uncommon, the most recent episode suggests a level of animosity uncharacteristic of the recent past.”

OE Watch Commentary: *It is the civil war that seems to be inextinguishable. As of late, violent tensions are rising between Mozambique’s two main political parties, the incumbent Frelimo party (in power since the country’s independence in 1975) and its historical opposition, Renamo.*

As the accompany article details, opposition Renamo is being accused of killing seven government soldiers in a raid on a weapons store in Savane; for its part, Renamo claims no responsibility and says that the Frelimo government is trying to paint it as a villain. In response, Renamo has also recently announced that it is threatening to disrupt the Sena rail line, the main thoroughfare connecting the country’s coalfields to the Indian Ocean.

Two rationales underlie this threat. First, if successful, the move would cripple the country economically, in effect hobbling ruling Frelimo. Second, as alluded to in the article, Renamo claims that the railway disruption is intended to protect its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, who lives in the semi-militarized Gorongosa region, which the Sena line traverses.

*As tensions rise, the reader should take away the point that although threats and even occasional violence between the Frelimo and Renamo are not uncommon, the most recent episode suggests a level of animosity uncharacteristic of the recent past. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)***



Source: “Renamo distancia-se do assalto ao paiol de Savane e promete dividir Moçambique pelo rio Save,” (Renamo distances itself from an attack on Savane weapons storehouse, threatens to divide Mozambique by the Save River,). Verdade (Maputo, Mozambique), 19 June 2013: <http://www.verdade.co.mz/tema-de-fundo/35-themadefundo/37757-renamondiz-que-vai-impedir-circulacao-de-pressoas-e-bens-no-centro-do-pais>.

Article:

Renamo, the largest opposition party in Mozambique, announced on Wednesday, June 19, 2013, that it will prevent road traffic between the Save river and Muxúnguè, and rail traffic in Beira-Moatize and Beira-Marromeu in the Sofala Province. Its goal is to block the transport of arms and military equipment to the Gorongosa region, where its party’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama is now stationed.

“Renamo forces will be positioned to prevent the movement of vehicles carrying people and goods, because the Government uses these vehicles to carry arms and military personnel in civilian clothes in the vicinity of Satungira to attack the President Afonso Dhlakama,” said Jerónimo Malagueta, information head of that party.

Renamo made the announcement during a press conference in which it distanced itself from an attack on a storeroom of arms held by the Armed Forces of Mozambique, which culminated in the deaths of seven soldiers, as well as the theft of some materiel.

For Malagueta, the fact that the Government has been saying that Renamo men perpetrated the assault is just a ploy to trick Mozambican society and the international community.

In his speech, Malagueta claimed that Renamo does not want war, but “a country of inclusion in all areas of life.” Thus, the prohibition of movement of vehicles and trains aims to “undermine the logistical capacity of those who cause Mozambicans to suffer, subjecting them to slavery.”

On Friday of last week, a considerable amount of military equipment arrived through the port of Maputo, which had been imported by the Ministry of Defense. The new import includes approximately 25 large trucks carrying large weaponry and 25 additional Land Rover brand vehicles that appear to be military in nature.

“The Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee, under the environment ministry, has given clearances to a few companies and research institutes to conduct field trials for genetically modified rice, wheat, maize, castor and cotton.”

OE Watch Commentary: *The creation and dissemination of transgenic plants has been hailed as the next “Green Revolution.” These genetically modified organisms (GMO) have been touted by governments and industry as a way to feed the growing world population through their ability to withstand pesticides and herbicides, as well as bringing enhanced nutrients to consumers. In the developing world, where often at least half of the working population is involved in agriculture, introduction of these crops has had significant impact. Opposition to GMO involves concerns for environmental and health dangers. Recent developments in Asia reveal the challenges of food security. Japan and South Korea both canceled tenure to purchase US-grown wheat due to reports of genetically modified wheat contamination.*

Disruption of agricultural exports due to GMO concerns has cost US producers significant losses in the past. At the same time US soy beans (90% of US soy production is GMO) flow by the metric ton to Asia to be used as animal feed.

In both South and Southeast Asia governments are working to provide long-term food security, while honoring socially sensitive historical agriculture practices and products. The Times of India reports the government clearance of field trials for several crops. This has been strongly resisted for years, as reflected in the article from The Hindu. Opposition and resistance to these GMO crops is expressed in social media, blogs, and other internet venues. This is illustrated in the article from the One World South Asia website.

Southeast Asia is another focal point for food security. Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Thailand,

Source: The Times of India, “Field trials cleared for genetically modified rice, wheat, maize, castor and cotton,” June 20, 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Field-trials-cleared-for-genetically-modified-rice-wheat-maize-castor-and-cotton/articleshow/20668530.cms>

TIMES VIEW

It's the future of food

The Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee, under the environment ministry, has given clearances to a few companies and research institutes to conduct field trials for genetically modified rice, wheat, maize, castor and cotton. ... Note that the latest move doesn't open Indian doors to GM crops indiscriminately, but only recognises that our stagnating agriculture sector cannot afford to shut out the most promising scientific opportunities of today.

Unfortunately the matter has become quite politicised, ... Under their spell, India's first Green Revolution would never have taken off, because it was accompanied by problems like groundwater exhaustion and pesticide abuse. All technologies need proper monitoring and regulation. This cannot be a pretext for stalling the road to the future. ...

Developing countries are now growing more hectares of GM crops than rich countries, where early adopters like the US have been consuming them for over a decade without turning into Frankensteins.... It makes no sense for India to forfeit the gains that the whole world is chasing.

COUNTERVIEW

Don't give in to Frankenfood

Murali Ramachandran

The clearance given by the environment ministry for field trials of genetically modified rice, wheat, maize and castor oil is flawed and needs to be revoked. This is because a case challenging the suitability ... for GM crops is under the consideration of the Supreme Court. ... technical committee constituted by the court has recommended a 10-year moratorium on all trials of food crops used for human consumption.

There are serious apprehensions about the current regulatory framework for an unproven and potentially harmful technology such as GM crops. A major grouse is that in the current set-up, the promoter (director of biotechnology) has a major say and is bound to pitch in favour of GM crops. ...



Cotton Fields in India, via <http://www.non-gmoreport.com/articles/february2012/gmtechnologypesticideindia.php>

(continued)

Continued: Indo-Pacific Asia - Food Security and "GMO"

and Vietnam have almost half or more of their working population involved in agriculture. The controversy around GMO in the region began in 1999, when genetically modified wheat was found in US wheat sold to Thailand; considered by the Thais to be a contaminant. An article from Asianewsnet reflects the current debate in Thailand. Each nation has its own agenda for the introduction or control of these crops. Vietnam's situation is illustrated in the article from Thanh Nien Daily. End OE Watch Commentary (Welch)

A major scientific worry is the impact of GM crops on biodiversity. Release of transgenic varieties leads to monoculture and elimination of traditional varieties. ... So large-scale adoption of GM crops, whose safety and sustainability remain unproven, is a major risk that a poor country like India cannot afford. The sudden decline of the initial euphoria over Bt cotton is a warning that should not be ignored.

Farmers protest in Haryana, India. via <http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/actions-and-events-mainmenu-26/stop-transnational-corporations-mainmenu-76/1322-north-indian-farmers-destroy-monsantos-gm-corn-field-trials>



“...this episode was a repetition of Herbicide Tolerant cotton being planted by Monsanto’s affiliate, Mahyco, without permission...”

Source: The Hindu, “Maize trial: Coalition for a GM Free India demands blacklisting of Monsanto,” February 8, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/maize-trial-coalition-for-a-gmfree-india-demands-blacklisting-of-monsanto/article2869791.ece>

The Coalition for a GM-Free India has demanded that Monsanto be blacklisted in view of the revelations of “illegal” planting of Herbicide Tolerant (HT) maize in its GM maize trial in Karnataka. ...

Speaking at a press conference ... a member of the Coalition, said that ... the agri-business corporation has been caught violating norms repeatedly.

The RTI response revealed that a team led by Pradyumn Kumar of the Directorate of Maize Research (DMR) had noted the violation in its visit report. “Monsanto’s GM maize trials have been going on for several seasons now in various locations across the country. It took a rare scientist in one monitoring team to point out the fact that planting of the herbicide-tolerant GM maize took place without permission from competent authorities. What is more damning is that there is no evidence of any discussion or action by the regulators on this finding,” said Ms. Kuruganti.

She also pointed out that this episode was a repetition of Herbicide Tolerant cotton being planted by Monsanto’s affiliate, Mahyco, without permission, as well as illegal planting of HT maize in the University of Agricultural Sciences in Dharwad.

Demands

In a letter sent to Minister of State for Environment and Forests ... the Coalition, has demanded inquiry into all GM maize field trials by Monsanto across the country; immediate withdrawal of permission for field trials by Monsanto and its affiliates till all violation issues are investigated and re-examining the monitoring, evaluation mechanism for field trials....

(continued)

Continued: Indo-Pacific Asia - Food Security and "GMO"

“Monsanto conducted an open field trial of GM cotton for the first time in Thailand in 1995. Four years later, there was a report of contamination of GM cotton in the environment and on agricultural farms.”



A Thai organic farmer protesting the introduction of GMO into Thailand., via <http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/pages/20130119-genetically-modified-organisms-worm-their-way-into-vietnam.aspx>

Source: Asianewsnet, “Thailand’s Greenpeace protests against GM field trials,” April 3, 2013, <http://www.asianewsnet.net/Thailands-Greenpeace-protests-against-GM-field-tri-44932.html>

... Greenpeace has urged the Thai government not to approve a genetically modified (GM) maize field trial, to be conducted by Naresuan University and agriculture-technology giant Monsanto, out of concern that the experiment could contaminate the environment....

The university organised a public opinion forum ... According to University president Professor Jinayon, the forum was a cooperation between the government, the academic institute and Monsanto Thailand, aimed at estimating bio-safety in the environment....

Greenpeace campaign coordinator for Southeast Asia Ply Pirom warned that if the Cabinet approved this trial, it would open the door for other GM plant trials to be conducted in Thailand....

The leak of GM plants into the environment and surrounding farms prompted the Thai Cabinet in 2007 to issue a resolution regulating GM plant trials in open fields... Despite such Cabinet resolutions, there were still reports of GM plant contamination among crops such as chilli, bananas and cotton among farms in Kanchanaburi and Nakhon Sawan....

Source: The Than Nien News, “Genetically modified organisms worm their way into Vietnam,” January 19, 2013, <http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/pages/20130119-genetically-modified-organisms-worm-their-way-into-vietnam.aspx>

Vietnamese farmers no longer have to look far to find genetically-modified seeds, scientists warn.

They are widely available on the black market and have been smuggled into the country for years, they said while speaking at a panel discussion on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in Vietnam held in Hanoi last week....

“...it would appear that a significant quantity of genetically-modified papaya from Thailand has been smuggled in and illegally distributed to farmers around Vietnam....

Environmental activists ... are worried about GM plants that have undergone trials and are about to be cultivated widely in the country by 2020, especially because Monsanto is ... to carry out research and tests in Vietnam.

There is well-founded concern that the Agent Orange saga might be repeated with the introduction of GMOs paired with toxic weed killers....

Heated debate

Meanwhile, the country’s scientific community has split into two camps: pro-GM and anti-GM.

The former sees the introduction of GM crops as the logical conclusion to efforts to improve yields to feed a growing population and drive down prices. The pro-GM scientists promote it as a highly promising solution to bolstering food security in Vietnam.

The anti-GM scientists and environmental activists dismiss this completely, saying GM crops are neither inexpensive nor healthy....

Activists challenge pro-GMO groups’ claims that genetic engineering will enhance the sustainability of agriculture by improving conventional farming, enhancing productivity, and reducing the environmental footprints of agriculture.

Vandana Shiva, an Indian physicist and prominent anti-GMO activist ... saying there are no such gains.

“There is no increase in yields, and hence GMOs are not a solution to hunger. There is an increase in the use of agrichemicals. GMOs are also leading to the emergence of super-pests and super weeds.”....

Meanwhile, even as the safety of GMOs is still being debated, GM seeds have already been sold to Vietnamese farmers on the black market and started their invasion of the country’s food chain....

OE Watch Commentary: Last month a functionary of the Cuban government announced that a tentative agreement had been reached between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in their now eight-month-old peace talks. The agreement only addresses one of several areas of contention on the talk agenda, that of land reform. Control or ownership of rural land may set near the heart of the Colombian political puzzle, but agreement about the importance of land quickly breaks down once any details are expressed. Little is known publicly about the details of this announced accord. Peace negotiators have asserted that if the land problem were hammered out, the rest of the peace negotiations would be relatively easy. Many other Colombians, however, do not see it that way at all, noting that impunity of FARC leaders and restitution for their victims are the weighty problems. They point to a kind of displacement of arguments in which the subject of the future of the FARC as an armed insurgency was switched to the question of power distribution in the countryside. They see the two as barely touching one another, that to comingle one with the other is to greatly and unjustifiably raise the status, both moral and institutional, of the FARC.

The FARC leadership is widely considered to be guilty of massive, violent and felonious behavior. Acceding to FARC leaders, the position of advocates for progress in a contrived negotiating balance galls many Colombians. Now representatives of the government are pitted against FARC leaders, as though the FARC somehow represented a moral option or any significant portion of the population. Given that the government had presented the security situation as one in which the FARC was all but defeated militarily, many Colombians expected the talks were going to be more on the order of surrender terms. They contend that the FARC long ago lost its moral azimuth and that land reforms can and should be accomplished without their opinion, leadership, or participation. They argue that the FARC leaders don't have a moral right, nor a demographic or electoral following such that they should be allowed any state-sponsored opinion. Upon this assertion they note further that favoring the FARC, or even allowing its presence in deals about the distribution of land ownership, will doom any peaceful future.

General support for the negotiations appears polite and muted. Opposition to it is more vocal, may be spreading, and is centered among followers of the former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. FARC sympathizers are among the few enthusiasts of the process. The question of resolving the internal war, as polarized, will again dominate the presidential election cycle, the elections to take place in May 2014. As with past peace talks, the Colombian government might appear weak or submissive in the face of rich, manipulative, unremorseful FARC narco-comandantes. Moreover, if the electorate thinks the negotiation prolongs the war rather than shortens it, Colombia will elect the candidate with the more aggressive stance. It may be for this reason exactly that the FARC negotiators suggested that the country postpone its 2014 elections, a move that Colombians are very unlikely to take. Outcomes (of the conflict and future of the FARC leaders) wait on the development of several exogenous factors, including economic performance and internal stability in neighboring Venezuela. Mostly they await the results of next year's Colombian elections. **End OE Watch Commentary (Demarest)**

Source: Alberto Rojas Jaimes. "Este proceso de paz nació muerto" May 22, 2013 at Debate Nacional, Colombian News, <http://www.pensamientocolombia.org/DebateNacional/los-colombianos-creemos-en-la-paz-pero-no-creemos-en-las-farc>

This Peace Process Was Dead at Birth

It was born dead because it began with secret conversations behind the back of Colombian society, between the government and the FARC terrorists. It was born dead because it is offering all kinds of judicial, economic and political privileges to criminals, which the terrorists are happily accepting and which the government will not be able to fulfill because the public will deny such a delivery of the country to criminals. It was born dead because has and must comply with international treaties that clearly and concisely addresses this issue, as to crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and narco-trafficking. It was born dead because Congress wants it that way -- that the Constitution will not be legally reformed in order to authorize all the guarantees that today the administration is offering and the bandits demanding.

Source: AFP and CONtesto Ganadero. "“El acuerdo alcanzado con las Farc es desafortunado”: Lafourier" at CONtexto Ganadero, 27 May 2013, <http://www.contextoganadero.com/politica/el-acuerdo-alcanzado-con-las-farc-es-desafortunado-lafaurie>

The agreement reached with the FARC is unfortunate: Lafourier

For his part, José Félix Lafaurie, president of the Colombian Cattlemen's Federation, Fedegán, categorized as unfortunate the agreement reached by the negotiators. The Fedegán president declared, "I think that the chief negotiator had the mission of arriving at a signed preliminary agreement, and he completed his task, but I see, really, more noise than agreement. It does not take six months of negotiating with the FARC to recognize the abandonment of terrain; note that redistribution of dispossessed lands and the strengthening of peasant reservations were talked about, but little or nothing about the factors that make of land an input for wealth creation; nothing was spoken of technical assistance, of irrigation, of schools, of health clinics; nothing was spoken of roads and less about markets. Neither was anything said about investment-based agricultural production, about the possibilities of producing for the world market and to generate honorable employment and rural development."

Combating Organized Crime: Differences between the Peña Nieto and Calderon Administrations

OE Watch Commentary: Felipe Calderon and the National Action Party (PAN) changed history in Mexico when they began their frontal assault against drug-trafficking organizations in 2006. Many Calderon opponents argue that his strategy was a complete failure given the estimated 63,000 deaths it caused. His proponents argue that violence associated with attempting to limit drug trafficking activity was an expected outcome of the undertaking and in no way signified failure.

Given the attention violence and drug trafficking generated during the Calderon administration, it seemed logical that the topic would appear at the forefront of the 2012 Presidential election debates.

Instead, Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) Candidate Enrique Peña Nieto PAN candidate Felipe

Calderon skirted the issue and were reluctant to discuss possible changes to the PAN strategy. In the end, Peña Nieto won the elections and was inaugurated in December 2012. Seventeen days later, he met with the National Public Security Counsel to delineate his security strategy and to differentiate it from that of his predecessor, Calderon.

What is interesting to note, and what was expected, is that Nieto is making what he calls “adjustments” instead of “changes” to the Calderon strategy. The casual observer may state that Nieto’s plan is very similar to that of his predecessor, but the new president has argued that in the intermediate term his adjustments, as opposed to the Calderon plan, will result in lower levels of violence and more stability in the country. Below are a few examples that delineate how he is putting his own mark on security and military operations in Mexico.

- **Adjustment One:** Under the Calderon administration, the military was heavily involved in counterdrug operations. Nieto will continue these operations, but will utilize a National Gendarmerie, which will consist of 10,000 officers instead of soldiers. The rationale behind this change is to train a force dedicated to conducting urban combat missions and to lessen human rights violations, which were prevalent during the Calderon administration.

- **Adjustment Two:** Under the Calderon administration, soldiers were deployed in 39 military zones/12 military regions.

Under Nieto, the country will be divided into the following five military zones:

- o **Region 1, Northwest Zone:** Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Sonora. The Juarez and Sinaloa Cartels are currently vying for control in this region. Between 2008 and 2010, the Northwest zone was deemed as the most violent in the country.

- o **Region 2, Northeast Zone:** Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, and Tamaulipas. The Gulf Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, and Los Zetas are currently vying for control of this region.

- o **Region 3, West Zone:** Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Queretaro, and Zacatecas. The New Generation Cartel of Jalisco, La Familia, and Los Caballeros Templarios are currently vying for control of this region.

- o **Region 4, Central Zone:** Federal District, Mexico State, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala. This region is primarily controlled by the Beltran Leyva Organization.

- o **Region 5, Southeast Zone:** Campeche, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and the Yucatan. This sector represents a strategic area for human and drug trafficking activities. The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas are vying for control of region five.

- **Adjustment three:** Calderon maintained a constant frontal offensive against organized crime groups during his administration. This action contributed to rising levels of violence in the country, but also resulted in the arrests of multiple cartel operatives.

Nieto has publicly stated that one of his key goals is to reduce violence levels in Mexico. To do this, he has indicated that he will maintain counterdrug operations but not at the same intensity as during the Calderon administration.



Peña Nieto is on the left; Calderon on the right, via Source uncited.

(continued)

Continued: Combating Organized Crime: Differences between the Peña Nieto and Calderon Administrations

• **Adjustment four:** One of Calderon's first actions following his inauguration in 2006 was to send a small contingent of troops to his home state of Michoacan. This action was coordinated by SEDENA (Secretary of National Defense) and was intended to thwart the growth of La Familia Michoacana, a drug cartel dedicated to recruiting the local populace and producing synthetic drugs.

During the six-year Calderon administration, new organized crime groups and civil self-defense groups flourished in Michoacán. When Nieto took office, one of his first actions was to give control of counterdrug operations back to SEGOB (Secretary of the Interior) and to re-deploy Federal Police to Michoacan.

These examples are just a sample of how the Nieto administration is adjusting the security strategy in Mexico. **End OE Watch Commentary (Fiegel and Gonzalez)**



Source: Sebastián Barragán. "Combate al crimen: Las diferencias entre Peña Nieto y Calderón". Union Jalisco. Retrieved on 16 May 2013 from <http://www.unionjalisco.mx/articulo/2012/12/17/seguridad/5-puntos-pena-nieto-se-desmarca-de-calderon-en-combate-al-crimen>

Combating Organized Crime: Differences between the Peña Nieto and Calderon Administrations

Looking strictly at statistics, organized crime related murders have decreased since the start of the Peña Nieto administration. During the first three months of his presidential term, 3,157 murders were reported. During the same time period in the Calderon administration, 4,975 murders were reported. It seems fitting that the crime rate decreased during the first three months of the Peña Nieto administration given that the number of operations conducted against organized crime groups also decreased. Statistics have shown that weapons seizures and arrests were also down during the first months of the Peña Nieto administration. This raises the following question: does Peña Nieto plan to reduce violence levels by easing off organized crime groups?

(continued)

Continued: Combating Organized Crime: Differences between the Peña Nieto and Calderon Administrations

Peña Nieto has made it clear that he plans to make “adjustments” to the Calderon security strategy with the end goal of decreasing levels of violence in the country. To understand the “adjustments” Peña Nieto is making to the PAN security strategy, it is important to understand how Felipe Calderon transformed security forces in Mexico during his term.

Calderon security policy:

- He doubled the pay of military personnel in an attempt to make them less susceptible to organized crime bribes. Prior to this action, some soldiers were earning as little as \$400 per month.
- He doubled the federal security budget which resulted in much larger security institutions. For example, the federal police force tripled between 2006 and 2012 while its budget quadrupled. During the same time period, officers received more technologically advanced equipment and recruitment efforts improved in the sense that the force sought out college graduates instead of high school graduates. By the end of the Calderon administration, 25% of the federal police force were college graduates.
- The federal penitentiary system expanded from 3 to 12 facilities. This makes perfect sense given that 41,318 organized crime operators were arrested during the Calderon administration.
- Large-scale military operations were conducted throughout the country. One of Calderon’s first moves as President was to deploy a contingent of troops to his home state of Michoacan. By the end of his administration, more than 45,000 soldiers were deployed in organized crime affected states throughout Mexico.
- Soldiers faced no time limitations in the sense that their operations would continue until state and municipal police forces could assume the role of controlling organized crime violence.
- The process of constitutional reform began in an aim to move forward towards a more adversarial system with the following end goals:
 - o To reduce congestion in courts and prisons
 - o To improve prosecutorial efforts
 - o To reduce levels of impunity and deter criminal behavior

The reform process, which began in 2009, was slated for eight years. So far, three Mexican states have completed the transition while eight other states have partially introduced the system.

- In 2009, the General Law of National Public Security was passed to ensure proper vetting of police and law enforcement personnel. The purpose behind this law was to ensure police cadets had not already been recruited by organized crime groups as drug cartels have been known to infiltrate police forces by sending their own through police academies.
- Cooperation with US forces reached new highs.

Peña Nieto Strategy:


Security experts predict that the Peña Nieto strategy will deliver results over the intermediate term. His key goals include reducing violence levels, kidnappings, and extortions in Mexico. To accomplish this, Peña Nieto is implementing the following strategies:

- The creation of a National Gendarmerie which will consist of 10,000 officers once it is fully operational. The National Gendarmerie will not replace the Federal Police. Instead, the Gendarmerie will serve as a specialized force dedicated to conducting high impact urban operations. During the Calderon administration, soldiers commonly conducted these operations but many have argued that were not properly trained to do so. Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, the Secretary of the Interior (SEGOB), will be responsible for overseeing activities of the National Gendarmerie and the Federal Police.
- Federal Police will undergo proficiency/confidence testing and will receive additional training to combat organized crime groups.
- 15 police units dedicated to combating extortion and kidnappings will be created.
- A new Social Crime Prevention Plan will be created. This plan will research social factors that precipitate violence. As part of this initiative and an effort to reduce crime levels, the government will invest \$(MXN) 2,250,000 to create vivid spaces and sports/cultural centers in 57 urban areas in Mexico.
- The creation of a National Human Rights Program. As part of this program, civil organizations will actively participate with the National Security Council to strengthen institutions aimed at guaranteeing human rights. The Human Rights Program will also be responsible for overseeing complaints related to the Victims Law which was established to create a legal and operational strategy to search for victims kidnapped by organized crime groups. This law was blocked by the Calderon administration.
- The Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) has been dismantled.

(continued)

Continued: Combating Organized Crime: Differences between the Peña Nieto and Calderon Administrations

- Single/Unified Police Commands will be created throughout the country. This means that there will no longer be state and municipal police forces as all organizations will be working together as one unit.
- The country will be divided into the following five military regions to combat organized crime (see breakdown of these regions in the commentary section)
- Excluding security issues from the daily media focus and international agenda. To achieve this goal, government entities are no longer reporting on the following statistics regarding organized crime activity:
 - o Statistics regarding governmental operations against organized crime groups
 - o The number of active cartels operating in Mexico
 - o The names of active cartels operating in Mexico
 - o The names of drug lords being targeted
 - o The AO of active drug cartels



Geoff Demarest's *Winning Insurgent War* is about a broader set of conflicts than just 'insurgency.' In its 144 sections, Geoff Demarest raises new and overlooked concepts related to modern conflict in a provocative manner designed to stir up debate and critical thinking. As Geoff Demarest puts it: "I hope that some of the ideas in it will be contagious."

'Peace Ark' Ahoy: The PLA's Growing Focus on Military Diplomacy



The PLA Navy's 'Peace Ark' at sea. Source: Xinhua

“The Peace Ark will be like a calling card for China. It will allow people to experience the unique characteristics of Chinese medicine, Chinese culture and the Chinese Navy.”

OE Watch Commentary: This article in the Global Times discusses a series of upcoming foreign deployments by the Peace Ark, a large Chinese-designed hospital ship. The mission, dubbed “Harmony Mission–2013,” will include numerous ports of call in Asia and the Gulf of Aden. Harmony Mission–2013 is being viewed as an important act of “military diplomacy,” according to Rear Admiral Shen Hao of the Chinese Navy. As China pursues a more aggressive tack in numerous territorial disputes in and around Asia, it is clearly cognizant of waning diplomatic goodwill. It is instructive to note that diplomatic strategy is now being conceived of at the military level as well.

Such concern for generating diplomatic goodwill at the military level also shows that China may be worried about global views of its military, especially the increasing global reach of its Navy. Military expansionism is often seen as the most threatening aspect of China’s global rise. Engendering goodwill and lessening the perceived threat of its global naval expansion are important strategic goals for China and the PLA Navy.

For a country that places heavy emphasis on non-intervention, the expansion of its global naval activities is difficult to justify theoretically. Humanitarian relief is one activity that provides adequate justification. As the article points out, while the ship is primarily going to be used for humanitarian relief, it was designed specifically to provide medical support for maritime warfare. Such international humanitarian missions provide important practice for such future engagements. **End OE Watch Commentary (Moskowitz)**

Source: “Heping fangchuan” dazao Zhonguo junshi waizhao mingpian (‘Peace Ark’ forges the calling card of Chinese military diplomacy) Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times – China) 13 June 2013 http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-06/13/c_124850113_2.htm

‘Peace Ark’ Forges Calling Card of Chinese Military Diplomacy

China’s Peace Ark, a hospital ship, recently set sail for stops in eight countries in and around Asia and the Gulf of Aden, as part of its 2013 “Harmony Mission” tasks. As part of its mission the boat will visit Brunei and participate in the ASEAN+10 humanitarian aid relief joint military exercises organized by ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). The ship will next travel to the Gulf of Aden as part of a naval escort, before travelling to Indonesia and participating in a multinational joint maritime parade. Following the parade, the ship will make stops to provide medical services in Hong Kong, Maldives, Karachi, Mumbai, Chittagong, Burma, Jakarta, and Sihanoukville. This will be the ship’s fourth annual deployment.

“...This mission displays our character as a great nation, and presents a positive image for our troops, both of which are extremely important aspects of military diplomacy. As commander of this mission, I feel great honor and responsibility,” said Rear Admiral Shen Hao. This is the first major diplomatic naval deployment undertaken since the 18th Party Congress [the official ascendancy of the new administration], and this mission will be important in ensuring conditions conducive to a positive naval security environment for China, noted Shen.

...Unlike other medical ships used by the US and Russia that are built from converted container ships, the Peace Ark was designed and built primarily to serve as a floating hospital. Though it will mostly be used for humanitarian aid, the Peace Ark was designed and will be critical for the medical evacuation and immediate treatment of wounded [seamen and other personnel] during maritime combat operations.

... “The Peace Ark will be like a calling card for China. It will allow people to experience the unique characteristics of Chinese medicine, Chinese culture and the Chinese Navy,” said Shen Hao.

“Harmony Mission – 2013 is a really important undertaking of military diplomacy,” said Shen, comparing the mission to the humanitarian relief provided by US hospital ships to Southeast Asian nations.

“If one always holds an ideological prejudice to conjecture and exaggerate China’s cyber capability, that will inevitably deepen both sides’ misunderstanding.”

OE Watch Commentary: China’s cyber activities to date preclude making Professor Lu’s plan for US-China cyber cooperation, described in the adjacent article, a reality. The US has discussed China’s cyber reconnaissance activities with the PLA and other Chinese security organizations for several years now. However, they have not changed Chinese motivations or attitudes toward reconnaissance, and these activities have continued not only against the US but also against a host of other nations (England, Germany, France, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, etc.). Discussions regarding warnings and mechanisms for moving a cooperative cyber agenda forward have not produced anything of note.

The Chinese clearly are not observing “the rules of the road” for cyber behavior as they profess. As evident by the recent report by the American software firm Mandiant, which detailed PLA cyber violations. US civilian and military companies, to include Lockheed Martin, Google, Northrup Grumman, and RSA to name but a few have been repeatedly targeted. No major company in China has attributed a cyber attack on it to the US. Rather, the Chinese are “driving” according to rules set by Chinese strategy. They continue to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the cyber age, such as lack of rules and regulations, use of surrogates, anonymity of the Internet, etc.. What is interesting, as the article suggests, is the Chinese endeavor to put cyber’s global reach into the hands of the UN or the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This would take away a government’s flexible and cultural use of cyber, and could result in an economic, military, or diplomatic disaster if manipulated for a political block’s advantage. Consider a Chinese partnership with Russia and other close friends (Iran, North Korea, etc.) within the international community to control the free use of information. In short, it is not ideological prejudice that deepens misunderstanding, as the opening quote to this section notes, but rather China’s aggressive cyber behavior. **End OE Watch Commentary (Thomas)**

Source: “Cyber Cooperation: The New Converging Point of Interests between China and the United States,” Lu Jinghua, PLA Academy of Military Science, Jiefangjun Bao Online, 15 June 2013.

...Sino-US Cyber Cooperation Has Broad Room and Prospects

1. Cooperate in cracking down on cyber crimes
2. Cooperate in dealing with cyber terrorist activities
3. Cooperate in establishing cyber rules...China and the United States can first discuss and define some important concepts, such as what is cyberspace, which software can be regarded as cyber weapons, and what standards can be used to determine cyber attacks. On the basis of such definitions, both sides will, as a necessary step, establish information-sharing mechanisms for coping with cyber threats, draw up the “red line” for cyber activities, and even set up a cyber hot line to prevent misjudgment. The ultimate objective of cooperation is to establish the cyber behavior norms commonly accepted by the international community.

...in the eyes of most Americans, “freedom” is the primary principle of cyberspace, so protecting an individual’s freedom in cyber activities should be a goal higher than anything else. However, **in the eyes of China, cyber behaviors are something similar to driving vehicles on roads, and only when all people observe certain rules** can smooth driving be guaranteed. As another example, China holds that cyber security is a global affair and should be jointly solved by the international community. Therefore, **the best way of dealing with this issue is to rely on the existing international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Telecommunications Union** for exchanging opinions and settling disputes. However, in the eyes of some Americans, China’s above-mentioned proposition showed that “the Chinese government is getting more skillful in using international organizations for gaining interests,” and that may pose a challenge to the US-led international cyber order.



China’s People’s Liberation Army (left) pitted against the U.S. Cyber Command (right), via Source: <http://nextgenlog.blogspot.com/2013/03/wwiii-chinas-cyber-espionage-defense.html>

China Develops Another Top Supercomputer But Claim They Have a Long Way To Go

25 April 2013

OE Watch Commentary: According to an unattributed report in Jiefangjun Bao Online, China has developed the world's fastest supercomputer. Of particular note is that the People's Liberation Army was responsible for this development. Another Chinese source noted that supercomputers will be used to develop nuclear fusion energy, conduct molecular dynamic simulations, and aid in climate studies. The supercomputer has also been heralded by Chinese scientists working on seismic issues, meteorology, medicine, commercial design, and construction.¹

However, supercomputers, according to a US source, also help design weapon system and crack codes.² One US computer scientist feels that in five years China will "have their cyber-infrastructure connected. They could create a distributed supercomputer that is 100 times faster than anything we have in the US"³ and it is ready for production.⁴

In spite of their supercomputer developments (this is not the first time the Chinese have had the world's fastest supercomputer) and continued cyber theft of terabytes of information from foreign computer systems, Chinese authorities continue to plead for cyber sympathy in line with their the stratagem of "appearing weak when strong" or Deng Xiaoping's "Hide your strength, bide your time." China's computer strength is obvious to all nations. **End of OE Commentary (Thomas)**

“Therefore China still has a long way to go in the application of supercomputers...”


Source: "NUDT Develops World's Leading Tianhe-2 Supercomputer," Unattributed report, Jiefangjun Bao Online, 18 June 2013.

NUDT Develops World's Leading Tianhe-2 Supercomputer

The international TOP 500 Organization formally released the new edition of the TOP 500 list of the world's most powerful supercomputers...on the afternoon of June 17. The Tianhe-2 supercomputer developed independently by the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), took first place in the list with its peak computing speed of 54.9 petaflops per second and sustained computing speed of 33.9 petaflops per second.

Now the overall situation is not substantially changed. There are gaps between China and the developed countries, especially the US, in aspects including core electronic devices, high-end general-purpose chips, basic software, and software for large industrial applications. Therefore China still has a long way to go in the application of supercomputers...

1. Mao Zhenhua, (no title), Xinhua Domestic Service, 11 June 2011.
2. Dan Lyons, "Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid," Newsweek, 5 December 2011, p. 58.
3. Ibid., p. 59.
4. Don Clark, "China Computer Poised for Top Rank," The Wall Street Journal, 6 June 2013, p. B8.



China's cyber policy has become partly visible to foreign nations through observation, tracking, and interference. The policy appears to have three vectors. *Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon* is divided into sections that coincide with these vectors. It attempts to provide context to the unfolding nature of China's cyber policy, and gives the analyst a more penetrating look into unconsidered, under "advertised" aspects of Chinese security thinking.

China's Investment in the U.S. Goes Beyond U.S. Treasuries 28 May 2013

“It is a trend that Chinese firms will be involved in more outbound investment, but compared with the US and the European Union, China is still t an early stage of outbound business and they have many things to learn”

OE Watch Commentary: Significant Chinese capital has been exiting China for global financial markets for more than a decade. U.S. sovereign debt markets have attracted the bulk of this capital, currently at \$1.25 trillion in U.S. treasuries alone. Motivations for this outbound capital flow are varied, but a principal one has been the need to find a safe haven for the trillions of dollars held by China's financial system. Given the constant flow of new dollars into the country's financial system, repatriating these dollars has not been necessary. Repatriation of dollars would also positively impact the Yuan/dollar exchange rate, something Chinese manufactures are loath to see. Chinese companies of all ownership types have increasingly seen the need and opportunity to expand not just sales, but also operations into overseas markets that are difficult to penetrate from a strictly Chinese base. Surveys of Chinese businesses expanding or considering an overseas expansion show that new market acquisition is a greater motivator than technology and brand acquisition.

What does this tell us about Chinese investment intentions and, more broadly, about their economy? Some possible indications are that Beijing is growing tired of the minimal returns of U.S. debt, Chinese companies need greater access to larger markets than their own, and returns to capital in China are no longer sufficient to keep Chinese capital at home. **End OE Watch Commentary (Zandoli)**

(Left) Chinese conglomerate Dalian Wanda bought the U.S. cinema company AMC for \$2.6 billion in 2012. Source via: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2013-05/24/content_16526969.htm



(Right) A group of investors led by China's SOHO property company bought a 40% stake in Manhattan's GM building for \$1.4 billion in May 2013. Source via: <http://online.wsj.com>



Source: “Outbound Investment Continues,” China Daily, 25 May 2013, Zhao Yanrong, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2013-05/24/content_16526969.htm>

China's Global Investment Grows

In what many analysts see as a healthy indicator of China's economic transition away from exports and toward consumption, Chinese outbound investment rose to \$77.2 billion (59.5 billion euros) last year, a 14-percent increase from the previous year's tally of \$68 billion, according to the Dragon Index, the first index to track Chinese outbound investment globally.

Europe led all regions and continents as the preferred destination for Chinese outbound direct investment last year, with 33 percent of all Chinese overseas funds being funneled toward the continent. That figure is more than double the amount of ODI into the US.

The ongoing overseas investments trend is largely the result of the Chinese government's encouraging major state-owned enterprises to look abroad.

Source: “China's SAFE eyes American real estate, reports say,” China Daily, 28 May 2013, Joseph Boris, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-05/28/content_16539360.htm>

China's Holder of U.S. Treasuries Set to Expand Investment in U.S. Real Properties

China's official overseer of foreign-currency reserves is considering real estate and other investments in the United States. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange, or SAFE, began studying the possibility of investing in US real estate after noting signs of a recovery in the country's property market.

(SAFE's) recently established operation on Manhattan's Fifth Avenue is meant as a launch pad for so-called alternative investments and complements a separate SAFE office in New York that for years has focused on buying US government debt, along with corporate bonds and asset-backed securities.

At \$3.4 trillion, China's reserve of foreign currencies is the largest in the world, more than a third of which is invested in US Treasury bonds and other issues. China is also the biggest single foreign creditor of the US government, and in March it reduced its Treasury holdings by 0.1 percent, to \$1.25 trillion. The reduction, though slight, was the latest signal that the Chinese government, mainly through SAFE, is seeking to diversify away from US government debt.

OE Watch Commentary: During an informal summit last month (June 2013), the leaders of the US and China released a joint statement expressing a mutual demand that North Korea must relinquish its nuclear weapons. The statement went on to say that neither country would accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and that China and the US would work together to achieve denuclearization. According to the excerpt from the adjacent article, however (released just prior to US-China summit), some Chinese analysts argue that a nuclear-armed North Korea might be the lesser of two evils, and given US intentions to strengthen its military presence in Northeast Asia, might actually serve Chinese interests.

In the excerpted article the author describes why the Pyongyang regime has been so insistent on developing a nuclear weapons program. According to his analysis, North Korea has been under severe military threat for the past two decades, with the US and South Korea continually conducting aggressive military exercises along its border. With the end of the Cold War, North Korea could no longer count on protection from its powerful neighbors, Russia and China, nor could it rely upon the assistance of the UN. As the conflicts in Iraq and Libya illustrated, the US was willing to take unilateral action against “rogue states” without UN approval.

The author compares North Korean fears to that of China before it became a nuclear power, “when it was being squeezed by the United States and the Soviet Union.” He posits that North Korea has no intention of proliferating nuclear technology, and that its program is solely defensive in nature. He goes on to suggest that the US “pivot to Asia” is primarily directed at containing China and not directed at the North Korean weapons program. Given the minor threat that a nuclear-armed North Korea poses for China, the author concludes that the status

Source: Liu Jia, “China Must Look Squarely at a Nuclear North Korea,” Huanqiu Wang, 31 May 2013.

‘China Must Look Squarely at a Nuclear North Korea’

...Making considerations from these several points, realizing denuclearization of the Peninsula is indeed incredibly advantageous to China. The question, however, is whether or not North Korea will abandon nuclear weapons. To be clear on this question, one must first be clear on why North Korea wants to research and develop nuclear weapons.

Increasingly large military pressure is the direct reason for North Korea’s research and development of nuclear weapons.

Over the past 20 years, the United States annually carried out multiple military exercises of differing scales on the Korean Peninsula. Most notable of these is the annual “Key Resolve” army, navy, air force exercise, whose predecessor was the “RSOI” exercise, which began in 1994. In 2009, during the “Key Resolve” joint military exercise, the United States mobilized a nuclear aircraft carrier, multiple nuclear submarines, and eight Aegis-equipped military vessels. Of the service members participating in the joint military exercises, 26,000 were from the United States military and over 50,000 were officers and troops from South Korea, a total of over 80,000 forces participating in the exercise. Some very provocative actions were designed for the content of this exercise. For example, during the exercise, the United States military would advance toward the “38th Parallel” on a large scale and over 10,000 United States military forces would all at once advance to the vicinity of the “38th Parallel.” Of these, the target range where artillery troops carried out live ammunition firing was only a few kilometers from the “38th Parallel.”

The “Key Resolve” joint military exercise on 27 February 2012 had even more troop strength participating in the exercise, nearly 200,000, an unprecedented scale.

This year, North Korea experienced a handover of leadership, and the United States took the opportunity to dispatch such efficient war machines as B2 bombers and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to the Korean Peninsula to carry out so-called military exercises with South Korea. The United States exercises on the Korean Peninsula are increasingly approaching live combat and increasingly possessing the characteristics of an attack. As a weak country, North Korea’s unease can be well understood.

Second, a lack of protection has also made North Korea turn its gaze in pursuit of security toward nuclear weapons. For a long time, North Korea served as the frontline in the Cold War. From a geographical perspective, China and Russia formed a surrounding and protecting posture around North Korea. Following the end of the Cold War and changes in the international situation, however, this sort of external protection has increasingly weakened.

Third, Deng Xiaoping once said that “without the atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, and satellites from the 1960s, the Western great powers would not be able to look straight at China.” North Korea’s all-out efforts to research and develop nuclear weapons to a greater or lesser degree have borrowed from the historical experiences of China. The downfalls of Qaddafi and Saddam have been even clearer lessons for North Korea.



North Korea's Nuclear Test by Patrick Chappette. Source via: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/opinion/global/patrick-chappatte-cartoon-north-koreas-nuclear-test.html?n=Top/Opinion/Editorials%20and%20Op-Ed/Op-Ed/Chappatte,%20Patrick?ref=patrickchappatte&_r=0

(continued)

Continued: Chinese View of North Korean WMD

quo may actually better serve China's interests. End OE Watch Commentary (Kim)

North Korea will absolutely not abandon nuclear weapons. From the North Korean perspective, abandoning nuclear weapons would be tantamount to surrendering to the United States.

China must directly face a nuclear North Korea. In that case, would not forcing North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons be the one and only choice for China? Actually, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea would not endanger China that much.

First of all, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea would not directly lead to the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea. South Korea's command authority is in the hands of the United States, and South Korea's own abilities are insufficient for researching and developing nuclear weapons. Japan is restricted by its "Peace Constitution" and "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," so independent research and development of nuclear weapons would still have a long route to run. In addition to this, independent research and development of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea would not conform to the interests of the United States, and the United States would not just sit watching. As far as the United States strengthening its military presence in Northeast Asia, this was the fixed policy of the United States anyway, and regardless of whether or not North Korea gets involved with nuclear weapons, the United States would still be coming.

Second, with regard to the worry about North Korean nuclear weapons flowing outward, this is still after all a hypothetical situation. As a weak and small country lacking strategic depth, North Korean nuclear weapons would mainly be for self-defense and would not be used for making profits.

The danger the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea poses to China is very limited, while the danger to the United States is much greater. In the current situation on the Peninsula, if China cooperates too closely with the United States, persisting in forcing North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons, it would equally damage China's interests.

First of all, China pressuring North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons would indeed not be able to guarantee China-US cooperation in return. Second, if North Korea makes positive overtures, China would not need to make accommodations and would not have to refuse either.

The United States ceasing hostilities and North Korea abandoning nuclear weapons would be the best of the best outcomes for China. However, in the current situation, no matter how North Korea acts, the United States will not possibly cease hostilities. As such, the danger to the United States of North Korean possession of nuclear weapons is far greater than that to China. In choosing the lesser of two evils, keeping a nuclear North Korea which maintains its distance from the United States is not a bad choice for China. The predicament faced by North Korea today is incredibly similar to that of China when it was being squeezed by the United States and the Soviet Union and went all-out to research and develop nuclear weapons. As such, China must adjust its policies and mentality to ensure peace on the Peninsula.



Tim Thomas's *The Dragon's Quantum Leap* peels back the transformation process and uncovers the digital-age impacts of new modes of Chinese military thinking.

***The Dragon's Quantum Leap* expands the scope of Tim Thomas's two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. As with his previous work, Tim Thomas primarily uses all-Chinese source material**

“The government of Uzbekistan has been one of the most vocal governments in Central Asia about security threats that could emerge from Afghanistan following the drawdown of forces in 2014.”



Uzbekistan Special Forces. Source via: <http://rt.com/politics/uzbekistan-military-base-ban-956/>

OE Watch Commentary: *The government of Uzbekistan has been one of the most vocal governments in Central Asia about security threats that could emerge from Afghanistan following the drawdown of ISAF forces in 2014. The accompanying article on the establishment of a new department for training in counterterrorism and special operations in the Chirchik Higher Tank Command School of Engineering shows that this continues to be an important issue. The article itself is short, but there are a couple of additional points to consider.*

First, the establishment of a new department within the Chirchik Command School is noteworthy, but perhaps even more interesting is that the announcement did not receive much attention outside of a couple of news sources. In particular, it did not receive attention from media in Tajikistan, which is somewhat surprising, considering the poor relationship between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. There has been tension between the two sides over a number of issues, and while the possibility of a conflict is small, the news of Uzbekistan developing its special operations capabilities does not appear to have caused too much concern for Tajikistan, at least not publicly.

*Second, while the article mentions that current facilities will receive modern technology, it is difficult to determine how much of an upgrade this will be or what impact it might have. Certainly, the Uzbek Ministry of Defense could be preparing for any number of scenarios to combat terrorism, and while the new department could help with that, counterterrorism operations might also involve other security ministries of Uzbekistan. It could be that Uzbekistan is placing an emphasis on its Ministry of Defense to deal with these threats, but it is worth remembering that it is not the only ministry that would combat terrorism. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)***

Source: Azizov, D. “Узбекистан будет готовить специалистов по проведению спецопераций (Uzbekistan will prepare specialists to carry out special operations),” Trend, 7 June 2013. <http://www.trend.az/regions/casia/uzbekistan/2158999.html>

Uzbekistan will prepare specialists to carry out special operations

The Higher Tank Command School of Engineering in Chirchik, Uzbekistan has opened a new department for the training of counterterrorism and special operations, reported the head of military training department of the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan, Colonel Shukhrat Kasimov...

...“Starting this year, the school will train units to combat terrorism and carry out special operations,” – said the ministry representative...Kasimov has said that the facilities for developing effective airborne, chemical, and engineering training will feature modern technology. Cadets will be able to use a pool, sports fields, a special obstacle course, a computerized shooting range, combat vehicle simulator systems, a gym, library, and study rooms.

At the moment the higher military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan prepare officers in nearly 30 occupational specialties.

“Kazakhstan has a Navy with an estimated force of 3,000 (according to the publication Military Balance) and over a dozen patrol boats; however, the Border Guards of the National Security Committee (KNB) has a detachment on the Caspian Sea that plays an active role in the country’s maritime defense.”

OE Watch Commentary: Since Kazakhstan has over 7456 miles of shared borders with Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, it is easy to forget that the country has a coastline of 1176 miles on the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan has a Navy with an estimated force of 3000 (according to the publication Military Balance) and over a dozen patrol boats; however, the Border Guards of the National Security Committee (KNB) has a detachment on the Caspian Sea that plays an active role in the country’s maritime defense. The accompanying photographs come from a piece by Vox Populi (the same journalist visited an outpost on the Kazakh-Chinese border last year, see: December 2012 OE Watch, “Night on Guard Duty”) and provide a look into the Border Guards posted on the Caspian Sea.

While all of the photographs at this interesting link provide some insight into what the detachment does (like dealing with poachers in Kazakh waters) a significant aspect that the accompanying photographs show is how the maritime detachment is using “Zhenis” (Victory), which was built in Kazakhstan’s Ural shipyard. The government’s defense procurement has been putting an increasing emphasis on utilizing the domestic defense industry. “Zhenis” was launched and entered service in 2010 as one of several “Sardar” class ships; another “Sardar” class ship can be seen in the background of photo 26. There are reportedly plans to build additional ships that would be significantly larger and would feature a helicopter deck. The Kazakh Navy received its first armed ship only last year, and there are plans to supplement this. Overall, the detachment appears to have a fairly modern ship with a motivated crew and with so much attention on land borders, it is easy to forget that the Border Guards have a significant impact on Kazakhstan’s maritime security. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)**

Source: Rakhim, Raykhan and Shatrov, Maks. “Sea Service,” Vox Populi, 6 June 2013. <http://www.voxpopuli.kz/en/post/view/id/1143>



“At different times during the revolutions crowds of protestors mobilized quickly and used fairly simple, but effective measures to hinder government security forces from restoring order.”

OE Watch Commentary: *The revolutions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 occurred at a pace that surprised many observers both inside and outside the country. At different times during the revolutions crowds of protestors mobilized quickly and used fairly simple, but effective measures to hinder government security forces from restoring order. The 2005 revolution started in the southern regions of the country and was notable for how crowds of people cut off the Bishkek-Osh road, took over airports and spread debris over the runways, which prevented government security forces from the north from reinforcing key infrastructure and reasserting control. Additionally, during both revolutions crowds took over provincial and district administration buildings.*

As the accompanying articles show, these types of actions take place and can be effective not just for a revolution, but also to achieve other goals. The Kumtor mine (Issyk Kul Province, southeast of the capital Bishkek) has been in operation for over 15 years and is estimated to provide around 12 percent of Kyrgyzstan's Gross Domestic Product. The mine is operated by Centerra Gold Inc., a Canadian company, and is jointly owned by Centerra and the government of Kyrgyzstan, with the latter owning around 33 percent. The mine has been a source of contention between the two, and there has been animosity toward Centerra from part of the population of Kyrgyzstan. The contention comes from agreements Centerra signed with the governments of Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who were overthrown in 2005 and 2010



Kumtor at night. Source via: <http://kloop.kg/blog/2013/05/30/hronika-na-kumtore-vozobnovilos-e-lektrosnabzhenie/>

Source: Dzhaniybekova, Nurzhamal and Ruziyev, Azat. “Хроника: На задержанных митингующих возбуждали уголовные дела (Chronicle: Criminal charges have been filed on the detained protestors),” Kloop, 30 May 2013. <http://kloop.kg/blog/2013/05/30/hronika-na-kumtore-vozobnovilos-e-lektrosnabzhenie/>

Chronicle: Criminal charges have been filed on the detained protestors

Police filed criminal charges against the detained protestors for the (power) outage to Kumtor. They face up to 14 years in prison...

18:53, 31 May 2013, “About 20 passenger cars and trucks pulled up to the substation. There are around 200 people,” – wrote Azamat Aitbayev, who is on site

18:47, 31 May 2013, Protestors again cut off the power supply to Kumtor.

18:05, 31 May 2013, The online edition of “Vercherniy Bishkek” says that the owner of Kumtor, “Centerra Gold Inc.,” has decided to suspend work at the mine. “This decision was made due to the lack of fuel and food at the mine, which was caused by the roadblock,”

17:03, 31 May 2013, A Kloop correspondent reports that a rally of “Ata Jurt” supporters has begun in front of the regional administration building in Jalal-Abad. The main demand appears to be the nationalization of Kumtor...

15:14, 31 May 2013, The Ministry of Health: “In the area of Kumtor, medical personnel have assisted 55 victims, including 13 military (or police), five of whom were hospitalized...”

12:26, 31 May 2013, Journalist Azamat Aitbayev, who is in Barskoon, said that there are about 1,200-1,300 protestors and a burning bus

00:00, 31 May 2013, One of the first power failures at the Kumtor mine is reported on the company's twitter

(continued)

Continued: The Effects of Civil Unrest in Kyrgyzstan

respectively. The current government believes the previous deals unfairly benefited Centerra and recently pressured the company to agree to a new deal, in which Centerra would pay a higher tax rate and be assessed a fine of over \$450 million for alleged environmental damages.

The two protests differed in their level of violence, but both got the attention of Kyrgyz authorities; Prime Minister Zhantoro Satybaldiyev visited the protestors around the mine and pledged to defend Kyrgyzstan's interests. Additionally, the date that the protest at the mine took place is worth noting. The government pressure for a new deal came from the Kyrgyz parliament, which forced government officials working with Centerra to come up with a new deal by 1 June 2013. While any new deal might not be resolved until later in the summer of this year, the recent animosity over the Kumtor mine is a reminder of how even basic acts of protest in Kyrgyzstan have an impact. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)**

Source: Atambayev, Nurmukhammed and Pogrebnyak, Evgeniy. "Хроника: Митингующие продолжают перекрывать трассу Бишкек-Ош (Chronicle: Protestors continue to block the Bishkek-Osh road)," Kloop, 2 June 2013. <http://kloop.kg/blog/2013/06/03/hronika-mitinguyushhie-prodolzhayut-perekry-vat-trassu-bishkek-osh/>

Chronicle: Protestors continue to block the Bishkek-Osh road

About 200 supporters of the "Ata-Jurt" party continue to block the strategic Bishkek-Osh road, near the village of Barpy, Jalal-Abad Province. They are upset with the detention of their leader Meder Usenov, and in favor of the nationalization of the Kumtor gold mine...

22:08, 3 June 2013, an Interior Ministry official has said that the traffic jam on the Bishkek-Osh road is now about 1,500 cars; almost 900 Osh and 600 from Bishkek

19:24, 3 June 2013, Turdumamat Mamytov, father of the prisoner and "Ata-Jurt" member, Talant Mamytov, said that demonstrators allowed a car with "Cargo 200" (a casket) and ill people who cannot move on their own...

17:44, 3 June 2013, A press official from the Interior Ministry, Ernis Osmonbayev, said they do not plan to use any force to disperse the demonstrators...

16:20, 3 June 2013, A Jalal-Abad government spokesman, Jyldyzbek Attokurov, told Kloop that the situation on the Bishkek-Osh road is calm.

14:11, 3 June 2013, Kloop reporter Evgeniy Pogrebnyak, who is on the Bishkek-Osh road, said that fuel was spilled and that there were rocks (piled) on the road.

11:28, 3 June 2013, Pogrebnyak, said that everything is calm, "The protestors have put benches on the road. They number about 200; they are standing, talking, doing nothing."

Fergana as FATA?

Central Asia after 2014 – Outcomes and Strategic Options

By Ted Donnelly

The analysis presented in this essay describes the most likely effects of the 2014 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan on the Central Asian States, focusing on the Fergana Valley – the strategic center of gravity of the region.



<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/products.html#Europe>

China's New Defense White Paper

The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces: Have We Really Learned Anything?

In April 2013 the Chinese State Council Information Office released its 2012 defense white paper (DWP) entitled, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*. Soon after the white paper came out the Chinese press began boasting about the “uniqueness” of the document, claiming that it showed a new level of transparency. While there are indeed some differences between this DWP and its predecessors, the level of transparency that China demonstrated is inconclusive: either it is a small step forward or a foundational effort to set a low bar.

Since 1998 China's DWPs have evolved with the changing global security environment. Despite this changing environment, China's primary stated themes and goals have remained constant over the years. For one thing, China claims that due to its turbulent past history of wars and struggles, it aspires for peace, development, and cooperation. The country insists that its national defense policy is defensive in nature. It claims it will neither engage in any arms race nor pose a military threat to any other country. China adamantly voices its opposition to any form of hegemonies or power politics. It states that relations among nations should be established on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit.

China's 2012 DWP continues to voice these same themes and goals. However, as its new title says, the roles of the armed forces have become more diversified. China appears to be taking on a more global mission. For example, this is the first time a Chinese DWP has indicated that the protection of overseas interests is a People's Liberation Army (PLA) priority. Despite this stronger stance and stated diversification, however, there are still many unanswered questions, and the document is filled with vague information and textbook definitions and descriptions of the various military and civilian forces involved in the country's national security. As China's military capabilities continue to grow, one might expect to see the opposite occur – a longer, more detailed white paper that discusses China's changing roles and growing capabilities in an increasingly complex global security environment. This is not the case, however.

China's recent DWP is the eighth such paper that the country has released since 1998, and it is by far the most condensed one to date. At approximately 10,000 words, it is also considerably shorter than DWPs put out by other countries. For example, Australia's latest DWP, released in 2013, is about 46,000 words. France released its DWP at approximately 50,000 words. India's 2011-12 Annual Report is approximately 70,000 words. Japan's most recent DWP is over 130,000 words, about 90,000 of which are dedicated to information on Japan's military. The rest of the report gives a thorough overview of various countries' militaries and issues in the international community. Ironically, Japan's DWP offers even more details about China's military than does China's DWP. Of course, it is not fair to criticize a publication based simply on length of manuscript.

Immediately following the release of the 2012 white paper, Chinese press reports began touting it as the country's “great effort for raising the military transparency and openness.” The white paper, for the first time, reveals the number of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, and the designations of the combined Army props under the seven military area commands. It also gives strength numbers for the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). However, no numbers are given for the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), a core force for China's strategic deterrence. This information is said to be classified at the “top military secret” level.

The 2012 DWP also offers information on China's People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), which was specifically designed to respond to internal security problems. According to the white paper, 1.6 million PAP forces were engaged in dozens of various missions, ranging from serious violent incidents and hostage rescues to provision of security for high profile events. In 2008, however, there was believed to be only about 700,000 troops in the PAPF. A concern brought up over these forces is in their “role in emergency response and in suppressing social unrest.” The PAPF, which is part of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, are in addition to China's national police, which falls under the Public Security Bureau. While the addition of so many PAPF may reflect much local unrest and, therefore, a requirement to impose stability, the DWP offers no reason for this increase in strength.

Despite China's leap into declassifying information and its perceived increased openness, the paper still seriously lacks detail and transparency when compared to DWPs released by other countries. For example, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and many other countries releasing DWPs freely go into detail about such topics as weaponry, defense spending, and their associated forecasts. China completely avoids any discussion within these and other important defense-related topics. The paper stays within a seemingly defined safety net.



Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun holds up a copy of the country's defense white paper at a press conference in Beijing on April 16, 2013. (Kyodo), via <http://english.kyodonews.jp/photos/assets/201304/0417002-thumbx300.jpg>

Continued: China's New Defense White Paper The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces: Have We Really Learned Anything?

With regard to defense spending, up until the most recent DWP China has always devoted a section to discussing this, albeit in broad terms. Between 1998 and 2008 China's DWPs consistently reported its annual defense budget; composition of expenditures broken out into three broad categories (personnel expenses, maintenance of activities, and equipment); comparison of defense expenditures to those of select other countries; percentage of defense expenditures to the country's gross domestic product; and comparison of the percentage of China's defense expenditures in gross domestic product to other countries. Then, with its percentages increasing, the 2010 annual DWP omitted any such comparative data. Finally, in the 2012 DWP China left out defense expenditures data all together.

According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, China accounted for nearly ten percent of all global military expenditures in 2012 and is now ranked as having the second highest defense spending in the world, behind the United States. China is also showing a trend toward increasing its defense expenditures while worldwide military spending falls, a fact that China might not be willing to discuss openly for fear of perpetuating the "China threat" theory.

China's defense expenditures are not the only thing missing from its white paper. While other countries' DWPs readily provide information on weapons systems and military equipment, China's DWP offers only generalities, avoiding details. The only mention of specific weapons is a brief, one sentence blurb stating that the PLASAF has a series of "Dong Feng" ballistic missiles and "Chang Jian" cruise missiles. However, there is no amplifying information beyond that. Moreover, other countries freely discuss past weapons and military systems procurement and procurement goals. China's DWP offers no information on either past or planned procurement goals. It also fails to clarify its vision of military modernization.

Therefore it can be said that the primary difference between China's DWP and those of other countries is that China's paper lacks detail and a deeper level of substance. It leans on vague generalities. For example, it states that the PLAN "organizes the training of different formations of combined task forces composed of new types of destroyers, frigates, ocean-going replenishment ships and shipborne helicopters." However, it does not specify the types or quantities of destroyers or frigates.

Along with completely omitting such detailed information from its latest DWP, the authors seem to have toned down certain defense-related topics while shifting emphasis to less threatening topics, such as national development, disaster relief, and social stability. For example, China's DWPs between 2004 and 2010 emphasized the informationization of its Armed Forces. Today, the informationization of China's armed services is at the forefront of its defense objectives, the country's stated goal being to attain major progress in informationization by 2020. Yet, the concept is barely mentioned in the 2012 DWP, except in broad, generic terms.

Although China's 2012 white paper marks a new approach for sure, it is far from meeting the standards and design of DWPs put out by the leading militaries of the world. Chen Zhou, Director of the National Defense Policy Research Center at the Academy of Military Science, explained that China plans to alternate its DWPs between themed, focused topics and more comprehensive papers; this was the first themed DWP. The question remains whether in 2014 China will release a more detailed DWP, as expected of a global power, or will it continue to hold back the sort of specifics that really define "transparency."

