

URBAN POPULATION CONTROL IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

by

Mounir Elkhamri, Lester W. Grau, Laurie King-Irani, Amanda S. Mitchell and Lenny Tasa-Bennett

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not express those of the US Army, US Air Force, Department of Defense, US Government or Canadian Government

Historically, guerrilla movements have had more success in the rural countryside than in the city. From the urban uprising of the Paris commune to the urban revolts in Shanghai, most urban insurrections have ended up smashed and leaderless. Usually, it is a mistake for the guerrilla to move into the city. In the city, the guerrilla is surrounded by a thousand eyes and a thousand jealousies. The government can mass forces and move rapidly within the city. The guerrilla force must stay small and fragmented in order to survive. The guerrilla cannot conceal large weapons and cannot conduct on-site training and rehearsals. In Peru, the *Sendero Luminoso* did well as long as they fought from the mountains and jungles. The government was able to respond effectively only after the movement shifted its forces to the cities. The Peruvian government conducted an effective urban information campaign against the *Sendero Luminoso* while building and conducting an impressive urban intelligence effort. Then the government smashed the movement. *Sendero Luminoso* is now resurrecting itself and making a comeback—in the jungles and mountains.

Local government and local forces have had fair success in rooting out urban insurgencies. It gets stickier when an outside power, particularly one which does not share the same language, culture, history and religion, has to destroy the urban insurgency. How does an outside power control a local urban populace and elicit voluntary or involuntary cooperation? How does an outside power conduct an effective counter-insurgency in a city? How does an outside power, whose dominant religion and culture are different from those of another people, introduce new controls and procedures without sparking riots and attacks?

Much of urban counter-insurgency resembles police work and consequently is alien and anathema to the military. Yet much of the police intelligence techniques, relationships with bureaucracy, and maintenance of law and order are central to successful urban counter-insurgency. How does the military adjust to police methods without assuming police missions and police restrictions? How does the military supplement police missions without supplanting police control and responsibility? How do police and military forces and leaders interact and cooperate to achieve common goals?

The authors examined several urban insurgencies in the Middle East and South Asia in an attempt to determine answers and approaches. The insurgencies examined are the French experience in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s; the British Battle for Aden in 1964-1966; the Soviet experience in Afghanistan's major cities from 1979-1989; the Israeli experience in Beirut, Lebanon in the 1980s; the second (current) Intifada in Israel; and the current insurgency in Iraq. While none of these particular counter-insurgencies were stellar successes for the

occupier, there are often more lessons to be learned in failure than in success. There have been recent successful urban counter-insurgencies in the area, such as the Jordanian Army's battles against the Syrians and PLO ("Black September) in 1970-1971, the Saudi Arabian military move against the occupied Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979 and the Indian Army's Operation Blue Star in Amritsar in 1984. Since these were operations by local in-place forces, the authors did not explore them in depth. One successful counter-insurgency, conducted by the Sultan of Oman against the Marxist Dhofari insurgency from 1962-1975 involved local and British forces. This will be the topic of a future study. As in all academic endeavors, the authors frequently disagreed with one another, however they are in accord with the final analysis and conclusion chapter—the chapter that may have application in contemporary venues.

CHAPTER ONE: URBAN CONTROL IN ALGERIA (Elkhamri)¹

Algeria has long been a region of interest for Europe and the United States. Fleets of “Barbary pirates” from the cities of Algiers, Tunis, Salé, Tripoli, and various ports in Morocco raided and controlled shipping in the western Mediterranean Ocean from the time of the crusades to the early 19th Century. European governments and the new United States paid tribute to sail in these waters, although at varying times, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, Spain, various Italian states and France fought them for control of the Mediterranean and to stop the trade in Christian slaves. For 15 years, the new United States paid \$1 million annually in tribute to the Barbary States until the fledgling US Navy and US Marine Corps fought two wars with the Barbary Pirates (1801-1805 and 1815) and the US quit paying tribute. Control of the seas, however, did not mean control of the vast lands and different political entities behind the coastal cities. This control required more than a navy and small marine corps. It required a large, modern army. In 1830, France supplied that army, invaded Algeria and, in 1834, declared that Algeria was a French colony. France’s “civilizing mission” was initially a cover to provide public support to the reinstated, but failing French royalist government. After the bloody conquest, retention of Algeria became a matter of French national prestige, regardless of the government.

French colonization of Algeria extended beyond exploitation of natural resources. French settlers acquired large tracts of land and introduced contemporary agricultural techniques in this ancient land. The French “modernized” Algeria by imposing European culture, governance, education, economics, infrastructure, industry and thought in the country. French Algerians came to think of Algeria as a permanent part of France. Things were not as pleasant for the native Algerians. Although the native Algerians were French subjects, they could not become citizens unless they renounced Islam and converted to Christianity. Further, native Algerians could not leave their neighborhoods, districts and villages without permission from the French colonial authority. Native Algerians worked as servants, unskilled labor and peasants. French citizens, and other European whites, held the skilled jobs and top positions in society. The majority of native Algerians were stuck at the bottom of society. Some native Algerians did have an opportunity to rise, but under France’s terms. The children of the elite native Algerians were educated in the best schools of France. While they were learning at the French academies, the students were also supposed to become imbued with French culture, French values and French ideals. However, many of the young bumped into the hard reality of French racism (not so much racism in the American sense, but more a sense of “culturism”). Many of these became the nucleus of the Algerian nationalist movement. France treated the native Arabs, Berbers and Jews differently. The caste-like system was particularly onerous for the Arabs, and the resistance to France was principally centered in the Arab community.

The French had occasional problems exerting their authority over Algeria, but until World War II, it was limited to tribal revolts, nomadic raiders and bandits. During World War I, Algerian men of all races fought in the French Armed Forces. In World War II, France was conquered by Germany and divided into occupied France and a collaborationist Vichy France. Algeria was part of Vichy France. When the Anglo/American Forces invaded North Africa in 1942, the French initially resisted, then joined the allies. Algeria became the capital of Free France. After the war, France sent troops to reoccupy its old colonies. The intent was to resume

control as if nothing had happened. However, the local inhabitants were not always happy to see the French return. Serious resistance developed in Indochina and the army became locked in a bitter guerrilla war. The French withdrew from Indochina and fell back on their next problem area—Algeria.

The first Algerian nationalist movement was the *Federation des Elus Indigenes d'Algerie* (Federation of Elected Natives of Algeria).² It was founded in 1926 by native Algerians educated in the top schools of France. It was a moderate, liberal movement that sought full assimilation with France and political equality within Algeria. It never developed the necessary support needed to survive, but certain of its members, such as Ferhat Abbas and Dr. Ben Djelloul, achieved widespread recognition and stature.

The second movement, the *Etoile Norde Africane* (North African Star-ENA) was founded in 1926 and was decidedly anti-colonialist.³ Its leader, Messali Hadj, called for total independence from France and advocated “Islamic-proletarian” economic and social reforms. The ENA platform stressed three different issues: Arabism, Islam and populism. Arabism sought solidarity with all the Arabic countries. The Islam issue was sure to gain the Algerian Muslims’ solidarity at home and abroad. Populism sought to gain support across class lines for their movement in order to compete with other nationalist movements.

The ENA created a religious organization, the Association of the Ulama. This became a third major movement. Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Baddis led this organization of “orthodox” Muslims who resented French domination of their religion. Its goals were limited to religious and social reform. Although the movement did not promulgate armed struggle or violence against the French colony, their religious teachings were of great importance in forming the philosophy and inciting the Algerian Muslim people to prepare for and wage a holy war (*Jihad*). This jihad would be fought as a national liberation war by nationalists and Islamists. The enemy was France, colonialism and Christianity. In 1940-1945, French and Arab nationalist radicals expected this to justify their existence in terms of history and religion—a justification that would prove crucial when they launched their guerrilla campaigns.

During 1944-45, the outlawed Party of the Algerian People (*Parti du Peuple Algerian* -- PPA) created political cells throughout Algeria and paramilitary groups in the Kabylie and the Constantine regions.⁴ Many PPA supporters also joined the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (*Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté*--AML) and attempted to promote Messali Hadj's independence concept in contrast to the more moderate advocates of autonomy with the French Empire. Social unrest in the winter of 1944-45 was fueled by a poor wheat harvest, shortages of manufactured goods, and severe unemployment—much of this due to the upheaval of World War II. On May Day, the AML organized demonstrations in twenty-one towns across the country. Marchers demanded freedom for Messali Hadj and independence for Algeria. Violence erupted in some locations, including Algiers and Oran, leaving many wounded and three dead. The post World War II anti-colonialist struggle was breaking across the globe and Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain had their hands full. Indochina's victory over France further fueled the Algerian demands for independence. Closer to home, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser

overthrew Egyptian King Farouk in 1952. Nasser initiated a sweeping program of land expropriation, Pan-Arabism, economic reform and political upheaval. Nasser's program of "Arab socialism" was prepared to aid Arab insurgencies throughout the region.

In March 1954, Ahmed Ben Bella and eight other exiled Algerians formed a revolutionary committee in Egypt that became the National Liberation Front (FLN).⁵ On November 1st of the same year, the FLN declared war on France and launched a spectacular simultaneous attack on government buildings, military installations, police stations and communications facilities in Algeria. The FLN broadcast a proclamation from Cairo calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the "restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam." The French Minister of the Interior, socialist François Mitterrand responded sharply "the only possible negotiation is war." It was the reaction of Premier Pierre Mendès-France that set the tone of French policy for the next five years. On November 12, he declared in the National Assembly: "One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French...between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession." Of course, that very thing had just occurred in IndoChina.

As the FLN campaign spread through the countryside, many European farmers in the interior sold their holdings and moved to Algiers. From there, they demanded stern countermeasures. French settlers (colons) formed vigilante units that conducted *ratonnades* (rat-hunts) against suspected FLN members.⁶ The police looked the other way or actively cooperated with the vigilantes. The colons demanded the proclamation of a state of emergency, the proscription of all groups advocating separation from France, and the imposition of capital punishment for politically motivated crimes.

In Algiers, the FLN chose the Kasbah, the ancient exclusively-Arab section of the city, as their headquarters. The Kasbah's narrow, twisting streets and alleys, its secret passageways and flat rooftops played a dramatic role in the success of the FLN's missions in Algiers. The Kasbah also served as a recruiting ground for the network: half of the men who lived in the Kasbah were out of work and under twenty years old, which made them the perfect troublemakers. The FLN recruited pimps, whores and drug dealers of the Algiers underworld as intelligence agents and gunmen. Sometimes even the French police's informers were spying on the police.⁷

In August 1955, the FLN massacred civilians near the town of Philippe Ville. Before this, FLN policy was to attack only military and government-related targets. The wilaya commander for the Constantine region, however, decided to drastically escalate the conflict by provoking a French response. The FLN killed 123 people, including old women and babies. France and the world was shocked. Jacques Soustelle, the French Governor General, demanded more repressive measures against the rebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation. The FLN puts the figure at 12,000 Muslims, guerrilla and non-guerrilla, combatant and civilian. The massacre at Philippe Ville marked the outbreak of all-out war in

Algeria.

The FLN members sought publicity for their cause but subscribed to Lenin's dictum "The purpose of terrorism is to terrify".⁸ FLN attacks on the French and their loyal allies terrorized them and made them reluctant to frequent bars or go shopping. Such fears were calculated to drive a deep wedge of hostility and suspicion between the French and the Algerian. Was a day time servant a night time terrorist? Was a friendly European employer a nighttime vigilante?⁹

Guerrilla Tactics

During 1956 and 1957, the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale--ALN), the FLN's military arm, successfully applied guerrilla hit-and-run tactics. Specializing in ambushes and night raids while avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside. Kidnaping was commonplace, as was the ritual murder and mutilation of captured French military, colons of any age or gender, suspected collaborators and traitors. At first, the revolutionary forces targeted only Muslim officials of the colonial regime; later, they coerced or killed those civilians who simply refused to support them¹⁰.

In 1959, the FLN formed the National Revolutionary Council-CNRA that included military men who had fought for France in Indochina and during WWII. Later on, the CNRA formed military committee in an effort to merge political and military aspects of the guerrilla war and to coordinate attacks within Algerian cities. Their military actions were:

- To destroy electric fences that the French had erected to keep FLN units from infiltrating across the Algerian border.
- To recruit personnel to the FLN.
- To conduct combat and military attacks to disrupt the economy.
- To expand the conflict out side of the cities to include the Sahara region where regular French units could be divided and harassed.
- To conduct combat and guerrilla strikes on French soil.
- To develop leadership within the movement.
- To develop the logistics bases in Tunis, Libya, and Morocco.¹¹

Egyptian President Gamal Abdul-Nasser was a key element in the resistance's success.

He provided funds, training, and most important, the Voice of the Arabs radio station that provided Arab nationalist solidarity propaganda. Egypt also sponsored meetings where FLN leaders could discuss strategy. The Revolutionary Command Council met every three months to reevaluate its course and to adjust hostilities by alternating between guerrilla and conventional tactics. All major chiefs of the ALN attended meetings in the nations that supported the FLN. Tunis provided safe havens for Algerian refugees. The movement of those refugees provided a perfect mechanism for transporting supplies and fighters across borders.¹² Tunisia's restriction prohibiting pursuing French army units from crossing the Tunisian border gave the FLN a chance to use the border area to target French Army units and then withdraw to hit them again. The FLN along the borders knew the exact locations where pursuing French's units would have to stop. They directed and concentrated fire on these points.

In response to terrorist attacks in Algeria's major cities, which included assassination of French police, civil servants, and military personnel, the French erected an electronic fence along 400 kilometers of Algeria's borders and around towns and villages. The electronic fence was protected by guard posts, mines, and a rapid heliborne response force.¹³ French tanks, artillery batteries, and mobile radar units reinforced the fenced border area. Named the Morice Line, after French Defense Minister André Morice, the fence was enhanced with motion-detecting trip wires. The penetration of the Morice Line was a daily challenge to FLN guerrilla who would attack one area of the line as a diversion while massing forces to over-run a smaller garrison or watch tower elsewhere.

A few FLN fighters were veterans of Dien Bien Phu who understood that to force the French to withdraw, the FLN had to inflict massive losses. They were right. When French casualties reached 350,000 with 39,000 dead, France lost the will to fight on.¹⁴

There were other key factors that came in play, such as the ALN's methods of gathering information. The movement monitored newspapers, paying particular attention to French casualty lists. The ALN developed the ability to conduct reconnaissance from the sea. It developed specialized units that penetrated the Morice Line and cleared mines. The ALN made diversionary attacks to allow sappers and wire cutters time to penetrate electrified fences. The ALN took great care in selecting key terrain, not just for ambush but also to monitor French military convoys, command post activity, and roads. Ever mindful of helicopters, the ALN made great efforts to track all French military air assets based in Algeria. The French wanted to win battles with a standard force and would always meet 60 FLN guerrillas with the same amount of tanks, command and control helicopters, and truck-mounted infantry that they would use if they were confronting a much larger force.¹⁵ The FLN discovered this predictable force structure for French attacks and used the terrain and the time of their own choosing, to assemble overwhelming force. Their objective was to inflict casualties and withdraw to fight in another location. Sometimes, they would lure French forces to the Tunisian border, knowing the French would stop at certain locations where they would hit them with mortar fire. Some of these tactics were the same that Vietnamese General Giap used against French forces in Indochina and later against U.S. forces in Vietnam.¹⁶

FLN conventional units had infantry, 82-millimeter (mm) mortars, and 57-mm rifles. The FLN took care to assign French-trained veterans to new recruits. By the end of the war in 1962, the FLN had armed and equipped 25 regiments.¹⁷

Arming the Insurgency

Arms came mainly from Arab countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), East European countries, the US and the UK. From 1954 until 1962, elements within both the United States and the United Kingdom backed the FLN and supplied them with arms (although France and the United Kingdom were allied in the 1956 attack on Egypt and the Suez canal). Reported incidents provide an example of the scope of this support:

-In June 1957, military equipment, clothing and different types of armament came into Algeria through Libya and Tunisia. The main supply route was Benghazi city (Libya), Ghadames (Libya) to Madennines in Tunisia (FLN base) and then into Algeria.

-In July 1957,

221,500 firearms and hundred of shotguns were sent to the FLN from Libya.

6 trucks transported another 900 firearms.

800 firearms were stockpiled some 100 kilometers west of Tripoli.

16 trucks carried ammunition and military equipment from Libya to the Tadjrouine region, which is located just off the Algerian and Tunisian's border.

-In August 1957,

In Casablanca (Morocco), the French seized a Yugoslavian ship, the *Sbrija*, which was carrying weapons of Czech manufacture from the Second World War.

The French navy intercepted a ship off the coast of Algeria that was loaded with 70 tons of arms supposedly from Egyptian depots and consigned to the FLN-ALN.¹⁸

French Military Tactics

From the beginning of 1956 and lasting until the summer of the following year, the FLN tried to paralyze the administration of Algiers through what has come to be known as the Battle of Algiers. Paratroopers led by General Jacques Massu countered attacks by the FLN against both military and civilian European targets. To stem the tide of FLN attacks, the French military resorted to the torture and summary execution of hundreds of suspects. The entire leadership of the FLN was eventually eliminated or forced to flee. The French also cut Algeria off from independent Tunisia and Morocco by erecting barbed wire fences that were illuminated at night by searchlights. This separated the Algerian resistance bands within the country from some 30,000-armed Algerians on the frontiers of Tunisia and Morocco.

Late in 1957, General Raoul Salan, commanding the French army in Algeria, instituted a system of *quadrillage*, dividing the country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory.¹⁹ Salan's methods sharply reduced the instances of FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static defense.

Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco.

At the same time, the French military ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. The French also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels -- or, according to the official explanation, to protect them from FLN extortion. In the three years (1957-60) during which the regroupement program was followed, more than two million Algerians were removed from their villages, mostly in the mountainous areas, and resettled in the plains, where many found it impossible to reestablish their accustomed economic or social situations. Living conditions in the camps were poor.²⁰

In France, the feeling was widespread that another debacle like that of Indochina was in the offing and that the government would order another precipitate pullout and sacrifice French honor to political expediency. Many saw in Charles de Gaulle the only public figure capable of rallying the nation and giving direction to the French government. Europeans, as well as many Muslims, greeted de Gaulle's return to power, in June 1958, as the breakthrough needed to end the hostilities. De Gaulle's political initiatives threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent Algeria.

Meanwhile, the French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on *quadrillage* to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against ALN strongholds. Within the next year, Salan's successor, General Maurice Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance. In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. But political developments had already overtaken the French army's successes.²¹

During 1958-59, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of French society. International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. In September 1959, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand on Algeria and uttered the words "self-determination" in a speech. Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, with backing by elements of the French army, staged insurrections in January 1960 and April 1961. De Gaulle was now prepared to abandon the colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off.

Summary

Forty-five years ago, the French used torture during the Algerian war. This proved to be the key element in destroying the French will to stay in Algeria. It was so disgusting that the French public demanded that Algeria be given its independence. Today the United States is unfortunately facing the same problems in Iraq. Americans believe that our troops are in Iraq to

promote democracy, freedom and liberation and that the Iraqis should like us instead of hating us. On the other hand, the Iraqis look at us as brutal colonists who used the pretext of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in order to invade their country, take their oil resources and to infect the Islamic region with the Western culture virus. The Iraqi daily news and the Iraqi footage about the Abu Ghrib prison photos promote racial and religious hatreds. This hatred is growing daily in the Arab world and especially within Iraq. This hatred may result in further acts of terrorism such as suicide bombers, oil pipeline sabotage, kidnaping, roadside bombs and attacks on the coalition buildings.


No matter how many more troops the United States sends to Iraq, or how many millions of dollars they spend, they will not win the hearts of Iraqis as long as they cannot understand or predict Iraqi behavior, acts of patriotism/terrorism, pain, anger, and frustration.

Therefore, commanders in the United States should include serious cultural differences training dealing with Iraqi religion, clan, tribal and ethnic matters as part of the soldier's pre-deployment training. Once in Iraq, the US commander should repeat this training and include cultural considerations in his plans directing how and what should the troops do and not do while conducting raids and searches and mounting checkpoints.

Coalition forces need to improve border control in order to eliminate the external support for the resistance. Iraq shares its borders with six different countries- Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey. Sunni and Shia Islamic groups in each of these countries encourage their own forms of jihad in Iraq and provide support for the Iraqi resistance (arms supplies, personnel, training and finance). Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iranians now enter Iraq every day, illegally or legally along the different border posts. Under Saddam Hussein, the Mundhariya post was the only entry point for Iranians that wished to visit the Shia shrines. This control reduced arms trafficking and the support of radical Shia during the 1991 Shia uprising.

CHAPTER 2: URBAN CONTROL IN ADEN: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1964-1967 (Grau)²²

The port and city of Aden are located on the southwest tip of Yemen and the Arabian peninsula. An extinct volcano sticking up in the sea, the Jebel Shamsan mountain overlooks an inner harbor of 70 km², an anchorage and an outer harbor. The city of Aden huddles around the mountain. The volcano is connected to the mainland by a long spit of sand. Khormaksar airfield occupies much of this sand spit. Aden's Crater district, where the bulk of the Arab populace



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restricted breeze can make it a stifling hot and humid area. The commercial center of Tawahi and the harbor area of Ma'alla comprise the rest of the main city. The city is laid out fairly geometrically, but old neighborhoods by the sea are tangled and twisted. The shanty town region is a jumble of cardboard and tin shacks with open sewers. The buildings are typical for the region—flat roofs, stone, cinder block or concrete walls rising three or four stories. The Crater district has an interesting variety of Yemeni, Indian and Victorian

architecture. Ancient walls and towers still guard the city. Excessive garbage is strewn about the streets.

Relevant History

Great Britain established Aden as a British territory in 1839. It was an important seaport on coaling station on the route to India. When the Suez canal opened in 1869, it became even more important as the southern guardian to the canal approaches. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the now- Crown Colony of Aden included the city and port of Aden, the British Petroleum Refinery and surrounding tribal territories that comprised the Federation of South Arabia. Aden and the Federation were surrounded by southern Yemen. The Federation was joined to Aden in January 1963 despite the popular opposition of the Arab populace. The 1950s and 1960s were a time of unrest. Britain ceded control of the Suez canal to Egypt. Egypt's President, Gamal Nasser, whipped up Arab nationalist fervor throughout the region. Nasser sent troops into southern Yemen in September 1962 to create what eventually became the Southern Yemen People's Republic. The unrest spread into Aden and Britain's troops fought to maintain control of the colony. Much of the fighting was within the port city of Aden itself.²⁴

In 1964, Britain announced that the Federation of South Arabia would receive its independence in 1968, however, British forces would remain in Aden. Arab nationalists objected to this. In January 1964, the tribesmen in the mountainous border Radfan region revolted and tried to block roads into Aden. The tribesmen received aid from the National Liberation Front (NLF) based in Southern Yemen. The British-trained Federation Regular Army (FRA) moved into the region and suppressed the revolt. However, in November 1964, the NLF launched an urban terror campaign in the city of Aden. Grenades were the weapon of choice of the urban terrorists and British servicemen and their families were targeted as were local security forces and government supporters. An Air Aden DC-3 was blown up in mid-air with no survivors. HUMINT was difficult to develop since the local populace was unwilling to cooperate with the British or the security forces.²⁵

In 1966, the British announced that all British forces would be withdrawn upon independence. Few locals believed that the new government would survive much past independence and provided little support. A new opposition group, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied Southern Yemen (FLOSY) emerged and began its own terrorist campaign—as well as an armed struggle against the NLF for control of the region following the British departure. On 20 June 1967, the FRA revolted and were joined by the police. Twenty-two British soldiers were killed by the mutineers and the British were forced out of the Crater. The British sealed the area. On the night of 3 July 1967, the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders moved into the Crater to regain control.²⁶ The city was back in British hands on the 4th, although grenade attacks continued to plague patrols.

In November 1967, the British withdrew from Aden. The NLF and FLOSY then fought each other with the NLF being the eventual winner. The area joined South Yemen. In 1970, South Yemen became the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen—a Marxist state. By 1979,

the Soviet Navy had established naval bases there.

NLF and FLOSY Tactics

The NLF and FLOSY used mortars against the British compounds. These were fired from the shanty towns and always in a group of seven rounds. Sometimes the mortars were homemade—mere three-inch pipes buried in the ground, filled with a propellant and a grenade or other explosive round. Other times, these were actual mortars which were set up, fired and moved rapidly. The attacks almost always came between 1000 and 1200 hours.²⁷

British rules of engagement prevented British soldiers from searching women. Therefore, the Arab men seldom carried weapons—the women did. Men could be searched two or three times, then go to a designated rubbish pile where a woman had left his grenade or firearm. Most grenade attacks were on the rear of a patrol just after it passed the attacker.²⁸

Grenades, bombs and mines were weapons of choice against the British. The grenade attacks began with an attack on the British High Commissioner of Aden at Khormaker airbase. The high commissioner was not wounded, but a woman passenger and the Deputy High Commissioner were killed and fifty others wounded.²⁹ One of the earliest targets was a British children's Christmas party, again at RAF Khormaker airbase. One girl was killed and four children were wounded. Children were also wounded during a grenade attack on an army movie theater.³⁰ The grenade, and later the mine, were easily hidden, easily used and often anonymous. During 1966, 45 people were killed and 538 were injured in some 500 terrorist attacks.³¹

The British rules of engagement were known by the FLN and FLOSY and created a morale problem for the British soldiers. The soldiers felt that if they captured a terrorist, the terrorist would not be punished, however, if the soldier killed a suspect, even in *extremis*, the soldier would be punished if the suspect could not be proven guilty. The soldiers were denied the use of the bayonet, even in self-defense and, for several months, could not fire until they had been fired on first. Soldiers were not allowed in mosques unless accompanied by a local policeman. Soldiers were required to ask an Arab soldier to go in pursuit inside any mosque. The Arab soldier never seemed able to find the suspect.³²

British Urban Control Measures during and after the Battle for Crater

Because Aden's towns were small, close to each other and dominated by high ground, the British could control them fairly readily using a limited number of troops on the high ground. Technology in the form of electronic bugging devices, tracking devices, advanced cameras and night-vision devices enhanced the reconnaissance capability of the soldiers. SAS squads took the surveillance and control into the neighborhoods. SAS soldiers would dress as Arabs and blend with the populace, protected only by their 9-mm Browning High Power pistols.³³ Wild dogs ran in packs and initially made secret approaches impossible. The British used their silenced Brownings to reduced the number of dogs.

After the FRA and police revolt, an estimated 500 Arabs held Crater—a combination of mutinous police and FRA plus NLF and FLOSY insurgents. The British returned to Crater with a vengeance. First, they stationed some 50 sniper pairs on the mountains surrounding Crater. The snipers were from the 45th Royal Marine Commando and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. Equipped with .303 Lee-Enfield sniper rifles, spotting scopes, night scopes, maps and aerial photographs, the sniper pairs kept Crater under a round-the-clock siege, emptying roof tops and keeping the streets empty of arms-carrying Arabs for five days. Inside Crater, disguised SAS teams eliminated enemy personnel with knives and silenced pistols.³⁴ The approaches to Crater were sealed by British forces, but inside Crater, widespread looting and rioting went on while the NLF and FLOSY battled each other for supremacy.

The retaking of Crater belonged to the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Its commander, LTC “Mad Mitch” Mitchell, noticed that his night reconnaissance patrols were unchallenged, while attempts to enter during the day met with heavy small arms fire. He planned for a battalion attack to retake the Crater from the sea and Eastern end. The snipers on the high ground would provide cover while a heliborne force landed on the Ras Marshag peninsula. This force would move into Crater from the south while the rest of the battalion would enter Crater along the northern approach—Marine Drive. It would be a night attack when most of the defenders slept. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were reinforced with Saladin armoured cars from Alpha Squadron Queens Dragoon Guards, a troop of 60th Squadron Royal Engineers, a helicopter from the 47th Light Regiment Royal Artillery, radio operators from the 15th Signal Regiment Royal Corps of Signals and transport from 60th Squadron Royal Corps of Transport.³⁵

The evening attack began with a heliborne landing. A platoon landed near Sira island and the South Gate. The soldiers followed the Battalion Pipe Major, who played “Monymush”, the regimental charge, on his bagpipes. The rest of B Company landed on the Ras Marshag peninsula and pushed forward. The battalion main body moved south along the causeway, cleared Sira island and captured the Treasury. By 2300 hours, the battalion controlled the Chartered Bank and the Legislative Council Building. At dawn, the battalion pipes and drums assembled on the School roof and played “The Long Reveille” and “Hey, Johnny Cope”. The battalion then moved on to seize the Police Barracks, where the mutiny began. Crater was retaken at the cost of one Arab life.³⁶

The battalion occupied Crater. Battalion headquarters was in the Chartered Bank building. LTC Mitchell divided Crater into three areas. Each rifle company provided security in one of these areas. A Company had the northern part of Crater. B Company covered the coastal area. D Company controlled the center of Crater where the population was the densest and the streets were the narrowest. The reconnaissance platoon occupied key observation posts. The Pipes and Drums were the headquarters defense force. The battalion established about 30 fortified posts throughout Crater. The tops of tall buildings were fortified with concrete and sandbags. Machine gun positions covered the main streets with interlocking fire. All patrols, posts and vehicles were linked by radio to the Battalion net. The Argylls aggressively patrolled their areas, sometimes accompanied by armored cars of the Queen's Dragoon Guards and later

the Queens Own Hussars. Night foot patrols were effective at first since all streetlights were turned off. After a few days, civil authorities ordered that the lights be switched on again. This meant that the foot patrols were now vulnerable to sniper fire. The soldiers simply shot the street lights out! There was no official curfew in Crater, but LTC Mitchell told the Arab Police to tell the inhabitants of Crater that they would be safer if they kept off the streets after 7pm. Some Arab cars would try to blind the Argyll patrols at night with their headlights so the Argylls enforced a new rule of side parking lights only.³⁷

The battalion kept the terrorists guessing by constantly changing orders so that there was nothing routine about their movements around Crater. One day, LTC Mitchell ordered that all Arabs riding motorcycles would be stopped and searched; the next day he ordered that all taxis would be stopped. LTC Mitchell thought that the terrorists were using the taxi drivers as a source of information, so the battalion started to curb the speeding and honking horns of the taxis. They also changed the flow of traffic, converting the road network into a series of one-way circuits for all civilian vehicles confined to a single lane. This freed a "battalion only" lane that allowed the battalion's vehicles to drive in whatever direction they needed to. The battalion also used a "Phantom" observation patrol that would secretly occupy an apartment in Crater during the night. In the morning, taking care not to be seen, the "Phantom Patrol" would observe and report to Battalion headquarters without the terrorists knowing where they were.³⁸

The battalion opened the road blocks but continued to check Arab vehicles. Higher authority would not let them inspect the vehicles of the recent mutinous police and army forces. After a few days, the Arab population realized that there was not going to be retaliation for the mutiny and a sense of normalcy returned to Crater. Many residents came back and shops re-opened for business. Any Arab male, between the ages of 15 and 35, found anywhere near an incident was arrested and held until interrogated. All suspects were isolated and taken separately to battalion headquarters where Arabic speaking interrogators interviewed them. They photographed and finger printed each detained Arab and used this to build a large database of the big and small "players".³⁹

In late July, the Egyptian press mounted a campaign against the "brutality" of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. This campaign was picked up by other press agencies and the British authorities ordered the battalion to "throttle back" on its control measures in the interests of attaining a political settlement. As the battalion "throttled back", the terrorist attacks with grenades, pipe bombs and mortars resumed. British and Arab casualties mounted until the withdrawal of the battalion from Crater in November. The British left Aden in November without the traditional farewell parade and the FLN and FLOSY turned to fighting each other for supremacy. LTC Mitchell was one of the last casualties—due to his notoriety in the press, he was passed over for regimental command and promotion. Although popular with much of Britain, he was "too hot" for the political masters and retired in 1968.⁴⁰

URBAN CONTROL DURING THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR (Grau)⁴¹

The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan to prop up a faltering communist state and replace its ineffective leadership. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) enjoyed more urban than rural support, but party infighting led to a major schism within the Afghan communist party. One communist faction was primarily rural and Pushtun while the other was primarily urban and Tajik or Uzbek. The communists promised reforms that were advantageous to the city dwellers,

but failed to deliver on their promises. Some city dwellers supported the communist ideology and competed for government jobs, but more were neutral and more concerned with day to day life—until the Soviets occupied the cities.

The Soviet Union held the cities and connecting road network of Afghanistan as the operational key terrain during 1979-1989. There were problems controlling both. The Mujahideen guerrillas frequently ambushed the lines of communication. The Mujahideen also contested control of the cities with internal and external guerrilla forces. The key urban contests were in the cities of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Charikar.

Kabul is an ancient city that Alexander the Great passed through in 330 BC while en route to India.⁴² The Kabul river runs through it and three large mountains push through the city in various directions. In 1969, the population was 435,202—the largest city in Afghanistan.⁴³ Ancient palaces, mosques and fortifications crowd against the bazaars and the ministries; foreign embassies, hotels, restaurants and cafes are located in the new city—to the north and southwest of the core. Northeast of the city is the “microrayon”—a modern city sector of prefabricated Soviet buildings produced in a Soviet-constructed factory. These multi-storied buildings pierced the skyline and new restaurants, stores, supermarkets and garages catered to the foreign colony that lived in the “microrayon” alongside the growing Afghan middle class. Kabul had electricity, but not all the time. Running water was not potable and modern plumbing was confined to the newer parts of the city. The Soviets captured Kabul in late December 1979, using resident Soviet military advisers, Spetsnaz (Special Forces) and airborne forces to seize the 15 key points within the city practically simultaneously. The operation was carried out masterfully with minimal casualties.⁴⁴ Capturing Kabul was one matter. Controlling it proved to be more difficult.

Herat is an ancient city that was first mentioned in the Vendidad of the Zoroastrians. It was renamed by Alexander the Great and sacked by the Mongols in 1223 AD.⁴⁵ Urban control of Herat was a problem to the DRA even before the advent of the Soviet occupation. In March 1979, Herat rose in open revolt. Most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. Forces loyal to the DRA advanced and occupied the city while the Afghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Over 5,000 people died in the fighting, including some 100 Soviet citizens.⁴⁶ One of the leaders of the rebellion was Captain Ismail Khan, who became a prominent guerrilla chief in Herat province during the Soviet-Afghan War. Control of Herat proved to be a problem throughout the war. In frustration, the Soviets ended up bombing or shelling three-fourths of it to rubble.⁴⁷ The population is about 177,000.

Kandahar is a walled city that was once capital of the Durrani Empire. The Soviets and DRA controlled the city of 250,000 by day, but the night was up for grabs as defiant Kandaharis screamed “Allahu akbar” (God is great) into the darkness. Eventually, the Soviets and DRA brought most of the walled city under nominal control, but were never able to control the outward sprawl and the suburbs. On occasion, the Soviets used artillery on rebellious parts of the city itself.

Jalalabad was built in 1570 AD by the Mughal Empire. It has a population of about 48,000 and is the last major city on the western approach to the Khyber pass. It was firmly controlled by the Soviets and DRA during the war and most of the urban guerrillas lived outside the city and made forays inside.

Charikar is a small city of about 27,000 people. It's textile factory attracted workers that expanded the size of the city during the past decades. It is also famous for its pottery and viticulture. It has a compact city core that is approximately one square kilometer and a large suburb. During the war with the Soviet Union, Charikar had a resident urban guerrilla infrastructure and a number of guerrillas that lived and trained outside the city.

The Urban Terrain

The cities of Afghanistan have much in common with most of the ancient cities of Central and South Asia. Buildings are adobe, concrete or cinder block. There is an old city core in which neighborhoods and bazaars crowd together. The bazaars consist of narrow, winding streets opening onto wider streets where the shops and stalls of the bazaar are located. Guild-like shops are usually located together, so there may be an iron mongers' street, a leather workers' warren, a coppersmiths' alley, a wool merchants' block or a money changer and lenders' row. Other streets open onto plazas where foodstuffs and livestock are sold. Merchants often live over their shops. Women shop for groceries daily.

The inner city core neighborhoods are crowded snarls of snaking streets, open sewers and high adobe walls. Space is limited. There are some courtyards, but many of the dwellings share walls and new construction is vertical. Water comes from a neighborhood well or faucet. Houses and streets are usually unnumbered and unmarked. There are few sidewalks and not all the roads are paved. The water supply is sporadic and often bacilli-laden. Water sellers are common. Sewer systems are sometimes underground, but are often open canals that are flushed only occasionally by torrential rain. The aromas of the center city are pungent at best.

The metropolitan area is more ordered outside the tangle of the old city. Street signs and house numbers are still unusual, but the roads are wider and straighter and the neighborhoods are laid out in rough geometric blocks. Sewage and run-off ditches line the roads. Government buildings and industrial parks are located in these more-modern zones. Most of the houses in this section are surrounded by high walls topped with barbed wire, iron spikes or broken glass. A high metal gate controls access into the house's courtyard. Sidewalks are rare, so people normally walk in the street alongside the cars, buses, donkey carts and bicycles. Packs of wild dogs warily stay out of stone's range, but hunt the streets at night.

Individual homes in this area normally have a courtyard where trees and flowers grow, chickens scratch and cars and bicycles are parked. One enters the home immediately into the guest room. Most male visitors go no further, but are entertained regally in the guest room. Beyond the guest room are the living quarters, women's section, kitchen and family room. The privy is often outside. Some houses maintain a small, separate guest bedroom outside in the

courtyard. Several generations may live in the same house. Stories are added as sons marry and bring their wives into their father's home. The flattop roof is usually an area used to raise pigeons, dry fruit or forage and to sleep on during the summer.

In Kabul, the Soviets built a new city section called the "microrayon". Soviet prefabricated five and eight-story buildings, like those in Moscow, provided housing and security for Soviet political, economic and military advisers as well as select DRA government officials. The "microrayon" had running water, modern sewage and a semi-reliable electrical supply.

Outside the newer, more-modern section of the city are the dwellings of the internal refugees—Afghans who fled from the fighting and air strikes in rural Afghanistan but did not leave the country for Iran or Pakistan. Although there were some initial attempts to impose some geometric order on these areas, they quickly expanded into another maze of twisty, narrow streets, open sewers and numberless adobe dwellings. These dwellings share walls and many have a small courtyard in the back. DRA attempts to bring government services—postal, public health, firefighting, education, sanitation, refuse collection and police—to these areas were sporadic and uneven. Approximately 13% of the country's population became internal refugees in Afghanistan's cities—greatly straining the already austere civic support structure. These areas were the most lawless—traditional neighborhood social order was lacking and traditional tribal/village discipline dissolved as refugees left the tribal areas and villages. These hovels are seldom left unattended since pick-axe equipped burglars can burrow from one house to another through the adobe walls.

The Guerrilla Force

The guerrillas had internal and external forces. The internal forces were necessarily small, cellular organizations which operated independently of each other—and often in complete ignorance of each other—for security. They were surrounded by potential informants and government spies. The government could react quicker and move against them faster in the city than in the countryside. Their primary missions were reconnaissance, kidnaping, bombing and ambush. Although these cells had weapons, they were seldom carried except during actual actions. The internal guerrillas seldom had an opportunity to range fire or train with their weapons. Consequently, their standards of marksmanship were usually low.⁴⁸

Resupply of internal guerrillas was difficult. Internal guerrillas were dependent on an outside organization for supplies. Normally old men and old women, who were unlikely to be searched at the checkpoints, smuggled in explosives and ammunition. The urban guerrillas did not depend on urban ambushes for resupply. Their attacks were single, quick strikes followed by a rapid withdrawal to avoid a decisive engagement with a better-armed and trained regular force. Guerrilla urban tactics were low-level and relatively unsophisticated. The risk that the urban guerrilla accepted was great and the results were often minimal or not immediately evident. The urban guerrilla attacked the credibility of the government by chipping away at morale, attacking government targets and disrupting the daily life of the populace. Mujahideen guerrilla success in the urban areas was due primarily to the support of the population and the lack of Soviet/DRA

control outside those areas that they physically controlled. The Mujahideen enjoyed relative freedom of movement away from the main thoroughfares, however they could not exploit this advantage due to inadequate training, a lack of modern weapons and equipment, ineffective command and control and a lack of tactical cohesion among the various combatant groups. Lack of communications equipment also hindered the guerrillas.

The other component of the urban guerrilla structure was the external forces that resided and trained outside the city and entered the city for specific missions such as raids and ambush. Many urban guerrilla commanders maintained their primary operating base within the suburbs or outlying villages where it was easier to assemble and train a group of men without government cognition. Often the internal guerrillas provided guides and reconnaissance to the external guerrillas. A network of informers and supporters also facilitated the entry of guerrilla groups into the city and guided their safe passage within the city. However, the external guerrilla groups had to secure their route of entry and withdrawal for urban operations. This security mission usually tied up the bulk of their force—sometimes over 80%. The external guerrillas also conducted shelling attacks on the cities—a tactic that created anxiety for the Soviets and DRA authorities—but also terrorized the civilian populace and lost support for the guerrillas.

Both internal and external guerrilla forces failed to conduct adequate mission rehearsals. Too often, an attack or raid would fail because the participants did not know what the mission was (due to operational security) and what to do when they got there (mission rehearsal). Too much was done on the fly. However, the Mujahideen had thoroughly penetrated the DRA government forces and often knew what the DRA (and Soviet) plans were. This gave them a great advantage in survival and conducting successful offensive actions. Children and teenagers were an essential auxiliary element for the internal and external guerrillas. They performed reconnaissance, delivered messages, arranged defections, purchased supplies and performed other tasks for the guerrillas.

Urban guerrilla attacks inside the city normally involved bombs, assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and machine guns. Recoilless rifles and mortars were sometimes used, but with uneven results. The Mujahideen lacked the ability to register these weapons' firing positions beforehand and consequently the supporting fire could be erratic and dangerous to the attacking Mujahideen.

To this day, it is hard to determine how many urban guerrillas fought in Afghanistan's cities. Their numbers were clearly small due to problems of survival and less popular support than that found in the rural countryside.

Soviet and DRA Urban Control Measures

The DRA fielded three uniformed security forces—those of the Secret Police (KHAD), Minister of the Interior (Sarandoy) and Minister of Defense (the army, air force and air defense forces). The purpose of these multiple armed forces was not efficiency, rather regime survival. They assured that a *coup de etat* could not be readily mounted against the government. All of

these security forces played a role in urban control.

The Soviets and DRA used an integrated model to control their cities. They began the control with a one to three belts of outposts encircling the city. The space between the outposts was covered with minefields, obstacles and foot or vehicle patrols. Fortified checkpoints controlled all roads and paths entering and exiting the city. Additional fortified checkpoints controlled main intersections within the city. Small guard posts secured key sites within the city—sites such as government buildings, police stations, factories, public works, vehicle parks, fuel points, embassies and housing areas inhabited by Soviet and DRA officials. These fixed sites were supplemented by vehicular and dismounted military patrols and civilian police. The KHAD (the DRA counterpart to the KGB) mounted a stringent counter-guerrilla effort. This effort included a vast agent net of paid informers that reported on suspicious activities and relationships. The Kabul and Jalalabad KHAD agent net was fairly effective and forced the internal urban guerrillas to limit the size of their cells to three-five members. The KHAD also conducted raids and monitored bazaar activities.

The DRA Sarandoy were heavily armed police that belonged to the Afghan Minister of the Interior (The Soviet Ministry of the Interior also had its own uniformed force—the MVD). While active in the countryside, the Sarandoy also maintained units in the cities. In addition to normal police duties, the Sarandoy served as separate combat units and did an extensive amount of convoy escort and convoy security work.

The DRA Armed Forces, particularly the army, were active in city defense and urban control. They conducted patrols, manned check points, guarded facilities and conducted counter-battery fires and patrols against Mujahideen shelling attacks.

The Soviets from the KGB, MVD and MOD worked closely with their DRA counterparts. The Soviets and DRA controlled the main roads of Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad using vehicular and dismounted patrols and checkpoints. DRA-issued identification papers were necessary to get through the checkpoints—and actual or forged documents were often an essential part of the urban guerrilla's survival kit. The Soviets checked vehicles and donkey carts carrying goods into the city. Soviet and DRA control was less effective in the inner core region and in the slums and shanty towns.

The Soviets and DRA conducted joint active measures inside the cities—usually sealing neighborhoods and then conducting a house-by-house search of the region. Consequently, guerrillas seldom hid their weapons inside their houses or courtyards. Instead, they were wrapped in plastic and buried, concealed within walls, or secured inside underground sewage pipes. The block and sweep [cordon and search] was the standard Soviet approach to clearing an inhabited area. Soviet forces would encircle the area and move personnel into blocking positions. Armored vehicles would be withdrawn into a separate mechanized reserve (*bronnegruppa*). Then DRA forces would move methodically through the area, searching for contraband and guerrillas.⁴⁹

The Soviets and DRA were most successful in controlling Kabul, Charikar and Jalalabad.

Kandahar was actively contested on a nightly basis. Herat was such an urban problem to the Soviet and DRA forces that the Soviets ended up bombing and shelling three-fourths of the city into ruin. Clearly destruction of a city to “save it” is a sign of desperation, not success.

Conclusions

The Soviets committed the equivalent of five and two-thirds divisions to the fight in Afghanistan. DRA forces were theoretically three times larger, but desertions kept them at about 40% manning. Some 85% of this combined force was devoted to security—security of the cities, airfields, garrisons, highways and factories or manning outposts along the highways or providing convoy escort to the long truck convoys snaking back and forth to the Soviet Union.

Urban control is a tedious business for the government force. It uses a lot of soldiers and police in patrols and static defense. It consumes valuable resources and requires a great deal of bureaucratic support. As a minimum, a national police data base, a registration and identification card regimen, a good system of traffic and commerce control and an extensive agent net are necessary. The Soviets and DRA tried these measures, but they were implemented in a slipshod manner. The Soviets never fully trusted the DRA—with good reason since the DRA was well-penetrated by the Mujahideen. The Soviets and DRA were never successful in standing up competent urban police forces—a prerequisite for effective urban control. However, the DRA kept control of Afghanistan’s cities long after the Soviet withdrawal. The cities were the last part of the DRA to fall to the Mujahideen.

MOUT AND URBAN CONTROL IN BEIRUT, 1982-1984 (King-Irani)⁵⁰

Cities happen to be problems in organized complexity....They present situations in which a half-dozen or even several dozen quantities are all varying simultaneously and in subtly interconnected ways....The variables are many, but they are not helter-skelter; they are

*interrelated into an organic whole.*⁵¹

*Conditions in the Beirut cityscape resembled those of the mountains: appropriately armed, a few defenders could hold off a far more numerous attacking force, especially if they are strangers to the city. Militias in Lebanon were always much better defenders than attackers. The modalities of mountain and urban warfare in Lebanon favored the defenders. Despite superiority in numbers, weaponry, and discipline, no regular army Syrian, Israeli or otherwise ever crushed an opposing militia in all the years of the Lebanese war.*⁵²

Wild beasts, when at bay, fight desperately. How much more is this true, then, of men? If they know there is no alternative, they will fight to the death. – Sun Tzu

Introduction

For many Americans, the names “Lebanon” and “Beirut” have long been synonymous with violence, chaos, terrorism, hostage-taking, and anti-US organizations, ideologies, and activities. These place names are often bywords for a total breakdown of social, political, and legal order. Indeed, the noun “Lebanization” has been applied to numerous situations of internecine ethnic conflicts played out in urban settings. Countering such conventional perceptions, this study argues that even during the worst phases of Lebanon’s multidimensional wars (usually fought in and over Beirut) order and patterns were evident in the structures and levels of confrontation: local, national, regional, and international. Multiple strategies, sometimes in concert, though more often in competition, shaped the dynamic sociopolitical context of Lebanon over a period of sixteen years. As the war progressed, fighting became protracted and a war system was institutionalized, giving rise to a new class of warlord/politicians and *nouveaux riches* decision makers. Beirut was dissected socially and devastated physically.

By the late 1980s, paralysis had set in; no one side could decisively win or lose militarily. On the socioeconomic level, most Lebanese were unequivocally losers. On the political level, the Lebanese war, despite its monotonous internecine violence, gave rise to dramatic developments in the form of new players, tactics, ideologies, and alliances. Even seasoned Middle East observers were taken by surprise at the latter developments, most clearly demonstrated by the emergence of the radical Shi`i militias, Islamic Jihaad and Hizbullah (Party of God), also known as the Islamic Resistance (*al-muqaawamah al-islamyyah*). These new political and military actors were born from local and regional events—the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Hizbullah’s combat in rural and urban settings would soon change the nature of guerrilla tactics in Lebanon, and even influence other groups beyond Lebanon’s borders, such as Hamas in Israel and Al-Qa’ida.

In 1983, the United States learned particularly painful lessons from the Islamic Resistance with the suicide truck-bombings of the US Embassy and the even deadlier attack on the US Marine Battalion barracks near the Beirut Airport, which took 241 marines’ lives. The lessons?

-Expect the unexpected and assume nothing in a fluid, multi-ethnic urban combat setting in which

parties/factions have shifting ties to external players and are motivated by local as well as distant events.

-Use multiple analytical lenses simultaneously in order to understand the lay of the land – literally as well as socio-politically.

-Never underestimate the strength, flexibility, and reach of informal networks and associated patron-client relationships. In the Lebanese war, such networks were “wired” into the executive and military branches of surrounding nation states. Now, such networks in Iraq are linked to transnational, non-state entities, such as Al-Qa’ida, shadowy arms’ dealers, and criminal gangs and syndicates.⁵³ Communications and financial transactions between local insurgencies and external groups are harder to track, making them that much more dangerous. Factor the “moral economy of honor” and different cultural conceptions of rights, duties, legitimacy and power into military strategy and the choice of tactics in sensitive and volatile urban settings.

US and Israeli experiences with MOUT in Lebanon, particularly the confrontation with the Islamic Resistance, underscore the critical need for sensitive Human Intelligence of high quality, based not only on linguistic ability but also on cultural, political, and historical awareness. In appraising and responding to such threats in the urban theater of combat, US forces must avoid over-reliance on one set of ideologically-tinted lenses and instead must adopt new and flexible frames of reference and a consult a variety of interpretations and possible viewpoints. Lessons learned in Beirut twenty years ago are especially crucial in assisting Coalition military forces in Iraq to save lives and attain long-term political mission goals, not just short-term military victories.

Political and Historical Background: During the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon was celebrated as “the Switzerland of the Middle East.” Beirut, a vibrant Levantine crossroads of cultures, was home to over a million Lebanese from 17 different ethno-confessional sects, thousands of Palestinian refugees, Arabs fleeing tyrannical regimes, and many European and American families working for ARAMCO and its subsidiaries. A regional center for banking, finance, insurance, and import-export trade, Beirut meant very different things to the wide variety of people who lived in her neighborhoods or passed through her streets en route to other destinations. For middle class Arabs in Lebanon and throughout the region, Beirut was a glittering modern capital: *sitt ad-dunya*, “The Lady of the World” -- the center of Middle Eastern sophistication, luxury, cosmopolitan attitudes, fashions, and pleasures. For Arab intellectuals and aspiring politicians, Beirut offered a welcome breathing space for discussing and publishing ideas deemed radical or revolutionary elsewhere. For the wealthy from east or west, Beirut was “Paris on the Mediterranean,” site of a vibrant and lucrative services industry, deluxe casinos and hotels, and the best hospitals and universities in the Arab world. Yet Beirut was also a troubled zone of tragic contradictions and painful contrasts: between the ostentatiously wealthy and the miserably poor, citizens and refugees, secularists and religious, Left and Right, Orient and Occident.

Although Beirut has been continuously inhabited for millennia, it was not until the 20th century that the city became demographically and politically significant. The name “Beirut” has either Syriac, Hebrew, or Phoenecian roots, meaning “wells” or “many wells,” indicating that this

flat triangular plain, which juts into the Mediterranean and enjoys a natural harbor, has always been rich in fresh water sources other than those provided by rivers and snow melt descending from the mountainous regions to the city's south and east (the Shouf region and Mount Lebanon, respectively).

Beirut grew dramatically during the latter half of the 20th century. A middling port town and trading center that took on added importance with the rise of the silk trade in the 18th and 19th century under Ottoman rule, Beirut's population was predominantly Sunni Muslim and Greek Orthodox. Lebanon is a country marked by profound ethnic diversity first because its mountainous terrain was historically so attractive to religious and ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the Ottoman period, and second because the manner in which it was patched together as an administrative territory following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire represents a living remnant of the Ottoman *millet* system disguised as a centralized nation state. Lebanon began as the autonomous region of Mount Lebanon that the French exacted from the Ottoman authorities in the 1860s in order to protect the Christian *dhimmi*s, or non-Muslim minorities (primarily the Maronites, an Eastern rite church that was always in communion with Rome and thus had more of a Western orientation than most of the other Christian sects). Before Lebanon's independence in 1943, the French colonial powers had attached to Mount Lebanon the northern regions of Akkar province, the city of Tripoli and its surroundings, the city of Beirut, and the southern cities of Sidon and Tyre. This deft carving and combining of territories added Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Jacobite, Assyrian, and Shi'a communities to the largely Maronite and Druze communities of Mount Lebanon.

France's creation of the Republic of Lebanon never sat well with Syrian leaders or the Syrian populace, who had always considered some of the new territories of Lebanon, particularly the northern provinces, Tripoli, and the Bekaa Valley, as its territory. To this day, Syria does not have an embassy in Beirut, the Lebanese capital.

Adding to the inherently unstable mix of confessional groups in the newly forged Lebanese Republic (which, at independence, was said to be 51 percent Christian and 49 percent Muslim by manipulations of statistical data) was the arrival in 1948 of tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees fleeing war and violence between Palestinian Arabs and the European Jews who had been living and settling in Palestine since the last decades of the 19th century. The Jews obviously won that battle, founding the State of Israel in 1948 and forbidding the return of the majority of the refugees who had fled or who had been driven out. The presence of the Palestinian refugees in Beirut constituted a logistical and economic problem of immense proportions for a new state lacking in resources. The biggest threat posed by the refugees' presence was the potential demographic and political significance of a large Sunni Muslim group in a state dominated by Christians. Many Christian--and even a few Muslim--leaders of the new republic feared that the refugees might one day tip the delicate confessional balance that enabled Christians to coexist and collaborate with Muslims.

The Lebanese political system is based on confessional (sectarian) power sharing (called "*taa'ifiyya*" in Arabic, from the word "*ta'ifa*," meaning "sect"). No single Lebanese group

constitutes a majority; Lebanon is unique in being a country comprised solely of minorities--18 officially recognized ethno-confessional groups, to be exact.⁵⁴ Each group has its guaranteed number of seats in the parliament, and each expects to receive its fair share of ministerial posts. The three largest groups--the Maronites, the Sunnis and the Shi'ites--get the presidency, the prime ministerial, and the speaker of the parliament positions respectively.

Theory and practice rarely coincide in politics, however, and the Maronite community's historic domination of Lebanon's political and economic power structures since before the state's establishment, no less than profound economic inequalities, rising regional Arab nationalist sentiments (particularly pro-Palestinian feelings), and the polarizing influences of the Cold War between the US and the USSR in the region, all led to eventual war. Although Lebanon was described as multi-confessional, it was truly only in the capital, Beirut, where all of the countries' 18 sects came together in actual space and lived and worked in the same socio-physical setting. Beirut was the living embodiment of Lebanese confessionalism, in all its rich cultural and interpersonal glory as well as its potential tensions, disjunctions, and contradictions.

Sociological studies consistently emphasize that a minority is not necessarily defined in terms of demographic size, but rather, in terms of relative political and economic power, as well as by distinguishing cultural beliefs and attitudes. If a minority is a group that lacks power, it is only a short leap to the conclusion that a minority group is always a potential victim. Members of minority communities are often mistrustful, quick to take offense, pessimistic, and ready to defend even minimum interests with maximum force. After all, any incident could well be a life or death matter for a group continuously threatened with marginalization, exploitation, or even extermination.

In Lebanon, the entire population, being a mosaic of contending minorities, was thinking and feeling like potential victims even before the war broke out on April 13, 1975 with the shooting by Christian gunmen of a bus carrying Palestinian demonstrators. This searing event took place on a main road in the suburb of Ayn a Rummaneh, a district in which Maronite, Palestinian, Greek Catholic and Shi'a neighborhoods and commercial zones were in close proximity to one another. Given heightened minority fears among all parties it is no surprise that the war was so violent, so bitter, and so protracted. "It was a macabre game of musical chairs in which no one wanted to be the only one left standing...The fear of being the ultimate loser is the motivating force in [Lebanese] politics".⁵⁵ Long before the war began, the Lebanese were enmeshed in a political and psychological "economy of scarcity" which left everyone feeling both vulnerable and opportunistic, and thus prone to aggressiveness.⁵⁶

Clearly, many of Lebanon's 18 different sects had valid historical, political, and economic reasons to worry about scarcities of power, security and resources. *Taa'ifiyya*, however, actually obstructs power sharing at the grass-roots level and gives rise not to a nation of fellow citizens, but rather, to an arena of pronounced conflict and competition between many anxious and agonistic minority groups. Because of Lebanon's confessionally based system, every individual is encouraged to think of himself or herself as a Maronite, a Shi'i or a Sunni first, and only secondarily as a Lebanese citizen. By emphasizing the group over the individual (and thereby

minimizing the individual's choice, power, and sense of responsibility), and by privileging the sect over the state (thus contributing to the fragmentation of the polity), *ta'ifiyya* set the stage for conflict.⁵⁷

The tragedy of Lebanon lies in the fact that “the very factors that account for much of the viability, resourcefulness, and integration of the Lebanese are also the factors that are responsible for the erosion of civic ties and national loyalties....In short, the factors that enable at the micro and communal level, disable at the macro and national level. This is, indeed, Lebanon’s predicament”.⁵⁸ Or, in the words of singer and song-writer Ziad Rahbani, the bard of the Lebanese civil war whose captivating music and ironic lyrics allowed the Lebanese to look at themselves with jaundiced but compassionate eyes: *yaa zaman at-ta'ifiyya! ta'ifiyya/ kheli eidek 'alal-howiya; shidd 'alaha qad ma fiik!* (“Oh, these are confessional times, such confessional times!/so best keep your hand on your identity[card]/ and grasp it for all that you are worth!”). The song refers both to the wartime retreat into primary identities, demonstrated by the massive mobilization and ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods, as well as the horrifying political murders perpetrated by militiamen who routinely killed civilians captured at checkpoints along the Green Line on the basis of their religious confession, which at that time was recorded on every Lebanese citizen’s identity card. The Green Line bisects the Lebanese capital into Muslim West and Christian East Beirut. (See Map 1, indicating Green Line, below.)



Map of Beirut showing “green line” dividing the city⁵⁹

Not only has Lebanon's system of confessional power sharing had detrimental effects on national identity and the consolidation of the institution of citizenship, it has also complicated

Lebanese conceptions, attitudes and behaviors associated with holding and wielding power. In Lebanon, power is not vested in the individual; rather, individuals can only attain power through their community, or, more specifically, through the leader (*za'im*) of their community, who usually wields absolute power (backed-up by credible threats of force) in the context of his confessional group. The concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals in Lebanon's political system has increased the sense of powerlessness and dependency that was already so prevalent among the members of each of the country's contending minority communities. If two communal leaders become embroiled in a personal conflict, the strife can quickly spread to their supporters in each respective community. The good of the community is thus sacrificed for the political or economic interests of leaders, who often have more in common with each other than they do with the communities they are ostensibly representing. One of the key prizes that all confessional leaders fought over constantly during the war was control of Beirut, particularly the port and business district.

The complexities and tragedies of the long and destructive Lebanese civil war, which took 150,000 lives, sparked massive emigration, and resulted in the disappearance of 17,000 people, were profound and mind-boggling, and seemed to demand a complex, elaborate, and carefully calibrated diplomatic solution to end the fighting. This proved to be a mistaken notion. What finally halted the war was a blunt, unambiguous, and decisive show of force by the Syrian military in 1990. In a land beset by an abundance of armed bullies (i.e., a wide variety of warlords representing different confessional communities), the Syrians stopped the war in its tracks simply by acting as the biggest bully of all. Though the fighting ended, so did the existence of Lebanon as an autonomous and sovereign state enjoying unprecedented freedoms in the Arab world. Lebanon is now a satellite of Syria, which controls Lebanese affairs more through deftly manipulated patron-client relations and involvement in public and private economic endeavors than through brute military force.

More than a decade after the Green Line's dissolution, the underlying socio-political dynamics of the war have yet to be addressed in a comprehensive and constructive manner. Given the existence of multiple regional tensions that could destabilize Lebanon once more, particularly the widening regional gap between rich and poor, the unresolved problem of the 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and growing transnational Shia networks, more violence is indeed possible in the land of the cedars.

Beirut's Urban Fabric: From the 1920s until the onset of the civil war in 1975, Beirut attracted waves of rural-to-urban migrants from a variety of ethno-confessional sects, all searching for work, education, and socioeconomic advancement in the capital of the new country of Lebanon, distinct in the Arab world for having a Christian head of state and a delicately balanced system of confessional representation in its parliament, army, and administrative structures of governance. Beirut quickly expanded outward from its port and souk-centered core (See Map 2) in the 1940s and 1950s. New suburbs kept pace with the development of industrial zones and factories to the east and southeast of the traditional city core. More than half a million migrants inhabited the new suburbs by the 1950s, most of them Shi'a from the South and Maronites and Druzes from Mount Lebanon and the Shouf District.



Map 2. Road network in Lebanon shows paths of trade, rural to urban migration, and natural and social borders between different regions surrounding the capital before onset of the civil war.⁶⁰

On the eve of the 1975-1990 war, approximately one third of Lebanon's population of 3.5 million lived in and around Beirut, most in densely clustered multi-storey apartment buildings constructed of concrete, or in squalid shanty-towns built quasi-legally on public or private land at the growing edges of Beirut-proper, particularly in the southern suburbs between downtown and the Airport, where poor Shi'ites from the south intermingled with Palestinian refugees, and in the Bourj Hammoud neighborhood east of predominantly Christian Ashrafiyyeh and south of the port.

Beirut absorbed an inordinate share of Lebanon's people, services, money, capital, and attention. Even villages ten miles away in the Shouf district had not yet been connected to the national electrical or telephone grid by 1975, though all the latest technology and gadgets were easily available in downtown Beirut – for those who could afford them. Disparities in services mirrored other disparities: geographical, class, and confessional, all of which increased as Beirut expanded, fueling more tensions and giving rise to a strong sense of relative deprivation among the poor, who lived in such close proximity to the upper middle class and the wealthy. But not all of Lebanon's tensions were internally generated.

By the late 1940s, a new demographic and socio-political element had appeared on the Lebanese landscape: thousands of Palestinian refugees moved into twelve different camps located throughout the country, some of them located on the edges of Beirut: Sabra and Shatila to the south of Beirut, Mar Elias near its center, Tell as-Za'ater and Jisr al-Basha to the south east, and Dbaye to the northeast. By 1958, when Lebanon experienced its first, short-lived civil war, Beirut was in fact two cities: the well-to-do urban core where upper middle class and wealthy Lebanese of all confessional sects lived, and a surrounding ring of impoverished working class and unemployed Lebanese and non-Lebanese refugees. These economic, political, and geographical factors have to be viewed in a dynamic socio-cultural context.

Beirut was not just an urban setting, it was also an ethnic setting. Politics and fighting, took place not only in ideological terms, but also for ethnic reasons.

If alienation is a malfunction of modern society, then ethnicity is an antidote...Ethnicity provides a fundamental and multifaceted link to a category of others that very little else can do in modern society....In a multiethnic society in which a plurality of groups, ethnic and non-ethnic, vie for scarce rewards, stressing individual human rights leads ultimately to unequal treatment...Individuals are fated to obtain more rewards because of their group identities. Organized ethnic groups can fight for equal rights.⁶¹

What makes a city a city is not the number of people who live there, or the existence of different classes, ethnicities, lifestyles, or occupations, but rather the nature of social role configurations and most crucially how social roles are combined to create new social formations that highlight personal networks, informal structures, diverse role domains that do not necessarily overlap, and various roles that one individual may play in a single day.⁶² The militarization and mobilization of distinctively urban networks was key to the carnage in Beirut.

One Urban Setting, Multiple Levels of Confrontation: The Lebanese war, largely played out in and through the urban fabric and infrastructure of Beirut, was in fact three overlapping, interpenetrating and dynamically interacting wars:

A civil war to influence and alter power sharing within Lebanon among Christians and Muslims. power sharing (*at-taa'ifiyya*), which had grown unworkable as Muslims began to outnumber confessional Christians. As historian Ussama Makdisi notes in his study of the roots of

confessional conflict in Lebanon, sectarianism is not an ancient and deeply rooted identity system. Rather, it first appeared as a thoroughly modern response to jarring, internal and external changes in the mid-19th century Ottoman Empire. Confessionalism, like ethnicity, is about contests for power in uncertain settings, usually urban settings. It is not a genetically transmitted mentality or an ineluctable set of traits. Makdisi further observes that "The war in Lebanon ended, but sectarianism did not." To dismantle sectarianism, he urges us to look not at religion and culture, but rather to attend to political and economic realities as well as local conceptions and practices of power in their articulation and interaction with regional and global political configurations.⁶³ Confessionalism is grounded in globalization, not tribalism; it is a correlate of processes of modernity, not ancient history. At its birth, Lebanon was anchored in a "gentleman's agreement" between the country's Christian and Muslim political leadership, who represented families and regions, not individuals: Lebanon would be a Christian country with an Arab face, in which Christians would not turn to the West and Muslims would not turn to the Arab world, but rather each group would negotiate and coordinate with each other to create a special balance in which a multi-ethnic sociocultural and political space would be viable on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. The breakdown of this agreement, known as the "National Pact," had actually preceded the war, but was hastened by the second dimension of Lebanon's war.

An Israeli-Palestinian-Arab war to determine the configuration of power, identity, and influence in the region. This dimension had begun, in fact, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the overt influence of European colonial powers in drawing up the borders of the region's new nation states—a political process that assumed special poignancy in historic Palestine with Great Britain's promise of the same land to two different peoples. Before the inception of Lebanon's war, the regional battle was largely fought in and around Palestine and Israel, and usually as short-lived conventional warfare on battle fields (1948, 1967 and 1973). The PLO's adoption of Lebanon as a site for a Palestinian state within a state in the early 1970s and its increasing use of Lebanese territory as a staging ground for attacks on Israel provided the rationale for Israel's 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon. While securing Israel's position as a regional power, both invasions had serious repercussions. The 1982 invasion caused the most intensive and extensive physical damage and loss of civilian life, altered the course of the Lebanese civil war, deepened political dilemmas for all parties (including the USA) and revealed the extent and dangers of the third dimension of Lebanon's war.

The international conflict. This was implicit from the start, given Lebanese connections to both the West and the Arab-Islamic world. Lebanese are inveterate labor migrants, and economic ties between Lebanon, the Persian Gulf states, Western and Central Africa, and North and South America played a role in political lobbying, remittance income, and arms dealing from the start of the war. France, the former colonial power, had intense interests in Lebanese developments, as did the Vatican. Israel and the US were anxious about radical Arab nationalist and Palestinian tendencies in Lebanon. After 1979, and especially after the 1982 Israeli invasion and its bloody aftermath, the Islamic Republic of Iran became a key player in Lebanon. Though political scientists of the 1980s viewed the US-USSR confrontations through various proxies in Lebanon as significant, in retrospect, it was the emergence of urban warfare between Western and Islamicist groupings that signaled new and evolving international dimensions of conflict in

Lebanon and the region.⁶⁴

The multi-dimensionality and dynamism of the Lebanese conflict was not new. Beirut's tensions were beginning to take on regional and international shades of meaning and danger as early as the mid-1950s. Conflicts in the Arab world, coupled with the US-USSR confrontation, certainly colored Lebanon's 1958 disturbances. These same conflicts reverberated much more loudly and lethally two decades later, not only because of international developments, but even more so because of social, economic, and political realities within the urban landscapes and social formations of Lebanon.

The "poverty belt" (*hizaam al-fuqr*) or "misery belt" (*hizaam al-ya's*) housing Beirut's poor continued to grow during the 1960s, generating its own informal economic and social constellations, based largely on kinship and confessional networks. The weak Lebanese state provided scant assistance to the marginalized poorer classes of Lebanese and Palestinians, so informal family and sectarian networks and patron-client relationships assumed added importance. This ensured that particular families dominated various businesses as well as public and private economic sectors. Residents of the poverty belt formed the bottom ranks of Lebanon's port, factory, and the tourist industry. They were represented by ethno-sectarian and/or trade union organizations. By the war's end, the ethno-sectarian organization dominated. The poverty belt provided a natural constituency for a variety of radical groupings and militias during the war. By the late 1960s, the residents of Beirut's shantytowns were very receptive to the revolutionary and radical messages of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had relocated its infrastructure, leadership, fighters and funds to Beirut from Amman in 1970-71.

Beirut's faces were many and diverse. Identities, interests, goals, affiliations, and perspectives were always plural and subject to rapid change and shifts in emphases and direction. This ambiguity made the city intriguing and attractive to outsiders, exciting and charming to its residents, and perplexing to invading or occupying armies. That the city became the stage for local, national, regional, and international confrontations is not surprising. Native Beirutis would sigh each time a new round of fighting or shelling began: *Beirut mal`ab duwwali* ("Beirut is an international playing field"). And Beirut is a tempting military-political objective, given its open political and literary culture, its coastal geographical location, and its weak state structure. Even now, more than a decade after the end of Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, many Lebanese refer to this dark period as *harb al-aakhireen*, "the war of others" on Lebanese soil. This characterization is only partly true. It was a war created and coordinated by Lebanese and others (See Table 1).

Period	Main Actors	Locales Affected	Strategies and Tactics
1975-76	Palestinians and Muslim Left (Lebanese National Movement, LMN) v. Maronite dominated	Downtown Beirut: port, souks, banking and hotel districts. Business district virtually destroyed, Green Line emerges, stretching	Destroying opponents' physical and economic bases of operations, and ethnically cleansing areas of opponents co-religionists/nationalists. Political debates over confessional power sharing and social equity are pursued "by

	<p>Lebanese Front and others on the Right</p> <p>Lebanese Army disintegrates into competing factions in 1976.</p>	<p>from port in north and cutting through the main (Martyrs) square, through residential districts near the Museum and extending south/southeast to industrial zone. Fighting in Zahle, Tripoli, Zghorta in late 1975 echoes that of Beirut.</p>	<p>other means” in the streets and avenues of downtown Beirut. Sharpening and intensification of ethnoconfessional identities and thus divisions. Shrinking space for neutrality or other political logics.</p> <p>Firing at opposing groups, sniping, massacres and counter-massacres, in an attempt to ethnically cleanse Beirut from center outward, delineating demarcation lines and fortifying positions along the Green Line dividing capital into Muslim West and Christian East Beirut. Shelling of neighborhoods on either side of city to accomplish ends by instilling fear.</p>
1976- 77	<p>Syrians back Maronites and their allies against Palestinians and LNM. Beginnings of roles of Druze and Shi`a militias, usually involved on the Left.</p>	<p>Beirut, East and West; Shouf and Mt. Lebanon mountain areas. Increased fighting between Christians and Palestinians in South Lebanon attracts Israel’s interest.</p>	<p>As above, with addition of tactic of assassinating Lebanese leaders such as Kamal Jumblatt and assassination of US Ambassador Melloy and DCM Waring in 1976.</p> <p>Increased international and regional attention to Lebanon; local actors try various strategies to sustain and manipulate external diplomatic, political, and military attention.</p>
1978-81	<p>Syria switches sides; Israel stages “Operation Litani,” occupies part of S. Lebanon temporarily, begins to use South Lebanon Army under Sa’ad Haddad as its proxy militia in</p>	<p>Beirut, South Lebanon, Bekaa</p>	<p>External actors become more embroiled in the Lebanese civil war, which is now becoming a regional threat. Syria and Israel face off in Lebanon through proxies and occasionally directly. Syria places Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) in Bekaa, sparking Israeli-Syrian missile crisis, which occurs outside of Maronite-Muslim confrontation.</p>

	<p>Lebanon; Syrian units lay siege to Zahle to defeat Phalangist (Lebanese Forces) in key city in Lebanese interior; Lebanese Christians split into competing groups (Chamoun v. Gemayel family blocs), Shi'a Amal militia clashes with Leftist groups in South of country, and Beirut.</p>		<p>Various Arab, Western, Vatican, and UN attempts to calm or end the fighting founder.</p> <p>Bombings, shelling, air war; various armed clashes. Most diplomatic activity of this first half of the war occurs in 1977, a year in which some begin to believe war is near its end.</p>
1982-84	<p>Phalangists, PLO, Israel, UN, US, France, Italy, Iran, Iraq, Amal and Hizbullah militias</p>	<p>South Lebanon, Bekaa, Shouf mountain, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, and Tripoli</p>	<p>Internationalization of the conflict increases. Israel invades on pretext of ending Palestinian attacks on northern Israel, initiating Operation: Peace for Galilee, Israel's most costly endeavor up until this time. Though indicating to PM Begin that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is only going 40 km into Lebanon, within a week the IDF is on the outskirts of Beirut. Siege of Beirut and massive bombardments by air, sea and land forces PLO to withdraw its leadership and fighters from Beirut under multinational protection. Israeli ally, Bashir Gemayil of the Lebanese Forces, is elected president, but assassinated soon after. Sabra and Shatila massacre of over 1000 Palestinians and Shi'i Lebanese by IDF-backed and assisted Christian militias brings US, French, Italian troops back to</p>

			<p>Beirut and spells end of any chance of peace.</p> <p>IDF invasion sparks volatility in Shouf between Maronites and Druses. Massacres and counter-massacres, ethnic cleansing results. Maronites and other Christians forced to flee to East Beirut.</p> <p>Shi'a Islamic Resistance rises in wake of summer of 1982. Stages dramatic suicide attacks on US, French, and Israeli forces in 1983.</p> <p>Attempts by President Amin Gemayil to reconstitute the Lebanese government and restore political and legal order come too little, too late. With departure of US Marines in 1984, and internecine violence between Shi'a and Palestinian and Christian forces, Lebanon is broken into virtually irreparable fragments.</p> <p>Increased ethnic divisiveness and population movements reinforced by constant shelling. Revenge more than grand strategies guides tactics. Decreasingly devoid of mobilizing ideological agenda, various militias become tools of regional agents while consolidating economic structures and wealth.</p>
1985-90	Lebanese Forces, Amal and Hizbullah Militias, Druze PSP, Syria, Israel, Iran, Palestinian	Beirut, Mt. Lebanon, Shouf, South Lebanon	Israelis gradually draw down troops and withdraw to the Occupied Zone of south Lebanon. Syrians play Palestinians, Amal militia off against one another. Shi'a militias fight bloody battles

factions; Iraq. General Aoun, appointed president by Amin Gemayil in 1988 in the absence of elections, attempts to initiate a new political logic, but fails. In return for its support of the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in fall 1990, Syria is allowed to show decisive military force in Lebanon, crushing Gen. Aoun's rebellion and coercing all parties to halt internecine fighting in Lebanon. Sunni leader, Rafiq Hariri, positions himself as key post-war economic and political broker. Main focus of post war politicking and economic deal making is the reconstruction of downtown Beirut. War begins and ends at city center: Martyrs' Square, as competition over historic and political meanings, identities, and

with Palestinian refugees. Hostage taking and murders drive most Western individuals and organizations out of Beirut. Criminal class rises to top of militia leadership. Shelling preferred means of fighting, to detriment of civilian population. By war's end, Maronites are fighting Maronites, Shi'ites fighting Shi'ites, and Palestinians fighting Palestinians. Beirut's center is a wasteland. Government services non-existent. Southern suburbs swelling with Shi'a refugees from South Lebanon's combat zone. Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon, particularly Jounieh and the Kesrwan, are economic, cultural, and political center of Christian Lebanon. Lebanese exhausted and angered by the war system and militia rule briefly see an alternative in General Michel Aoun, but his poor strategies in responding to the Salim Hoss government on one hand and Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces on the other through military means (massive shelling) discredits him.

	interests continues by other means: real estate transactions ⁶⁵		
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Sociopolitical dimensions of urban combat in Lebanon: Military clashes linking localized feuds with international issues were inevitable given the weakness of the Lebanese state, the presence of representatives of groups from throughout the Arab world and Beirut’s culture of openness, free expression, free market commerce and deal-making. Beirut was the birthplace of a new and deadly kind of warfare: an urbanized, shape-shifting mode of combat that combined elements of the tribal feud, patron-client relationships, urban street gang organization, Mafia-style “hits,” and international intrigue with high-tech weaponry, asymmetrical tactics, organized crime, and politically charged media spectacles such as highjackings and bombings.⁶⁶

This was not a war for conventional armed forces. The Israeli Defense Forces (1982-2000) and the United States Marine Corps (1983) were mauled in the fighting there and failed to produce the desired political outcome. The interconnected political, military, and geostrategic challenges Beirut posed represented a qualitatively different military situation than those that the US confronted in World War II, Korea, or Viet Nam. In the final years of the 20th century, similar scenarios were repeated in Europe (Sarajevo) and Africa (Mogadishu).⁶⁷ Placing foreign troops in the midst of such an amorphous, volatile, and multi-dimensional socio-political system exacted high human, financial, and political costs from the United States and Israel. As both powers discovered, it was very easy to go into Lebanon, but extremely difficult to maneuver once in, and very costly to get out again. Literally and metaphorically, the Beirut street could not accommodate tanks. The danger of becoming trapped and frustrated in Beirut was reliance on massive air strikes. These usually served to increase the population’s resolve,⁶⁸ reconfirm support for militias, and provoke outrage, sympathy and support for fellow Arabs/Muslims/Christians in those states linked to the fighting through informal networks. This often translated into increased arms sales or financial transfers to purchase military equipment and supplies.

If there is no alternative but to go in, it is incumbent upon a conventional army to understand all the socio-political ramifications and the local culture. Exit planning should proceed the intervention in case the mission proves unviable. In other words, more than military maneuver planning and military resources have to be committed to such an endeavor, particularly since withdrawal options are limited by urban terrain, the social climate and international law.

What made warfare in Beirut distinctively dangerous was not Arab culture, Islamist ideologies, or Levantine politics, but the nature and potential of multi-ethnic urban social organization in a rapidly changing social environment. No place was safe. No place was predictable. No place was unequivocally public or private, but rather, all of Beirut was suspended in a limbo of ambiguity and uncertainty. Daily life hung in the balance as over 20 different well-armed militias jockeyed for power and shifted alliances at the expense of non-combatants.

Like other cities of the developing world, Beirut has witnessed rapid urban growth, class

disparity, and psycho-social dislocation and moral breakdown. A functioning city government provides a centralized bureaucracy, public services, consolidation of authority, and redistribution of resources. These functions affect rural communities. The long war in Lebanon gradually reversed and subverted all of these functions. Fragmentation replaced centralized bureaucracy. Duplication of services replaced a formal resource allocation structure as various militias claimed public facilities, such as ports, for themselves and their community. Militias began exacting high taxes and custom duties to fill their coffers. The militias also turned to criminal activity to supplement their income and sponsored drug and arms sales, protection rackets, and robbery. Pluralism and heterogeneity, the urban mix that makes or breaks a successful city⁶⁹, disappeared during the war. The logic of the militias was the logic of cantonization. Beirut's division had its echoes in other Lebanese cities and villages, where fighting and massacres often led to the influx of more villagers into those parts of the capital controlled by "their" co-religionists' militias.

Territory became identity. In 1985, if one could have traveled safely and quickly from the Beirut Airport to the Christian heartland's Jounieh, one would have felt that the trip had begun in Tehran and ended in Paris—such was the physical/cultural discontinuities between Shi'a dominated southern Beirut and the Maronite-dominated heartland to the northeast of Beirut. In the absence of a state structure and a centralized government, familial and religious networks, and the patron-client relationships linking neighborhoods, cities, regions, and transnational settings and actors, assumed pronounced importance, power, and utility. These networks probably enabled many Lebanese to survive the war, and certainly played a role in keeping the Lebanese economy vibrant and resilient from the start of the war until 1983, but these networks also fragmented Lebanon as a nation, and were especially evident in the fracturing of Beirut.

Beirut is comparatively small in area and population when compared to mega-cities such as Istanbul, Cairo, Damascus or Tehran. Despite a relatively Westernized population of multi-lingual, well-educated and middle class residents, Beirut posed enormous military, policy, strategic, and philosophical problems for the US Government since the onset of Lebanon's civil war in the mid-1970s. Partly, America was the victim of its own historical successes in Beirut. The American University and the American University Hospital, plus dozens of American reporters, students, professors, tourists, and ex-patriots, meant that a lot of US citizens and institutions could become targets in Beirut as the war progressed and virulently anti-US actors such as Hizbullah gained ascendancy. By the mid-1980s, Beirut had claimed the lives of numerous US Foreign Service officers and personnel, 241 US Marines, Malcolm Kerr, president of the American University of Beirut; and CIA Station Chief William Buckley. Indeed, the US government declared Lebanon off limits for US nationals by the end of the war, only lifting the ban on travel to Lebanon in the late 1990s. US citizens and officials still tread carefully in Lebanon. The American Embassy resembles a fort and the murderers of Americans still walk freely in that country. Although the Lebanese admire and enjoy US cultural and economic products and emulate many American values, mutual wounds have not healed. Beirut, the city, may now be unified, but Lebanese hearts remain divided about the United States and its role in the Middle East.

Conclusions

As developments during the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century demonstrated, some of the problems that the United States first confronted in Beirut in the early 1980s have continued to loom large in the Middle East as well as in Europe, Southeast Asia, and tragically, on our own shores. Chief among these are:

- Mistrust, anger, and hostility toward the United States, its mission, interests and allies in the region;

- The perception of a large and growing gap between US and Arab-Islamic values, aims, and interests and an accompanying breakdown in dialogue and understanding;

- The emergence of informal networks of committed, highly mobile, and carefully trained actors willing to deploy massive political violence against civilian populations in furthering political and ideological agendas. These are often inspired by radical interpretations of Islam. In open territory, such an opposition would be formidable. In an urban setting such an opposition is lethal;

- Highly volatile socio-political milieux that can generate networks, emotions, projects, and movements faster than established, complex, and formal institutions such as intelligence agencies and armies can identify and comprehend them. Rapid communications technologies, such as cellular telephones, text-messaging, the Internet, satellite television transmission, and e-mail have only increased the volatility of the socio-political milieux;

- Unconventional and asymmetrical warfare, including suicide attacks;

- The prominence of non-state actors as combatants;

- Challenges to US conceptions of and compliance with International Humanitarian Law as the result of the previous two developments, which can lead to loss of public support and decrease of armed forces' morale.

Revisiting key lessons learned in Lebanon and Beirut by the Israeli Defense Forces and the US Marine Corps in 1982-83 can assist Coalition troops in Iraq in appraising situations, processing information, and making decisions in a manner benefitting all parties: US, UK and other troops, Iraqi civilians, and Iraqi government and security structures.

Key points:

1. Understand the dynamics of urban settings, and ethnic networks. Ethnicity and ethnic identity are a confrontational and changing phenomena; they only emerge in societies comprised of different types of peoples from a wide variety of backgrounds. Ethnicity is commonly a feature of plural and urbanized societies characterized by cultural, economic, linguistic or religious heterogeneity and inequalities of class, wealth, privilege, and access to resources. With increasing migration from rural to urban areas and the impact of enhanced communications and

transportation systems, individuals and groups from a wide variety of cultural, linguistic, socioeconomic, and religious backgrounds have suddenly been brought into contact with each other throughout the developing world. In the rapidly expanding cities of the Middle East, various ethnic groups interact and compete with one another in new and frequently hostile socio-political realms characterized by economic scarcity and uneven development.

Identity is neither programmed nor pre-existent; it is constantly being shaped by the interplay of events and power. If identities were only determined by genes, then the same categorizations, symbols, and expressions of identity would endure over time in the same place, regardless of economic, cultural, or political developments. This is clearly not the case in the Middle East, a region that has experienced rapid metamorphoses from empire to colonial regimes to modern nation state structures in less than a century, and in which organized ethnic and religious groupings have emerged in different periods to compete for power, resources, and privileges. Under empires, familial and confessional (sectarian) identities were most significant in the region. Under centralized state administrations, new regional, class, cultural, and ethnic identities--and consequently, new conflicts--resulted as laws and policies imposed identities on people that were new, uncomfortable, and even, in some cases, objectionable. In the modern nation state, identities can be claimed in order to get scarce resources or rights, or to compete with other groups for control of the state's resources. The cultural and religious heterogeneity of the Middle East is neither a new phenomenon associated with rapid urbanization nor a function of the creation of nation states in this century. Cultural diversity is not a byproduct of colonialism (although colonial powers certainly employed "divide and rule" tactics to consolidate their control of local societies and political systems under their rule). Different ethnic and religious groups have been living side by side in the Middle East for centuries, occasionally in conflict, but more often in harmony.

What *is* new is the transformed relationships and vertical incorporation among different ethnic and religious groups within the contemporary Middle Eastern nation state. The social, political, and economic frameworks in which different groups interact, work, and struggle are no longer characterized by accommodation but by competition. Although the Ottoman Empire was hardly a model of economic efficiency or social justice, it encouraged accommodation and cooperation to a greater degree than subsequent colonial regimes or nation states. In Lebanon, competition has always been especially acute and the state fragmented.

2. Urban combat can intensify psycho-social dimensions of conflict in the Middle East.

Understanding why people throughout the Middle East preserve and value kinship, ethnicity, and religious affiliations highlights the reasons for intra-state turmoil and interstate hostilities. Discovering how Middle Eastern peoples invoke and manipulate ethnic affiliations provide an awareness of the creative and effective means individuals and groups use to survive and thrive in a challenging socio-economic environment while preparing for future events.

An organized and mobilized ethnic group or religious sect serves the economic, social, and political needs of its members far better than any state apparatus of the modern Middle East. Such groups become very prominent in the event of war or during state collapse. This is a

primary reason for the growth of so-called "fundamentalist" Islamic organizations in the urban centers of Cairo, Algiers, Istanbul, Beirut and Khartoum. Beirut's militias were urban social and political structures that provided meaning and identification. Their goals were not purely military, but social and economic as well.

Militias and insurgents are often more mobile than conventional armies and are ideologically and emotionally more adaptive than formal military organizations. Their alliances and competition can be rooted not simply in material interests, but also in a "moral economy" of honor. Honor is often a topic associated with Middle Eastern society and politics. Usually it is interpreted as pride, particularly male pride, or it is equated with ancient and unchanging traditional codes of "tribal" conduct. Though there is some truth to both of these misrepresentations of the concept and practice of honor, the most accurate translation centers on a notion of dignity. There are different terms for this concept in Arabic. The most frequently cited term, "*sharf*" denotes a hierarchical type of honor or status that one has by virtue of lineage or earns through noble deeds. Another term, *karaameh*, refers to basic human dignity and the inviolability of the person, male or female, adult or child.

It is the fear of losing *karaameh*, of having one's own or one's family members' dignity violated or cancelled, that mobilizes groups and undergirds their willingness to sacrifice themselves. Believing that dignity is more important than life itself, Arabs (Christians as well as Muslims) can and will sacrifice (or "martyr") themselves in ways that often strike US soldiers as bizarre, irrational, or disturbing. For many Arabs, the mere presence of US troops in their city or neighborhood is viewed as an assault on national and even personal dignity, in that it shows that boundaries have been violated, borders crossed, and spaces invaded. The cognitive map is more important than geographic maps. Many actions of US troops, which are not intentionally abusive or hostile, can be interpreted as violations of spaces and boundaries only when viewed on the cognitive mappings of social situations. In the tension and uncertainty of operations in close urban quarters, especially in homes or around homes, emotions run high and cultural miscues are not only possible, but also probable, if US forces are unaware of the relevant socio-cultural and psychological maps.

Similarly, US conceptions of the term "freedom" are not universally endorsed in or shared by Arab societies. Freedom, according to a characteristically American cultural perspective, means that an individual has the right to do whatever he or she pleases. Such a view of freedom is neither valued nor encouraged in most Arab societies. This type of free-for-all liberty is called *fitnah* ("chaos"), in Arabic, and is considered social and moral anathema. Indeed, the types of people most likely to act according to this highly individualistic and assertive conception of liberty are known, in Arabic slang, as *muslaahjiyeen* -- selfish and uncaring people who trample on others' dignity and rights while narrowly pursuing their own needs and objectives. In the cultural and moral context of most Arab societies, such self-serving people often manage to gain power, and may even come to be feared and obeyed, but they are never respected, nor are they genuinely elected by popular will. Saddam and his late sons are good examples.

One cannot enjoy either freedom or dignity in isolation, but only in relation to others. To

treat another with dignity is to accord him or her full humanity, to respect the inviolability of his or her person, will, feelings, rights, and pride. One who has dignity is humane, and to show humanity, one must interact with others properly and sensitively, with care, respect and foresight. This is a concept of freedom *to*, not freedom *from*.

Karaameh entails nobility of spirit, generosity, and compassion. Perhaps the most valued trait in conflict resolution in the Arab Islamic world is that of *hilm*, denoting magnanimity and humility. *Karaameh* also requires freedom -- but with a "relational" twist: it means granting others the space, the right, and the freedom to participate and collaborate in public without compulsion or coercion. As such, *karaameh* implies agency and empowerment--not of isolated individuals so prevalent in contemporary American conceptions of democracy and freedom, but rather, the actions of socially interdependent individuals linked together in networks of mutual obligation, concern, care and support.

The transition from the local level to the political and governance levels of nation building is not a job for an army, but understanding local concepts of dignity and how they play out in the operation of key social networks is a crucial task for the army. As Beirut's example demonstrated, fluid social networks can pose grave dangers to foreign armies. They and the ideas and needs that influence them must be taken seriously and treated with respect and care.

Western commentators often malign diverse social settings such as Beirut and Baghdad as fertile terrain for ethnic conflict and communal violence. Diversity itself does not produce political tension (think of New York, London, Paris or St. Petersburg). Political tension arises from how these communities are incorporated into larger political and economic relationships which may not respect individual and collective dignity. The "clash of civilizations" is not inevitable, nor is "Arab-Islamic exceptionalism" anti-democratic. Understanding is much more important than sweeping generalities with little basis in fact.

Simplistic observations devoid of cultural context can fuel narrow perspectives that ignore historical and geo-strategic considerations, such as the external imposition of the nation-state and the dynamics of the global economy. Such simple approaches pin all political failure on "essential cultural predilections" of Arabs and Muslims for tyranny and repression.

For a people to whom dignity -- of self and other -- is so crucial and valued in everyday life, for a people who invented urban and plural social spaces in Mesopotamia and along the shores of the Mediterranean millennia ago, nothing could be farther from the truth. Listening and learning, not just policing, in the urban settings of post-war Iraq is strategically important and tactically wise. Humility and good manners, after all, are key to the consolidation of local as well as global civil societies.

Ultimately, the US Army's secret weapon lies in the bedrock values of respect for human dignity and freedom that inform and undergird the United States of America. These noble values are not, after all, too different from those underpinning the urban Arab-Islamic concepts of honor and dignity.

THE SECOND INTIFADA (Tasa-Bennett)⁷⁰

The Second Intifada began on the morning of September 28, 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, then a parliamentary leader of the Likud opposition party, decided to visit the

Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The purpose of his visit is a function of one's political beliefs. Sharon said that he did it to bring a message of peace to the Palestinians. Political foes and Palestinians claim he did it to wrest control of the Likud party from Benjamin Netanyahu. Clearly, the visit would threaten the on-going Palestine-Israel peace talks which were discussing who would have sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Just a month earlier, President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Arafat engaged in extensive negotiations in the hope of bridging their differences. Palestinians were very close to getting their own state and some control over Jerusalem. The Palestinian leadership needed some progress or a diversion for, by September 2000, Palestinian poverty was widespread and many were reduced to a state of despair.

The Israeli security services were concerned about the proposed visit. They feared it would incite a Palestinian reaction. The Israeli security services contacted their counter-parts on the Palestinian side to coordinate the visit. They were told that if the visitors did not enter the Mosque everything should be okay. The visit was short, and Sharon did not enter the Mosque. However, about 1000 Palestinians demonstrated and threw stones at the visitors. Israeli security services dealt with the demonstrators as they did so many times in the past—with tear gas and rubber bullets. Some thirty people were hurt, mostly Israeli soldiers. By afternoon, the incident seemed to be over and nothing looked out of the ordinary. A few hours later, the Palestinian media started a propaganda campaign denouncing the visit and calling upon all Moslem countries and Arabs to intervene and stop “that kind of aggression”.⁷¹

By the next day, widespread Palestinian rioting broke out. Palestinian police refused to work together with Israeli officers, as they had in the past and, in one case, a Palestinian police officer shot and killed his Israeli counter-part. The Second Intifada continued to escalate, but this time Israel was not facing kids throwing stones as in the first Intifada. This time they faced guerilla warfare. Palestinian police officers and security services joined the battle. Some Moslem clerics called on people to resist and even become suicide bombers '*shuhada*' (martyrs.)

Palestinian militants sought to get more concessions on land, power and influence than they were achieving in negotiations. The Palestinians viewed the relative successes of Hizballa in Lebanon and believed that continued attacks on civilians would demoralize Israeli public opinion, ultimately forcing the government to grant more concessions.⁷²

The Palestinian Resistance

Palestinian militants have not been organized under a central command. There are some 12 different terrorist groups that work independently but sometimes join for bigger actions. Most of the Palestinian militant training is conducted locally by veteran terrorists, who attended terrorist camps in Syria or Lebanon. Hizballa still provides continued support for the Palestinian terrorists with money, weapons, training, and the use of facilities in the Bekaa Valley. Terrorist organizations receive financial support from Palestinians who live abroad in the United States and Europe. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other Arab countries also support the terrorists financially and morally. Terrorist goals are to bring the Israeli population to a state of despair by conducting

a war of attrition. Their motto is “you will never know when it’s coming; you will never feel safe”. The Palestinians use suicide bombers to carry explosives stuffed with nails, screws or any other sharp objects, which are coated with poisonous material. These bombs are designed to produce the maximum number of casualties and infect the lightly wounded with blood poisoning. The terrorists choose crowded places that are enclosed to maximize casualties. Lately, more females and younger males are participating in suicide attacks. Their favorite targets are buses, restaurants and shopping areas. Their other tactics include ambushes, random shootings, use of land mines, use of booby traps inside houses and launching rockets into civilian areas. Local Palestinian intelligence is normally good and is based on a wide-net of ground observers. Palestinian terrorist groups include:

Fatah: was founded in 1956 by a group of young residents of the Gaza strip. It was then, and still is now, the military arm of the PLO. **Black September** was an infamous Fatah element that massacred Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Fatah is secular and nationalist.

Hamas: Originally a social welfare organization, Hamas has evolved into a militant anti-peace process organization bent on Israel's total destruction and the establishment of a Palestinian State. It is a mostly religious organization.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): The PIJ originated among militant Palestinian fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip in the 1970s. It espouses Islamic holy war to destroy Israel and create an Islamic Palestinian State.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Founded in 1967 by George Habash, this Marxist-Leninist group advocates Pan-Arab revolution, opposes the 1993 Declaration of Principles, and has suspended its membership in the PLO.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF): The PLF is split into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO **Abu Abbas** group was based in Iraq.

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP): split from the PFLP which it accused of not being militant enough. This group carried out the terrorist raid on Ma'alot in May of 1974 which murdered 21 young Israeli school children.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC): was another splinter group of the PFLP. They were responsible for the 1974 incursion into Northern Israel that murdered 16 residents of Kiryat Shemona.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: is an armed Palestinian group associated with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization. The group has carried out operations against Israeli soldiers and settlers, largely in the West Bank and Gaza, and most recently on civilians in Tel Aviv. Its main *modus operandi* is drive-by shootings.

Tanzim: is part of the FATAH organization and operates as an armed militia for enforcing order

on the Palestinian street. It also provides Arafat's personal body guards and serves as a tool for maintaining violent friction with Israel without focusing the blame on Arafat or his own security apparatus.

The Issues

The Jews and Palestinians coexist in some areas, such as Jerusalem, however they mostly live in segregated communities. The Jews live primarily along the sea coast while the Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli settlements in Gaza, the Golan Heights and the West Bank have met with a great deal of Palestinian resistance. The West Bank and Gaza strip are different regions/theaters which the Israel Army approaches differently. The West Bank terrain is mostly hillsides, and the Gaza Strip is mostly flat lands. The average Palestinian town is very crowded with narrow alleys only big enough for one automobile at a time. It is very unlikely that a tank can even fit into the small alley ways and therefore, tanks must use only main streets. The middle of the town usually contains the Mosque, school, and businesses. Sometimes there is only one to two meters separating each house. Usually, the houses are two-story, made of concrete and brick. Many family members live under one roof. The hard concrete roof is flat and most likely has a balcony, surrounded by a one meter high cement fence. This is an ideal observation post, an excellent firing point and a convenient site for throwing grenades or dropping other Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

Gaza Strip Demographic Information

Area:	360 sq. km (slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC)
Population:	1,178,119 (July 2001 est.) note: in addition, there are some 6,900 Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip (August 2000 est.)
Population Growth Rate:	4.01% (2001 est.)
Infant Mortality Rate:	25.37 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy:	(male): 69.76 (female): 72.32
Racial/Ethnic background:	Palestinian Arab and other 99.4%, Jewish 0.6%
Literacy:	N/A
Economy:	services 66%, industry 21%, agriculture 13% (1996)
GDP per capita:	purchasing power parity - \$1,000 (2000 est.)
GDP real growth:	-7.5% (2000 est.)
Unemployment Rate:	40% (includes West Bank) (yearend 2000)
Economic Aid:	\$121 million disbursed (2000) (includes West Bank)
Religion:	Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 98.7%, Christian 0.7%, Jewish 0.6%

Language:	Arabic, Hebrew (spoken by Israeli settlers and many Palestinians), English (widely understood)
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West Bank Demographic Information

Area:	5,860 sq. km (slightly smaller than Delaware)
Population:	2,090,713 (July 2001 est.) note: in addition, there are some 176,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and about 173,000 in East Jerusalem (August 1999 est.)
Population Growth Rate:	3.48% (2001 est.)
Infant Mortality Rate:	21.78 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy:	(male): 70.58 (female): 74.07
Racial/Ethnic background:	Palestinian Arab and other 83%, Jewish 17%
Literacy:	N/A
Economy:	services 66%, industry 21%, agriculture 13% (1996)
GDP per capita:	purchasing power parity - \$1,500 (2000 est.)
GDP real growth:	-7.5% (2000 est.)
Unemployment Rate:	40% (includes Gaza Strip) (yearend 2000)
Economic Aid:	\$121 million disbursed (includes Gaza Strip) (2000)
Religion:	Muslim 75% (predominantly Sunni), Jewish 17%, Christian and other 8%
Language:	Arabic, Hebrew (spoken by Israeli settlers and many Palestinians), English (widely understood)

73

Besides protecting the nation against external threats, the Israeli Army has an internal mission to prevent terrorist attacks and to maintain or restore public confidence in their own safety. The Israeli Army is very modern, centrally organized, and well trained in counter-terrorism. Its record is good in that it successfully prevents about 90% of planned terrorist attacks.

Under the Oslo Accord, Israel relinquished control of some territories to the Palestinian Authority. When Israel realized that the second intifada was a serious event and not just temporary



Israel⁷⁴



West Bank



Gaza

unrest, the government directed that the army retake some of these territories. However, the territories had changed since the army withdrawal. There were now many weapons on the streets and the territories contained bomb/rocket factories, smuggling tunnels, and “safe houses”. The Israeli Army had given some weapons to the Palestinian Police for combating terrorism. These weapons were turned against the Israeli Army.

The Israeli Army moved back into the region resolutely. The Israeli Army extended the use of unannounced checkpoints. It equipped the main crossing gates with metal and bomb detection devices. It began reimposing curfews and tightening up crossing point procedures (when Israeli intelligence suggests that an attack is imminent, the army usually reacts by putting that area under curfew and limiting the crossing into Israel to females and married males 35 and older). The Israeli Army began constructing a wall around the territories to physically segregate the Israelis and Palestinians. So far, the wall has effectively reduced the number of terrorist attacks. The building of the wall is a complex balance between security and basic human needs. Sections of the wall which are not completed, are areas of vulnerability. After a relatively calm period, an attack on September 1, 2004 killed 16 and wounded 93. The attacker came to Israel through an uncompleted section of the wall. The Israeli Government decided to speed up building that section of the wall. The wall separates many Palestinians and some Jewish settlers from their fields, schools, work, etc. Palestinians have to spend extra hours to get through the checkpoints to their work or other essential places. The Palestinians appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court. The court decided that many sections of the wall will have to be rerouted to accommodate the Palestinians needs. Settlers are appealing to the Israeli government to protect their needs and might ask the Supreme Court for a remedy as well. The Jewish settlers have a great influence on the Israeli Army policy and action. Most of the settlers served in the Israeli Army and are continuing to serve in their reserve. Some settlers are career soldiers who command units in the Occupied Territory. In addition, some soldiers identify with the settlers’ ideology and therefore are sympathetic to the settlers needs. Each settlement has a volunteer security unit. These settlements are supplied with the proper weapons and training to defend their settlement if needed. Settlers’ security units work closely with the Army to protect the settlements and act as a quick reaction/response force in the event of an attack on a settlement and the surrounding area. An Army proposal would let settlers serve in the settlement unit as their reserve duty station. This proposal, if passed by the Israeli government, will further strengthen the bond between Army personnel and the settlers. Moreover, the proposal may confuse the Palestinians since the Palestinians will not know if the settlers are acting solely on their own or under military orders.

The settlers also have influence in the Israeli government. The majority party, Likud is generally in favor of the settlers. However, lately Prime Minister Sharon, the Head of the Likud Party, is struggling with politicians in his party about his proposal to evacuate Gaza settlements. Sharon’s arguments are due to the high financial costs to protect few settlements surrounded by Palestinian population. Also the human cost is rising among the Jewish settlers, soldiers, and the Palestinians.

The right-wing parties are very supportive of the settlers and joined the Sharon government on his promise to expand and increase security to the settlements. The right-wing parties

threatened to withdrawal from the government if Sharon went ahead with the dismantling of the settlements in Gaza. The withdrawal of the right-wing parties can cause the government to lose its majority in the parliament and force the country into new elections. On the other hand, the Left-wing-Party, that supports the Gaza withdrawal might join the Sharon government to guarantee the government's success. Another argument regarding the disengagement is who is going to lead? Will it be the Army or the Police that will evacuate Jewish settlers? Some right-wing politicians and settler leaders announced that every soldier should refuse orders to evacuate Jewish settlements and called on all settlers to physically fight whoever comes to evacuate the settlements. Many Jews are sympathetic with the Palestinians' situation. Many joined Palestinians in demonstrating against the building of the "security wall." The demonstrations got out of hand and Jews were arrested along with Palestinians. On August 8, 2004, an Israeli Jewish woman was arrested and accused of supporting Palestinian terrorists in killing Israelis.

Another issue is how the withdrawal will take place? Should it be in one stage or should it be in many stages over several months? Some people in the government argue that one stage will be seen as a weakness and will encourage terrorist organizations to declare a victory and continue to recruit more supporters to attack Israel. Others in the government favor a one stage withdrawal (all settlements evacuate on the same day and time). They argue that the Jewish settlers will resist and a media fiasco would accompany a protracted multi-stage withdrawal. They argue that a multi-stage withdrawal will allow settlers to regroup and anticipate what the Army or Police will do and thereby resist more effectively.

Once Israel disengages, who will take over? Will it be the Palestinian Authority or will it be Hamas and its supporters? Should Israel negotiate with the Palestinian Authority to ensure the disengagement plan will be successful? Should Egypt play a role in the disengagement? All these questions are still being debated in the Israeli government. But one thing all agree on is that Hamas and other terrorists should not take control of the settlements.

The Israeli Army's Approach

The Israeli Army is conscription-based with a large reserve. It is primarily Jewish and many of the Israeli soldiers are emigres from Russia. Despite being a conscript-based army, the Israeli Army is the most effective military in the region. It has a remarkable history of swift, decisive victories against regional Arab states. Its history of fighting terrorism, however, shows that this kind of fight is never swift.

Israel tries to avoid civilian casualties since martyrs and collateral deaths exacerbate the problem. Israel uses various methods to deal with terrorists when women and children are present. When practical, they use rubber bullets to save civilian lives. Israeli snipers are carefully positioned in critical locations to selectively "take out" terrorists who use civilians as human shields. However, aircraft have also been used to take out high-value targets—often with unintended casualties among the populace. The Israeli Armed Forces are currently modifying weapons and aircraft to meet the demands of this type of urban warfare.

Israeli intelligence gathers data from informers, undercover agents who can blend in with the population and electronic interceptions of cell phones, two-way radios, and other communications. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) conduct aerial intelligence surveillance.

The Israeli Army created special units whose members speak fluent Arabic and look like Arabs. Some of the units' missions are to blend with the Palestinian population, collect intelligence, arrest suspected terrorists, and conduct special operations. A network of paid informers also provides valuable information to the army. The Israeli Army uses different methods to induce people to cooperate and to inform. For example, Israel may provide financial assistance to the informer and promise to move him and his family permanently to Israel at a later date. If the Israeli Army knows that a person is withholding information, they will arrest him and then release him very quickly. This makes it look as if he is collaborating with Israel. The Israelis will threaten him and tell him that if he does not cooperate, he will be set-up to look as though he is working with Israel. Israeli officials will visit his house for a coffee to corroborate his neighbor's suspicions of collaboration. Pictures of the meeting will be taken and distributed on the Palestinian streets. This puts the person in imminent danger with the Palestinian militants. In most cases, the person will talk and cooperate..

The Israeli Army is actively engaged in curtailing the terrorist's money sources. Recently, the army raided Palestinian banks and confiscated money belonging to terrorists. It is Israeli standard operating procedure to destroy the houses of suicide bombers after an attack. This proves to be a useful tactic since, in many cases, family members report an impending attack in order to save their home. Israeli Army policy allows the assassination of terrorists on their way to an attack. "Ticking Bomb", an Apache attack helicopter, is used widely for this mission.

The IDF does not treat all terrorist groups the same. It is the hope of the IDF that the terrorist groups associated with Yasser Arafat will turn into security forces for the Palestinian Authority. However, the more militant groups are handled in a more severe way of target assassination of terrorists and their leaders. A good example is Hamas who wants to establish a Palestinian, Islamic Nation instead of an Israeli, Jewish State. Israel tries to promote quarrels among the terrorist organizations in the hopes that the terrorists will fight amongst themselves and therefore not attack Israel.

The Israeli Army uses various tactics and methods in every urban mission, depending upon the circumstances and the commander. Large scale operations involve air support and armor. The Merkava tank provides the best protection for ground troops. An infantry squad usually rides inside the Merkava tank up to their dismount point. Commanders sometimes position a Merkava tank at the point of entry to the house that will be cleared of terrorists. The tank main gun will blast a hole in the wall to serve as the entry point into the house. The tank will cover the troops and serve as a wall or barrier. The tank can also back up to the hole it just blasted and let the infantry squad dismount directly from the tank into the building. The Merkava is an excellent machine, but the Palestinians have learned to attack the Merkava with large explosive land mines or IEDs buried at critical spots.

Urban actions require careful planning and detailed knowledge of the objective. A typical action begins late at night in order to avoid civilian casualties, to take advantage of the Israeli Army's night vision capabilities and to catch the terrorists while they are asleep. The town is surrounded and all entries and exits are sealed. Security teams will surround the objective houses and provide a 360 degree security perimeter. Additional teams will control each house's escape routes. Some type of diversion will precede the actual entry into the house. Soldiers will enter and rapidly clear the house. Normally two soldiers will clear and search each room. Two soldiers will secure the stairs, if there are any. If it is a multi-level house, the bottom floor will be cleared first or at the same time as the second. Movement and clearing techniques within the house are situation dependent. If it is clear that a terrorist is in a room and that he will fight to the end, the soldiers will first throw a grenade into the room. After the explosion, the soldiers will rush into the room together. One soldier will clear the room all the way from the right side of the door to the middle, and the other soldier will take the left side all the way to the middle. If the soldiers are uncertain who is in the room and if there might be civilians present, the first soldier will take a very quick peek from the corner and tell the other soldier when it is clear to pass to the other side of the door. Then, on command, both soldiers will enter the room at the same time. One will cover from the left to the middle and the other will cover the right to the middle. Withdrawal will be coordinated with the soldiers outside. Soldiers will exit the same way that they came in. Then the commander will direct the movement to the next house.⁷⁵

Israeli Army Lessons Learned:

An Army cannot run a successful counter- terrorism or counter- insurgency operation without controlling the area of operation. Control of the territories is a priority for the Israeli military. The army realizes that it cannot stop the terrorist attacks through negotiation. Reliance on the Palestinian Authority has proved fruitless. The Israeli Army moved back into the territories in order to establish intelligence collection and to destroy terrorist infrastructures. The army took over key buildings and apartments that the PLO used for command and control and other covert operations. The Israeli Army effectively controls the West Bank but only controls the exits and entrances to the Gaza strip and its border with Egypt unless they conduct operations within the strip.

There must be fewer weapons in the hands of the new Palestinian police and security services. This is a difficult dilemma—how to balance the needs of an effective organization with the possibility that this organization will get out of hand in the future. In the case of the Palestinian Authority, Israel was anxious to provide the Authority with a lot of weapons so they would be powerful enough to fight any terrorist threats. However, these weapons were turned against the Israeli Army, and now Israel realizes that they supplied many more weapons than were needed. The Palestinian Authority also argued that they needed a lot of weapons and firepower in order to frustrate any revolt by a terrorist organization.

Incitement and education of the young to hate and to kill must be curtailed. Israel trusted the Palestinian Authority to prevent anti-Israeli incitement and to modify their teaching

regarding the Jewish state. The Palestinian Authority not only did nothing to stop the incitement, they helped to fuel it. New generations of Palestinians have grown up with anti-Semitic views and are ready to serve as suicide bombers to attack Israel. Israel should have insisted that any steps toward the peace talks should have been conditional upon the cessation of the spreading of hatred and propaganda. This has been part of past peace accords, however, enforcement has been difficult.

Democracy without corruption should be emphasized. Israel should have insisted that the Palestinians reform their institutions and start developing a democratic government. The lack of democracy and the prevalence of corruption increased the suffering for the average Palestinian citizen as well as hindered any long range chances for peace. The citizens were told that Israel should be blamed for their misfortunes. Many Palestinian citizens still believe that the only way to be happy is to join a terrorist organization and destroy Israel.⁷⁶

An Army must control the border of the area of operation in order to neutralize the movements of terrorists and their weapons into the area. In Iraq, movement of foreign terrorists from Syria and Iran are a contributing factor to the instability of Iraq. Israel has the same problem. The Israeli Army uses a combination of air and electronic surveillance, fences, walls, guards, checkpoints, and patrols to monitor and to prevent the movement of terrorists. Air and coastal control are also enforced. On January 3rd 2002, Israel successfully prevented major arms smuggling from the sea. The Israeli Navy intercepted a Palestinian ship. It contained 50 tons of advanced weaponry bound for Gaza. The smuggling was financed in part by Iran and the Hezbollah. Hezbollah was also active in experimenting with Ultra-lighters and light boats.⁷⁷

HUMINT is the most important aspect of intelligence during counter-terrorism. At the age of 14-15, all students are screened and tested for foreign-language aptitude and proficiency. Those with native Arabic are developed and given enhanced language training. When these students are conscripted, they are placed into intelligence billets. Non-Arab minorities (Bedouins, Druze, Charkasi) who speak Arabic are also sought for these billets. Intelligence is developed through standard procedures, special units and even infiltration. The Israelis also run a wide agent net within the Palestinian areas using local Palestinians.

Do not enter a house through a door or window but through the wall. The Israeli Army found out that during intensive urban combat, it is better to enter a building from the side that provides the most protection for the troops, even if it doesn't have windows or doors. To achieve this, the army uses explosives to blow a big-enough hole in the wall to permit the entry of troops. When the mission dictates that a house should be destroyed, the army uses a specially-protected bulldozer to demolish the house, thereby limiting civilian casualties. Bulldozers are protected with special armor around the operator. When a bulldozer is engaged in destroying a house or breaking a wall for entry, troops provide 360 degree perimeter security for it.

Training should be done shortly before deployment and in a place that resemble the real thing. The Israel Army constructed model Arab towns that they use to train troops before they are deployed and also to teach new lessons learned in. The Israeli Army uses three different

field schools. Each school corresponds to a different geographic location of the territories. The reason for the different schools is that not all Arab villages and towns look alike. For example, Gaza City sits on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea. It is flat, very crowded and looks like a modern city with skyscrapers. On the other hand, most villages in the West Bank are small, and sit on the hills, surrounded by mountains. Each army unit will attend the school that corresponds to its sector of deployment and will return to the school after deployment to share its experiences with the school staff.

THE CURRENT INSURGENCY IN IRAQ (Mitchell)⁷⁸

Iraq has a bloody history of insurrections and coups. There have been at least 20 insurrections and coups since it was established as a country post-World War I until today. The only time Iraq has not had any major civil strife within its borders were during the 1940's and the 1980's. These temporary lacks of civil strife were due to the Second World War and the Iran-Iraq War—major conflicts that consumed the passions and resources needed for insurrection. The first revolt in Iraq was in 1920.⁷⁹

Iraq was formed out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Britain founded a colony in its new mandate. Simultaneously in 1918, secret societies formed against the British colonials. Chief among these were Jamiyat an Nahda al Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening); Al Jamiyat al Wataniya al Islamiya (The Muslim National League); and Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). These groups preferred to meet in the hot-bed centers of Karbala, An Najaf, Al Kut, and Al Hillah—similarly to today's resistance groups. In 1920, Sunnis and Shias from all over Iraq combined in Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolution, to gain independence from the British Mandate. The grand *mujtahid* of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, were the primary organizers of the revolt. Shirazi issued a *fatwa*, "pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British." The British suffered slight military losses, but lost a greater amount financially due to the costs of maintaining a presence in the area. In order to reverse the damage, the British created a "provisional Arab government" with King Faisal I ruling Iraq. Iraq still was not independent. This caused a lot of dissension among Iraqis since Faisal was not local (a Sunni Hashemite) and was considered to be a puppet of Great Britain. By 1958, Iraqis were no longer able to tolerate King Faisal I or the monarchy.

Other religious and ethnic skirmishes developed in and around Iraq. In the late 1920's to early 1930's, a religious group known as the Ikhwan [Brotherhood] revolted against Abdul Aziz Al-Sa'ud. Their goal was to keep Islam pure from modern technology and influences (similar to the goals of Wahabbism and Deobandism). From 1919 until 1932, both the British and the Iraqis fought against a Kurdish uprising, whose goal was to establish an independent country. Both revolts failed. The 1950s were a period of turmoil in the Middle East as communists, Arab

nationalists and Arab socialism emerged to fight for influence and power. In 1958, General Abdul Karim Kassem (sometimes spelled Qassim), overthrew King Faisal II (grandson of King Faisal I and son of King Ghazi) and the monarchy. The Republic of Iraq took its place. However, President Kassem's republic was also opposed. In 1959, another unsuccessful revolt rocked Iraq. President Kassem responded by removing 200 officers from the Iraqi army along with anyone else whom he deemed "untrustworthy."

The Ba'ath Party was founded in Iraq in 1954 after its merger with the Arab Socialist Party. Its main ideological objectives were secularism, socialism, and pan-Arab unionism. In 1963, a group of officers overthrew President Kassem and then assassinated him within 24 hours. Most of the participants in the coup were Ba'athists.⁸⁰ Abdul Salam Arif became the second president, but he was not a Ba'athist. Although Arif died in a helicopter crash a few years later, his decision to not be a Ba'athist severely affected his younger brother's presidency. Abdul-Rahaman Arif, the third president, was overthrown by the Ba'athists during a coup in 1968.

Following the 1963 coup, the Ba'ath Party chose Ahmed Hasan Al-Bakir as prime minister. Al-Bakir was ousted from his position within the first ten months when Arif broke his ties with the Ba'athists. At the first opportunity, the leaders of the 1968 coup appointed Al-Bakir as president. Although Al-Bakir remained in office until 1979, his cousin, Prime Minister, Saddam Hussein, ran the show. Under Saddam, Iraq stumbled militarily as it fought the eight-year Iran- Iraq war (1980-1988), Desert Storm (1991) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). After Desert Storm, the Iraqi Army was also involved in counter-insurgency as it fought and oppressed the Iraqi Kurds in the north and Iraqi Shias in the south. Today, many of those same soldiers involved in fighting guerrillas have joined guerrilla forces.

Who Are They?

Iraqi insurgents guerrillas are currently battling to "free Iraq" from the US and Coalition forces. Over a dozen insurgent organizations and smaller cells make up the resistance. Each group and organization are subdivided by ideology and intent. The Ba'athists want to restore the Ba'ath Party to power. They are Sunni with ties to the old regime— Fedayeen, former military and intelligence specialists, and secret police. The Nationalists are a murkier group with undefined and varying goals, but a common desire to reject a US or foreign presence. They are a mixed group of former military and everyday citizens. The Islamists comprise two main groups. The first group of Iraqis belong to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam.⁸¹ They call for a "full return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Muhammed" and to oppose any foreign, non-Muslim influence. The second group is made up of "freedom fighters" who have claimed that Iraq is the site of "jihad". Some of these combatants include members of Al-Qaeda and Ansar Al-Islam. The Shia have also fielded several groups.

How Many and Where?

The estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerillas varies. The US military estimates that there are approximately fifty thousand active insurgents. Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle⁸² are the hotspots for guerilla activity. Other urban hotspots include Al-Qaim, Mosul, and Kirkuk. Although the guerrillas have been primarily Sunni, revolt has broken out beyond predominately Sunni areas. The south may become a problem area due to the acts and speeches of the radical Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr has issued numerous *fatwas*, declaring a revolt against US Forces.⁸³ This revolt comes as a result of dissatisfaction with the coalition and US forces. Jaish-I-Mahdi, Al-Sadr's militia, have launched attacks in the southern cities of Najaf, Kufa, and Ak Kut. It is possible that the Jaish has from three to ten thousand fighters.

The Tactics

Iraqi guerilla attacks against coalition forces usually take the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar strikes against coalition bases and locations. Helicopters are also a target. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, 14, and in one case the SA-16.⁸⁴ The oil pipelines are also regular targets of insurgent activity. Suicide bombers are used to gain attention and create fear. Guerrilla groups or squads are the base unit and are usually composed of five to ten men. Fighters are rarely concentrated in larger numbers in order to escape attention. There have been a few incidents where large numbers of fighters were involved such as the battle near the town of Rawa, near the Syrian border, on June 13, 2003, and during a large ambush on a convoy in Samarra on November 30. There are also frequent attacks on non-military and civilian targets. These include assassinations of Iraqi Governing Council members and supporters. There have been suicide bombings at the U.N., Jordanian Embassy, Shia mosques, civilians, the International Red Cross, Iraqi Police, and Kurds. Guerillas have also been targeting private contractors.

Resistance Support

A great deal of attention has been focused on winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population. It appears as though the Iraqi resistance retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, in particular, in Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge have fed the harsh opinions that many Sunni Arabs have about the US and Coalition Forces. Unhappy Shias tend to chose demonstrations and protests. Along with the Kurds, the Shias seem reluctant to use violence against coalition forces due to their past heavy persecution by the Sunni minority. Polls in late 2003 showed that approximately one-third of all Sunni Arabs are supporters of the guerillas and consider armed attacks on coalition forces acceptable. In al-Anbar province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, solid support for the Iraqi resistance stood at 70%. Only about 10% of the Shiite Arab population supported violent resistance. Support was very minimal for attacks on Alliance forces among the Kurds. Curiously, the poll (which was supposed to cover an even distribution of the Iraqi population) showed more people stating that they are Sunnis (44%) than Shiites (33%), leading to speculation that the poll's sample was badly skewed.⁸⁵ The poll was also conducted before the spring 2004 US crackdown on the insurgency in

Fallujah which was widely condemned by Iraqis, including normally pro-US members of the governing council.

The Groups

Jaish-i-Mahdi aka Mahdi Army or Mehdi Army. This militia force was created by radical Iraqi "cleric" Muqtada Al-Sadr in June of 2003.⁸⁶ The army began as a small group of 500 seminary students connected with Al-Sadr in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, formerly known as Saddam City. The group provided security in Sadr City and in some southern cities following the fall of Baghdad. This regional force is armed with AK-47s, RPGs, mortars and other light weapons. Al-Sadr is anti-American, and at times has joined with Sunni forces in revolt against Americans.⁸⁷

Fedayeen Saddam: "Sacrificers of Saddam". This paramilitary organization is loyal to the former Ba'athist regime of Saddam. At its height, the group had thirty to forty thousand members. It was formed by Saddam's son, Uday Hussein, in 1995. It consisted of the most loyal male members of the Ba'ath Party who were primarily from the Sunni regions of central Iraq. Uday used it for personal gain as well as smuggling. They deployed AK-47s, RPGs, machine guns and truck mounted artillery and mortars upon the arrival of US forces in Iraq in 2003. These irregular fighters often wore civilian clothes to confuse coalition forces. One of their favorite ruses was to stage a false surrender in order to draw advancing soldiers into an ambush.⁸⁸

Jaish-i-Muhammed: Muhammed's Army. This guerilla organization has been operating in Iraq against US-led forces since mid-2003. Its goal is to remove the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council. The regional group specializes in attacks on low-flying aircraft and helicopters using shoulder fired missiles. The group claims that it receives financial and moral support from Iraqis, and does not receive financial assistance from foreign sources.⁸⁹

Ansar Al-Islam: Supporters of Islam. This group promotes a radical interpretation of Islam and Holy War, or *Jihad*. It is infamous for its suicide bomber attacks. This group is led by a Jordanian, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who is believed to have ties to both Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. It was in existence before the war.

Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna: Army of the Protectorates of the Sunna Faith. This is a group of Islamist militants and foreign fighters attacking US and Coalition forces. This group is based in northern and central Iraq. They are responsible for various suicide bombings.

Other Groups to Keep an Eye On:

The Snake Party, Black Banner Organization, Army of Right, Nasserites, Wakefulness and Holy War, Salafai Group of Iraq, and Liberating Iraq's Army, are just a few examples of emerging, possibly insurgent, groups.⁹⁰ Hostage-taking is a new tactic, and form of revenue, for several of these groups, particularly the Black Banner Organization.

The Urban Insurgency

The Iraqi insurgency has a strong rural contingent but no recognized external sanctuary, although Iran is available to some groups. Consequently, it has used Baghdad, Al-Qaim, Mosul, Fallujah and Kirkuk as sanctuary areas. However, since the guerrillas cannot defend these areas, their value as sanctuary is limited. The urban guerrilla is not dependent on loot from ambush to sustain and rearm the force. There is plenty of ammunition and weapons in Iraq, so weapons are often discarded after ambush. The key advantage that the Iraqi urban guerrilla enjoys is intelligence. There is a large net of informants, lookouts and spies that keep the guerrillas abreast of movements by patrols and convoys. Since US forces tend to use the same roadways and administrative schedules, the guerrilla is able to use these patterns to avoid or engage US forces. Further, rockets, horns, and runners keep the guerrilla aware of unexpected coalition movement.

An efficient bureaucracy with a well-maintained data base is essential for urban control. Much of the police and central government records were destroyed or lost during the orgy of looting that followed the entry of US forces into Baghdad. Until efficient bureaucracy is constituted and record keeping resumed and restored, normal urban control measures will be hard to implement. The old bureaucracy under Saddam Hussein was inefficient and venal. It was possible for draft dodgers and felons to buy false documents and avoid detection for years. The new bureaucracy will need to be efficient, honest and computerized. This will take time and effort, but is essential for urban control.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS (Grau, Elkhrami and Tasa-Bennet):

There are a variety of measures that have been applied in the counter-insurgencies discussed. Some are administrative-bureaucratic. Others are police or public services functions, while others are military or a combination of police and military. These measures often overlap.

1. Administrative-bureaucratic control measures

It is essential to know who lives where, who sleeps where and who owns what property. There are several ways of achieving this:

1. Census
2. National identity cards and finger printing
3. Central registration of births, marriages and deaths
4. Tax rolls
5. School registration and student identification cards
6. Land and property title registration and deeds
7. Registration of criminals released from prison
8. Hotel registration reporting
9. Hospital and medical center registration reporting
10. Inheritance registration
11. Voter registration
12. Block control system—block wardens, block registration
13. Public health services registration

14. Social welfare registration
15. Public utilities installation, billing and usage
16. Religious rolls and “zakat” registry
17. Department of Motor Vehicles registration
18. Conscription registration
19. Cemetery registration
20. Naturalization and immigration files
21. Postal records
22. Telephone records
23. Weapons registry
24. Renters’ registration
25. Business permits
26. Customs and duties lists
27. Airline, train and bus ticket sales
28. Organization, political party and tribal rolls
29. Banking and credit card transactions

A city government needs to know who its residents and visitors are in order to control them. This involves a lot of non-glamorous, repetitive record keeping. These records have to be cross-checked—a tedious process that is greatly eased by computerizing these records. Control begins with good records and trustworthy people who create, maintain and protect those records. A computerized government central registry should be able to keep track of its citizens and look for anomalies—households with an unusual number of young males, citizens who appear on some registration lists but not on associated others (title and postal but not public utilities registrations), people who die and are buried but continue to drive a car, people who own a house but rent others.

Citizens may find this degree of government knowledge of their private lives intrusive and overbearing. However, if the government is delivering on the services it is supposed to deliver, the citizen is more likely to cooperate.

2. Physical control measures

Since early times, cities were designed to protect their citizens from invaders and the depredations of the city’s own criminals and rioting mobs. Gated communities are traditional and common in the Middle East and South Asia, where the homes of the middle class and well-to-do are surrounded by high walls topped with broken glass. Today, planners spend little effort in protecting their city from external armies. In most cities their first concerns are traffic flow and physical security. Planners seek to protect residents and high-value property from the city’s more aggressive residents. Architects have joined with them to develop subtler, more effective ways of controlling public access to high-dollar residential areas, government buildings, banks, major firms, presidential palaces and key industrial sites. Historically, cities controlled their populations by restricting access; canalizing movement; positioning military barracks or police and fire stations at critical points; conducting intelligence gathering among criminal and dissident

elements; modifying public behavior through laws, religion and education; controlling access to commodities; segregating castes, races, classes and trouble-prone businesses into designated neighborhoods; controlling movement to and through key neighborhoods and centers; and maintaining a system of rewards and punishments for their citizenry. When these efforts failed, the military was often called on to restore order.⁹¹

Modern control architecture can help the military and police mission. Many cities have rebuilt key centers incorporating control architecture. While perhaps appearing to improve access to an area, this new architecture actually aims to allow a small security element to control or deny access. Television monitors can detect the presence of any unwanted elements, microphones can monitor conversations, escalators and elevators can be shut off remotely and barriers on access ramps can be activated electronically. Intruders can be sealed into holding areas that appear to be a normal lobby. Many of these centers are self-contained, with their own water, food and electrical supplies.⁹²

Close circuit television (CCTV) is a fact of life in most European, Japanese, Canadian and United States cities. CCTV monitors high traffic areas, high crime areas, isolated loading docks, passenger terminals, store displays, parking lots and the like. The average urban US citizen may appear on television seven times a day during the course of everyday living. Traffic light and speed zone automatic cameras increase the coverage. CCTV increases observation and records activities that are important to the military and police intelligence and response missions. CCTV should be installed throughout the urban area, starting with the high-incident areas and key facilities.

Checkpoints can be a good source of information. Permanent vehicle checkpoints are not as effective as mobile vehicle checkpoints since people who cannot pass a checkpoint will normally avoid it. People are more accepting of a vehicle checkpoint than a pedestrian one. While the primary objective of the vehicle checkpoint is to interdict supplies, weapons and likely enemy, the primary objective of the pedestrian checkpoint is to gain information. Professional behavior by checkpoint personnel is especially important. Tips for successful pedestrian checkpoints include:

- interview pedestrians individually and in private. Covert CCTV taping of the interview can be used to counter charges of inhumane treatment;
- give each person approximately the same amount of time regardless of whether they are providing information or not. Have a system in place so that individuals with lots of information can easily and confidentially contact the unit for a lengthy debriefing;
- offer each individual coffee, tea, cigarettes, candy or another comfort item as appropriate;
- apologize for and explain the need for the interview and/or a brief search;
- organize and control the waiting area. Provide seating and place a polite, patient person in charge of it. Secure the area against attack;
- maintain tight security, but do not openly brandish weapons;
- use a trained interrogator;
- do not try to control too large an area or stay in one place too long;
- do not act immediately on information provided by a pedestrian if that would compromise the safety or future cooperation of the pedestrian;

-have women present when women are interviewed and have women search women.⁹³

3. Police Control Measures

Guerrilla order of battle, TO&Es and line and block charts are fantasies in most Middle East and South Asian insurgencies. In these insurgencies, the police intelligence personnel are tracking gangs, not constituted forces. The problem is equivalent to determining who are in gangs, the territories that they control, their armaments, tactics, logistics and patterns.⁹⁴

Two things that the police have going for them are the beat cop who has worked the neighborhood for years and police snitches who keep the police abreast for a fee or a favor. There are more modern police tools that have military application. Geographic profiling is a police technique that combines spatial analysis and psychological behavior patterns of criminals. It looks at such factors as distance to the crime, demographics, landscape analysis, pattern analysis, crime scene forensic analysis and psychological criminal profiling to solve complex serial crimes. Ambushes, raids, IED attacks, shelling attacks, sniping attacks and other guerrilla actions are complex serial crimes. Geographic profiling can be used to identify separate groups, identify members, provide theoretical profiles, determine likely residences, determine likely attack times, routes and tactics.

There is clearly a need for a trained, effective, honest well-paid police force. It needs a strong internal affairs section to keep it so. Police presence on the streets is essential, so mounted and dismounted patrols are necessary. Sometimes police forces will require manning adjustments to reflect the neighborhood ethnic mixtures. A city police data base is also necessary to support police intelligence work. It should be computer-driven and have connectivity to a national police data base and all the other government data bases. Increasingly, it is the police forces that are responsible for the infiltration of criminal gangs and terrorist groups.

4. Police-military measures

The police and military need to work closely together in an urban counter-insurgency. Shared intelligence is essential among police, military and other intelligence agencies. This is not easy. Unfortunately, various departments, agencies and services run their intelligence data—and analysis—in bureaucratic stove pipes that run straight from the tactical to the highest strategic levels. There is little sharing along the way. In theory, the community is supposed to share intelligence at the highest strategic level and then pass that information back down to the people that need it. In practice, this seldom happens. Raw data is seldom passed back, just agreed-on intelligence. Agreed-on intelligence is a homogenized product from which dissenting views and contradicting evidence has been removed or discounted so that the community can have a common view. This may serve the policy-level intelligence customers, but it does not provide timely, relevant intelligence to the tactical user. It comes back down the stove pipe too late if at all. Indeed, the tactical user often lacks the clearances and tickets necessary to get the approved product.

The tactical intelligence officer needs to meet, visit and cultivate counterparts in the police and other agencies and develop access to raw data and preliminary analysis as it goes up the various stove pipes. Conversely, the intelligence officer needs to “play nice and share” so that the relationship is mutually supportive. Other intelligence agencies also experience difficulties with the stove pipes. Intelligence sharing extends to neighboring units, coalition partners, sister services and combat service and combat service support units.⁹⁵

Often the police and military will conduct joint mounted and dismounted patrols, man joint checkpoints or conduct joint raids. These actions require close coordination, agreed on procedures, joint training and rehearsals. These should be conducted on a regular basis so that when it is imperative that the police and military work together, such as during riots and crowd control, the procedures, communications, command relationships and political difficulties have already been resolved.

Prisons and prisoners are a potential problem area for the police and military. Who has custody of what prisoners and for how long is often an issue. Further, the military and police may have different standards for detention, questioning, physical confinement, rules of evidence, family visits, prisoner welfare and the like. Even when the civilian and military standards are in complete accord, prisoner welfare is a potentially volatile topic in a counterinsurgency. During the French-Algerian War, the French used torture to extract information from prisoners. The information gained from the torture provided immediate, tactical success, but was instrumental in alienating the French population from the actions of their military and led to the eventual French withdrawal from Algeria. The current scandal concerning US Army treatment of prisoners in Iraq has major national, regional and international repercussions.

5. Military control measures

Patrols, checkpoints, drivers and pilots can generate excellent HUMINT. However, getting this data from them is not an automatic process. All participants have to be regularly briefed as to what they are looking for (“What is taking place outside this Mosque today? Are weapons openly displayed there? Are there more or fewer people outside the Mosque than normal? How many? How did the people react to your presence near the Mosque? Are there any banners displayed by the Mosque? What does your translator tell you that they say? Was the Mosque loudspeaker set used for anything besides the call to prayer? What does your translator tell you was the loudspeaker message? Was anyone wearing headbands or distinctive clothing near the Mosque? Did anything strike you as unusual? ”). Debriefing personnel is crucial—and easily neglected—soldiers want to maintain their equipment and get some chow and rest after a mission. The mission should not be over until the participants are debriefed. Timely, professional debriefing is essential as it provides information, keeps the observers focused and keeps the intelligence effort tuned to the tactical arena—where the counterinsurgency is fought. The same care should go into preparing for, executing and gathering covert collection. A good agent net is essential and agents should be trained, targeted, briefed and debriefed just as carefully as the soldiers on patrol.⁹⁶

Although some police departments have bomb disposal squads, usually this chore falls to the military. Intelligence and EOD files on the local bomb-making techniques, counter-lift devices, triggers, markings and bomb-maker “signatures” should be on file—particularly if the EOD personnel have just arrived in the city.

There are not nearly enough US soldier FAOs, translators and interrogators available who speak the local languages. Mastery of the primary form of the language is still not always enough, since local dialects frustrate effective communication. Soldier/linguists may have little training in the culture, history and customs of the region. The military is frequently at the mercy of contract hire translators whose command of English (and sometimes the target language) is spotty. If the translator is local, he has better community access and acceptance, but is subject to local threats and blackmail. If the translator is an outsider, he is less subject to threats and blackmail, but is also less trusted and accepted by the locals. Often people will not want to speak through a local translator, since this provides information that they may not want to get out. They prefer to talk to uniformed personnel. Vetting of translators is tricky and often means that the translator is banned from certain areas and his/her input is limited.

Working with a translator is a process that requires time and rehearsal. Just because a person speaks English and the target language does not mean that they are expert in the topic of conversation. Sometimes the translator is not sufficiently literate in his/her own language. In Iraq, 60% of the males and 70% of the females are not educated above the 8th grade. In Afghanistan, the literacy rate is below 10%. The translator must understand the topic before he can interpret the conversation correctly. The translator will frequently need crash training in military topics, civil engineering, medical treatments or banking laws before he can effectively serve as a translator in specialized areas. This means that interviews should be rehearsed to insure that the translator understands the topic of conversation and has time to master unfamiliar vocabulary. The user and translator need to develop a close relationship so that the translator feels that he/she has the freedom to criticize and offer constructive suggestions. Conversations requiring a translator take longer since a translated conversation normally takes at least three times as long as the same conversation between native speakers. Remember to give your translator frequent breaks. Nonstop translation work is tiring and tired translators make mistakes. Further, use of multiple translators provides checks and balances to the agendas that each translator has—and each ethnic and religious group has its own agenda.

Soldier behavior is a key element in urban population control. The soldier needs to be professional, courteous, calm and clearly in control. Weapons control is paramount. Friendliness is fine, but not to the point where it can be mistaken for vulnerability. On the other hand, the soldier should not appear threatening. The soldier is there to provide security and keep the local populace controlled and peaceful. The soldier needs to be trained in the local culture and know key phrases of the language in the local dialect.

6. Looking to the Present and Future

Although the United States Armed Forces have superior technology compared to that of the insurgents in Iraq, the situation on the ground indicates that this technology is not very effective in controlling the urban areas. The United States needs to invest in specific technological development that will give our forces an advantage in urban military operations. For example, robots armed with a camera and a weapon could lead patrols and convey and should save the lives of soldiers. Machines that can detect explosives over a long range would also be lifesaving, and some currently in development can detect explosives up to one hundred yards away. The development of an unmanned helicopter that hovers above danger zones, giving continuous video signals to commanders in real time, was being investigated by the Israeli army. Unfortunately, its development was canceled before its actual value could be determined. The Fire Scout UAV helicopter exists. This platform might be able to accomplish such a mission.

Psychological influence over the enemy is important as well, and can be just as or more important than developing technology specifically tailored to fight in an urban environment. In spite of its technological superiority, Israel did not win in Lebanon, and has continued to clash with the Palestinians. Likewise, the superiority of the French did not enable them to win in Algeria, and the military might of the British did not enable them to win in Aden. These past and present military conflicts show that one cannot win against insurgents who are determined to keep the occupier out of their land, and who see the armed force as an invader rather than as a protector or liberator. Dead insurgents serve to fuel rebel propaganda to show the world the brutality of the occupier and recruit more insurgents to prolong the struggle indefinitely. Suicide bombers add a dimension of unreality or sacrifice, depending on one's perspective. The information battle is clearly a prime part of the struggle. The information battle must be fought within the context of the contested society—while also informing the population about the occupying power. The way to militarily triumph over the insurgents is to gain the support of the local people who oppose such acts. Extremist and hate-mongering education must be prohibited. Education must start at a young age and target all segments of the population as a tool to build support for coalition forces. The United States Armed Forces, or any other foreign army, must support the local government with all the necessary tools to win, but it cannot be the only one doing the job. Psychological warfare is no less important than the fighting on the streets. It must be aggressively done, with an understanding of native culture and customs, and it must reach every place and person in a city. Local government and coalition forces need to exert control over the media to ensure that it is fair and balanced, and in order to ensure that it shows the rebuilding and the “good news,” not just the destruction and the preaching of hatred.

ENDNOTES:

1. Mounir Elkhamri is a serving soldier in the US Army. Born and raised in Morocco, he speaks Arabic, French, German and English. He has a BA from the University of Missouri at Kansas City.
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<http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/alpha/falgeria1954.html> accessed on 04-01-04.
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13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
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18. Jureidini, 68
19. Algerian War of Independence 1954-1962.
20. Ibid.
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22. Lester Grau is a retired US Army Infantry officer and a former Soviet Foreign Area Officer. A Russian and German-speaker, he is the author of over 90 articles dealing with the Soviet Union, Russia, Central Asia, South Asia and Afghanistan. He is working on a PhD in history at the University of Kansas. He has published three books on the Soviet-Afghan War.
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<http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Aden/opsstirling.html>

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28. Reginald Lingham, "Aden's Last Hours", One Soldier's Wars, extracted and posted on <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Aden/AdenLastHours2.html>, assessed on 25 April 2004.
29. Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens, Boulder: Westview Press, 1983, 149.
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31. Ibid, 173.
32. Ibid, 176.
33. Reginald Lingham, "Aden's Last Hours", One Soldier's Wars, extracted and posted on <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Aden/AdenLastHours1.html>, assessed on 25 April 2004.
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42. Percy Sykes, A History of Afghanistan, London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd, 1940, 64.
43. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, 161.

44. For a detailed account of the capture of Kabul, see Lester W. Grau, "The Takedown of Kabul: An Effective Coup de Main", Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations, Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003, 291-324.
45. Sykes, 9.
46. Yahya Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: History or Harbinger of Future War?", Military Review, September/October 1995, 18. There is strong evidence that much of the aerial effort may have come from the Soviet Union flying TU-16 "Badger" bombers out of Merv (Mari).
47. Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, London: Frank Cass, 1998, 48-52.
48. Most of the material on the urban guerrillas is extracted from chapter 14 of Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico: USMC Special Study DM-980701, 1998.
49. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet block and sweep, see The Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2001, 106-125 and Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, 1-46.
50. Dr. Laurie King-Irani is a lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Victoria in Victoria, Canada. She lived for five years in Lebanon and two years in Israel and speaks Arabic. She in past editor of Middle East Report Magazine and is co-founder of Electronic Intifada and coordinator of the International Campaign for Justice for the Victims of Sabra and Shatila—an organization seeking to try Ariel Sharon and other Israelis and Lebanese in Brussels.
51. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of the Great American Cities, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, 433.
52. Theodore Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, 337-339.
53. Al-Qaeda has never had much of a presence in Lebanon. The Shia and secular Sunnis alike are not too keen on them.
54. Barabara Harf, "Minorities, Rebellion and Repression in North Africa and the Middle East", Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Ted Gurr, editor), United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1993. PAGE
55. Hanf, 1-2.
56. The author, who lived and worked in Lebanon for five years in the post-war period, often heard colleagues and friends refer to Lebanon's tragedy as being analogous to "one hundred dogs

trying to chew on the same bone," the bone being the state and its various material and non-material resources.

57. The Ta'ef Accord, an agreement that set the terms for the end of the Lebanese conflict in 1989 (and which takes its name from the Saudi Arabian city where the negotiations were held), clearly stipulated that the Lebanese system would be de-confessionalized in an orderly progression of steps, culminating in complete deconfessionalization by the mid-1990s. To date, this process has scarcely been initiated or attempted.

58. Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, 14.

59. <http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/900/910/919/beirut/pictures/html/Beirut.html>

60. <http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/>

61. Ronald Cohen, "Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology", Annual Review of Anthropology, Volume 7, 401-402.

62. Ulf Hannerz, Exploring the City, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

63. Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

64. American Task Force on Lebanon, Working Paper on Lebanon, Washington, DC: ATFL, 1990.

65. See the website of the Solideire corporation, a hybrid public-private development company in which Lebanon's prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, holds considerable shares. The company has indeed renovated downtown Beirut, restoring a number of Ottoman era buildings that most observers thought were beyond salvation. But these reconstruction efforts are premised on, and serve to consolidate, a post-war social class structure of haves and have-nots, in which the middle class is virtually absent. See: <http://downtownbeirut.com/> for illustrations of Solideire's efforts and public relations campaign.

66. Larry Pintak, Seeds of Hate: How America's Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the Jihad, London: Pluto Press, 2003 and Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon, London: Touchstone Press, 1990.

67. Smith Hempstone, US Ambassador to Kenya noted wryly in 1992: "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu!" In a cable to Washington, he observed: "I think it is safe to assume that a 30,000-man force could be landed in Mogadishu and Somali ports with few or no American casualties. But you must not think that the gunmen will remain conveniently on the beaches to be destroyed or disarmed. The gunmen and the technicals will withdraw into the interior out of range of UN guns. Somalis, as the British and Italians discovered to their discomfiture are natural-born guerillas. They will mine the roads, they will lay ambushes, they will launch hit-and-run attacks. If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu. To what end, to keep tens of

thousands of Somali kids from starving to death in 1993, who in all probability will starve to death in 1994, unless we are prepared to remain until 1994? Just how long are we prepared to remain in Somalia and what are we prepared to do? Provide food? Guard and distribute food? Hunt guerillas? Establish a judicial system? Encourage the formation of political parties? Hold free and fair multi-party elections? I have heard estimates, and I do not feel that they are unreasonable, that it will take 5 years to get Somalia, not on its feet, but just on its knees. Cambodia is costing 2 billion [dollars] a year; how much will Somalia cost – 10 billion?"

68. The author of this section experienced this first hand during Israeli attack helicopter assaults on Beirut in July 1993 and April 1996. The impact on Beirutis was not fear, but defiance and anger and a willingness among youths to take foolish risks in response.

69. Jacobs, 433.

70. Lenny Tasa-Bennett is a reserve officer in the US Army. Born in Tel Aviv, Israel, he served in the Israeli Defense Force prior to immigrating to the US. He speaks Hebrew, Arabic and English. He has a BA from California State University and is currently working on an MA in National Security.

71. Hellman. "The Beginnings of the Second Intifada" myjewishlearning.
http://www.myjewishlearning.com/history_community/Israel/Overview_IsraeliPalestinian_Relations/Intifada_I/Intifada2.htm Accessed on March 19, 2004.

72. Rosenblum. "Lessons not learned" Rosenblum's Columns.
<http://www.jewishmediaresources.com/article/148/> Accessed on March 19, 2004.

73. Ecumenical Partnership. www.pcusa.org/pcusa/wmd/ep/country/wesdemo.htm

74. All three maps from Koret Communications Ltd. www.koret.com

75. Author's personal experience and interviews with former IDF personnel.

76. Amidror. "Israel's Security: The Hard-Learned Lessons" Middle East Quarterly.
<http://www.meforum.org/article/575> accessed on March 24, 2004.

77. "The seizure of the Palestinian weapons ship Karine A" Israel Ministry of Foreign affairs
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2002/Seizing%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20weapons%20ship%20Karine%20A%20> - accessed on March 24, 2004.

78. Amanda Mitchell is a reserve non-commissioned officer in the US Air Force. She speaks Arabic and was a leading expert on the now-defunct Iraqi Air Force. She has a BA from American Military University. Aside from European tours, she has served in Tunisia and Iraq. She has authored several articles on the war in Iraq. She was selected as US Air Force Non-Commissioned Officer of the Year for 2003.

79. Iraq has a long history of insurgencies. Unfortunately, these insurgents and their tactics are not well documented. Perhaps the tactics are passed down verbally from generation to generation, just like traditional folklore. The only information available on tactics in Iraq come from the British RAF during the Arab Insurrection of 1920 and the United States and Coalition Forces from the Gulf War in 1991 and the current war in Iraq.

80. <http://www.cartage.org.lb/en/themes/GeogHist/histories/history/hiscountries/I/iraq.html>)

81. Very similar in philosophy to the Wahabbi.

82. The Sunni Triangle runs west from Baghdad to Ramadi and north to Tikrit.

83. Robert Fisk, “Iraq on the Brink of Anarchy”, The Independent, April 4 2004.

84. Al-Jazeera special report, 2004.

85. Poll, “Iraqi resistance reports” from The Free Arab Voice.

86. Al-Sadr has not actually earned his clerical “wings” yet. He is still a student.

87. Patrick Johnson, BBC World Service, 6 April 2004.

88. Council on Foreign Relations, “What is the Saddam Fedayeen”, March 2003

89. Ali Kais Al-Rubai, “Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition”, IWPR-Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Baquba (ICR No. 63, 14 May 04).

90. Iraqi Patrol Editorials.

91. Lester W. Grau and Geoffrey Demarest, “Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—A Challenge for the Urban Warrior”, Military Review, September-October 2003.

92. Lester W. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp, “Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter”, Military Review, July-August 1999, 16.

93. Geoffrey B. Demarest, “Tactical Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict”, Military Intelligence, October-December 1985, 19.

94. Lester W. Grau, “Insurgency and Intelligence Processing”, Military Review, July-August 2004, 44.

95. Ibid, 49.

96. Ibid, 47.