Military specialists in China have monitored the progress and studied the societal and
military impacts of the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) for some time. For example,
they studied closely Russian Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov's works and observations on the RMA
during the 1980s. Chinese specialists also studied not only the application of new technologies
by the multinational coalition during Desert Storm in 1991, but also their impact on military art.
These studies greatly influenced the initial examination, assessment, and development of
China's RMA approach, as well as sub-components such as information warfare (IW). The
struggle now is to develop a uniquely Chinese approach, one that integrates Chinese military
philosophy and history, developments in modern technology, and the study of foreign army
experiences. An example of a uniquely Chinese approach can be found in the 1985 monograph of
Shen Weiguang, then a 25-year-old soldier of the Chinese ground forces. In one of the first
papers ever written on IW, Weiguang described the concept of "take-home" battle in which the
Chinese would conduct a different and personal type of People's War with computers:
those who take part in information war are not all soldiers. Anybody who understands
computers may become a "fighter" on the network. Think tanks composed of non-governmental experts may take part in decision-making; rapid mobilization will not just
be directed to young people; information-related industries and domains will be the first
to be mobilized and enter the war...(1)
At every opportunity authors and leaders are stressing the requirement to develop asymmetrical
or "out of the box" thinking, such as this excerpt from analyst Li Yinnian:
we should go for the enemy's weak parts and dead angles. Technologically, we should try
harder to go where others have not trodden and develop uncommon technology. We can
also consider organizing some "network special warfare detachments" and finding
some computer experts to form a shock brigade of "network warriors" who specialize
in looking for critical nodes and control centers on the enemy network and sabotaging
them.(2)
By striking at the vital points of an enemy's information and support system, attacking forces
become blinded and paralyzed and their morale collapses.(3)
This article examines the Chinese understanding of the RMA, its information warfare
corollary, and the impact of these issues on the Chinese understanding of future war. The focus is
on the years 1996-1998, with the research designed to identify significant changes. It centers on
those areas that are unique to the Chinese understanding of the RMA and IW, and areas of
concern to the West.
Defining the RMA
Chinese military analysts recognize that a military-technological revolution (MTR) has
occurred, citing the whole host of new technologies used during operation Desert Storm. In the
opinion of most Chinese specialists, a far-broader RMA, encompassing the MTR, is still in
progress and far from complete (some analysts, for example, believe the RMA will be complete
only by 2050 while others see a completion date somewhere between 2005 and 2010).(4) This
RMA, they point out, is the natural result and progression of social, economic, and science and
technology developments associated with the information age. It is not known if the economy of
China and other countries can support this revolution completely. It is also unknown what effect
other technologies and sciences, such as biology, will have on the present RMA. Thus, while the
revolution eventually will lead to significant changes for the armed forces of China, they must be
content in the short term, as many other armies must be, with the current weapons and equipment
of the Chinese armed forces supplemented with a few new weapons; and new combat and
training tactics that supplement the current technology gap, much as Sun-Tzu and Chairman Mao
accomplished during the agricultural and industrial ages, respectively. These developments will
be followed later by changes in equipment, troop strength, strategy, tactics and training.
Further, the Chinese characterize the present RMA as fundamental, all-inclusive,
extensive, unbalanced, and protracted. It is fundamental in that it represents a transformation of
the military establishment from an industrial to an information era. It is all-inclusive in that it
touches on every sphere and aspect of military development. It is extensive in that it is taking
place all over the world but unbalanced in that it is not taking place simultaneously with the same
intensity everywhere. And it is protracted in that it has a start point but no clear-cut end point. In
the opinion of some Chinese analysts, this revolution, which started in the civilian sector, will
extend to the military sector after building sufficient "potential energy."(5)
The Chinese have been reluctant to offer their official definition of the RMA, relying
instead on Western definitions of the term. One definition of the RMA not available in the press
but reportedly from the 1997 Chinese military affairs dictionary defined the RMA in the
following way:
starting from the premise that social transformation is a prerequisite for a revolution in
military affairs, the military field experienced a series of fundamental and profoundly
influential transformations. It is primarily a reflection of qualitative changes in military
technology, weapons and equipment, unit structure, warfighting methods, and military
thought and theory.(6)
The Chinese Military Affairs Dictionary, 1990 version, does not have a definition of
RMA but defines military affairs as
Involving both theory and practical matters related to armed combat. For example, it
includes the construction of armed forces, the preparation for armed conflict, and the
research into military science. It also includes both social, political, and economic
aspects. During the long period of war, people deepen and broaden their knowledge of
military affairs, making military affairs the embodiment of a science with wide-ranging
meaning.(7)
The Chinese apparently utilize the term "military revolution" interchangeably with and
more often than RMA. A 1996 Chinese article on IW theory, for example, defined a military
revolution as "a reflection of social, economic, and scientific and technological changes in the
military field."(8) Information technology (IT), the article added, has given rise to this new,
worldwide military revolution. IT is the "core and foundation of this military revolution, because
information and knowledge have changed the previous practice of measuring military strength by
simply counting the number of armored divisions, air force wings, and aircraft carrier battle
groups. Nowadays, one must also take into account some invisible forces(9), such as computing
capabilities, communications capacity, and system reliability."(10) Another 1996 article defined a
military revolution as "a major qualitative change which can correctly integrate, in good timing,
advanced technologies and weapon systems with new military theories and military
establishments; bring permanent changes to modes of operations; considerably improve military
efficiency; and enhance the combat effectiveness of armies by several orders of magnitude."(11)
To improve efficiency and effectiveness, the challenge of the military revolution is finding a way
to combine the increased accuracy of technology with the increased complexity required by new
military theory/strategy. Simple force ratios built on numbers of pieces of hardware have lost
their significance. Accuracy, however, has many problems to overcome, especially since there is
five to ten times the amount of information to handle, and the information has a quality all its
own. The good information must be separated from "information contamination or information
trash." Theory must be directed at the art of dealing with information at higher levels where
accuracy is hard to achieve, at the level of multidimensional battlefields and commanding
diversified forces via multi-media devices (computers, images, etc.).(12)
A third definition of a military revolution developed in 1996 noted that it consists of
three factors that must be integrated: advanced weapons systems, pioneering military theory, and
corresponding force organization. These changes are designed to raise a country's military
capability to its maximum potential. In-depth precision strikes will be the key combat form,
requiring the creation of a joint operations theory, while concepts such as a nonlinear battlefield
and non-contact combat will dominate. Offensive-defensive IW will be the focus of coming
wars. The aim of belligerents will be to seize the information high ground and pave the way for
ultimate victory, with the struggle for information supremacy becoming the crux of battle, in a
sense acting as a strategic deterrent.(13)
Two years later, the tone and substance of Chinese articles on the RMA had changed.
One article noted that "a mammoth revolution currently underway in the military sphere is
producing an unprecedented impact on, and shock waves in, man's military activities."(14)
Another noted that a "new military revolution is now taking the world by storm."(15) The military
revolution this author speaks about sounds very familiar to the RMA:
the history of the development of mankind shows that the development of science and
technology from a quantitative change to a qualitative change and the achievement of a
"qualitative leap" invariably led to a revolutionary change in the form of the technology
era of mankind and triggered off a profound military revolution.(16)
Engels, the author noted, pointed out over 100 years ago that technology determines
tactics. Qualitative changes in technology and weapons cause changes in military theory and the
composition of the force. The initiator of the military revolution currently underway among these
three (weapons systems, theory and organization) was the military-technical aspect of the
weapon systems in their physical form.(17) Later, military theory becomes the soul of the
military revolution. In some information societies, military theories have already overtaken
military technologies as the leading factor. The military revolution is completed when all-round
changes are reflected in organization, structure and the setup of the military system. Military
revolutions thus follow the trend of moving "from objects to concepts and from concepts to
structure...its ultimate completion will change the mode of military activities in the
complete sense and bring about a qualitative leap in combat capability...and we can put a
full stop to the new military revolution."(18)
A military revolution can effect policymakers, both military and non-military alike.
Precise kills allow policymakers to flexibly use both diplomatic and military means to political
and strategic ends. Information as a diplomatic or combat resource permits global reach,
nonlinear warfare, speed of light transmissions, comprehensive integration, and multiple and
joint use. Diverse technologies indicate that single weapons alone will not be the key factor in
judging combat capability but rather the comprehensive performance of basic weapons
"systems." Finally, new theory and force organization (to include the impact of the RMA on
training) must be developed.
China's most prolific writers on the RMA note that the country must find its own "unique
techniques and skills" during its investigation of the RMA. The country should not simply follow
western thinking and add only western developments and technologies to the existing framework
since
due to their different economic and scientific development levels, as well as their
different cultures, traditions, and ways of thinking, different countries will be subjected to
different impacts produced by military revolutions; as a result, they will adopt different
approaches toward new things and accept the new military revolution in varying degrees.
Therefore, there will be a growing trend toward diversification in the pattern of war
at the initial stage of the military revolution.(19)
Impact of the RMA on Chinese Theory and its Organization/Training for Warfare
The RMA has had a significant impact on the way in which Chinese military authors
view and assess military theory and today's battlefield. The Chinese note that the objectives are
more limited, in that total surrender or occupation of enemy territory are not as important as in
the past. The struggle to control information is more sharp and fierce than ever before, the
battlefield is more transparent due to the digital technology that extends the range at which forces
can be detected, warfare is highly integrated (especially between land, sea, air, and space forces),
and the lines of demarcation between strategic, campaign and tactical operations are more
blurred with each passing day.(20)
The understanding of the word "warfare" has changed as well, in that the information age
has introduced more potential instigators of warfare than ever before (to include terrorist
organizations, drug cartels, etc.). The face of war has changed from mechanized to information
and precision warfare, and the duration of war is being shortened. The time to make decisions
and implement them has also shrunk, and there is an effort to avoid life-and-death decisive
battles if casualties can be spared by other methods. Finally, the meaning of "concentration of
forces" is moving from the tactical to the campaign and strategic level of war.(21)
The Chinese military, these authors contend, is intent on exploiting the advantages
offered by the information age and its new technology. Information technology (IT) has provided
five capabilities on the modern battlefield: stereoscopic displays; wide-ranging reconnaissance
and surveillance; very deep, high-density early-warning networks; accurate positioning systems
that cover the entire globe; a wide variety of information communication methods with anti-interference capabilities; and nimble, high performance automated battlefield controls. These
systems have become the nervous system of the warfighting effort and exert a multiplier effect
on warfighting capabilities. Combat strength is a combination of personnel, weaponry,
information, and the integration of these elements. They also recognize that the ability to control
information resources, both friendly and enemy, will determine victory or defeat, as well as
the ability of information capabilities to break the enemy's will to resist (by attacking his
cognitive understanding and convictions).(22) IT has blurred the once sharp dividing line that
separated peacetime and wartime actions.
IT has also caused significant changes in weaponry. In the past, matter and energy were
the two main components, whose primary capabilities were mobility and lethality. With IT as
their anchor, new high-tech weapons pursue the integration of matter, energy, and information,
which allows weapons to be "smart" and "configurable." IT based weapons are also more
effective, a trait demonstrated during Desert Storm where, by Chinese calculations, precision-guided munitions accounted for only 7% of the munitions launched but destroyed 80% of the
total targets. Finally, IT has shown that force calculations are now less devoted to quantity and
more devoted to quality.(23) Stated somewhat differently, invisible forces (computing capabilities,
communication capacity and system reliability) are now as important in measuring military
strength as the number of divisions, wings and battle groups.(24)
Organizationally, the RMA should result in a scaled down force in both personnel and
numbers. Quality will replace numerical strength. Equipment will become more compact and
integrated, designed to operate in one unified, organic operational space. "Tree-shaped"
command systems will be replaced by "network-shaped" command organizational systems.
Priority will be given to reconnaissance equipment, information weapons systems, and the
development of a battlefield information network based on computer technology. Training
methods must also change, and the introduction of simulation laboratories designed to strengthen
research, forecasting, and the integration of technology and tactics are priority items. Finally,
people must be educated in the field of IW. The goal of this entire effort is to "unify the concept
of a people's war with the concept of victory through information."(25)
One of the most important corollaries to evolve out of this military revolution is that
associated with information war. IW was defined in a 1995 article by two senior PLA Colonels
as:
combat operations in a high-tech battlefield environment in which both sides use
information-technology means, equipment, or systems in a rivalry over the power to
obtain, control and use information. Information warfare is combat aimed at seizing the
battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential combat force; the seizure, control,
and use of information as its main substance; and all sorts of information weaponry
[smart weapons] and systems as its major means. Information warfare is combat in the
area of fire assault and operational command for information acquisition and anti-acquisition; for suppression [neutralization] and anti-neutralization; for deception and
anti-deception; and for the destruction and anti-destruction of information and
information sources.(26)
IW will affect Chinese views of combat since the fight for information dominance is so intense.
Additionally, outer space, force engagement times, and the types of force concentrations (from
people to firepower at the campaign and strategic level) must receive attention.
The remainder of this essay studies the content of China's IW thinking. It examines the
thoughts of the Chinese author who claims to have first written about information warfare, and
follows with an examination of Chinese writings on the subject of IW from 1996-1998.
A Look at the Information Warfare Thoughts of Shen Weiguang
In 1995, Dr. Shen Weiguang, author of more than 100 articles (and mentioned above as
one of the first authors to write about the topic of IW), wrote an IW introductory research piece
for the Chinese military newspaper JIEFANGJUN BAO. His thoughts offer a touchstone from
which to measure more recent IW writings in China.
Weiguang defined information warfare as command and control warfare or decision
control warfare, using information as the main weapon to attack the enemy's cognitive and
information systems, and to influence, check or change the decisions of enemy policymakers and
their consequent hostile actions. That is, the main target of IW is the ability to disrupt the
enemy's cognitive and trust systems, and to exert control over his actions. This definition implies
that U.S. and Russian concepts of perception management and reflexive control, respectively, are
also of interest to the Chinese, since control is a primary function of each. The Chinese
sometimes refer to this idea as "guidance control." Here the term cognitive system refers mainly
to information and computer decision-making systems. This thinking is similar, Weiguang
notes, to a U.S. air force colonel who recommended "electronic beheading" at the beginning of
an IW operation.(27)
IW has changed not only the pattern and methods of war but also its form, according to
Weiguang. For one thing, IW will be carried out though the army and society as a whole, a new
application of a People's War. Non-governmental organizations in society and individuals will
make use of the global computer network to take part in IW. This will make it increasingly
difficult to define where and who are the belligerent parties on the information battlefield since
the latter now has nearly unlimited parameters. Computer programmers will return to their
offices or homes to fight, denying servicemen the chance to engage in close combat. "Unity of a
nation" is the source of power in such a war, where the people are extensively mobilized.
Soldiers must also become more well-rounded in this environment, with expertise not only in
military affairs but also in science and technology. Human policy decisions rather than
technology remains the key to victory.(28)
IW also will give rise to a revolution in military philosophy, such as the fact that
information superiority has replaced air superiority in four-dimensional warfare, offering a new
criteria for freedom of action. IW will attempt to gain the initiative in battle through control over
information flows, especially regarding intelligence. The operational target of IW lies precisely
in control rather than bloodshed. The Chinese, Weiguang notes, have proposed maneuver warfare
and structural damage warfare in their tactical studies. The former is distinguished from
mobile warfare since it "takes IW as its soul." Structural damage warfare can only become
effective when information warfare's true essence is understood, that is when it is brought in line
with IW's entire framework. Weiguang also proposed that multi-layer and pagoda-style
command systems be abandoned, with an increase in the intermediate command layers leading to
a more balanced command system.
Weiguang warns not to abandon all thinking from the past. He notes that in accordance
with the theory of the "negation of the negation" of historical development, IW will negate much
of the theories associated with mechanized warfare of the industrial age. But IW will seek
reference from the theory of military tactics, which predictably lies in the military science of Sun
Tzu. He adds that IW, combined with Chinese thinking on guerrilla warfare, will display
tremendous power. Additionally, small information units will carry small-size, light
comprehensive electronic equipment offering navigation and night vision capabilities, as well as
the capability to release information bombs. These units will be composed of small groups of
soldiers active in the enemy rear, implying not only a continued but expanded role for special
forces soldiers in the IW environment. The losers in future wars will be those who lack
command thinking and the ability to apply strategies, not those who possess only backward
technology. System inputs from grasping or attaining knowledge costs far less than directly
purchasing advanced weaponry.(29)
The correct choice here is avoiding the opponent's strong points and attacking its weak
points, making the best use of advantage and avoiding disadvantage. When faced with a
technologically superior force armed with IW weaponry, it is important to refrain from "devising
a solution only from the angle of tactics and stratagem." Instead, the thinking of technological
experts can help turn one's strategic thinking or theory to advantage, finding new technological
orientations for strategy and tactics. As such, emphasis must be placed on military soft science,
which utilizes soft attacks and soft damage. Military soft science is
A branch of science devoted to the study of military theory, strategy, planning and
management. The study of soft science is a comprehensive one that straddles the army,
various departments, and branches of science. IW involves not only computer virus
warfare and EW, but also psychological warfare, deterrence warfare, and political
propaganda warfare....[IW] is beyond comparison to all previous forms of warfare.
Therefore, it calls for the support of "hard" science as well as the guarantee of "soft"
science.(30)
Weiguang recommends that China not sit and wait but start with military soft science and move
out on its own path of development, stressing the need for cross fertilization and cooperation of
qualified people from multiple branches of science.
Views on Information War (1996)
In 1996 there was a focus on the high-technology aspect of IW, especially the
digitalization aspect. There were also thoughts expressed on information injuries, negative
entropy, U.S. and other foreign army IW efforts, IW's impact on military art, and People's War.
Finally, there was much conjecture on how technology could be transformed into theory.(31)
The Chinese army in 1996 believed that IW was the focal point of the new military
revolution. It is clear that IW will have a much larger operational space in which to maneuver
than EW had. The Chinese believe that the precondition for the conduct of IW is to be found in
the digitization of the battlefield and the armed forces. Digitalization, in the view of one author,
would
turn voices, characters, images, and information of various types into digital coding; link
together battlefield command posts, various operational and logistic detachments, single-piece weapons and equipment, and individuals through such transmission means as
wireless stations, optical-fiber telecommunications, and satellite telecommunications;
form an intertwining computer telecommunications network; ...realize near-time
information exchange in all directions; ...and will optimize the command and control
functions of our units so as to enhance their antipersonnel force, survival capability, and
ability of co-ordinated operations. Therefore, battlefield digitization will be a
background condition and a core pillar for conducting and winning the information
war.(32)
Digitized forces can enhance the fighting capacity of a force simply by changing the way
information is transmitted. To counter this problem, the following techniques should be used:
insert information into a network; interfere with viruses; destroy vital nodes; and employ
dispersed forces and strength, breaking up the enemy into horizontal and vertical parts.(33)
Information was viewed in 1996 as a weapon that could cause various types of injury.
These "information injuries" were caused by deception, occupation (information overload),
contamination, blocking or sabotaging, and guidance.(34) The latter is so named because it
intentionally transmits certain information to an opponent so as to cause him to take an action
conforming to the opposite side. Guidance injury is thus much like the U.S. perception
management theory or the Russian reflexive control theory mentioned above. The target of these
different types of "information injuries" is the enemy's cognitive system and information system.
Here the author defines a cognitive system as referring to a man's brain, thinking and
information analysis process which can be affected by deception, contamination and guidance
injuries. An information system refers to the collection, handling and transmission of information
by communications systems, news media, and computer hardware and software, which is
susceptible to deception, occupation and contamination.(35) Direct information attacks affect the
decision-making and command authorities of an enemy, while an indirect attack affects enemy
morale and incites anti-war sentiment, eventually rendering the enemy command ineffective.
Another author noted that the essence of information is the negation of uncertainties, or
negative entropy. Entropy is disorder, thus negative entropy means order. This means that areas
with the greatest uncertainties will have the greatest demands for information. Whoever can turn
uncertainties into certainties will gain the upper hand under such conditions.(36)
One of the more interesting articles of 1996 discussed military art. Author Ch'en Huan
first discussed the challenge to traditional operational principles, noting that force concentration
is no longer effective, replaced by the concentration of striking efficacy in the form of
information and other types of energy; that the role of software is increasing; and that a soft
strike force is now even more important than a hard strike force. Additionally, he noted that the
lines between front and rear will blur, with attacks perhaps aimed at the support and technical
units first and then the first echelons, and with the operational objective being to paralyze the
other sides information system and will to resist. Long range combat will replace hand to hand
fighting, and new space weapons will appear in a "continuous stream": laser, ultra-high
frequency and ultrasonic wave weapons; mirror-beam, electromagnetic and stealth weapons;
plasma, ecological, smart, logic, and sonic weapons; and electromagnetic guns. Finally, Huan
noted that command structures would be "thin and flat" since networked systems would
eliminate the need for middle-level commanders, reducing the number of levels and producing a
structure that is wide horizontally and short vertically.(37)
The idea of a People's War also found expression in 1996. One author noted that there
would now be a new kind of political mobilization, one based on "generating and distributing
political mobilization software via the Internet, sending patriotic e-mail messages, and setting up
databases for traditional education." These factors greatly increase the ability of people to
participate in future wars, aiming to maintain the "peace of hardware through software
confrontations."(38)
Chinese authorities also wrote often on the IW developments and practices of the United
States. Even though countless detailed accounts had already been written about the U.S. based
coalition victory during Desert Storm, and how IT played such a key role in the success of that
operation, more articles continued to appear. The overwhelming majority of comments about the
U.S. approach to the RMA and its IW corollary were positive. The Chinese commentary was
rather matter of fact, simply stating a success as a success and not entering into polemics about
what the U.S. might do with its success. However there exists some material on how "foreign
armies" might conduct an IW attack. For example, one report noted the following warfare plans:
- virtual reality warfare (applying virtual scenes of troops advancing or withdrawing, or
transplanting virtual information into an enemy's command and control system for a variety of
reasons, such as disinformation, deception, disruption, or to cause panic)
- computer virus warfare (to paralyze core equipment)
- network warfare (designed to infiltrate information systems)
- broken circuit warfare (designed to disrupt the flow of command and control information)
- information infiltration warfare (designed to sap enemy morale by sending information directly
to soldiers about the military and civilian situation, sending information from soldiers at the front
or rear to civilians, and so on reaching not only commands but the individual soldier very quickly
and silently while offering a more extensive and destructive force than the old methods of
PSYOP).(39)
There have been some Chinese warnings to the U.S., although they make up only a small
percentage of the reporting on the issue (especially compared to Russian military journalists, who
speak with emotion, almost hysteria, and who have accused the West of preparing for IW with
Russia on several occasions). Chinese criticism is worth U.S. attention in any case, since it is
usually professional in manner, and the specialists can decide for themselves if the Chinese have
made good recommendations or not. For example, one author noted that the U.S. Army must be
careful since it can easily become trapped in the blind alley of technology. Whereas transparency
can be enhanced by advanced technologies, there is no way of making the decisions of
commanders as transparent as the view of the battlefield, the author notes.
By the end of 1996 the following questions were being asked: Will the guiding RMA
ideology be pulled by theory or practice? How will practice be reflected in the reworking of the
strategic plan? How can war methodologies be reformed and updated? One author noted the need
to improve "the theories and methods of war, so as to bring along and guide the practice of army
building." In this regard, simulation confrontation technologies were an extremely urgent area in
need of development. Combat laboratories, one author believed, must be built to take advantage
of virtual reality technology which allows military science to come closer to the natural sciences
in its ability to discover, test, and verify the rules of military science. The same author noted the
further need for a macro-control system. This is because not only the armed forces, but various
departments of the entire country could experience profound changes. The development of an
overall system would allow for targets, content, methods, and measures of the RMA to be guided
in its implementation. At the same time, the enhanced role of the individual was underscored,
especially at the soldier level where a wide range of professional skills are employed.(40)
Views on Information War (1997)
In 1997, the theory of IW was developed, and a IW exercise was held late in the year. It
was one of the first applications of theory to field conditions. Increased emphasis was placed on
finding ways to use operational thinking in the most effective way. The idea of "confrontation of
commands" played a key role in the discussions of the face of future war, and the concept of
information security was also developed. Finally, a plan was offered to build an information-age
China.
In one 1997 article, IW was defined as
all types of war fighting activities that involve the exploitation, alteration and paralysis of
the enemy's information and information systems, as well as all those types of activities
which involve protecting one's own information and information systems from
exploitation, alteration and paralysis by the enemy.(41)
This definition appears to closely resemble U.S. definitions at the time. Author Liang Zhenxing
then went on to explain that the essence of IW theory, from his point of view, is to render
operational space cloudy and indistinct to the enemy while making operational space transparent
to one's own force. IW was described by Zhenxing as a style and not a category of war, and
something that cannot function as a stand-alone item. He characterized mobile warfare, land
warfare, guerrilla warfare, and electronic warfare as styles of warfare.
The IW highlight of 1997 was a late autumn IW exercise in the Shenyang Military
Region. This exercise involved the deployment of ground, logistics, medical, and air force units.
As one observer noted:
the speed of marking and mapping on the computer screens by the advisors was more
than 20 times faster than the traditional manual methods, and accuracy was 100 percent
[faster]. The computer network in the commanding unit was activating more than 100
terminals, connecting and commanding a fourth-degree campaign network...the
commanders' attention was not on the number of documents handled, but on whether the
high-tech design was excellent. Their focus was not on whether the commanding
procedures and soldiers' movements were standardized, but on how much high
technology was being applied to their strategies and operations.(42)
The Taiwan Central News Agency on 27 December published a report on the exercise, and
accused the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of trying to develop a computer-virus warfare
capability.(43)
A few weeks later in the "Military Forum" column of JIEFANGJUN BAO, the PLA
Academy wrote a detailed article on the confrontation of command on the information
battlefield.(44) The initiative in future battle, the work concluded, depended on the side that
controlled information. The seminar then went on to discuss the contours of an information
engagement, noting that it would probably start with a confrontation of command. PLA
Academy Commandant Guo Anhua noted that the success of a military revolution depends not
on technology but rather on operational thinking and the methodology of utilizing
technology in the most effective way. No longer is it enough to shape an opponent's decisions
through stratagem, firepower, and the indirect approach, since now the direct approach is
possible. Confrontation can only be understood from the integration of technologies, and from
"winning in strategy by winning in battle" simultaneously (instead of the old "winning in strategy
via strategy" or "winning in strategy after winning in battle"). Troop deployments are oriented
more on the communications between an enemy's command system and his combat units than
against manpower and firepower, as the former destroys the ability to deploy troops. Finally,
confrontation of commands manifests itself as a confrontation on the information network, which
allows for joint and integrated operations.(45)
To obtain network supremacy, one must have superiority in the procurement,
transmission, and processing of information. That is, network supremacy is possible only if it
exists at these three levels. The "drift mobility" of command, the fact that the number of control
nodes for command has redundancy built-in, makes it harder to cut off the head (a U.S. division
commander in the 1980s was able to communicate from any of 14 network nodes across the
division). Networks able of performing on the battlefield are time intensive and must be planned
well in advance since they take years to construct.(46)
Another characteristic of the confrontation of commands (or information engagement) is
the fact that human intelligence stands between two technologically based "bodies of
knowledge", that is two computer-based systems. The human must be able to comprehend what
happens when these two bodies of knowledge collide, and how to control or manipulate the
interaction and the consequences.(47) Humans must respect technology but not deify it, neither
blindly following the RMA and IW theories nor evading its challenges.
Yet another characteristic is the fact that computer-aided simulations are used more and
more in decision-making for the confrontation of commands. Network models calculate combat
time, the distribution of manpower and weaponry, a comparison of battle plans, and an
evaluation of combat effectiveness, with the totality designed to arrive at a scientific prediction
and a decision. But the human interface maintains its importance here too since "how to think"
and analyze may be more critical than how to do something suggested by a computer. The
Chinese regard their efforts in this area as lagging behind foreign armies, noting that a lack of
experimentation has not allowed them to "know the flavor of the pear."(48)
Finally, and perhaps most important, the confrontation of commands must no longer be
viewed as simply a confrontation between two systems designed to support operations. Rather,
the command functions have become so crucial to survivability that they must be outfitted
with their own innate attack and defend systems. Command structures must also be careful
not to follow in someone else's inertia, or to follow the inertia of tradition too closely. A unique
approach to the subject is vital to success. Additionally, the material base of the command
confrontation, technology, must achieve breakthroughs in some of the critical technologies for
future success.(49)
A detailed article on computer virus weapons also appeared in 1997. A computer virus
was defined by the author as a computer program which can revise a computer's program or use
a replica of itself to infect computer systems other than the one already invaded. A virus revises
or destroys a computer system after normal applications have been executed. Not only can a
virus alter stored data, revise stored files, and cause computers to have "mental disorders,"
according to the Chinese, but it can paralyze an entire computer network without anyone
knowing about it. More than 6,000 executable, infectious, destructive, hidden, latent or
aggressive viruses were listed.(50) The author further noted that computer viruses may become a
new field for electronic countermeasures. Viruses can attack the brains of an operational
command system, not just the receivers and transmitters, as occurs with normal electronic
countermeasures. In the latter case, electronic measures can continue once jamming ceases. This
is not the case with a virus. It can cause permanent damage. Insertion remains a problem, of
course, but with the assistance of electromagnetic waves, they can be inserted remotely into
airplanes, tanks, submarines and other systems.(51)
Chinese methods of countering viruses to date include:
- establishing a native integrated circuit production industry
- establishing secure importation procedures for computers brought into the country
- studying computer virus detection methods, establishing mechanisms for defending against
viruses and improving the ability of computer systems to resist viruses
- reinforcing and strengthening the resistance of systems to electromagnetic pulses
- tightening computer systems' use and management, and the awareness of the potential of
information confrontation.(52)
These recommendations will help guarantee the national security strategy of China, its
overall military information system security, and raise the consciousness of the citizenry in
regard to the information security of the country. China must, as a result, draw up security
standards and norms for its information infrastructures; enhance research on information
protection technology, and develop technologies to detect, track and prevent computer network
incursions; and independently develop computer systems to raise the technological level of
China's independent efforts in this area. High-level bodies designed to establish national defense
information modernization are required. They must track trends in foreign IT and IW, develop a
strategy for China's defense information modernization and research programs, and develop a
body of IW theory for China's unique situation. Training must be accelerated, and IW courses
offered at institutions, key young people must be selected and provided with advanced training,
and leaders and cadres in important posts must be systematically trained to increase their
command abilities in an IW environment. Finally, the country must be aware that weapons with
applied IT could become the means of exerting military, political and economic pressure on an
enemy.(53)
Authors Wang Xusheng, Su Jinhai, and Zhang Hong of the PLA Academy of Electronic
Technology listed the following as essential elements of IW theory and the latter's role in
providing information security:
- primary goal is to attack command and control systems, the electronic solar plexus of the
enemy
- fight with speed so that the enemy doesn't know where the actual battlefield is located
- attack command authorities, staff headquarters, theater of operations headquarters, and unit
headquarters
- project force organization scenarios with increased roles for special small scale and flexible
forces
- destroy enemy "eyes and ears" while protecting friendly systems
- use multi-node/path/frequency network systems equipped with information deception and
concealment procedures to ensure survival
- use digitized equipment(54)
The foundation for IW is the network. The command network or nervous system has the
following functions: gathering surveillance information, transmitting and processing information,
locating targets, and allocating targets to be attacked, resulting in the categorization, collation,
identification, and synthesis of information, thereby enabling precision attacks, transparency in
command, and grasp of the initiative in war. IW is waged by all the people under high-tech
conditions, and electronics experts, computer experts, and information engineers are the
new heroes on the stage of modern warfare. Their basic need, Chinese experts assert, is the
establishment of high-speed information networks. Mid and low speed networks exist, but
additional ones are needed as well as the capability to do research on and build high speed ones.
This will also require a variety of information resources and information equipment, systems,
and qualified people to enable the country to achieve victory over an enemy without directly
engaging him.(55)
To build an information-age China, the following plan was offered:
- Build an information network architecture suitable for use by the civilian and military sectors
in peacetime and wartime. IT not only has a multiplier effect on the growth of the national
economy but also links the "market" with the "battlefield", in the opinion of the PLA Academy
officers. The construction of an information superhighway with Chinese characteristics is
essential.
- Strengthen the training of qualified personnel. The study of technology must be integrated
with the creative innovation of military affairs theories.
- Networks must be created and free rein must be provided to the market's driving power, but
government administration and coordinated development must be present as well to serve both
the market and battlefield. China's Public Communications Network, Economic Information
Network, and The China Education and Research Network (CERNET) are already taking shape.
- New technology must be adopted quickly. The information environment is already being
shaped by graphics, images, voice, and animations, made possible by surmounting some space
and time limitations in technology. It also enables the battlefield to move from a passive to a
dynamic environment.
- The survivability of information networks must be enhanced. Otherwise, the orderly flow of
personnel, material, energy resources and information will cease, and "soft kill" objects become
unattainable. Flexibility, camouflage, and the ability to operate under a variety of conditions are
most desirable. This requires the establishment of a military defense network.
- Legislation concerning information and its administration must be strengthened. IT affects
social, economic and cultural developments in many ways.(56) The Chinese officers feel that
We should use legal mechanisms and norms to regulate, safeguard and guide the research,
development and application of IT and information security technology. We should build
a legal system of laws and regulations that standardizes, safeguards and promotes the
application of IT. Thus the drafting, observance, and enforcement of laws relating to the
application of IT will embody the objective laws of applied IT development, as well as
embodying the role of IT in the context of the market economy, the national situation and
the military situation.(57)
Views on Information War (1998)
Specific themes developed in 1998 include the requirement to develop a new strategy and
tactics for waging a high-technology People's War; the need to integrate technology with theory
while maintaining the most important elements of Chinese military history and philosophy;
command and control issues; and the impact of information technology on military art.
Speaking at the Chinese National Defense University in January, Defense Minister Chi
Haotian, a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China
(and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission) discussed the concept of People's War
and its applicability to China today. His lecture, entitled "Issues Concerning the Modern High-Tech People's War," offered a systematic explanation of how to develop the concept of waging a
high-tech People's War. Haotian stressed the fact that new focal points had appeared for
accumulating the resources required to fight a People's War; and that new and effective means
for mobilizing and inspiring the people to wage war against aggression had appeared. Since
information technology is present in both the military and civilian sectors, there are now new
methods for people to partake in and support a war, he added. These systems, which count
heavily on integrated and rear support, offer new guidelines and measures for waging an
extensive People's War. Strong reserve forces are needed, especially in terms of quantity,
training, mobility, and equipment. People's War theories, strategies and tactics must be
developed and enriched based on these new circumstances. Minds must be emancipated and
mindsets changed in order to take advantage of this situation.(58) In particular
we must focus on studying the characteristics and laws of fighting a People's War,
building our defense, and waging high-tech military struggles; seize the commanding
point of contemporary military theory; and actively create new strategies and tactics that
meet the needs of waging a high-tech People's War.(59)
It will be interesting to follow the development of this theory and strategy over the next few
years. It may offer a futuristic view of the total integration of the military and civilian sectors that
all nations may someday employ.
A second issue receiving top priority in 1998 was the integration of technology with
theory. This is an important topic to the Chinese, one which they will undoubtedly continue to
develop over the next few years. They deem it absolutely invaluable to uncover the
characteristics, objective laws, principles and stipulations associated with the ongoing RMA.
Developing the theory of IW, in their view, is as important as the technology itself, since without
it there is no means for the application of IT. In the realm of tactics, for example, the Chinese are
investigating the objective laws of combined operations by studying the interaction between
technology and tactics. This will improve the operational formulas and methodologies of the
tactical and electronic means for the offense and defense and the art of command capabilities.(60)
As one author noted
in addition to the current three major factors of operations (firepower, assault, and
mobility) the importance of protection, support, electromagnetic fighting, information
and even command and control has attracted more and more attention. Obviously, people
are giving play to the comprehensive effects of armaments and tactical means,
emphasizing comprehensive and in-depth attacks at the same time, and increasing the
percentage of technological confrontations in battle.(61)
The information age urges a new theoretical examination of the battlefield for several reasons.
Now we are facing the nonlinearity of several issues: space (no regional boundaries), response
(release combat power in unexpected places), coordination (different levels of command now
must stay in contact), confrontation (operations are more asymmetrical than symmetrical), and
decision-making (computers do non-sequential thinking).(62) The nonlinearity of these aspects
invites a much closer examination than in the past.
Military theory itself also received attention. Some icons must be preserved, one analyst
wrote, to wit Marxist military theory, Mao Zedong thinking on military affairs, Deng Xiaoping
thinking on army building in the new period, and Chairman Jiang Zemin's important thoughts on
army building. However, it is also important to emancipate the mind, boldly develop new
theories, and study the impact of high-tech on the face of modern wars. Combat units will be
employing advanced combat means and consuming a larger amount of resources on a
multidimensional battlefield. Chinese officers must therefore study the military value of high-tech developments, understand the reason, purpose, scale, style, and means of high-tech warfare,
analyze changes and characteristics of high-tech battlefields and combat methods, and identify
the key factors concerning the process and outcome of high-tech wars. Otherwise it is not
possible to properly prepare the force. The old adage of "one rifle, two legs, three meals, and four
hand-grenades" must be replaced with "science, technology, system, quality, and efficiency."(63)
Thinking outside the box will require breaking with old theories or reinterpreting them:
Everyone is equal before truth; earnestly advocate creative and pioneering efforts; let a
hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend; and weed through
the old to bring forth the new...draw upon all advanced and beneficial military thinking;
make foreign experiences serve China's purposes; and enrich and develop China's
military theories.(64)
The Chinese explored other issues in 1998, especially the study of command and control
issues. One report consisted of a book review in which the author noted that recent books on
command and control warfare specified the following issues: the subject, object, means and other
concepts of command and control; concepts for building an information corps; the principles on
which information warfare should be based; and the means through which command and control
should be exercised. The authors also examined the composition, characteristics and trends in
the basic technologies of information warfare, its structural system, and the strategies for
developing new technologies. Many of these questions will most likely be answered at the
Communications Command Academy, an institution that combines command with technology
and studies questions of organizational preparation and implementation of combat plans.(65)
One of the best general articles on IW in 1998 that expanded on ideas first developed in
1996 was that by Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong called "Viewing Our Army's Quality Building
from the Perspective of What Information Warfare Demands."(66) They discussed in detail several
aspects of IW and its impact on military affairs. First, they noted, IW is the product of the new
technological revolution, one that ensures that simply stronger firepower will not be enough to
win in battle. Instead, who uses IW and IT to discover the enemy first, respond the fastest, and
strike with accuracy will win. Effectiveness comes from the mastery of command and control
capabilities, the ability to reduce interference in the decision-making process, and the
introduction of interference into enemy systems or thinking. Second, information acquisition
means will determine the accuracy of firepower and timeliness for the use of reserves. That is,
accuracy comes from integrating means of reconnaissance and precision, and timeliness of the
employment of forces also relies heavily on seeing the enemy first and anticipating his every
move. The focus of operations will switch from firepower to detecting, concealing, searching and
avoiding. Further, information now makes non-contact engagements as likely as contact
engagements.
Third, the stability of the operational structure has become more important than the
survivability of units. Traditional conflict witnessed the quantitative destruction of units (tanks,
planes, etc.) to bring about structural disintegration. Now, the first efforts are aimed at command
and control elements, for their destruction will destroy the utility and application of the units.
Preserving the integrity and stability of the structure of one's own side and sabotaging the
enemy's will be the cornerstone of the operational theory of IW. The overriding strike and
long-range victory will advance to the forefront. The principle of concentrating military
strength will be replaced by that of concentrating operational effectiveness. Since targets can
be engaged literally hundreds of times, there will be a greater shock effect and explosive force
with the effect of "nuclear fusion." With regard to the construction of the army, there will be a
switch from functional expansion to structural optimization. Networked command that unites the
various armed services will infiltrate to the tactical level.(67) Another author noted that the armed
forces will be characterized by the downsizing of troops, improved quality and small, integrated
and versatile units.(68) Fourth, the core activity is the pursuit of integrated information supremacy.
Building systems of soft destruction (signal deception or interference) is more important than
weapons of hard destruction. As system integration expands downward, it will integrate
information, firepower, and mobility, and when it expands upward it will result in the infamous
"system of systems."
The authors warn that IW is occurring in peacetime, reflected strategically as intelligence
collection warfare and propaganda war. The superpowers are pushing the battle lines formed by
information to the fore at the same time that they are pulling back regular forces. With the
popularization of the Internet, this is becoming an affair of the whole nation. At the same time
that China is presented with these challenges, there is also the golden opportunity to skip over
several other phases of development in the mechanization process. This should be achieved not
by buying equipment but by boosting domestic production capabilities.(69)
China's belief that preparations are ongoing for IW in peacetime puts added emphasis on
preparations for and the necessity to win the initial battle, which they believe will develop into a
decisive battle determining winners and losers. The core issue will be the battle for network
supremacy, turning into a battle for the "nervous system" of the armed forces (remote sensing
equipment, communications and transmission equipment, processing and decision-making nodes,
etc.). As one author noted:
the initial battle in future local wars may begin with a "hard" strike or may have "soft"
strikes as its precursors. In addition, the causes of hi-tech local wars will be intricate and
complex, involving not only the interests of neighboring countries but also directly or
indirectly affecting the strategic interests of great powers and power blocs. The fact that
policy and tactics play a major role in wars determines that it will not be possible to bring
about and attain the objectives of war through traditional military means, and new means
and forms of initial battles will emerge as the time requires.(70)
These new means and forms include political warfare, financial and economic warfare,
psychological warfare, information network warfare, space control warfare, and regional
blockade warfare. Initial battles may begin with "a keystroke" instead of a "first shot." The four
most dangerous points of contention for this author were network early warning, space and air
defense early warning, and early warning against an initial battle taking the form of a financial
war. The recent Asian financial crisis served as a warning shot to the Chinese.(71) All of these
issues are tied to networks, which will become the "commanding heights" for forces to capture.
On the battlefield, the authors suggest that China should focus on developing
asymmetrical information offensive means. The use of physical symbols to transmit messages by
Somalians, for example, crippled U.S. information gathering means, and should be remembered
as a way of thinking asymmetrically. It is important to bring into play the mutual substitution and
complementary use of both high and low technologies. China's force must focus on integration
and the combination of four factors, opportunity, foundation, potential, and decision to determine
the orientation, speed, and outcome of the armed forces' development.(72)
Finally, the Chinese offered an example of high-technology battlefield prowess in 1998
when it staged an integrated high-technology exercise in October that united several military
regions around the country. The center of gravity of the exercise was the Beijing Military
Region, where a joint defense warfare drill used a "military information superhighway" for the
first time. It was described as an information network sub-system of the command automation
system, composed of digital, dial, command net, and restricted channels. Other elements of the
command automation system are the command operations, audio and graphics procession and
control, and date encryption sub-systems. The exercise started on 20 October and was
coordinated with several other regions. The superhighway transmitted graphics, characters, and
audio data in addition to situation maps.(73) The Lanzhou Military Region, which includes the
Gobi Desert, most likely also participated, since they reported on 26 October (as did the Beijing
Region) of having participated in a high-technology exercise that emphasized electronic
confrontation.(74) Earlier in October, the General Staff reported that it too had held an all-army
high-technology training exercise to discuss and design training issues to meet the challenges of
the worldwide military revolution. Fu Quanyou, chief of the General Staff, attended and presided
over the training exercise. They viewed the training of the Shenyang Military Region,(75) which
may also have been part of the exercise mentioned above.
Conclusions
There are many conclusions to be drawn from this short survey of Chinese writings on
the RMA and IW over the past three years, but first it is worthwhile to summarize what was
emphasized in each year. In 1996 Chinese specialists wrote on digitalization, the ability to inflict
information injuries, using information to eliminate uncertainties, U.S. and other foreign army
IW efforts, and the concept of a high-technology People's War. In 1997, an IW exercise was
held, the idea of future war focused on the importance of high-technology "operational thinking"
and "confrontation of commands," the concept of information security was developed, and a plan
was offered to build an information-age China. In 1998, detailed discussions continued on a
high-technology People's War, the impact of IW on military art, the essential requirement of
integrating technology with theory (highlighting the role of networking and the initial period of
war), and a major high-technology exercise was conducted (with the introduction of a "military
information superhighway").
What conclusions can be drawn? First, these writings clearly were initially influenced by
western perceptions and understanding of terms. Many of the definitions and characteristics
associated with both RMA and IW drew heavily (in some cases entirely) on foreign army
experiences. By 1997, however, it was also clear that the Chinese had arrived at a stage where
they began to put their own spin and emphasis on the concepts. In particular, the Chinese began
to stress asymmetrical and "out of the box" theoretical applications. Some of the terms
highlighted above underscore this fact:
- take home battle
- network warriors/special warfare detachments
- invisible forces
- non-contact combat
- decision control war
- information injury
- guidance control injury
- negative entropy
- military soft science
- information corps
- and drift mobility
At the same time, Chinese theorists ensured that they did not eliminate the main elements of the
Chinese understanding of warfare developed over thousands of years. Rather, the main lessons of
past wars will be viewed through the prism of the current RMA and IW concepts. That is, Sun
Tsu's Art of War and the 36 stratagems of military theory will now find new expression in RMA
and IW theories.
Second, Chinese writings, similar again to western efforts, focused on the impact of the
RMA and IW in three areas: weapons system integration, military theory, and military
organization. Only when these three areas of analysis reach maturity will the Chinese feel they
have arrived at a point where they are somewhat in control of the military revolution process.
The Chinese look at the difficulties of the transition in terms of challenges and opportunities.
Challenges are the problems associated with the proper integration of theory, weapons and
organizational structure, while opportunities are the ability to skip some of the challenges
presented by the mechanized age.
Third, the Chinese clearly have an optimistic attitude about the future. They do not look
at the developments abroad as serious threats in the same manner that the Russians do, for
example. Rather, they applaud creative efforts abroad and use them as examples for their people
to follow, all the while emphasizing that one must learn from foreign armies but not copy their
experience. Rather, the Chinese RMA and IW developmental phases must be full of unique
Chinese characteristics and thinking.
Finally, it is clear that Chinese thinking stresses the increased role of the individual. The
mere fact that a People's War has simply been reworked by Chinese theorists and adapted to the
RMA and IW concepts is the best example of this fact. In addition, the Chinese stress the
importance of people as the obvious "new heros" of the information age. In particular, they
believe that the professions of electronics, computer, and information engineers will be just as
vital in destroying an opponent's center of gravity as the infantryman. They may just be right.
On the other hand, access to the Internet has given the individual more power than ever
before to reach other citizens and communicate throughout the mainland and the region. This has
not been to the liking of the authorities. Neither has the rising number of hacker attempts on
government websites, according to China's computer police. To counter this "information
counterrevolution" the Ministry of Information Industry, which operates Internet servers for
China, have created a so-called "Great Firewall of China" to keep out anything subversive.(76)
The difficulty for Chinese authorities will be to transition from a control-oriented
information society to a computer dominated, open-information society. Russia is struggling
with the same problem. The debate over access to information will be hotly contested over the
coming months, as will information threats to the government. China is not immune from other
information-oriented debates as well, such as developing a code of conduct for the information
age or developing a region-wide information security system.
Above all, Chinese authorities do not believe that the development of an information
society will solve societies problems. In the military sphere they correctly state, as have many
American civilian and military think tanks, that IW will not be a panacea even for U.S. military
strategists. LTG Li Jijun, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Institute of Military Sciences, noted that:
this new military revolution is undoubtedly a new development, however, it will prove an
ill omen to all countries, including the United States. The information age will make the
most advanced country vulnerable to war damages, and to personnel casualties and
network breakdowns in particular.(77)
Yet people and networks are the very areas over which China is most concerned, making it as
vulnerable as any of the advanced countries of the world. Li Jijun's comment demonstrates that
China will have much to work on to overcome its vulnerabilities. Internal conflict between the
government and the people/businessmen over the right to use different forms of and access to
information will be as contentious an issue as trying to compete with foreign militaries in the
near future. The U.S. is still wrestling with this internal conflict of access to information as well.
A recent court decision in the U.S. to allow access to pornography sites in high school libraries is
a case in point. Most Americans would vehemently argue that access to this type of information
in this particular environment is simply wrong, but the courts have ruled otherwise in the interim.
The primary area of concern for western governments will be Chinese intent, that is how
they interpret what other nations are doing in this area and how they intend to respond with their
own IW capability. It is important that governmental decisions about information operations in
the U.S. and other western nations are clearly explained by diplomats and understood in China.
To lessen concern on both continents, it would be beneficial to initiate high level discussions on
this sensitive issue now. America is trying to do this with their Russian counterparts, and several
important conferences have already been held. Leaders world-wide must confront this issue with
the concern and patience it will require. We all must remain acutely aware of our shortcomings
and take advantage of the time afforded us to discuss and solve these new, serious problems of
the 21st century.
ENDNOTES
1. Wei Jincheng, "New Form of People's War," JIEFANGJUN BAO, 25 June 1996, p 6 as
downloaded in translated form from the FBIS webpage.
2. Li Yinnian, quoted in column by Huang Youfu, Zhang Bibo, and Zhang Song, "New
Subjects of Study Brought about by Information Warfare," JIEFANGJUN BAO, 11 November
1997, p 6 as translated on the FBIS web page, 23 December 1997.
3. Ch'en Huan, "The Third Military Revolution," Contemporary Military Affairs, 11
March 1996, as published in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, National
Defense University Press, 1996, pp 389-398.
4. Liang Zhenxing, (no title), presentation at the 15 September 1997 Defense Information
Modernization Symposium organized by the Chinese Electronics Society, Zhongguo Dianzi Bao,
24 October 1997, from the FBIS web page of 13 January 1998.
5. Wang Baocun, "Military Transformation in an Information Era," Beijing Jiefangjun
Bao, 21 April 1998, p 6 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web page.
6. Definition obtained by the author during a recent trip to China.
7. Chinese Military Affairs Dictionary, Liberation Army Publishing House, 1990, p
unknown, sent as an e-mail to the author after translation by James Mulvenon of the RAND
corporation.
8. Hai Lung and Chang Feng, "Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare," Kuang
Chiao Ching, No 280, 16 January 1996, pp. 22-23 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-035, 21
February 1996, pp 33-34.
9. These have been defined as the calculation capacity of equipment, telecommunications
volume, and the reliability and real-term reconnaissance ability of relevant systems.
10. Hai Lung, Ibid.
11. Zhang Feng, Historical Mission of Soldiers Straddling 21st Century," JIEFANGJUN
BAO, 2 January 1996, p 6 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-061, 28 March 1996, p 29.
12. Su Enze, "Have Mastery of Essence, Construct 'Two Mansions'," JIEFANGJUN BAO,
9 January 1996, p 6 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-061, 28 March 1996, p 35.
13. Su Enze, "Logical Concept of Information Warfare," JIEFANGJUN BAO, 11 June
1996, p 6 as it appeared on the FBIS web page, 11 June 1996.
14. Cheng Yawen, "Keep Abreast of the Development Pattern of the New Military
Revolution," JEFANGJUN BAO, 7 July 1998, p 6 as downloaded from the FBIS web page on 21
July 1998.
15. Baocun.
16. Ibid.
17. Yawen.
18. Ibid.
19. Zhang Feng, p 34.
20. Yang Shuqi and Guo Ruobing, (no Title), Beijing Zhongguo Guofang Keji Xinxi, Sept-Dec 1996, No 5/6, pp 90-93 as translated by FBIS and downloaded on its webpage.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Hai Lung and Chang Feng, "Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare," KUANG
CHIAO CHING, 16 January 1996, no 280, pp 22-23, as translated and downloaded from the
FBIS webpage.
25. Ibid.
26. Wang Baocun and Li Fei, "Information Warfare," in Chinese Views of Future Warfare,
Michael Pillsbury, editor, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, p 328.
27. Shen Weiguang, "Focus of Contemporary World Military Revolution-Introduction to
Research in Information Warfare," JIEFANGJUN BAO, 7 November 1995, p 6 as translated in
FBIS-CHI-95-239, 13 December 1995, pp 23- 25.
28. Ibid., p 26.
29. Ibid., p 26, 27.
30. Ibid., p 28, 29.
31. These summaries of developments in each year are not claimed by the author to be all-inclusive, but represent only the general trends offered by translated material.
32. Zhang Feng, p 30.
33. Xue Lianfang, "Digitized Forces' Killer has Come into Being," JIEFANGJUN BAO,
30 April 1996, p 6, as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-097, 17 May 1996, p 24.
34. Wang Huying, "Exploring and Analyzing Characteristics of Information Warfare,"
JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 January 1996, p 6 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS
webpage.
35. Ibid.
36. Su Enze, "Have Mastery...", p 34.
37. Ch'en Huan, "The Third Military Revolution," Contemporary Military Affairs, 11
March 1996, as published in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, National
Defense University Press, 1996, pp 389-398.
38. Wei Jincheng.
39. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 25 June 1996, p 6 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-145, 26 July
1996, pp 27, 28.
40. Zhang Feng, p 33, 34.
41. Liang Zhenxing.
42. Beijing Xinhua, 1508 GMT, 22 October 1997, as downloaded in translated form from
the FBIS webpage.
43. Taiwan Central News, 1057 GMT, 27 December 1997, as downloaded in translated
form from the FBIS webpage.
44. Liang Zhenxing, (no title), Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, 24 October 1997, as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS webpage.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Xu Runjun and Chen Xinzhong, "Computer Virus Weapons," GUOFANG, 15 February
1997, No 2, pp 42-44, as translated and published on the FBIS webpage.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Li Nengjing, (no title), Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, 24 October 1997, p 8, as translated and
downloaded on the FBIS webpage.
54. Wang Xusheng, Su Jinhai, and Zhang Hong, (no title) Beijing Jisuanji Shijie, 11
August 1997, No 30, as translated and downloaded on the FBIS webpage.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 0921 GMT 8 January 1998, as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS web page.
59. Ibid.
60. Zeng Sunan, "New Technological Revolution Calls for Breakthrough in Military
Theory," Hong Kong Hsien-tai Chun-shih, No 259, 11 August 1998, p 19-20, as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS web page.
61. Ibid.
62. Guo Anhua and Zhang Haitian, "Increase Sense of Times, Vigorously Explore Laws,"
Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 21 July 1998, p 6 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web page.
63. Fu Quanyou, "Study Military Theories, Proper Military Science," Beijing Jiefangjun
Bao, 10 March 1998, p 6 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS webpage.
64. Ibid.
65. Lei Yuanshen, "New Breakthrough in the Study of Information Warfare," Beijing
Jiefangjun Bao, 21 July 1998, p 6 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS webpage.
66. Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong, "Viewing Our Army's quality Building from the
Perspective of What Information Warfare Demands," Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 3 March 1998 p 6
as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web page.
67. Ibid.
68. Baocun. In the reform process, Baocun notes that the army will most likely follow a
"comprehensive" development, meaning the army will be ready for both mechanized and
information warfare.
69. Jianghuai and Dong.
70. Zhao Shuanlong, "The Initial Battle is the Decisive Battle, and Preparations for
Military Struggle in the New Period," Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 18 August 1998, p 6 as translated
and downloaded from the FBIS web page.
71. Ibid.
72. Jianghuai and Dong.
73. Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 1148 GMT, 26 October 1998, as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS web page.
74. Ren Yanjun and Zhang Jianjun, "General Staff Department Holds All-Army Hi-Tech
Training Exercise," Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 2 October 1998, p 1 as translated and downloaded
from the FBIS web page.
75. Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She, 1309 GMT, 26 October 1998, as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS web page.
76. Elaine Kurtenback, "China Determined to Tighten Secrecy," Associated Press, 25
November 1998.
77. Li Jijun, "International Military Strategy and China's Security at the Turn of the
Century," Hong Kong Zhongguo Pinglun, No 8, 5 August 1998, pp 76-80 as translated and
downloaded from the FBIS web page.