



Mapping Saudi Arabia's Succession

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This paper aims to serve as a guide for keeping track of the key players in the Saudi royal family. It uses network mapping software to create various snapshots of the key players in the looming transfer of power to a new generation of princes.

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INTRODUCTION

Saudi Arabia's ruling generation is aging fast.¹ The youngest living son of Ibn Saud, the modern kingdom's founder, is nearly seventy years old. For the kingdom to survive in its present form, the throne will need to be transferred to the next generation of princes. Keeping track of the key players in this large generation can be difficult. Through basic visual representations of the Al Saud family, this paper aims to serve as an aid to those following the important issue of succession in Saudi Arabia.²

Ibn Saud, also known as King Abdul Aziz Al Saud, bequeathed the throne to his eldest living son, Saud bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, in 1953.³ After a protracted behind-the-scenes power struggle, King Saud was forced to abdicate in favor of his brother Faysal in 1964. This created a precedent by which Saud's claim to the throne by primogeniture was overridden by a broad notion of "competence," producing an unwritten succession rule that incorporated both age and ability. Since then, each king has added his grain of sand to the rules of succession. The most recent is King Abdullah's creation of an "Allegiance Council," in essence a mechanism for naming the crown prince following the end of Abdullah's rule, in which each of Ibn Saud's living sons (or their descendants) gets a single vote, with consensus required for a candidate to be named.


As the first generation of Al Saud royals continues aging without formally transferring power to the new generation, speculation on the precise mechanism of intergenerational succession will continue swirling. Saudi Arabia's interventionist regional policies, first in Bahrain and Yemen, and then in Syria, may expose the kingdom to complex regional currents at a delicate time.⁴ The kingdom's foreign policy activism contrasts starkly with the rulers' timidity in pursuing domestic reforms. This in itself may be only the beginning of a rocky period in which Saudi policies are increasingly driven by the politics of succession.

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- 1 Given this paper's focus on succession, the current ruling generation is here called the "first generation."
 - 2 Relevant works published recently on Saudi succession include Stig Stenslie, *Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia* (Routledge, 2012) and Andrew Hammond, *The Islamic Utopia: The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia* (Pluto Press, 2012). Earlier books on the succession include Joseph Kechichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia* (Palgrave, 2001) and Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies* (SUNY Press, 1999). See also: May Yamani, "From Fragility to Stability: a Survival Strategy for the Saudi monarchy," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 2.1 (2009); Brian Lees, "The Al Saud family and the future of Saudi Arabia," *Asian Affairs* 37.1 (2006) and Simon Henderson, "After King Abdullah: Succession in Saudi Arabia," *WINEP Policy Focus #96* (2009) (Available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus96.pdf> [accessed 5/29/13]). Twitter chatter, mostly in the Arabic language, has also proliferated on the topic. Within this realm, @mujtahidd is the most influential and critical voice.
 - 3 Here the Arabic term "bin" means "son of" and is the same as the term "ibn."
 - 4 Different royal family factions are considered to have different portfolios. Prince Nayif and now his sons, for instance, were in charge of AQAP and more recently Bahrain (see: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f695afdc-87e9-11e2-b011-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UztsdwKk>). The Syria policy is allegedly run by sons of Sultan (see: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531>).

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: THE ENTIRE NETWORK

From approximately 1900 to 1950 Ibn Saud sired over thirty sons from more than a dozen wives.⁵ Each was by birthright entitled to great power and wealth in the vast, oil-gushing kingdom ruled by his father. The political role each son would come to play in the kingdom's political life depended both on maternal lineage and levels of competence and ambition. The map below (Figure 1),⁶ which includes the entire network of Ibn Saud's direct male descendants, makes no distinction as to each son's political relevance. It links father and sons via the mother, allowing clusters of full brothers to be distinguished from one another (represented by different colors).⁷ The network includes all direct male descendants of Ibn Saud, whether living or dead, relevant or irrelevant.

FIGURE 1 – ENTIRE NETWORK




5 In total Ibn Saud had over 40 sons, although many of them died in infancy.
 6 This and the other figures in this paper were made using the open-source software program Gephi. Family tree data on the Saudi royal family comes from the website www.datarabia.com.
 7 Male descendants in the second, third and fourth generation are linked directly to the father (that is, no distinction is made between full- and half-brothers); a more detailed map would include the women of Saud beyond the mothers of the first generation. Although the Al Saud's Wahhabi regime is paternalistic and misogynistic, women play an important role within the royal family. See for instance: Stig Stenslie, "Power Behind the Veil: Princesses of the House of Saud," *Journal of Arabian Studies* 1.1 (2011).

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: THE SUDAIRI SEVEN

In Figure 1 the red cluster on the upper right-hand corner represents the "Sudairi Seven," the strongest and most important kin-based faction within the first generation of Saudi royals. The Sudairi Seven, also called the "Al Fahd," are seven full brothers, the children of Hassa bint Ahmed Al Sudairi. Only one of them (Fahd) has ever been king, from 1982 to 2005. Two have come very close, only to be outlived by non-Sudairi King Abdullah: Sultan was crown prince from the death of King Fahd in 2005⁸ until his own death in 2011; Nayif replaced him but died the following year. Current Crown Prince Salman is the third consecutive Sudairi crown prince. King Abdullah has outlived the past two; were he to outlive Salman, he would essentially have outlived the key Sudairi competitors from his generation (Sultan, Nayif and Salman).⁹

The competition over power and resources is already playing out in the next generation; a significant temporal gap between the death of Abdullah and Salman would strengthen the sons and allies of the one over the other. The map below (Figure 2) shows the seven Sudairi brothers and their male offspring. The four living brothers are in the upper half of the figure, the three deceased in the lower half. For a list of the seven brothers, see Appendix I.

FIGURE 2 – SUDAIRI SEVEN




8 King Fahd was infirm for the last several years of his rule, during which Crown Prince Abdullah (the current king) acted as de facto ruler
 9 Neither of the three remaining Sudairis (Abd al-Rahman, Turki II and Ahmad) is considered a serious threat to King Abdullah: Abd al-Rahman has essentially been retired, and Turki (II) has always been a controversial reformist, at odds with his brothers. Longtime Deputy Interior Minister Ahmad was named interior minister following the death of his brother Prince Nayif; a few months later, he was replaced by Nayif's son Muhammad, the first prince from the second generation to attain a full ministerial position.

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: THE NON-SUDAIRIS

The Sudairis may be the strongest kinship-based faction in Saudi Arabia, but they are not the only one. Figure 3 below shows all of Ibn Saud's other sons, both living and dead, along with their male offspring. The number of second-generation princes in each family (the size of each cluster) is not necessarily correlated with political influence. The large blue cluster on the left, which represents King Saud's numerous but mostly politically marginalized offspring, is a case in point.¹⁰

FIGURE 3 – NON-SUDAIRI SONS

(Click on the image to view a more detailed version through your browser.)




10 Figure 3 includes all sons of the second generation, including those who died in infancy.

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: LIVING NON-SUDAIRIS PRINCES¹¹

Although many of Ibn Saud's living sons likely retain some level of personal political ambition, the political careers of most either plateaued at a middle level of responsibility or have wound down due to advanced age. A notable exception is Prince Muqrin, the youngest among them. In February 2013 he was promoted to "Second Deputy Prime Minister," a position that is seen as crown-prince-in-waiting. Were he to somehow ascend the throne, King Muqrin would have a limited independent power base and consequently be considered either beholden to a key group (likely King Abdullah's sons and their allies) or a consensus candidate who would further prolong the inevitable transfer of power to a new generation. For a list of the twelve remaining non-Sudairi sons, excluding King Abdullah, see Appendix II.

FIGURE 4 – LIVING NON-SUDAIRI SONS

(Click on the image to view a more detailed version through your browser.)




11 Excluding King Abdullah.

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: THE ALLEGIANCE COUNCIL¹²

King Abdullah created the Allegiance Council in October 2006.¹³ The royal decree establishing the council posits fairly clear procedures by which the position of crown prince is to be filled following the end of Abdullah's rule.¹⁴ The council further codifies rules laid down in the Basic Law of 1992, in which then-ruler King Fahd extended the succession horizon beyond only the sons of Ibn Saud, to include the most qualified among both them and their sons. The Allegiance Council is composed of the sons of the founder of the modern Saudi state (or if deceased, a family representative), plus two family members appointed by the king.¹⁵ In December 2007 the king announced the initial council membership.¹⁶ See Appendix III for the list of names.

FIGURE 5 – ALLEGIANCE COUNCIL



(Click on the image to view a more detailed version through your browser.)

12 It is also referred to as “Bay’ah Council,” “Allegiance Commission,” “Allegiance Institution,” et al.
 13 The king convened the Allegiance Council when Nayif succeeded Sultan as crown prince in 2011, but not when naming Salman to succeed Nayif in 2012. In protest, Prince Talal resigned from the Allegiance Council. For more on the Allegiance Council, see: Nathaniel Kern and Matthew M. Reed, “The Crown Prince and the Allegiance Commission,” Middle East Policy Council Foreign Reports Bulletin, 6/12 (available at: <http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/crown-prince-and-allegiance-commission>) and Simon Henderson, “New Saudi Rules on Succession: Will They Fix the Problem?” WINEP Policy Watch #1156, 10/06 (available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/new-saudi-rules-on-succession-will-they-fix-the-problem>).
 14 The laws creating the council are available at: <http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2006/transcript/Page4.aspx>
 See also: <http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2007/news/page150.aspx>
 15 The line of Hamoud bin Abdul Aziz is not represented, as he died without a son. The same goes for Fawaz bin Abdul Aziz.
 16 The list of the initial 35 members available at: http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news12100801.aspx

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: CURRENT PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS


Among the Al Saud, governorships have been a key office for building political prestige and gaining executive experience. Not all governorships are made the same, though, with the three most important reserved for members of influential factions: the capital Riyadh, the province of Mecca (where the key cities of Mecca and Jeddah are located), and the large and oft-restive Eastern Province (where most of the kingdom's oil is found).

In 2013, two of these three key governorships changed hands. Saud bin Nayif was named governor of the Eastern Province, replacing longtime governor Mohammed bin Fahd.¹⁷ In Riyadh, following the death of Prince Sattam bin Abdul Aziz¹⁸ in February 2013, Khalid bin Bandar, a former army commander, was named governor (King Abdullah's son Turki was named his deputy). The administration of Mecca Province, meanwhile, has remained in the hands of Khalid bin Faysal since 2007.

Although not as critical, other governorships are also important in different ways. The map below (Figure 6) shows the branches that are currently in control of the different governorships.¹⁹ A list of governors can be found in Appendix IV.

FIGURE 6 – CURRENT PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS

(Click on the image to view a more detailed version through your browser.)




17 According to some accounts, Mohammed bin Fahd was replaced for failing to properly contain the Shi'a protests that had spread in the province in the wake of the Arab Spring.
 18 Sattam had been governor for barely over a year, having replaced longtime governor Prince Salman, who became defense minister upon the death of Prince Sultan (then-Defense Minister and Crown Prince) in 2011. Before becoming crown prince, Salman had been governor of Riyadh Province for nearly 40 years.
 19 The lightly populated Northern Border province, located along the desert bordering Iraq, is excluded, given that its governor is not a direct descendant of Ibn Saud.

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: THE SECOND GENERATION

Succession dynamics and family deaths are creating new and powerful princes in the second generation. Broadly speaking, those in this generation fall into one of two groups. The first of them have held important positions for some time, were mostly born in the 1950s, and will become the immediate inheritors of power; the second were born in the 1970s and are now emerging to fill roles previously played by their elder generational cohorts. Figure 7 (below) maps out some of the key players in the second generation. Their names, year of birth and current position are listed in Appendix V.

FIGURE 7 – INFLUENTIAL SECOND-GENERATION PRINCES

(Click on the image to view a more detailed version through your browser.)




20 Muhammad bin Nayif was the first of this generation to attain ministerial rank, becoming minister of the interior in November 2012. Mitib bin Abdullah, son of the current King, recently joined his cousin by being appointed minister of the national guard, a newly established position seemingly created explicitly for him to attain ministerial rank.

SAUDI ARABIA'S SUCCESSION: RECENT RESHUFFLINGS

Since November 2012 seven important cases of death, demotion, or promotion have occurred in the Saudi royal family. They are listed in Appendix VI, with the individuals involved mapped below (Figure 8).

FIGURE 8 – RECENT CHANGES

(Click on the image to view a more detailed version through your browser.)



CONCLUSION

According to one prominent Gulf expert, “[Succession] is the most closely held issue in Saudi Arabia. Members of the ruling family rarely if ever talk about it to outsiders, yet it is the subject of intense and constant gossip. Generally, ‘those who know do not talk and those who talk do not know,’ so one should be leery of any published material on this subject.”²¹

With that caveat in mind, a few observations are worth making. Control over the kingdom’s three security portfolios continues to be key to being considered a dominant faction. As a result, Crown Prince Salman and his sons may continue seeking to wrest control of the defense ministry from the sons of Sultan, whose influence has waned since the death of their father.²² The kingdom’s two other security portfolios – interior and national guard – have safely been passed on from father to sons, from the deceased Nayif to his son Muhammad in the case of Ministry of Interior, and from King Abdullah to his son Mitib in the case of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG).

The distribution of power among these three dominant factions (the sons of Abdullah, Salman and Nayif) will largely depend on their relations with one another, as well as their alliances with other important factions, including Sudairi groups (particularly the sons of Fahd and Sultan) and non-Sudairis such as Faysal’s sons. Individuals such as the enormously wealthy al-Walid bin Talal may also play important roles, were they to become directly involved in succession politics.²³

As noted earlier, the key issue continues to be the age of the first generation, with the race to stay alive between King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman its main pivot. The king is about a decade older than Salman and in poor health; Salman allegedly has Alzheimer’s. According to @mujtahidd, the king will now try to remove Salman for health reasons and promote Prince Muqrin, who is currently third in line, to crown prince; the loyalist Muqrin would then be enticed by the king to step aside and make way for King Abdullah’s son Mitib to become crown prince.²⁴ Much can change between then and now. The long-awaited denouement, however, may be closer than many think.

APPENDIX I - THE SUDAIRI SEVEN

The Sudairi Seven are:

- Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz (former King, d. 2005)
- Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz (deceased 2011)
- Abd al-Rahman bin Abd al-Aziz (b. 1931)
- Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz (d. 2012)
- Turki (II) bin Abd al-Aziz (b. 1934)
- Salman bin Abd al-Aziz (current Crown Prince, b. 1936)
- Ahmad bin Abd al-Aziz (b. 1940)

21 F. Gregory Gause III, *Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2011): p. 35 footnote 23.

22 Control over the Defense Ministry appears to be in flux. Some believe that the recent naming of Mitib bin Abdullah to the post of minister of the national guard is the prelude to merging the National Guard and Ministry of Defense under his leadership. See: <https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/339077486157635585>.

23 Non-royals may also play an important role, paramount among them the king’s close advisor Khalid al-Tuwajjri, whom a recent Guardian editorial calls a Saudi version of Cardinal Richelieu. See: *The Guardian*, “House of Saud: Built on Sand,” 6/2/13 (Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/02/saudi-arabia-editorial>)

24 Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), “Saudi King Moves His Son One Step Closer to Throne, 2/2/13. (Available at: <http://english.al-akhbar.com/Content/Saudi-King-Moves-His-Son-One-Step-Closer-Throne>)

**APPENDIX II - LIVING FIRST GENERATION
(MINUS KING ABDULLAH AND SUDAIRIS)**

The ten remaining living sons of Ibn Saud (Figure 4), excluding King Abdullah and the four living Sudairis, are:

- **Bandar bin Abdulaziz** (born 1923) – Limited governmental service.
- **Musaid bin Abdulaziz** (born 1923) – Marginalized given that one of his sons was King Faisal's assassin.
- **Mishaal bin Abdulaziz** (born 1926) Close confidant of King Abdullah, and Chairman of the Allegiance Council.
- **Mutaib bin Abdulaziz** (born 1931) Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs from 1975 to 2009. He has a long-standing family alliance with King Abdullah.
- **Talal bin Abdulaziz** (born 1931) – Not considered a contender for the throne as a result of his reformist views. Resigned from the Allegiance Council in 2011.
- **Nawwaf bin Abdulaziz** (born 1933) – Senior Advisor of King Abdullah, former Minister of Finance and Director General of the General Intelligence Directorate from 2001 to 2005.
- **Abdul Ilah bin Abdulaziz** (born 1935) – Former Governor of Al Jawf Province. Appointed Special Advisor to King Abdullah in 2008.
- **Mamdouh bin Abdulaziz** (born 1940) – Former Governor of Tabuk region, removed from the post by King Fahd.
- **Mashhur bin Abdulaziz** (born 1942) – Limited governmental service.
- **Muqrin bin Abdulaziz** (born 1945) – Director General of the General Intelligence Directorate from 2005 to 2012. Former Governor of Ha'il and Madinah provinces. Second deputy prime minister since 1 February 2013.

APPENDIX III - ALLEGIANCE COUNCIL

The initial list, with some notable changes that have since taken place inserted between parenthesis and the names of since-deceased members italicized, is below.

1. Mishal bin Abdul Aziz (chairman)
2. Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz
3. Miteb bin Abdul Aziz
4. Talal bin Abdul Aziz (resigned November 2011)
5. Badr bin Abdul Aziz
6. Turki (II) bin Abdul Aziz
7. Nayif bin Abdul Aziz (deceased, one of his sons to take his place)
8. Fawaz bin Abdul Aziz (died in 2008, no sons)
9. Salman bin Abdul Aziz (currently crown prince, one of his sons to take his place)
10. Mamdouh bin Abdul Aziz
11. Abdul-Ilah bin Abdul Aziz
12. Sattam bin Abdul Aziz (deceased 2/13)
13. Ahmad bin Abdul Aziz
14. Mash'hoor bin Abdul Aziz
15. Hazloul bin Abdul Aziz
16. Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz
17. Mohammed bin Saud bin Abdul Aziz
18. Khalid bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz
19. Mohammed bin Saad bin Abdul Aziz
20. Turki bin Faisal bin Turki (I) bin Abdul Aziz (died 2/09 replaced by brother Abdullah)
21. Mohammed bin Nasser bin Abdul Aziz
22. Faisal bin Bandar bin Abdul Aziz
23. Saud bin Abdulmohsin bin Abdul Aziz
24. Mohammed bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz

Mapping Saudi Arabia's Succession:

25. Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz
26. Talal bin Mansour bin Abdul Aziz
27. Khalid bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz
28. Mohammed bin Mishari bin Abdul Aziz
29. Faisal bin Khalid bin Abdul Aziz
30. Badr bin Mohammed bin Abdul Aziz
31. Faisal bin Thamir bin Abdul Aziz
32. Mishaal bin Majed bin Abdul Aziz
33. Abdullah bin Musaed bin Abdul Aziz (replaced by bother Bandar)
34. Faisal bin Abdulmajeed bin Abdul Aziz
35. Abdulaziz bin Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz

APPENDIX IV - PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS

List of provincial governors with their year of appointment:

1. Khalid bin Bandar bin Abd al-Aziz: Riyadh (2013)
2. Khalid bin Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz: Mecca (2007)
3. Faysal bin Salman bin Abd al-Aziz: Medina (2013)
4. Saud bin Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz: Eastern Province (2013)
5. Faysal bin Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz: Asir (2007)
6. Mishari bin Saud bin Abd al-Aziz: Al-Baha (2010)
7. Fahd bin Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz: Tabuk (1987)
8. Faysal bin Bandar bin Abd al-Aziz: Qasim (1992)
9. Saud bin Abd al-Muhsin bin Abd al-Aziz: Ha'il (1999)
10. Fahd bin Badr bin Abd al-Aziz: al-Jawf (2001)
11. Muhammad bin Nasir bin Abd al-Aziz: Jizan (2001)
12. Mishaal bin Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz: Najran (2009)

APPENDIX V - NEXT GENERATION KEY PLAYERS

For reference, their year of birth is included in parenthesis. They are:

- Khalid bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1940)
 - o Governor of Mecca Province (2007)*
- Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1949)
 - o Director General of Saudi Intelligence (2012)*
 - o Former Ambassador to United States*
- Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1949)
 - o Former Deputy Defense Minister (dismissed 5/2013)*
- Muhammad bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1950)
 - o Former Eastern Province Governor (1985-2013)*
- Khalid bin Bandar bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1951)
 - o Governor of Riyadh Province (2013)*
 - o Lt. Gen. in Saudi Armed Forces*
- Mitib bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1952)
 - o Minister of National Guard (newly created post, 2013)*
- Al-Walid bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1955)
 - o Wealthy businessman, media mogul*
- Sultan bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1956)
 - o Former Air Force pilot, Tourism Minister*
- Saud bin Nayif bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1956)
 - o Governor of Eastern Province (2013)*
- Muhammad bin Nayif bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1959)
 - o Minister of Interior (2013)*
- Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1963)
 - o Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2011)*
- Faysal bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1970)
 - o Governor of Medina Province (2013)*
- Turki bin Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1971)
 - o Deputy Governor of Riyadh Province (2013)*
- Abdul Aziz bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1973)
 - o Wealthy businessman, media mogul*
- Salman bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1976)
 - o Assistant Secretary General of the Saudi National Security Council*
- Muhammad bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz (b. 1970s?)
 - o Crown Prince Salman's Chief of Staff*

APPENDIX VI - RECENT RESHUFFLINGS

- 1. 11/5/12**
 - a. Muhammad bin Nayif replaces Ahmad bin Abdul Aziz as Interior Minister
- 2. 1/14/13**
 - a. Saud bin Nayif replaces Muhammad bin Fahd as Eastern Province Governor
 - b. Faysal bin Salman replaces Abdul Aziz bin Majid as Medina Governor
- 3. 2/1/13**
 - a. Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz is appointed Second Deputy Prime Minister (customarily the Crown-Prince-in-waiting)
- 4. 2/12/13**
 - a. Sattam bin Abdul Aziz passes away.
- 5. 2/14/13**
 - a. Khalid bin Bandar replaces Sattam bin Abdul Aziz as Riyadh Governor
 - b. Turki bin Abdullah replaces Muhammad bin Saad bin Abdul Aziz as Riyadh Deputy Governor
- 6. 4/1/13**
 - a. Prince Badr bin Abdul Aziz passes away
- 7. 4/20/13**
 - a. Prince Khalid bin Sultan is dismissed as Deputy Defense Minister