Mr. Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen:
First, please allow me to express my appreciation for the opportunity to present the views
of the Russian Ministry of Defense on approaches to peacekeeping.
Because of major world changes of recent years, a qualitatively new military-political
environment has arisen.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the bipolar model of
international relations has ceased to exist, and a qualitatively new military-political and
military-strategic environment is forming.
This development has had a significant destabilizing effect on individual regions of the
world and on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The probability that instability and crises will evolve into open armed conflict is highest in
Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, in
Southeast Asia and in Africa.
Factors contributing to the rise of crisis situations and armed conflict include:
- general instability, serious crises in the economic and financial systems of states in the
- a break in economic ties and the establishment of customs barriers;
- a crisis in the system for managing the economy and errors in setting priorities for
developing the economy;
- a marked decline in the standard of living and a deep
stratification in society;
- a social-class and ethnic polarization of the population;
- a lack of maturity of the governmental and political institutions and of democratic
- the growth of corruption in governmental agencies;
- the struggle for power under the motto "the end justifies the means";
- a crisis of power and the undermining of trust in leadership, not only on the part of
the world community but also in the various layers of our own society;
- a crisis in societal consciousness;
- no sense of legal limitations, and a "criminalization" in the consciousness of the people;
- a startling increase in nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes.
As a consequence of conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, a so-called
"migration crisis" could take place. Already approximately 860 thousand people from the
countries of the "Near Abroad" have arrived on Russian territory. According to various
assessments, if a crisis occurs on the territory of the former Soviet Union the stream of refugees
to the West could reach as high as 8 to 10 million people. This in turn could lead to a significant
decline in both the economic situation and internal political stability in the countries of West and
The end of the ideological confrontation contributes to a partnership between Russia and
the USA in the name of maintaining the general peace. At present, with the end of rivalry for
spheres of world influence, the security interests of the United States and Russia have converged.
They focus on ways to manage the new multi-polar balance of power. The developing
Russian-American cooperation, examples of which are the meeting between Presidents Yeltsin
and Clinton in Vancouver in April of 1993, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev's visit to the
in September of 1993, and the upcoming summit in January  in Moscow, creates new
possibilities for joint international peacekeeping and peacemaking activity. Acting together, the
USA and Russia could combine their efforts to create an effective global mechanism for
preventing and resolving international conflicts.
Because of the seriousness of these conflicts, their management will be neither quick nor
easy. These tasks require new concepts and flexible mechanisms for their realization, as well as
For many reasons Russia finds herself at the epicenter of peacemaking activity on the
territory of the former Union. Its own basic efforts are understandably being directed at
crisis situations and armed conflicts in areas immediately contiguous to its borders, since
in those territories is vital to the Russian state and to its citizens, 25 million of whom live in the
In certain "hot spots" Russia has been and remains the only power capable of separating
the hostile sides and bringing them to a negotiating table. Real world experience confirms that
international organization or group of states will take the place of our peacemaking efforts on the
territory of the former Soviet Union.
In UN circles, the CSCE has noted several times that Russian peacemaking on the
territory of the former Soviet Union has its own distinctive features as compared to "standard"
UN practice elsewhere. Specifically, I am referring to the fact that the conflicting sides
themselves participate in the peacemaking forces and that there is an authoritative umpire--it is
these parties which are the most interested in stability in the given region. For example, in the
Dniester area of the Republic of Moldova and in Georgia's Southern Ossetia, in addition to
Russian military contingents, for the first time in the history of peacekeeping operations, units of
the conflicting sides themselves participated in the operations.
There are both benefits and drawbacks in this approach. Among the benefits are an in-depth
knowledge of the situation and of the area of operations, stringent control over observance
of the ceasefire, and reduced tensions between the conflicting sides, etc.
On the negative side is excessive suspiciousness of the opposing military contingents
towards one another. Further, the Russian contingent is frequently accused of favoring one side
over the other, etc.
Nevertheless, the armistice in the Dniester area and in Southern Ossetia has lasted more
than a year and combat actions have ceased in Abkhazia.
It is unfortunate that a greater understanding of Russia's independent peacemaking role on
the territory of the former Union has so far not brought support for the idea that Russia be
permitted to carry out the operations under the CSCE mandate.
Russia views participation in international peacekeeping activity as an element of its
foreign policy and of its national security policy. Problems of peacekeeping are now duly
reflected in the military doctrine which was approved recently by the Security Council of the
Russian Federation; for the first time the doctrine states, in writing, that:
"Russia will assist in the efforts of the world community and the various organs of
collective security for the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, peacekeeping and peace
restoration, and, for this purpose, considers it essential to maintain armed and other forces
for conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with the UN Security Council or in
keeping with international circumstances."
Thus, in Russia, peacekeeping has been elevated to the level of national policy.
In 1992-1993, using the existing combat potential of two large ground forces units and a
composite [non-TO&E] battalion of air-assault troops, the Ministry of Defense is carrying out the
mission of forming and training peacekeeping contingents as well as having them participate in
resolving conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the republics of Moldova and Georgia and also in
collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS forces in Tajikistan.
This action was not taken because it makes life easy. This solution to the problem creates
difficulties for the Ministry , scatters forces and resources, and is not efficient on an
We are unanimous in the opinion that the creation of Russia's peacekeeping forces must be
carried out on the principle that they are subordinate to the upper levels of government (to the
President, the government); their organizational structure, composition and numerical strength
must conform to the requirements of our military doctrine; they must match Russia's concept of
security and her international obligations; they must be consistent with a centralized
they must make maximum use of the existing military potential and structures; they must reflect
continuity of national traditions, the norms of international law and the experience of
peacekeeping forces in other countries.
In 1994 a plan which contains a concept for Russia's participation in peacekeeping activity
will be developed and adopted in the [Russian] Security Council; in the Duma there will be a law
on peacekeeping forces and a statute on peacekeeping forces--an addendum to the law. In other
words, peacekeeping will be put on a normative, legal footing.
At the same time, two ground-forces motorized rifle divisions will be given a new
organizational structure which meets the requirements for military contingents participating in
peacekeeping operations. The necessary training materials and gear will be created and,
in 1995, these missions will be removed from the responsibilities of the air-assault troops.
The organizational structure of peacekeeping units must allow for the autonomy needed
by battalions (companies) to execute the mission. It must also anticipate the resources needed to
support the day-to-day living needs of unit personnel. Peacekeeping units should be brought
up to strength and have rapid, maneuverable hardware transportable by air. They should also be
equipped with light arms, and reinforced by communications systems, by command and control,
and by engineering and logistics which assure the autonomy of their actions.
At the governmental level, there has already been a decision to create an Interagency
Board for coordinating Russia's participation in peacekeeping. Its joint chairmen will be the
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, S.V. Lavrov, and the Deputy Minister of Defense, G.G.
Many different groups will be involved full-time in the preparation of statutes and
recommendations on the whole range of problems relating to Russia's participation in
peacekeeping: 16 ministries, agencies, Russian Federation committees, as well as representatives
of social and other non-governmental organizations for preparing statutes and recommendations.
Peacekeeping mechanisms on the territory of the former Soviet Union are still in the
formation stage. The legal basis for peacekeeping operations on the part of CIS countries is
contained in an agreement "On Groups of Military Observers and Collective Forces for
Peacekeeping in the CIS" (20 Mar 92, 11 states) and also in the particular accords between
and the interested side in each specific situation.
In our opinion, Russia's peacekeeping forces should include units and subunits of the
Ministry of Defense (military contingents) together with their command and control bodies.
These forces should be formed and trained for participation in peacekeeping operations, and
military, civilian and police personnel (the lead staff of the mission, observers, and experts).
Communications and logistics units should also be included.
Russia's Ministry of Defense recruits, forms, trains, equips and controls the military
contingents of peacekeeping forces and is responsible for their logistical support. In any case, it
our opinion that the political and military-strategic control of operations must remain in the
of the UN, CSCE, or the CIS, depending upon whose decision led to the peacekeeping operation.
In our opinion, those formations and units which comprise the Russian peacekeeping
forces should be in a separate category, i.e., their numbers, arms and equipment should not be
counted when calculating the maximum levels which are limited by treaty obligations in the
European part of Russia.
Serious financial issues arise for us in the financing both Russia's peacekeeping forces and
peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Union. In 1992 alone, the Ministry of
Defense spent more than 2.5 billion rubles (1992 prices) for these purposes.
There are several reasons for this:
First, not a single former Soviet republic has any peacekeeping laws;
Second, despite the fact that in May of 1992 the heads of the CIS states passed a
resolution (the Protocol was signed) "On the Recruiting, Structuring and Logistical and Financial
Support of a Group of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS", which
called for covering these expenditures though contributions from the CIS states or in kind
(according to a special CIS contribution scale), the reality is that Russia has not received a single
ruble for peacekeeping activity.
And third, we assume it to be logical that the international community, which is inclined
towards recognizing Russia as a sort of guarantor that any clashes will not grow into regional
wars, will express this not only in words but in deed by partially covering, out of UN resources,
Russia's peacekeeping expenses in the "Near Abroad". Alternatively, it should count Russia's
expenditures as a contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.
We assume that the financing of Russia's peacekeeping forces must be taken from the
federal budget and that outlays related to peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former
Union will be covered by financial contributions from the CIS states on an apportioned basis.
A peacekeeping operation which involves a military contingent serves as a continuation of
political and diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in a region where an armed conflict could arise
has already arisen.
The consent of the two sides engaged in the conflict is a fundamental condition for
conducting such an operation.
On the basis of inter-state accords: Russia's peacekeeping forces can be activated as a
third neutral side (umpire) to resolve an armed conflict. [Examples of this are:] The Dniester
region of Moldovan Republic, the South Ossetia area of the Republic of Georgia, as part of the
collective peacekeeping forces of the CIS (Tajikistan) and under the aegis of the UN, the CSCE
and other regional organizations (Yugoslavia).
Peacekeeping operations are radically different from the missions carried out by the
military line units and subunits (military groups) of the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry,
State Committee for Emergency Situations during emergencies and during armed conflict inside
the Russian Federation, i.e., these forces support and execute the missions of the President and
government of Russia to establish public order within the country.
Peacekeeping forces are neutral and are utilized outside the national borders of the
Russian Federation based on a UN Security Council mandate, the CSCE, the CIS or
inter-government accords (including those of the conflicting sides).
In our opinion, the mandate should reflect the following:
- approval by the world community and by the regional organization (bilateral agreement)
for conducting the operation and its time frame;
- a nomination for the position of commander of the peacekeeping forces;
- the composition, personnel strength and [a recommendation as to] who designs the force
structure and deployment of the military contingent;
- recommendations for the financing and logistical support of the operation.
After the mandate to conduct the peacekeeping operation has been received, an accord
will be struck between the host country and the countries taking part in the operation. It should
include a statement concerning:
- the neutrality of the peacekeeping operation and of the personnel participating in it;
- the sequence for inserting and withdrawing troops;
- the insignia of the peacekeeping forces;
- the types of arms permitted and the force's right to bear them;
- the need for freedom of movement while performing service and outside of service;
- the legal status of the peacekeeping participants.
Planning of the operation must be accomplished in parallel with political and diplomatic
measures and must take into consideration the development of the specific crisis situation.
Information about the region in question must be constantly collected and analyzed by all
services in the state, and it must be specifically collated in the Interagency Board for the
Coordination of Peacekeeping--in the interests of the activities of the peacekeeping forces.
Information about the conflict area may include:
- an analysis of the conflict's origin and evolution;
- the composition, strength, weapons, and nature of the combatants' actions, characteristics of
the local population, information about the government, military objectives suitable for use for
peacekeeping forces, geographical, climate and other information.
As a separate matter, I would like to share my thoughts on peace restoration operations.
We also believe that armed conflicts tend to escalate very quickly and cause heavy losses
among the civilian population.
Nevertheless, for now the major powers are very skeptical about intervention with force.
Ongoing attempts to pass laws that support the use of force for peace restoration could lead to
the start of a new round of rivalry among the great powers, and actions by the world community
could lose their neutrality. Peace enforcement operations would lack sufficient approval.
Another problem, in our opinion, is that there has been no definition of precise and
reasonably compatible criteria for determining which military actions should be taken to enforce
The UN Security Council will not be able to effect the management of military and
financial resources when it is has to cope with a number of conflicts simultaneously. Simply put,
the need for peace enforcement operations conducted by the UN will exceed the resources the
UN has available.
Therefore, despite the fact that it is generally reflected in the UN charter, this problem
raises many complex political and legal issues and requires further analysis. But even if it proves
impossible to work out any consistent and explicit legal underpinnings for peace enforcement
intervention, it is important to make the effort and to get to work identifying those crimes against
humanity which will automatically lead to action by the Security Council. The legal documents
for this purpose are the UN Charter, the Convention Against Genocide, the 1949 Geneva
Convention and its Protocols on the defense of the civilian population.
We are convinced that permanent, joint action and the development of contacts between
Russia, the UN and international organizations, as well as bilateral Russian-American meetings,
will assure the continuity of cumulative international experience and will refine the
problem-solving mechanisms related to armed conflict and force.
Today's exchange of views will facilitate this.
Thank you for your attention.
by General-Major Alexander F. Arinakhin
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Before turning to an examination of Russia's first-hand
peacekeeping experience, I would like to outline for you briefly
several aspects of the internal political situation in the CIS
states and in Russia, problems in the creation of Russian
Peacekeeping Forces, and the role and place of the Russian
Federation armed forces in resolving armed conflicts within the
borders of the CIS.
Part I. [Omitted by presenter due to conference time
constraints. Text unavailable.]
Part II. Some Aspects of the Internal Political Environment
within the CIS States and Russia.
With the collapse of the USSR and the resulting political
situation, the process of dividing up the political, economic and
military interests of the sovereign states has begun. This has
resulted in the loss of formerly smooth regional economic ties
and a gradual decline in the level of all types of production in
all the Republics of the former Union.
It should be noted that within the CIS states there is now a
sufficiently powerful social base oriented towards strengthening
national independence in situations where the composition of the
population is multi-national. This often lends an expressly
nationalistic character to political decisions and ignores the
interests of the non-indigenous population.
Without a doubt the open question of the reestablishment of
repressed nationalities is having a negative impact on the status
and prospects for the development of the internal political
situation in the CIS. This includes groups who live in close
proximity to one another, a situation which leads to mistrust and
mutual political and territorial claims, fans the flames of
nationalistic conflict and results in armed conflicts.
A lack of internal unity among peoples of different
nationalities, among peoples who have formed their own
communities within the boundaries of their national borders,
increasingly is provoking crisis situations. Events taking place
in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South
Ossetia and Russia all attest to this.
The rise of nationalism as manifested in the wide
dissemination of chauvinistic ideas leads to an exacerbation of
cross-national clashes both within individual states (the problem
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and of North Ossetia and
Ingushetia in Russia) and also between states (Armenia and
Azerbaijan). There is also the concomitant declaration of
political and territorial claims.
Still on the agenda is the intense struggle between
political parties within the CIS states which will resort to any
means for the achievement of their own, not always noble, goals.
Using nationalistic slogans in the course of a political
battle or in religious or other disagreements inflames passions,
aggravates the situation, and has a destabilizing effect on the
general course of events.
The process of the formation of a Commonwealth of
Independent States and of the states which did not join the
Commonwealth, all on the territory of the former USSR, and the
existence of antagonisms inside the states of the Commonwealth
and, to some extent, between them, make it necessary to create a
Collective Peacekeeping Force for stabilization and for
peacekeeping in the CIS member-states.
Very serious attention has been devoted to this problem at
nearly every meeting between the CIS heads of state.
I would like to mention several documents adopted at
meetings of the CIS heads of state which directly affect our
At a meeting in Kiev on March 20, 1992, an Accord was
adopted "On Groups of Military Observers and Collective
Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States".
Article 6 of this Accord concerning participation of our
Peacekeeping Forces in UN, CSCE and CIS peacekeeping operations
expressly states: "The states party to this agreement may, in
accordance with their obligations under the UN charter, other
international agreements and by mutual consent, agree to the
participation of military and civilian peacekeeping personnel in
peacekeeping efforts undertaken by CSCE organs and structures and
in UN peacekeeping operations being carried out in accordance
with a decision of the UN Security Council".
The CSCE is not currently conducting peacekeeping
operations. Its peacekeeping efforts consist of travel to
conflict sites, consultations, meetings, etc.
At a meeting in Tashkent on May 15, 1992, two documents were
adopted which regulate the status, recruiting and multi-lateral
support of military observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces
as well as a "Protocol on the Rules for Forming and Activating
Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces
in Conflict Zones".
Lastly, a meeting in Minsk on January 22, 1993, saw the
passage of a "Decision on Measures to Stabilize the Situation on
a Sector of the National Border of the Tajikistan Republic and
Afghanistan", and of other documents.
Russia's goal, and the goal of other participating CIS
countries, is to build a democratic state governed by the rule of
law and to strive for relations with other states based on
respect for state sovereignty; for the inalienable right to
self-determination; for the principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs; a
complete rejection of the use
of force or the threat of force; peaceful control of
disagreements which arise; and respect for human rights and
freedoms. These are reasons why Collective Peacekeeping Forces
To halt the bloodshed in the so-called "hot-spots" on the
territory of a number of sovereign states of the former USSR and
beyond its borders, and also in accordance with the above-listed
documents of understanding and with the consent of the leadership
of several of these states, a number of peacekeeping units and
subunits have been formed from the armed forces of the Russian
Federation and are active.
Based on the situation as it is currently unfolding, we can
draw the following conclusions:
Dniester Area. The situation has stabilized and the blood
of peaceful inhabitants is no longer being spilled; negotiations
are underway for final management of the conflict through
peaceful means. However, peacekeeping forces will most likely
remain in the region until there is a complete resolution of all
points of contention through political means. The only open
issue is a possible reduction in the number of forces and
resources in the conflict area.
South Ossetia. The presence of a military contingent has
made possible: a substantial improvement of the region's socio-political situation; a transition
from combat actions to a search
for a peaceful solution; a return of refugees; putting local
authorities back to work, etc. A withdrawal of Russian troops
was discussed, but the situation currently developing in the
Tskhinval area may significantly violate the accords already
reached and could lead to an escalation of armed conflict.
Therefore, it has been decided to halt the withdrawal of the
Abkhazia. Negotiations processes to implement the articles
of the Summary Document of the Moscow meeting (3 Sep 92) have
been disrupted. In this beautiful area, as before, military
relations between the sides are purely war-like--harsh and
barbarous in nature. Needless to say, this situation seriously
affects the local populace and the Russian-speaking population in
particular. It is unfortunate that for now the leadership of
both Georgia and Abkhazia are at opposite poles in their points
of view as to the way out of the conflict, which of course does
not further the process of political management of the conflict.
In looking to the future, it is safe to say that this region is,
and apparently will remain for the time being, extremely
North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The stand-off between
militarized groups has been eliminated. The situation in the
conflict zone is now of a manageable and predictable nature.
While a definite stabilization of the socio-political situation
has been achieved, the sides remain irreconcilable. As long as
the primary cause (in our opinion) of destabilization has not
been eliminated (to date there has been no solution to the
question of the Chechen Republic), no improvement is likely.
Tajikistan. The threat of military clashes continues.
The opposition, and chiefly the Islamic fundamentalists, are
preparing very ardently for a spring/summer campaign. At
present, a combat-ready group (more than 1500 men, including as
many as 500 Afghan Mujahideen) has been created, and Tajik
refugees are undergoing combat training on Afghan territory. By
the start of the offensive, the total number of combat personnel
could reach 5,000.
As a result, issues surrounding the use (or increased use)
of armed forces in conflicts on CIS territory have become a
permanent topic of discussion at the highest levels (Kiev, twice
in Tashkent, Minsk). Nevertheless, the idea everyone approves
of, i.e., the creation of a multi-national peacekeeping force, is
still not a reality.
The primary burden of responsibility for the functioning of
such forces and for carrying out peacekeeping efforts has fallen
almost completely on the shoulders of the Russian armed forces.
As a result, numerous problems arise, the most serious of
which is a lack of any laws on the management of Russian forces
on the territories of other states and frequent accusations that
Russia supposedly continues to behave like a domineering
It seems premature be "proud" of the Russian army's
peacekeeping involvement, because the actions of the peacekeeping
forces are still a long way from highly professional in every
case, if we leave out the sufficiently rather experience of the
Russian battalion in Yugoslavia and the generally positive
results of military intervention in the Dniester area and in
The army's involvement in halting armed conflicts is still
not very popular with military personnel. On the whole, military
personnel oppose using the army to carry out what are essentially
The performance of peacekeeping tasks entails a daily risk
to life and limb, which leaves a very, very serious imprint on
how military personnel approach their tasks. The activity of
Russian military contingents occurs under conditions of endless
provocations from both of the warring sides. People die.
Part III. Problems in Creating Peacekeeping Forces.
A. Purpose, missions, composition and status of military
observer groups and the Collective Peacekeeping Force
The purpose of the creation of the military observer groups
and Collective Peacekeeping Force (also called the Peacekeeping
Group) is to render mutual assistance within the framework of the
CIS, based on mutual consent, in order to manage and prevent on
the territory of any CIS member-state cross-national, ethnic,
religious, socio-political conflicts which involve a violation of
Because of the specificity and non-combat nature of the
functions it performs, the Peacekeeping Group has only very
strictly defined missions. They include:
- monitoring observance of armistice and ceasefire
- marking the zones of responsibility, separating the
combatants, creating demilitarized zones, buffer zones and
humanitarian corridors, assisting in the deconcentration of the
sides' forces and in preventing their relocation and further
clashes in these zones;
- creating conditions for negotiations and other measures
for peaceful management of the conflict, restoring law and order
and the normal functioning of societal and state institutions in
their zones of responsibility;
- establishing facts when violations of ceasefire and
armistice agreements occur and conducting investigations in
connection with these violations;
- monitoring the area and the actions of the local
population in the zone of responsibility, countering unrest and
riots, assisting in the protection of human rights;
- monitoring the removal of fortification structures,
obstacles and mine fields in their zone of responsibility;
- guarding vital objectives in their zone of responsibility;
- taking measures to assure communications between the
conflicting sides and the security of meetings that take place
between them at all levels;
- monitoring transport activities, halting the unlawful
transport of combat hardware, weapons, munitions and explosive
materials in the zone of responsibility;
- assisting in humanitarian aid to the civilian population
and assuring the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- helping execute decisions and recommendations of the UN
Security Council and CSCE structures for peaceful conflict
The composition of the Peacekeeping Group might be as
- command and administrative services;
- combat units and subunits;
- a group of military observers;
- a group of military police;
- combat and logistics/support units;
All staffing of all Peacekeeping Group components is done on
a voluntary, contractual basis.
In accordance with the agreement "On Groups of Military
Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth
of Independent States" and the "Protocol on the Rules for Forming
and Activating Groups of Military Observers and Collective
Peacekeeping Forces in Conflict Zones", the most important
decision on the conduct of an operation with the use of the
Collective Forces is made by the Council of the CIS Heads of
State based on the request of one or several CIS member-states
and the consent of all conflicting sides.
The UN Security Council and the Acting CSCE Chief are then
informed of the decision to carry out such an operation.
The mandate for such an action is confirmed by the Council
of the CIS Heads of State based on a recommendation of the
foreign affairs ministers or their authorized representatives.
The time when the Collective Forces' peacekeeping action is
complete is determined by a decree from the Council of the CIS
Heads of State based on a conclusion a panel of expert observers
from the member-states party to the Agreement.
The personnel of the Collective Peacekeeping Force enjoy the
status, privileges and immunity per the "Convention of Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations", passed by the UN General
Assembly on February 13, 1946, which includes the following basic
- Freedom of Movement
The Peacekeeping Forces Group, including its air, land and
water transport means and equipment, enjoys freedom of movement
on the territory of the host country without the normal
requirement to register or request permission.
All facilities and land sectors where the headquarters,
institutions and services will be located for the period during
which the Collective Force will be carrying out its functions are
inalienably conveyed to them. They cannot be touched and are
under the exclusive control and management of the Peacekeeping
- Criminal, administrative and civil responsibility
Peacekeeping Forces Group personnel have immunity from
criminal, civil and administrative responsibility in their oral
and written declarations and in the actions they take in their
official capacity. This immunity continues in effect even after
the personnel cease to be members of the Peacekeeping Group or
cease service in it.
The military and civilian police created by the Peacekeeping
Group Commander have the right to arrest Collective Forces
personnel in order to guarantee order and discipline in the
places where they are located or based. Service personnel
arrested outside the borders of their unit's base area are
transferred over to the control of the Group Commander for
appropriate disciplinary measures. The Group's military
personnel fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of their home
countries for any criminal acts of any kind which they may commit
in the host country, just as civil cases being handled in the
court of the host country must be halted if the peacekeeping
Group Commander confirms that the matter relates to the
performance of official duties.
- Freedom of Entry and Exit
Immediately before entry or after exit of the Group into or
out of the host country the Peacekeeping Group commander issues
to all personnel a numbered photo I.D. with name, rank, date of
birth and branch of arms.
With this I.D. or with a personal or collective command
order issued either by the commander or in his name or by some
other competent authority of one of the participants in the
Agreement, members of the Peacekeeping Group may enter the host
nation, be located on its territory and depart from it, all
unhindered. Current passport and visa rules do not apply to
them, nor do immigration rules or entry/exit restrictions or any
other orders regulating the stay of foreign nationals in the host
nation, including registration requirements.
- Freedom from Tax Liability and from Percentage Fees
All personnel in the Collective Peacekeeping Force are free
of any tax obligation on salary or cash awards or incentives
received from the group or from the nation party to the
Agreement. In addition, they shall pay no other taxes on
services received, and they shall not be charged any sort of
registration fees including fees for the identification issued by
the Group commander to personnel which give them the right to:
- bear and use firearms for the performance of their duties;
- operate ground transport or pilot air-transport;
- use of the Group's communication systems;
- carry out any professional or other activity connected
with the functions of the group, on the condition that the permit
or identification card are given to appropriately trained
personnel and to those who have certified skills.
- Favorable Treatment in Services
Water, electricity and other essential services and should
be provided free of charge or, if that is not possible, at the
lowest possible rate. If there are disruptions or threats of a
disruption in services, they should be restored if possible
together with other government services.
As far as other privileges extended to members of the
military contingent who are part of the Collective Force, it
should be noted that to date, unfortunately, this question has
only been partially answered.
B. Conditions for the Use of Collective Forces
It is essential to keep in mind that the following basic
principles must be maintained no matter how the peacekeeping
- peacekeeping operations must have a clear mandate from the
body which the CIS member-states have invested with primary
responsibility for peacekeeping and security;
- deployment of the peacekeeping operation must take place
after armistice and ceasefire agreements have been reached,
otherwise, the effectiveness and impartiality of the measures
being taken will be jeopardized.
C. Leadership of the Peacekeeping Group
To lead the Peacekeeping Group the Council of the CIS Heads
of State appoints a Group Commander under whom a Joint Staff is
created which consists of representatives of the staffs of the
CIS Combined Force and the armed forces of the individual member-states. The Group
Commander carries out the decisions and
instructions of only the Council of the Heads of State or its
body for operational leadership of Group actions, i.e., the
Provisional Combined Command. The Commander enjoys full
authority in leading the Group in the area where the operation is
being conducted. He bears full responsibility for strict order
and discipline within the group.
D. Formation and Preparation of the Peacekeeping Contingent
The Collective Peacekeeping Forces are formed from military
contingents designated by the member-states party to the
Among them are units and subunits who: have fully completed
the combat training program; are at 100% TO&E; have all types of
rations per standards no lower than those established by the CIS
Combined Force as suitable for the physical and geographical
conditions of the region where the missions are to be carried
Drawing on UN peacekeeping experience, the reinforced rifle
battalion is in our opinion the most suitable unit for the
Collective Force. It can be utilized for accomplishing military
control of a specific area, for example, for controlling a buffer
zone by not admitting armed or military personnel into that zone
or by assuring that the area is not used for any purposes
connected in any way with military activity. In other instances
motorized battalions are essential for guarding specific
objectives or vital structures. For example, it can guard
military dumps where weapons and hardware are stored, or it may
serve as a visible presence in order to assist in the creation of
a safe environment in certain areas.
Based on this, we train military peacekeeping contingents
according to a program especially developed for this purpose by
the RF armed forces. The program was designed with the knowledge
that service in the units will be voluntary and that there will
be a constant turn-over of personnel due to separation into the
reserves or completion of fixed periods of service.
Collective Forces units are staffed as a rule from personnel
who have served more than six months and are capable of carrying
out special tasks. Therefore, along with concrete skills within
their specialty, personnel must master special skills.
Training is done in two stages. In the first stage there is
a developing of company-battalion teamwork, and one month is
devoted to this. In our opinion this time is more than
sufficient to develop teamwork to the fullest extent.
In the second stage, combat and special skills are honed
At first glance it might seem superfluous to create one
additional program in the place of a combat training program, but
experience in using peacekeeping forces has shown otherwise.
Thus, when the personnel of the 27th Guard Motorized Rifle
Division (GMRD) completed such a six-week program and arrived to
augment the 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Dushanbe, they
quickly familiarized themselves with the situation at hand and
functioned adroitly under difficult conditions.
Note that in the training, increased attention should go to
preparing personnel for independent actions under circumstances
unusual for soldiers, i.e., circumstances in which the weapon
does not play a primary role, but rather the ability to make
contact and to achieve assigned goals without using force is of
As a result of all this training the soldier must master a
whole series of new qualities, such as the ability to: separate
warring sides; create barrier zones for security; guard important
objectives in populated areas and with a large number of people
present; serve at control checkpoints as a part of foot or
mobile patrols; participate in disarming formations; carry out
monitoring and observer functions; use a weapon properly; observe
personal security rules; blockade groups, and much more.
Finally, I will not go into the experience of using
peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, North Ossetia, Ingushetia
or Tajikistan, since although there are some differences, the
experience in each case is essentially analogous. Therefore, I
will discuss the practical experience the peacekeeping forces
have had in the Dniester area.
As I mentioned, in accordance with the bi-lateral Agreement
between the Russian Federation and Moldova "On the Principles of
Peaceful Management of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Area",
and based on the Moscow oblast RF directive No. 9 of 23 Jul 92,
the RF armed forces contingent was formed on a voluntary basis,
originally with six battalions, and was introduced into the
conflict area over the period 23 July through 31 August 1992.
The Ministry of Defense jointly with the RF Ministry of the
Interior has created a Joint Control Commission in Bendery
consisting of representatives for Russia, Moldova and the
Dniester area. This commission determined that the composition
Russia: 2000 men with 400 in reserve;
Moldova: 1200 men;
Dniester area: 800 men with 400 in reserve.
Total Strength: 4000 men with 800 in reserve.
Because Belarus and Ukraine declined to designate their own
military contingents for Moldova, three additional battalions
each were formed from Moldova and the Dniester region.
I will briefly touch upon the experience of our battalions'
peacekeeping actions in this region.
The personnel serve in the zone of responsibility between
the conflicting sides over a total area approximately 225 km wide
and 4 to 15 km long.
In the zone of responsibility a traffic regulation system
is established, observation posts are set up, mobile groups are
created for patrolling sectors, important objectives are placed
under guard and a duty unit is designated.
The zone of responsibility is divided into three security
sectors: the northern sector (Rybnitsa), the central sector
(Dubossary) and the southern sector (Bendery) from 60 to 80 km
wide and from 4 to 15 km in length. Within the borders of each
sector along the perimeter of the security zone joint bilateral
or trilateral posts are set up (a total of 27). Observation
posts monitor the opposing groupings in their designated sector
and utilize all available observation instruments for this
purpose. Each post has 6-9 or more men.
On the roads, bridges, crossings, large forks in the road
and at other objectives, trilateral checkpoints are set up--a
total of 11 in the zone of responsibility.
In addition, mobile posts are set up on armored vehicles and
on all-terrain vehicles. These carry out their missions by
patrolling along roads and valleys, and 2-3 personnel are sent
out on foot to reconnoiter the terrain parallel to the direction
of movement where combatting groups may be present.
Units designated for guarding important industrial and vital
services objectives take up a circular defensive and provide
In order to handle tasks that come up suddenly, in each
sector a reserve group is created from representatives of the
three sides, up to platoon-size.
As an example, 432 men took up posts simultaneously (185
from Russia, 125 from Moldova, and 122 from the Dniester
Republic). They are on duty for 2-3 days and are then replaced.
In the zone of responsibility two heightened-security zones,
with 5 commands, have been created (in Bendery and Dubossary).
Replacement of personnel (due to the expiration of their
contracts) was completed in the second half of 1992 with a
separate reconnaissance battalion and a motorized rifle regiment
of the 27th Guard Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD) of the Volga
Military District. Currently undergoing training are the
replacement peacekeeping forces from the 27th GMRD, which has
been converted to a special TO&E structure.
Based on the probable development of the situation in the
Dniester area, withdrawal of our peacekeeping forces without a
final political solution to the conflict does not seem advisable,
since one may expect the hostile sides to resume combat actions
immediately upon their withdrawal.
On the whole it can be said that Russia's purposeful and
coordinated actions to manage the conflict situation in the
Dniester area, including the actions taken under the Russian
Ministry of Defense, have brought significant stabilization and
control over the situation in the region.
Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to express the hope that my
brief presentation has helped you to become familiar with the
basic aspects of the situation as it has developed in the CIS and
in Russia, with regard to politics and to our growing role as
peacekeepers, and also with our experience in using our
In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation for
your cordial reception as well as my wish for the continued
prosperity and well-being of the American people and your
Thank you for your attention.
by Colonel Vladimir I. Krysenko
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Peacekeeping operations which involve bringing in military
contingents and military personnel as observers are carried out
in accordance with Article 40 of the UN Charter under the
following conditions: the sides involved in the conflict must
consent; 10 (of 15) members of the UN Security Council, including
all permanent members, must approve of the operation; the nations
must be prepared to designate voluntarily the appropriate forces
and means for the operation.
Thus, we proceed from the assumption that all mechanisms and
procedures for providing collective security under the aegis of
the UN will be worked out and firmly in place before any actions
will be undertaken. The basic principles underlying such
- the Security Council must assume leadership;
- there must be an effective military command which is
answerable to the UN Secretary General and controlled by the
- the responsibility and burden for such operations must be
shared with regional organizations (CSCE, NACC, NATO, WEU, CIS,
- there must be adequate financing for such operations (this
is especially urgent, given the major difficulties with the UN
The military operations cannot be conducted in isolation.
Rather, they must be closely linked with political efforts to
regulate conflicts. If this linkage is missing, a dangerous
"syndrome of mistrust" towards the UN arises. As a result, the
countries providing military contingents begin to lose their
interest and motivation to participate in the action, and public
opinion in these countries will negatively affect the government.
Something similar to this is happening now in the USA in
connection with the American involvement in operations in Somalia
We also believe it would be advisable to strengthen and
possibly augment the existing structures for planning, preparing
and controlling peacekeeping operations.
We also believe that revitalizing the activity of the
Military-Staff Committee is worth considering seriously; it was
intended to assist the Security Council when military issues are
Meanwhile, we should focus our attention on proposals to
create a unique "general staff" under the UN Secretary General.
This staff would include a group of military and civilian experts
capable of planning, coordinating and rapidly initiating
peacekeeping operations. We support the idea of strengthening
the UN Secretary's peacekeeping department.
We were very interested in the ideas contained in the "UN
Reserve Forces" concept suggested by the Secretary General. The
very fact that the Security Council would have at its disposal a
compact, mobile, international "rapid reaction" force could
become a significant factor in deterrence and reinforce the UN's
conflict prevention capabilities.
At the same time, military peacekeeping forces cannot be
permitted to participate in combat operations. Furthermore, as a
rule they are to be equipped only with light arms to be used
exclusively for self-defense.
As Russian military contingents and military observers are
made available to the UN, and as rules for their use within the
framework of peacekeeping operations are defined, Russia is
guided by the appropriate decisions of the UN Security Council.
At the same time, as military contingents are sent into UN
peacekeeping operations, for Russia the security of its military
personnel in the conflict area is of foremost importance.
The world community does have experience in organizing and
conducting peacekeeping operations: since the UN began in 1948
there has been a total of 30 such operations (counting those
currently underway), in which approximately 600,000 military and
civilian personnel from more than 100 countries have
participated. More than 800 of these lost their lives in the
performance of their duties.
Russia's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Direct Russian participation in UN peacekeeping operations
has a 20-year history. In October of 1973 the first group of
Russian military personnel was sent to the Near East as UN
military observers. Beginning in 1991 Russian participation in
these operations increased: in April, after the war in the
Persian Gulf, a group of Russian military UN observers was sent
the Iraq-Kuwait border area, and in September to the Western
Sahara. By the beginning of 1992 the participation of our
military observers had grown to include both the former
Yugoslavia and also Cambodia.
At present, six groups of Russian UN military observers--a
total of 105 personnel--are participating in peacekeeping
operations under the aegis of the UN: 16 are in the Middle East
(3 in Syria, 8 in Egypt, 4 in Israel and 1 in Lebanon), 15 along
the Iraq-Kuwait border, 30 in the Western Sahara, 3 in Cambodia,
23 in the former Yugoslavia and 19 in Mozambique.
The principal tasks of the military observers are monitoring
adherence to armistice agreements and ceasefires between
combatants. In addition, they are tasked with preventing
possible violations of accords and understandings between the
conflicting sides; they attempt to do this by being a visible
presence but without the right to use force. The selection of
volunteers for UN observer positions is done by the Main
Directorate for the Training and Disposition of Personnel, Moscow
District, Russian Federation (RF). Training for these duties is
done at annual, two-month courses (up to 100 persons per year) in
connection with the senior officer courses of the "Vystrel"
military college 4, where officers
gain experience in
maintaining combat documents and in working with topographical
maps of the basic NATO countries which have been accepted by the
In April of 1992, for the first time in the history of
Russia's peacekeeping activities, a 900-man Russian infantry
battalion was dispatched to Yugoslavia. This action was based on
UN Security Council Resolution No. 743 and was in accordance with
the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation No.
2462 of March 6, 1992. The battalion included: a command group,
5 rifle companies of 117 men and a headquarters company of 266
In addition, 12 officers are working in the headquarters of
the "East" sector, and 5 are working in the headquarters of the
UN forces in the former Yugoslavia.
A separate infantry battalion has been formed on a voluntary
basis from the formations and units of the air-assault forces
based on Russian territory. Personnel training is carried out at
the training center in Ryazan and takes into consideration the
recommendations of the UN Secretary General as well as the
specifics of the missions being planned.
The battalion is based in the area of Klissa, Croatia, and
carries out peacekeeping actions, the principal functions of
- monitoring the observance of ceasefires and the
maintenance of public order as agreed upon by the conflicting
- military control of the buffer zone between forces;
- patrolling the main routes and maintaining watch over the
control/checkpoints in its area of responsibility;
- guarding the headquarters of the "East" sector;
- rendering assistance to refugees and halting forced
expulsion of the indigenous population;
The battalion is operationally subordinate to the UN. The
commander-in-chief of all UN forces is the Secretary General of
the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Questions such as military
discipline and the financing of the battalion fall within the
competence of the national command.
According to official comments from the office of the UN
Secretary General and of commander of the UN forces in the former
Yugoslavia, the Russian battalion is handling its missions
successfully. It is considered one of the best units of the
peacekeeping contingent, and it's actions deserve high praise.
From this battalion 2 personnel have been killed and 15 wounded
in the course of carrying out their peacekeeping operations.
During the entire period (since April of 1992) of the
Russian battalion's participation in peacekeeping operations in
the former Yugoslavia, three personnel rotations have been
carried out (this is done every six months), in accordance with
the rules of the UN Secretariat. Personnel selection is
voluntary and is made from soldiers and NCOs who have completed
their mandatory service.
In order to better understand its battalion's activities and
to identify problems and needs, the Russian Defense Ministry is
officially permitted, with approval from the UN Secretariat, to
send officers to visit the Russian contingent. It is also
permitted to send a military transport plane to the former
Yugoslavia as needed.
Issues connected with the logistics support of peacekeeping
operations are extremely important and present a complex
challenge both for the UN and for the national commands whose
units and subunits are taking part in them.
The experience of the most recent large-scale operations (in
the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Somalia) show just how important
it is to coordinate the all aspects of the operation: planning,
wise use of human and material-technical resources and the
monitoring of the peacekeeping operations. A significant amount
of criticism is leveled at the UN (some of it justified) because
of a lack of management, excessive expenditures, etc. Russia
favors strengthening the UN's control and inspection mechanisms.
Logistics support for Russian peacekeeping operations within
the framework of the UN is provided through the Ministry of
Defense in accordance with instructions received from the
government of the Russian Federation.
Combat support, logistics support and rear support for
national contingents participating in peacekeeping operations in
the former Yugoslavia are all handled centrally by the
administrative components located in force headquarters in
Zagreb, Croatia, and by the UN Secretariat. Issues that cannot
be solved by purchases or contracts on the local or world market
are solved in the following manner: requests are sent from the
battalion to the administrative organs at force headquarters and
the UN Secretariat, addressed to the national command, i.e.,
requests to send weapons, military hardware and reserve units to
those who are under the control of this national command
(coordinating through the UN Secretariat payment for their cost
and delivery). Requests may include medicines used in the
national healthcare system, also billeting requirements, etc.
Russian Armed Forces Participation in Peacekeeping Operations on
the Territory of the CIS and Russia
As you know, as a result of the collapse of the USSR, we are
now in the process of dividing up interests in the economic,
political and military spheres in the newly formed sovereign
Reforms which are not always well thought out, a declining
standard of living, and rising prices all leave their imprint on
the overall development of the situation and make stabilization
difficult. Furthermore, the rise of nationalism and chauvinism
aggravate cross-national antagonisms, both within a state, as is
the case with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia or North
Ossetia and Ingushetia in Russia, and between states, as with
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Understanding this situation, as well as the trends in the
domestic political situation on the territory of the former USSR,
leads us to the clear need to create a Collective Peacekeeping
At meetings between the heads of the Commonwealth states (on
20 Mar 92 and 15 May 92 in Kiev and Tashkent) several agreements
were worked out. They are: "On Groups of Observers and
Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS", "Protocol on Rules
for Formation and Activation of Groups of Military Observers and
the Recruitment of Peacekeeping Forces in Conflict Zones", as
well as other documents relating to the recruitment and
logistics support of these forces.
Based on these documents and on inter-governmental accords,
Russian military contingents have been used since July of 1992 in
peacekeeping operations in Southern Ossetia and in the Dniester
region. Military observers have been placed on the banks of the
Humist River in Abkhazia and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.
Under crisis conditions in Tajikistan at the request of the
Republic, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division has been carrying
out operations since September of 1992. Their purpose is to
guard and defend the most important state and economic
objectives, patrol dangerous areas, escort convoys carrying
humanitarian cargo, and serve as the guarantor of peace and
security in the region.
In the south of Russia events have developed which
necessitate the creation of a combined group (11,000 military
service personnel) made up from the troops of the North-Caucasus
military district. This force was created on the territory of
Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia. As a result of its active
operations, this group has succeeded in separating the combatants
and, in concert with the internal troops of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, it has guaranteed the establishment out of
state-of-emergency procedures. At the present time there are
approximately 1000 men in this area directly engaged in
peacekeeping tasks. Thus, as we are reporting to you today,
since the summer of 1992, Russian armed forces have been actively
and successfully carrying out peacekeeping functions in several
regions of the former USSR and in Russia. The total number of
military personnel engaged in peacekeeping operations at any one
time has reached approximately 15,000.
The Russian armed forces leadership has now acquired a
certain amount of experience in these new operations, which in
many ways are unusual for an armed force, and we are ready to
share our experience with you.
Based on a political decision about peacekeeping operations,
mixed, governmental, multi-lateral commissions are being created
in order to work out a mechanism for implementing the terms of a
treaty (accord) . Mixed governmental commissions have the full
authority of their governments to resolve political, economic and
military issues in the areas where peacekeeping operations are
underway. Based on this, relations are established between all
peacekeeping bodies and political and administrative authorities
of the region. A number of issues are within the competence of
military peacekeeping authorities, i.e., of the combined
headquarters and commands. In addition, peacekeeping forces act
on these issues in concert with local authorities and with the
commands of the opposing sides. The basic issues resolved by
military contingents as they carry out peacekeeping operations
are as follows:
- separating the hostile (conflicting) sides;
- assistance in seeing that ceasefire agreements are
- monitoring troop withdrawal and ensuring that they are
- checking the maintenance of law and order;
- carrying out patrols, engaging in mine sweeping, escorting
and transporting cargo, assuring the evacuation of the
Direct management of a group of peacekeeping forces made up
of contingents from Russia and the conflicting sides is carried
out by a combined headquarters. The basic combat unit is a
reinforced motorized rifle or reconnaissance battalion. It is
used for military control of a specific sector of the security
zone, and it carries out the above-listed duties within the
boundaries of its sector. The battalion is staffed on a
voluntary basis and will have TO&E arms. Given the presence of
various explosives and explosive devices in conflict areas,
combat engineering units, and equipment used for clearing
obstacles and mines, support battalion activities.
The training of units and subunits designated for
peacekeeping forces is carried out in a three-month program
specially created for them by the RF Armed Forces. The training
was put together with two factors in mind, i.e., that staffing
for the units would be on a voluntary basis and that there would
be constant personnel turnover because of their regular release
into the reserves. Considerable attention is given to preparing
personnel for independent actions in an environment and in
situations where use of weapons is prohibited. In the course of
this training, skills and abilities are acquired which teach the
personnel how to: make contacts with the population of the
conflicting sides; check transport activities in order to
identify any unlawful import or export of arms and ammunition;
guarantee the security of transport activities and the
functioning of communications systems; serve at check-points
either in foot patrols or in mobile patrols, etc. All of these
actions require the officers and soldiers of small units to
display a high degree of independence, initiative,
communicativeness, and have excellent physical preparation. It
is essential to keep in mind that military personnel often must
execute their duties while completely separated from their units
and in direct contact with people who represent the interests of
the combating sides. Thus arises a serious need for legal
training as well.
We are coming to believe that logistics support for
peacekeeping operations should be carried out in accordance with
the standards and conditions of peace time. In order to cut
transport expenses, units depart for the conflict region with an
increased level of reserve matériel (sufficient for 1 1\2 to 2
months). Subsequently, peacekeeping forces and subunits are
supplied from the bases and dumps of troop structures located in
the region or in very close proximity to the conflict zone.
Issues surrounding the utilization (or increased
utilization) of armed forces in conflicts on CIS territory have
become a constant topic of discussions at the highest level (in
Kiev, in Tashkent--twice, in Minsk). Nevertheless, it should be
noted that this idea of which all concerned parties approve,
i.e., the creation of a multi-national peacekeeping force, has so
far not yet been implemented.
The basic burden of responsibility for the functioning of
such forces and for conducting peacekeeping efforts rests almost
entirely upon the shoulders of the armed forces of Russia. The
cost of financing these measures is also borne chiefly by Russia.
Many problems arise as a result. The most serious of these
is the absence of laws regulating the use of Russian forces on
the territory of other nations and the frequent accusations that
Russia continues to pursue the imperialistic politics of a
How We See the Basic Paths to Creating Peacekeeping Forces Within
the Framework of the CIS
- In our view, the starting point for determining the
composition of the group of military observers and Commonwealth
Collective Peacekeeping Forces must be the missions and the
specific conditions of the situation in the conflict area. The
following units might make up such a force: command and
administrative services; combat units and subunits; a group of
military observers; a group of experts; a group of military
police and militia; logistics and combat support units.
- The primary decision to carry out an operation using a
multi-national force is made by a council of the heads of the CIS
states based on a request of one or several CIS member-states and
with the consent of the conflicting sides.
The UN Security Council and the CSCE are informed about the
decision to conduct such an operation.
- The Collective Peacekeeping Forces must be international
and must be made up of groups from all the armed forces of the
CIS member-state participants who made the decision to use them.
- Recruitment of personnel for the peacekeeping force must
be strictly voluntarily and should be based on a signed contract.
- Peacekeeping units and subunits must: undergo a special
program of instruction before being sent to the trouble area;
have light weapons; have highly maneuverable hardware which is
transportable by air; have modern communications systems (from
portable radio stations to satellite communications stations),
and; have at their disposal helicopters (airplanes). The arms
and hardware they possess must be excluded from the limits on
conventional weapons specified under treaty obligations in the
European part of the country.
In conclusion, I would like to mention that on the whole
peacekeeping operations being conducted by Russian troops have
been successful; the situation in Southern and Northern Ossetia,
Ingushetia, the Dniester area, basically have stabilized, people
have resumed their life's labor, and refugees are returning to
their homes. Now it is essential to find a political means to
resolve points of contention.
We are prepared to continue to share our peacekeeping
experience and to broaden cooperation in the peacekeeping arena
between the armed forces of our states, both within the framework
of bilateral contacts and also through the UN, CSCE and NACC. It
seems to me that our meeting here today will contribute to the
effectiveness of such work, as will further discussion of
problematic issues in this area at various seminars, conferences
and meetings involving Russian and American military experts and
those of other interested countries.
Thank you for your attention.
1. Unpublished text of an oral presentation given at a TRADOC
Peacekeeping Conference in December, 1993, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. BACK
2. Unpublished text of an oral presentation given at a TRADOC
Peacekeeping Conference in December, 1993, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. BACK
3. Unpublished text of an oral presentation given at a TRADOC
Peacekeeping Conference in December, 1993, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
4. "Vystrel" is a military college near Moscow and is below the level of
the Frunze Academy. It offers an advanced course for commanders and also trains UN
peacekeeping observers. Peacekeeping troops are trained elsewhere. --Trans. BACK