


Foreign Military Studies Office

# OEWATCH



FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT



## Special Essay: Water Wars in the Heart of Mesopotamia?

<b>TURKEY</b>	<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>EASTERN EUROPE</b>
3 Questions about the ISIS Presence in Turkey	28 Dilemmas of Negotiation, Amnesty, Restitution, and the Rule-of-Law	47 Russian Food Ban Worries Some Balkan States
5 Turkey and the Gaza Crisis	30 Venezuela Continues to Race Downhill	48 Forty ISIL Radicals Arrested In Kosovo
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	31 Paraguay Classified as the Marijuana King of South America	48 Serbia and Montenegro to Increase Military Collaboration
7 Iran Ready to Help Lebanon Counter Terrorism	32 Human Trafficking Activity in Colombia	
8 Khamenei Speaks on Gaza	34 "Technical" Default Causes Very Real Paralysis for Argentine Military	<b>RUSSIA</b>
9 Iran to Launch New Missile Defense System	35 Brazilian Presidential Politics:	49 Russian VDV Expanding by 30%, Increasing Reconnaissance & Spetsnaz Assets
10 The Islamic State Flexes its Muscles in Syria	35 PSB Candidate Dies in Plane Crash	50 Ground Forces Integrate UAVs into Artillery Reconnaissance Units
12 Egypt: Long Live Austerity!		52 Russian Mistral May Serve as a Delivery Vehicle for "Polite" Peacekeepers
14 Egypt's Libya Conundrum	<b>INDO-PACIFIC ASIA</b>	54 With or Without Sanctions, Russia's Economy is Declining
<b>AFRICA</b>	36 Thailand Trouble in the South	55 Russian Perspectives on Growing Violence in Afghanistan
16 A Military Response to a Public Health Crisis: Preventing Ebola's Spread	<b>CHINA</b>	56 Western Sanctions and Russia's Armenia Connection
17 Two Conflicts, Two Famines: South Sudan and Somalia	39 Death of an Imam and Heightened Tensions in Xinjiang	57 Russian Volunteers in Southeast Ukraine
18 South Africa: The Ascendancy of Organized Crime	41 PLA Daily Posts Articles on Combat Methods Used in the Nanjing Military Region	59 Closer Collaboration between Russian Military and Schools
19 Suez Canal Expansion Plans Reflect both Hopes and Fears of Egyptians	42 Cameroon Expanding Military Cooperation with China	61 Loose Lips and the Internet
20 Cameroon and Boko Haram: A Model for Nigeria?	<b>KOREA</b>	62 Sanctions and Military Rearmament
22 Eritrea: Rebel Group Threatens Overthrow	43 Pyongyang as Savior of World War III	64 Attack of the Giant Arctic King Crab
24 Nigerian Perspectives on 21st Century Global Security Threats	<b>CENTRAL ASIA</b>	64 Lack of Northern Sea Route Mapping Information: a Persistent Challenge to Commerce Expansion in the Arctic
26 The Nigerian Military's Reaction to Boko Haram's Attack in Lagos	44 The Impact of the Growth of Kazakhstan's Defense Industry	65 Russia Reopens the Lourdes, Cuba Signals Station to Collect Intelligence on the US
27 To Flee or Fight: The Nigeria's Military Struggles with Boko Haram	45 Reviving the Kyrgyz National Guard	
	46 The CSTO's Take on a Peacekeeping Exercise	<b>SPECIAL ESSAY</b>
		66 Water Wars in the Heart of Mesopotamia?

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is part of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2's Operational Environment Enterprise and for over 25 years has conducted open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

Operational Environment Watch provides translated selections and analysis from a diverse range of foreign articles and other media that our analysts and expert contributors believe will give military and security professionals an added dimension to their critical thinking about the Operational Environment.

Materials, outside of the original foreign press article, under copyright have not been used. All articles published in the Operational Environment Watch are not provided in full, and were originally published in foreign (non-US) media. For questions or original articles, contact FMSO at [usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.fmso-web@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.fmso-web@mail.mil). The Operational Environment Watch is archived, and available at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.

FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to these articles to conform to organizational standards. Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

# OE Watch

## Foreign News & Perspectives of the Operational Environment

Volume 4 | Issue 9

September | 2014

### Regional Analysts and Expert Contributors

#### Africa

Robert Feldman  
Kevin Freese  
Jason Warner

#### Middle East

Michael Rubin  
Lucas Winter

#### Turkey

Karen Kaya

#### China, Korea

Cindy Hurst  
Youngjun Kim  
Tim Thomas  
Jacob Zenn

#### India, Southeast Asia

Ivan Welch

#### Mexico, South America

Geoff Demarest  
Brenda Fiegel  
Kevin Grilo  
Cynthia Gonzalez

#### Central Asia

Matthew Stein

#### Russia, Eastern Europe

Chuck Bartles  
Anna Borshchevskaya  
Ray Finch  
Les Grau  
Alyssa Jackson

#### Editor-in-Chief

Tom Wilhelm

#### Editors

Ray Finch  
Harry Orenstein

#### Design Editor

Hommy Rosado

#### FMSO Contact

[usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.fmso-web@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.fmso-web@mail.mil)

## Questions about the ISIS Presence in Turkey

15 August 2014

“Instead of calling them “terrorists” on paper, if our government would see the inexplicable atrocities that this organization is causing in Iraq and Syria, would they be able to roam so freely in Turkey?”

**OE Watch Commentary:** Turkey designated ISIS as a terror organization in September 2013. In addition, the government consistently and vehemently denies reports about turning a blind eye to ISIS activities in Turkey and in the border regions with Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, the government of Turkey has still been criticized for alleged links to, and alleged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). As the accompanying Turkish passages demonstrate, several recent incidents within Turkey have raised questions among Turkish analysts about ISIS’s presence in Turkey and the alleged support it receives from the government. The final passage is a quote by the Foreign Minister in which he denies the allegations.

The first three passages, written by prominent human rights lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz, discuss several recent ISIS activities in Turkey, including an ISIS sermon which was calling for jihad in İstanbul, without any intervention by the provincial police and gendarmerie. He also discusses that two Shiite mosques in İstanbul were set on fire by people who first issued threats and mentions that the Human Rights Association claimed that ISIS was behind these arson attacks. He claims that ISIS has attacked Kurdish parliamentarians in Turkey, and that over 5000 people have been recruited by ISIS in Turkey.

Cengiz also points out that social media in Turkey has circulated photos of the ISIS Commander being treated for his wounds at a Turkish hospital and that the same commander was interviewed by the Washington Post in Reyhanli (in Turkey). In addition, the group has a Turkish-language website. He asks how all of these are possible. He claims that, despite the fact that Turkey designated



Source: [http://www.aydinlikdaily.com/Detail/ISIS-Terrorists-Trained-In-A-US-Base-In-Turkey/3640#.U\\_jeC-mOndeM](http://www.aydinlikdaily.com/Detail/ISIS-Terrorists-Trained-In-A-US-Base-In-Turkey/3640#.U_jeC-mOndeM)

ISIS militants took control of the Turkish Consulate in Mosul on June 10, 2014 and are still holding 49 Turkish Consulate personnel hostage, including the Consul-General.

Source: Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “Müslüman soykırım yapmaz değil mi? (Muslims don’t commit genocide, right?),” Radikal.com.tr, 15 August 2014, [http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan\\_kemal\\_cengiz/musliman\\_soykirim\\_yapmaz\\_degil\\_mi-1206922](http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan_kemal_cengiz/musliman_soykirim_yapmaz_degil_mi-1206922)

“...the ISIS commander [was] interviewed by the Washington Post in [the Turkish town of] Reyhanlı. He says that entry and exit [to and from Turkey] has gotten harder recently, but also that they have received a lot of help from Turkey. He says, “God bless [Turkey].”

...Those who called on the U.S. to conduct military operations to get rid of Assad, are now able to criticize the U.S. air strikes which are saving the Yezidis and Turkmens at a time when they are at the brink of total annihilation. Mehmet Ali Şahin, [a member of Parliament from the Justice and Development Party] says, “If the U.S. thinks it can fix [the region] by bombing it, it is mistaken.”

[Foreign Minister] Davutoğlu can’t bring himself to call ISIS members as terrorists. He says, “ISIS...may look like a terrorized structure.” He continues by saying that if Sunni Arabs had not been excluded in Iraq, there would not be such accumulated grievances. If our potential prime minister would show half the empathy that he shows to understanding ISIS’s state of mind, to the Alevis and Kurds in Turkey, it would solve one of Turkey’s greatest problems.

Instead of calling them “terrorists” on paper, if our government would see the inexplicable atrocities that this organization is causing in Iraq and Syria, would they be able to roam so freely in Turkey?”

(continued)

## Continued: Questions about the ISIS Presence in Turkey

*ISIS as a terrorist group on paper, in reality, they are being allowed to 'roam free' in Turkey without any real consequences.*

*ISIS has been holding 49 Turkish personnel from Turkey's Mosul Consulate hostage, including the Consul General since 10 June. Cengiz also criticizes the Turkish government decision to impose a media ban on the issue, which they claim is necessary for the safety of the hostages.*  
**End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)**

**Source:** Orhan Kemal Cengiz, "Kafa kesicilere rehin düşmek (Falling hostage to the beheaders)," Radikal.com.tr, 5 August 2014, [http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan\\_kemal\\_cengiz/kafa\\_kesicilere\\_rehin\\_dusmek-1205069](http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan_kemal_cengiz/kafa_kesicilere_rehin_dusmek-1205069)

"These beheaders have internet sites in Turkey... These beheaders have representatives in Turkey, where they pray in Istanbul and make calls for jihad. Children that join the beheaders from Turkey, talk about their experiences as if it were summer camp. How are all these things possible? Not just these, but these beheaders, in the middle of Istanbul, freely burn down to Jaferi mosques after threatening them. Nobody catches them, and there is no mention of it in your newspapers or your television channels. Rojava [Syrian Kurdistan] keeps lamenting the same thing. They keep saying that these beheaders are coming from the Turkish borders and hitting [them]. European countries claim that the beheaders going to Iraq and Syria get there from Turkish borders..."

**Source:** Orhan Kemal Cengiz, "ISIS allegations," Today's Zaman, 7 August 2014, [http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/orhan-kemal-cengiz/isis-allegations\\_354881.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/orhan-kemal-cengiz/isis-allegations_354881.html)

... We have lots and lots of questions about ISIS's presence in Turkey, about its relations with Turkey and so on. But we cannot get any answers to these questions. The government has even prevented the airing and publishing of news on the situation of the Turkish hostages being held by ISIS with a gag order issued by a court. Not just our 49 citizens, but apparently the whole of Turkey has fallen hostage to this bloody organization."

**Source:** Ruşen Çakır, "İŞİD, Irak Kürdistanı, PKK, Türkiye ve ABD üzerine beş not (Five notes on ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK, Turkey and the U.S.)," Gazetevatan.com.tr, 9 August 2014, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/rusen-cakir-666358-yazar-yazisi-isis-irak-kurdistan-pkk-turkiye-ve-abd-uzerine-bes-not/>

"Two years ago, when some areas on the Turkish-Syrian border put up flags of the [Kurdish] PYD and posters of [the PKK leader] Abdullah Öcalan, there was a crisis in Ankara. In July 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan had said that "Turkey cannot stand idle in the face of such developments. We will stand firm against any initiative that threatens our security and internal peace"... In the more recent period, it is odd that Ankara has not demonstrated a similarly clear stance against ISIS, which has carried out such brutalities in Syria and Iraq and upended regional balances and will continue to do so."

**Source:** "Türkiye'den Sincar'a havadan yardım (Help from Turkey to Sinjar from the air)," Yenisafak.com.tr, 8 August 2014, <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/politika-haber/turkiyeden-sincara-havadan-yardim-8.8.2014-675149>

"The foreign minister Davutoglu reacted to allegations of ISIS receiving support from Turkey by saying, 'Those who say this are either blind or have no conscience. If it's someone from Turkey, they're a traitor.' Davutoglu said, 'We have a ring of fire around us...'"

## Turkey and the Gaza Crisis

13 August 2014

“...[Erdoğan] statements on the issue show that the Gaza situation will become a new parameter in Turkish foreign policy. His statements show that Ankara will continue its stance, despite the fact that it diverges with other countries...even if it causes a divergence with the West, particularly the U.S...”



Pro-Palestinian graffiti during a protest against Israel near the Israeli consulate in Istanbul June 1, 2010. Source: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-211972-104-protests-against-brutal-israeli-massacre-continue-worldwide.html>

**OE Watch Commentary:** The crisis in Gaza has elicited harsh reactions against Israel not only from Turkish government officials, but also from parts of the Turkish public including demonstrations in front of the Israeli Embassy and Consulate buildings in Ankara and Istanbul. The accompanying passages summarize the government's reactions, its efforts to bring some of the wounded to Turkey, what Turkey's stance on the issue might mean for its relations with the U.S.

As the first accompanying passages explains, a number of wounded people from Gaza have been brought to Turkey for treatment and were greeted at the airport by the deputy prime minister and health minister. The second accompanying passages discusses reactions by the former prime minister (and current President) Erdoğan and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, in which they harshly criticize Israel. Erdoğan has accused Israel of committing terror and genocide, leading to accusations against him by Turkish commentators about inciting anti-Semitism in Turkey. These and other commentators claim that this will make it difficult for Turkey and Israel to reconcile, after a four-year period of frozen diplomatic relations.

The third accompanying passage by veteran foreign policy journalist Sami Kohen claims that Erdoğan's statements on the issue show that the Gaza situation will become a new parameter in Turkish foreign policy. He points out that Ankara is likely to insist on this stance, even if it means divergence on this issue with the U.S. In the final passage, prominent Turkish human rights lawyer and journalist Orhan Kemal Cengiz claims

**Source:** “Yaralı Gazzeliler Türkiye’ye getirildi (Wounded Gazans brought to Turkey),” Haber7.com, 13 August 2014, [http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/105563/Yarali\\_Gazzeliler\\_Turkiye\\_ye\\_getirildi.html](http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/105563/Yarali_Gazzeliler_Turkiye_ye_getirildi.html)

“The plane carrying 18 Palestinians who were wounded in Israel’s attacks against Gaza, and who will be treated in Turkey, landed at [Ankara] Esenboğa Airport. The wounded were greeted by the Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay and Health Minister Mehmet Müezzinoğlu. ... Atalay, who said that only 18 people were brought for now, but that efforts are ongoing to bring more, said that, “We have sent a significant amount of humanitarian aid over there. But of course, there are a lot of wounded as a result of the Israeli bombardments. We are working to bring at least part of the heavily wounded to Turkey. We have a plan to bring about 200 wounded people [to Turkey].”

**Source:** “Gazze: Türkiye’den İsrail’e topyekûn kınama (Gaza: Turkey condemns Israel),” Bbc.co.uk, 18 July 2014, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/07/140718\\_israil\\_turkiye\\_gazze.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/07/140718_israil_turkiye_gazze.shtml)

“Turkey, which has been one of the most vocal and firm countries regarding Israel’s air attacks on Gaza...reacted to last night’s ground operation with the same firmness.. Reaction against Israel spilled over into the streets last night. Thousands of people in Ankara and Istanbul protested in front of the Israeli Embassy and Consulate buildings for hours.

...The harshest reaction came from the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan, who spoke with journalists in Istanbul, referred to Israel as the country that knows best how to kill children and said that Israel is conducting terror and genocide. He said, ‘Israel threatens peace in the world and in the Middle East.... Erdoğan criticized Egypt along with Israel, and criticized the Egyptian President el-Sisi’s initiatives for a ceasefire saying, “Sisi himself is vicious and a coup-plotter.”

(continued)

## Continued: Turkey and the Gaza Crisis

*that there is a double standard in how the government deals with the wounded from Gaza versus in comparison to those escaping the ISIS onslaught in Iraq. End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya)*

The first reaction following the ground operation came from the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu via a tweet. Davutoğlu wrote, “We condemn the fact that Israel has started a ground offensive in Gaza following its inhumane crimes from air strikes.”

**Source:** Sami Kohen, “Dış politikada yeni belirleyici (A new determinant in foreign policy),” Milliyet.com.tr, 26 July 2014, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/dis-politikada-yeni-belirleyici/dunya/ydetay/1917257/default.htm>

“Ankara has taken a firm stance against Israel’s attacks and has made a huge effort to mobilize the international community regarding the humanitarian drama that is happening in Gaza. In particular, [Erdoğan’s] statements on the issue show that the Gaza situation will become a new parameter in Turkish foreign policy. His statements show that Ankara will continue its stance, despite the fact that it diverges with other countries. This, even if it causes a divergence with the West, particularly the U.S.; and Arab and Islamic countries which [Erdoğan] has accused of standing idly by...”

**Source:** Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “Müslüman soykırım yapmaz değil mi? (Muslims don’t commit genocide, right?),” Radikal.com.tr, 15 August 2014, [http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan\\_kemal\\_cengiz/musluman\\_soykirim\\_yapmaz\\_degil\\_mi-1206922](http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/orhan_kemal_cengiz/musluman_soykirim_yapmaz_degil_mi-1206922)

“Our government, who has been greeting the wounded from Gaza at the ministerial level, is asking for passports from those Yezidis and Turkmens who have been desperately escaping death for days with no water or food. It’s as if those people are not escaping from one of the greatest brutalities in history, but they are knocking on Turkey’s door for a touristic visit.”



**For background reading on Turkey-Israel relations, please see FMSO monographs:**

“**Turkey and Israel in a New Middle East,**” July 2013, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Turkey-Israel-in-a-New-ME.pdf>

“**Changing Trends in Israel-Turkey Security and Military Relations: Their Perspectives,**” January 2011, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Changing-Trends-in-Israel-Turkey-Security-Relations.pdf>

*“Iran is always willing to preserve and defend Lebanon’s unity and stability.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *Fighting in Syria increasingly threatens Lebanon’s already strained stability in a way unseen since Lebanon’s 1975-1992 civil war. In recent months militants affiliated with both the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) have challenged the Lebanese army. It is against this backdrop that Iranian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham announced Iranian willingness to assist the Lebanese government to preserve Lebanon’s internal unity.*

*While the Islamic Republic has through Hezbollah and related militias maintained significant, if not predominant influence in southern Lebanon and southern Beirut for three decades, Afkham’s statement, referred to in the excerpted article, provides diplomatic cover to Iranian attempts to take its power projection in Lebanon to new areas and to a new level. Already the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears to be expanding its area of operation inside Lebanon to the north of the country. For example, in 2012 Lebanon’s Minister of Water and Power Hassan Ghassil signed an agreement with his Iranian counterpart, Majid Namjoo, to enable a company affiliated with the IRGC’s economic wing to build a dam in northern Lebanon, providing Iran with an excuse for an enhanced presence in an area of Lebanon traditionally associated with Christians and Sunni Muslims. The January 2013 assassination of IRGC General Hassan Shateri in Syrian territory, just across the border from Lebanon, also shone light on other Iranian activities: in addition to helping to supply Iranian proxies with advanced weaponry, Shateri had set up front business in Lebanon to purchase land from Druze and Christians in order to transfer it to Hezbollah loyalists and thereby further Iranian influence. Iranian authorities did not announce his death for more than a month, and only then did the broad outline of his IRGC duties become known.*

*That Afkham suggests that Iran wants to preserve Lebanese security is risible, given Iranian intervention in Syria and Iraq under the same pretense has led more to the breakdown of order through the empowerment of and supply of weaponry to pro-Iranian sectarian militias than to peace. If Iran is ramping up its involvement in Lebanon to such an extent that the Iranian Foreign Ministry openly discusses intervention, then it reflects poorly on future stability in Lebanon and suggests that tension there might soon erupt into open violence. **End Watch Commentary (Rubin)***



Map showing Iran and Lebanon.

Source: <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/map/1707/the-middle-east-showing-iraq-iran-and-lebanon>

**Source:** “Afkham: Iran Amadeh Komak beh Lubnan dar Mobarazeh ba Terrorism Ast” (“Afkham: Iran is Ready to Help Lebanon Combat Terrorism”), Tasnim News, 6 August 2014. <http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/452569>

### Iran is Ready to Help Lebanon Combat Terrorism

Afkham, in response to the foreign policy correspondent of Tasnim, declared that “Iran is ready to assist Lebanon in the fight against terrorism. In addition, our officials are in talks with their Lebanese counterparts and are ready to provide help for the situation. She added that if Lebanon is ready to accept, then we will always be willing to help them, and that Iran is always willing to preserve and defend Lebanon’s unity and stability.

*“The perpetrators and supporters of these crimes should be put on trial and punished on an international level.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The Islamic Republic of Iran has traditionally designated the last Friday of Ramadan—the month of dawn-to-dusk fasting—as Qods [Jerusalem] Day and used the occasion to focus the Iranian populace on the regime’s goal to delegitimize, if not destroy Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s sermon delivered on Eid al-Fitr, the feast day marking the end of Ramadan, reinforces the regime’s hostility toward Israel’s existence and gives Israel’s destruction his religious imprimatur. While Khamenei’s rhetoric may have been particularly vitriolic this year against the backdrop of fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, his implied threats suggest that whatever the progress of diplomacy between Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear program, and despite rhetoric moderation in the speeches and twitter feeds of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, there will be no moderation in Iranian government policy toward Israel and its existence. Throughout the entire sermon, only a small portion of which is excerpted here, Khamenei honors and supports continued resistance, a euphemism for terrorism, and also implicitly endorses Hamas vis-à-vis more moderate factions within the Palestinian Authority.*

*Khamenei’s call for all Islamic countries—of which Iran sees itself as the vanguard—to arm the resistance suggests that Tehran will continue its violent opposition to the Middle East peace process and work to rearm Hamas in the Gaza Strip, regardless of any ceasefire agreement which might be negotiated. As worrisome is Khamenei’s call not only for leading Israeli officials, but also Israel’s supporters globally to be targeted. While Iranian officials could claim that a close reading of the speech suggests Khamenei seeks only legal actions against past and present Israeli officials and their supporters, the broader context of the speech suggests that Khamenei would not be adverse to violence and retaliation against them, even years into the future.*

*Khamenei’s position suggests that the animosity toward Israel that remains a central pillar of the Islamic Republic is rooted not in any particular grievance, but rather in the regime’s ideology, and that there will be no end to Iran’s support for proxy terrorist groups in the Middle East. **End OE Watch Commentary (Rubin)***



Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Source: Wikipedia

**Source:** “Khutbeh-ha-ye Namaz Eid Sa’id Fitr” (“Prayer Sermons for Eid al-Fitr”), Khamenei.ir, 29 July 2014. <http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=27112>

### Sermons for Eid al-Fitr Prayers

Three points need to be said about the issue of Gaza: The first point is that what the leaders of the Zionist regime are doing today is genocide and a great historical catastrophe. The perpetrators and supporters of these crimes should be put on trial and punished on an international level. Their punishment is what people’s representatives and righteous and sympathetic personalities in the world should request. And they should not escape punishment with the passage of time. They should be punished, whether they are in power or when they lose their power and are overthrown. Both the perpetrators of these crimes and those who are openly supporting them - you have heard and seen the news about their support - should be punished....

The second point is that we should see the power of endurance and resistance of a people who have stood up for their legitimate claims....

And the third point is that the political leaders of arrogance say, ‘We should disarm Hamas and Jihad....’ The President of America has issued a fatwa [religious judgment] saying that the resistance should be disarmed. Of course, it is clear that you want it to be disarmed so that it cannot deliver any blow against these crimes. But we say that the opposite should happen. The entire world - particularly the world of Islam - should provide the people of Palestine with as many weapons as they can.

## Iran to Launch New Missile Defense System

6 August 2014

*“A new mid- and long-range missile defense system will be unveiled on September 22.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Even as Iranian and Western diplomats continue negotiations to resolve Western suspicions regarding Iran's nuclear program, the Iranian government appears determined to advance its military, with a focus on ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and now, according to the article from Iran's defense press service excerpted here, anti-ballistic missile defense. The backdrop for such discussion was the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, a war which highlighted the success of Israel's "Iron Dome" anti-missile system. While it is doubtful that the Islamic Republic will be able to unveil as advanced a system in the short-term, Iranian Air Defense Force Commander General Farzad Esmaili's promise to reveal the new system on September 22 (the last day of the Iranian month of Shahrivar) suggests that Iranian work on anti-missile technologies is already well advanced.

Should Iran deploy a successful anti-missile system, it could have regional implications: if Iranian authorities feel themselves immune to effective retaliation by regional states or outside powers, then some of the more ideologically inclined Iranian officials might advocate a more aggressive regional policy. Regardless, Iranian missile and missile defense advancements suggest that even should there be a diplomatic resolution to questions regarding Iran's nuclear program, Iran's increasing military power and capabilities will continue to challenge the West, including U.S. regional interests. **End OE Watch Commentary (Rubin)**

**Source:** "Ravanma-ye Samaneha-ye Jadid Mushaki Pedafand Havaye dar 31 Shahrivar" ("Iran to Launch New Missile Defense System on 22 September"), Defapress.ir, 6 August 2014. <http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/24634>

#### Iran to Launch New Missile Defense System

According to the Defense Press correspondent, Gen. Farzad Esmaili this morning stated to young defense personnel at the 5th Annual Army Festival, referring to air defense developments, that a new mid- and long-range missile defense system will be unveiled on September 22. The commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Headquarters said we have made improvements to several of our ballistic missiles and several other missiles have been produced this year. He continued to say that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the most secure country in the Middle East region, and said, that's why the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) thanked us.... In answer to a question from the Defense Press correspondent about the defensive systems of the country and specifically about dealing with a possible invasion by hostile UAVs, Gen. Esmaili said, for this issue we have the necessary budget and funds for UAVs and aircraft and choppers, and so we would take necessary action against enemy aggressors, and so in due time we will use these accomplishments on the battlefield.



Iranian Army personnel prepare to launch missiles during a maneuver at an undisclosed location in the country last Nov. 13.  
Source: [http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/31/world/u-s-takes-lead-on-missile-defense/#.U\\_JNImOndeM](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/31/world/u-s-takes-lead-on-missile-defense/#.U_JNImOndeM)

“... If we stop fighting now, this would mean death for all of us ...”

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The rebel takeover of Syria's Raqqa Province was never completed. Although rebels seized the provincial capital (Raqqa) in March 2013, the province's three key military bases remained in government hands throughout the rest of the year. In January 2014 the Islamic State (IS) expelled other rebel groups from Raqqa but did not challenge for control of the government-held military bases. It was only after the IS seized territory to the east (the provinces of Hasakah in Syria and Nineveh in Iraq) and southeast (the provinces of Deir Ezzour in Syria and al-Anbar in Iraq) of its stronghold in Raqqa that it began attacking Syrian government positions. In late July IS fighters launched a coordinated attack against three important, semi-isolated Syrian military sites: the Kuweiris Military Airport in the eastern Aleppo countryside, the 121st Artillery Regiment HQ in Hasakah Province, and the 17th Division HQ on the northern outskirts of Raqqa city. The latter two were quickly overrun, as were the Baath Party HQs in Hasakah and the 93d Tank Regiment to the north of the 17th Division HQ in Raqqa. At the time of writing, the IS appears to be readying an offensive against the al-Tabqa [aka al-Thawra] Military Airport, the final Syrian military position in Raqqa. According to the first accompanying article, from the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, military airbases are to become the key targets for both the IS and the Islamic Army (Jaysh al-Islam), the Douma-based rebels at the center of the newly formed Syrian Revolutionary Command.*

**Source:**

المطارات على رأس أهداف جيش الإسلام وداعش  
Suhaib Anjarini. "Airports the Main Target for Jaysh al-Islam and ISIS," 8 August 2014. Al-Akhbar (Lebanon). <http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/213121>

For its part, the Islamic State has determined the target of its next attack, without saying so officially. According to leaks obtained by al-Akhbar, military airports in al-Tabqa (rural Raqqa), Deir Ezzour and Kuweiris (rural Aleppo) will be the target of coordinated violent fighting in the next few days.

**Source:**

مسرحية تحرير الفرقة ٧١  
Muzmajer al-Sham. "The Theater of the 17th Division Liberation," 1 August 2014. El Dorar. <http://eldorar.com/node/55596>

Anyone with passing knowledge of the 17th Division and its nature will not have the slightest doubt that that what took place was cheap theatrics and nothing more...

(continued)

Images (from 93d regiment)  
Source: <http://justpaste.it/gazoalewa2>



## Continued: The Islamic State Flexes its Muscles in Syria

*The fall of the 17th Division and 93d Regiment in Raqqa was surprisingly quick. As a result, opposition activists have described the battle for these bases as “theater,” as shown in the second accompanying article. Be that as it may, the expulsion of Syrian military from most of Raqqa is a significant tactical, strategic and informational victory for the IS. Images showing heavy armor and artillery seized from the bases in Raqqa and Hasakah were uploaded by IS fighters. The group is now in a position to begin consolidating its hold on Raqqa, Deir Ezzour and eastern Aleppo. Perhaps most importantly, the fighting in Raqqa shows that a key element to IS military successes is the slick, multifaceted and largely successful efforts of its partisans to strike fear in the hearts of their adversaries, elicit respect from the populations they control, and awaken a desire to participate in the minds of sympathizers and admirers. The takeover of the 17th Division HQ featured heavily publicized beheadings of men who IS fighters claimed were Syrian military officers. Grotesque photos showing the heads on stakes in a plaza in Raqqa went viral on Twitter.*

*The IS offensive in Syria’s east began with a bloody attack on the Sha’ir (Shaer) gas field in the Syrian desert near Palmyra. The offensive has been costly for the government and its supporters, and, as the third accompanying article notes, the steep death toll of late July/early August is causing renewed anxiety among Syria’s Alawite community. The IS’s targeting of religious minorities in Iraq’s Nineveh Province is likely to fuel Alawite unease, making them less willing to fight in areas where they have little to no demographic presence and more likely to consolidate their forces to defend the Damascus-Homs-Lattakia axis. This, at least, is what the IS is probably hoping for. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)***

**Source:** “Syrian Alawites Horrified by Rising Death Toll,” 5 August 2014. Al-Monitor. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/alawites-pain-death-of-youth-regime-support.html>

A woman from the same village emphasized, “We must continue to fight.” Although she lost one of her children in the Kassab battles this past spring, she stressed, “The rest of my sons are still in the battle. We will fight until the end. If we stop fighting now, this would mean death for all of us. This is why I am angry at the Alawite youth who evade military service,” she added.



“... the effect on a quarter of Egyptians living below the poverty line may be daunting ...”

**OE Watch Commentary:** Alongside campaigns to combat sexual harassment and traffic problems, Egypt's newly elected president Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has decided to tackle his country's soaring deficit. After refusing to ratify the national budget on the grounds that it did not cut costs sufficiently, on 7 July al-Sisi gave a televised address announcing measures to chip away at the country's vast and inefficient price-support system. The measures entail trimming subsidies on energy, fuel, natural gas, and electricity. Basic necessities such as transportation and food will remain subsidized, although some reforms were made to curb profiteering from the food subsidy program. Despite this, the austerity measures are likely to hit Egypt's vast underclass hardest, according to the first accompanying article, from the English-language version of Egypt's newspaper of record, al-Ahram.

In Egypt, austerity measures usually beget popular protests, particularly when they tinker with food subsidies. Al-Sisi's austerity program, however, has thus far been met with quiescent silence. While this may be partly due to the Egyptian government's low tolerance for dissent, al-Sisi's popular support undoubtedly plays a role too.

Perhaps to secure al-Sisi's populist image, the new austerity measures have been overshadowed by the rapid growth of the Long Live Egypt Fund (named after al-Sisi's presidential campaign slogan), which was established by Egypt's Central Bank in June. Its bank account number is 037037, in reference to the day on which Mohammed Morsi was overthrown. A purported goal of the fund is to gather private donations to finance development schemes. The president himself pledged half of his monthly salary and a chunk of his net worth to the fund, triggering a cascade of large donations by high-ranking officers, cabinet ministers and members of Egypt's



Al-Sisi Campaign Facebook Page ("Long Live Egypt"). Source: <https://www.facebook.com/lahia.Misr.egy/photos/a.1375584842717722.1073741825.1375584599384413/1377243362551870/?type=1&theater>

**Source:** Osman El Shamoubi. "How your daily life may change under El-Sisi," 25 July 2014. Al-Ahram English. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/107032/Egypt/Features/How-your-daily-life-may-change-under-ElSisi.aspx>

While higher income groups will still be able to maintain their lifestyles, the effect on a quarter of Egyptians living below the poverty line may be daunting. And the majority of Egyptians spending below LE4100 a month – almost 94 percent of Egyptian families according to the latest government statistics – will be desperately hoping to glimpse the significant – albeit longer term – economic benefits promised by the hikes.

(continued)

## Continued: Egypt: Long Live Austerity!

*business elite, as well as from a range of public and private institutions. The fund is not without its critics, as illustrated by the second and third accompanying articles. Some objections include lack of transparency in the management of the fund, willingness to accept funds from convicted Mubarak-era plutocrats and creation of public pressure on businessmen to contribute to what is on paper a voluntary cause.*

*Throughout his political ascent al-Sisi has portrayed himself as the heir to Gamel Abdel Nasser, the man who instituted the very social welfare programs that al-Sisi is now cutting. The austerity measures and the Long Live Egypt Fund together signal that al-Sisi is embarking on a form of neoliberal populism that sets him clearly apart from the tradition of Nasser. As argued in the fourth accompanying article, written by influential Saudi columnist Jamal Khashoggi, al-Sisi may have more in common with Chile's Pinochet or Turkey's Ozal than he does with Abdel Nasser. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)***

### Source:

جدل حول تدشين "قائمة سوداء" لرجال الأعمال الراضين للتبرع لـ"تحيا مصر"  
Mohammed Magdi al-Sisi. "Controversy Over the 'Blacklist' of Businessmen Who Have Refused to Donate to 'Long Live Egypt,'" 2 August 2014. Al-Yaum al-Sabaa. <http://goo.gl/cjLndN>

The launching by some young men of a "blacklist" of businessmen who have not donated to the Long Live Egypt Fund has been controversial among public figures. Some see it as a good step, an opportunity for businessmen to pay back what they have gained illicitly, while others reject the idea emphasizing that donations are voluntary and not compulsory.

**Source:** "Robin Hood Style? Long Live Egypt Fund to Accept Donations from Mubarak-Era Convicted Businessmen," 12 August 2014. Al-Bawaba. <http://www.albawaba.com/business/egypt-economy-donations-595982>

Steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz was reported to have announced his willingness to donate half of his wealth to the Long Live Egypt Fund after his release from jail on bail on Thursday... Al-Sisi has called on Egyptians to participate in the fund, saying the country "needs around EGP 100bn" to implement a number of necessary projects, adding that collecting donations is the "only solution" to find funds. In a move to force businessmen to donate, a campaign was launched in early August to track businessmen who did not donate to the fund, aiming to influence public opinion and prompt citizens to boycott their companies and products.

### Source:

السياسي لن يكون عبدالناصر... ولكن ماذا عن أوزال أو بينوشيه؟  
Jamal Khasoggi. "Al-Sisi will not be Abdel Nasser... But What About Ozal or Pinochet?" 1 March 2014. Al-Hayat. <http://goo.gl/fluwPQ>

Many countries have been in a situation like Egypt's, but two deserve al-Sisi's attention... they are Chile and Turkey, in both of which chaos and inflation reigned for decades, leading the military to intervene.

## Egypt's Libya Conundrum

7 August 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** In a 2 August press conference in Cairo with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Egyptian President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi stated that his country was ready to fight terrorists and defend its borders with Libya. These statements came in the wake of two events that thrust the Libyan file to the forefront in Egypt. The first was a 19 July attack that killed over 20 Egyptian troops at an isolated border post (al-Farafra) along Egypt's southwestern border with Libya. The second was the mass exodus of Egyptians residing in Libya following the outbreak of violence in Tripoli and Benghazi. The issue of Egyptian laborers in Libya is especially complicated for a number of reasons, including their large numbers (prior to Qaddafi's overthrow, estimated by the International Organization for Migration at between 330,000 and 1.5 million), the difficulty of repatriating them through Tunisia (video of Tunisian border guards using force to prevent Egyptians from crossing the Libya-Tunisia border went viral), and the problems of finding employment for them in Egypt. The first accompanying article, from the Egyptian daily al-Yaum al-Sabaa, describes an Egyptian perspective on the forced flight of Egyptians from Libya.

According to the second accompanying article, Egyptian authorities should exercise caution when reacting to the situation in Libya. The article cites two retired Egyptian military officers, who warn that Egyptian authorities should be both vigilant and cautious in their reaction to events in Libya, particularly the plight of Egyptians there. However, prominent figures in Egypt's political establishment have begun calling for direct Egyptian military action to deal with the threat from Libya. The third accompanying article, from al-Jazeera's website (which is highly critical of Egypt's new leader), cites two arguments against cross-border intervention.

Egyptian military capabilities should not be taken for granted. As the second part of the al-Jazeera excerpt shows, there are grounds for skepticism when it comes to the Egyptian military's capacity to deal with the Libyan threat. Fortunately for Egypt, it is not the only country concerned with the growing strength of Libya's Islamists; the governments in Algeria and Tunisia have also expressed concern about Libya's ongoing instability, and the three countries appear to have begun coordinating policies toward their troubled neighbor. The fourth accompanying article, from the Tunisian newspaper al-Chorrouk, describes a recent report in the Algerian newspaper al-Watan that was reproduced by several important Egyptian newspapers, and spoke of direct Egyptian-Algerian coordination in preparation for any type of military intervention. **End OE Watch Commentary (Winter)**



(Left) Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and (right) Egyptian President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi.  
Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org>

**Source:** Ibrahim Dawoud. "The Exit from Libya," 4 August 2014. Al-Yaum al-Sabaa. <http://goo.gl/I9d4WD>

Egyptians in Libya are not a party to the conflict. They are there because their government failed to secure their future in their homeland... The timing is good neither here nor there, as if there were a global conspiracy against Egypt's poor everywhere, with some of them dying after arriving to the Tunisian border, after being saved from an actual war...

**Source:** Sami Saaid. "Military Officers: The Situation in Libya is an Attempt to Push Egypt into a Military Confrontation," 1 August 2014. El Badil. <http://goo.gl/g2CkpS>

Retired Brig. Gen. Ali Hafadhi, a military expert from military intelligence... said that some parties aim to draw Egypt into events in Libya by targeting Egyptians residing in Libya, as happened a few days before when several Egyptians were killed in a Tripoli neighborhood. The Egyptian administration, he added, should be aware of these dangers. Military expert Brig. Gen. Yusri Qandil noted that ... the life of Egyptians in Libya is being threatened and they have been targeted several times in terrorist attacks...

(continued)

## Continued: Egypt's Libya Conundrum

**Source:** Abdul Rahman Abu al-Ghait. "Will al-Sisi Involve the Egyptian Army in the Libyan Crisis?" 7 August 2014. Al-Jazeera. <http://goo.gl/jCoz3K>

... abd al-Karim added that calls to fight terrorism and protect national security are farcical and obvious theatrics that are used by tyrants everywhere to cover up for their crimes. Despite this, al-Sisi seeks to stage this theater even though he realizes that these lies have been discovered by millions worldwide... he added that "al-Sisi wants to transform the Egyptian military into mercenaries that fight in the interest of those who pay most," describing any Egyptian intervention in Libya as a shame that will be with the Egyptian military forever... According to political researcher Mohammed Mohsen Abdel Nour, "One thing that is certain in this context is that Egypt's military is unprepared for any kind of armed confrontation, as in principle it cannot even protect its own men, who are regularly hunted down. Consequently, it does not have the ability to seize the initiative or act pre-emptively."

**Source:** "To Confront the ISIS Advance, Algeria and Egypt Warm Up for Military Intervention in Libya," 1 August 2014. Al-Chorrouk. <http://goo.gl/JKy9WB>

Algerian newspaper al-Watan reported on an imminent Egyptian-Algerian military intervention in Libya, noting that there are new preparations by both countries to face the potential rise of ISIS in Libya. A high committee including senior intelligence officers from both countries was recently created and is preparing to hold a meeting to lay down a plan to confront the security threats from Libya, which may at any time transform into a civil war.

## Raqqa: From Regime Overthrow to Inter-Rebel Fighting

By Lucas Winter, Foreign Military Studies Office

The paper details the March 2013 takeover of Raqqa by Syrian rebels and the subsequent rebel infighting. The important dynamics in Raqqa in 2013 occurred between three distinct rebel factions: the FSA ("secular opposition"), the Islamic Front ("moderate Islamists") and ISIS ("radical Islamists"). As things stand now, neither of the three has a persuasive banner under which to unify the rebellion. As with Libya, it seems that many analysts have, amidst the Arab Spring fever, forgotten that Syria has been ruled for many decades by a highly ideological regime. Only through a strong unifying ideology will the country be put back together. Islam and the ancien régime appear to be the only options currently on the table.

<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Raqqa.pdf>



## A Military Response to a Public Health Crisis: Preventing Ebola's Spread




**OE Watch Commentary:** *The militaries of West Africa are engaging in a battle with a very tiny enemy that can render large numbers of casualties - the Ebola virus. Specifically, as the accompanying article relates, several nations are using their military and police forces to cordon off areas in an attempt to prevent Ebola from spreading. In a region of porous borders, with populations who are sometimes wary of security forces, the oft undermanned and underequipped armed services face a monumental task in trying to contain the disease.*

*Military action is not limited to restricting population movement. Material support such as food must be brought in to the cordoned off areas to supply people who would normally get some of their necessities through purchases at the local market or trade. Such support and the logistics associated with it frequently fall on already overstretched West African militaries. There is, of course, also the concern of significant violence breaking out within these areas, and it will largely be up to the military to prevent, and, if necessary, quell such incidents.*

*Other impacts are related to the redistribution of forces. For instance as the accompanying article points out, Sierra Leone will not be sending forces to Somalia to serve with the African Union (AU) mission fighting al-Shabaab. This is because the AU does not want to risk introducing Ebola, which is present in Sierra Leone, into Somalia. This turn of events, however, enables Sierra Leone soldiers to assist with the public health efforts in their own nation. The AU mission in Somalia will still need to find replacements for the Sierra Leone troops, and, with the disease spreading to other African countries, this will be a significant challenge.*

*Still, while peacekeeping missions might suffer from the lack of available troops, the soldiers are performing an invaluable service in helping to, if not contain, then at least slow down the spread of Ebola. However, it is not just militaries from countries where the disease is present that are participating in these efforts. Nations such as Cameroon, which at the time this article was written did not have a reported case of Ebola, are securing their borders to prevent the disease from infecting their populations. If Africa, - not just West Africa - is to eventually defeat Ebola, it will depend on many people, including physicians, nurses, public health officials, foreign aid workers, and, in no small measure, many of the continent's militaries. **End OE Watch Commentary (Feldman)***



Note: Suspected, probable, and confirmed cases and deaths as of July 23, 2014  
MAGGIE SMITH, NG STAFF; JOEY FENING. SOURCE: WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

**Source:** Kimeng Hilton Ndukong, "Cameroon: Ebola Outbreak - Security Cordon Created Around Affected States," Cameroon Tribune on AllAfrica.com, 4 Aug 2014, [http://allafrica.com/stories/201408042160.html?aa\\_source=acrdn-f0](http://allafrica.com/stories/201408042160.html?aa_source=acrdn-f0)

As the Ebola virus outbreak rages on in West Africa, leaders of [Guinea Conakry, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire] met over the weekend to proffer emergency measures to combat the unprecedented epidemic.

In a drastic decision, movements in and out of the four countries will be strictly monitored by a security cordon created to stop further spread.

All over the world, reactions to the outbreak have been prompt and drastic. With 20,000 citizens living in West Africa, Lebanon is taking a series of measures to prevent the virus reaching its shores.

...a military spokesman for the African Union mission in Somalia says the AU has cancelled a planned troop rotation by Sierra Leonean forces because of the Ebola outbreak... Sierra Leone is one of five nations that sends large numbers of troops to Somalia to protect the government and fight Al-Shabab militants.

*“...Both South Sudan and Somalia are hurtling towards a devastating famine that will, once again, decimate their already-vulnerable populations.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *One is at war with al-Shabaab and the other is essentially at war with itself... violent ethnic confrontations unresolved with independence. The conflicts in both countries - Somalia in the first and South Sudan in the second - have greatly disturbed both farming and grazing, aggravating existing or actually causing widespread famine, as the accompanying article relates. Somalia has seen famine before, many, many times before. For South Sudan famine has not been as common, but, then again, South Sudan has only been South Sudan since 2011, the year it gained independence from Sudan.*

*To see a satellite image of Somalia is to see a country with very little arable land. It is not surprising that even small obstacles to grazing or planting, let alone the drought now engulfing the region, could lead to sharp drops in food production. However, though the drought is contributing mightily to the famine, so, too, is the conflict, which not only keeps farmers from their fields and pastoralists from their ranges, but also impedes the flow of food donated by foreign governments, leading to mass starvation. A struggling government, woefully inadequate health system, and near total absence of transportation infrastructure exacerbate the famine's misery.*

*South Sudan's terrain is not like Somalia's. With its abundant rainfall and rich soil, much of the country is quite verdant. However, the open warfare between President Salva Kiir, who is Dinka, and his former vice president, Riek Machar, who is Nuer, is devastating agriculture. Farmers flee their land as fighting rages or even threatens to break out. It is estimated that 1.5 million South Sudanese have been displaced, many unable to plant the subsistence crops they depend on to feed their families. Thus, even if the fighting were somehow to suddenly stop, the crisis would continue, as too little food would be raised; this in a country that was considered to have the potential to become east Africa's breadbasket.*

*Both South Sudan with its excellent farmland and abundant oil resources, and Somalia with its sun-drenched coastline, once populated by hotels and tourists, have enormous potential. However, the ongoing conflicts, which exacerbated the famine in Somalia while actually causing it in South Sudan, have resulted in both countries foregoing peace and prosperity. **End OE Watch Commentary (Feldman)***

**Source:** Simon Allison, "South Sudan and Somalia: A Tale of Two Famines," Daily Maverick, 11 Aug 2014, <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-08-11-south-sudan-and-somalia-a-tale-of-two-famines/#.U-t2YK90xv4>

Humanitarian organizations are calling for immediate action, but is it already too late? And does anybody care?

Somalia has been in this situation before. In 2011, a similar confluence of bad governance and bad fortune led to a famine that killed nearly 260,000 people, or 2.5% of the entire population. Of the dead, more than half were children.

Donors, however, have rather a lot on their plates at the moment. Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Gaza and the Central African Republic have stretched aid budgets to breaking point. Who will find hundreds of millions of dollars more for Somalia?

.. the fighting prevented humanitarian organizations from stockpiling supplies in advance. Just getting the food to the affected areas is an extraordinary logistical challenge, not helped by the poor condition of most of South Sudan's airstrips.

In terms of the sheer number of potential lives lost, the twin threats of famine in Somalia and South Sudan are surely the most pressing human security issue currently facing the African continent. Yet currently both are overshadowed in the headlines by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which has so far claimed just under one thousand lives.



*A woman lays on the ground while waiting to be seen in the health clinic at Maputo, near the Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya, which serves refugees from several countries, including South Sudan and Somalia.*

*Source: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-08-11-south-sudan-and-somalia-a-tale-of-two-famines/#.U-t2YK90xv4>*

*“The state cannot exercise its authority in many areas of Cape Town where organized crime wields significant power, has capitalized on economic opportunities, and can manipulate and corrupt the state.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *In South Africa, the hope at the end of forced segregation was that there would be less crime, but as the accompanying article relates, with regards to Cape Town, crime is now entrenched, particularly that associated with organized criminal networks. Signs posted along high risk roads near Cape Town are harbingers of this. The authors of the article stress that the government’s response fails to address the underlying causes of the problem, especially with regards to youth.*

*There are significant governance issues associated with this rise of organized crime here. The Cape Town government, strained by the rapid influx of rural migrants seeking employment, is unable to fulfill its necessary duties. As a result, criminal enterprises often step in to fill the void, offering work in areas such as narcotics trafficking, prostitution, theft, credit card fraud, and so forth. Many young people from Cape Town’s poorer areas, often from broken families and already engaged in drug use, are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by these criminal networks.*

*Besides employment, several of the criminal networks provide dispute mediation, goods, and even surrogate families for the young. Thus, the criminal networks are deeply embedded in Cape Town, in some instances offering parallel services to the government and in other cases serving as the governing body itself. Research studies have shown such actions to have a delegitimizing effect on city government: if the people cannot depend on government to deliver necessary services, then it has little reason in their eyes to exist.*

*The authors of the accompanying article, after providing a fascinating overview of how criminal enterprises developed and became entrenched in South Africa’s second most populous city, advocate that additional resources be devoted to combating the poverty, drug use, and other social issues that make crime an attractive option for Cape Town’s youth. With South Africa being such a large economic engine for the continent and frequently providing troops for peacekeeping missions, the stability and security of its urban areas have ramifications beyond the nation itself.*

**End OE Watch Commentary (Feldman)**

**Source:** “Crime networks and governance in Cape Town: the quest for enlightened responses,” Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), 7 August 2014, <http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/crime-networks-and-governance-in-cape-town-the-quest-for-enlightened-responses>

That criminals corrupted public officials and business entrepreneurs to facilitate their activities.

That they also contaminated ethical business practices by using existing financial intermediaries or setting up their own in order to launder the proceeds of crime.

South Africa’s relative exclusion from the world economy during the apartheid era – which may have isolated the country from hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin – ended, allowing these ‘new’ drugs and some of their merchants in. South Africa was regarded as an untapped drug market.

Firstly, while they lack the legitimacy generally derived from a formal mandate, organized criminals wield considerable power. Secondly, and as a result of such power, criminal networks can corrupt or manipulate the state without necessarily taking it over....

Many young people in Cape Town who find no viable economic options available through formal channels are inculcated into the gang lifestyle at an early age. The ostentatious lifestyles of some criminal actors are a persuasive recruitment technique.

According to Pinnock, it is cheaper to manage interventions before criminality occurs (rather than later) by providing youth with an alternative social support system.

Carjacking is a lucrative enterprise in parts of South Africa. The sign below is posted along various roads in South Africa. Source: Wikimedia.org



# Suez Canal Expansion Plans Reflect both Hopes and Fears of Egyptians

6 August 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** *Egypt has finally inaugurated plans to expand the Suez Canal. When (and if) the expansion is complete, the added lane would drastically reduce both canal transit time and the scale of staging that currently occurs outside the canal and in the Great Bitter Lake.*

*The first article projects annual canal revenues to increase from five to more than thirteen billion dollars (USD) annually. However, the only real competition is to use longer and more expensive routes; it is unclear whether additional revenue could actually be attributed to the new lane or would occur from economic trends that have already been forecasted. The second article describes the projected job creation of the project – one million – and predicts an effective eradication of unemployment, at least during the construction phase. The optimism in both these articles reflects desperation on the part of the Egyptian people to rebuild their economy following the tumult of the Arab Spring, and on the part of President Sisi to demonstrate economic progress that his predecessor could not achieve.*

*The third article describes how the Egyptian government plans to fund canal expansion by relying entirely upon investments from Egyptian citizens, rather than upon outside investors. This was an essential message for Sisi to communicate because of lingering historical distrust of foreign control: he has no intention of letting control of the canal and its profits go to anyone but the Egyptians. **End OE Watch Commentary (Freese)***

**Source:** Mohamed Hassan Shaban, “Egypt Begins Project to Dig New Suez Canal,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 6 August 2014, <http://www.aawsat.net/2014/08/article55335142>

Egypt launched a project on Tuesday which includes building a new Suez Canal waterway in a bid to increase revenues from the trade route .... The new 4-billion-US-dollar, 45-mile-long canal would run parallel to the current one, allowing ships to pass in the opposite direction ....

the new thoroughfare would reduce maximum waiting hours for ships from 11 to three hours, and would allow 46 ships to cross the channel simultaneously. The Suez Canal brings Egypt some 5 billion dollars in revenue yearly ... the new canal would boost these revenues to 13.5 billion dollars by 2023.

**Source:** Staff Author(s), “New Suez Canal Project to Offer 1mn Jobs: Official,” Pravasi Mathrubhumi, 15 August 2014, <http://www.mathrubhumi.com/english/news/world/new-suez-canal-project-to-offer-1-mn-jobs-official-150569.html>

The new Suez Canal project -- aimed at expanding the existing vital waterway -- will completely eradicate unemployment in Egypt as it will offer nearly one million jobs, an official said Friday. Suez Governor El-Arabi al-Serwi made the remark during the launch of the first phase of a social housing project in the city, state-run MENA news agency reported.

**Source:** Mada Masr, “Gov’t Announces Funding Plan for Suez Canal Project,” Mada Masr, 14 August 2014, <http://www.madamasr.com/content/govt-announces-funding-plan-suez-canal-project>

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has agreed to fund the long-anticipated Suez Canal development project through Egyptian banks and investment certificates .... A new canal will be dug alongside the historic canal — the fastest shipping route for a significant portion of international trade between Europe and Asia .... Sisi emphasized the need for Egyptian citizens to contribute to the military-run project, which he asserted would be completed in one year ... urging citizens living inside Egypt to contribute LE100, and expatriates to give US\$100. [Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb] said the certificates would be issued through public sector banks, the CBE, the Banque du Caire and Ahly Bank over a period of 5 years, with a 12 percent interest rate cashed every 3 months.

Photo: Container ship viewed from USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) at the northern edge of the Great Bitter Lake during 01 August 2007 transit. Currently, ships must stage in the lake and alternate transits as this is one of the few locations on the canal where two-way traffic is possible.

Photo source: Kevin Freese

## Cameroon and Boko Haram: A Model for Nigeria?

12 August 2014

*“The lesson to we Nigerians is that a small country like Cameroon can deal with the Boko Haram problem. We have always said that Nigeria is the giant of Africa, so there is no reason why we cannot do it.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** More than ever, Boko Haram is bleeding into Cameroon’s borders. Now it is arguably not just Nigeria’s biggest security challenge, but Cameroon’s as well. Yet the ways that Cameroon is dealing with the group differ from Nigerian responses, and may well provide new insights into the nature of military efficacy in West Africa.

As the first article details, Boko Harm is now increasingly targeting northern Cameroon as a source for new recruits and using it as a training ground outside of the purview of the Nigerian state. While precise numbers of how many Cameroonians might have been recruited are unavailable, estimates range in the hundreds; one report suggested that at least 450 had been recruited from the town of Kolofata. Observers believe it to be the case that the new recruits are being engaged not to return to Nigeria, but rather to begin to undertake attacks in Cameroon itself. Some have suggested that in early August 2014 the recruits’ training had just been completed, and that they were about to return to the frontlines of battle.

To that end, as detailed by the second accompanying article, Cameroonian civil society groups have been pressuring the administration of Paul Biya to deploy the military in the service of their protection against Boko Haram. Notably, this confidence in the military is a stark divergence from the situation in Nigeria, where human rights abuses by the national counterinsurgency forces are common, and, thus, the military is not only viewed as a source of danger rivaling that of Boko Harm, but also has thus far proven to be impotent in actually combatting the insurgency.

The capacity of the Cameroonian military was put on notable display in late July. On 27 July a suspected 200 militants from Boko Haram crossed into neighboring Cameroon and kidnapped the wife of Amadou Ali, Cameroon’s deputy prime minister, a known anti-Boko Haram politician. Her kidnapping,



The Cameroonian military: now the envy of Nigeria? Source: <http://goo.gl/FOfnLd>

**Source:** “Cameroun: Boko Haram Aurait Recruté Plusieurs Centaines de Jeunes.” [Cameroon: Boko Haram Recruited Hundreds of Youth.”] Pambazuka News (Pan-African source). 9 August 2014: <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201408141552.html>

According to police and civil servants, northern Cameroon has, in the past few months, become a recruitment zone and training ground for the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram.

In the past months, the group has recruited hundreds of young Cameroonians, whom it is training, so that they can begin to attack their own country. There are no precise figures concerning the number of the young Cameroonian recruits, but local security sources have estimates in the several hundreds.....

**Source:** Belibi, Jean Francis. “Cameroun: La Mobilisation Contre Boko Haram Gagne En Intensité.” [Cameroon: Mobilization Against Boko Haram Intensifies.] Cameroon Tribune (Yaoundé, Cameroon), 12 August 2014: [http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201408120926.html?aa\\_source=acrdn-f0](http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201408120926.html?aa_source=acrdn-f0)

More than ever, Cameroonians are mobilizing against abuses and violence by the Islamist sect, Boko Haram. This has especially been the case since the last attacks on 27 July that killed numerous people among the civilian population in the town of Kolofata,...

Marches and meetings have both been arranged in protest of the abuses that locals have faced by Boko Haram, these men from another time. [Representatives from various regions] have decided that it is a question that must become central to the Cameroonian government, headed by Paul Biya, and to encourage the necessary actions by Cameroonian soldiers engaged in the fight.

(continued)

## Continued: Cameroon and Boko Haram: A Model for Nigeria?

which inevitably recalled that the mass abductions of the “Chibok girls” in Nigeria in April, was met with shock in the country. Yet the outcomes in the two situations could not have been more divergent: whereas the Nigerian military has yet to recover its abductees, the significantly smaller Cameroonian military succeeded just days later in rescuing the deputy prime minister’s wife.

As the third article details, Nigerian elite have been awed by the Cameroonian army’s efficiency in rescuing the deputy prime minister’s wife. Nigerians are shocked that the Cameroonian army could do what theirs seemingly could not. As one asserted: “The prompt, precise, highly successful, commendable and exemplary rescue of their Prime Minister’s wife sends loud, clear and unmistakable message to their Nigeria military counterpart...I am shocked... by that singular display of their military prowess.” Others, as can be read in the accompanying excerpts, were also surprised at the Cameroonian military’s effectiveness, and (previously rare) conversations have been circulating suggesting that Nigeria’s military should follow Cameroon’s example.

In sum, the increased infiltration of Boko Haram into Cameroon has been a double-edged sword. While it inevitably puts Cameroonians themselves at greater risk, the Cameroonian military’s response is proving to both Nigerians and the world at large that regional players have more capacity to address Boko Haram than Nigeria has thus far shown. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)**

**Source:** “Nigeria: Rescue of Cameroon Minister’s Wife - Nigerian Military Has Proved Impotent.” Vanguard (Lagos, Nigeria). 9 August 2014: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201408111226.html>

...Few days after the abduction [of the Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister’s wife], the Cameroonian Army in a successful operation, rescued the abducted deputy Prime Minister’s wife....With no arrest of those behind the kidnap of Chibok girls and no rescue of the girls by our security agencies, Saturday Vanguard sought to know what the action in Cameroun tells of our [Nigerian] security agencies.

### **Former Nigerian Bar Association President, Dr. Olisa Agbakoba SAN:**

It means that the Cameroonians have a clear strategy that is working; and that we should emulate what they are doing.... So, if the Cameroonians can do it, I am sure that we can do it. So, the lesson to we Nigerians is that a small country like Cameroon can deal with the Boko Haram problem. We have always said that Nigeria is the giant of Africa, so there is no reason why we cannot do it.

### **Chief Morah Ekwunoh:**

No doubt, the cheery news of the Cameroonian military’s storming of Boko Haram’s den, and the prompt, precise, highly successful, commendable and exemplary rescue of their Prime Minister’s wife sends loud, clear and unmistakable message to their Nigeria military counterparts. Compare that with the kidnap and detention by the same sect of our schoolgirls from Chibok and you will feel for Nigeria. No wonder we didn’t go to war over Bakassi [a tract of Cameroon that was once claimed by Nigeria]....I am shocked as to the overall messages sent to us by that singular display of their military prowess.

### **Chief Uwazuruike:**

The situation here is not the same thing with that of the Cameroonian woman. In the process of rescuing her, 16 people were killed. The Chibok girls’ situation is different from hers. Do we start shooting? We are talking about over 200 girls here and if anything is going to be done, the girls have to come out live. They did not rescue her in Nigeria; she was rescued in Cameroon, if our Federal Government should use force, a lot of lives would be lost, it’s a gradual process.

### **Monday Ubani, former chairman of NBA, Ikeja branch**

The difference is that the Cameroonian government believed that someone was abducted and they swung into action immediately and the result is that within two days, the woman was rescued but in Nigeria, it was alleged that there was no abduction until after 17 days. May be if the government had taken action, when it first happened, what we are seeing today, would have been a different story.

### **Oliver Uzoma Okafor, Civil Servant:**

If the security forces should attack them without being tactical, we might lose the girls. It’s a dicey situation, except one expects the girls to be sacrificed. One has to be diplomatic in dealing with these terrorists, so we have to be tactical in order to bring them out safely. Nigeria is in the spotlight and any action or inaction will be commented upon. Remember, it took ten years to pin Osama Bin Laden down.”

### **Wale Adeyemi, Banker:**

This portrays the current Nigerian government in its real form. A form characterised by gross inefficiency and deceit...The FG should hide their heads in shame... I admire the Cameroonian government for taking the bull by the horns and tackling this issue head on.

## Eritrea: Rebel Group Threatens Overthrow

13 August 2014

“Militarily, RSADO is relatively considered stronger than the other Eritrean rebel groups. In the past its armed wing has carried out a number of successful attacks against the Eritrean government army.”

**OE Watch Commentary:** Eritrea, arguably Sub-Saharan Africa’s most autocratic nation, has been ruled since independence in 1991 by Isaias Afiwerki. Through extreme authoritarian oversight of civilian and military life Afiwerki has been able to keep a tight hold on the country, however, current events suggest that his long-running military regime is seriously challenged by the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organizations (RSADO).

As the first article details, RSADO, which was founded in 1998 to demand ethnic Afar autonomy, is now taking bold new steps in making public claims, in blatant defiance of Eritrean national law, that it is planning the overthrow of Afiwerki. As the second article details, these claims of the need for the government overthrow are based on the assertion that Afiwerki’s party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, is specifically targeting ethnic Afars. The group claims that he is not only exacting a “genocide” against them, but also killing their cattle and other livestock. Resultantly, as the third article lays out, this fear of the government, especially its mandatory military conscription, is generating massive flows of emigrants out of the country, who often subsequently get entangled in illicit trading networks of human, drugs, and arms traffickers.

What is the likelihood that these threats will amount to anything? Despite the fact that, as the first article mentions, RSADO is stronger than other Eritrean rebel groups and has even successfully attacked the government before, what does this actually mean? Given the strength and iron-fisted control of the Eritrean military, it would superficially seem as though any rebel group, no matter how strong, would face an uphill battle in dethroning Afiwerki. While it is true that the military is tightly under his grasp, it is nevertheless the case that Eritrean military morale is almost nonexistent, not least because of frequently lifelong conscriptions and abhorrent conditions within its ranks. To

## Qasa Badih Qafarih Dimokraasih Missoyna

ዲሞክራሲያዊ ውድብ ዓፋር ቀይሕ ባሕር



التنظيم الديمقراطي لعفر البحر الأحمر

## Red Sea Afar democratic organization

Source: <http://omaa.org/ar/images/news/Red%20Sea%20Afar%20democratic%20organization.jpg>

**Source:** Tekle, Tesfa-Alem, “Eritrea Opposition Vows to Oust Regime, Establish Federal System.” Sudan Tribune (Sudan), 13 August 2014: [http://allafrica.com/stories/201408140421.html?aa\\_source=mf-hdlns](http://allafrica.com/stories/201408140421.html?aa_source=mf-hdlns)

An Eritrean opposition group, Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO) on Tuesday vow[ed] to step up military attacks to topple the current repressive rule in the East African nation.

The opposition political organization held a three day conference in Ethiopia Afar region’s Semera town where participants discussed a framework of government should they succeed to remove the current President Isaias Afwerki led government in Asmara.

RSADO leaders told Sudan Tribune that the armed wing of the group was more than ever strengthened and ready to launch full-scale military attacks to unseat the Eritrean leader and turn the Red Sea nation into a democratic federal state.

...The regime has ‘zero tolerance’ to dissent. Any citizen who attempts to criticize the government is considered as traitor or spy of arch foe Ethiopia and will be thrown to indefinite jail term or could be punished by death without court ruling.

Militarily, RSADO is relatively considered stronger than the other Eritrean rebel groups. In the past its armed wing has carried out a number of successful attacks against the Eritrean government army.

(continued)

## Continue: Eritrea: Rebel Group Threatens Overthrow

*that end, rumblings of attempted military coup d'états trickle out of the notoriously closed country from time to time. Most notably, what appears to be a legitimate (and potentially viable) attempted putsch in January 2013 was quickly covered up by the regime as a story fabricated by the international community, desirous of his unseating. Others in the country suggested that it was more serious.*

*Indeed, if the RADS0 succeeds in allying itself with some of the dissident elements in the military, Afwerki's only real form of protection, the lamentable status quo in Eritrea could cease to exist. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)***

**Source:** Nagish, Yemane, "Eritrea: Government Accused of Committing Genocide." The Reporter (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), 9 August 2014: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201408090027.html>.

The Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO), which struggles for the realization of an Independent Red Sea Afar, renewed its genocide accusation against the "rogue" regime in Eritrea.

...RSADO accused the Eritrean government and its ruling party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) of committing ethnic cleansing against the Red Sea Afar community.

...This is not the routine fleeing the country experience, but a new condition is worsened," the letter expressed. The number of people fleeing Eritrea has now reached 80 to 120 daily, according to the information obtained by The Reporter.

...In its deliberation, the organization accused the PFDJ a.k.a. Sha'bia of continued repression, killing, and other acts of genocide that target not only people but their livestock too; sheep, goats, cattle, and camels in the last six months.

...RSADO is among the few Eritrean oppositions in exile fighting militarily against the Eritrean regime. It is to be recalled that a few months ago, some European countries, including Sweden, accused the Eritrean government of committing genocide against its people.

**Source:** Allison, Simon, "Eritrean Authoritarianism and Human Trafficking in the Sinai," Daily Maverick (Johannesburg, South Africa): 1 August 2014: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-08-01-the-strange-link-between-eritrean-authoritarianism-and-human-trafficking-in-the-sinai/#.U-4ti0i3IXw>.

...A staggering number of Eritreans have already fled their country, and more seek to join these refugees and asylum-seekers every day. As of January 2014, the United Nations (UN) estimated that there were 308,000 Eritreans outside of Eritrea – nearly 5% of the country's total population.

...In a country [like Ethiopia or Sudan] where they don't understand the laws, speak the language or, often, share the local religion, refugees are at the mercy of smugglers to get them to a place where they think they'll be safe. There are two main routes: into Italy through Libya, or into Israel through the Sinai.

...Even if all goes according to plan, their journeys are incredibly dangerous, and many don't make it. Furthermore, and increasingly in recent years, would-be migrants are hijacked by human trafficking rings....'It's a complex, interlocking network that runs from East to West Africa. Eritreans find themselves, by dint of circumstances, having to negotiate their way across it.'

# Nigerian Perspectives on 21st Century Global Security Threats

19 June 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** For Nigeria, the string of security threats it faces is seemingly never-ending. From trepidation about French rivalry (and Saharan nuclear testing) in West Africa in the post-independence 1960s, Nigeria quickly faced threats of secession from the southeastern Igbos during the Biafran war of secession from 1967 to 1970. With the bloody war over, by the beginning of the 1970s the country was primarily preoccupied with economic growth, until the collapse of global oil prices and a string of military dictatorships, combined with ethnic disunity, threatened disintegration in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Thereafter, petrol-militants came to rise in the Niger Delta, followed by the Christian and Muslim violence of the 2000s and, most recently, the newest threat, Boko Haram.

However, as the accompanying article details, Nigerians seem to view their country as likely facing the same genre of “globalized” security threats that others across the world, including global powers such as the United States, will endure throughout the 21st century. To this end, the article offers thoughts on how various threats are likely to affect the country in the coming years.

In particular, climate change seems to increasingly be on the table as a 21st century priority. Indeed, it will particularly be the case in the northern, Sahelian regions of Nigeria, where climate change is leading to desertification, which generates new cattle grazing patterns for the region’s primarily nomadic Hausa and Fulani cattle pastoralists. Inevitably, shifting topographies will lead to strains on preexisting resource bases. So too will cybercrime and other technologically related security threats have indelible impacts on the country.

Perhaps the most interesting discussion relates not to “new” security threats, but rather, to an “old” one, namely the question of nuclear weapons. As the first article notes, Nigeria, which views itself as the undisputed leader of West Africa and, at times, Sub-Saharan Africa more generally, has been “tinkering” with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is not

*“Nigeria, which is unable to manage its hydro electricity technology, cannot attempt nuclear technology, a more complex technology to handle.”*

**Source:** Odeh, Onche, “Nigeria: Climate Change, Biological Weapons May Worsen Nigeria’s Security Crisis.” Daily Independent (Lagos, Nigeria), 18 June 2014: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201406190045.html?page=3>

Over two years ago, the United States listed climate change, use of biological and nuclear weapons, cyber attacks and transnational crimes as five major events that could change the scope of global security for the worse in the coming decades.

**Climate Change:**...The US prediction hinted that the warming of the planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees, resources and catastrophic natural disasters, requiring U.S. military support and resources. The arrival of the team from US to assist Nigeria in finding the over 200 girls that were abducted by the Boko Haram in Chibok, Borno State, may be an attestation to this. Borno, where the Boko Haram insurgency is rife is bordered by the Lake Chad, a body of water that has been affected by climate change more than any natural landmark in the area. Lake Chad is a major source of freshwater for irrigated farming and projects in the countries in parts of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. However, recent satellite images have revealed a lake that has lost a larger proportion of its body within the last three decades... Many of the conflicts in the area have been linked to the struggle for control of the water and land.

**Biological Weapons:** Fears that biological weapons will become eventual choice weapons for terrorists attack are becoming more real... But Nigerian scientists are concerned that the porous nature of the country’s borders pose a huge risk factor in this regards... Fears that Nigeria could be an easy target for terrorists who choose to use biological weapon are heightened by the country’s lack diagnostic capacity to handle bio-hazardous substances, as is the case with Ebola...

**Nuclear weapons:** The US expressed concern in the National Defence report that black-market trade in sensitive nuclear materials might be building up. As at the time of publishing, the report disclosed that no high-tech sensors existed to help break up nuclear black markets, detect and intercept them in transit. Nigeria has, in the recent past tinkered with nuclear technology that has not really blossomed. It was one of the issues raised for considerations at the ongoing National Conference. Former President of the Nigeria Academy of Science, Prof. Anya O. Anya, who is also a delegate at the confab, pushed for Nigeria to endorse the idea of developing capacity in nuclear and other high profile technologies, saying that Nigeria would continue roll over without the political will to develop science and technology. This was countered by some of the delegates at the conference, one of whom pointed out that Nigeria, which is unable to manage its hydro electricity technology, cannot attempt nuclear technology, a more complex technology to handle. Some others said a nuclear plant is accident-prone, and far beyond what the country could cope with. So, as it stands, the country is naïve as far as nuclear technology is concern, raising fears that it may just be helpless in case of any nuclear attack.

(continued)

## Continued: Nigerian Perspectives on 21st Century Global Security Threats

*done in self-defense, it seems, but rather as a symbol of capacity for leadership, both military and diplomatic. As the second accompanying article notes, Nigeria's recent suggestions that it might put a nuclear facility on its borders gave (justifiable) rise for concern from neighboring Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.*

*While the pursuit of such technology is a notable development, perhaps the more interesting issue is the reaction by Nigerian security personnel themselves, many of whom think that Nigeria is frankly not mature enough to handle a nuclear weapon. As one commentator remarked in the second of the two accompanying articles, "Nigeria's inability to effectively manage motor accidents much less nuclear plant accidents" leads it to be an unlikely venerable nuclear steward. As others have noted, given Nigeria's inability to effectively manage other domestic security affairs, the country could be deeply vulnerable to an attack on its nuclear facilities, should they come to fruition.*

*In sum, though Nigeria will continue to deal with its own internal threats to security that are uniquely borne of local conditions, Nigerians perceive their country to be in no way immune from the larger arc of threats prevalent in contemporary global discussions. **End OE Watch Commentary (Warner)***

Cyber Attacks: The use of internet video streams by the terrorist group, Boko Haram, has raised concerns that the internet could pose serious threat to national security. ... On how this could be used to tame insurgency in Nigeria, Iheagwara said, "The developed world and some developing countries have been using it for quite a while now for a variety of purposes including tracking and fighting insurgencies. Drones for example that are used to destroy terrorist cells are ICT-operated."

**Source:** Henry Umoru, Levinus Nwabughioqu, and Joseph Erunke, "Nuclear Power: Kutigi urges delegates to be diplomatic." Vanguard (Lagos, Nigeria), 19 June 2014: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/nuclear-power-kutigi-urges-delegates-diplomatic/>

Justice Idris Kutigi, has warned delegates to be careful in their choice of words during presentations. According to the leadership of the Conference, it has become imperative to counsel delegates against the backdrop that submissions by a delegate a fortnight ago on the siting of nuclear power plants had already alarmed neighbouring Cameroun, Chad and Niger Republic...

He said if we were going to set up nuclear plants we should set it up in borders of [these countries]. This has been taken seriously within the diplomatic community who were reading an implied hostile intention against them."...

Two weeks ago, during plenary, a delegate, Atedo Peterside, while kicking against exploring the nuclear option of power generation cited "Nigeria's inability to effectively manage motor accidents much less nuclear plant accidents" and suggested that if the country must explore the option it must ensure it sites the plants near Cameroun, Chad or Niger republic.

## Eritrea's Military Unprofessionalism and US Security Assistance in the Horn of Africa

By Jason Warner, FMSO

The United States military's Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is in need of capable and dependable regional military allies as it seeks to bring stability to the Horn of Africa. Eritrea – once a proclaimed US friend and home to one of Africa's largest military establishments – superficially seems to fit the bill. Drawing from literature on the 'unprofessional nature' of African militaries as well as the scant amount of open source material available on the notoriously secretive nation, this article argues that despite its experienced and well-funded military, President Isaias Afewerki's overbearing control of it has made Eritrea's military highly 'unprofessional' in various ways. As a result, a military that could be a useful US ally in a historically tenuous region will likely remain more of a problem than a boon for the United States into the foreseeable future.

[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2013.857940#.U\\_NHDeNdX-5](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2013.857940#.U_NHDeNdX-5)

Small Wars & Insurgencies

## The Nigerian Military's Reaction to Boko Haram's Attack in Lagos <sup>9 July 2014</sup>

*“Senior foreign diplomats indicated privately that the blast was deliberate, attributing the official denials to fears over the potential effects of a confirmed first attack on Lagos, which drives the country's economy.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Lagos, with some 20 million people, is southern Nigeria's commercial center. The city consists almost evenly of Muslims and Christians and was spared from Boko Haram attacks until 25 June, when a female suicide bomber detonated explosives that destroyed a fuel tanker in the city. An article for This Day confirmed from a variety of government, business and social media sources that this was a terrorist attack. In a video statement in July, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau also claimed he ordered the attack, although in the immediate aftermath of the attack the Nigerian military had claimed that it was an industrial accident.

The This Day article says that the Nigerian military denied there was an attack in Lagos because of fears that the panic following news of an attack would hurt the country's economy or provoke religious clashes. The perception that the military covered up the attack, however, will cause the international community and Nigerians to lose more trust in the military. Already the military is receiving criticism for claiming several times that Abubakar Shekau is dead, only to have him appear again in videos, while leading politicians have claimed several times that Boko Haram's days are numbered, only to have the militant group become even more lethal after each claim.

In a country as ethnically and religiously diverse and as economically dependent on the oil industry as Nigeria, its military is understandably concerned about the effects of a Boko Haram attack in Lagos. Nonetheless, the cost of the military losing credibility in the eyes of the public at a time when many Nigerians feel that Boko Haram is gaining ground in its insurgency is also a major setback. Moreover, eyewitness photographs of the detached head of the female suicide bomber in Lagos quickly undercut the military's narrative, and the military should be aware that in the age of social media hiding information from the public is almost impossible. Lastly, Nigeria has asked for international cooperation to combat Boko Haram, but if other countries do not trust the military, such cooperation will be in jeopardy. **End OE Watch Commentary (Zenn)**



Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed to have ordered the militant group's first ever attack in Lagos, southern Nigeria on June 25 and mocked the military's claim that it was an accident. Source: <http://naijagists.com/boko-haram-confirms-presence-in-lagos-i-sent-female-suicide-bomber-to-bomb-apapa-fuel-depot-shekau/>

**Source:** “Lagos Fuel Depot Blast ‘No Accident’, Say Experts, Witnesses?” This Day, 9 July 2014.

### Lagos Fuel Depot Blast ‘No Accident’, Say Experts, Witnesses

The federal government, while battling to stem an escalating Islamist insurgency, covered up a bomb attack in the financial capital Lagos by claiming a blast near a major fuel depot was an industrial accident.

The explosion ripped through an area of Nigeria's biggest city on June 25, just hours after a suspected Boko Haram car bombing in the administrative capital Abuja, which killed 21 people and stoked fresh fears that the group's deadly campaign was spreading.

The photographs of the scene showed a destroyed car plus damage to surrounding vehicles, which the British army's former head of bomb disposal said left no doubt as to the cause.

Senior foreign diplomats also indicated privately that the blast was deliberate, attributing the official denials to fears over the potential effects of a confirmed first attack on Lagos, which drives the country's economy.

*“Our soldiers are recruited from Nigerian society and, today, most people join because they are desperately in need of jobs...”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Since the kidnapping of more than 250 schoolgirls in Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria, on 15 April, the Nigerian security forces' capacity to combat Boko Haram has increasingly come into question. However, in May 2014, at a summit in Paris, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan vowed to crush Boko Haram with the support of other West African countries. One of the most recent obstacles to President Jonathan fulfilling this pledge is that Nigerian troops appear to be deserting the army at higher rates with every passing month.

An article in the Nigerian newspaper Leadership included confirmation from the Chief of Army Staff about Nigerian troops' morale problem. Lieutenant General Kenneth Minimah said that most people become soldiers because of lack of other employment opportunities, and that soldiers are deserting because they fear being killed by Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria. In April soldiers also mutinied against their superiors in Borno, where Boko Haram is based, while in May and January in Lagos soldiers rioted after a reckless bus driver crashed into and killed a soldier (this was also after President Jonathan had raised fuel prices). During the Chibok kidnapping many soldiers refused to fight Boko Haram because they were outnumbered and outmatched by Boko Haram's superior firepower.

With Boko Haram for the first time controlling towns in southeastern Borno and elections set for February 2015, the final months of 2014 will be a critical time for Nigeria's army to maintain unity and project confidence. The military is likely the most important institution in the country that can preserve order; if it fails, according to Minimah, Nigeria's democracy could fall apart and the war against Boko Haram could spiral downwards even more. The military has recognized its morale and desertion problem, and it will be its responsibility, as well as that of political leaders, to address the grievances of soldiers in coming months to raise morale and prevent more mutinies and soldiers' riots. **End OE Watch Commentary (Zenn)**



Nigerian troops protested an increase in fuel prices in Lagos in January 2014 by blocking off the roads, which reflected morale problems within the army.

Source: <http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/soldiers-take-over-lagos-roads-0>

**Source:** “Fear Of Boko Haram: Soldiers Deserting Force,” Leadership, 23 July 2014.

#### **Fear Of Boko Haram: Soldiers Deserting Force**

The Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minimah has revealed that some army personnel have abandoned the force due to the fear of the terrorist group Boko Haram. Minimah said such actions by the soldiers vividly showed that they joined the force for the wrong reasons: “Desertion is part of war. A real soldier is known when he is put in the warfront. The one who is not a soldier would run away and abandon his job. Our soldiers are recruited from Nigerian society and they join because they are desperately in need of jobs.”

Lt. Gen. Minimah also warned soldiers resident in Lagos to obey the laws of the state and be of good behaviour. He said: “Respect the rule of law. Respect the laws of Lagos. Lagos State has laws that are made by legislators, you must respect those laws.”

## Dilemmas of Negotiation, Amnesty, Restitution, and the Rule-of-Law

7 August 2014

*“They [victims of the FARC] have gained the recognition they deserve according to the criteria of International Humanitarian Law”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *One phenomenon that distinguishes irregular warfare from regular warfare is the greater influence of various categories of law and legalism -- not just the laws of war, but contract, migration, international criminal and civil, as well as domestic laws, to include procedural and administrative laws of all kinds. Let us be generous and call the best of this body of influences a reflection of civilizing cultural norms and aspirations. When that reflection engages with another reflection of ideas -- the propagandistic expressions of adversaries competing for political power -- public displacement behavior can ensue.*

*Colombians are now restating a mind-numbingly intricate needlepoint of moral dilemmas, which surfaced with the “peace” negotiations that are progressing (or not) in Havana, Cuba. Should the FARC guerrillas (sowers of landmines, kidnapers, defilers of the natural environment, traffickers of dangerous drugs, thieves, murderers) ask forgiveness of victims and pay restitution to them? Should not the victims be represented at the negotiations? These seemed like reasonable questions to some, but then came the questions of who were the victims and who would represent them, and to answer those questions along came experts from international organizations to suggest that FARC prisoners are among the victims, and that, in any case, the parties at the negotiation table, especially the FARC leaders, should provide the answer.*

*Should FARC leaders be allowed to run for political office in Colombia as part of the agreement? Might they not then become political leaders of persons formerly their victims? What if they are the subject of international indictments*



UN Humanitarian Coordinator Fabrizio Hochschild.  
Source: <http://www.agenciadenoticias.unal.edu.co>

**Source:** Editors, “Tras el Foro de Víctimas,” *El Mundo*, Medellín, August 7, 2014  
[http://www.elmundo.com/porta/opinion/editorial/tras\\_el\\_foro\\_de\\_victimas.php](http://www.elmundo.com/porta/opinion/editorial/tras_el_foro_de_victimas.php)

“The Constitutional Court declared in accordance with the Constitution the third article of the Juridical Outline for Peace [part of the proposed peace accords] that opens the possibility that FARC guerrillas demobilized in the peace process might participate in [electoral] politics, except if they have committed grave crimes.”

**Source:** Editors, “Guerrilleros condenados por delitos de lesa humanidad no podrán hacer política: Corte,” *El País*, Cali August 6, 2014, <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/corte-constitucional-decidio-guerrilleros-farc-si-podrian-participar-politica> 6 de agosto de 2014

“Given the enthusiasm of the participants [at the negotiating table] for creating a single category of victims, useful for the pretensions of the FARC to blur their identity as perpetrators, and the equivocations that spokesmen have made to exclude important groups affected by the violence, who have personally suffered the conflict, ...they have gained the recognition they deserve according to the criteria of International Humanitarian Law... Thanks to their own [efforts ], victims of the FARC, not content with the treatment that they were being given, won recognition in a process in which the perpetrator refused to admit his condition...who also tried to artifice prejudices, like classifying victims as representatives of hate, or haggling over their religious political, social, or labor identities.”

*(continued)*

## Continued: Dilemmas of Negotiation, Amnesty, Restitution, and the Rule-of-Law

*for grave human rights abuses? (They are.) If the FARC leaders are forgiven grave breaches, should not members of the government armed forces be eligible as well? Can the government legally negotiate away extraditions? Should land restitutions be made to peasants who work for, and are probably indebted to subordinates of the FARC leaders? If one were a leader of the FARC discussing all these questions, would he be willing to surrender all of the guerrillas' weapons and expose their bank accounts in exchange? Should all citizens of Colombia, including family members of FARC guerrillas, enjoy the right of habeas corpus? These questions and more, perhaps typical of today's irregular wars everywhere, are being slowly, painfully sorted out. **End OE Watch Commentary (Demarest)***

**Source:** Eduardo Mackenzie, "Las piruetas de Fabrizio," *Primero Colombia*, August 7, 2014, <http://www.pensamientocolombia.org/las-piruetas-de-fabrizio/>

"Of the two actors in Havana [meaning at the peace negotiations there] only one decided to do away, by means of assaults, infiltrations, massacres, kidnappings, drug trafficking and massive destruction, Colombia's neo-liberal system. Accordingly, only one of the two carries the associated historical baggage. Only one is burdened by the moral and political responsibility for the hundreds of thousands of victims that that aggression against Colombian democracy generated. That actor did not send its troops to attack the Kremlin; it created an irregular army to attack Colombia."

**Source:** Editors, "Estas son las exigencias que las víctimas le hacen a las Farc para seguir diálogo," *El País*, Cali, August 5, 2014, <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/victimas-piden-liberen-secuestrados-para-siga-dialogo>

"In a presentation given by the NGO Olive Green Ladies, composed of the wives of police and military killed in combat, the organization said that as a condition for continuing the dialog it was necessary to recognize the condition of victims of these military members who fell in combat. According to the presentation, Olive Green Ladies consider the desire of the FARC to make them invisible, as well as their refusal to ask forgiveness for the crimes they committed to be a mockery not only of them, but for all of the victims."

"Gloria Luz Gómez, president of the Association of the Family Members of The Detained and Disappeared, asserted that all of the victims of these crimes hoped that each one of the groups of perpetrators would provide them information regarding the whereabouts of their family members. Gloria Luz stated, "This crime has not only been committed by the FARC or the illegal groups, but also by the State. Therefore, we demand access to official documents in which the State has information about our disappeareds. Above all, we demand that, if they were taken alive, that they return them to us alive."

(Special appreciation to Eduardo MacKenzie and Colombian News for materials informing this report)

## Venezuela Continues to Race Downhill

11 August 2014

*“Nothing and nobody escapes the surge in prices in Venezuela”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The situation in Venezuela is kept off the front pages of US newspapers by things happening on the other side of the world. The conflict in Venezuela does not appear to be as inflamed as it was a few months ago. Nevertheless, this major exporter of crude oil, baseball players and illicit drugs appears, according to some local reporting, to be destroying itself utterly. Venezuelans are no longer fabricating or selling automobiles; airlines are withdrawing scheduled flights, out-migration and contraband export seem to be accelerating, infrastructure seems to be rotting, and violent crimes are apparently increasing.*

*The regime is protecting its own, however, case in point being its welcome home of a retired senior Venezuelan military officer and suspected drug trafficker for whom the United States had requested extradition from neighboring Aruba. Meanwhile, the opposition movement, centered on student activists, appears to have taken on a dimension of regional intrigue. It is hard to predict where or when this will all end, but the elements of unrest and instability remain unextinguished. End OE Watch Commentary (Demarest)*

**Source:** Laura Sobral, “Rechaza la oposición cierre de frontera ‘por violar derechos fundamentales’” (The opposition rejects the closing of the border ‘because it violates fundamental rights.’), La Nacion.com, August 11, 2014, <https://dolartoday.com/rechaza-la-oposicion-cierre-de-frontera-por-violar-derechos-fundamentales/>

“In Táchira, diverse reactions were produced by opposition spokespersons in response to the announcement that the Colombian Venezuelan border was to be closed at night as a means for controlling smuggling... The Táchira congressman is convinced that the measure will not end contraband in the state, given that it would [only] be eliminated taking macroeconomic measures of production and stabilization of the value of money, since, as he explained, the economic disequilibrium in Venezuela is so strong that it incentivizes the out-movement of basic goods.”

**Source:** Victor Rodríguez Cedeño, “Inmunidad e impunidad” (Immunity and Impunity), El País Internacional, July 31, 2014, [http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/07/31/actualidad/1406824159\\_815858.html](http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/07/31/actualidad/1406824159_815858.html)

“The liberation of Hugo Chavez’ ex-intelligence chief puts international penal procedures for combating drug trafficking in doubt. In this case, Mr. Carvajal, as has been affirmed by the prosecutor’s office and the court considering the case in Aruba, does not enjoy diplomatic immunity, nor consular immunity, given that the procedure for his accreditation had not been concluded...”

**Source:** EFE, “Ni Superman puede con la subida de los precios en Venezuela” (Not even Superman can beat the price climb in Venezuela), El Mundo, August 8, 2014, <http://www.elmundo.es/america/2014/08/09/53e60626268e3e8c128b456b.html>

“Nothing and nobody escapes the surge in prices in Venezuela. Not Jedi lightsabers, not laser beams, nor Superman can avoid that which visitors to the sixth edition of the Caracas ComicCon, the comics venue going on now in the Venezuelan capital, suffer -- an intergalactic attack on their pocketbooks.”

**Source:** AFP, “Venezuela: Liberado dirigente estudiantil chileno Felipe Cuevas” (Venezuela: Chilean student leader freed), Lapatilla, August 8, 2014, <http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2014/08/08/liberado-dirigente-estudiantil-chileno-felipe-cuevas/>

“Leader of the UDI [Juventud Unión Demócrata Independiente or Independent Youth Democratic Union, a Chilean student activist organization], Felipe Cuevas, has been on a visit to Venezuela since Sunday, where he met with various representatives of the Venezuelan opposition. According to Venezuelan dissident Maria Corina Machado, Cuevas was arrested together with two other young Venezuelan dissidents for visiting Sairam Rivas, one of the students jailed during the protests against the government that swept Venezuela in February and May with a balance of 43 deaths.”

## Paraguay Classified as the Marijuana King of South America

5 July 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** According to this source, Paraguay is being classified as the marijuana King of South America, as it is the largest producer of marijuana in the world after #1 Mexico. However, one factor that differentiates these countries is violence. Whereas Mexico notoriously has high levels of violence associated with drug trafficking, Paraguay has very low levels of violence. This may be because marijuana production in Paraguay boils down to simple, local economics. Paraguayan officials even classify many of its key marijuana producers as farmers. As explained by the head of Paraguay's anti-drug agency, "They [individuals growing drugs] don't dedicate themselves to cultivating marijuana because they are narcotraffickers, but because of economic necessity. Compared to the price of a traditional crop, they can make 500 percent more with this."  
**End OE Watch Commentary (Fiegel and Gonzalez)**

**Source:** "Paraguay, el reino de la marihuana en Sudamérica," Infobae. Accessed on July 03 2014 from <http://www.infobae.com/2013/09/25/1511402-paraguay-el-reino-la-marihuana-sudamerica>

Paraguay is the second largest producer of marijuana in the world with an average yearly production rate of 5,900 metric tons. Total yearly marijuana production in South America, including Paraguay, tops out at 10,000 metric tons. Within Paraguay, an estimated 5000 -8000 hectares of land are used to produce marijuana. Of the marijuana produced in Paraguay, nearly 80% is exported to Brazil. Other countries with relatively high marijuana demands in the region include Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.

In comparison, Mexico produces an estimated 7,400 metric tons of marijuana yearly, but is plagued by internal violence generated by drug trafficking organizations. This is likely because strict border checkpoints along the US/Mexico border and increased security measures in Mexico have put added pressure on Mexican cartels.

The 2006 UNODC World Drug Report graphic below highlights Paraguay's contribution to the cannabis market.  
Source: <http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/en/perspectives/0601/page011.html>



## Human Trafficking Activity in Colombia

28 July 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** According to Spanish open source media, Colombia is a country of origin for human trafficking, as victims are commonly sent from here to other Latin American countries, Asia and Europe. It is also a transit country and a country of destination, principally for indigenous women and girls from Ecuador who are forced into sexual exploitation. In addition to sexual exploitation, forced labor and modern day slavery are the most common types of human trafficking in the country. Accurate statistics regarding the number of victims in Colombia are difficult to find, as some open source channels report as few as 223 victims per year while NGOs report up to 70,000 victims a year.

In terms of prevalence, Colombia has been classified as having the second highest number of human-trafficking victims in Latin America, following Brazil. Recruitment of human-trafficking victims within Colombia generally occurs in the coffee region. From this location girls may be sent to Bogota to work as prostitutes in local brothels. Trafficking of Colombian women within Latin America is also a new trend, especially to countries such as Guatemala and Argentina. **End OE Watch Commentary (Fiegel and Gonzalez)**




SOURCE: Colombia's Administrative Department of Security (DAS)

RICH CLABAUGH/STAFF

**Source:** "Las regiones más afectadas por la trata de personas." La Semana. Accessed on July 27, 2014 from <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/las-regiones-mas-afectadas-por-la-trata-de-personas/395080-3>

Human trafficking in Colombia remains an issue despite steps authorities have taken to thwart this activity. According to this source, an estimated 223 individuals have fallen victim to human traffickers in the last four years within Colombia. Of these individuals, 189 were identified as female while 34 were identified as male. Additionally, 147 of the 223 reported cases involved sexual exploitation, 62 involved forced labor, and 14 involved modern day slavery.

(continued)



## Continued: Human Trafficking Activity in Colombia

**Source:** “Desmantelan organización dedicada a la trata de personas organization.” El Espectador. Accessed on June 27, 2014 from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/desmantelan-organizacion-dedicada-trata-de-personas-articulo-386160>


Those departments within Colombia with the highest numbers of reported human trafficking cases include Valle del Cauca, Antioquia, Risaralda, Quindío, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Córdoba and Nariño. Of these departments, six are located in what is known as the “coffee region” of Colombia. This idea is evidenced by the 2012 arrested of multiple members of Las Paisitas gang. This group was dedicated to recruiting young girls from the coffee region by offering them modeling contracts, fame, and fortune. Once recruited, they would be taken to Bogota and forced into sex slavery.

**Source:** “Colombia, país de origen, tránsito y destino de la trata de personas.” El Tiempo. Accessed on July 18, 2014 from <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13192675>

Whereas internal trafficking of Colombian women to Asia and Europe used to be the norm, a new trend is emerging and the women sent to Latin American countries. This idea is evidenced by the dismantling of a sex trafficking ring involving Colombian women in Guatemala and the rescue of hundreds of Colombian women in Argentina who were forced to work as modern day slaves.

**Source:** “En Colombia hay 70 mil víctimas de trata de personas.” El Espectador. Accessed on July 25, 2014 from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/colombia-hay-70-mil-victimas-de-trata-de-personas-articulo-458390>

What is of particular interest regarding human trafficking in Colombia is that open source channels and government channels report relatively low numbers of actual victims. For example, some articles indicated that 223 individuals fell victim to human traffickers during 2013 in Colombia. Conversely, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide information indicating that an estimated 70,000 individuals fall victim to human traffickers in Colombia on a yearly basis. The reason for the discrepancy may be due to the fact that prostitution is legal in Colombia which makes it difficult for society and state authorities to see prostitutes as possible victims of sex trafficking.



**Geoff Demarest's *Winning Insurgent War* is about a broader set of conflicts than just 'insurgency.' In its 144 sections, Geoff Demarest raises new and overlooked concepts related to modern conflict in a provocative manner designed to stir up debate and critical thinking. As Geoff Demarest puts it: "I hope that some of the ideas in it will be contagious."**

## “Technical” Default Causes Very Real Paralysis for Argentine Military

14 August 2014

The Argentine Air Force celebrated its 102nd birthday with a million visitors to its Moron Air Force Base outside of Buenos Aires. Source: <http://www.defesanet.com.br/ar/noticia/16402/Argentina---Crise-financeira-paralisa-Forcas-Armadas/>.



**OE Watch Commentary:** Though largely unfelt outside of Argentina, the 31 July technical default of Argentina’s economy has been having calamitous effects within the country, particularly in regards to the nation’s Armed Forces. By failing to conclude a deal with the “vulture” bondholders ahead of the judicially imposed 30 July deadline, the Kirchner administration has found itself frozen out of international credit markets for the second time in thirteen years. As can be seen in the first two excerpts below, the administration has been forced to make tough decisions as to which government programs receive funding and which do not. For its part, much of the Ministry of Defense has found itself on the outside of the funding window looking in. Of particular note are reduced funding and suspension of logistical support to Argentines abroad (in Haiti supporting MINUSTAH and Antarctica), domestic air service to remote areas of Patagonia, and counternarcotic flights along the tri-border region. The third excerpt indicates some immediate temporary relief may be in sight, as the Kirchner regime has promised to make in excess of US \$700 million available to the Ministry of Defense by 20 August; however long-term budget planning seems impossible until a resolution to the “vulture” crisis occurs. **End OE Watch Commentary (Grilo)**

**Source:** 1 <http://www.defesanet.com.br/ar/noticia/16402/Argentina---Crise-financeira-paralisa-Forcas-Armadas/>

... Last week, the Ministry of Defense, had to beg YPF (51% state owned Argentine Energy Company) to release a few thousand liters of fuel so the Argentine Air Force (FAA) could perform a traditional flyover to commemorate the Argentine Air Force’s birthday (102 years) on the tenth of August. The company had disclosed to Air Force generals on July 31st its intent to interrupt aviation fuel deliveries, due to an accumulation of debts whose payment the Air Force could not even predict.

**Source:** 2 <http://www.defesanet.com.br/ar/noticia/16402/Argentina---Crise-financeira-paralisa-Forcas-Armadas/>

... Other elements and programs of the Argentine Armed Forces that have been affected (either significantly curtailed or shut down completely):

- Military Pilot Training
- Plan Escudo del Norte. Counter-Narcotic Air Patrols in the Country’s North, vicinity of the Tri-Border Area (Paraguay and Brazil)
- Fishing enforcement flights in the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone Waters
- Fuel and lubricant deliveries to Argentine Naval Vessels
- Funds transfers needed to operate the Airplane Factory Brigadier San Martín, in Cordoba
- Argentine Air Force logistical flights in support of Argentine personnel in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Antarctica
- Domestic flights operated by LADE (state owned airline operated by the Argentine Air Force), to remote areas of Patagonia

**Source:** 3 <http://www.defesanet.com.br/ar/noticia/16402/Argentina---Crise-financeira-paralisa-Forcas-Armadas/>

... The Ministry of Defense, which urgently sought US\$737,460,000 – was initially left out of the groups to which funding would be allocated. President Kirchner is now promising to make the funds available next Wednesday, 20 August.

## Brazilian Presidential Politics: PSB Candidate Dies in Plane Crash

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The Brazilian political landscape was rocked by the sudden death on 13 August of Eduardo Campos, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) nominee for president in the upcoming October elections. Campos was killed when the small aircraft in which he and four aides were travelling crashed in poor weather in Santos, just south of Sao Paulo. Campos had been routinely polling in the third position for most of the year behind center-right Aécio Neves (PSDB/Brazilian Social Democratic Party) and President Dilma Rousseff (PT/Worker's Party). Though Campos could never garner widespread national support, he was a personally popular Brazilian politician whose death spurred President Rousseff to declare three days of national mourning and a voluntary suspension (matched by Neves) of campaign activities. Campos' funeral in Recife on 18 August was attended by an estimated 120,000 mourners.*

*Nearly as shocking as his sudden death is the apparent upswell in support that it has caused for Marina Silver, his heir apparent for the nomination. She had previously been the environmental minister under President Lula da Silva and also had previously run for president as the Green Party candidate. At the time of his death she was the PSB nominee for vice-president and Campos' running mate. Polling conducted by Datafolha on 14 and 15 August and published by the Folha de Sao Paulo on 18 August suggests that if the election were to be held today, Silva would force a second-round with President Rousseff, with a further simulation suggesting that she would unseat Rousseff by a margin of four percentage points in the run-off. As is detailed in the second excerpt, Silva's increase in support is appearing to materialize from the ranks of undecided voters and abstainers, as the poll numbers of her opponents have shown little change. Silva has yet to be nominated by her own party, but most analysts believe that is just a formality that will come to pass on 19 August.*  
**End OE Watch Commentary (Grilo)**



(Left) Marina Silva, is the presumed heir to the PSB nomination for President of Brazil. She was formerly Eduardo Campos running mate and vice-presidential nominee. (Right) Eduardo Campos, 49, was the PSB candidate for the President of Brazil at the time of his death in a plane crash on 13 August, 2014. Sources: Marina Silva's & Eduardo Campos's individual Facebook Pages respectively.

**Source:** 1 <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/181230-com-21-no-1-turno-marina-empataria-com-dilma-no-2.shtml>

Marina Silva (PSB / Brazilian Socialist Party) enters the Presidential elections with the support of 21% of likely voters. According to Datafolha, she's currently running in second place, a mere 1% ahead of Aécio Neves (PSDB / Brazilian Social Democratic Party) – a virtual tie – and 15% behind Dilma Rousseff, the Workers Party (PT) candidate for re-election.... However if the elections were to proceed to a second round, Marina, whose candidacy for President should be made official on August 20th, is projected to beat Dilma Rousseff with the support of 47% of likely voters to Rousseff's 43%.


**Source:** 2 <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/181230-com-21-no-1-turno-marina-empataria-com-dilma-no-2.shtml>

The hypothetical conclusion of the election in the first round is dispelled by Marina because her recent surge has tripled the poll numbers of her predecessor, Campos (8%), without causing a significant change in the support of her two most competitive rivals (Rousseff and Neves). When Campos was still alive, Rousseff's share of likely voters was 36% and Neves was 20%. A direct comparison between Marina and her predecessor Campos, does reveal a significant drop in undecided voters and abstaining voters. Abstentions were previously polling at 13% of likely voters, but are now 8% with Marina in the race. Undecided voters have fallen from 14% to 9%.

## Thailand Trouble in the South

15 August 2014

*“Political autonomy is the main issue. Otherwise, there is nothing to talk about.”*



National Security Council Secretary-General Thawil Pliensri declared that the talks with southern rebels would reconvene before the end of August, in agreement with the junta. Source: <http://www.worldbulletin.net/asia-pacific/142418/thai-junta-aims-to-restart-muslim-south-dialogue>

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The unrest in southern Thailand has continued for decades. Characterized as an ethnic separatist insurgency, in the past five years the violence has resulted in over 6000 deaths and uncounted thousands of injuries. Since the recent coup in Thailand, talks between insurgent groups and the government of Thailand have been announced. The insurgency has long been factionalized and lacks clear leadership, making all negotiations difficult to start and tenuous in their results.*

*An article from Daily Sabah captures the government of Thailand's moves toward reconvening formal talks that had begun in March 2013. The junta is gaining a great deal of positive press coverage for this initiative. Media sources serving Islamic populations in Southeast Asia and expats in the Arabian Gulf region are carrying news of this development. The Anadolu Agency of Turkey draws attention to the parallels to historic Muslim separatist movements in the region. It reminds us, "The deep south - the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat as well as a part of Songkla province - was an independent sultanate until the 19th century and was*

**Source:** Daily Sabah, "Thai Junta Aims to Restart Dialogue with Southern Thai Muslims," August 14, 2014 <http://www.dailysabah.com/asia/2014/08/14/thai-junta-aims-to-restart-dialogue-with-southern-thai-muslims>

**BANGKOK** – More than a year after previous talks stalled due to Thailand's political crisis, the military has announced it will attempt to restart a peace dialogue with insurgents in the country's Muslim-majority south who are demanding political autonomy...

... Although southern Thailand's armed insurgent groups are yet to formally respond, analysts ... doubt the new dialogue's ability to bear fruit under present conditions...

The insurgents argued during the previous nine-month dialogue that with such a strong historical claim and the area's continuing Muslim identity, political autonomy should be a key element of any potential settlement. But the junta has clearly indicated that any such movement would be considered an unacceptable violation of the "territorial integrity" of the country...

**Source:** Anadolu Agency, "Thai junta aims to restart Muslim south dialogue: Analysts doubt ability to bear fruit under present conditions," August 13, 2014 <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/372643--thai-junta-aims-to-restart-muslim-south-dialogue>

**BANGKOK**

...The bitter conflict, rooted in historical distrust between Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists, has killed over 6,000 people and injured around 10,800 since January 2004....

*(continued)*

## Continued: Thailand Trouble in the South

*only formally annexed by Buddhist-majority Siam (Thailand's previous name) under the terms of a 1909 Anglo Siamese agreement. Eighty percent of the population, however, remains Muslim, maintaining Malay as its first language." The full article provides a background on current insurgent attitudes and potential future demands. Speculation about the sincerity of the separatist groups and continued violence is an expressed theme in most media reviewed.*

*The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) Official Website maintains documents that call into question the role of Malaysia in the resolution of separatist claims. This is another indication of the internal confusion as to who has representative authority at the talks, who is providing guarantees, and who is promoting the talks.*

*The stakes involved regarding tangible progress in resolving the cultural and political issues in these southern provinces of Thailand have grown over the years. Projected railways, pipelines, and even a possible sea-to-sea canal will cross through these troubled areas. The elected government of Malaysia and the junta of Thailand are equally eager for an end to the violence and some economic good news. **End OE Watch Commentary (Welch)***

"I am not optimistic. It is, of course encouraging, that the military talk about the perspective of peace through a dialogue, but it is not apparent yet what kind of concessions they are ready to make," Matthew Wheeler, an International Crisis Group (ICG) expert on the southern conflict, told AA....

To complicate matters, the insurgents are not a homogeneous movement, but a collection of different groups, sometimes subdivided into different factions.

The lead representative during the 2013 peace dialogue was a leader of the National Revolution Front (BRN) - which appears to exert a certain degree of control on armed operatives on the ground – however "some hardliners are not willing to join the talks," said Chalermripinyorat.

BRN is one of several groups that emerged in the 1960s in reaction to attempts by the military dictatorship of the time to control Islamic schools. Another group of that period is the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which was also involved in last year's peace talks. A third active group is the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP), but it did not participate in the talks....

ICG south expert Wheeler told AA that the reluctance of some groups to participate could deepen given the attitude of the junta in the south since the coup. The military has marginalized what little influence government-linked civilian organizations had in the area.

"The National Council for Peace and Order [the Junta's official name] is leaning towards greater centralization. It doesn't appear to me as a progressive step," he said.

The junta's obsession with national unity is also leading to a rejection of any external involvement in efforts to find a peaceful solution.

Malaysia had been asked to act as a facilitator in the 2013 talks by the Thai civilian government, despite objections from the Thai military. Diplomats have also been waging a long campaign to stop the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) - in which Thailand enjoys observer capacity - from speaking out on the issue....

"They cannot think out of the box. They have to learn from the experiences of other countries - such as Aceh, in Indonesia, or the southern Philippines - and see that autonomy is not [always] the first step to independence."

In Indonesia's northern Sumatra region of Aceh, a separatist armed Free Aceh Movement (GAM) settled for autonomy in 2005 after negotiations with Jakarta. In the southern Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front was granted in 2014 an autonomous zone by Manila after negotiations facilitated by Malaysia.

*(continued)*



Logo of the Patani United Liberation Organization  
Source: [http://puloinfo.net/images/logo\\_st.png](http://puloinfo.net/images/logo_st.png)

## Continued: Thailand Trouble in the South

“...[Translation] Malaysia is acting as a promoter to a fight between Thailand and the liberation movement...”

**Source:** The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) Official Website, “Open Letter To Whom It May Concern,” March 29, 2014, <http://puloinfo.net/Statements.asp?ID=55>

PULO and all groups of Patani liberation movements are very concerned regarding the statement from Gen. Akanikt Muansawad published in ISRA NEWS ... relating to the so called “KL process”. Some of his statements are as followed; ....

- พล.เอกนิษฐ์ กล่าวด้วยว่า บทบาทของ คาโต๊ะซัมซามิน เมื่อวันที่ 28 กุมภาพันธ์ ที่ผ่านมา (วาระ 1 ปีพูดคุยสันติภาพ) สะท้อนชัดว่า มาเลเซียไม่ใช่แค่ผู้อำนวยความสะดวกให้แก่กระบวนการพูดคุยเดินหน้าได้ และไม่ใช่คนกลาง แต่เป็นผู้วางแผนและจัดการพูดคุยทั้งหมด เป็น “โปรโมเตอร์” จัดคนขึ้นชก โดยที่ฝ่ายไทยไม่รู้ล่วงหน้าว่าต้องชกกับใคร มาเลเซียจึงไม่ใช่ facilitator (ผู้อำนวยความสะดวก) หรือ mediator (คนกลาง) แต่เป็นโปรโมเตอร์

[Translation]-. General Akanikt said on the 28th of February that the role of Datuk Sam Sami reflects clearly that Malaysia is not just a facilitator to move the talks ahead. Malaysia is not the middleman but is providing planning and management of all talk as “promoters”. The parties are in a fight and Malaysia is not a facilitator or mediator, but is acting as a promoter.

On this regard, We, PULO and all groups of Patani liberation movements as well as all the UMMAH of Patani and Malaysian, urge the clarification from the caretaker Prime minister of Thailand Yingluck Shinawatra or her companies, former Sec.Gen of the NSC Lt.gen Paradon Pattanathabut and the Sec.Gen of the SBPAC Thawee Sodsong, on these issues.

Best regards,  
Kasturi Mahkota



Hassan Taib, (centre) chief of Malaysian-based National Revolution Front (BRN), speaks as Lukman Lima (left) from Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and BRN's Adam Nor (right) listen during a Friday (June 14th) press conference in Kuala Lumpur. Thailand and rebel leaders agreed to scale back violence in the Deep South for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in July. Taib said peace negotiations could take “two or three years” or longer. [Mohd Rasfan/ AFP]  
Source: [http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/shared/images/2013/06/15/130615-POTD\\_SEA\\_THPEACETALKS2\\_MY-310\\_207.jpg](http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/shared/images/2013/06/15/130615-POTD_SEA_THPEACETALKS2_MY-310_207.jpg)

## Strategic Implications of the Afghan Mother Lode and China's Emerging Role

By Cindy A. Hurst and Robert Mathers

[http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72\\_75-81\\_Hurst-Mathers.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72_75-81_Hurst-Mathers.pdf)



**JFQ** | Joint Force Quarterly  
Issue 72, 1st Quarter 2014

As the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops draws closer, the question on many minds is what will become of Afghanistan. Will the country slip back into its usual pattern of power struggles, be taken over by the Taliban, or continue to develop into a global economic player? This report talks about many of the hurdles Afghanistan must overcome before being able to achieve success. It also discusses one possible outcome – a growing alliance with neighbor China, in which both countries stand to benefit. Although this prospect may initially be distasteful to those who have shed blood and treasure over the past decade to create a viable state within Afghanistan, it may be the best way to achieve the end state those nations strived to establish.

Lieutenant Commander Cindy A. Hurst, USNR, is a Research Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Colonel Robert Mathers, USA, is the former Chief of the International Engagement Cell, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, and is now the Director of the Eurasian Security Studies Program at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

# Death of an Imam and Heightened Tensions in Xinjiang

4 August 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** In July 2009 riots broke out in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang, China, in which more than 200 ethnic Uyghurs and Han Chinese were killed. Since then there has been an increasing level of mistrust between the Han and Uyghurs, and, just as normalcy seemed to have set in, terrorist activity rebounded. These activities include mass stabbings and car-rammings of Han Chinese and clashes between security personnel and Uyghurs.

The three articles below describe some of the activities. Following a large-scale police crackdown in Hotan, on July 28 “police gunned down 59 terrorists and arrested 215 others” in Shache, Kashi prefecture. Two days later, as Mullah Jume Tahir, Imam of China’s oldest mosque, finished the morning worship, three men brutally attacked and killed him. According to Tianshan Wang, a news portal affiliated with the Xinjiang Autonomous Region Information Office, authorities located the perpetrators and shot two to death and arrested the third after the attackers turned on them with knives and axes.

The murder of Imam Jume Tahir, believed to be in response to his public condemnation of “the brutality of extremists after their recent deadly attacks in the northwestern region,” has caused an outcry in Xinjiang. According to one commentary, “The murder of the respected imam is a hideous crime. It only indicates that the extremists felt growing anxiety and fear over the patriotic religious leaders’ public criticism and elaboration of the real spirit of Islamic teachings. They were attempting to create a sense of terror.”

Terrorist activities seem to be ramping up. As one article points out, “The scale of the incident [of July 28] is the largest in recent years in terms of the number of terrorists arrested. It shows that the conflicts between antiterrorism forces and terrorists are becoming more fierce and confrontational as terrorists grew increasingly desperate.” **End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)**

Pictured is Jume Tahir, imam of China’s largest mosque, who was murdered by religious extremists on July 30. Source: <http://images.china.cn/attachement/jpg/site1007/20140801/7427ea210ac-c15452c3a05.jpg>



**Source:** Bai Tiantian, “Xinjiang Vows Unceasing Terror Crackdown,” Global Times, August 4, 2014, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/874084.shtml>

**Article 1:** ...Xinjiang authorities said masked militants armed with knives and axes attacked police stations and government offices in Elixku township early on the morning of July 28 and were fought off by law enforcement. The extremists also set up roadblocks at multiple sites on the Bachu-Shache road, stopping vehicles before slashing passengers indiscriminately and forcing civilians to join them in the terror attack, Xinhua reported.

Thirty-one vehicles were smashed and six were burned. Two government officials from a nearby township, who were Uyghur, were murdered after they allegedly criticized extremists for their terror activity.

...

“The scale of the incident is the largest in recent years in terms of the number of terrorists arrested. It shows that the conflicts between anti-terrorism forces and terrorists are becoming more fierce and confrontational as terrorists grew increasingly desperate,” Pan Zhiping, director of the Institute of Central Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times.

(continued)

## Continued: Death of an Imam and Heightened Tensions in Xinjiang

*“...conflicts between anti-terrorism forces and terrorists are becoming more fierce and confrontational as terrorists (grow) increasingly desperate...”*

**Source:** “Imam’s Murder is Death Knell for Terror,” Global Times Online,” August 2, 2014, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/873860.shtml>

### Article 2: Imam’s Murder Is Death Knell for Terror

According to a report by Xinjiang’s official news portal ts.cn, the three suspects, who had been influenced by religious extremism and intended to do “something big” to make a name for themselves, killed the 74-year-old imam Wednesday after he finished the morning prayer service.

Id Kah Mosque is the largest in Xinjiang. Imam Jume Tahir was a patriotic religious leader who enjoyed a wide reputation and respect among Uyghur Muslims.

He publicly condemned the brutality of extremists after their recent deadly attacks in the northwestern region, which authorities believe to be connected to overseas terrorist groups.

The murder of the respected imam is a hideous crime. It only indicates that the extremists felt growing anxiety and fear over the patriotic religious leaders’ public criticism and elaboration of the real spirit of Islamic teachings. They were attempting to create a sense of terror.”

They mean to destroy the peace and stability of Xinjiang...

**Source:** “Xinjiang Imam’s Murder: 2 Suspects Killed, 1 Detained,” CCTV, August 2, 2014, <http://english.cntv.cn/2014/08/02/VIDE1406923918551368.shtml>

### Article 3: Xinjiang Imam’s Murder: 2 Suspects Killed, 1 Detained

According to police, the three suspects (who murdered the imam), influenced by religious extremism, planned to “do something big” to increase their influence after killing the 74-year-old religious leader Wednesday morning. People from all walks of life and ethnic groups in Xinjiang have condemned the murder.

Ma Jinguo, Akhond of West Bridge Temple, said, “Jume Tahir was knowledgeable, respected, incorruptible. He was an imam who enjoyed a high reputation among Muslims nationwide. I’m extremely angry about the murder and extremely sad over losing such a good imam.”

*(continued)*

## PLA Daily Posts Articles on Combat Methods Used in the Nanjing Military Region

4 July 2014



**OE Watch Commentary:** In a recent edition of Jiefangjun Bao Online, the online version of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) daily newspaper, three commanders discussed military training, focusing on the Nanjing Military Region. They explained various methods they used to better understand combat power standards and simulations.

One commander stressed that to win a future war it was necessary to know what battles will be fought, who the adversary will be, and how one will fight. He emphasized the need to adjust to the times and the situation, since they are dynamic and constantly developing and changing. He also stressed that the new combat methods under development require testing.

A second commander supported this thought, stating that in his training he had achieved success through the use of realistic combat exercises to test combat methods. Operational capabilities of the unit have increased as a result, sometimes through learning based on failure.

The third commander offered the most interesting commentary. He noted that informatized warfare will be the basic form of future wars. To him, information domination, system confrontations, precision operations, all-area mobility, and cyber attacks and defenses are the important factors in winning wars. He notes that mastering these issues will require deep study, since the PLA has not fought a war in years. Many commanders are still too shallow in understanding and applying new combat forces. "Achieving victory through quantity" remains too widespread in this commander's opinion.  
**End OE Watch Commentary (Thomas)**

*“Relative to traditional warfare, modern warfare operational conditions have undergone essential change. A military operation in any direction can trigger a multidirectional, multi-area chain reaction. The boundary between traditional and nontraditional security and between war and non-war is more blurred. Tactics and combat methods are endlessly emerging.”*

**Source:** Ahao Min, Hu Chunlei, and Zhu Da, “Nanjing Military Region Organizes Level-Five Military Commanders in Deepening Their Understanding of Combat Power Standards in Combat Method Simulation: Sharpening Swords in Eastern Anhui,” and Yang Lin, “Correctly Grasping the Mechanisms of Achieving Victory in Modern Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, 4 July 2014, p. 5.

In terms of effect mechanisms, we must emphasize “focusing energy” and “releasing energy.” Focusing energy consists of aggregating to a high degree the main combat factors of intelligence and reconnaissance, command and control, firepower strikes, and comprehensive support; optimally integrating operational forces such as ground, sea, and the air force; optimizing system [xi tong] structures and mutually complimentary functions; and achieving multi-dimensional joint victories. Releasing energy consists of relying on information-enabled effects; using information flows to control the direction, level, and speed of material flows and energy flows; producing rapid, accurate, and decisive victorious effects; and achieving “speed prevails over slowness” and “precision prevails over coarseness.”

In terms of combat forms we must emphasize grasping “asymmetry” and “non-linearity.” Asymmetrical operations refer to promoting our strengths to attack the enemy's weaknesses; integrally applying forces against the core or weak points of the enemy's operation systems [ti xi] in broad-area, multidimensional battlefield deployments, and seeking quick victory. Non-linear operations refer to combining flanking and direct attacks, using both conventional and unconventional tactics, comprehensively employing various combat forces and strike means, and implementing multi-dimensional, all-azimuth, irregular attack operations against targets at all depths. In terms of operational modes we must emphasize grasping “system [ti xi] support” and “winning with crack forces.”

## Cameroon Expanding Military Cooperation with China


4 July 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** On 4 July Cameroon radio reported on the visit of a Chinese National People's Congress delegation to Cameroon, which included the Chinese ambassador to Cameroon. Consistent with previous visits, the Cameroonian and Chinese parties pledged to expand cooperation and build on their long-standing friendship. Several weeks earlier, on 30 May, a Chinese Navy task group stopped in Cameroon for the first time on part of an eight-country continental visit. Also on 20 May Cameroon held a military parade on National Day, which featured armored personnel carriers that it had recently acquired from China.

The developing Chinese-Cameroonian military relationship must be understood in the context of shifting regional alliances and priorities. France, the traditional security guarantor in West Africa, is redeploying most of its forces in Africa as part of the new Operation Barkhane, but the focus is on Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (the "Sahel G-5"), as well as Libya. The U.S. is most focused on security cooperation with Nigeria. This leaves Cameroon as a country that presents an opportunity for China to expand its military cooperation and diplomatic influence.

China also has strong incentive to be concerned about security in Cameroon. In May 2014 ten Chinese workers were kidnapped by Boko Haram, and their whereabouts still remain unknown; moreover, as a result of this attack two Chinese energy companies in northern Cameroon had to shut operations. As long as French and American military interests are focused on the Sahel and Nigeria, respectively, China will find room for growth in its relationship with Cameroon. **End OE Watch Commentary (Zenn)**

**“On behalf of the Speaker of the House, Datouo Théodore exalted the government of the Peoples Republic of China that has been carrying out policies to strengthen Sino-Cameroon cooperation.”**



Cameroon President Paul Biya developed good relations with former Chinese President Hu Jintao, and now under President Xi Jinping military relations appear likely to develop further. Source: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/01/content\\_798329.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/01/content_798329.htm)

**Source:** “China-Cameroon: Parliamentarians Consolidate Friendship,” <http://www.crtv.cm>, 4 July 2014.

A delegation from the National People's Congress of China currently visiting in Cameroon has been treated to a reception at the banquet hall of the National Assembly of Cameroon.

On behalf of the Speaker of the House, Datouo Théodore exalted the government of the Peoples Republic of China that has been carrying out policies to strengthen Sino-Cameroon cooperation.

He stressed on the China and Cameroon inter-parliamentary exchanges that has been highlighted by visits of top personalities from the Cameroon's National Assembly and the National People's Congress of China (NPC)

Dou Shuhua, member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, who is leading the delegation expressed the joy of maintaining the long standing friendship with Cameroon.



Propaganda poster of Kim Il Sung.  
Source: Wikimedia Commons

**OE Watch Commentary:** *There is overwhelming consensus among scholars and historians outside of North Korea that the leadership in Pyongyang initiated hostilities in June 1950 in an attempt to overthrow and seize South Korea. Archival research has uncovered that in 1949 and 1950, during discussions between Kim Il Sung and Stalin on North Korea's preemptive attack plan, Kim expressed concerns that he might lose popular support if North Korea was perceived as the aggressor. Therefore, Kim did everything possible to portray South Korea as the attacker.*

*Before hostilities commenced, Kim concealed his preemptive strike plan from the North Korean people, including most of his military commanders and staff. Both during and after the war Kim continued to argue that the North Korean People's Army's action had been a counterattack against South Korea's preemptive strike. Not surprisingly, today the North Korean people fully believe that they have been victims of South Korean and American aggression.*

*Not content with merely being portrayed as prey of the US and South Korea, the leadership in Pyongyang has now scripted a narrative in which their "victory" in the Korean War helped to prevent World War III. In the brief accompanying excerpt, North Korean "experts" suggest that their victory against the US in 1953 stymied Washington's plans to provoke another world war by spreading the Korean War into China and Russia, in its attempt to achieve world domination.*

*Though it was published a year before North Korean forces invaded South Korea, this quote from Orwell's novel 1984 applies well to North Korea today: "Who controls the past, ran the Party slogan, controls the future: who controls the present controls the past." While the present conditions of the average North Korean remain grim, the leadership in Pyongyang continues to demonstrate its mastery in portraying both the past and future in unbelievably beautiful and heroic terms. **End OE Watch Commentary (Kim)***

**Source:** "DPRK's Victory in Korean War Prevents New World War," KCNA, 30 July 2014.

The DPRK's victory in the 1950-1953 Korean War prevented possible outbreak of another world war.

World experts on politics and history still affirm that the U.S. provoked the Korean War as a prelude to another world war in consideration of geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula.

The then U.S. President Truman said in his reminiscences that the U.S. was planning to use A-bomb in early period of the war when its forces could not but retreat and, at the same time, start a third world war.

Before the war, MacArthur's Command at Truman's instruction had mapped out a scenario for invasion of the Far East, which was ratified by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The scenario envisaged launching the Korean War by the U.S. and south Korean forces, expansion of the war into Manchuria with participation of rearmed Japanese forces and Chiang Kai-shek's forces of Taiwan and invasion of Russia's Ural area.

The facts evidently proved that the U.S. schemed to provoke another world war by spreading the Korean War into China and Russia.

That's why historians claimed that if the DPRK had failed to win in the Korean War, mankind would have faced a third world war accompanied by nuclear warfare.

The world people appreciated the DPRK's war victory as a significant contribution to defending global peace.

Over 60-odd years after the Korean War, there has been no war in the Korean peninsula, a zone plagued with biggest danger of another world war, a nuclear war, despite the U.S. persistent military provocations for world domination....

# The Impact of the Growth of Kazakhstan's Defense Industry 5 August 2014

*“At present there is no bilateral or multilateral document or agreement that would restrict Kazakhstan's goals of developing its defense industry and military capabilities”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Kazakhstan's defense industry has been making headlines in recent years because of deals reached with well known international companies like Airbus and ThalesRaytheonSystems. The article by Zhulduz Baizakova, from which the accompanying excerpts are taken, provides an overview of how these deals have come about and shows that there are many layers to Kazakhstan's defense industry. It is worth noting how significant Kazakhstan's economic growth has been since the country became independent in 1991: Kazakhstan's estimated GDP grew from \$54 billion in 1991-92 to \$214 billion in 2013. While the country has gone through rough economic periods as recently as 2008, its overall growth has allowed for increased defense spending.

As Baizakova points out, this is not a matter of the Kazakh Ministry of Defense simply making purchases of weapons and equipment, but is part of a long-term strategic goal to increase technical capabilities within the country. Though she does not mention it, Kazakhstan has been moving away from receiving security assistance to taking a more active role in defense procurement. While agreements with companies like Airbus or ThalesRaytheonSystems might seem to be a move away from doing business with entities in the Russian defense industry, she points out how from a Kazakh perspective this is an effort to provide balance and fits in with the Kazakh government's foreign policy and economic and strategic goals. Ultimately, Kazakhstan's diversification in weapons and equipment might allow the country to develop more international partnerships, but as Baizakova surmises, this could have some operational or even tactical effects on the armed forces. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)**

**Source:** Sami Kohen, “Türkiye neden hedef oluyor? (Why is Turkey a target?)” Milliyet.com.tr, 13 June 2014, <http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-neden-hedef-oluyor-/dunya/ydetay/1896502/default.htm>

## Kazakhstan's Military-Industrial Complex: “Its Own” Or “Someone Else's”

When Kazakhstan was a part of the Soviet Union, it, as well as other republics, was a part of the USSR's military-industrial complex. According to some data, as much as 50 percent of various enterprises were located on Kazakh territory...After the collapse of the Soviet Union the majority of enterprises remained; however, government orders ceased, specialists left, and economic ties with the other republics were ruptured...

...At present the country's military-industrial complex is limited to the production of artillery, armored transports, missiles, small ships, aviation parts and systems, trucks, bulletproof vests, and radios for markets in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)...In addition to the lack of technical expertise, one of Kazakhstan's biggest obstacles for developing a defense industry is the lack of technical or scientific research institutes and relevant design departments...The main reason why Kazakhstan is actively entering into joint enterprises with foreign companies is connected with the fact that, according to the strategic development plan, the defense industry must account for no less than 80 percent of domestic production by the year 2020...

...At present there is no bilateral or multilateral document or agreement that would restrict Kazakhstan's goals of developing its defense industry and military capabilities...the ability to select potential partners makes it possible for Astana to use defense contracts as a mechanism for pressuring Moscow. This leaves the Russian defense industry no choice but to compete as Kazakhstan strives to acquire quality and inexpensive products that the Russians are not always able to provide...



“A demonstration at the Kazakhstan Defense Expo-2014 involving EC-145 helicopters and a Cobra armored vehicle.” Source: Zhulduz Baizakova

## Reviving the Kyrgyz National Guard

21 July 2014

*“Vice speaker of the Zhorgoku Kenesh (Parliament) Torobai Zulpukarov, said that 22 years ago on this parade ground he took the oath as part of the first conscription group”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The National Guard has not always been a priority or had a clear role with the government of Kyrgyzstan, but, as the accompanying article shows, the unit could be changing and possibly benefiting from recent restructuring of the country’s Armed Forces. While the National Guard celebrated its 22nd anniversary this past month, it went into disarray in the fall of 2009, when then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev transferred it out of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and into the National Security Committee (GKNB) and subsequently changed its mission from combating external threats to internal ones. The unit was reformed and transferred back to the MoD after the April 2010 revolution. General Asanbek Alymkozhoyev, who made an appearance at this event, was the last commander of the National Guard before it faded from view in 2009; earlier this year he became the first Chief of the General Staff of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces. His appointment is considered an important part of reforms taking place in the Armed Forces. Another significant reform that did not receive much attention was a decree by President Almazbek Atambayev in March of this year to place the National Guard under the control of the Interior Ministry, once more changing its mission to focusing on internal threats to the country.*

*Comments made at the event by Daniyar Isakov, one of the current commanders in the National Guard, might be an indication of what training-related changes could happen with the unit. It is unknown what percentage of personnel in the National Guard are conscripts versus contractors, but Isakov is referring to the one-year requirement for conscripts and how that time frame is not enough for adequate training before a conscript transitions out of the military. If the National Guard were to incorporate more contractors in order to have a better trained force, in addition to the unit now operating within the Interior Ministry, it will be worth watching what function it might fulfill in ensuring the security of Kyrgyzstan. The National Guard appears to have the backing of some high-level officials and could be a priority moving forward, but with apparent training issues and so many changes having taken place over the last several years, it is difficult to determine the readiness or capability of the unit. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)***



*“A National Guard soldier drives an armored personnel carrier (BTR variant) during a training exercise.”*  
Source: <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?228940-Armed-Forces-of-Kyrgyzstan>

**Source:** Lapteva, Svetlana. “В Бишкеке отметили День национальной гвардии (The Day of the National Guard is Celebrated in Bishkek),” *Vecherniy Bishkek*, 21 July 2014. [http://www.vb.kg/doc/281021\\_v\\_bishkeke\\_otmetili\\_den\\_nacionalnoy\\_gvardii.html](http://www.vb.kg/doc/281021_v_bishkeke_otmetili_den_nacionalnoy_gvardii.html)

#### **The Day of the National Guard is Celebrated in Bishkek**

...on July 20 the Day of the National Guard was celebrated. On this day 22 years ago the first guards of Kyrgyzstan swore an oath. Since then, they have come to congratulate all for who the title ‘guard’ is not a meaningless word...then the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Asanbek Alymkozhoyev, addressed the soldiers and gave out medals, certificates, and gifts...

...Vice speaker of the Zhorgoku Kenesh (Parliament) Torobai Zulpukarov, said that 22 years ago on this parade ground he took the oath as part of the first conscription group... Daniyar Isakov also took the oath 22 years ago, is now a colonel and commander of a separate brigade of the National Guard...“Today, one year is not enough to realistically train a soldier to master a job...,” complained Isakov...

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has had an interest in conducting an international peacekeeping operation for a number of years, and, as the accompanying article explains, this interest continues to develop. As the article mentions, “Unbreakable Brotherhood” is the CSTO’s third joint peacekeeping exercise to take place in as many years, though there is a difference from previous exercises. All three exercises included some training with peacekeeping-related tasks; the exercises in 2012 and 2013 each had an overall goal (maintaining an armistice in 2012 and conducting a peacekeeping operation in the territory of a CSTO member state in 2013). However, this year’s exercise included a scenario of destroying an extremist group, which is very similar to the majority of other previous non-peacekeeping CSTO exercises. Other articles in Central Asian or Russian sources also emphasized the combined arms assault as the focus of Unbreakable Brotherhood. It is worth noting that this year’s “Rubezh” (Frontier) exercise of the CSTO’s reaction force was only a command and staff exercise with a limited number of personnel (around 700 took part in Unbreakable Brotherhood). In past years “Rubezh” focused on the same scenario (or slight variations of it) seen in Unbreakable Brotherhood 2014.*

*It is possible that the CSTO used this as a way to train for peacekeeping and a combined arms assault in one exercise for various reasons (there had been an announcement earlier this year that the exercise format would be different). The CSTO has stated that its forces could be used in a UN peacekeeping mission, and the article mentions that UN representatives had been invited to observe, though it is unknown if any were in attendance. It might be worth remembering the experience of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Peacekeeping Force that was involved in the Tajik Civil War (1992-97). That peacekeeping force largely consisted of Russian personnel (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan contributed small units), did not receive backing from the UN, and at various times strayed from an international definition of peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If the experience of the Tajik Civil War is being considered in the context of this recent joint exercise, then the CSTO is preparing for what it sees as a likely threat. **End OE Watch Commentary (Stein)***



*“Infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant) from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participate in the CSTO’s “Unbreakable Brotherhood 2014” exercise in Kyrgyzstan from 29 July – 1 August.”*  
Source: [http://vk.com/csto\\_odkb](http://vk.com/csto_odkb)

**Source:** Alymbekov, Mirlan. “ИАЦ «Кабар»: Геополитические игры и учения миротворцев в Кыргызстане (ИАЦ «Кабар»: The geopolitical games and exercise of peacekeepers in Kyrgyzstan),” *Kabar*, 31 July 2014. <http://kabar.kg/kabar/full/80535>

#### **ИАЦ «Кабар»: The geopolitical games and exercise of peacekeepers in Kyrgyzstan**

...Because of events taking place in the world, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan Asanbek Alymkozhoyev has stated that Kyrgyzstan must be ready for a new form of war which involves civilians, like Syria and Ukraine... Last week the International Red Cross acknowledged that an internal conflict is taking place in Ukraine...

The Collective Peacekeeping Force of members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) recently began the exercise “Unbreakable Brotherhood 2014” in the context of relevant world events... peacekeeping forces of CSTO member states will work out joint activity in conditions similar to those conflicts already mentioned. The blocking and destruction of illegal armed groups in mountainous areas, protection of important government infrastructure, riot control, working with a field hospital, hostage rescue, and escorting humanitarian aid and protecting against ambushes...

Alymkozhoyev noted in his speech at the opening of the exercise that the withdrawal of international security forces from Afghanistan will escalate military-political situations in the Central Asian region... representatives from the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations were invited to observe... The first such exercise took place in 2012 in Kazakhstan and worked out separating opposing sides and monitoring compliance of an armistice. In 2013 the exercise in Russia worked on preparing a peacekeeping operation in the zone of the CSTO...

*“...The [Russian food] ban would have repercussions for both Bulgarian producers and the European agriculture in general.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *In response to sanctions imposed upon Russia by the EU and the US due to Russia's continued involvement in Ukraine, Russia imposed its own food ban upon the same states. This food ban includes all imports of meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, milk and milk products from the U.S. and Canada, all 28 EU countries, Norway and Australia. Many fear the one-year ban's affects, especially on smaller Balkan states.*

*The excerpt from the first article demonstrates the extent of the concern from the Bulgarian Agricultural Ministry, where the minister called for a meeting to find compensation for the affected farmers throughout the EU. Some, however, are looking to continue trading with Russia through an intermediary. The pressure to find viable markets for these European agricultural goods places Serbia, a country that is not an EU member, at an advantage, as affected farmers consider repackaging their own goods and transporting them to Serbia in order to be sold in Russian markets.*

*However, serving as an 'illegal' conduit for EU agricultural goods would damage Serbia's credibility with Russia, one of its main importers, and tighten what many see as a golden opportunity for Serbia's economy. Unhampered by the food sanctions, Serbia hopes to gain new customers in Russia and a foothold that will last as the food ban comes to a close. It has little incentive to help others circumvent the food ban as EU officials work to find compensation for farmer's losses. **End OE Watch Commentary (Jackson)***

**Source:** “Bulgarian Agriculture Min Demands EU Meeting over Russia's Food Ban,” Novinite. 10 August 2014. <http://goo.gl/m2hV9i>

“Interim Agriculture Minister Vasil Grudev sent on Friday a request to Brussels that an emergency meeting be called to discuss the response to Russia's ban on EU food imports.

... A “single position” of the EU should be adopted to handle the situation, Grudev insisted, adding the ban would have repercussions for both Bulgarian producers and the European agriculture in general.

... The Czech Republic, Austria, Poland, Finland, Belgium and Estonia have joined Grudev's call, the ministry reports.”

**Source:** Milekic, Sven. “Croats Eye Using Serbia to Skirt Russian Food Ban,” Balkan Insight. BIRN. 11 August 2014. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croats-eye-using-serbia-to-skirt-russian-ban>

“As Croatian exporters ponder repackaging goods in Serbia to evade Russia's import ban, Serbia says it won't let itself be used for sanctions-busting.

... These companies have to calculate which is the cheaper option: find new markets or repackage goods in Serbia - which is not part of the EU, has not backed Western sanctions and is unaffected by Russia's moves.

... “Repackaging is a constant part of the business, the only problem is to find the channels through which they will be placed on the final market,” Teski said.”

## Forty ISIL Radicals Arrested In Kosovo

8 August 2014

*“Kosovo police have arrested at least 40 people in a major operation targeting Islamic radicals suspected of fighting alongside extremists in Iraq and Syria.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) recruits all over the world, but it is notable that much of its recruitment efforts goes toward Albanian Muslims. For instance, at the end of June, when ISIL declared its authority as an Islamic State over all the Sunni Muslims in the world, the text was translated into several widely spoken languages, such as English, German, Russian, Turkish, and French, as well as Albanian, which is much less widely spoken.*

*Over 90% of Kosovars profess to be Muslim, and ISIL's appeal has not gone unnoticed. Reports indicate 100-200 Kosovars have traveled to join ISIL and at least 16 have been killed in Syria so far. The massive police operation undertaken in Kosovo indicates that Kosovo's government recognizes the internal threat ISIL poses. The caches of weapons and ammunition mentioned in the article show that combating this extremism is a matter of Kosovar national security. **End OE Watch Commentary (Jackson)***

**Source:** “Islamic Radicals Arrested in Kosovo,” Irish Independent, 8 August 2014.

“Kosovo police have arrested at least 40 people in a major operation targeting Islamic radicals suspected of fighting alongside extremists in Iraq and Syria.

Spokesman Baki Kelani said weapons, ammunition and explosives were seized as hundreds of police officers and special police units raided 60 locations across Kosovo, including makeshift mosques believed to have served as recruiting centres.

The police operation is the largest ever against suspected Islamic radicals in Kosovo. Authorities have been on alert as a growing number of ethnic Albanians have joined militants in Syria and Iraq and appeared on social media in attempts to lure more followers.

“We believe these persons pose a threat to Kosovo's security and they have therefore been arrested,” Mr Kelani said. “Some are suspected of being involved in terrorist organisations such as ISIS and (Jabhat) Al-Nusra.”

## Serbia and Montenegro to Increase Military Collaboration

13 August 2014

*“Montenegro has outlined plans for intensified military co-operation with Serbia, as the two countries continue to patch up formerly cool relations.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *Montenegro gained its independence from Serbia in 2006 through a political referendum. However, this peaceful break brought years of strained political and military relations. After independence Montenegro initiated the NATO membership process, while Serbia has retained its military neutrality. Montenegro's recognition of Kosovo's independence from Serbia in 2008 underscored Montenegro's cool relations toward Serbia.*

*However, since Boris Tadic's term as President of Serbia ended, Serbia and Montenegro's prime ministers have been working to improve ties. New military collaborations are the latest in strengthening the two countries' relationship. As outlined in the article, the two militaries will begin sharing training centers and expertise for pilots, divers, fire mechanics, demining specialists, and special forces. Another new initiative, that of developing joint response teams to natural disasters, may have been motivated by recent massive flooding that resulted from heavy rainfall throughout the Balkans. **End OE Watch Commentary (Jackson)***

**Source:** Tomovic, Dusica. “Serbia, Montenegro to Boost Military Cooperation,” Balkan Insight. BIRN. 13 August 2014. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-montenegro-to-boost-military-cooperation>

“Ahead of the Defense Minister's visit to Belgrade, Montenegro has outlined plans for intensified military co-operation with Serbia, as the two countries continue to patch up formerly cool relations.

According to a Ministry of Defence report, which BIRN has seen, Serbia will be offered use of the helicopter pilots training centre in the military complex in the capital, Podgorica, as well as training on the schoolship “Jadran” and training of divers. In return, ‘the Montenegrin Army is interested in training test pilots, demining specialists, fire mechanics and special forces in Serbia’, the report said.

‘The Montenegrin Army is [also] interested in developing capacities for joint responses to natural and man-made disasters,’ the document said.”

## Russian VDV Expanding by 30%, Increasing Reconnaissance & Spetsnaz Assets

*“The implementation of all these plans, including the deployment of some additional support subunits, will give an increase in the numerical strength of the Airborne Troops by no more than 11,000-12,000 men, which means the overall numbers reaching 46,000-47,000 men. So we’re talking about an increase of about 30 per cent,”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Colonel General Shamanov, commander of the Russian Airborne (VDV), was very successful at avoiding many of previous Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov’s reforms. Two aspects of the reforms that could not be avoided were the elimination of one of the three infantry regiments in each of the four VDV divisions and the downsizing of the divisions’ reconnaissance units from battalions to companies. Shamanov has long lamented these losses, and, as the accompanying article states, he has finally corrected these slights, and then some. If this reporting is accurate, the Russian VDV will have a 30% increase in personnel, the reconstitution of its reconnaissance assets, the addition of four infantry regiments, the formation, as previously planned, of a completely new separate brigade (the 345th Separate Air Assault Brigade in Voronezh, Russia), and the upgrading to a full-sized brigade of the 45th VDV Spetsnaz Regiment in Kubinka. He also announced that the VDV would be taking charge of 64 BMD-4Ms (enough to outfit two battalions), the new infantry fighting vehicle for the airborne.

Despite all the good news about his beloved VDV, all is not glowing for Shamanov. One thorn in his side is the operational control of the aviation regiments that support his parachute and air assault infantry units. He has made wresting control of these assets away from the Air Force a high priority. In late July the Air Force announced that the army aviation force structure would consist of one aviation brigade for each military district and one aviation regiment for each of the ten combined arms armies. Due to there being no mention of the VDV, it is likely that the operational control of army aviation units that support the VDV will remain with the Air Force for the foreseeable future. **End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles)**

**Source:** Airborne Troops Numbers to Increase,” Interfax Online, 7 August 2014, <http://www.militarynews.ru>>, accessed 8 August 2014.

### Airborne Troops Numbers to Increase

Moscow, 7 August: As a result of the organization-and-establishment measures that are being implemented and planned in the Airborne Troops, the number of “blue berets” will increase...

“From what Airborne Troops Commander Col-Gen Vladimir Shamanov has said, it is known how the troops will be augmented: through the formation of a new air assault brigade, the reorganization the 45th separate special-purpose regiment into a brigade, the deployment of third regiments in the existing air assault and airborne divisions, and the completion of the process of deployment of reconnaissance battalions in divisions,” the spokesman reiterated.

“The implementation of all these plans, including the deployment of some additional support subunits, will give an increase in the numerical strength of the Airborne Troops by no more than 11,000-12,000 men, which means the overall numbers reaching 46,000-47,000 men. So we’re talking about an increase of about 30 per cent,” the agency was told.

The combat strength of the Airborne Troops currently includes four divisions, four brigades, two separate regiments, a training center and the Ryazan military school...

**Source:** “Russian Air Force to have 4 army aviation brigades, 10 independent helicopter regiments,” Interfax Online, 26 July 2014, <<http://www.interfax.com/>>, accessed 8 August 2014.

### Russian Air Force to have 4 army aviation brigades, 10 independent helicopter regiments


POGONOVO AIR RANGE, Voronezh region. July 26 (Interfax) - The structure of the Russian Air Force will include four army aviation brigades and 10 independent helicopter regiments within the next several years, Air Force Commander Viktor Bondarev said.

“There will be fourteen brigades and regiments, including 10 army aviation regiments. There are 10 all-arms armies in our armed forces, and each army will have one helicopter regiment. There are four military districts, and each district will have an army aviation brigade. This makes a total of 14 brigades and regiments,” Bondarev told journalists on Saturday.

The army aviation brigades and helicopter regiments will possess Ka-52, Mi-28N, Mi-8MTV-5, Mi-8AMTSh, and Mi-26 helicopters. “Each regiment will have 66 helicopters, and each brigade from 84 to 88,” he said.

## Ground Forces Integrate UAVs into Artillery Reconnaissance Units

24 July 2014



Ground Control Station for the ZALA-421-08 "Strekoza"  
<http://www.27.mchs.gov.ru/upload/iblock/fd5/fd534fb7a5fb857fd3ef8ecacefc50ca.jpg>



ZALA-421-08 "Strekoza" Courtesy Ukrainian Border Service.

**OE Watch Commentary:** Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development is being pursued in the Russian Federation by all of the main and lesser branches (including the airborne forces) of the Ministry of Defense, in a variety of sizes ranging from smaller models, similar to the US "Raven," to larger models similar in size and purpose to the US "Predator." As for the Russian Ground Forces (GF) in particular, GF officials have mentioned that the UAVs will be used for communications, intelligence and electronic warfare tasks. In practice, the Russian GF appear to be focusing on the use of UAVs as artillery spotters. As the accompanying article explains, Russia has fielded several models for this purpose (Granat, Eleron, Takhion, and Zastava), with maximum ranges of about 40 kilometers, appropriate for Russian artillery systems. There have been conflicting reports about how these assets would be controlled. Some reports have stated that UAVs would be considered a brigade-level asset and assigned to the brigade's reconnaissance company or intelligence support platoon (attached to subordinate units as required); other reports state these particular UAVs (artillery spotters) would be organic to the artillery companies' reconnaissance platoons.

Interestingly, these UAVs are now turning up in Eastern Ukraine, as shown by the accompanying picture, provided the Ukrainian Border Service, of a recently downed Russian ZALA-421-08 "Strekoza" mini-UAV. Russia likely views Eastern Ukraine as it does the North Caucasus, a perfect place to field test new technologies and tactics in combat. If events in Eastern Ukraine continue to deteriorate, it is likely that more Russian technologies will find themselves in Ukraine for field testing. **End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles)**

**Source:** Central Military District Artillerymen Destroyed 200 Camouflaged Targets," RIA Novosti Online, 2 July 2014, <<http://ria.ru>>, accessed 9 August 2014

### Central Military District Artillerymen Destroyed 200 Camouflaged Targets

Crews of Msta-S self-propelled artillery pieces on Totskoye Range (Orenburg Oblast) destroyed 200 camouflaged command posts of a simulated enemy using coordinates received from unmanned aviation, the Central Military District Press Service reports on Wednesday.

Employment of unmanned aerial vehicles in executing practice firing allows artillery subunits to determine the coordinates and nature of targets more accurately and to enter corrections more promptly in conducting fire depending on weather conditions.

"Crews of Granat-1 UAV complexes, which were at altitudes from 800 to 1500 m, transmitted precise target coordinates to the command post over a digital communications channel. During execution of tactical missions, the Central MD artillerymen destroyed more than 200 various single and multiple targets," the report points out.

Granat-1, which is part of the new Navodchik-2 UAV complex, is designed to monitor the Earth's surface, various objects, thoroughfares, personnel, and equipment in near real-time. Total inconspicuousness of these UAV's from the ground is an important factor of the new developments.

(continued)

## ***Continued: Ground Forces Integrate UAVs into Artillery Reconnaissance Units***

**Source:** Yuriy Gavrilov, "Western Military District Servicemen Test New Drones," Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 5 July 2014, <<http://rg.ru/>>, accessed

### **Western Military District Servicemen Test New Drones**

Western Military District battalion and squadron commanders who attended training musters held in Naro-Fominsk, near Moscow were briefed on the tactical capabilities of modern UAVs.

The Granat, Eleron, Takhion, and Zastava drones are entering service with Western Military District ground brigades and divisions. Furthermore, the units equipped with them are being assigned to battalion commanders during the implementation of combat training tasks. This greatly increases the capabilities of military formations. For example, a platoon with a small Granat UAV increases the firing efficiency of an artillery battalion by 1.5 - 2 times. This is due to the reduced time needed for target detection and increased accuracy of targeting. And the all-weather mobile system of reconnaissance, control, and communication, which includes the Takhion, not only makes it possible to provide information in real time to a battalion command post about the movement of a hypothetical enemy and its units, but also to work as a communications relay. Audio and visual information can be sent using it via a secure channel to higher headquarters over distances of 100 km.

The Eleron drone is a special close-range reconnaissance device. It features a modular payload. Depending on its task, the Eleron crew can suspend on this device a still camera, thermal imager, video camera, or electronic surveillance equipment.

There is also the portable Zastava system. It is designed for aerial reconnaissance and to provide targeting data to firing positions over distances of 10 km. The system deployment time from travel mode to combat position is just 20 minutes, allowing the battalion commander to use it in the lead formations of advancing units.

Practical sessions involving the study of the tactical capabilities of military drones have helped battalion and squadron commanders to learn how to properly use them in modern warfare. Especially since most of the officers in the near future will have to use such devices during special tactical and operational exercises.

Colonel Oleg Kochetkov, head of the Western Military District press service, told Rossiyskaya Gazeta that over 200 officers are participating in these musters. Their training program is planned so that every day is devoted to the study of one aspect of support for ground and coastal troops.

**Source:** Vasilisa Yegorova, "Drone in Inventory of Russian FSB Spotted Over Ukraine", Novyy Region Online, 24 July 2014, <<http://www.nr2.ru/>>, accessed 9 August 2014.


### **Drone in Inventory of Russian FSB Spotted Over Ukraine**

The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service press service reports, an unmanned aerial vehicle without identifying marks was detected today in a section of the Kharkiv detachment's Veseloye border service department.

According to the border guards' information, the drone was carrying out aerial reconnaissance of the positions of border guards in the section and had penetrated Ukrainian territory to a depth of 2 km. It has been provisionally established that it is an unmanned aerial vehicle of the Zastava type...

Let us recall that on 23 July the Ukrainian military shot down a Russian UAV in the zone where the antiterrorism operation is being implemented, near the population center of Amvrosiyevka. This was an Orlan-10 -- a multipurpose UAV produced by the Special Technological Center Limited Liability Company, St. Petersburg (Russia).

## Russian Mistral May Serve as a Delivery Vehicle for “Polite” Peacekeepers



**OE Watch Commentary:** Russia's military involvement in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria has taught it that the use of military force is considered abhorrent in the international community, but the same use of military force used in the context of peacekeeping is perfectly acceptable, and even lauded by the same community. Russia is using peacekeepers, or more accurately the threat of peacekeepers, in eastern Ukraine to temper Ukrainian efforts to crush the ongoing Russian-sponsored insurgencies in Luhansk and Donetsk. Russia's renewed fascination with peacekeeping has caused an expansion of peacekeeping capabilities within the Russian military.

Traditionally, peacekeeping duties were the sole purview of the Russian Airborne, which has one dedicated peacekeeping brigade (31st Air Assault Brigade at Ulyanovsk) and dedicated battalions within each of the four airborne divisions and one dedicated battalion in the 56th Air Assault Brigade for a total of 5,000 peacekeepers in the Airborne. In the last few years Russia has expanded the number of peacekeeping forces, the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Samara has been transitioned to a dedicated peacekeeping brigade, and there are currently plans for another dedicated peacekeeping brigade to be stood up in Tuva, Russia. Not only is Russia establishing these units, but it is also receiving top notch personnel and equipment, including new

Cutaway of the Mistral Amphibious Assault Ship.  
Source: <http://www.veteranstoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/mistral2.jpg>

**Source:** “Peacekeeping Contingent Formed in the Eastern Military District,” Interfax Online, 28 July 2014, <http://www.interfax.com/>, accessed 15 August 2014.

### Peacekeeping contingent formed in the Eastern Military District

MOSCOW. July 28 (Interfax) - The Eastern Military District (EMD) has completed the creation of peacekeeping units that included troops from a motorized formation, a marine brigade, an army aviation squadron, a special-purpose medical detachment and a company of bomb disposal engineers.

“In all, over a thousand troops will be serving in the District's peacekeeping units. The units are armed with around 60 IFVs (infantry fighting vehicles), APCs (armored personnel carriers) and special hardware, and more than ten Mil Mi-8AMTSh helicopters,” EMD spokesman Col. Alexander Gordeyev told Interfax-AVN on Monday.

The District's peacekeeping units are being manned with professional servicemen, he said.

“This week the peacekeeping units will start intensive combat training at the District's training sites,” Gordeyev said.

*(continued)*

## Continued: Russian Mistral May Serve as a Delivery Vehicle for “Polite” Peacekeepers

*BTR-82s and UAVs. As the excerpts from the accompanying articles discuss, the Eastern Military District is setting up a new peacekeeping element, with a naval infantry battalion. The Eastern Military District is a likely home for Russia’s new Mistral amphibious assault/helicopter landing ship, creating the possibility that the new peacekeeping element could be a potential payload which would fit nicely within the Mistral. As Russia tests the boundaries of international acceptance of its peacekeeping activities, it will continue to invest in peacekeepers as a way of projecting force, and the Mistral may serve as the method of delivering that force. **End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles)***

**Source:** “Naval Infantry Peacekeeping Battalion in Primorye Rehearses Driving and Fighting Skills,” 5 August 2014, Regnum Online, <http://www.regnum.ru>, accessed 15 August 2014.


### Naval Infantry Peacekeeping Battalion in Primorye Rehearses Driving and Fighting Skills

A Pacific Fleet naval infantry brigade assault landing battalion (peacekeeping) field problem began within the scope of Pacific Fleet Coastal Defense Troops scheduled combat training. The Eastern Military District Press Service told the IA REGNUM correspondent that “Black Berets” [Naval Infantry] will practice skills of driving fighting vehicles over rough terrain and fighting at platoon strength and will fire all kinds of weapons at Bamburovo Training Center (Khasanskiy Rayon).

Weapon training classes will be held at several training stations, where naval infantrymen will carry out small-arms exercises against various types of targets with assault rifle, machinegun, sniper rifle, underbarrel and shoulder-fired antitank grenade launchers, and armored personnel carrier weapons. Practice classes in medical training and in radiation, chemical, and biological defense also will be held with the peacekeepers...

## The French Navy’s Mistral (L9013) amphibious assault ship/helicopter carrier

The Russian Navy plans to build four helicopter carriers under a French license.



Displacement	Length	Beam	Height
Standard: 16,500 metric t. Full: 21,300 metric t.	199 m.	32 m.	64.3 m.
Speed	Range	Complement	
18.8 knots (35 kph)	10,800 km at 18 knots (33 kph); 119,800 km at 15 knots (28 kph)	160 officers and men	
Landing craft	Anti-aircraft armament		
Four CTM-class landing craft or two hovercraft	Two Simbad surface-to-air missile (SAM) system launchers Two 30-mm Brenda Mauser guns Four 12.7-mm Browning machine guns		
Capacity	Endurance		
450 military personnel Up to 16 helicopters Up to 60 light fighting vehicles	30 days		

Specs

For more information, click on the small circles in the illustration

RIANOVOSTI © 2009

**OE Watch Commentary:** *As the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine continues, the West imposed additional sanctions on Russia. In this context, a discussion about the state of the Russian economy is warranted.*

*Russia's economy has been declining in recent years, with little to indicate that this trend will change unless the Kremlin revises its policies. The following excerpts from the Russian-language press express a pessimistic view, which only supports the argument that Russia's economy is, indeed, in decline and that there is little hope for change in the near future.*

*The first excerpt, by Tigran Mordoryan, from Gazeta.ru (Newspaper) says the level of monetization of the Russian economy is shamefully low. Monetization refers to the ratio of the so-called "broad" money (money supply in its most inclusive terms) to nominal GDP. The degree of an economy's monetization holds important implications for economic growth: the higher the monetization, the better off the economy.*

*Monetary policy, which is typically carried out by the central bank, is what affects monetization. As Mordoryan suggests, in simplest terms the Russian economy has very little money because the Russian Central Bank restricts the money supply. It does so out of fear that increasing the money supply will be inflationary. Yet in Russia inflation has little to do with the money supply, according to Mordoryan.*

*Russia's economic woes, however, go deeper. A recent study by Russia's own Academy of Sciences' Sociology Institute (ISRAS) found that the government employs the majority of Russia's middle class, which is Russian President Putin's support base. To keep these individuals happy, the government pays them inflated salaries and provides other benefits. The Russian government keeps accumulating higher debts to accomplish this. In the context of an already corrupt and stagnant economy resistant to reform, this policy is unsustainable. Once this support base begins to feel the effects of Russia's economic decline, it is less likely to support Putin.*

*While economists and policy analysts debate the effects of Western sanctions on Russia, one thing is clear: even without sanctions, Russia's economy is going downhill. "Is it possible to relax?" asks the author of the second excerpt from Finam.ru, "Only in one case: if you live in the today, and the absence of the threat of default in six months is your main demand from the future. In actuality, the Russian economy has been showing growth that verges on statistical error." In this context, it is certainly possible to conclude that, even if Western sanctions have not made a serious impact as of yet, they do matter. Beyond sanctions, Russia's economy is important to watch because its growth and decline are intrinsically connected to the public's ultimate support for Putin. **End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)***

**Source:** Tigran Mordoryan, «Экономика роста» для «чайников» №3: Российская экономика обескровлена" ("The economy of growth" for Dummies №3: The Russian economy is anemic)," Gazeta.ru (Newspaper), 21 July 2014. [http://www.gazeta.ru/growth/2014/07/17\\_a\\_6117077.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/growth/2014/07/17_a_6117077.shtml)

Russia's Central Bank policy has brought Russia down to the level of Papua New Guinea. In 2013, Russia's level of monetization of the economy - the ratio money to GDP - was 47.1%. Approximately the same level as that of Papua New Guinea (52%) and Paraguay (46%). The world's average of monetization in 2012 was 125.1%...

Thus, the higher the monetization, the more money banks have to lend to everyday citizens (for example, to buy a house) and to businesses (for the modernization of production)...

The Russian economy has so little money because the Russian Central Bank pursues a policy of restrict the money supply. The Central Bank believes that this way it will reduce inflation.

However, the Central Bank for some reason does not take into account that inflation in Russia is mostly has a non- monetary nature, that is, it is not formed from too much money in the economy...

**Source:** "Экономика России показывает рост на грани статистической погрешности - только санкций ей и не хватало" ("Russia's Economy Shows Growth that Verges on Statistical Error—Sanctions are the Last Thing it Needs"), Finam.ru, 4 August 2014. <http://www.finam.ru/analysis/newsitem/ekonomika-rossii-pokazyvaet-rost-na-grani-statisticheskoiy-pogreshnosti-tolko-sankciiy-eiy-i-ne-xvatalo-20140804-1816/>

In fact, the Central Bank has said that there was a sufficient number of instruments to support the sustainability of Russian banks that came under sanctions...

Is it possible to relax? Only in one case: if you live in the today, and the absence of the threat of default in six months is your main demand from the future. In actuality, the Russian economy has been showing growth that verges on statistical error, and... sanctions are the last thing we need when we vitally need maximum intensification of the investment process to simply grow. Well, if we talk about the more distant future, at stake is nothing less than the long-term prospects of the country, which is especially weighty against the backdrop of the changing global economic paradigm, especially in the field of energy.

**OE Watch Commentary: Violence**

*continues to escalate in Afghanistan, and Russia's response to this situation is worth understanding. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly criticized Western leaders for withdrawing NATO troops from Afghanistan prematurely. His concern rests upon fears that Russia, and neighboring Central Asia, will fall prey to increased terrorism and narco-trafficking without the help of NATO forces. "They [NATO] took up this burden and should carry it to the end," he said in August 2012. "If there is no order in Afghanistan, it will not be calm on our southern borders...We should not be fighting there again. Let them [NATO] sit there and fight."<sup>1</sup>*

*The accompanying excerpts from the Russian-language press present two different perspectives on the current situation in Afghanistan. The first, from an article by Andrei Medvedev in Vesti.ru, presents the Russian viewpoint that the US is responsible for the unfolding "chaos" in Afghanistan. Yet, this "chaos" does no harm to the US but to "Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia... to Russia, China and Iran." Washington, according to Medvedev, either does not understand this or is acting deliberately as part of a larger strategy to destabilize these borders.*

*Regarding Andrei Medvedev's viewpoint, consider additional historical context. While the Kremlin is, in part, sincerely concerned also about militant Islam internationally, Putin's concerns for radical Islamism domestically never precluded him from turning a blind eye to it abroad. For example, he never objected when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad allowed radical Islamists to transit Syria into Iraq. Putin had publically called for more—not less—aggressive US global action against terrorism as early as 1999, even before 9/11, as he referenced the problems he faced in the North Caucasus. Putin rushed to offer condolences to President George W. Bush after 9/11, and immediately offered logistical assistance for US forces in Afghanistan.*

*The second excerpt is from an article by Frud Bezhan in Radio Azzatyk, Kazakhstan's Radio Liberty service. He simply describes the economic problems that are developing in Afghanistan as NATO forces are pulling out. For example, housing prices are falling because the war economy had been sustaining them. Afghan firms are closing as their owners are leaving the country. Indeed, many Western analysts had warned years ago that early NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would lead precisely to the problems that Bezhan describes and to the very violence and instability currently unfolding in the country.*

*As far as Afghanistan is concerned, Putin still wants NATO troops to protect Russia's vulnerable borders. Blaming the US for the current situation in Afghanistan and spinning conspiracy theories, such as that of Andrei Medvedev, aligns with some of the Kremlin's anti-American rhetoric and creates a convenient scapegoat for problems in this region. **End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)***

1. Gleb Bryansky, "NATO should finish job in Afghanistan, Putin says," Reuters, August 1, 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-russia-nato-afghanistan-idUSBRE87011Q20120801>

**Source:** Andrei Medvedev, "Три американские ошибки в Афганистане: Кабул погружается в хаос" ("Three American Mistakes in Afghanistan: Kabul is Sinking into Chaos)," Vesti.ru, 6 August 2014. <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1872498>

...Talibs terror acts, attacks on columns, attacks on government buildings in Kabul, banditry and complete uncertainty... Most importantly, it seems they don't understand this in the United States, which bears full responsibility for the chaos unfolding in the country [Afghanistan]....

But the important thing is that all this does not present a threat to the United States, but to Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia, threat to Russia, China and Iran.

Although it is possible that it is this - the creation of a smoldering conflict at the borders of strategic rivals- is Washington's main goal.

And then everything that is happening fits into a plan of sorts. If of course, there is one.

**Source:** Frud Bezhan, "Афганистан ощущает последствия вывода войск" [Afghanistan is Feeling Effects of Troops Withdrawal], Radio Azzatyk (Kazakhstan's Radio Liberty) <http://rus.azattyq.org/content/afghanistan-posledstvia-vyvoda-voysk/26516378.html>

...Reduction of foreign military presence has already proved disastrous for many industries and different types of businesses, and the reduction of international aid threatens to further complicate the already difficult economic situation.

When Afghan firms close, their owners often leave the country, taking with them much-needed capital. Housing prices in the capital, supported mainly by the war economy, have already fallen by almost twofold over the last three years....

**OE Watch Commentary:** *As the West continues to impose sanctions on Russia, another topic deserves further discussion—Armenia's ties to Russia. The two accompanying excerpts from the Russian press discuss this issue.*

*Armenia deepened its ties to Russia last year. In this context, the sanctions against Russia may indeed hurt Armenia's economy. Yet more significantly, Russia may try to use Armenia to circumvent the sanctions. This second issue is more important because ultimately Armenia's economy is in poor shape not because of the sanctions, but because Armenia tied itself even closer to Russia. And for Russia finding an outlet around the sanctions will weaken their effect.*

*In 2013 Armenia had appeared set on a European integration course after concluding a comprehensive trade agreement with the European Union in July. However, after a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in September, Armenia abruptly reversed this pro-European course and instead joined the Russian-led Customs Union. Russia's control in Armenia has been deep and multifaceted for years. Russia has also served as the only guarantor of Armenia's security. Therefore, many analysts in the West, Russia, and the Caucasus concluded that Sargsyan simply was in no position to refuse Putin.*

*Now that Armenia is tied to Russia's economy even more deeply, Russia exerts even more control there. Indeed, according to former Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan, who is quoted in the first excerpt (from Radio Azatutyun, Armenia's Radio Liberty), the Kremlin will try to use Armenia to circumvent Western sanctions. Bagratyan had served during the largely pro-Western presidency of Levon Ter-Petrosyan and was a contender in Armenia's 2013 presidential election.*

*Additionally, according to both excerpts, Western sanctions could also contribute to worsening Armenia's already serious economic situation. The second article from Vestnik Kavkaza (Caucasus Herald) quotes an economist who notes with concern that because the Russian economy has not grown in the past six months, neither will Armenia's. Because Armenia is now tied to Russia through the Customs Union, as Russia's economy declines—with or without sanctions—it is likely to bring Armenia down with it. The sanctions may simply exacerbate an already existing problem. End OE Watch Commentary (Borshchevskaya)*

**Source:** Ruzanna Steponyan, “Россия попытается «использовать Армению» с целью обойти санкции” (“Russia Trying to ‘Use Armenia’ to go Around Sanctions),” Radio Azatutyun (Radio Liberty), 8 August 2014. <http://rus.azatutyun.am/content/article/25477030.html>

Armenia's former Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan is convinced that Russia will try to use Armenia to circumvent the sanctions imposed against Russia by the West.

According to Bagratyan, considering this circumstance, U.S. Embassy has warned the government of Armenia and Armenian businessmen about the possible risks if they work with sanctioned Russian companies. “In America, they probably understand that Armenia will try to oblige, as I like to say, to play the role of a ‘vents.’ That is, many Russian companies, unable to address their issues directly with the West, may try to do this through Armenian companies. ..”said Bagratyan ...

That the tough sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union will affect the Armenian economy, including banks operating in Armenia that deal with Russia's state capital, according to Grant Bagratyan, is unequivocal....

**Source:** Susanna Petrosyan, “Санкции США против России могут отразиться на Армении” (“US Sanctions against Russia May Affect Armenia),” Vestnik Kavkaza (Caucasus Herald), 8 August 2014. <http://www.vestnikavkaza.ru/analytics/Sanktsii-SSHA-protiv-Rossii-mogut-otrazitsya-na-Armenii.html>

...Russia's economy has registered zero growth in the past six months, and this cannot but affect Russian companies in Armenia, which produce 17% of the local GDP. According to economist and representative of opposition party Armenian National Congress, Vahagn Khachatryan, Western sanctions against Russia certainly will negatively affect the Russian companies, who will be forced to cut some of their programs in Armenia or postpone their implementation. “The impact will be direct, since the presence of Russian capital in Armenia is very large. Armenian-Russian economic and trade cooperation is on a large scale, and the Russian economy in the next year or two is unlikely to present positive development. This is not my analysis, but that of Russian officials, and if in 2016 there will be two percent growth, it will be considered a great success,” believes Khachatryan, who is convinced that the sanctions will affect the volume of Russian investments Armenia's economy...

**OE Watch Commentary:** *The conflict between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces in key areas around Donetsk and Luhansk shows little sign of being resolved anytime soon. A key factor has been the inability of Ukrainian forces to seal the adjacent border with Russia, through which pass men and material from Russia. The brief accompanying excerpt from one of Russia's popular tabloids examines why some Russians, who make up nearly 25% of those fighting against Ukraine, support the separatist cause.*

**Source:** Rimma Akhmirova, Ilya Mayorov, Кто из России и почему воюет против Киева на юго-востоке Украины [Who From Russia Is Fighting Against Kyiv in Southeast Ukraine and Why?], Sobesednik Online, 16 July 2014.  
<http://sobesednik.ru/rassledovanie/20140716-kto-iz-rossii-i-pochemu-voynet-protiv-kieva-na-yugo-vostoke>

### Russian Volunteers Said Constituting One-Fourth of Southeast Ukraine Militiamen

...From 20 to 30 percent of the volunteer militiamen confronting the Ukrainian army are most likely citizens of Russia. It is hardly likely that Putin and Shoygu sent them there. Why, then, are they making their way to the southeast of the contiguous country? The motives, it is learned, are different for all them.

The war in Ukraine stopped being for Olga Koroleva only a television scene when she was called on her cell phone by someone calling himself Zhenya, who said that her son had been

*(continued)*



## Continued: Russian Volunteers in Southeast Ukraine

*For the past eight months the Kremlin-supported national media have hammered home the message that the “illegal Kiev junta” is using the most bloodthirsty methods to crush the legitimate democratic aspirations of ethnic Russians living in the Donbass region. This powerful message has been amplified within Russia’s social media, resulting in a number of sites where, as this article points out, Russian men can find the necessary information to volunteer to fight with their compatriots in Eastern Ukraine. The article describes how a Russian mother only learns that her son had gone to fight for the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine when she is notified of his death.*

*The article suggests that most Russian volunteers decide to participate out of patriotic or ideological motivations. For experienced volunteers, however, high salaries (\$100 for an ordinary day, \$300-350 for taking part in combat operations) must serve as attractive incentives for many within the economically depressed regions in southern Russia. The actual requirements for volunteering are minimal (at least age 25 with no criminal record), and even these demands appear to be easily overlooked. While this article does not provide close detail, the training also appears equally minimal, where new volunteers spend just a week learning how to fight.*

*The article is careful to avoid inferring that these volunteers are aided and abetted by Russian officials, and it completely fails to address where these volunteers find the necessary combat equipment, ammunition and specialized training. Interestingly, though, the article does broach the problem of potential “blowback” for Russian authorities, suggesting “that hundreds of people gaining combat experience cannot fail to worry not only the Ukrainian, but also the Russian, security forces.” The skills these Russian volunteers are learning in Eastern Ukraine might someday be applied elsewhere. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)***

killed near Donetsk.... He took the events in Ukraine very much to heart, he was in an argument with someone on the internet, but I never thought he was ready to lay down his life for this! I have just one question: whoever sent him there, why did he not chuck him, a rookie, out and send him home?!”

...People like Dima Korolev fetch up in the Ukrainian hell mainly via the internet. There are on the networks currently 5-6 main websites which register volunteers. “We don’t take all those who wish to go. Only those without a criminal record, without mental disorders. Another condition – over 25 years of age – was added recently. Such decisions have to be made by an adult who is responsible for his actions....

...“About 40 volunteers left for the Ukrainian war from Saratov Oblast,” Ilya Mayorov, Saratov ataman of the Cossack horde, cited statistics. “In the capitals – Moscow and Petersburg – the figure is higher: 80-100 persons each. It may be assumed that of the 4,000-5,000 Ukrainian militiamen, approximately one-fourth is now composed of volunteers from Russia. There is among them a significant percentage of Cossacks and veterans of combat operations in Chechnya, the Dniester Region, and Syria. The participation of Cossacks is understandable: Southeast Ukraine is alongside the Don and Kuban Cossacks, and these ties have never been broken. Our Cossacks have always been in close contact with the East Ukrainian Cossacks – both in peace and in war. The veterans of combat operations have their own story: there are among them many who have not ‘done fighting,’ who the whole time long to return to war.”

Mayorov says that people are not going to Ukraine for money. There are more than enough of those wishing to do so at their own expense. The main influx of high-minded volunteers occurred after the events in Odessa.... But every war has to have professionals. There are rates on the internet which are offered professional “soldiers of fortune”: \$100 for an ordinary day, \$300-350 for taking part in combat operations....

...Aleksandr Grigorenko said that he was issued body armor and a weapon. Dmitriy Korolev’s ma conducted her small-scale inquiry and believes that her son spent roughly a week in a “training camp,” but does not know on which side of the border it is located.

“The authorities are not helping us but nor are they for the time being impeding us particularly,” “simply Kostya” evasively answered me.

But it is obvious that hundreds of people gaining combat experience cannot fail to worry not only the Ukrainian, but also the Russian, security forces. Oleg Melnikov, an aggressive recruiter of volunteers, recently learned that during a “Ukrainian assignment” he became a figure in the “Bolotnoye case”. Melnikov’s friends believe that the authorities have begun to fear that people who went to peaceful public rallies in Moscow will be mastering non-peaceful methods of struggle also....

*“...In the opinion of members of the commission, close collaboration between the army and schools could radically change children’s attitudes to serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces...”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** *Restoring Russia’s military prowess remains a key Kremlin platform, fueled by the ongoing conflict with Ukraine and increased tensions with the West. Rhetorically at least, Kremlin propaganda has mobilized the Russian population into believing that the West is determined to weaken Russia and prevent it from becoming a global power. The only way that Russia can resist this assault is by maintaining robust and combat-ready military forces. All aspects of Russian society must do their part in raising defense consciousness, and none more so than the educational system.*

*The brief excerpt describes new proposals to foster greater cooperation and collaboration between the military and Russia’s high school system. The initiatives harken back to the Soviet period, where military planning was the country’s focal point and where collaboration between the military and schools “was one technique for strengthening the unity of society and the Armed Forces.” The article describes how this cooperation can help to dispel negative stereotypes regarding military service, instill a greater sense of patriotism and also provide greater vocational training opportunities. Training and familiarity with military subjects will also help prepare students to transition into the military once their schooling is completed. It also points out how military sponsorship of high schools can provide guidance to those young Russians who come from broken homes.*

*Despite all the patriotic bravura over the past few years, a significant percentage of the Russian population still retains negative perceptions toward military service, particularly when their*

**Source:** Dmitriy Runkevich and Yelena Malay, “Воинским частям предлагают патронировать средние школы” [Military Units Are Being Asked to Support Secondary Schools], Izvestiya Online, 8 July 2014. <http://izvestia.ru/news/573499#ixzz36u3EcctD>

The Commission for Questions of Patriotic, Spiritual, and Moral Education of Children and Young People under the Russian Federation Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations, which is headed by State Duma Deputy Viktor Vodolatskiy, has prepared an appeal to Vyacheslav Volodin, first deputy head of the Presidential Staff, and Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, on organizing a system of sponsorship of secondary schools by Russian Navy ships and Russian Army military units. In the opinion of members of the commission, close collaboration between the army and schools could radically change children’s attitudes to serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and for many it will be a vocational point of reference in life.



*Students train with wearing gas mask at Volgograd professional technical college.*

*Source: <http://vptk34.ru/podrazdeleniya/metodicheskiy-kabinet/otkrytye-uroki/>*

In addition, Viktor Vodolatskiy is planning to bring his proposals on organizing joint work between the Russian Army and the secondary education system to the attention of head of state Vladimir Putin at the next session of the Russian Federation Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations.

The commission is proposing to use the Soviet experience of military units’ work with secondary schools and considerably expand such cooperation.

“This is a good, but forgotten Soviet form of collaboration between state institutions and young people, but just with a new approach, and with new motivation. Expanded sponsorship is being planned. Not just the schoolchildren visiting a unit and greeting the servicemen, but regular communications and knowledge of the problems. Children will start coming here for spring and summer vacations and tackle passing Ready for Labor and Defense objectives and military training,” Vodolatskiy explained. “This will help in questions of vocational guidance, it will eliminate the problem of hazing once and for all, give the children a military-patriotic education, and establish a fashion for service in the army...”

...Nikolay Pankov, state secretary and deputy minister of defense, told Izvestiya that the department is looking favorably at the idea of reviving military sponsorship of schools at state level. “At present we are conducting work to organize collaboration between certain military units and schools in various regions, but if the revival of this form of work is approved at legislative level on a federal scale, then the work will doubtless become more structured,” he noted.

*(continued)*

*children are involved. Nevertheless, reforms have helped to dispel some of these concerns, and reducing the draft period to one year and attempts to humanize military service have helped to improve the overall image of the military. In establishing closer cooperation between military units and high schools, Russian leaders hope to heighten defense awareness and form a tighter bond between the military and the society it purports to defend. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)***

Commenting on this initiative, Mayya Pildes, member of the Russian Federation Ministry of Education and Science public council and head of Secondary School No. 56 in St. Petersburg, noted that in Soviet times there was not only military sponsorship in schools, but also scientific production sponsorship, which bore useful fruit.

“Bringing back sponsorship in the format we had in the USSR is a good idea. And it was not only military units, but also production units, plants, factories, and scientific institutes that sponsored establishments in the

secondary education system in this way in the past,” she observed. “As far as military units are concerned, their sponsorship is important not just for vocational guidance and patriotic education, but also from the point of view of the formation of the psychology of children from broken families, who are quite numerous nowadays. Many kids grow up without a father, and for them the military sponsors will be their mentors for courage and bravery.”...

...Army sponsorship in the USSR was one technique for strengthening the unity of society and the Armed Forces, and extended not only to schools, but also to other organizations. This tradition arose just under a century ago -- with the start of the creation of the Red Army -- and it lost its relevance and statewide nature following the breakup of the Soviet Union.



Students train with wearing gas mask at Solikamskiy Teachers School, Solikamskiy, Russia. Source: <http://www.solgpi.ru/arhivkmbd.htm>

### Sergey Shoygu: Russia's Emergency Defense Minister A Bio-Sketch

By Ray Finch, FMSO

This paper briefly examines the background of Russia's Minister of Defense, Sergey Shoygu, the speculation behind his sudden appointment in November 2012, the challenges he faces, his efforts thus far within the Defense Ministry, and possible future implications -both military and political – surrounding his selection as Russia's chief military representative. This paper posits that should the stars align correctly, as a close friend of President Vladimir Putin, Shoygu could become the next leader of Russia.

<http://fms.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Finch-Shoygu.pdf>



*“We deem it necessary to limit authorization for use of the internet for servicemen to prevent any information of a military nature fetching up on the web since it could be used by Western news media for provocative purposes.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Internet usage continues to grow in Russia: recent surveys indicate that over half the population uses the Internet on a daily basis. Not surprisingly, given the Kremlin’s penchant for control over information, there has been a corresponding increase in legislation and regulation surrounding Internet use. For instance, in August 2014 legislation came into effect which would require Russian bloggers who have more than 3,000 followers per day to register with the government as a media outlet under their actual names. Those who fail to register or publish harmful information (which is not specifically defined in the legislation) are subject to fines or closure.

New Internet restrictions are also being applied to those who serve in the military. As the brief excerpt points out, legislation is now in the works which would prohibit Russian soldiers from posting “online photographs and video content from military units and from military exercises with images of special equipment and arms.” As justification for these restrictions, the article points out that in the past Western media have used this on-line information “for provocations” against Russia.

The timing of this new legislation is curious. Over the past six months there have been a number of instances when Russian official sources have denied any military involvement in the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, only to have these reports called into question after revelations from Russian social media sites (some belonging to Russian soldiers) suggest otherwise. By restricting soldiers from posting information on-line, Russian authorities hope to not only improve overall operational security, but also stop embarrassing leaks.

Over the past few years Russian social media sites have proven to be a valuable source of information for both domestic and foreign audiences. Instead of just the official Kremlin position, readers could gain access to the images, thoughts, views and interests of average Russians. While Russian military officials have valid operational security concerns, this proposed legislation will likely result in the constriction of open discussion and information sharing within both the Russian Armed Forces and the wider society. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)**

**Source:** Dmitriy Runkevich and Yelena Malay, “Военным запретят выкладывать в интернет фотографии о своей службе” [The Military Will Be Barred From Posting on the Internet Photographs of Their Service], Izvestiya Online, 30 July 2014.

#### **Duma Deputies Seek Legal Restrictions on Servicemen’s Use of Internet**

Vadim Solovyev, member of the lower house of parliament and head of the CPRF legal service, is preparing a bill on revisions to the federal law “Military Obligation and Military Service”. The amendments to the new version of the law are geared to the imposition of restrictions for servicemen of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, both conscripts and contract servicemen, on use of the internet for the publication of internal army information and the posting of online photographs and video content from military units and from military exercises with images of special equipment and arms. The member of parliament believes that military information that is open for general use may be used for provocations by Western news media and, in addition, be injurious to the country’s military security.

Sending messages and correspondence for personal purposes on the internet would not be prohibited for the servicemen here, Solovyev observed.

“We deem it necessary to limit authorization for use of the internet for servicemen to prevent any information of a military nature fetching up on the web since it could be used by Western news media for provocative purposes. Correspondence for personal purposes would not, in our view, be subject to prohibition,” the deputy said. “Proceeding from these goals, we are now preparing amendments to the law on military obligation.”

The deputy observed that photographs of military equipment and the plans of traffic routes, even if they are not a state secret, should not fetch up in the field of broad access.

“Under the conditions of the information warfare that is being conducted by the foe, even details that are not the most significant could be a weapon directed against us,” he notes.

Viktor Vodolatskiy, member of the State Duma Defense Committee, told Izvestiya that servicemen are at this time only cautioned as to the inexpediency of the publication of this piece of information or the other on the internet. The State Duma Defense Committee recently discussed this problem at a conference with representatives of the Defense Ministry and also reached a conclusion as to the need for the imposition of additional legislative restrictions...

...Anatoliy Tysganok, military expert and director of the Center for Military Forecasting, said that there already are such restrictions in the US army. He believes that they should for information-security purposes be adopted in Russia as well. He called impermissible here the recent appearance on the internet of photographs from exercises of the RF Armed Forces, which a number of Western media outlets used for their information manipulations.

*“President Vladimir Putin is convinced that Russia is capable of import substitution in the State Defense Order without problems and that the current difficulties should be used to the advantage of Russian industry.”*

**OE Watch Commentary:** Over the past two decades a large portion of Russia’s industrial infrastructure has deteriorated. Even though the government has made plans to restore and modernize some aspects of this infrastructure (e.g., the Skolkovo high tech initiative), many Russian factories and industrial plants remain outdated and inefficient. There are some notable exceptions, but capital investment in heavy industry has been neglected since Russian manufacturers were able to purchase the necessary equipment from foreign sources. With the recent breakdown of trade with Ukraine and the US/EU imposition of sanctions against select Russian manufacturers, this formula is about to change, particularly within Russia’s military-industrial complex (VPK).

The US and the EU have levied economic sanctions against Russia in an attempt to convince the Kremlin leadership to stop supporting separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine. Since this conflict began, however, the Russian people have been told a different rationale for Western pressure. In this narrative, nefarious Western powers (led by the US) have plans to move into Ukraine with the ultimate objective of fatally weakening Russia. Western sanctions, especially against Russia’s defense industry, are therefore interpreted by the Kremlin as further attempts to weaken and isolate Russia.

Since restoring and strengthening Russia’s defense capacity remains the Kremlin’s number one priority, defense officials are developing strategies to offset the impact of sanctions. As the excerpt points out, Russian defense manufacturers are reliant upon imports in certain key areas (e.g., ICBM components, engines), and finding import substitutes or building their own could be a challenge. The Russian president,



Topol-M. Source: <http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/446>

**Source:** Yelena Yegorova, “На совещании по оборонке Путин жестко приказал ‘устроить революцию’ в ВПК” [At Conference on Defense Industry Putin Issues Firm Order for ‘Revolution’ in VPK], MK Online, 28 July 2014.

### Putin Calls for Self-Sufficient Russian Defense Industry

President Vladimir Putin is convinced that Russia is capable of import substitution in the State Defense Order without problems and that the current difficulties should be used to the advantage of Russian industry. In place of “aging” parts and technologies arriving from abroad, and in the first place from Ukraine, the VPK [military-industrial complex], in the words of the president, has a chance to create modern manufacturing capacities. The main aspects are price, quality, and timeframe. However, these key questions were discussed behind doors closed to the press.

The ministers responsible for the State Defense Order, as well as representatives of major defense enterprises: the United Rocket and Space, Engine, Aircraft, and Shipbuilding Corporations, Rostekh [State Corporation for Assisting the Development, Production, and Export of High-Tech Industrial Products], the Almaz-Antey Concern, Russian Helicopters, and others gathered together with the head of state in a meeting on the problems of import substitution. Everyone’s mood was anxious. However, the share of Ukraine (and precisely the interrelationship with the Independent are on the agenda) in Russian military imports is not great, a total of 4.4 percent, however several classes of products have vitally important significance for the VPK.

*(continued)*

## Continued: Sanctions and Military Rearmament

however, claims that these sanctions provide Russia with an opportunity to build a more self-reliant defense industry. He maintains that Russia can overcome this dependence and that “we can do everything, absolutely everything ourselves.” His comments align with Kremlin rhetoric, which claims that the West is not merely an unreliable partner, but an enemy to Russia.

President Putin’s industrial optimism also harkens back to the autarchic manufacturing model enjoyed by the USSR, which was indeed capable of developing all of its defense needs domestically. Russia may have the potential to reach such “defense independence,” but it will be years (or decades) before this goal can be realized. In the interim, not only will Kremlin plans to modernize its defense forces to 70% by 2020 be almost certainly delayed, but the prospects for developing stronger Russian-Western ties will also be weakened. **End OE Watch Commentary (Finch)**

For example, the RS-20 Voyevoda intercontinental ballistic missile consists one-third of Ukrainian parts. The operational status of this weapon was regularly inspected and supported by specialists of Dnipropetrovsk’s Yuzhmash but, as is well known, Ukraine just at the end of March announced the cessation of cooperation with Russia in the military sphere. The guidance system of the Topol missile originates in Kharkiv. And the Motor Sich factory located in Zaporizhzhya produces jet engines for the An-124 Ruslan, as well as for Russian combat and transport helicopters. The break in relations with these enterprises, in addition to causing difficulties for our domestic VPK, brings into question the fulfillment by Russia of export obligations for the delivery to foreign buyers of 260 helicopters.

However, the president, similarly, did not share the pessimism. “We can do everything, absolutely everything ourselves,” he announced in a tone that brooked no doubt, much less rejoinder. And he specified: “The most extensive transition to domestic materials and parts is necessary for “military and economic security, as well as technological and manufacturing independence.” “We must secure ourselves against the risks of failure to fulfill the State Defense Order, as well as risks of a political character,” Putin emphasized.

The latest “wave” of European Union sanctions almost certainly will affect branches connected with the Russian defense industry. Moreover, 90 percent of the machine tools on which military equipment is manufactured, according to data from Minpromtorg [the Ministry of Industry and Trade], is purchased in the West. And the share of imports in heavy machine-building is 60-80 percent. However even there, it turns out, Vladimir Putin does not see “major complexities.” In his words, “many of the things that come from abroad are already aging, the technologies are old, and so is the equipment,” and our internal VPK is in need of a modern high-technology-base. Under the conditions of Western sanctions Russia has a chance to create that base.

The issues are price, quality, and timeframes, “so that in the fulfillment of the State Defense Order we do not veer off course in terms of the schedule.” In the presence of the mass media specific numbers were not referred to; however, according to information from experts, the high priority measures on import substitution in the defense industrial sector alone will take at least two years and require R40 billion from the budget....

### Russia’s Strategic Mobility

Supporting ‘Hard Power’ to 2020?

By Roger N. McDermott

[http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir\\_3587.pdf](http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3587.pdf)

Roger N. McDermott’s Russia’s Strategic Mobility: Supporting ‘Hard Power’ to 2020? examines the rapidly changing Russian military’s strategic capabilities for logistics, combat service support, and force projection. McDermott’s work for The Russia Studies Programme of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) sheds light on the unglamorous, but vitally important logistic backbone upon which the Russian military relies. Roger N. McDermott is a Senior International Fellow for the Foreign Military Studies Office.



## Attack of the Giant Arctic King Crab


3 July 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** *As this article points out, the understudied issue of invasive species is not new to the Arctic region, and will become a growing challenge as the Northern Sea Route is increasingly used. End of OE Commentary (Grau)*

**Source:** Kyle Kendrick, Barents Observer, <http://barentsobserver.com>, 3 July 2014

“The legacy of the king crab, which Soviet Union scientists introduced to the area during the 1960s, shows how even just detecting that a species is an ecological problem can take a long time. During the early 1990s, fishermen, managers and many scientists viewed the king crab as primarily a valuable fishing resource. But in 2000, scientists ... began to publicly emphasize that the king crab was wreaking havoc on ... organisms at the bottom of the ocean, denting the food chain and causing some other species to disappear.”

Map Source: <http://www.scientificamerican.com>



## Lack of Northern Sea Route Mapping Information: a Persistent Challenge to Commerce Expansion in the Arctic

28 June 2014

**OE Watch Commentary:** *Shipping along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a small, but expanding option for world trade. Volume on the NSR does not come anywhere near the 17,000 vessels that passed through the Suez Canal last year, but the former represents a 3,000-4,000-mile shortening of transit distance between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A completely ice-free Arctic passage remains impossible for the foreseeable future, and icebreaker escorts are still the safest option. As this article goes on to explain, however, sea ice and depth-mapping information remains unavailable to commercial shipping. End of OE Commentary (Grau)*

**Source:** Lyle Kendrick, Barents Observer, <http://barentsobserver.com>, 28 June 2014

“According to data from the Northern Sea Route Administration, four vessels used the route in 2010, 34 used it in 2011, 46 used it in 2012 and 71 used it last year. ... But the current weak satellites in the area and poor sea maps are like bottlenecks preventing the kind of massive Arctic transit speculated by some, said Jan-Gunnar Winther, director of the Norwegian Polar Institute.”

## Russia Reopens the Lourdes, Cuba Signals Station to Collect Intelligence on the US

**OE Watch Commentary:** From 1967-2001 the USSR and Russia ran a signals intelligence collection station in Cuba that was 155 miles from the US coast. Located in Lourdes, Cuba, the station adopted the same name. It obtained intelligence information for the Sixth Directorate of the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU); the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency Directorate (known as FAPSI); and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), among others. It is estimated that nearly 75% of all intelligence gathered by the USSR and Russia came from this listening post. It is thought that the post was manned by 2,000 to 3,000 personnel. Fewer specialists will probably be needed today due to the sophistication of equipment, which requires less manpower.

In July 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly agreed to forget nearly 32 billion dollars of Cuba's debt to Russia (about ninety per cent of the total debt) in exchange for the rights to once again open its operations in Lourdes. Further details of the agreement were not divulged. Before the dissolution of the USSR the Soviets did not pay for the use of the facility. In the 1990s, when Russia replaced the USSR, the annual cost of renting the facility rose from 90 million dollars in 1992 to some 200 million dollars by 2001.

Former SVR director Vyacheslav Trubnikov noted that reacquiring this territory was a necessity, since it will vastly increase Russia's awareness regarding what is happening on American soil. From Putin's perspective the reacquisition of Lourdes is but another step in expanding Russia's geopolitical ambitions. Apparently he also is interested in working with Nicaragua, Cyprus, and Vietnam for reasons specific to each nation (joint patrols, docking, repair centers, etc.).

**End OE Watch Commentary (Thomas)**

**Source:** Andrey Polunin, "United States 'Open to View.' Monitoring Center at Lourdes, Cuba Transferred to Russian Control," Svobodnaya Pressa, 16 July 2014.

(Polunin converses with Konstantin Sivkov, President of the Academy for Geopolitical Problems, in this excerpt)

**[Polunin]** Is \$32 billion in written-off Cuban debt a reasonable price for a monitoring center?

**[Sivkov]** It is a reasonable price for a geopolitical return to the region and for the opportunity to achieve security in the American direction. Geopolitics is expensive, and it had to be paid for.

**[Polunin]** Can we expect that, having returned to Lourdes, we will try to get back into Cam Ranh also?

**[Sivkov]** I hope so: We need Cam Ranh too. We cannot defend our economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region without securing our military influence there. Having Cam Ranh as a base for Russian ships makes it possible to control [kontrolirovat] the Malay and Singapore straits as well as to monitor the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean zones. Nobody would eschew opportunities like that.

Essentially we are talking about reestablishing our forward basing system. With a Russian Navy forces grouping in Cam Ranh, if a military conflict should arise we will be able to deliver strikes on the rear echelons of a US or allied armed forces grouping. That is extremely important from the viewpoint of ensuring strategic security.

**[Polunin]** Apart from Lourdes and Cam Ranh, where else should Russian basing points be located?

**[Sivkov]** Some points in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf would be useful to us, as would one on the territory of Venezuela or Brazil.

**[Polunin]** How realistic is the idea of building such a network?

**[Sivkov]** In principle, entirely so. It will require certain political preconditions, certainly. I think the preconditions will emerge and that the States will actually create them. In my view America is getting weaker, is trying to maintain its influence by using force, and is starting to take rash actions in the international arena. We could take advantage of that situation to broaden Russia's military network.

"Lourdes enabled us to listen to America up to approximately the latitude of its northern states that border Canada and to obtain 60-65 percent of our intelligence information on the United States," military expert Colonel Mikhail Timoshenko observes. "So the monitoring center in Cuba is extremely important to us. Of course, going back there is not going to happen instantaneously: The equipment at Lourdes will need replacing. On the other hand, the new-generation equipment will require significantly fewer personnel to operate it -- I think we will be able to manage with 700-800 staffers (in Soviet times it took around 3,000 people to service the monitoring center)." "There is another reason for going back to Lourdes. Thanks to the reform efforts of many of our leaders we have lost our huge grouping of radio monitoring ships, among them our best such ship and the world's biggest -- the intelligence craft Ural, with its nuclear power unit. If we still had the Ural we would not need Lourdes: We could hang around undisturbed in international waters and monitor all of US territory. But the Ural was cast aside and ultimately scrapped, so we no longer have it to rely on." "Finally, we have let our military space grouping fall apart completely, so we do not have the space-based monitoring facilities we once had. Therefore it is absolutely essential that we return to Lourdes."

## Water Wars in the Heart of Mesopotamia?

The capture of the Mosul Dam by fighters affiliated with the Islamic State has revived fears that water could be used as a weapon in the Middle East. A 2003 U.S. military intelligence assessment suggested that a catastrophic dam failure could send a 65 foot wall of water into Mosul.<sup>1</sup> As the surge of water swept down the Tigris, portions of Baghdad might find themselves under 15 feet of water. A 2011 study predicted dam failure could kill 500,000.<sup>2</sup> The dam's destruction would reverberate into southern Iraq, disrupting agriculture in predominantly Shi'ite southern Iraq. While fears of the dam's destruction remain both real and relevant, the Islamic State has so far decided it has more to gain by keeping the hydroelectric plant running,<sup>3</sup> and that flooding Baghdad is not worth the sacrifice of Mosul.

However, while analysts worry about the actions of the Islamic State, the Kurdish drive for independence could be just as disruptive in the long-term by exacerbating existing disputes about the division of regional water resources. The problem begins in Turkey, where nearly 90 percent of Euphrates water and 50 percent of Tigris water originate before flowing into Syria and Iraq.<sup>4</sup> The Tigris-Euphrates system is the only river system besides the Nile in the Middle East which offers an economically exploitable water surplus.<sup>5</sup>

### A Delicate Balance of Competing Water Claims

Perhaps the greatest complexity with regard to either Kurdish independence in Iraq or expanded Kurdish federalism in Syria and/or Turkey will be the impact of any new entity on division of water resources in the Tigris and Euphrates basin. Turkey has long defended its diplomatic management of water resources, but has not hesitated to play hardball in pursuit of its national interest. For example, Turkey was one of only three countries (Burundi and China being the others) that voted against the UN General Assembly's 1997 Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses on what constitutes fair and reasonable distribution of water resources.<sup>6</sup> Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was blunt when in 1992 he declared, "We do not say we share their oil resources. They cannot say they share our water resources. This is a right of sovereignty. We have the right to do anything we like."<sup>7</sup>

Disputes over water resources date back more than eight decades. Bilaterally and trilaterally, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq states have tried to regulate water resources and resolve disputes. In 1946, for example, Iraq and Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations, which addressed Euphrates and Tigris water sharing.

Such agreements worked as long as both countries remained undeveloped, but tension increased alongside industrialization. Adding Syria to the mix only further complicated questions over downstream rights. In 1962 Syria and Iraq agreed to exchange information on water discharge and river levels, and Iraq demand that it should receive a fixed share of Euphrates water. After multiple rounds of negotiations over the next four years, the two countries agreed Iraq should receive 59 percent of Euphrates flow.

In the 1970s and 1980s Syria, Iraq, and Turkey began laying the groundwork for a series of dams and hydroelectric plants. In 1974, for example, Syria completed the Thawra Dam; Turkey followed suit with the Keban Dam the same year. The reduced water flow led to an escalating series of accusations among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. As drought increased in Iraq, hostility almost erupted into open warfare between Iraq and



Moşul Dam Hydro Plant. Source: Wikimedia Commons

## Continued: Water Wars in the Heart of Mesopotamia?

Syria.<sup>8</sup> Only a Saudi-brokered agreement between Damascus and Baghdad, in which Syria received 40 percent of the Euphrates Water and Iraq 60 percent, averted war. Such agreements were mere band aids, though, readily voided as Turkey, Syria, and Iraq continued to prioritize their own development.

Iraq briefly suspended oil supplies to Turkey in 1977, after Turkey decided to alter the flow of the Euphrates, in part to begin construction of the Karakaya Dam. At the time the new Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Yumurталık) pipeline was filling two-thirds of Turkey's petrol demands.<sup>9</sup> Turkey refused to sign a binding agreement with Syria or Iraq, but it did subsequently promise the World Bank that it would allow 500 cubic meters per second of flow over the Karakaya Dam in exchange for international funding.

In 1982 Turkey and Iraq formed a joint technical committee on regional waters, and Syria joined the following year. Forming a committee is one thing, coming to an agreement quite another. It took five years for Turkey and Syria to reach an agreement. Turkey would allow Syria 500 cubic meters per second of Euphrates discharge, but claimed the right of first use. While this settled matters between Turkey and Syria, it did not for Iraq. It was only in 1989 that

Syria and Iraq agreed to a provisional division of Euphrates water released by Turkey. Bickering over water flow continues, however. Should Iraqi Kurdistan become independent, or should Syrian Kurds extend their reach to the Euphrates inside Syria, then they effectively void all previous agreements because the new entity would either declare itself not bound by existing treaties or insist on renegotiating its own allotment.



*Karakaya Dam, Turkey. Source: Wikimedia Commons*

### Can Water Disputes Erupt into Violence?

In the last decades of the twentieth century it became fashionable in university circles to suggest that water shortages in the Middle East could lead to war. While academics may have exaggerated the threat, it was not without basis. Turkey and Syria skirmished in 1987 when Turkey responded to Syrian support for Kurdish insurgents by suspending water sharing agreements. When Turkey turned down the spigots, Syrian MIGs retaliated by downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane inside Turkish airspace.<sup>10</sup>

In January 1990 Syria formally asked Turkey to reduce its diversion of the Euphrates, and in May Iraq demanded that Turkey release a minimum of 700 cubic meters per second to Syria, so that Iraq's downstream proportion would also rise. When Turkey refused, Iraq retaliated by refusing to renew its 1984 security protocol. Once again water disputes threatened to morph into broader hostility. As Turkey moved to fill the Atatürk Dam, effectively stopping the Euphrates' flow for one month, Iraq threatened to bomb the dam, and both Iraq and Syria joined together in a boycott of Turkish companies involved with its development of southeastern Anatolia.

Indeed, disputes continue to simmer. In December 1995 and at the behest of Syria, seven Arab states signed a declaration accusing Turkey of releasing contaminated water into Syria. The Arab League demanded Turkey stop building dams on both the Tigris and Euphrates, and began to retaliate against European companies working on Turkish hydroelectric projects. Decreasing flow on the Euphrates led to a 50 percent cut in electricity to Nasiriya, Iraq's fourth largest city, in August 2009.<sup>11</sup> "Iraq has not faced a water shortage like this," Iraqi Water Resources Minister Latif Rashid, an ethnic Kurd, quipped in 2009, blaming the shortage on water diversion. The Iraqi government claimed that Turkish dams had reduced flow into Iraq by nearly three-quarters.<sup>12</sup> Not only electricity and water for agriculture are at stake: increased salinity as salt water from the Persian Gulf and Shatt al-Arab flows northward compounds the problem. Iraq has set its maximum saline limit at 1,500 parts per million, lethal to all crops but date palms, but during the 2009 drought salinity levels peaked at 40,000 parts per million in southern Iraq, and they have since leveled out at 12,000 parts per million.<sup>13</sup> Iraq reserved some of its vitriol for Syria, as well. In a 2010 newscast the state-controlled al-Iraqiyah warned that "neighboring countries meet to wage a new war on Iraq, which Syria is spearheading through drying up the water of the Tigris River."<sup>14</sup>

### Could Kurdish Independence Spark a Water War


## Continued: Water Wars in the Heart of Mesopotamia?

Given the animosity that now exists between Iraqi Kurds and both Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis, any Kurdish claim to water resources could just as easily spark conflict. Already there are warning signs about how Kurdish independence could spark conflict within southern Iraq. In March 2014 prominent Iraqi Shi'ite politician Abbas al-Bayati warned Iraqi Kurdistan not to dam water that he said rightfully belongs to the Iraqi government.<sup>15</sup> Uday al-Khadran, governor of the largely Sunni Al-Khalis district, likewise condemned "attempts of Kurdistan Region President Masud Barzani to wage a water war against several governorates by reducing their water share from the dams, which should be under the control of the central government."<sup>16</sup> Not many issues can unite Iraqi Arabs across the sectarian divide.

Both Americans and Iraqis are right to worry about the security and integrity of the Mosul Dam. But that represents just one dam among dozens in the Tigris and Euphrates watersheds. Not only explosives placed by terrorists, but also the establishment of new political entities can spark conflict in an already volatile region. Kurds often argue that there can be no peace in Mesopotamia until they achieve their national aspirations. That may be true, but if the recent history of water disputes in the region is any indication, Kurdish statehood may simply swap one type of conflict for another.

Tigris and Euphrates Rivers along with various dam locations in Iraq (2009).

Source: <http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-R3ldNyg9xUo/T3lQgrTr-8I/AAAAAAAAALY0/y9TtkM7lhBo/s1600/Dams+Tigris+Euphrates.jpg>



## Continued: Water Wars in the Heart of Mesopotamia?

### Endnotes

- 1 Andrew G. Wright, "Iraqi Dam Has Experts on Edge until Inspection Eases Fears," *Engineering News-Record*, May 5, 2003. <http://enr.construction.com/news/Front2003/archives/030505.asp>
- 2 Amanda Ellison, "An Unprecedented Task," *International Water Power & Dam Construction* (London), November 3, 2011. <http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/features/featurean-unprecedented-task>
- 3 Mahmoud Habboush and Aziz Alwan, "Islamic State Funds Caliphate With Mosul Dam as Terror Spreads," Bloomberg, August 11, 2014. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-11/islamic-state-funds-caliphate-with-mosul-dam-as-terror-spreads.html>
- 4 Ryan Wilson, "Water-Shortage Crisis Escalating in Tigris-Euphrates Basin," Future Directions International (Perth), August 28, 2012.
- 5 Ali Çarkoğlu and Mine Eder, "Water Conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin," in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, ed. *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 235.
- 6 Ali Çarkoğlu and Mine Eder, "Water Conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin," p. 237.
- 7 Quoted in Ryan Wilson, "Water-Shortage Crisis Escalating in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin." Future Directions International (Perth), August 28, 2012.
- 8 Joost Jongerden, "Dams and Politics in Turkey: Utilizing Water, Developing Conflict," *Middle East Policy*, Spring 2010, p. 138.
- 9 Baskın Oran. *Türk Dış Politikası*, (Istanbul: İletişim Y., 2008), p. 795.
- 10 Ali Çarkoğlu and Mine Eder, "Water Conflict: The Euphrates-Tigris Basin," p. 225.
- 11 Martin Chulov, "Water Shortage Threatens Two Million People in Southern Iraq," *The Guardian* (London), August 26, 2009.
- 12 Paul Williams, "Euphrates and Tigris Waters—Turkish-Syria and Iraqi Relations," in Dhivendra Vajpeyi, ed. *Water Resource Conflicts and International Security*. (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), p. 43
- 13 Ryan Wilson, "Water-Shortage Crisis Escalating in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin." Future Directions International, August 28, 2012.
- 14 Al-Iraqiyah Television, in Arabic, May 27, 2010, 1700 GMT. Translation courtesy of the Open Source Center.
- 15 "Al-Bayati: Qati'a Kurdistan L'almiya 'an Muhafithat Akhri Yatalabu Tahrukan Itha Ma Thabut" ("Al-Bayati: If Kurdistan Cut Off Water from Other Provinces, then Action is Required"), *Al-Sumariya* (Baghdad), March 1, 2014. <http://goo.gl/ivu2B8>
- 16 "Qaimqamiyat al-Khalis Tahadud al-Barzani biqati'a al-Turuq Limuajahat Harb al-Miyah" ("District Governor of Khalis threatens to cut off roads in response to Barzani's water war,") *Al-Sumariya* (Baghdad), March 9, 2014 <http://goo.gl/fJNWYX>

(continued)