

Understanding Security Cooperation: A Comparison of the US and Russian System's of Security Cooperation

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Security Assistance Programs were an important component of Soviet and U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. Although Russian political and military power has significantly waned in comparison to the previous era, and the US has shifted focus from fighting large scale wars to peace keeping and stability operations, the Russia and the US remain world's largest providers of Security Assistance.

Interestingly, the previous divide that separated participants into exclusively US or Soviet patronage has blurred, as it is now not uncommon for Russian and American Security Assistance programs to operate simultaneously in the same states. This paper will examine the Security Assistance programs of Russia and the United States by comparing the differing definitions, motivations, and structures of the two states.

What is Security Assistance?

US Definition: Security Assistance is a component of a broader concept of Security Cooperation. Security Cooperation covers a variety of interactions including: combined exercises, appointment of attaches and liaison officers, military education and training exchanges, arms sales, over flight privileges, basing agreements, visits of senior defense officials, and counter-proliferation programs.¹ The term Security

¹ “**Security Cooperation:** All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”
Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), as amended through 22 October 2008, <<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/>> (accessed 22 October 2008)

Assistance refers specifically to military training and equipment that is granted, sold or leased to foreign nations to further US foreign policy.²

Russian Definition: Russia uses a term similar to the US Security Assistance definition. The Russian term for Security Assistance is Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC). Mikhail Dmitriyev, former director of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation defines Military-Technical Cooperation as:

In principle, military and technical cooperation is a system of interstate relations which involves supplying foreign countries with military weapons, equipment and technology, providing military and technical services, and investing in the field. At the same time, arms trade and the entire military and technical cooperation system is a Russian foreign policy instrument designed to mark Russia's presence in a region and influence a region's balance of forces.³

There is little difference between the US Definition of Security Assistance and the Russian definition of Military-Technical Cooperation. The terms “Security Assistance” and “Military-Technical Cooperation” are practically identical, and are defined as any military/security related activity that involves training, technology transfer, military financing, equipment servicing, and nonproliferation.

² “**Security Assistance:** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.” Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), as amended through 22 October 2008, <<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/>> (accessed 22 October 2008)

³ “Military and Technical Cooperation as a Factor in the Growth of Russian Influence,” *Russian Military Review*, No. 6, June 2004, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=6514773>>, accessed 24 October 2008.

Objectives of US/Russian Security Assistance Programs

Security Assistance programs are not altruistic plans designed for one nation to simply augment the security of another. Security Assistance almost always serves to the advantage of both giver and receiver. For example in Central Asia, receiving nations have gained high rents for basing privileges, skill sets, access to equipment and spare parts. Giving nations have received basing privileges, income from military sales and overflight privileges. Both the United States and Russia have reported their respective Security Assistance goals.

US Goals

- 1) To ensure that our military forces can continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries.
- 2) To help allies and friends deter or defend themselves against aggression, while promoting interoperability with US forces when combined operations are required.
- 3) To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interests, while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.
- 4) To promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control and human rights.
- 5) To enhance the ability of the US defense industrial base to meet defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological superiority at lower costs.⁴

Security Assistance goals of Russia

- 1) Strengthen Russia's military-political positions in various regions of the world, which in turn, helps to promote Russian dominance
- 2) Raise hard currency to address Russia's multiple economic needs, defense conversion projects, defense production, destruction and disposal of weapons, and restructuring of the defense industries.
- 3) Maintain Russia's export potential regarding conventional weapons and military hardware at a level equivalent or greater than the United States.
- 4) Develop a scientific and experimental basis for the defense industries, at multiple scientific research and development institutions throughout Russia

⁴ "Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," White House, Washington, D.C., (February 17, 1995).

5) Provide social support for the personnel of industrial plants, institutions, and organizations that develop and produce weapons, military and special hardware, and other items.⁵

The objectives of Security Assistance for the United States and Russia are remarkably similar. Both states actively promote Security Assistance to develop alliances, promote interoperability (mutual doctrine), and support their respective Military-Industrial Complex.⁶

US Structure

US Security assistance is provided under three main laws, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, and the annual appropriations acts for Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs. Additional Security Assistance guidance is found in Executive Order 11958. This Executive Order allocates authority and responsibility for Security Assistance principally to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense further delegates authority (DoD Directive 5105.65) to the Undersecretary of Defense, Policy (USD(P)) and to the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).⁷

⁵ “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 19 November 1993, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=6514773>>, accessed 8 November 2008. As translated in *Dangerous Weapons Desperate States*, pp. 146.

⁶ Igor Khripunov, “The Politics and Economics of Russia’s Conventional Arms Transfers,” *Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 146-147.

⁷ *Security Assistance Management Manual*, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (US Department of Defense, 2003), pp.32-35.

The US considers almost any US activity that supports a foreign defense establishment as Security Assistance. Thirteen of the most common programs are shown in figure 1.

Major Types of Security Assistance Programs⁸

Type of Security Assistance Program	Administered by
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)	Department of Defense
Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS)	Department of Defense
Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR)	Department of Defense
Leases	Department of Defense
Military Assistance Program (MAP)	Department of Defense
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	Department of Defense
Drawdown	Department of Defense
Economic Support Fund	Department of State
Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)	Department of State
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	Department of State
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)	Department of State
Commercial Export Sales Licensed Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended (reference (c))	Department of State
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)	Department of State

Figure 1.

Although a majority of Security Assistance programs are administered by the Department of Defense, ultimately all are controlled under the auspice of the Department of State. The US views Security Assistance as a part of the larger framework for US foreign assistance.⁹

⁸ *Security Assistance Management Manual*, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (US Department of Defense, 2003), pp.32.

⁹ *The Management of Security Assistance*, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (US Department of Defense, 2001), pp. 1-1.

US embassies host up to three distinct Department of Defense organizations that are involved with Security Assistance. The organizations are independent and subordinated to different headquarters, but often work in close collaboration with one another on projects of mutual interest

Security Assistance Office (SAO)/Office of Military Cooperation (OMC): The Security Assistance Office is the Department of Defense (DoD) lead for most DoD managed Security Assistance programs. The SAO is subordinated to the appropriate regional MACOM but also has responsibilities to the ambassador, and the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).¹⁰ The SAO runs day-to-day operations to include advising the ambassador and working with and advising the host nation. The SAO spends the majority of time on two programs: the International Military Education & Training and Foreign Military Sales. IMET provides U.S. training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The intent of the program is to “expose students to the U.S. professional military establishment and the American way of life, including amongst other things, US regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights and belief in the rule of law. Students are also exposed to U.S. military procedures and the manner in which our military functions under civilian control.”¹¹

¹⁰ The US military divides the world into 5 geographical regions known as Major Commands, Kazakhstan falls under Central Command (CENTCOM) as the rest of Central Asia and the Middle East.

¹¹ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “International Military Education & Training (IMET)”; available from http://www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm; Internet; accessed 11 November 2008.

When governments decide to purchase US arms they have two options. They may either purchase arms directly from the manufacturer through a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS), or they may purchase through the Foreign Military Sales program (FMS). The Foreign Military Sales program is the government-to-government method of selling US defense equipment, services, and training to foreign governments. SAO work continues long after contracts are signed and products are delivered in the FMS programs. The SAO often mediates warranty and servicing disputes between the host nation and manufacturer. In addition, the sale of major weapons systems usually requires continuing FMS support for training and maintenance on the system.

Defense Attaché Office (DAO): The Defense Attaché is responsible for intelligence collection activities for the Department of Defense in a given U.S. embassy. The office is subordinated to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Defense Attaché Offices usually have little involvement with Security Assistance projects, occasionally managing intelligence exchanges. In embassies lacking a Security Assistance Officer the Defense Attaché Office administers Security Assistance programs.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): “DTRA is responsible for threat reduction to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), other special weapons, and from conventional weapons, through the execution of technology security activities, cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs, arms control treaty monitoring and on-site inspection, force protection,

NBC defense, and counter proliferation (CP); to support the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and to provide technical support on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) matter to the DoD Components.”¹²

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is a Department of Defense agency subordinated to the Under Secretary of Defense-Policy. Although the DSCA is not present in foreign states, it does provide significant support for DoD Security Assistance activities. The DSCA is responsible for: administering and supervising security assistance planning and programs; coordinating the formulation and execution of security assistance programs with other governmental agencies; assisting with logistical support; functioning as the primary liaison between U.S. industry and Department of Defense organizations conducting Security Assistance; training military (US and foreign) and civilian (USG, foreign, and U.S. contractor) personnel for assignments in security assistance management positions, and managing the credit and financing aspects of Security Assistance. In 1998, the DSCA was tasked to administer the USD(P) security cooperation programs of humanitarian mine actions, humanitarian assistance, Warsaw Initiatives, and the Department of Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).¹³

The US Department of State manages several Security Assistance programs; two of the most important programs that are operating in Kazakhstan

¹² Defense Link, “Defense Threat Reduction Agency”; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/DTRA.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2008.

¹³ *The Management of Security Assistance*, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (US Department of Defense, 2001), pp. 3-12.

are the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS):

“This program is a US Government interagency program, managed by the Department of State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, designed to help prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their missile delivery systems, conventional weapons, and related items by assisting foreign governments to establish and implement effective export control systems that meet international standards.”¹⁴

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

(INL): “Within the Department of State, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) designs and carries out international counternarcotics policy and programs, while advising and coordinating other U.S. agencies' overseas anti-drug activities. INL provides aid and training to the governments and security forces of countries in which drugs are produced or transported. INL's program combines economic and security assistance, aiding civilian and military agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities. Types of aid include training, technical assistance, equipment and arms transfers, development assistance (particularly "alternative development" aid to encourage cultivation of legal crops), and aid to administration of justice and domestic drug demand-

¹⁴ Exportcontrol.org, “The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program”; available from <http://www.exportcontrol.org/index.php/pagetype/htmlpage/id/1371.html>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2008.

reduction programs. State Department INL officials may manage assistance programs, or INL funds may be transferred to other government agencies like US Agency for International Development or the Drug Enforcement Administration.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Just the Facts:, “The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)”;
available from <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/inl.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2008.

United States Government Organizations for Security Assistance¹⁶




Figure 2.

Due to the many organizations working on Security Assistance issues in the Embassy, sometimes responsibilities of the various organization overlap. In order to promote a unified front in US Security Assistance policy all activities are

¹⁶ *The Management of Security Assistance*, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (US Department of Defense, 2001), pp. 3-3.

discussed in frequent “country team” meetings. Often programs managed by different departments (DoS and DoD) will work closely on projects of mutual interest. These meetings also ensure the Ambassador, and other organizations in the embassy, are aware of each other’s efforts, and these efforts are in furtherance of the US’s overall policy. The Ambassador is the ultimate authority on all US government matters in the host country.

Russian structure of Security Assistance

During the era of the cold war, Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC) was used as a political/ideological tool to promote Soviet foreign policy, but the collapse of the Soviet/Russian economy caused a fundamental shift in the reasoning that the Soviets/ Russians provide Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC). The transition from communism to capitalism and a heavy drop in domestic arms sales would require major changes in Russian national security doctrine to keep the bloated Russian Military Industrial Complex afloat, and acquire the necessary capital to develop the next generation of weapons. These changes would come in the form of MTC agreements being made more for financial rather than foreign policy reasons.¹⁷ The Russian economy has improved substantially since the 1990’s and foreign policy motivations are again becoming more of a factor in Russian MTC agreements, but financial motivations are still the dominant factor.

¹⁷ Igor Khripunov, “The Politics and Economics of Russia’s Conventional Arms Transfers,” *Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 132-133

The Russian legislative/executive order for MTC is contained in Federal Law 114-FZ "On the Military and Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States," dated July 19, 1998; the Russian President's Decree 1953 "Issues of the Military and Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States," dated December 1, 2000; and "The Concept of State Policy in the Field of the Military and Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States Until 2010," approved by the Russian president in July 2001. On September 10, 2005, President Vladimir Putin signed Decree 1062, Issues of Military-Technical Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Foreign Countries.¹⁸

The turmoil following the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a multitude of entities in the Military Industrial Complex, Federal government, and Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to engage in the technology transfer aspect of Military-Technical Cooperation. Soon after former Russian President Putin's assumption of office he began to consolidate control of the instruments of Russian Military-Technical Cooperation.

The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC):

The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation was formed from the Foreign Military-Technology Cooperation Committee (KVTS) by the 2004 Presidential Decree "Issues pertaining to the Federal Service for Military-

¹⁸ "Military and Technical Cooperation as a Factor in the Growth of Russian Influence," *Russian Military Review*, No. 6, June 2004, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=6514773>>, accessed 24 October 2008.

Technical Cooperation." The FSVTS is the lead Russian agency responsible for implementing government policies (licensing) regarding Security Assistance arms transfers.¹⁹ "The FSVTS analyzes global arms-market development trends, charts conceptual approaches toward boosting the efficiency of military-technical co-operation and drafts new laws."²⁰ The service works closely with Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry and other departments.

Rosoboronexport: In 2000 President Putin made several decrees that merged three competing arms exporting companies (Promexport, Rosoboronexport, and Rosvooruzhenie) into Rosoboronexport, a federally controlled joint-stock company. In January 2007, Rosoboronexport was granted exclusive rights to export complete military (tanks, planes, etc.) items. Until this point only certain companies, usually in the aircraft industry, were allowed to sell end-use (complete) military items directly to foreign governments. Rosoboronexport currently accounts for 80-90% of Russian arms exports, the remaining percentage resulting from direct industry to foreign government sales of non end-use items (parts).²¹

¹⁹ V. V. Menshchikov, "The Legal Questions of Military-Technical Policy," *Military Thought*, No.004 Vol.15, 2006, pp. 77-81, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=11315221>>, accessed 24 October 2008.

The Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation available from <<http://www.fsvts.gov.ru>>, accessed 6 December 2008.

²⁰ Boris Obnosov "Military Industrial Complex Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation turns Five," *Military Diplomat*, No. 5, 2005, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=8817457>>, accessed 24 October 2008.

²¹ "Military-Technical Rearrangement," *Kommersant*, 12 February 2008, available from <<http://Kommersant.com>>, accessed 9 November 2008.

Military-Industrial Commission: In March of 2006, President Putin established the Military-Industrial Commission. “The commission is tasked to implement state policy in military-industrial matters and for military-technical support of national defense, law-enforcement activities and national security.” The Military-Industrial Commission is headed by the Minister of Defense, and its directives are binding on Russian Federation government institutions. In 2006, soon after the commission’s formation, Rosoboronexport was placed under its control. The organization puts both the Defense Ministry and Military-Industrial Complex under one administrative body, a feat never accomplished in the Soviet era.²²

Vneshtorgbank: Vneshtorgbank is a state owned bank responsible for the financial aspects of MTC. These responsibilities include providing financing to industries within the Russian Military-Industrial Complex, and servicing loans to foreign states for arms purchases. Vneshtorgbank works closely with the Ministry of Defense, Rosoboronexport, the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, the Federal Agency for Industry, and the Russian Military-Industrial Complex.²³

Ministry of Defense: The International Cooperation Directorate of the Defense Ministry of Russia implements Russian Military Technical

²² Anatoliy Antipov, “VPK Is Prescribed for the Defense Establishment,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25 March 2006, available from <<http://www.redstar.ru>>, accessed 9 November 2008. Mikhail Krasnov, "Sergey Ivanov Received Commission," *Gazeta.ru*, 28 March 2006, available from <http://gazeta.ru/>, accessed 9 November 2008.

²³ “Military-Technical Cooperation a Priority of Vneshtorgbank,” *Military Diplomat*, 30 April 2006, No. 002, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=9682509>>, accessed 24 October 2008.

Cooperation/Security Assistance programs for the Russian Ministry of Defense. According to Colonel General Anatoly Mazurkevich, Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Defense's goal regarding Security Assistance are "meeting Russia's long-term strategic interests and guaranteeing its military presence in different CIS regions, stability on our external borders, and elimination of threats to Russia's security." Furthermore, he indicates, "The principal goal is to consolidate the Russian military presence in CIS member- states and counter attempts to extend the long-term military presence of third countries."²⁴ See Figure 3, "Russian System of Security Assistance."²⁵

Comparison of US and Russian systems of Security Assistance

Both states have actively promoted the use of Security Assistance to achieve the same goals: develop alliances, promote interoperability (mutual doctrine), and support their respective Military-Industrial Complex. Due to these similar goals, the institutions of Security Assistance are also similar. Both states' Security Assistance programs have institutions to provide credit/financing, interact with their respective Military-Industrial Complex, and monitor export and licensing.

²⁴"Russian Federation Armed Forces International Ties Get Stronger," *Military Diplomat*, No. 2, 2004, available from Eastview [database on-line], <<http://dlib.eastview.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/sources/article.jsp?id=7790099>> accessed 24 October 2008.

²⁵ "Legal Framework for the Russian Arms Exports Moscow," *Moscow Defense Brief*, available from <<http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2001/ec/lfrae/>>, accessed 6 December 2008.

The greatest difference between US and Russian Security Assistance programs is the financial interest the state has in promoting Security Assistance. Although the US acknowledges its interest in promoting arms sales through domestic rather than foreign manufacturers, the US government has much less of a vested financial interest in promoting arms sales than the Russian government. The US government receives revenue from the purchase of excess defense articles, and benefits financially from the lower prices that are generated by economy of scale issues (allowing more revenue to be funneled into research and development). The US government does receive a 3% overhead fee on arms purchases that are brokered by the U.S. government (instead of the foreign nation purchasing directly from the manufacturer), but this fee often only covers expenses generated by the transaction. In short, the US government (not to be confused with the US defense industry) receives negligible financial benefits.

The Russian government is in a very different situation. The Russian government is a majority stakeholder in most entities dealing with Military-Technical Cooperation to include industries within the Military-Industrial Complex, Rosoboronexport (the joint-stock company chartered with arms exports), and Vneshtorgbank (the state controlled financial instrumentality of the Russian defense industry). The Russian arms industry is projected to generate over six billion dollars in revenue in 2008.²⁶ The majority of this generated revenue falls directly into state coffers or company coffers that are controlled by

²⁶ "Russian Arms Exports Through Rosoboronexport To Exceed \$6.2 Bln In 2008," *Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey*, 21 August 2008, available from <<http://www.militarynews.ru/>>, accessed 10 November 2008.

the state. Due to this situation and the fact that most, if not all, of Russian research and development funds come from external arms sales,²⁷ the Russian state has a much greater vested interest in promoting security assistance through arms sales than the US.²⁸

²⁷Stephen J. Blank, "Rosoboronexport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry," *Strategic Studies Institute*, January 2007, <<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>>, accessed 10 November 2008.

²⁸ Another difference between the two Security Assistance programs is the role of the president. In the US system, the president is the overall authority in charge of Security Assistance, but he has little direct involvement. The Russian system is much different. The Russian president actively directs Security Assistance, and often Russian presidential visits are accompanied with the signing of arms sales contracts. In short, the Russian president is much more actively involved in Security Assistance than his American counterpart.

Russian System of Security Assistance

